


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HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.

**COLONEL H. P. FORTY-THIRD REGIMENT, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH
ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.**

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1836.

TO

FIELD-MARSHAL

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

THIS History I dedicate to your Grace, because I have served long enough under your command to know, why the Soldiers of the Tenth Legion were attached to Cæsar.

W. F. P. NAPIER.

AMERICAN INTRODUCTION.

OF all the historical works which, during the present century, have issued from the British press, NAPIER'S PENINSULAR WAR is the most readable. Impartial criticism may award to SOUTHEY the palm for noble simplicity, exquisite purity of language, strangeness and immensity of bookish lore, and an art almost invisible, yet unrivalled, in the arrangement of his materials. It may allow TURNER a supremacy in antiquarian sagacity, an intimate acquaintance with the subsidiary information which reflects light on the character and manners of the periods embraced in his narratives, and the power of giving us glimpses into the inner frame work and secret movements of ancient society. It may eulogise HALLAM'S stern independence, masculine judgment and grave eloquence, and the frankness, candor and benevolence of MACKINTOSH. It may not attempt to disenchant the general taste from its deeply cherished admiration of LINGARD'S splendid diction, lively manner of developing his views and profound research, nor deny that his mind, though warped by temporary influences and narrow prejudices, is saturated and impregnated with every kind of historical information. NAPIER'S work has its own distinctive, individualizing physiognomy. Its excellence results from the writer's happy talent for impetuous, straight-forward, soul-stirring narrative and picturing forth of characters; for grappling his subject at once and setting it in sunshine. His genius is of the epic order. He never forgets narrating for the purpose of discoursing. The military manœuvre, march and fiery onset, the whole whirlwind vicissitudes of the desperate fight, he describes with dramatic force. His style has an animation which keeps the attention constantly awake, a descriptive richness which makes both manners and local scenery live before the imagination, and a condensation which makes every sentence teem with thought.

The story of the Peninsular War had already been told, not to mention a host of others, by SOUTHEY. His history displayed such a mastery over language, such a richness of allusion, such a brilliancy of illustration and ornament, gathered from every region under heaven, such a prodigious magazine of learning, such a skill in assimilating every substance to the subject on hand, such a vast reach and comprehension of view, and such picturesque and graphic narration, that it was generally believed it would hold its station unendangered by a rival or competitor. He adorned so chastely in addressing the imagination, he narrated so perspicuously for the intellect, and he described so affectingly to the heart, that the subject was by most supposed to be unapproachable by the future historian. With the conscious strength of the war-horse, NAPIER entered the lists, and it is praise enough to say that he has divided with his illustrious predecessor public opinion. He has proved that in the greatest crowds there is room enough for those who can reach it above their heads, and that no subject is exhausted except to barren mediocrity. In his hands no idea seems hackneyed or common place. Facts are not coinable, and he necessarily trod in the footsteps of others; but the turn of thought and manner of presenting it are his own; the attitude and drapery are peculiar to the master. It is not easy to contrast writers differing so widely as SOUTHEY and NAPIER. The former has more acquired knowledge. He draws his materials from a more extensive circumference of science, and probably has more art in bringing collateral matter to give life to the less interesting parts. NAPIER excels in directness, vigor and fervor, a union of simplicity and vehemence, which sweep along the feelings of the reader. SOUTHEY has more comprehension, NAPIER greater intensity. SOUTHEY may be the favorite of the learned, NAPIER will receive the suffrages of the people.

The political predilections of our author are of a liberal Americanized cast. Liberty he regards as a matter of natural right and not of pedigree. It is the immortal offspring of truth and reason. It has neither a Norman nor a Saxon ancestry, neither birth nor race, neither youth nor age. Merit he views not as a creature of adventitious circumstances, an appendage of honorary and political distinction, but as the product of mental power, the momentum of individual character. A reverence for antiquity does not blind him to the fact that a titled nobility are the progeny of feudal barbarism.

NAPIER was an actor in many of the scenes which he describes. In gathering materials for his history he also had access, not only to published documents and official papers, but to the unpublished memoranda of a number of the most distinguished British and French officers, who were engaged in the Peninsular campaigns.

His first volume has already reached a third edition, the second and third a second edition. At the appearance of each edition he has candidly weighed the criticisms which have been made on the book, and corrected whatever appeared to be faulty. The history may therefore for accuracy of information be pronounced unequalled.

He introduces us to an intimate acquaintance with the leading military and diplomatic characters of the time. NAPOLEON appears as he was, the wonder and the master spirit of the age, ranking among his contemporaries as Jupiter in the congress of the celestials.—A warrior who by intuition penetrated all the secrets of his art; original, daring and comprehensive in his plans, sudden and prompt in their execution.—A politician of far-reaching sagacity; skilful in masking his own designs and in unmasking those of others; every one of his movements producing a political convulsion, and victory apparently chained to his banner. In WELLINGTON we discover a worthy antagonist of this terrible conqueror.—A mind endowed with the elements of greatness brought into contact with events which roused them into action. He is not merely a thunderbolt of war but a leader who can multiply the energies of every man under his direction—his arm a fortress and his name a host. SIR JNO. MOORE, sprung from a race whose strong nerved yeomen twanged their bows at Bannockburn, shines as a star of the first magnitude in the galaxy of British generals. SOULT possesses almost every military quality in exquisite combination. NEY is what he was surnamed, the bravest of the brave, calm in the midst of a storm of grape shot, imperturbable amid a shower of balls and shells—none could with such energy rouse the masses of soldiers and precipitate them upon the enemy. MURAT, the handsome cavalier, is valiant and vain. Chivalry and the time of the crusades has not had a nobler representative. CHARLES THE 4TH is an embecile, and JOSEPH, the intrusive king, generous, amiable, convivial and unwarlike. GODOY we find faithless, supple, debauched, a mass of cowardice, and calculating selfishness. TALLEYRAND, a compound, a Proteus and Argus, eagle eyed and ever changing,—ecclesiastic, atheist, royalist, republican, Buonapartist and Bourbonist to suit the times.

The picture of Spain given in these volumes shews that its social and political state at the commencement of this struggle was most intricately evil. Its government was effete. Its palaces were filled with shameless and extravagant debaucheries. Its dungeons well furnished with racks and the abodes of forgotten despair. The patience of humanity which tolerated the control of its dotard king and his bevy of courtiers should excite a blush instead of eliciting approbation. Its patriotism was nothing more than a rancorous hatred of foreigners, and military science and spirit were almost extinct. The private history of its families made up to a great extent of divorces, separations, infamous intrigues, concubinage and libertinism. In the time of its caliphs the light of Arabian science beamed from the Peninsula over Western Christendom. After their expulsion its society appears to have made a retrograde movement. We believe there was one simple cause of this state of things—the rejection of the Reformation. This is the only great movement society has made in advance since the Christian era. Spain refused to move with it. She still retains her allegiance to the Papacy,—the most indefatigable, searching, multiform, and omnipresent tyranny which ever existed. Its swarms of ecclesiastics are traffickers in such inestimable wares as rags, bones, pebbles and splinters. Its holy office, at the time to which the history relates, hacked, ripped up and roasted the detested tribes of misbelievers. It breathed revenge and murder beat from its heart. Wherever the reformation prevailed it changed, modified, remodeled. The face of society became completely altered whilst nothing was destroyed. Liberty, an emancipation not from subjection to the gospel, but from the chains of super-

stitution was the result. The mind was projected, not into a limitless vacuum, its freedom was religious, limited by the Christian revelation. This liberty Spain would have enjoyed had she not rejected the reformation.

A sober reflecting mind will scarcely fail of finding in these volumes a powerful antidote to the *war spirit*. As the tide of war rolls over the Peninsula we see the most noxious and feculant materials upheaved from its long stagnant deeps. An outburst of the most fiendish passions ensued. Those ruffian spirits, who in seasons of the prevalence of order skulk in caverns, suddenly felt the barriers by which their depredations had been checked give way and their ranks filled up by the scum and dregs of the community, and rushed forth to glut their cannibal appetite for blood and to wallow in the abundance placed within their reach. The infection spread to previously peaceful citizens, and the elements of society were rapidly dissolved in confusion and bloodshed. Such were the demoralizing and unhumanizing effects of war on the public mind.

The war was not conducted with unusual ferocity. The belligerent powers were France and Great Britain, the only European nations who effectively support the cause of civilization. Yet how often are the marches of their squadrons traceable by smoking ruins and a blood-sodden desert! How often is their employment to wade through human blood, trample on human corpses and lay waste the fields and dwellings, the hopes and happiness of mankind! We envy not the insensate robustness which can, without strong revulsion contemplate such appalling scenes.

P R E F A C E .

FOR six years the Peninsula was devastated by the war of independence. The blood of France, Germany, England, Portugal, and Spain, was shed in the contest, and in each of those countries, authors, desirous of recording the sufferings, or celebrating the valour of their countrymen, have written largely touching that fierce struggle. It may, therefore, happen that some will demand, why I should again relate 'a thrice told tale?' I answer, that two men observing the same object, will describe it diversely, following the point of view from which either beholds it; that, which in the eyes of one is a fair prospect, to the other shall appear a barren waste, and yet neither may see aright! Wherefore, truth being the legitimate object of history, I hold it better that she should be sought for by many than by few, lest, for want of seekers, amongst the mists of prejudice, and the false lights of interest, she be lost altogether.

That much injustice has been done, and much justice left undone, by those authors who have hitherto written concerning this war, I can assert from personal knowledge of the facts. That I have been able to remedy this, without falling into similar errors, is more than I will venture to assume; but I have endeavoured to render as impartial an account of the campaigns in the Peninsula, as the feelings which must warp the judgment of a contemporary historian will permit. I was an eye-witness to many of the transactions that I relate; and a wide acquaintance with military men has enabled me to consult distinguished officers, both French and English, and to correct my own recollections and opinions by their superior knowledge.

Thus assisted, and thus encouraged to undertake the work, I offer it to the world with the less fear, because it contains original documents, which will suffice to give it interest, although it should have no other merit. Many of those documents I owe to the liberality of marshal Soult, who, disdaining national prejudices, with the confidence of a great mind, placed them at my disposal, without even a remark to check the freedom of my pen; I take this opportunity to declare that respect which I believe every British officer, who has had the honour to serve against him, feels for his military talents. By those talents the French cause in Spain was long upheld, and after the battle of Salamanca, if his counsel had been followed by the intrusive monarch, the fate of the war might have been changed.

Military operations are so dependent upon accidental circumstances, that, to justify censure, it should always be shown that an unsuccessful general has violated the received maxims and established principles of war. By that rule I have been guided, but, to preserve the narratives unbroken, my own observations are placed at the end of certain transactions of magnitude, where, their real source being known, they will pass for as much as they are worth, and no more: when they are not well supported by argument, I freely surrender them to the judgment of abler men.

Of those transactions, which, commencing with 'the secret treaty of Fontainebleau,' ended with 'the Assembly of Notables' at Bayonne, little is known, except through the exculpatory, and contradictory, publications of men interested to conceal the truth; and to me it appears, that the passions of the present generation must subside and the ultimate fate of Spain be known, before that part of the subject can be justly or usefully handled. I have, therefore, related no more of those political affairs than would suffice to introduce the military events that followed; neither have I treated largely of the disjointed and ineffectual operations of the native armies; for I cared not to swell my work with apocryphal matter, and neglected the thousand narrow winding currents of Spanish warfare, to follow that mighty English stream of battle, which burst the barriers of the Pyrenees, and left deep traces of its fury in the soil of France.

The Spaniards have boldly asserted, and the world has believed, that the deliverance of the Peninsula was the work of their hands; this assertion, so contrary to the truth, I combat; it is unjust to the fame of the British general, and injurious to the glory of the British arms. Military virtue is not the growth of a day, nor is there any nation so rich and populous, that, despising it, can rest secure. Now the imbecility of Charles IV., the vileness of Ferdinand, and the corruption of Godoy, were undoubtedly the proximate causes of the calamities that overwhelmed Spain; but the primary cause, that which belongs to history, was the despotism arising from the union of a superstitious court with a sanguinary priesthood; a despotism which, by repressing knowledge and contracting the public mind, sapped the foundation of all military as well as civil virtues, and prepared the way for in-

vasion. No foreign potentate would have attempted to steal into the fortresses of a great kingdom, if the prying eyes, and the thousand clamorous tongues belonging to a free press, had been ready to expose his projects, and a well-disciplined army present to avenge the insult; but Spain, being destitute of both, was first circumvented by the wiles, and then ravaged by the arms of Napoleon. She was deceived and fettered because the public voice was stifled; she was scourged and torn because her military institutions were decayed.

From the moment that an English force took the field, the Spaniards ceased to act as principals in a contest carried on in the heart of their country, and involving their existence as an independent nation. They were self-sufficient, and their pride was wounded by insult; they were superstitious, and their religious feelings were roused to fanatic fury by an all-powerful clergy who feared to lose their own rich endowments; but after the first burst of indignation the cause of independence created little enthusiasm. Horrible barbarities were exercised on all French soldiers thrown by sickness or the fortune of war into the power of the invaded, and a dreadful spirit of personal hatred was kept alive by the exactions and severe retaliations of the invaders, yet no great and general exertion to drive the latter from the soil was made, at least none was sustained with steadfast courage in the field. Manifestoes, decrees, and lofty boasts, like a cloud of canvas covering a rotten hull, made a gallant appearance, when real strength and firmness were nowhere to be found. The Spanish insurrection presented indeed a strange spectacle. Patriotism was seen supporting a vile system of government; a popular assembly working for the restoration of a despotic monarch; the higher classes seeking a foreign master; the lower armed in the cause of bigotry and misrule. The upstart leaders, secretly abhorring freedom, though governing in her name, trembled at the democratic activity they had themselves excited; they called forth all the bad passions of the multitude, and repressed the patriotism that would regenerate as well as save. The country suffered the evils, without enjoying the benefits, of a revolution; for while tumults and assassinations terrified or disgusted the sensible part of the community, a corrupt administration of the resources extinguished patriotism, and neglect ruined the armies. The peasant-soldier, usually flying at the first onset, threw away his arms and returned to his home, or, attracted by the license of the *partidas*, joined the banners of men, who, for the most part, originally robbers, were as oppressive to the people as the enemy; and these *guerilla* chiefs would, in their turn, have been as quickly exterminated, had not the French, pressed by lord Wellington's battalions, been obliged to keep in large masses; this was the secret of Spanish constancy. It was the copious supplies from England, and the valour of the Anglo-Portuguese troops, that supported the war, and it was the gigantic vigour with which the duke of Wellington resisted the fierceness of France, and sustained the weakness of three inefficient cabinets, that delivered the Peninsula. Faults he committed, and who in war has not? yet shall his reputation stand upon a sure foundation, a simple majestic structure, that envy cannot undermine, nor the meretricious ornaments of party panegyric deform. The exploits of his army were great in themselves, great in their consequences, abounding with signal examples of heroic courage and devoted zeal. They should neither be disfigured nor forgotten, being worthy of more fame than the world has yet accorded them—worthy also of a better historian.

NOTICE.

Of the manuscript authorities consulted for this history, those marked with the letter S. the author owes to the kindness of marshal Soult.

For the notes dictated by Napoleon, and the plans of campaign sketched out by king Joseph, he is indebted to his grace the duke of Wellington.

The returns of the French army were extracted from the original half-monthly statements presented by marshal Berthier to the emperor Napoleon.

Of the other authorities it is unnecessary to say more, than that the author had access to the original papers, with the exception of Dupont's Memoir, of which a copy only was obtained.

HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE hostility of the European aristocracy caused the enthusiasm of republican France to take a military direction, and forced that powerful nation into a course of policy which, however outrageous it might appear, was in reality one of necessity. Up to the treaty of Tilsit, the wars of France were essentially defensive,—for the bloody contest that wasted the continent so many years, was not a struggle for preeminence between ambitious powers, not a dispute for some accession of territory, nor for the political ascendancy of one or other nation, but a deadly conflict, to determine whether aristocracy or democracy should predominate, whether equality or privilege should henceforth be the principle of European governments.

The French Revolution was pushed into existence before the hour of its natural birth. The power of the aristocratic principle was too vigorous and too much identified with that of the monarchical principle, to be successfully resisted by a virtuous democratic effort, much less could it be overthrown by a democracy rioting in innocent blood, and menacing destruction to political and religious establishments, the growth of centuries, somewhat decayed indeed, yet scarcely showing their grey hairs. The first military events of the Revolution, the disaffection of Toulon and Lyons, the civil war of La Vendee, the feeble, although successful resistance made to the duke of Brunswick's invasion, and the frequent and violent change of rulers whose fall none regretted, were all proofs that the French revolution, intrinsically too feeble to sustain the physical and moral force pressing it down, was fast sinking, when the wonderful genius of Napoleon, baffling all reasonable calculation, raised and fixed it on the basis of victory, the only one capable of supporting the crude production.

Nevertheless that great man knew the cause he upheld was not sufficiently in unison with the feelings of the age, and his first care was to disarm, or neutralize, monarchical and sacerdotal enmity, by restoring a church establishment, and by becoming a monarch himself. Once a sovereign, his vigorous character,

his pursuits, his talents, and the critical nature of the times, inevitably rendered him a despotic one; yet while he sacrificed political liberty, which to the great bulk of mankind has never been more than a pleasing sound, he cherished with the utmost care equality, a sensible good that produces increasing satisfaction as it descends in the scale of society. But this, the real principle of his government and secret of his popularity, made him the people's monarch, not the sovereign of the aristocracy, and hence, Mr. Pitt called him 'the child and the champion of democracy,' a truth as evident as that Mr. Pitt and his successors were the children and the champions of aristocracy: hence also the privileged classes of Europe consistently transferred their natural and implacable hatred of the French revolution to his person; for they saw, that in him innovation had found a protector, that he alone having given preeminence to a system so hateful to them, was really what he called himself, 'the State.'

The treaty of Tilsit, therefore, although it placed Napoleon in a commanding situation with regard to the potentates of Europe, unmasked the real nature of the war, and brought him and England, the respective champions of equality and privilege, into more direct contact; peace could not be between them while both were strong, and all that the French emperor had hitherto gained, only enabled him to choose his future field of battle.

When the catastrophe of Trafalgar forbade him to think of invading England, his fertile genius had conceived the plan of sapping her naval and commercial strength by depriving her of the markets for her manufactured goods, that is, he prohibited the reception of English wares in any part of the continent, and exacted from allies and dependants the most rigid compliance with his orders; but this 'continental system,' as it was called, became inoperative when French troops were not present to enforce his commands; it was thus in Portugal, where British influence was really paramount, although the terror inspired by the French arms seemed at times to render it doubtful. Fear is however momentary, while self-interest is lasting, and Portugal was but an ungarded province of England; from thence

and from Gibraltar, English goods freely passed into Spain. To check this traffic by force was not easy, and otherwise impossible.

Spain stood nearly in the same position with regard to France that Portugal did to England; a warm feeling of friendship for the enemy of Great Britain,* was the natural consequence of the unjust seizure of the Spanish frigates in a time of peace; but although this rendered the French cause popular in Spain, and the court of Madrid was from weakness subservient to the French Emperor, nothing could induce the people to refrain from a profitable contraband trade; they would not pay that respect to the wishes of a foreign power, which they refused to the regulations of their own government. Neither was the aristocratical enmity to Napoleon asleep in Spain. A proclamation issued by the Prince of Peace previous to the battle of Jena, although hastily recalled when the result of that conflict was known, sufficiently indicated the tenure upon which the friendship of the Spanish court was held.

This state of affairs drew the French Emperor's attention towards the Peninsula, and a chain of remarkable circumstances, which fixed it there, induced him to remove the reigning family, and place his brother Joseph on the throne of Spain.† He thought that the people of that country, sick of an effete government, would be quiescent under such a change; and although it should prove otherwise, the confidence he reposed in his own fortune, unrivalled talents, and vast power, made him disregard the consequences, while the cravings of his military and political system, the danger to be apprehended from the vicinity of a Bourbon dynasty, and above all the temptations offered by a miraculous folly which outrun even his desires, urged him to a deed, that well accepted by the people of the Peninsula, would have proved beneficial, but being enforced contrary to their wishes, was unhallowed either by justice or benevolence.

In an evil hour, for his own greatness and the happiness of others, he commenced this fatal project. Founded in violence, and executed with fraud, it spread desolation through the fairest portions of the Peninsula, was calamitous to France, destructive to himself; and the conflict between his hardy veterans and the vindictive race he insulted, assumed a character of unmitigated ferocity disgraceful to human nature,—for the Spaniards did not fail to defend their just cause with hereditary cruelty, while the French army struck a terrible balance of barbarous actions. Napoleon observed with surprise the unexpected energy of the people, and therefore bent his whole force to the attainment of his object, while England coming to the assistance of the Peninsula employed all her resources to frustrate his efforts. Thus the two leading nations of the world were brought into contact at a moment when both were disturbed by angry passions, eager for great events, and possessed of surprising power.

The extent and population of the French empire, including the kingdom of Italy, the confederation of the Rhine, the Swiss Cantons, the Duchy of Warsaw, and the dependant states of Holland and Naples, enabled Buonaparte, through the medium of the conscription, to array an army, in number nearly equal to the great host that followed the Persian of Old against Greece; like that multitude also, his troops were gathered from many nations, but they were trained in a Roman discipline, and ruled by a Carthaginian genius. Count Mathieu Dumas, in a work that, with unrivalled simplicity and elegance, tells the military story of the world for ten years, has shown, how vigorous and well-contrived was the organization of Napoleon's army; the French Officers, accustomed to victory, were as bold

and enterprising, as the troops they led were hardy and resolute, and to this power at land, the Emperor joined a formidable marine.* The ships of France were, indeed, chained in her harbours, but her naval strength was only rebuked, not destroyed. Inexhaustible resources for building, vast establishments, a coast line of many thousand miles, and, above all, the creative genius of Napoleon, were fast nursing up a navy, the efficiency of which, the war then impending between Great Britain and the United States promised to aid.‡ Maritime commerce was certainly fainting in France,‡ but her internal and continental traffic was robust, her manufactures were rapidly improving, her debt small, her financial operations conducted on a prudent plan and with exact economy, the supplies were all raised within the year without any great pressure from taxation, and from a sound metallic currency.¶ Thus there seemed no reason to think that Napoleon could fail of bringing any war to a favourable termination. By a happy combination of vigour and flattery, of order, discipline, and moral excitement, admirably adapted to the genius of his people, he had created a power which appeared resistless; and in truth would have been so if applied to only one great object at a time, but this the ambition of the man, or rather the force of circumstances, did not permit.

On the other hand, England, omnipotent at sea, was little regarded as a military power. Her enormous debt was yearly increasing in an accelerated ratio, and this necessary consequence of anticipating the resources of the country and dealing in a factitious currency, was fast eating into the vital strength of the state: for although the merchants and great manufacturers were thriving from the accidental circumstances of the times, the labourers were suffering and degenerating in character; pauperism, and its sure attendant crime, were spreading over the land, and the population was fast splitting into distinct classes,—the one rich and arbitrary, the other poor and discontented, the former composed of those who profited, the latter of those who suffered by the war. Of Ireland it is unnecessary to speak; her wrongs and her misery, peculiar and unparalleled, are too well known, and too little regarded, to call for remark.

This general comparative statement, so favourable to France, would, however, be a false criterion of the relative strength of the belligerents, with regard to the approaching struggle in the Peninsula. A cause manifestly unjust is a heavy weight upon the operations of a general; it reconciles men to desertion—it sanctifies want of zeal and is a pretext for cowardice; it renders hardships more irksome, dangers more obnoxious, and glory less satisfactory to the mind of the soldier. Now the invasion of the Peninsula, whatever might have been its real origin, was an act of violence on the part of Napoleon repugnant to the feelings of mankind; the French armies were burthened with a sense of its iniquity, the British troops exhilarated by a contrary sentiment. All the continental nations had smarted under the sword of Napoleon, but with the exception of Prussia, none were crushed; a common feeling of humiliation, the hope of revenge, and the ready subsidies of England, were bonds of union among their governments stronger than the most solemn treaties. France could only calculate on their fears, England was secure in their self-love.

The hatred to what were called French principles was at this period in full activity. The privileged classes of every country hated Napoleon, because his genius had given stability to the institutions that grew

* *Exposé de l'Empire*, 1807-8-9-13.

† *Napoleon's Memoirs*, Las Casas, 7th part. Lord Collingwood's letters.

‡ *Exposé 1808-9*. Napoleon, in *Las Casas*, vol. ii. 4th part.

¶ *Ibid.* 6th part.

* *Monsieur de Champagny's Report*, 21st Oct. 1807.

† *Napoleon in Las Casas*, vol. ii. 4th part.

out of the revolution, because his victories had baffled their calculations, and shaken their hold of power. As the chief of revolutionary France, he was constrained to continue his career until the final accomplishment of her destiny,—and this necessity, overlooked by the great bulk of mankind, afforded plausible ground for imputing insatiable ambition to the French government and to the French nation, of which ample use was made. Rapacity, insolence, injustice, cruelty, even cowardice, were said to be inseparable from the character of a Frenchman, and, as if such vices were nowhere else to be found, it was more than insinuated that all the enemies of France were inherently virtuous and disinterested. Unhappily, history is but a record of crimes, and it is not wonderful that the arrogance of men, buoyed up by a spring-tide of military glory, should, as well among allies, as among vanquished enemies, have produced sufficient disgust, to insure a ready belief of any accusation however false and absurd.

Napoleon was the contriver and the sole support of a political system that required time and victory to consolidate; he was the connecting link, between the new interests of mankind and what of the old were left in a state of vigour, he held them together strongly, but he was no favourite with either, and consequently in danger from both; his power, unsanctified by time, depended not less upon delicate management than upon vigorous exercise; he had to fix the foundations of, as well as to defend, an empire, and he may be said to have been rather peremptory than despotic; there were points of administration with which he durst not meddle even wisely, much less arbitrarily. Customs, prejudices, and the dregs of the revolutionary license, interfered to render his policy complicated and difficult, but it was not so with his inveterate adversaries. The delusion of parliamentary representation enabled the English government safely to exercise an unlimited power over the persons and the property of the nation, and, through the influence of an active and corrupt press it exercised nearly the same power over the public mind. The commerce of England, penetrating, as it were, into every house on the face of the globe, supplied a thousand sources of intelligence,—the spirit of traffic, which seldom acknowledges the ties of country, was universally on the side of Great Britain, and those twin-curses, paper-money and public credit, so truly described as 'strength in the beginning, but weakness in the end,' were recklessly used by statesmen, whose policy regarded not the interests of posterity. Such were the adventitious causes of England's power, and her natural, legitimate resources, were many and great. If any credit is to be given to the census, the increasing population of the United Kingdom amounted at this period to nearly twenty millions, and France reckoned but twenty-seven millions when Frederick the Great declared that, if he were her king, 'not a gun should be fired in Europe without his leave.'

The French army was undoubtedly very formidable from numbers, discipline, skill, and bravery; but, contrary to the general opinion, the British army was inferior to it in none of these points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because a national army will always bear a sterner code than a mixed force will suffer. Amongst the latter, military crimes may be punished, but moral crimes can hardly be repressed; men will submit to death for a breach of great regulations which they know by experience to be useful, but the constant restraint of petty, though wholesome rules, they will escape from by desertion, or resist by mutiny, when the ties of custom and country are removed; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches not to them, but to the nation under whose colours they serve. Great indeed is that genius that can keep men of differ-

ent nations firm to their colours, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same time. Napoleon's military system was, from this cause, inferior to the British, which, if it be purely administered, combines the solidity of the Germans with the rapidity of the French, excluding the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of the other; yet, before the campaign in the Peninsula had proved its excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly under-rated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given to the French, but the individual soldier was most falsely stigmatized as deficient in intelligence and activity, the officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a French army, even for a single campaign, considered chimerical.

The English are a people very subject to receive, and to cherish false impressions; proud of their credulity as if it were a virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt for the British soldiery had been long entertained, before the ill-success of the expeditions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the general prejudice. The true cause of those failures was not traced, and the excellent discipline afterwards introduced and perfected by the duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad, was, in 1803, scorned as a military power, when she possessed, without a frontier to swallow up large armies in expensive fortresses, at least two hundred thousand of the best equipped and best disciplined soldiers in the universe,* together with an immense recruiting establishment; and through the medium of the militia, the power of drawing upon the population without limit. It is true that of this number many were necessarily employed in the defence of the colonies, but enough remained to compose a disposable force greater than that with which Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz, and double that with which he conquered Italy. In all the materials of war, the superior ingenuity and skill of the English mechanics were visible, and that intellectual power which distinguishes Great Britain amongst the nations, in science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in the hour of danger.

CHAPTER II.

Dissensions in the Spanish court—Secret treaty and convention of Fontainebleau—Junot's army enters Spain—Dupont's and Monecy's corps enter Spain—Duhesme's corps enters Catalonia—Insurrection of Aranjuez and Madrid—Charles the Fourth abdicates—Ferdinand proclaimed king—Murat marches to Madrid—Refuses to recognize Ferdinand as king—The sword of Francis the First delivered to the French general—Savary arrives at Madrid—Ferdinand goes to Bayonne—The fortresses of St. Sebastian, Figueras, Pampeluna, and Barcelona, treacherously seized by the French—Riot at Toledo 23d of April, Tumult at Madrid 2d May, Charles the Fourth abdicates a second time in favour of Napoleon—Assembly of the Notables at Bayonne—Joseph Buonaparte declared king of Spain—Arrives at Madrid.

For many years antecedent to the French invasion, the royal family of Spain were distracted with domestic quarrels; the son's hand was against his mother, the father's against his son, and the court was a scene of continual broils, under cover of which artful men, as is usual in such cases, pushed their own interest forward, while they seemed to act only for the sake of the party whose cause they espoused. Charles IV. attributed this unhappy state of his house to the intrigues

* See Abstract of the military force of Great Britain in 1803.

of his sister-in-law, the queen of the Two Sicilies ;* he himself, a weak and inefficient old man, was governed by his wife, and she again by don Manuel Godoy,† of whose person it is said she was enamoured even to folly. From the rank of a simple gentleman of the royal guards, this person had been raised to the highest dignities, and the title of Prince of the Peace was conferred upon him: whose name must be for ever connected with one of the bloodiest wars that fill the page of history.

Ferdinand, prince of the Asturias, hated this favourite, and the miserable death of his young wife, his own youth, and apparently forlorn condition, created such an interest in his favour, that the people partook of his feelings ; thus the disunion of the royal family extending its effects beyond the precincts of the court, involved the nation in ruin. Those who know how Spaniards hate will comprehend why Godoy, who, though sensual, was a mild, good-natured man, has been so overloaded with imprecations, as if he, and he alone, had been the cause of the disasters in Spain. It was not so. The canon, Escoiquiz, a subtle politician, who appears to have been the chief of Ferdinand's party,‡ finding the influence of the Prince of the Peace too strong, looked for support in a powerful quarter, and under his tuition, Ferdinand wrote upon the 11th of October, 1807, to the emperor Napoleon.¶ In this letter he complained of the influence which bad men had obtained over his father, prayed for the interference of the 'hero destined by Providence,' so run the text, 'to save Europe and to support thrones ;' asked an alliance by marriage with the Buonaparte family, and finally desired that his communication might be kept secret from his father, lest it should be taken as a proof of disrespect. He received no answer, and fresh matter of quarrel being found by his enemies at home, he was placed in arrest, and upon the 29th of October, Charles denounced him to the emperor as guilty of treason, and of having projected the assassination of his own mother. Napoleon caught eagerly at this pretext for interfering in the domestic policy of Spain,—and thus the honour and independence of a great people were placed in jeopardy, by the squabbles of two of the most worthless persons.

Some short time before this, Godoy, either instigated by an ambition to found a dynasty, or fearing that the death of the king would expose him to the vengeance of Ferdinand, had made proposals to the French court to concert a plan for the conquest and division of Portugal, promising the assistance of Spain, on condition that a principality for himself should be set apart from the spoil. Such is the turn given by Napoleon to this affair. But the article which provided an indemnification for the king of Etruria, a minor, who had just been obliged to surrender his Italian dominions to France, renders it doubtful if the first offer came from Godoy, and Napoleon eagerly adopted the project if he did not propose it. The advantages were all on his side. Under the pretext of supporting his army in Portugal, he might fill Spain with his troops ; the dispute between the father and the son, now referred to his arbitration, placed the golden apples within his reach, and he resolved to gather the fruit if he had not planted the tree.

A secret treaty was immediately concluded at Fontainebleau, between marshal Duroc on the part of France, and Eugenio Izquierdo on the part of Spain. This treaty, together with a convention dependant on it, was signed the 27th, and ratified by Napoleon on the 29th of October, the contracting parties agreeing on the following conditions.

The house of Braganza to be driven forth of Portugal, and that kingdom divided into three portions. The province of Entre Minho e Duero, including the town of Oporto, to be called the kingdom of North Lusitania, and given as an indemnification to the dispossessed sovereign of Etruria.

The Alemtejo and the Algarves to be erected into a principality for Godoy, who, taking the title of prince of the Algarves, was still to be in some respects dependant upon the Spanish crown.

The central provinces of Estremadura, Beira, and the Tras os Montes, together with the town of Lisbon, to be held in deposit until a general peace, and then to be exchanged under certain conditions for English conquests.

The ultramarine dominions of the exiled family to be equally divided between the contracting parties, and in three years at the longest, the king of Spain to be gratified with the title of Emperor of the two Americas. Thus much for the treaty. The terms of the convention were :

France to employ 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. Spain 24,000 infantry, 30 guns, and 3,000 cavalry.

The French contingent to be joined at Alcantara by the Spanish cavalry, artillery, and one-third of the infantry, and from thence to march to Lisbon. Of the remaining Spanish infantry, 10,000 were to take possession of the Entre Minho e Duero and Oporto, and 6,000 were to invade Estremadura and the Algarves. In the mean time a reserve of 40,000 men was to be assembled at Bayonne, ready to take the field by the 20th of November, if England should interfere, or the Portuguese people resist.

If the king of Spain or any of his family joined the troops, the chief command to be vested in the person so joining, but, with that exception, the French general to be obeyed whenever the armies of the two nations came into contact, and during the march through Spain, the French soldiers were to be fed by that country, and paid by their own government.

The revenues of the conquered provinces to be administered by the general actually in possession, and for the benefit of the nation in whose name the province was held.

Although it is evident, that this treaty and convention favoured Napoleon's ulterior operations in Spain, by enabling him to mask his views, and introduce large bodies of men into that country without creating much suspicion, it does not follow, as some authors have asserted, that they were contrived by the emperor for the sole purpose of rendering the Spanish royal family odious to the world, and by this far-fetched expedient, to prevent other nations from taking an interest in their fate, when he should find it convenient to apply the same measure of injustice to his associate, that they had accorded to the family of Braganza. To say nothing of the weakness of such a policy, founded, as it must be, on the error, that governments acknowledge the dictates of justice at the expense of their supposed interests, it must be observed that Portugal was intrinsically a great object. History does not speak of the time when the inhabitants of that country were deficient in spirit, the natural obstacles to an invasion had more than once frustrated the efforts of large armies, and the long line of communication between Bayonne and the Portuguese frontier, could only be supported by Spanish co-operation. Add to this, the facility with which England could, and the probability that she would, succour her ancient ally, and the reasonable conclusion is, that Napoleon's first intentions were in accordance with the literal meaning of the treaty of Fontainebleau, his subsequent proceedings being the result of new projects, conceived, as the wondrous imbecility of the Spanish Bourbons became manifest.*

* Nellerto. The anagram of Llorente.

† Vide Doblado's Letters.

‡ Napoleon in Las Casas.

¶ Nellerto.

* Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii.

Again, the convention provided for the organization of a large Spanish force, to be stationed in the north and south of Portugal, that is, in precisely the two places from whence they could most readily march to the assistance of their country, if it was invaded. In fact the division of the marquis of Solano in the south, and that of general Taranco in the north of Portugal, did, when the Spanish insurrection broke out, (Nov. 1807,) form the strength of the Andalusian and Gallician armies, the former of which gained the victory at Baylen, while the latter contended for it, although ineffectually, at Rio Seco.

The French force, destined to invade Portugal, was already assembled at Bayonne, under the title of the "First army of the Garonne," and actually entered Spain before the treaty was signed. It was commanded by general Junot, a young man of a bold, ambitious disposition, but of greater reputation for military talent than he was able to support; and his soldiers, principally conscripts, were ill fitted to endure the hardships which awaited them. At first by easy marches, and in small divisions, he led his troops through Spain, but the inhabitants, either from a latent fear of what was to follow, or from a dislike of foreigners common to all secluded people, were not friendly.* When the head of the columns reached Salamanca, the general halted, intending to complete the organization of his troops in that rich country, and there to await the most favourable moment for penetrating the sterile frontier which guarded his destined prey; but political events marched faster than his calculations, and fresh instructions from the emperor prescribed an immediate advance upon Lisbon; Junot obeyed, and the family of Braganza, at his approach, fled to the Brazils. The series of interesting transactions which attended this invasion will be treated of hereafter, at present, I must return to Spain, now bending to the first gusts of that hurricane, which soon swept over her with destructive violence.

The accusation of treason and intended parricide, preferred by Charles IV. against his son Ferdinand, (Dec. 1807,) gave rise to some judicial proceedings, which ended in the submission of the prince, who being absolved of the imputed crime, wrote a letter to his father and mother, acknowledging his own fault, but accusing the persons in his confidence, of being the instigators of deeds which he himself abhorred.† The intrigues of his advisers, however, continued, and the plans of Napoleon advanced as a necessary consequence of the divisions in the Spanish court.

By the terms of the convention of Fontainebleau, forty thousand men were to be held in reserve at Bayonne; but a greater number were assembled on different points of the frontier, and in the course of December, two corps had entered the Spanish territory, and were quartered in Vittoria, Miranda, Briviesca, and the neighbourhood. The one commanded by general Dupont, was called the second army of observation of the 'Gironde.' The other, commanded by marshal Moncey, took the title of the army of observation of the 'Cote d'Ocean.' In the gross, they amounted to fifty-three thousand men, of which above forty thousand were fit for duty;‡ and in the course of the month of December, Dupont advanced to Valladolid, while a reinforcement for Junot, four thousand seven hundred in number, took up their quarters at Salamanca. It thus appeared as if the French troops were quietly following the natural line of communication between France and Portugal; but in reality, Dupont, and Moncey's positions cut off the capital from all intercourse with the northern provinces, and secured the direct road from

Bayonne to Madrid.* Small divisions under different pretexts continually reinforced these two bodies, and through the Eastern Pyrenees twelve thousand men, commanded by general Duhesme, penetrated into Catalonia, and established themselves in Barcelona.

In the mean time the dispute between the king (March 1808,) and his son, or rather between the Prince of the Peace and the advisers of Ferdinand, was brought to a crisis by insurrections at Aranjuez and Madrid, which took place upon the 17th, 18th, and 19th of March, 1808. The old king, deceived by intrigues, or frightened at the difficulties which surrounded him, had determined, as it is supposed by some, to quit Spain, and take refuge in his American dominions, and preparations were made for a flight to Seville, when the prince's grooms commenced a tumult, in which the populace of Aranjuez soon joined, and were only pacified by the assurance that no journey was in contemplation.

Upon the 18th, the people of Madrid, following the example of Aranjuez, sacked the house of the obnoxious Manuel Godoy, and upon the 19th the riots having recommenced at Aranjuez, that minister secreted himself, but his retreat being discovered, he was maltreated, and on the point of being killed, when the soldiers of the royal guard rescued him. Charles IV., terrified by the violent proceedings of his subjects, had abdicated the day before, and this event being proclaimed at Madrid on the 20th, Ferdinand was declared king, to the great joy of the nation at large: little did the people know what they rejoiced at, and time has since taught them that the fable of the frogs demanding a monarch had its meaning.

During these transactions, (March 1808,) Murat, grand duke of Berg, who had taken the command of all the French troops in Spain, quitted his quarters at Aranda de Duero, passed the Somosierra, and entered Madrid the 23d, with Moncey's corps and a fine body of cavalry; Dupont at the same time, deviating from the road to Portugal, crossed the Duero, and occupied Segovia, the Escorial, and Aranjuez. Ferdinand who arrived at Madrid on the 24th, was not recognised by Murat as king; nevertheless, at the demand of his powerful guest, he delivered to him the sword of Francis I. with much ceremony. Meanwhile Charles protested to Murat that his abdication had been forced, and also wrote to Napoleon in the same strain. This state of affairs being unexpected by the emperor, he sent general Savary to conduct his plans, which appear to have been considerably deranged by the vehemence of the people, and the precipitation with which Murat had seized the capital.† But previous to Savary's arrival, Don Carlos, the brother of Ferdinand, departed from Madrid, hoping to meet the emperor Napoleon, whose presence in that city was confidently expected; and upon the 10th of April, Ferdinand, having first appointed a supreme junta, of which his uncle, Don Antonio, was named president and Murat a member, commenced his own remarkable journey to Bayonne. The true causes of this measure have not yet been developed; perhaps, when they shall be known, some petty personal intrigue, may be found to have had a greater influence than the grand machinations attributed to Napoleon, who could not have anticipated, much less have calculated, a great political scheme upon such a surprising example of weakness.

The people everywhere manifested their anger at this journey; in Vittoria they cut the traces of Ferdinand's carriage, and at different times several gallant men offered, at the risk of their lives, to carry him off by sea, in defiance of the French troops quartered along the

* Thiebault, Exp. du Portugal.

† N. Ilterio. Historia de la Guerra contra Nap.

‡ Return of the French army. Appendix. Journal of Dupont's Operations MSS.

* Notes of Napoleon, found in the port folio of king Joseph at the battle of Vittoria.

† Napoleon in Las Casas.

road. Unmoved by their entreaties and zeal, and regardless of the warning contained in a letter that he received at this period from Napoleon, (who, withholding the title of majesty, sharply reproved him for his past conduct, and scarcely expressed a wish to meet him) Ferdinand continued his progress, and, on the 20th of April, 1808, found himself a prisoner in Bayonne. In the meantime, Charles under the protection of Murat, resumed his authority, obtained the liberty of Godoy, and quitting Spain, also threw himself his cause and Kingdom, into the emperor's hands.

These events were in themselves quite enough to urge a more cautious people than the Spaniards into action; but other measures had been pursued, which proved, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the country was destined to be the spoil of the French. The troops of that nation had been admitted, without reserve or precaution, into the different fortresses upon the Spanish frontier, and, taking advantage of this hospitality to forward the views of their chief, they got possession, by various artifices, of the citadels of St. Sebastian in Guipuscoa, of Pampeluna in Navarre, and of the forts of Figueras and Monjuik, and the citadel of Barcelona in Catalonia. Thus, under the pretence of mediating between the father and the son, in a time of profound peace, a foreign force was suddenly established in the capital, on the communications, and in the principal frontier fortresses; its chief was admitted to a share of the government, and a fiery, proud, and jealous nation was laid prostrate at the feet of a stranger, without a blow being struck, without one warning voice being raised, without a suspicion being excited, in sufficient time, to guard against those acts upon which all were gazing with stupid amazement.

It is idle to attribute this surprising event to the subtlety of Napoleon's policy, to the depth of his deceit, or to the treachery of Godoy; such a fatal calamity could only be the result of bad government, and the consequent degradation of public feeling. It matters but little to those who wish to derive a lesson from experience, whether it be a Godoy or a Savary that strikes the last bargain of corruption, the silly father or the rebellious son, that signs the final act of degradation and infamy. Fortunately, it is easier to oppress the people of all countries, than to destroy their generous feelings; when all patriotism is lost among the upper classes, it may still be found among the lower; in the Peninsula it was not found, but started into life with a fervor and energy that ennobled even the wild and savage form in which it appeared; nor was it the less admirable that it burst forth attended by many evils; the good feeling displayed was the people's own, their cruelty, folly, and perverseness, were the effects of a long course of misgovernment.

There are many reasons why Napoleon should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain, there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. The Spanish Bourbons could never have been sincere friends to France while Buonaparte held the sceptre, and the moment that the fear of his power ceased to operate, it was quite certain that their apparent friendship would change to active hostility; the proclamation issued by the Spanish cabinet just before the battle of Jena was evidence of this fact. But if the Bourbons were Napoleon's enemies, it did not follow that the people sympathized with their rulers; his great error was that he looked only to the court, and treated the nation with contempt. Had he, before he openly meddled in their affairs, brought the people into hostile contact with their government,—and how many points would not such a government have offered!—instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator in a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people.

The journey of Ferdinand, the liberation of Godoy, the flight of Charles, the appointing Murat to be a

member of the governing junta, and the movements of the French troops who were advancing from all parts towards Madrid, aroused the indignation of the nation, and tumults and assassinations had taken place in various parts; at Toledo a serious riot occurred on the 23d of April, the peasants joined the inhabitants of the town, and it was only by the advance of a division of infantry and some cavalry of Dupont's corps, then quartered at Aranjuez, that order was restored.* The agitation of the public mind, however, increased, the French troops were all young men, or rather boys, taken from the last conscription, and disciplined after they had entered Spain; their youth and apparent feebleness excited the contempt of the Spaniards, who pride themselves much upon individual prowess, and the swelling indignation at last broke out.

Upon the 2d of May, a carriage being prepared, as the people supposed, to convey Don Antonio, the uncle of Ferdinand, to France, a crowd collected about it, their language indicated a determination not to permit the last of the royal family to be spirited away, the traces of the carriage were cut, and loud imprecations against the French burst forth on every side; at that moment colonel La-Grange, aide-de-camp to Murat, appeared, he was assailed and maltreated, and in an instant the whole city was in commotion. The French soldiers, expecting no violence, were killed in every street, about four hundred fell, and the hospital was attacked, but the attendants and sick men defended themselves; and meanwhile the alarm having spread to the camp outside the city, the French cavalry galloped in to the assistance of their countrymen by the gate of Alcala, while general Lanfranc, with three thousand infantry, descending from the heights on the north-west quarter, entered the Calle Ancha de Bernardo. As he crossed the end of the street Maravelles, Daois and Velarde, two Spanish officers who were in a state of great excitement, discharged a cannon at the passing troops, and were immediately attacked and killed by some *voltigeurs*; the column, however, continued its march, releasing, as it advanced, several superior officers, who were in a manner besieged by the populace. The cavalry at the other end of the town, treating the affair as a tumult, and not as an action, made some hundred prisoners, and some men were killed or maimed by the horses, but marshal Money, general Harispe, and Gonzalvo O'Farril, restored order.† Nevertheless, after nightfall, the peasantry of the neighbourhood, who were armed and in considerable numbers, beset the city gates, and the French guards firing upon them, killed twenty or thirty, and wounded more.

In the first moment of irritation, Murat ordered all the prisoners to be tried by a military commission, which condemned them to death; but the municipality interfering, represented to that prince the extreme cruelty of visiting this angry ebullition of an injured and insulted people with such severity, whereupon admitting the weight of their arguments, he forbade any executions on the sentence. Yet it is said that general Grouchy, in whose immediate power the prisoners remained, after exclaiming that his own life had been attempted, that the blood of the French soldiers was not to be spilt with impunity, and that the prisoners having been condemned by a council of war, ought and should be executed, proceeded to shoot them in the Prado. Forty were thus slain before Murat could cause his orders to be effectually obeyed. The next day some of the Spanish authorities having discovered that a colonel, commanding the imperial guards, still retained a number of prisoners in the barracks, applied to have them also released. Murat consented, but it is said by some, although denied by others of greater authority,

* Journal of Dupont's Operations MSS.

† Memoir of Aranza and O'Farril.

that the colonel getting intelligence of what was passing, and being enraged at the loss of so many choice soldiers, put forty-five of his captives to death before the order arrived to stay his bloody proceedings.*

Such were nearly the circumstances that attended this celebrated tumult, in which the wild cry of Spanish warfare was first heard, and as many authors, adopting without hesitation all the reports of the day, have represented it, sometimes as a wanton and extensive massacre on the part of the French, sometimes as a barbarous political stroke to impress a dread of their power, I think it necessary to remark—First, that it was commenced by the Spaniards; their fiery tempers, the irritation produced by passing events, and the habits of violence which they had acquired in their late successful insurrection against Godoy, rendered an explosion inevitable. Second, that if the French had secretly stimulated this disposition, and had resolved in cold blood to make a terrible example, they would have prepared some check on the Spanish soldiers of the garrison; they would not have left their own hospital unguarded, still less have arranged the plan so, that their loss should far exceed that of the Spaniards; and surely nothing would have induced them to relinquish the profit of such policy after having suffered all the injury! Yet marshal Moncey, and general Harispe were actively engaged in restoring order; and it is certain that, including the peasants shot outside the gates, and the executions afterwards, the whole number of Spaniards slain did not amount to one hundred and twenty persons, while several hundred French fell.† Of the imperial guards seventy men were wounded, and this fact alone would suffice to prove that there was no premeditation on the part of Murat;‡ for if he was base enough to sacrifice his own men with such unconcern, he would not have exposed the select soldiers of the French empire in preference to the conscripts who abounded in his army.

The affair itself was certainly accidental, and not very bloody for the patriots, but policy induced both sides to attribute secret motives, and to exaggerate the slaughter. The Spaniards in the provinces, impressed with an opinion of French atrocity, were thereby excited to insurrection on the one hand; and, on the other, the French, well aware that such an impression could not be effaced by an accurate relation of what did happen, seized the occasion to convey a terrible idea of their own power and severity. It is the part of history to reduce such amplifications. But it is impossible to remain unmoved in recording the gallantry and devotion of a populace that could thus dare to assail the force commanded by Murat, rather than abandon one of their princes; such, however, was the character of the Spaniards throughout this war, they were prone to sudden and rash actions, and though weak in military execution, fierce and confident individually, and they had always an intuitive perception of what was great and noble.

The commotion of the 2d of May was the forerunner of insurrections in every part of Spain, few of which were so honourable to the actors as that of Madrid. Unprincipled villains hailed the opportunity of directing the passions of the multitude, and under the mask of patriotism, turned the unthinking fury of the people against whomever it pleased them to rob or to destroy. Pillage, massacres, assassinations, cruelties of the most revolting kind, were every where perpetrated, and the intrinsic goodness of the cause was disfigured by the enormities committed at Cadiz, Seville, Badajoz, and other places, but chiefly at Valencia, pre-eminent in barbarity at a moment when all were barbarous!

The first burst of popular feeling being thus misdirected, and the energy of the people wasted in assassinations, lassitude and fear succeeded to the insolence of tumult at the approach of real danger; for it is one thing to shine in the work of butchery, and another to establish that discipline which can alone sustain the courage of the multitude in the hour of trial.

To cover the suspicious measure of introducing more troops than the terms of the convention warranted, a variety of reports relative to the ultimate intentions of the French emperor had been propagated; at one time Gibraltar was to be besieged, and officers were dispatched to examine the Mediterranean coasts of Spain and Barbary; at another, Portugal was to become the theatre of great events; and a mysterious importance was attached to all the movements of the French armies, with a view to deceive a court that fear and sloth disposed to the belief of any thing but the truth, and to impose upon a people whose unsuspecting ignorance was at first mistaken for tameness.

In the mean time, active agents were employed to form a French party at the capital; and, as the insurrections of Aranjuez and Madrid discovered the fierceness of the Spanish character, Napoleon enjoined more caution and prudence upon his lieutenant than the latter was disposed to practise. In fact, Murat's precipitation was the cause of hastening the discovery of his master's real views before they were ripe for execution. For Dupont's first division and cavalry had crossed the Duero as early as the 14th of March, and upon the 10th of April had occupied Aranjuez, while his second and third divisions took post at the Escorial and at Segovia, thus encircling the capital, which was soon occupied by Moncey's corps. It was then evident that Murat designed to control the provisional government left by Ferdinand; and the riot at Toledo, although promptly quelled by the interference of the French troops, indicated the state of the public mind, before the explosion at Madrid had placed the parties in a state of direct hostility. Murat seems to have been intrusted with only a half confidence, and as his natural impetuosity urged him to play a rash rather than a timid part, he appeared with the air of a conqueror before a ground of quarrel was laid. His policy was too coarse and open for such difficult affairs, yet he was not entirely without grounds for his proceeding; a letter addressed to him about this time by Napoleon contained these expressions: '*The duke of Infantado has a party in Madrid; it will attack you; dissipate it, and seize the government.*'

At Bayonne the political events kept pace with those of Madrid. Charles IV. having reclaimed his rights in presence of Napoleon, commanded the infant, Don Antonio, to relinquish the presidency of the governing junta to Murat, who, at the same time, received the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. This appointment, and the restoration of Charles to the regal dignity, were proclaimed in Madrid, with the acquiescence of the Council of Castile, on the 10th of May; but five days previous to that period, the old monarch had again ceded his authority to Napoleon, and Ferdinand and himself were consigned, with large pensions, to the tranquillity of private life. The throne of Spain being thus rendered vacant, the right to fill it was assumed by the French emperor in virtue of the cession made by Charles IV., and he desired that a king might be chosen from his own family. After some hesitation, the council of Castile, in concert with the municipality of Madrid and the governing junta, declared that their choice had fallen upon Joseph Buonaparte, who was then king of Naples; and cardinal Bourbon, primate of Spain, first cousin of Charles IV., and archbishop of Toledo, not only acceded to this arrangement, but actually wrote to Napoleon a letter testifying his adhesion to the new order of things. As it was easy to

* See gen. Harispe's observations at the end of this volume.

† Manifesto of the council of Castile. Page 28.

‡ Surgical Campaigns of Barron Larrey.

foretell the result of the election, the king of Naples was already journeying towards Bayonne, where he arrived on the 7th of June. The principal men of Spain had been previously invited to meet in that town upon the 15th, with a view to obtain their assent to a constitution prepared by Napoleon; and at this meeting, called 'the Assembly of Notables,' ninety-one Spaniards of eminence appeared. They accepted Joseph as their king, proceeded to discuss the constitution in detail, and after several sittings adopted it, and swore to maintain its provisions. Thus finished the first part of this eventful drama.

The new constitution was calculated to draw forth all the resources of Spain; compared to the old system it was a blessing, and it would have been received as such under different circumstances, but now arms were to decide its fate, for in every province the cry of war had been raised. In Catalonia, in Valencia, in Andalusia, Estremadura, Galicia, and the Asturias, the people were gathering, and fiercely declaring their determination to resist French intrusion. Nevertheless Joseph, apparently contented with the acquiescence of the ninety-one notables, and trusting to the powerful support of his brother, crossed the frontier on the 9th of July; and on the 12th arrived at Vittoria. The inhabitants still remembering the journey to Bayonne, seemed disposed to hinder his entrance; but their opposition did not break out into actual violence, and the next morning he continued his progress by Miranda del Ebro, Breviesca, Burgos, and Buitrago. The 20th of July he entered Madrid, and on the 24th he was proclaimed king of Spain and the Indies, with all the solemnities usual upon such occasions, thus making himself the enemy of eleven millions of people, the object of a nation's hatred! With a strange accent, and from the midst of foreign bands, he called upon a fierce and haughty race to accept of a constitution which they did not understand, and which few of them had ever heard of, his only hope of success resting on the strength of his brother's arms, his claims upon the consent of an imbecile monarch, and the weakness of a few pusillanimous nobles, in contempt of the rights of millions now arming to oppose him. This was the unhallowed part of the enterprise; this it was that rendered his offered constitution odious, covered it with a leprous skin, and drove the noble-minded far from the pollution of its touch!

CHAPTER III.

Council of Castile refuses to take the oath of allegiance—Supreme junta established at Seville—Marquis of Solano murdered at Cadiz, and the conde d'Aguilar at Seville—Inter-course between Castanos and sir Hew Dalrymple—General Spencer and admiral Purvis offer to co-operate with the Spaniards—Admiral Rossily's squadron surrenders to Morla—General insurrection—Massacre at Valencia—Horrible murder of Filanghieri.

JOSEPH being proclaimed king, required the council of Castile to take the oath of allegiance prescribed by the constitution; but, with unexpected boldness, that body, hitherto obsequious, met his orders with a remonstrance, for war, virtually declared on the 2d of May, was at this time raging in all parts of the peninsula, and the council was secretly apprized that a great misfortune had befallen the French arms.* It was no longer a question between Joseph and some reluctant public bodies; it was an awful struggle between great nations; and how the spirit of insurrection, breaking forth simultaneously in every province, was nourished in each, until it required the consistence of regular warfare, I will now relate.

Just before the tumult of Aranjuez, the marquis of Solano y Socoro, commanding the Spanish auxiliary force in the Alentejo, had received an order from Godoy to withdraw his division, and post it on the frontier of Andalusia, to cover the projected journey of Charles IV. Napoleon was aware of this order, but would not interrupt its execution, wherefore Solano quitted Portugal without difficulty, and in the latter end of May, observing the general agitation, repaired to his government of Cadiz, in the harbour of which place five French sail of the line and a frigate, under admiral Rossily, had just before taken refuge from the English fleet. Seville was in a great ferment, and Solano, in passing through was required to put himself at the head of an insurrection in favour of Ferdinand VII., he refused, and passed on to his own government; but there also the people were ripe for a declaration against the French. A local government was established at Seville, which assuming the title of 'Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies,' declared war in form against the intrusive monarch, commanded all men between the ages of sixteen and forty-five to take arms, called upon the troops of the camp of San Roque to acknowledge their authority, and ordered Solano to attack the French squadron. That unfortunate man would not acknowledge the authority of this self-constituted government, and as he hesitated to commit his country in war against a power whose strength he knew better than he did the temper of his own countrymen, he was murdered. His ability, his courage, his amiable and unblemished character, have never been denied, and yet there is too much reason to believe that the junta of Seville sent an agent to Cadiz for the express purpose of procuring his assassination. This foul stain upon the cause was enlarged by the perpetration of similar, or worse deeds, in every part of the kingdom. At Seville the conde d'Aguilar was dragged from his carriage, and without even the imputation of guilt, inhumanly butchered; and here again it is said that the mob were instigated by a leading member of the junta, count Gusman de Tilly, a man described as 'capable of dishonouring a whole nation by his crimes,' while his victim was universally admitted to be virtuous and accomplished.

As early as April, general Castanos, then commanding the camp of San Roque, had entered into communication with sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of Gibraltar. He was resolved to seize any opportunity that offered to resist the French, and he appears to have been the first Spaniard, who united patriotism with prudent calculation; readily acknowledging the authority of the junta of Seville, and stifling the workings of self-interest, with a virtue by no means common to his countrymen at that period. When the insurrection first broke out, admiral Purvis commanded the British squadron off Cadiz, and in concert with general Spencer, who happened to be in that part of the world with five thousand men, offered to co-operate with Solano, in an attack upon the French ships of war in the harbour. Upon the death of that unfortunate man, this offer was renewed and pressed upon don Thomas Morla, his successor; but he, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, refused all assistance, and reduced the hostile ships himself.—Castanos, however, united himself closely with the British commanders, and obtained from them supplies of arms, ammunition, and money; and at the instance of sir Hew Dalrymple, the merchants of Gibraltar advanced a loan of forty-two thousand dollars for the service of the Spanish patriots.*

Meanwhile the assassinations at Cadiz and Seville were imitated in every part of Spain; hardly can a town be named in which some innocent and worthy persons were not slain.† Grenada had its murders; Car-

* Memoir of O'Farrell, and Azanza.

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's correspondence.

† Moniteur. Azanza and O'Farrell: Nellerito.

thagena rivalled Cadiz in ruthless cruelty, and Valencia reeked with blood. Don Miguel de Saavedra, the governor of that city, was killed, not in the first fury of commotion, which he escaped, but, having returned, was deliberately sacrificed. Balthazar Calvo, a canon of the church of San Isido, at Madrid, came down to Valencia, and having collected a band of fanatics commenced a massacre of the French residents; and this ruthless villain continued his slaughters unchecked, until French victims failing, his raging thirst for murder urged him to menace the junta, who with the exception of the English consul Mr. Tupper, had given way to his previous violence, but now readily found the means to crush his power. The canon, while in the act of braving their authority, was seized by stratagem, and soon afterwards strangled, together with two hundred of his band. The conde de Serbelloni, captain-general of the province, then proceeded to organize an army, the old count Florida Blanca placed himself at the head of the Murcian insurrection, and his force acted in unison with that of Valencia.

In Catalonia the occupation of Barcelona repressed the popular effervescence, but the feeling was the same, and an insurrection, breaking out at the town of Manresa, soon spread to all the unfettered parts of the province.

In Aragon the arrival of don Joseph Palafox kindled the fire of patriotism. He had escaped from Bayonne, and his family were greatly esteemed in a country where it was of the noblest among a people absurdly vain of their ancient descent. The captain-general, fearful of a tumult, ordered Palafox to quit the province, but this circumstance, joined to some appearance of mystery in his escape from Bayonne, increased the passions of the multitude; a crowd surrounded his abode, and forced him to assume the command, the captain-general was confined, some persons were murdered, and a junta was formed. Palafox was considered by his companions as a man of slender capacity and great vanity, and there is nothing in his exploits to create a doubt of the justness of this opinion; it was not Palafox that upheld the glory of Aragon, it was the spirit of the people, which he had not excited, and could so little direct, that for a long time after the commencement of the first siege, he was kept a sort of prisoner in Zaragoza, his courage and fidelity being distrusted by the population which he is supposed to have ruled.

The example of Aragon aroused the Navarrese, and Logrono became the focus of an insurrection which extended along most of the valleys of that kingdom. In the northern and western provinces, the spirit of independence was equally fierce and as decidedly pronounced, accompanied also by the same excesses. In Badajos the conde de la Torre del Frenio was butchered by the populace, and his mangled carcass dragged through the streets in triumph. At Talavera de la Reyna, the corregidor with difficulty escaped a similar fate by a hasty flight; Leon presented a wide, unbroken scene of anarchy, and, generally speaking, in all the great towns violent hands were laid upon those who opposed the people's wishes.

Gallicia seemed to hold back for a moment, but the example of Leon, and the arrival of an agent from the Asturias, where the insurrection was in full force, produced a general movement. A junta was formed, and Filanghieri, the governor of Coruña, an Italian, was called upon to exercise the functions of royalty by declaring war in form against France. Like every man of sense in Spain he was unwilling to commence a revolution upon such uncertain grounds, and the impatient populace sought his death; he was saved at the moment by the courage of an officer of his staff, yet his horrible fate was only deferred. Being a man of talent and sincerely attached to Spain, he exerted himself to organize the military resources of the province,

and no suspicion attached to his conduct; but such was the inherent ferocity of the people and of the time, that the soldiers of the regiment of Navarre seized him at Villa Franca del Bierzo, and, as some say, stuck him full of bayonets, while others assert that they planted their weapons in the ground, and then tossing him on to their points, left him there to struggle, and then disbanded themselves.

The Asturians were the first who proclaimed their indefeasible right of choosing a new government when the old one ceased to afford them protection. They established a local junta, declared war against the French, and despatched deputies to England to solicit assistance. Meanwhile, although the great towns in Biscay and the Castiles were overawed by fifty thousand bayonets, the peasantry commenced a war, in their own manner, against the stragglers and the sick, and thus a hostile chain surrounding the French army was completed in every link.

This universal, and nearly simultaneous effort of the Spanish people was beheld by the rest of Europe with astonishment and admiration; astonishment at the energy thus suddenly put forth by a nation hitherto deemed unnerved and debased; admiration at the devoted courage of an act, which, seen at a distance and its odious parts unknown, appeared with all the ideal beauty of Numantian patriotism. In England the enthusiasm was unbounded; dazzled at first with the splendour of such an agreeable, unlooked-for spectacle, men of all classes gave way to the impulse of a generous sympathy, and forgot, or felt disinclined to analyse, the real causes of this apparently magnanimous exertion. It may, however, be fairly doubted if the disinterested vigour of the Spanish character was the true source of the resistance; it was, in fact, produced by several co-operating causes, many of which were anything but commendable. Constituted as modern states are, with little in their systems of government or education adapted to nourish intense feelings of patriotism, it would be miraculous indeed if such a result was obtained from the pure virtue of a nation, which for two centuries had groaned under the pressure of civil and religious despotism.

The Spanish character, with relation to public affairs, is distinguished by inordinate pride and arrogance. Dilatory and improvident, the individual as well as the mass, all possess an absurd confidence that every thing is practicable which their heated imaginations suggest; once excited, they can see no difficulty in the execution of a project, and the obstacles they encounter are attributed to treachery; hence the sudden murder of so many virtuous men at the commencement of this commotion. Kind and warm in his attachments, but bitter in his anger, the Spaniard is patient under privations, firm in bodily suffering, prone to sudden passion, vindictive, bloody, remembering insult longer than injury, and cruel in his revenge. With a strong natural perception of what is noble, his promise is lofty, but as he invariably permits his passions to get the mastery of his reason, his performance is mean. In the progress of this war, the tenacity of vengeance peculiar to the nation supplied the want of cool, persevering intrepidity; but it was a poor substitute for that essential quality, and led rather to deeds of craft and cruelty than to daring acts of patriotism. Now the abstraction of the royal family, and the unexpected pretension to the crown, so insultingly put forth by Napoleon, had aroused all the Spanish pride, and the tumults of Madrid and Aranjuez, prepared the public mind for a violent movement; the protection afforded by the French to the obnoxious Godoy increased the ferment of popular feeling, because a dearly cherished vengeance was thus frustrated at the moment of its expected accomplishment, and the disappointment excited all that fierceness of anger which with Spaniards is, for

the moment, uncontrollable; and then came the tumult of Madrid, which, swollen and distorted, was cast like Cæsar's body before the people to urge them to frenzy; they arose, not to meet a danger the extent of which they had calculated, and were prepared for the sake of independence to confront, but to gratify the fury of their hearts, and to slake their thirst of blood.

During Godoy's administration the property of the church had been trenced upon, and it was evident, from the example of France and Italy, that under the new system, the operation would be repeated; this was a matter that involved the interests, and, of course, stimulated the activity of a multitude of monks and priests, who found no difficulty in persuading an ignorant and bigoted people, that the aggressive stranger was also the enemy of religion and accursed of God. With processions, miracles, prophecies, distribution of reliques, and the appointment of saints to the command of the armies, they fanaticised the mass of the patriots, and in every part of the peninsula the clergy were distinguished for their active zeal; monks and friars were invariably, either leaders in the tumults, or at the side of those who were, instigating them to barbarous actions. Buonaparte found the same cause produce similar effects during his early campaigns in Italy; and if the shape of that country had been as favourable for protracted resistance, and a like support had been furnished by Great Britain, the patriots of Spain would have been rivalled by modern Romans.*

The continental system of mercantile exclusion was another spring of this complicated machinery. It threatened to lessen the already decayed commerce of the maritime towns, and the contraband trade, which has always been carried on in Spain to an incredible extent, was certain of destruction; with that trade the fate of one hundred thousand excise and custom-house officers was involved.† It required but a small share of penetration to perceive, that a system of armed revenue officers, organized after the French manner, and stimulated by a vigorous administration, would quickly put an end to the smuggling, which was, in truth, only a consequence of monopolies and internal restrictions upon the trade of one province with another—vexations abolished by the constitution of Bayonne: hence all the activity and intelligence of the merchants engaged in foreign trade, and all the numbers and lawless violence of the smugglers, were enlisted in the cause of the country, swelling the ranks of the insurgent patriots; and hence also, the readiness of the Gibraltar merchants to advance the loan before spoken of.

The state of civilization in Spain was likewise exactly suited to an insurrection, for if the people had been a little more enlightened, they would have joined the French, if very enlightened, the invasion could not have happened at all. But in a country where the comforts of civilized society are less needed, and therefore less attended to than in any other part of Europe; where the warmth and dryness of the climate render it no sort of privation, or even inconvenience, to sleep for the greatest part of the year in the open air; and where the universal custom is to go armed, it was not difficult for any energetic man to assemble and keep together large masses of the credulous peasantry. No story could be too gross for their belief, if it agreed with their wishes. 'Es verdad, los dicen,' 'It is true, they say it,' is the invariable answer of a Spaniard if a doubt is expressed of the truth of an absurd report. Temperate, possessing little furniture, and generally hoarding all the gold he can get, he is less concerned for the loss of his house than the inhabitant of another country would be, and the effort that he makes in relinquishing his abode, must not be measured by the scale of an Englishman's

exertion in a like case; once engaged in an adventure, the lightness of his spirits and the brilliancy of his sky, make it a matter of indifference to the angry peasant whither he wanders.

The evils which had afflicted the country previous to the period of the French interference also tended to prepare the Spaniards for violence, and aided in turning that violence against the intruders. Famine, oppression, poverty, and disease, the loss of commerce, and unequal taxation, had pressed sorely upon them. For such a system the people could not be enthusiastic, but they were taught to believe, that Godoy was the sole author of the misery they suffered, that Ferdinand would redress their grievances; and as the French were the protectors of the former, and the oppressors of the latter, it was easy to add this bitterness to their natural hatred of the domination of a stranger, and it was so done.*

Such were the principal causes which combined to produce this surprising revolution, from which so many great events flowed, without one man of eminent talent being cast up, to control or direct the spirit thus accidentally excited. Nothing more directly shows the heterogeneous nature of the feelings and interests, which were brought together, than this last fact, which cannot be attributed to a deficiency of natural talent, for the genius of the Spanish people is notoriously ardent, subtle, and vigorous; but there was no common bond of feeling, save that of individual hatred to the French, which a great man could lay hold of to influence large masses. Persons of sagacity perceived, very early, that the Spanish revolution, like a leafy shrub in a violent gale of wind, greatly agitated, but disclosing only slight unconnected stems, afforded no sure hold for the ambition of a master-spirit, if such there were. It was clear that the cause would fail, unless supported by England, and then England would direct all, and not suffer her resources to be wielded for the glory of an individual, whose views and policy might afterwards thwart her own; nor was it difficult to perceive that the downfall of Napoleon, not the regeneration of Spain, was the object of her cabinet.

The explosion of public feeling was fierce in its expression, because political passions will always be vehement at the first moment of their appearance among a people new to civil commotion, and unused to permit their heat to evaporate in public discussions. The result was certainly a wonderful change in the affairs of Europe, it seems yet undecided whether that change has been for the better or for the worse; and in the progress of their struggle, the Spaniards certainly developed more cruelty than courage, more violence than intrepidity, more personal hatred of the French than enthusiasm for their own cause. They opened, indeed, a wide field for the exertions of others, they presented a fulcrum upon which a lever was rested that moved the civilized world, but assuredly the presiding genius, the impelling power, came from another quarter; useful accessories they were, but as principals they displayed neither wisdom, spirit, nor skill sufficient to resist the prodigious force by which they were assailed. If they appeared at first heedless of danger, it was not because they were prepared to perish, rather than submit, but that they were reckless of provoking a power whose terrors they could not estimate, and in their ignorance despised.

It is, however, not surprising that great expectations were at first formed of the heroism of the Spaniards, and those expectations were greatly augmented by their agreeable qualities. There is not upon the face of the earth a people so attractive in the friendly intercourse of society. Their majestic language, fine persons, and becoming dress, their lively imaginations, the inexpress-

* Napoleon's Mémoires, Campagne d'Italie, Venice.

† Wellesley's letter to Burrard.

* Historia de la Guerra contra Napoleon.

sible beauty of their women, and the air of romance which they throw over every action, and infuse into every feeling, all combine to delude the senses and to impose upon the judgment. As companions, they are incomparably the most agreeable of mankind, but danger and disappointment attend the man who, confiding in their promises and energy, ventures upon a difficult enterprise. 'Never do to-day what you can put off until to-morrow,' is the favourite proverb in Spain, and rigidly followed.

CHAPTER IV.

New French corps formed in Navarre—Duhesme fixes himself at Barcelona—Importance of that city—Napoleon's military plan and arrangements.

THE commotion of Aranjuez undeceived the French emperor, he perceived that he was engaged in a delicate enterprise, and that the people he had to deal with were anything but tame and quiescent under insult. Determined, however, to persevere, he pursued his political intrigues, and without relinquishing the hope of a successful termination to the affair by such means, he arranged a profound plan of military operations, and so distributed his forces, that at the moment when Spain was pouring forth her swarthy bands, the masses of the French army were concentrated upon the most important points, and combined in such a manner, that, from their central position, they had the power of overwhelming each separate province, no three of which could act in concert without first beating a French corps. And if any of the Spanish armies succeeded in routing a French force, the remaining corps could unite without difficulty, and retreat without danger. It was the skill of this disposition which enabled seventy thousand men, covering a great extent of country, to brave the simultaneous fury of a whole nation; an army less ably distributed would have been trampled under foot, and lost amidst the tumultuous uproar of eleven millions of people.

In a political point of view the inconvenience which would have arisen from suffering a regular army to take the field, was evident. To have been able to characterise the opposition of the Spanish people, as a partial insurrection of peasants, instigated by some evil-disposed persons to act against the wishes of the respectable part of the nation, would have given some colour to the absorbing darkness of the invasion. And to have permitted that which was at first an insurrection of peasants, to take the form and consistence of regular armies and methodical warfare, would have been a military error, dangerous in the extreme. Napoleon, who well knew that scientific war is only a wise application of force, laughed at the delusion of those who regarded the want of a regular army as a favourable circumstance, and who hailed the undisciplined peasant as the more certain defender of the country. He knew that a general insurrection can never last long, that it is a military anarchy, and incapable of real strength; he knew that it was the disciplined battalions of Valley Forge, not the volunteers of Lexington that established American independence; that it was the veterans of Arcole and Marengo, not the republicans of Valmy, that fixed the fate of the French revolution. Hence his efforts were directed to hinder the Spaniards from drawing together any great body of regular soldiers, an event that might easily happen, for the gross amount of the organized Spanish force was, in the month of May, about one hundred and twenty-seven thousand men of all arms. Fifteen thousand of these were in Holstein, under the marquis of Romana, but twenty thousand were already partially concentrated in Portugal, and the remainder, in which

were comprised eleven thousand Swiss and thirty thousand militia, were dispersed in various parts of the kingdom, principally in Andalusia. Besides this force, there was a sort of local reserve called the urban militia, much neglected indeed, and more a name than a reality, yet the advantage of such an institution was considerable; men were to be had in abundance, and as the greatest difficulty in a sudden crisis is to prepare the framework of order, it was no small resource to find a plan of service ready, the principle of which was understood by the people.*

The French army in the Peninsula about the same period, although amounting to eighty thousand men, exclusive of those under Junot in Portugal, had not more than seventy thousand capable of active operations, the remainder were sick or in depôts. The possession of the fortresses, the central position, and the combination of this comparatively small army, gave it great strength, but it had also many points of weakness; it was made up of the conscripts of different nations, French, Swiss, Italians, Poles, and even Portuguese whom Junot had expatriated; and it is a curious fact, that some of the latter remained in Spain until the end of the war. A few of the imperial guards were also employed, and here and there an old regiment of the line was mixed with the young troops to give them consistence, yet with these exceptions the French army must be considered as a raw levy, fresh from the plough and unacquainted with discipline: † so late even as the month of August, many of the battalions had not completed the first elements of their drill, ‡ and if they had not been formed upon good skeletons, the difference between them and the insurgent peasantry would have been very trifling. || This fact explains, in some measure, the otherwise incomprehensible checks and defeats, which the French sustained at the commencement of the contest, and it likewise proves how little of vigour there was in Spanish resistance at the moment of the greatest enthusiasm.

In the distribution of these troops Napoleon attended principally to the security of Madrid. As the capital, and the centre of all interests, its importance was manifest, and the great line of communication between it and Bayonne was early and constantly covered with troops. But the imprudence with which the grand duke of Berg brought up the corps of Moncey and Dupont to the capital, together with his own haughty, impolitic demeanour, drew on the crisis of affairs before the time was ripe, obliged the French monarch to hasten the advance of other troops, and to make a greater display of his force than was consistent with his policy. For Murat's movement, while it threatened the Spaniards and provoked their hostility, isolated the French army, by stripping the line of communication, and the arrival of fresh battalions to remedy this error generated additional anger and suspicion at a very critical period.

It was, however, absolutely necessary to fill the void left by Moncey's advance, and a fresh corps sent into Navarre, being, by successive reinforcements increased to twenty-three thousand men, received in June the name of the 'army of the Western Pyrenees.' § Marshal Bessieres assumed the command, and, on the first appearance of commotion, fixed his head quarters at Burgos, occupied Vittoria, Miranda de Ebro, and other towns, and pushed advanced posts into Leon. This position, while it protected the line from Bayonne to the capital, enabled him to awe the Asturias and Biscay, and also by giving him the command of the valley of the Duero to keep the kingdom of Leon and the province of Segovia in check. The town and castle of

* Historia de la Guerra contra Napoleon Buonaparte.

† Napoleon's notes.

‡ Thiebault.

|| Dupont's Journal, MSS.

§ Napoleon's notes.

Burgos, put into a state of defence, contained his dépôts, and became the centre and pivot of his operations, while intermediate posts, and the fortresses, connected him with Bayonne, where a reserve of twenty thousand men was formed under general Drouet, then commanding the eleventh military division of France.

By the convention of Fontainebleau, the emperor was entitled to send forty thousand men into the northern parts of Spain, and though the right thus acquired was grossly abused, the exercise of it, being expected, created at first but little alarm; it was however different on the eastern frontier. Napoleon had never intimated a wish to pass forces by Catalonia, neither the treaty nor the convention authorized such a measure, nor could the pretence of supporting Junot in Portugal be advanced as a mask; * nevertheless, so early as the 9th of February eleven thousand infantry, sixteen hundred cavalry, and eighteen pieces of artillery, under the command of general Duhesme, † had crossed the frontier at La Jonquera, and marched upon Barcelona, leaving a detachment at the town of Figueras, the strong citadel of which commands the principal pass of the mountains. Arrived at Barcelona, Duhesme prolonged his residence there, under the pretext of waiting for instructions from Madrid relative to a pretended march upon Cadiz; ‡ but his secret orders were to obtain exact information concerning the Catalan fortresses, dépôts, and magazines, —to ascertain the state of public feeling,—to preserve a rigid discipline,—scrupulously to avoid giving any offence to the Spaniards, and to enter into close communication with marshal Moncey, at that time commanding the whole of the French army in the north of Spain.

The political affairs were then beginning to indicate serious results, and as soon as the troops in the north were in a condition to execute their orders, Duhesme, whose report had been received, was directed to seize upon the citadel of Barcelona and the fort of Montjuick. The citadel was obtained by stratagem; the fort, one of the strongest in the world, was surrendered by the governor Alvarez, because that brave and worthy man knew, that from a base court he should receive no support. It is said that, stung by the disgrace of his situation, he was at one time ready to spring a mine beneath the French detachments, yet his mind, betraying his spirit, sunk under the weight of unexpected events. What a picture of human weakness do these affairs present! —the boldest shrinking from the discharge of their trust like the meanest cowards, the wisest following the march of events, confounded, and without a rule of action! If such a firm man, as Alvarez afterwards proved himself to be, could think the disgrace of surrendering his charge at the demand of an insolent and perfidious guest, a smaller misfortune than the anger of a miserable court, what must the state of public feeling have been, and how can those who, like O'Farril and Azanza, served the intruder, be with justice blamed, if, amidst the general stagnation, they could not perceive the elements of a salutary tempest. At the view of such scenes Napoleon might well enlarge his ambitious designs, his fault was not in the projection, but in the rough execution of his plan; another combination would have ensured success, and the resistance he encountered only shows, that nations, like individuals, are but the creatures of circumstances, at one moment weak, trembling, and submissive, at another proud, haughty, and daring; every novel combination of events has an effect upon public sentiment distinct from, and often at variance with what is called national character.

The treacherous game played at Barcelona was renewed at Figueras, with equal success, the citadel of

that place fell into the hands of the detachment left there; a free entrance, and a secure base of operations, was thus established in Catalonia; and when the magazines of Barcelona were filled, Duhesme, whose corps took the name of the 'army of the Eastern Pyrenees,' concluded that his task was well accomplished. The affair was indeed a momentous one, and Napoleon earnestly looked for its termination, before the transactions at Madrid could give an unfavourable impression of his ulterior intentions, for he saw the importance which, under certain circumstances, a war would confer upon Barcelona, which with its immense population, great riches, good harbour, and strong forts, might be called the key of the south of France or Spain, just as it happened to be in the possession of the one or the other nation. The proximity of Sicily, where a large British force was kept in a state of constant preparation, made it more than probable that an English army would be quickly carried to Barcelona, and a formidable systematic war be established upon the threshold of France, and hence Napoleon, seeing the extent of the danger, obviated it, at the risk of rendering abortive the attempt to create a French party in Madrid. The greater evil of finding an English army at Barcelona left no room for hesitation; thirty or forty thousand British troops occupying an intrenched camp in front of that town, supported by a powerful fleet, and having reserve dépôts in Sicily and the Spanish islands, might have been so wielded as to give ample occupation to a hundred and fifty thousand enemies. Under the protection of such an army, the Spanish levies might have been organized and instructed; and as the actual numbers assembled could have been easily masked, increased, or diminished, and the fleet always ready to co-operate, the south of France, whence the provisions of the enemy must have been drawn, would have been exposed to descents, and all the inconvenience of actual hostilities. The Spanish provinces of Valencia, Murcia, and even Andalusia, being thus covered, the war would have been drawn to a head, and concentrated about Catalonia, the most warlike, rugged, sterile portion of Spain. Duhesme's success put an end to this danger, and the affairs of Barcelona sunk into comparative insignificance; nevertheless, that place was carefully watched, the troops were increased to twenty-two thousand men, their general corresponded directly with Napoleon, and Barcelona became the centre of a system distinct from that, which held the other corps rolling round Madrid as their point of attraction.

The capital of Spain is situated in a sort of basin, formed by a semicircular range of mountains, which, under the different denominations of the Sierra de Guadarama, the Carpentanos, and the Sierra de Guadaxara, sweep in one unbroken chain from east to west, touching the Tagus at either end of an arch, of which that river is the chord. All direct communications between Madrid and France, or between the former and the northern provinces of Spain, must therefore necessarily pass over one or other of these Sierras, which are separated from the great range of the Pyrenees by the valley of the Ebro, and from the Biscayan and Asturian mountains by the valley of the Duero.

Now the principal roads which lead from France directly upon Madrid are four.

The first a royal causeway, which passing the frontier at Irun runs under St. Sebastian, and through a wild and mountainous country, full of dangerous defiles, to the Ebro; it crosses that river by a stone bridge at Miranda, goes to Burgos, and then turning short to the left, is carried over the Duero at Aranda. Afterwards encountering the Carpentanos and the Sierra de Guadaxara it penetrates them by the strong pass of the Somosierra, and descends upon the capital.

The second, which is an inferior road, commences at

* St. Cyr.

† Napoleon's notes.

‡ Duhesme's Instructions, Jan. 23th. Vide St. Cyr.

St. Jean Pied de Port unites with the first at Pampe-lona, runs through Taffalla, crosses the Ebro at Tudola, and enters the basin of Madrid by the eastern range of the Sierra de Guadalaxara, where the declination of the mountains presents a less rugged barrier than the snowy summits of the northern and western part of the chain.

The third threads the Pyrenees by the way of Jaca, passes the Ebro at Zaragoza, and uniting with the second, likewise crosses the Guadalaxara ridge.

The fourth is the great route from Perpignan by Figueras, Gerona, Barcelona, Cervera, Lerida, and Zaragoza, to Madrid.

Thus Zaragoza, which contained fifty thousand inhabitants and was one of the great Spanish magazines for arms, furnished a point of union for two great roads and was consequently of strategic importance; an army in position there could operate on either bank of the Ebro, intercept the communication between the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, and block three out of the four great routes to Madrid. If the French had occupied it in force, their army in the capital would have been free and unconstrained in its operations, and might have acted with more security against Valencia; and the danger from the united forces of Galicia and Leon would also have been diminished, when the road of Burgos ceased to be the only line of retreat from the capital. Nevertheless, Napoleon neglected Zaragoza at first, because, having no citadel, a small body of troops could not control the inhabitants, and a large force, by creating suspicion too soon, would have prevented the success of the attempts against Pampe-lona and Barcelona, objects of still greater importance; neither was the heroic defence afterwards made within a reasonable calculation.

The grand duke of Berg and the duke of Rovigo remained at Madrid, and from that central point appeared to direct the execution of the French emperor's projects; but he distrusted their judgment, and exacted the most detailed information of every movement and transaction. In the course of June, Murat, who was suffering from illness, quitted Spain, leaving behind him a troubled people, and a name for cruelty which was foreign to his character. Savary remained the sole representative of the new monarch, and his situation was delicate. He was in the midst of a great commotion, and as upon every side he beheld the violence of insurrection, and the fury of an insulted nation, it behoved him to calculate with coolness and to execute with vigour. Each Spanish province had its own junta of government, and they were alike enraged, yet not alike dangerous in their anger. The attention of the Catalonians was completely absorbed by Duhesme's operations, but the soldiers which had composed the Spanish garrisons of Barcelona, Monjuick, and Figueras, quitted their ranks after the seizure of those places, and joined the patriotic standards in Murcia and Valencia; the greatest part belonged to the Spanish and Walloon guards, and they formed a good basis for an army which the riches of the two provinces and the arsenal of Carthage afforded ample military resources to equip. * The French had, however, nothing to fear from any direct movement of this army against Madrid, as such an operation could only bring on a battle; but if, by a march towards Zaragoza, the Valencians had united with the Aragonese, and then operated against the line of communication with France, the insurrection of Catalonia would have been supported, and the point of union for three great provinces fixed. In the power of executing this project lay the sting of the Valencian insurrection, and to besiege Zaragoza and prevent such a junction was the remedy.

The importance of Andalusia was greater. The regular troops which, under the command of the un-

happy Solano, had been withdrawn from Portugal, were tolerably disciplined; a large veteran force was assembled at the camp of San Roque under general Castaños, and the garrisons of Ceuta, Algeziras, Cadiz, Granada, and other places being united, the whole formed a considerable army, while a superb cannon foundry at Seville, and the arsenal of Cadiz, furnished the means of equipping a train of artillery. An active intercourse was maintained between the patriots and the English, and the juntas of Granada, Jaen, and Cordova and the army of Estremadura, admitted the supremacy of the junta of Seville. Thus Andalusia, rich, distant from the capital, and well fenced by the Sierra Morena, afforded the means to establish a systematic war, by drawing together all the scattered elements of resistance in the southern and western provinces of Spain and Portugal.* This danger, pregnant with future consequences, was, however, not immediate; there was no line of offensive moment, against the flank or rear of the French army, open to the Andalusian patriots; and as a march to the front, against Madrid, would have been tedious and dangerous, the true policy of the Andalusians was palpably defensive.

In Estremadura neither the activity nor means of the junta were at first sufficient to excite much attention; but in Leon, Old Castille, and Galicia, a cloud was gathering that threatened a perilous storm. Don Gregoria Cuesta was captain-general of the two former kingdoms. Inimical to popular movements, and of a haughty, resolute disposition, he at first checked the insurrection with a rough hand, and thus laid the foundation for quarrels and intrigues, which afterwards impeded the military operations, and split the northern provinces into factions; yet finally, he joined the side of the patriots. Behind him the kingdom of Galicia, under the direction of Filanghieri, had prepared a large and efficient force, chiefly composed of the strong and disciplined body of troops which, under the command of Tarranco, had taken possession of Oporto, and after that general's death had returned with Belesta to Galicia; the garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña, and a number of soldiers flying from the countries occupied by the French, swelled this army, the agents of Great Britain were active to blow the flame of insurrection, and money, arms, and clothing were poured into the province through their hands, because Coruña afforded an easy and direct intercourse with England. A strict connexion was also maintained between the Gallician and Portuguese patriots, and the facility of establishing the base of a regular systematic war in Galicia was, therefore, as great as in Andalusia; the resources were perhaps, greater, on account of the proximity of Great Britain, and the advantage of position at this time was essentially in favour of Galicia, because, while the sources of her strength were as well covered from the direct line of the French operations, the slightest offensive movement upon her part, by threatening the communications of the French army in Madrid, endangered the safety of any corps marching from the capital against the southern provinces. To be prepared against the Gallician forces was, therefore, a matter of pressing importance, a defeat from that quarter would have been felt in all parts of the army; and no considerable, or sustained operation, could be undertaken against the other insurgent forces until the strength of Galicia had been first broken.

Biscay and the Asturias wanted regular troops and fortified towns, and the contracted shape of those provinces placed them completely within the power of the French, who had nothing to fear as long as they could maintain possession of the sea-ports.

From this sketch it results that Savary, in classing

* Cabane's War in Catalonia, 1st Part.

* Mr. Stuart's Letters; vide Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

the dangers of his situation, should have rated Galicia and Leon in the first, Zaragoza in the second, Andalusia in the third, and Valencia in the fourth rank, and by that scale he should have regulated his operations. It was thus Napoleon looked at the affair, but the duke of Rovigo, wavering in his opinions, neglected or misunderstood the spirit of his instructions, lost the control of the operations, and sunk amidst the confusion which he had himself created.

Nearly fifty thousand French and eighty guns were disposable for offensive operations in the beginning of June; collected into one mass, such an army was more than sufficient to crush any or all of the insurgent armies combined, but it was necessary to divide it, and to assail several points at the same time. In doing this, the safety of each minor body depended upon the stability of the central point from whence it emanated, and again the security of that centre depended upon the strength of its communications with France; in other words, Bayonne was the base of operations against Madrid, and Madrid in turn became the base of operations against Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia. To combine all the movements of a vast plan, which would embrace the operations against Catalonia, Aragon, Biscay, the Asturias, Galicia, Leon, Castille, Andalusia, Murcia, and Valencia, in such a simple manner, as that the corps of the army working upon one principle might mutually support and strengthen each other, and at the same time preserve their communication with France, was the great problem to be solved. Napoleon felt that it required a master mind, and from Bayonne he put all the different armed masses in motion himself, and with the greatest caution; for it is a mistaken notion, although one very generally entertained, that he plunged headlong into the contest, without foresight, as having to do with adversaries he desisted.

In his instructions to the duke of Rovigo, he says, *'In a war of this sort it is necessary to act with patience, coolness, and upon calculation.'* *'In civil wars it is the important points only which should be guarded—we must not go to all places,'* and he inculcates the doctrine, that to spread the troops over the country without the power of uniting upon emergency, would be a dangerous display of activity. The principle upon which he proceeded may be illustrated by the comparison of a closed hand thrust forward and the fingers afterwards extended: as long as the solid part of the member was securely fixed and guarded, the return of the smaller portions of it and their flexible movement was feasible and without great peril; whereas a wound given to the hand or arm, not only endangered that part, but paralyzed the action of the whole limb. Hence all the care and attention with which his troops were arranged along the road to Burgos; hence all the measures of precaution already described, such as the seizure of the fortresses and the formation of the reserves at Bayonne.

The insurrection having commenced, Bessieres was ordered to put Burgos into a state of defence,—to detach a division of four or five thousand men, under general Lefebre Desnouettes, against Zaragoza,—to keep down the insurgents of Biscay, Asturias, and Old Castille,—and to observe the army assembling in Galicia; he was likewise enjoined to occupy and watch with jealous care the port of St. Ander and the coast towns. A reinforcement of nine thousand men was also prepared for Duhesme, which, it was supposed, would enable him to tranquillize Catalonia, and co-operate with a division marching from Madrid against Valencia. The reserve under general Drouet was nourished by drafts from the interior: it supplied Bessieres with reinforcements, and afforded a detachment of four thousand men to watch the openings of the valleys of the Pyrenees, especially towards the castle of Jaea, then

in possession of the Spanish insurgents.* A smaller reserve was established at Perpignan, another body watched the openings of the eastern frontier; and all the generals commanding corps, or even detachments, were directed to correspond daily with general Drouet.

The security of the rear being thus provided for, the main body at Madrid commenced offensive operations. Marshal Moncey was directed, with part of his corps upon Cuenca, to intercept the march of the Valencian army upon Zaragoza;† general Dupont, with ten thousand men, marched towards Cadiz, and the remainder of his and Moncey's troops being kept in reserve, were distributed in various parts of La Mancha and the neighbourhood of Madrid. Napoleon likewise directed, that Segovia should be occupied and put in a state of defence; that Gobert's division of Moncey's corps should co-operate with Bessieres on the side of Valladolid, and that moveable columns should scour the country in rear of the acting bodies, uniting again at stated times, upon points of secondary interest.‡ Thus linking his operations together, Napoleon hoped, by grasping as it were the ganglia of the insurrection, to paralyze its force, and reduce it to a few convulsive motions, which would soon subside; the execution of his plan failed in the feeble hands of his lieutenants, but it was well conceived, embraced every probable immediate chance of war, and even provided for the uncertain contingency of an English army landing, upon the flanks or rear of his corps, at either extremity of the Pyrenean frontier.

Military men would do well to reflect upon the prudence which the French emperor displayed upon this occasion. Not all his experience, his power, his fortune, nor the contempt which he felt for the prowess of his adversaries, could induce him to relax in his precautions; every chance was considered, and every measure calculated with as much care and circumspection as if the most redoubtable enemy was opposed to him. The conqueror of Europe was as fearful of making false movements before an army of peasants, as if Frederick the Great had been in his front, and yet he failed! Such is the uncertainty of war!

CHAPTER V.

First operations of marshal Bessieres—Spaniards defeated at Cabecon, at Segovia, at Logrono, at Torquemada—French take St. Ander—Lefebre Desnouettes defeats the Spaniards on the Ebro, on the Huecha, on the Xalon—First siege of Zaragoza—Observations.

As all the insurrections of the Spanish provinces took place nearly at the same period, the operations of the French divisions were nearly simultaneous; I shall, therefore, narrate their proceedings separately, classing them by the effect each produced upon the stability of the intrusive government of Madrid.

OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL BESSIERES.

This officer had scarcely fixed his quarters at Burgos when a general movement of revolt took place.¶ On his right, the bishop of St. Ander excited the inhabitants of the diocese to take arms.§ In his rear, a mechanic assembled some thousand armed peasants at the town of Logrono. In front, five thousand men took possession of the Spanish artillery depot at Segovia, and an equal number assembling at Palencia, advanced to the town of Torquemada, while general Cuesta, with some regular troops and a body of organized peasantry, took post on the Pisuergra at Cabecon.

* Napoleon's notes.

† Journal of Moncey's Operations MSS.

‡ Napoleon's notes.

§ Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.

¶ Moniteur.

Bessieres immediately divided his disposable force, which was not more than twelve thousand men, into several columns, and traversing the country in all directions, disarmed the towns and interrupted the combinations of the insurgents, while a division of Dupont's corps, under general Frere, marched from the side of Madrid to aid his efforts. General Verdier attacked Logrono on the 6th of June, dispersed the peasantry, and put the leaders to death after the action. General Lasalle, departing from Burgos with a brigade of light cavalry, passed the Pisuergra, fell upon the Spaniards at Torquemada on the 7th, broke them, and pursuing with a merciless sword, burnt that town, and entered Palencia on the 8th. Meanwhile Frere defeated the Spanish force at Segovia, taking thirty pieces of artillery; and general Merle marching through the country lying between the Pisuergra and the Duero with a division of infantry, joined Lasalle at Duenas on the 12th; from thence they proceeded to Cabeçon, where Cuesta accepting battle, was overthrown, with much slaughter, the loss of his artillery, and several thousand muskets.

The flat country being thus subdued, Lasalle's cavalry remained to keep it under, while Merle, marching northward, commenced operations, in concert with general Ducos, against the province of St. Ander. On the 20th, the latter general drove the Spaniards from the pass of Soncillo; the 21st, he forced the pass of Venta de Escudo, and descending the valley of the river Pas, approached St. Ander; on the 22d, Merle, after some resistance, penetrating by Lantueno, followed the course of the Besaya to Torre La Vega, then turning to his right, entered St. Ander on the 23d; Ducos arrived at the same time, the town submitted, and the bishop fled with the greatest part of the clergy. The authorities of Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and St. Ander were then compelled to send deputies to take the oath of allegiance to Joseph. By these operations, the above-named provinces were completely disarmed, and so awed by the activity of Bessieres that no further insurrections took place, his cavalry raised contributions and collected provisions without the least difficulty; Frere's division then returned to Toledo, and from thence marched to San Clemente, on the borders of Murcia.

While Bessieres thus broke the northern insurrections, the march of general Lefebre Desnouettes against the province of Aragon brought on the first siege of Zaragoza. To that place had flocked from the most distant parts, soldiers, flying from Madrid and Pampelona, the engineers of the school of Alcala, and all the retired officers in Aragon.* With their assistance Palafox's forces were rapidly organized, and numerous battalions were posted on the roads leading to Navarre. The baron de Versage, an officer of the Walloon guards, occupied Calatayud with a regiment composed of students, and made a levy there to protect the powder-mills of Villa Felice, and to keep a communication with Soria and Sigüenza. The arsenal of Zaragoza supplied the patriots with arms; the people of Tudela broke their bridge on the Ebro, and Palafox reinforced them with five hundred fusileers.

It was in this situation of affairs Lefebre commenced his march from Pampelona the 7th of June, at the head of three or four thousand infantry, some field batteries, and a regiment of Polish cavalry.† On the 9th he forced the passage of the Ebro, put the leaders of the insurrection to death, after the action, and then continued his movement by the right bank to the Mallen.‡ On the Huecha, Palafox with ten thousand infantry, two hundred dragoons, and eight pieces of artillery, disputed the passage, but on the 13th, he was overthrown. The 14th, the French reached the Xalon,

where another combat and another victory carried Lefebre across that river. The 15th he was on the Huerba, in front of the heroic city.

FIRST SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

Zaragoza contained fifty thousand inhabitants. Situated on the right bank of the Ebro, it was connected with a suburb, on the opposite side, by a handsome stone bridge; its immediate vicinity was flat, and on the side of the suburb low and marshy. The small river Huerba, running through a deep cleft, cut the plain on the right bank, and taking its course close to the walls, fell into the Ebro nearly opposite to the mouth of the Gallego, which, descending from the mountains on the opposite side, also cut the plain on the left bank. The convent of St. Joseph, built on the right of the Huerba, covered a bridge over that torrent, and, at the distance of cannon-shot, a step of land commenced, which, gradually rising, terminated at eighteen hundred yards from the convent, in a hill called the Monte Torrero. On this hill, which commanded all the plain and overlooked the town, several storehouses, built for the use of the canal, were entrenched, and occupied by twelve hundred men, and the canal itself, a noble work, furnished water carriage without a single lock from Tudela to Zaragoza.*

The city, surrounded by a low brick wall, presented no regular defences, and possessed very few guns in a serviceable state; but the houses were strongly constructed, and for the most part of two stories, each story vaulted, so as to be nearly fire-proof. Every house had its garrison, and the massive convents, rising like castles, around the circuit and inside the place, were crowded with armed men. Such was Zaragoza when Lefebre Desnouettes appeared before it, his previous movements having cut the direct communication with Calatayud, and obliged the baron Versage to retire to Belchite with his volunteers and fresh levies.

Palafox had occupied the olive groves and houses on the step of land between the convent of St. Joseph and Monte Torrero, but his men, cowed by their previous defeats, were easily driven from thence on the 16th.† The town was then closely invested on the right bank of the Ebro, and so great was the terror of the Spaniards, that some of the French, penetrating without difficulty into the street of St. Engracia, were like to have taken the city.‡ Palafox, accompanied by his brother Francisco, an aide-de-camp, and one hundred dragoons, endeavoured, under pretence of seeking succour, to go forth on the side of the suburb at the moment when the French were entering on the side of Engracia, but the plebeian leaders, suspicious of his intentions, would not suffer him to depart without a guard of infantry, commanded by Tío, or goodman Jorge. It was this person and Tío Marin, who by their energy contributed most to the defence of the city in the first siege; but for them Palafox who has gathered the honours, would have fled at one gate, while the enemy was pressing in at another, and Zaragoza was then on the verge of destruction, for the streets were filled with clamour, the troops making little resistance, and all things in confusion. But the French, either fearful of an ambushade or ignorant of their advantages suddenly retired, and then the people as if inspired, changed from the extreme of terror to that of courage, suddenly fell to casting up defences, piercing loop-holes in the walls of the houses, and constructing ramparts with sand-bags, working with such vigour, that under the direction of their engineers, in twenty-four hours they put the place in a condition to withstand an assault. Whereupon Lefebre, confining his operations to the right bank of the Ebro, established posts close to the gates, and waited for reinforcements.

* Cavallero. † S. Journal of Lefebre's operations. MS.
‡ Moniteur. Victoires et Conquêtes des Français. Cavallero.

* Cavallero. Siege of Zaragoza.
† S. Journal of Lefebre's Operations MSS. ‡ Cavallero.

Meanwhile Palafox, crossing the Ebro at Pina, joined Versage at Belchite, and having collected seven or eight thousand men and four pieces of artillery, gained the Xalon in rear of the French. From thence he proposed to advance through Epila and relieve Zaragoza by a battle, but his officers, amazed at this project, resisted his authority, and would have retired upon Valencia.* Nevertheless, ignorant of war, and probably awed by Tio Jorge, he expressed his determination to fight, saying, with an imposing air, 'that those who feared might retire.' Touched with shame, all agreed to follow him to Epila, but two French regiments, detached by Lefebre, met him on the march, and the Spaniards, unable to form any order of battle, were notwithstanding their superior numbers, defeated with the loss of three thousand men. Palafox, who did not display that firmness in danger which his speech promised, must have fled early, for he reached Calatayud in the night, although many of his troops arrived there unbroken the next morning. After this disaster, leaving Versage at Calatayud, to make fresh levies, the Spanish chief repaired, with all the beaten troops that he could collect to Belchite, and from thence regained Zaragoza on the 2nd of July.

Meanwhile Lefebre had taken the Monte Torroero by assault, and on the 29th of June, was joined by general Verdier with a division of infantry and a large battering train; and being then twelve thousand strong, attacked the convents of St. Joseph and the Capuchins, the very day that Palafox returned. A first assault on St. Joseph's failed, but the second succeeded, and the Capuchins, after some fighting, was set fire to by the Spaniards and abandoned. All this time the suburb was left open and free for the besieged; and Napoleon, who blamed this mode of attack, sent orders to throw a bridge across the Ebro,—to press the siege on the left bank,—and to profit of the previous success, by raising a breaching battery in the convent of St. Joseph.† A bridge was accordingly constructed at St. Lambert, two hundred yards above the town, and two attacks were carried on at the same time. A change also took place in the command, for hitherto the French troops employed in the siege formed a part of marshal Bessieres' corps, but the emperor now directed Lefebre to rejoin that marshal with a brigade, and then constituting the ten thousand men who remained with Verdier a separate corps, gave him the command.

Verdier continued to press the siege as closely as his numbers would permit, but around him, the insurgents were rapidly organising small armies, and threatened to enclose him in his camp, wherefore he sent detachments against them;‡ and it is singular that, with so few men, while daily fighting with the besieged, he should have been able to scour the country, and put down the insurrection, as far as Lerida, Barbastro, Tudela, Jacca and Calatayud, without any assistance save what the garrison of Pampelona could give him from the side of Navarre. In one of these expeditions the powder-mills of Villa Felice, thirty miles distant, were destroyed, and the baron Versage was defeated, and forced to retire with his division towards Valencia. ||

During the course of July, Verdier made several assaults on the gate of El Carmen and the Portillo, but he was repulsed in all, and the besieged having been reinforced by the regiment of Estremadura, composed of eight hundred old soldiers made a sally with two thousand men to retake the Monte Torroero; they were, however, beaten, with the loss of their commander, and regular approaches were then commenced by the French against the quarter of St. Engracia and the castle of Aljaferia. The 2nd of August, the besieged were again reinforced by two hundred men of the Spanish guards and volun-

teers of Aragon, who brought some artillery with them, but the French also, were strengthened by two old regiments of the line, which increased their numbers to fifteen thousand men; and on the 3rd of August the breaching batteries opened against St. Engracia and Aljaferia; the mortars threw shells at the same time, and a Spanish magazine of powder blowing up in the Cosso a public walk formed on the line of the ancient Moorish ramparts, destroyed several houses, and killed many of the defenders. The place was then summoned, but as Palafox rejected all offers, a breach in the convent of St. Engracia was stormed on the 4th. The French penetrated to the Cosso, and a confused and terrible scene ensued, for while some Spaniards defended the houses and some drew up in the streets, others fled by the suburb to the country, where the cavalry fell upon them.* Cries of treason, the sure signals for assassinations, were everywhere heard, and all seemed lost, when a column of the assailants, seeking a way to the bridge over the Ebro, got entangled in the Arco de Cincja, a long crooked street, and being attacked in that situation, were driven back to the Cosso; others began to plunder, and the Zaragozans recovering courage, fought with desperation, and finally set fire to the convent of Francisco: at the close of day the French were in possession of one side of the Cosso, and the Spaniards of the other. A hideous and revolting spectacle was exhibited during this action, for the public hospital being set on fire, the madmen confined there, issued forth among the combatants, muttering, shouting, singing, and moping, each according to the character of his disorder, while drivelling idiots mixed their unmeaning cries with the shouts of contending soldiers.†

The Spaniards now perceived that, with courage, the town might still be defended, and from that day the fighting was murderous and constant; one party endeavouring to take, the other to defend the houses. In this warfare, where skill was nearly useless, Verdier's force was too weak to make a rapid progress, and events disastrous to the French arms taking place in other parts of Spain, he received, about the 10th, orders from the king to raise the siege, and retire to Logrona. Of this operation I shall speak in due time.‡

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Mere professional skill and enterprise do not constitute a great general. Lefebre Desnouettes, by his activity and boldness, with a tithe of their numbers, defeated the insurgents of Aragon in several actions, and scoured the open country; but the same Lefebre, wanting the higher qualities of a general, failed miserably where that intuitive sagacity which reads passing events aright, was required. There were thousands in the French army who could have done as well as he, probably not three who could have reduced Zaragoza; and yet it is manifest that Zaragoza owed her safety to accident, and that the desperate resistance of the inhabitants was more the result of chance than of any peculiar virtue.

2. The feeble defence made at Mallen, at the Xalon, at the Monte Torroero, at Epila; the terror of the besieged on the 16th, when the French penetrated into the town; the flight of Palafox under the pretence of seeking succour; nay, the very assault which in such a wonderful manner called forth the energy of the Zaragozans, and failed only because the French troops plundered, and, by missing the road to the bridge, missed that to victory, proves, that the fate of the city was determined by accident, in more than one of those nice conjunctures, which men of genius know how to seize, but others leave to the decision of fortune. However,

* Cavallero. † S. Journal of Lefebre's Operations, MSS.
‡ Napoleon's Notes. || Cavallero.

* Cavallero. † Ibid.
‡ S. Journal of Lefebre's Operations, MSS.

it must be acknowledged that Lefebre and Verdier, especially the latter, displayed both vigour and talent; for it was no mean exploit to quell the insurrections to a distance of fifty miles on every side, at the same time investing double their own numbers, and pushing the attack with such ardour as to reduce to extremity a city so defended.

3. The current romantic tales, of women rallying the troops and leading them forward at the most dangerous periods of this siege, I have not touched upon, and may perhaps be allowed to doubt; yet it is not unlikely, that when suddenly environed with horrors, the delicate sensitiveness of women, driving them to a kind of phrenzy, might produce actions above the heroism of men, and in patient suffering their superior fortitude is acknowledged by all nations: wherefore I neither wholly believe, nor will deny, their exploits at Zaragoza, merely remarking, that for a long time afterwards, Spain swarmed with heroines from that city, clothed in half uniforms, and loaded with weapons.

4. The two circumstances that principally contributed to the success of the defence were, the bad discipline of the French soldiers, and the system of terror which was established by the Spanish leaders, whoever those leaders were. Few soldiers can be restrained from plunder when a town is taken by assault, yet there is no period when the chances of war are so sudden and so decisive, none where the moral responsibility of a general is so great. Will military regulations alone secure the necessary discipline at such a moment? The French army are not deficient in a stern code, and the English army, taken altogether, is probably the best regulated of modern times; but here it is seen that Lefebre failed to take Zaragoza in default of discipline; and in the course of this work it will appear, that no wild horde of Tartars ever fell with more licence upon their rich effeminate neighbours, than did the English troops upon the Spanish towns taken by storm. The inference to be drawn is, that national institutions only will produce that moral discipline necessary to make a soldier capable of fulfilling his whole duty; yet the late Lord Melville was not ashamed to declare in parliament that the worst men make the best soldiers; and this odious, narrow-minded, unworthy maxim, had its admirers. That a system of terror was at Zaragoza successfully employed to protract the defence is undoubted. The commandant of Monte Torrero, ostensibly for suffering himself to be defeated, but according to some for the gratification of private malice, was tried and put to death; a general of artillery was in a more summary manner killed without any trial, and the chief engineer, a man of skill and undaunted courage, was arbitrarily imprisoned. The slightest word, or even gesture, of discontent, was punished with instant death.* A stern band of priests, and plebeian-leaders, in whose hands Palafox was a tool, ruled with such furious energy, that resistance to the enemy was less dangerous than disobedience to their orders: suspicion was the warrant of death, and this system once begun, ceased not until the town was taken in the second siege.

CHAPTER VI.

Operations in Catalonia—General Swartz marches against the town of Manresa, and general Chabran against Taragona—French defeated at Bruch—Chabran recalled—Burns Arbos—Marches against Bruch—Retreats—Duhesme assaults Gerona—Is repulsed with loss—Action on the Llobregat—General insurrection of Catalonia—Figueras blockaded—General Reille relieves it—First siege of Gerona—The marquis of Palacios arrives in Catalonia with the Spanish troops from

the Balearic isles, declared captain-general under St. Narcissus, re-establishes the line of the Llobregat—The count of Caldagues forces the French lines at Gerona—Duhesme raises the siege and returns to Barcelona—Observations—Money marches against Valencia, defeats the Spaniards at Pajaso, at the Siete Aguas, and at Quarte—Attacks Valencia, is repulsed, marches into Murcia—Forces the passage of the Xucar, defeats Serbelloni at San Felipe, arrives at San Clemente—Insurrection at Cuenca, quelled by general Caulin-court—Observations.

WHEN Barcelona fell into the power of the French, the Spanish garrison amounted to nearly four thousand men, wherefore, Duhesme, daily fearing a riot in the city, connived at their escape in parties, and even sent the regiment of Estremadura entire to Lerida;* but, strange to relate, the gates were shut against it! and thus discarded by both parties, it made its way into Zaragoza during the siege of that place. Many thousand citizens also fled from Barcelona, and joined the patriotic standards in the neighbouring provinces.

After the first ebullition at Manresa, the insurrection of Catalonia lingered awhile, yet the junta of Gerona continued to excite the people to take arms, and it was manifest that a general commotion approached.† This was a serious affair, for there were in the beginning of June, including those who came out of Barcelona, five thousand veteran troops in the province, and in the Balearic islands above ten thousand; Sicily contained an English army, and English fleets covered the Mediterranean.‡ Moreover, by the constitution of Catalonia, the whole of the male population fit for war are obliged to assemble, at certain points of each district, with arms and provisions, whenever the alarm bell, called the *somaten*, is heard to ring, hence the name of *somatenes*; and these warlike peasants, either from tradition or experience, are well acquainted with the military value of their mountain holds.

Hostilities soon commenced. Duhesme, following his instructions, detached general Chabran, with five thousand two hundred men, to secure Tarragona, and Tortosa, to incorporate the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen with his own troops, and to aid marshal Money in an attack on Valencia. At the same time general Swartz having more than three thousand Swiss, Germans, and Italians, under his command, was detached by the way of Martorel and Montserrat to Manresa.§ His orders were to raise contributions to put down the insurrection, to destroy the powder-mills at the last town, to get possession of Lerida, to incorporate all the Swiss troops found there in his own brigade, to place five hundred men in the citadel, and finally to penetrate into Aragon, and co-operate with Lefebre against Zaragoza.

These two columns quitted Barcelona the 3d and the 4th of June, but a heavy rain induced Swartz to halt the 5th at Martorel; the 6th he resumed his march without any military precautions, although the object of his expedition was known, and, the *somaten* ringing out among the hills, the peasants of eight districts were assembled in arms.¶ These men having taken a resolution to defend the pass of Bruch, the most active of the Manresa and Igualada districts, assisted by a few old soldiers, immediately repaired there, and when Swartz came on in a careless manner, opened a heavy but distant fire from the rocks. Some confusion arose, but the Catalans were soon beaten from their fastness, and pursued for four or five miles along the main road, to Casa Mansana, where a cross road leads to Manresa, here one part broke away, while the others continued their flight to Igualada.

Swartz, a man evidently destitute of talent, halted at the very moment when his success was complete, and

* Cabanes, 1st Part.

† Napoleon's Notes.

‡ Cabanes, 1st Part.

§ St. Cyr. Victoires et Conquêtes des Francois. Foy. Cabanes.

¶ Ibid.

* Cavallero.

the Catalans, seeing his hesitation, first rallied in the rear of Casa Mansana, then returned to the attack, and finally drove the advanced guard back upon the main body. The French general now became alarmed, formed a square, and retired hastily towards Esparraguera, followed and flanked by clouds of somatenes, whose courage and numbers increased every moment. At Esparraguera, which was a long single street, the inhabitants had prepared an ambush, but Swartz, who arrived at twilight, getting intelligence of their design, passed to the right and left of the houses, and continuing his flight, reached Martorel the 7th. He lost a gun and many men by this inglorious expedition, from which he returned in such disorder, and with his soldiers so discouraged, that Duhesme thought it necessary to recall Chabran from Tarragona. That general, although the country westward of the Llobregat is rugged and difficult for an army, had reached Tarragona on the 8th without encountering an enemy; but when he attempted to return, the line of his march was intercepted by the insurgents, who took post at Vendrill, Arbos, and Villa Franca, and spread themselves along the banks of the Llobregat. As he approached Vendrill the somatenes fell back to Arbos, and were defeated there, whereupon the French set fire to the town, and proceeded to Villa Franca. Here the excesses so common at this time among the Spaniards were not spared; the governor, an old man, and several of his friends, had been murdered, and the perpetrators of these crimes, as might be expected, made little or no defence against the enemy. Meanwhile general Lechi moved out of Barcelona, and acting in concert with Swartz's brigade, which had reached Martorel, cleared the banks of the Llobregat and formed a junction at San Felice with Chabran on the 11th. The latter, after a day's rest, then marched with his own and Swartz's brigade on Manresa to repair the former disgrace, and he arrived at Bruch the 14th; but the somatenes assisted by some regular troops with artillery, were again there, and Chabran, more timid even than Swartz, finding that in a partial skirmish he made no impression, took the extraordinary resolution of retreating, or rather flying from those gallant peasants, who pursued him with scoffs and a galling fire back to the very walls of Barcelona.

These successes spurred on the insurrection. Gerona, Rosas, Hostalrich, and Tarragona prepared for defence. The somatenes of the Ampurdan, obliged the French commandant to quit the town of Figueras, and shut himself up with three hundred men in the citadel, while others, gathering between the Ter and the Besos, intercepted all communication between France and Barcelona. In this predicament, Duhesme resolved to make a sudden attempt on Gerona, with six thousand of his best troops, and eight pieces of artillery; but as the fortress of Hostalrich stood in the direct road, he followed the coast line, and employed a French privateer, then in the harbour, to attend his march. The somatenes soon got intelligence of his designs; one multitude took possession of the heights of Moncada, which are six miles from Barcelona, and overhang the road to Hostalrich; another multitude was posted on the ridge of Mongat, which, at the same distance from Barcelona abuts on the sea, and these last were protected on the left by an intrenched castle with a battery of fifteen guns, and on the right were slightly connected with the people at Moncada. The 17th, Duhesme, after some false movements, defeated them, and a detachment from Barcelona dispersed those at Moncada the same day; the 18th, the town of Mattaro was taken and plundered, the somatenes were again defeated at the pass of St. Pol, and at nine o'clock in the morning of the 20th, the French appeared before Gerona.

This town, built on the right bank of the Ter, is cut in two by the Oña. To the eastward it is confined by

strong rocky hills, whose points filling the space between the Oña and the Ter, overlook the town at different distances. Fort Mont Jouy, a regular fortification, crowned the nearest hill or table land, at five hundred yards' distance; three other forts, namely that of the Constable, that of queen Ann, and that of Capuchins, all connected by a ditch and rampart, formed one irregular outwork, a thousand yards in length, and commanding all the ridge to the south-east. The summit of this ridge is five, eight, and twelve hundred yards from Gerona, and sixteen hundred from Fort Mont Jouy, and is separated from the latter by the narrow valley and stream of the Gallegan.

South-west, between the left of the Oña and the Ter, the country is comparatively flat, but full of hollows and clefts close to the town, and the body of the place, on that side, was defended by a ditch and five regular bastions connected by a wall with towers. To the west the city was covered by the Ter, and on the east fortified by a long wall with towers having an irregular bastion at each extremity, and some small detached works placed at the opening of the valley of Gallegan. Three hundred of the regiment of Ultonia and some artillery-men composed the garrison of Gerona; they were assisted by volunteers and by the citizens, and the somatenes also assembled on the left of the Ter to defend the passage of that river.

Duhesme, after provoking some cannon-shot from the forts, occupied the village of St. Eugenia in the plain, and making a feint as if to pass the Ter by the bridge of Salt, engaged the somatenes in a useless skirmish. Great part of the day was spent by him in preparing ladders for the attack; at five o'clock in the evening the French artillery opened from the heights of Palau, and then a column crossing the Oña passed between the outworks and the town, threw out a detachment to keep the garrison of the former in check, and assaulted the gate of El Carmen.* This attempt failed completely, and with great loss to the assailants. Two hours after, another column advancing by the left of the Oña, assaulted the bastion of Santa Clara, but with so little arrangement or discipline, that the storming party had only three or four ladders;† and although by favour of the hollows they reached the walls unperceived, and the Neapolitan colonel Ambrosio and the engineer Lafaille actually gained the top of the ramparts, the confusion amongst the assailants was such, that no success was obtained. Duhesme, tried negotiation on the following day, yet dreading a longer absence from Barcelona, broke up on the 22d, and returned by forced marches, leaving Chabran with some troops in Mattaro as he passed. During his absence the victorious somatenes of Bruch had descended the Llobregat, rallied those of the lower country, and getting artillery from Tarragona and other fortresses, planted batteries at the different passages of the river, and entrenched a line from San Boy to Martorel. Regular officers now took the command of the peasants. Colonel Milans assembled a body at Granollers; don Juan Claros put himself at the head of the peasants of the Ampurdan; colonel Baget took the command of those at Bruch.

Chabran, after a few days' rest at Mattaro, made a foraging excursion through the district of El Valles, but Milans, who held the valley of the Congosta, encountered him near Granollers, and both sides claimed the victory; Chabran, however, retired to Barcelona, and Milans remained on the banks of the Besos. The 30th, Duhesme caused the somatenes on the Llobregat to be attacked, sent Lechi to menace those at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, and the brigades of Bessieres and Goullus, to cross at San Boy; the latter having surprised a battery at that point, turned the whole line,

* St. Cyr.

† Lafaille.

and Lechi then crossing the river by the bridge of Molinos, ascended the left bank, took all the artillery, burnt several villages, and put the insurgents to flight. They however rallied again, at Bruch and Igualada, and returning the 6th of July, infested the immediate vicinity of Barcelona, taking possession of all the hills between San Boy and Moncada, and connecting their operations with colonel Milans. Other parties collected between the Besos and the Ter, and the line of insurrection was extended to the Ampurdan; Juan Claros occupied the flat country about Rosas, and the French garrison of Figueras having burnt the town, were blocked up in the fort of San Fernando by two thousand somatenes of the Pyrenees; a nest of Spanish privateers was formed in Palamos Bay, and two English frigates, the Imperieuse and the Cambrian, watched the coast from Rosas to Barcelona. A supreme junta was now established at Lerida, and opened an intercourse with Aragon, Valencia, Seville, Gibraltar, and the Balearic islands; it also decreed, that forty tercios, or regiments of one thousand men, to be selected from the somatenes, should be paid and organized as regular troops, and that forty others should be kept in reserve, but without pay.

This state of affairs being made known to Napoleon through the medium of the moveable columns watching the valleys of the eastern Pyrenees, he ordered general Reille, then commanding the reserve at Perpignan, to take the first soldiers at hand and march to the relief of Figueras; after which, his force being increased by drafts from the interior of France to nine thousand, he was to assault Rosas and besiege Gerona; and the emperor imagined, that the fall of the latter place would induce the surrender of Lerida, and would so tranquilize Catalonia, that five thousand men might again be detached towards Valencia. On receiving this order, Reille, with two battalions of Tuscan recruits, conducted a convoy safely to Figueras and raised the blockade, but not without difficulty, for his troops were greatly terrified, and could scarcely be kept to their colours.* He however relieved the place the 10th of July, and the same day, Duhesme, who had been preparing for a second attack on Gerona, quitted Barcelona with six thousand infantry, some cavalry, a battering train of twenty-two pieces, and a great number of country carriages to transport his ammunition and stores, leaving Lechi in the city with five thousand men. Meanwhile Reille, having victualled Figueras and received a part of his reinforcements, proceeded to invest Rosas; but he had scarcely appeared before it, when Juan Claros raised the country in his rear, and Captain Otway, of the Montague, landing with some marines, joined the migueletes, whereupon the French retired with a loss of two hundred men.†

Duhesme pursued his march by the coast, but the somatenes broke up the road in his front, Milans hung on his left, and Lord Cochrane, with the Imperieuse frigate and some Spanish vessels, cannonaded his right. Thus incommoded, he halted five days in front of Arenas de Mar, and then dividing his force, sent one part across the mountains by Villagorguin, and another by San Isicle. The first column made an attempt on Hostalrich, and failed; the second, beating Milans, dispersed the somatenes of the Tordera, and finally, Duhesme united his forces before Gerona, but he lost many carriages on his march. The 23d he passed the Ter, and dispersed the migueletes that guarded the left bank. The 24th general Reille, coming from Figueras with six thousand men, took post at Puente Mayor, and the town was invested, from that point, by the heights of San Miguel to the Monte Livio; from Monte Livio by the plain to the bridge of Salt; and from thence along the left bank of the Ter to Sarria. The garrison,

consisting of five hundred migueletes and four hundred of the regiment of Ultonia, was reinforced on the 25th by thirteen hundred of the regiment of Barcelona, who entered the town with two guns; the defences were in bad repair, but the people were resolute.

In the night of the 27th, a French column passed the valley of the Galligan, gained the table land of Mont Jouy, and of three towers, which the Spaniards abandoned in a panic. This advantage so elated Duhesme, that he resolved, without consulting his engineer, to break ground on that side;* but at this period a great change in the affairs of Catalonia had taken place.† The insurrection hitherto confined to the exertions of the unorganized somatenes, was now consolidated by a treaty between lord Collingwood, who commanded the British navy in the Mediterranean, and the marquis of Palacios, who was captain-general of the Balearic isles; thus the Spanish fleet and the troops in Minorca, Majorca, and Ivica, became disposable for the service of the patriots.‡ Palacios immediately sent thirteen hundred men to the port of San Felice di Quixols to reinforce the garrison of Gerona, and these men entered that city, as we have seen, on the 25th, while Palacios himself disembarked four thousand others, together with thirty-seven pieces of artillery, at Tarragona, an event which excited universal joy, and produced a surprising eagerness to fight the French. The supreme junta immediately repaired to that town, declared Palacios their president, and created him commander-in-chief, subject, however, to their tutelar saint, Narcissus, who was appointed generalissimo of the forces by sea and land, the ensigns of authority being, with due solemnity, placed on his coffin.

The first object with Palacios was to re-establish the line of the Llobregat. To effect this, the count of Caldagues, with eighteen hundred men and four guns, marched from Tarragona in two columns, the one moving by the coast way to San Boy, and the other by the royal road, through Villafranca and Ordal. Caldagues, in passing by the bridge of Molino del Rey, established a post there, and then ascending the left bank, fixed his quarters at Martorel, where colonel Baget joined him with three thousand migueletes of the new levy. Now the Llobregat runs within a few miles of Barcelona, but as the right bank is much the steepest, the lateral communications easier, and as the heights command a distinct view of everything passing on the opposite side, the line taken by Caldagues was strong, for the country in his rear was rough with defiles, and very fitting for a retreat after the loss of a battle.

General Lechi, thus hemmed in on the west, was also hampered on the north, because the mountains filling the space between the Llobregat and the Besos, approach in tongues as near as two and three miles from Barcelona, and the somatenes of the Manresa and Valls districts occupying them, skirmished daily with the French outposts. And beyond the Besos, which bounds Barcelona on the eastward, a lofty continuous ridge, extending to Hostalrich, runs parallel to and at the distance of two or three miles from the sea coast, separating the main from the marine roads, and sending its shoots down to the water's edge; this ridge also swarmed with somatenes, who cut off all communication with Duhesme, and lay in laager round the castle of Mongat, in which were eighty or ninety French. The Cambrian and the Imperieuse frigates blockaded the harbour of Barcelona itself; and, on the 31st, lord Cochrane having brought his vessel alongside of Mongat, landed his marines, and, in concert with the somatenes, took it, blew up the works, and rolled the rocks and ruins down in such a manner as to destroy the

* Foy's History.

† Lord Collingwood's despatch, Aug. 27. Foy's History.

* St. Cyr. Campaign in Catalonia.

† Cabanes' History.

‡ St. Cyr. Cabanes' History, 2d Part.

road.* Thus, at the very moment that Duhesme commenced the siege of Gerona, he was cut off from his own base of operations, and the communication between Figueras and general Reille's division was equally insecure; for the latter's convoys were attacked the 28th of July and the 3d of August; and so fiercely on the 6th, that a Neapolitan battalion was surrounded, and lost one hundred and fifty men.†

Palacios, whose forces increased daily, now wished to make an effort in favour of Gerona, and with this view sent the count of Caldagues, at the head of three or four thousand men, part migueletes, part regulars, to interrupt the progress of the siege, intending to follow himself with greater forces. Caldagues marched by Tarrasa, Sabadell, Granollers, and San Celoni, and reached Hostalrich the morning of the 10th, where his force was increased to five thousand men and four guns. The 13th, he entered Llagostera, and the 14th Castellar, a small place situated behind the ridges that overlook Gerona, and only five miles from the French camps. Here Juan Claros with two thousand five hundred migueletes, mixed with some Walloon and Spanish Guards from Rosas, met him, as did also Milans with eight hundred somatenes. A communication with the junta of Gerona was then opened, Fort Mont Jouy was upon the point of surrendering, but the French, who were ignorant of Caldagues' approach, had, contrary to good discipline, heaped their forces in the plain between the left of the Oña and the Ter, but only kept a slender guard on the hills, while a single battalion protected the batteries raised against Mont Jouy. Being an enterprising man, the Spanish general resolved to make an immediate effort for the relief of the place, and, after a careful observation, sent, on the 16th, several columns against the weak part of the besiegers' line, the garrison sallied forth at the same time from Mont Jouy, and the French guards being taken between two fires, were quickly overpowered, and driven first to the Puente Mayor and finally over the Ter. The Catalans re-formed on the hills, expecting to be attacked; but Duhesme and Reille remained quiet until dark, and then breaking up the siege, fled, the one to Figueras, the other to Barcelona, leaving both artillery and stores behind.

Duhesme at first wished to retreat by the coast, but at Callella he learned that the road was cut, that an English frigate was ready to rake his columns, and that the somatenes were on all the heights, wherefore, destroying his ammunition, he threw his artillery over the rocks, and, taking to the mountains, forced a passage through the somatenes to Mongat, where Lechi met him and covered the retreat to Barcelona.

OBSERVATION 1st.—Three great communications pierce the Pyrenean frontier of Catalonia, leading directly upon Barcelona.

The first, or Puycerda road penetrates between the sources of the Segre and the Ter.

The second, or Campredon road, between the sources of the Ter and the Fluvia.

The third, or Figueras road, between the sources of the Muga and the sea-coast.

The first and second unite at Vicque; the second and third are connected by a transverse road running from Olot, by Castle Folli, to Gerona; the third also dividing near the latter town, leads with one branch through Hostalrich, and with the other follows the line of the coast. After the union of the first and second at Vicque, a single route pursues the stream of the Besos to Barcelona, thus turning the Muga, the Fluvia, the Ter, the Tordera, Besos, and an infinity of minor streams, which in their rapid course to the Mediterranean, furrow all the country between the eastern Pyrenees and Barce-

lona. The third, which is the direct and best communication between Perpignan and the capital of Catalonia, crosses all the above-named rivers, and their deep channels and sudden floods offer serious obstacles to the march of an army.

All these roads, with the exception of that from Olot to Gerona, are separated by craggy mountain ridges scarcely to be passed by troops; and the two first leading through wild and savage districts, are incommoded by defiles, and protected by a number of old castles and walled places, more or less capable of resistance. The third, passing through many rich and flourishing places, is however completely blocked, to an invader, by the strong fortresses of Figueras and Rosas on the Muga, of Gerona on the Ter, and Hostalrich on the Tordera. Palamos and other castles likewise impede the coast road, which is moreover skirted by rocky mountains, and exposed for many leagues to the fire of a fleet. Such is Catalonia, eastward and northward of Barcelona.

On the west, at five or six miles distance, the Llobregat cuts it off from a rough and lofty tract, through which the Cardena, the Noga, the Foix, Gaya, Anguera, and Francoli rivers, breaking down deep channels, descend, in nearly parallel lines, to the coast, and the spaces between are gorged with mountains, and studded with fortified places which command all the main roads.

So few and contracted are the plains and fertile valleys, that Catalonia may, with the exception of the rich parts about Lerida, and the Urgel, be described as a huge mass of rocks and torrents, incapable of supplying subsistence even for the inhabitants, whose prosperity depends entirely upon manufactures and commerce. Barcelona, the richest and most populous city in Spain, is the heart of the province, and who masters it, if he can hold it, may suck the strength of Catalonia away. But a French army, without a commanding fleet to assist, can scarcely take or keep Barcelona; the troops must be supplied by regular convoys from France, the fortresses on the line of communication must be taken and provisioned, and the active intelligent population of the country must be beaten from the rivers, pursued into their fortresses, and warred down by exertions which none but the best troops are capable of: for the Catalans are robust, numerous, and brave enough after their own manner.

OBSERVATION 2d.—It follows from this exposition, that Duhesme evinced a surprising want of forethought and military sagacity, in neglecting to secure Gerona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, with garrisons, when his troops were received into those places. It was this negligence that rendered the timid operations of Swartz and Chabran capital errors; it was this that enabled some poor, injured, indignant peasants to kindle a mighty war, and in a very few weeks obliged Napoleon to send thirty thousand men to the relief of Barcelona.

OBSERVATION 3d.—Duhesme was experienced in battles, and his energy and resources of mind have been praised by a great authority;* but undoubtedly an absence of prudent calculation and arrangement, a total neglect of military discipline, marked all his operations in Catalonia, witness his mode of attack on Gerona, the deficiency of ladders, and the confusion of the assaults;† witness also his raising of the second siege, and absolute flight from Caldagues, whose rash enterprise, although crowned with success, should have caused his own destruction. In those affairs it is certain Duhesme displayed neither talent nor vigour; but in the severities he exercised at the sacking of Mattaro, in the burning of villages, which he executed to the extreme verge of, if not beyond what the harshest laws of war will justify, an odious energy was apparent;‡

* Lord Collingwood's despatches.

† St. Cyr.

* Napoleon.

† St. Cyr.

‡ Napoleon's notes. St. Cyr. Cabanes.

and as the ardour of the somatenes was rather increased than repressed by these rigorous proceedings, his conduct may be deemed as impolitic as it was barbarous. It is however to be remembered that Duhesme has not wanted defenders, who, asserting that he was humane and just, accuse Lechi, his equal in rank, of being the author of the severities exercised at Barcelona.*

OBSERVATION 4th.—In Catalonia all the inherent cruelty of the Spaniards was as grossly displayed as in any other province of Spain; the Catalans were likewise vain and superstitious. But their courage was higher, their patriotism purer, and their efforts more sustained, the somatenes were bold and active in battle, the population of the towns firm, and some of the juntas apparently disinterested; the praise merited and bestowed, upon the people of Zaragoza is great, yet Gerona more justly claims the admiration of mankind. For the Aragonese troops were by Lefebvre driven from the open country in crowds to their capital, and little was wanted to induce them to surrender at once; it was not until the last hour that, gathering courage from despair, the people of Zaragoza put forth all their energy, whereas those of Gerona, although attacked by a greater force, and possessing fewer means of defence, without any internal system of terror to counterbalance their fear of the enemy, manfully and successfully resisted from the first. The people of Zaragoza rallied at their hearthstone, those of Gerona stood firm at the porch. But quitting these matters, I must now, following the order I have marked out, proceed to relate the occurrences in Valencia.

OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL MONCEY.

The execution of Calvo and his followers changed the horrid aspect of the Valencian insurrection; the spirit of murder was checked, and the patriotic energy assumed a nobler appearance. Murcia and Valencia were united as one province, and towards the end of June, nearly thirty thousand men, armed and provided with artillery, attested the resources of these rich provinces, and the activity of their chiefs. The Valencians then conceived the plan of marching to the assistance of the Aragonese; but Napoleon had already prescribed the measures which were to render such a movement abortive.

An order, dated the 30th of May, had directed Moncey to move, with a column of ten thousand men, upon Cuenca; from that point he was to watch the country comprised between the lower Ebro and Carthagera, and he was empowered to act against the city of Valencia if he judged it fitting to do so. The position of Cuenca was advantageous; a short movement from thence to the left would place Moncey's troops upon the direct line between Valencia and Zaragoza, and enable him to intercept all communication between those towns;† and a few marches to the right would place him upon the junction of the roads leading from Carthagera and Valencia to Madrid. If he thought it essential to attack Valencia, the division of general Chabran was to co-operate from the side of Catalonia, by which combination the operations of Lefebvre Desnouettes at Zaragoza, and those of Duhesme in Catalonia, were covered from the Valencians; and at the same time the flank of the French army at Madrid was protected on the side of Murcia.

The 6th of June Moncey marched from Aranjuez by Santa Cruz, Tarancón, Carascoso, and Villa del Osma, and reached Cuenca the 11th. Here receiving information of the rapid progress of the insurrection, of the state of the Valencian army, and of the projected movement to relieve Zaragoza, he resolved to make an attempt against the city of Valencia.‡ In this view,

supposing general Chabran to be at Tortosa, he ordered him to march upon Castellón de la Plana, a town situated at some distance eastward of the river Guadalaviar, proposing himself to clear the country westward of that river, and he fixed the 25th of June as the latest period at which the two columns were to communicate in the immediate vicinity of Valencia.

Halting from the 11th to the 16th at Cuenca, he marched the 17th to Tortosa, the 18th to Buenachas, the 19th to Matilla, the 20th to Minglanilla, and the 21st to Pesquera; but from Buenachas to Pesquera no inhabitants were to be seen, the villages were deserted, and either from fear or hatred, every living person fled before his footsteps. At length, a Swiss regiment, some of the Spanish guards, and a body of armed peasantry, made a stand at the bridge of Pajaso, upon the river Cabriel, and the manner in which the country had been forsaken, the gloomy and desolate marches, and the sudden appearance of an armed force ready to dispute this important pass, prognosticated a desperate conflict; yet the event belied the omens, scarcely any resistance was made.

Moncey, having informed general Chabran of this success, appointed the 27th and 28th for a junction under the walls of Valencia. The next day he took a position at Otiel; * but hearing that the defeated patriots had rallied and, reinforced, to the number of ten or twelve thousand, were intrenching themselves upon his left, he quitted the direct line of march to attack them in their post of Cabrillas, which was somewhat in advance of the Siete Aguas. The Spanish position was of extraordinary strength, the flanks rested upon steep rocky mountains, and the only approach to the front was through a long narrow defile, formed by high scarped rocks, whose tops, inaccessible from the French side were covered with the armed peasantry of the neighbourhood. As a direct assault upon such a position could not succeed, and general Harispe was directed to turn it by the right, while the cavalry and artillery occupied the attention of the Spaniards in front; that general soon overcame the obstacles of ground, reached the Spanish troops, and defeated them, with the loss of all their cannon, ammunition and baggage, and also of the Swiss regiment which came over to the victors. This action happened on the 24th, it freed Moncey's left flank, and he resumed his march by the direct road to Valencia, where he arrived the twenty-seventh. The ancient walls remained, all the approaches were commanded by works hastily repaired or newly raised, the citadel was in a state of defence, and the population were willing to fight.

A city, containing eighty thousand people actuated by violent passions, cannot be easily overcome; and Valencia, built upon low ground, and encircled with numerous canals and cuts, made for the purposes of irrigation, had its deep ditches filled with water, so that no approach could be made except against the gates. An assault seemed hopeless, but it is said that the marshal had corrupted a smuggler, who promised to betray the city during the heat of the assault, and it is probable that some secret understanding of that kind induced him to make an attempt which would otherwise have been rash and unimpracticable.

Don Joseph Caro, a brother to the marquis of Romana, was with four thousand men entrenched behind the canal of the Guadalaviar, five miles in advance of the city gates; and as the village of Quarte, and some thickly planted mulberry trees, helped to render this post very strong, Moncey, who attacked it upon the 27th, met with a vigorous resistance. Caro was, however, beaten, and chased into the city, with the loss of some cannon, and on the 28th the French drove in the outposts, and occupied all the principal avenues of the

* Lafaille. † S. Journal of Moncey's Operations MSS.
‡ Ibid.

* S. Journal of Moncey's Operations MSS.

town. Enthusiastic as the Valencians were while the enemy was at a distance, Moncey's appearance filled them with terror, and it is possible that a vigorous assault might have succeeded at the first moment of consternation; yet the favourable opportunity, if it really existed, quickly passed away. Padre Rico, a friar distinguished by his resolution, traversed the streets, with a cross in one hand and a sword in the other, arousing the sinking spirit and exciting the fanaticism of the multitude; the fear of retaliation for the massacre of the French residents, and the certainty that Moncey's troops were few, powerfully seconded his efforts, and as it is usual for undisciplined masses of people to pass suddenly from one extreme to another, fear was soon succeeded by enthusiasm.

After disposing his field-pieces at the most favourable points, Moncey, while the impression of Caro's defeat was fresh, summoned the governor. The latter answered, 'That he would defend the city,' and the French fire then opened; but the heavy guns of the Spaniards soon overpowered it. A warm skirmish about the houses of the suburbs and at the gates ensued, and the Valencians fought so well, that when the night fell, no impression had been made on the defences; the assailants were repulsed with loss at every point, and the situation of the French marshal became delicate. The persons sent to seek Chabran could gain no intelligence of that general's movements; the secret connexions in the town, if any there were, had failed; the ammunition was nearly expended, and the army was encumbered with seven or eight hundred wounded men, and among them the general of engineers. Moncey, swayed by these circumstances, relinquished his attack, and the 29th fell back to Quarte.

When it is considered that in a great city only a small number of persons can estimate justly the immense advantages of their situation and the comparative weakness of the enemy, it must be confessed that the spirit displayed by the Valencians upon this occasion was very great; unfortunately it ended here, nothing worthy of such an energetic commencement was afterwards performed, although very considerable armies were either raised or maintained in the province.

At Quarte, the French ascertained that the captain-general, Serbelloni, was marching upon Almanza to intercept the communication with Chieva and Buñol, whereupon Moncey resolved to relinquish the line of Cuenca, and attack him before he could quit the kingdom of Murcia.* This vigorous resolution he executed with great celerity; for, directing the head of his column towards Torrente, he continued his march until night, halting a short distance from that town, and by a forced march the next day reached Alcira, only one league from the river Xucar. From his bivouac at that place he despatched advice to general Chabran of this change of affairs, and meanwhile Serbelloni, surprised in the midst of his movement, and disconcerted in his calculations by the decision and rapidity of Moncey, took up a position to defend the passage of the Xucar. The line of that river is strong, and offers many advantageous points of resistance, but the Spaniards imprudently occupied both banks, and in this exposed situation they were attacked on the morning of the 1st of July. The division on the French side of the river was overthrown, the passage forced without loss of time, and Serbelloni retired to the heights of San Felice, which covered the main road leading from Alcira to Almanza, hoping to secure the defiles in front of the latter town before the enemy could arrive there. But Moncey was again too quick for him; leaving San Felice to his left, he continued his march on another route, and by a strenuous exertion seized the gorge of the de-

files near Almanza late in the night of the 2d, and when the Spanish troops approached his position, he dispersed them at day-break on the 3d, and captured some of their guns. The road being now open, Moncey entered Almanza, and then marched by Bonete, and Chinchilla to Albacete, where he got intelligence that Frere's division, which he expected to find at San Clemente, was gone to Requena.

To understand this movement of Frere, it must be known, that, when Dupont and Moncey marched against Andalusia and Valencia, two divisions were retained by Savary to scour the country near Madrid, and to connect the operations of the main bodies; but they were ill-managed. General Gobert, who, following Napoleon's orders, should have been at Valladolid, reinforced Dupont; and general Frere was sent to Requena to reinforce Moncey, when he should have been at San Clemente, a central point, from whence he could have gained the road of Seville, that of Valencia and Cuenca, or that of Carthage. Meanwhile the people of the Cuenca district having suddenly overpowered a detachment left there by Moncey, Savary ordered Frere to move from San Clemente to Requena, and sent Caulaincourt from Tarazona to quell the insurgents, which was effected with great slaughter on the 3d of July; and the town of Cuenca was pillaged. Hence when Frere, who quitted San Clemente the 26th, reached Requena, he found the country quiet, heard of Caulaincourt's success, and discovered that Moncey, having crossed the Xucar, was on the road to San Clemente. Then retracing his steps, he returned to the latter place with troops, sickly, wearied, and exhausted by these long useless marches in the heat of summer.

Moncey now re-organized his forces, and was preparing artillery and other means for a second attempt against Valencia, when he was interrupted by Savary, who, alarmed at the advance of Cuesta and Blake, recalled Frere towards Madrid. The marshal, extremely offended that the duke of Rovigo, inflated with momentary power, should treat him with so little ceremony, then abandoned San Clemente, and returned by the way of Ocaña to the capital.*

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The result of marshal Moncey's campaign was published by the Spaniards, as a great and decisive failure, and produced extravagant hopes of final success; a happy illusion, if the chiefs had not partaken of it, and pursued their wild course of mutual flattery and exaggeration, without reflecting that in truth there was nothing very satisfactory in the prospect of affairs. Moncey's operation was in the nature of a moveable column, the object of which was to prevent the junction of the Valencian army with the Aragonese; the attempt upon the town of Valencia was, therefore, a simple experiment, which, successful, would have produced great effects, failing, was of trifling consequence in a military point of view. Valencia was not the essential object of the expedition, and the fate of the general campaign depended upon the armies in Old Castile.

2. It was consoling that a rich, and flourishing town, had not fallen into the power of the enemy; but at the same time, a want of real nerve in the Spanish insurrection was visible. The kingdoms of Murcia and Valencia acted in concert, and contained two of the richest sea-port towns in the Peninsula; their united force amounted to thirty thousand organized troops, exclusive of the armed peasants in various districts, and the populace of Valencia were deeply committed by the massacre of the French residents. Here then, if in any place, a strenuous resistance was to be expected; nevertheless, marshal Moncey, whose whole force was, at first, only eight thousand French, and never exceeded

* Journal of Moncey.

§ Foy's History.

ten thousand men, continued marching and fighting without cessation for a month, forced two of the strongest mountain passes in the world, crossed several large and difficult rivers, and carried the war into the streets of Valencia. Disappointed of assistance from Catalonia, he yet extricated himself from a difficult situation, defeated his opponents in five actions, killed and wounded a number of them, equal in amount to the whole of his own force, and made a circuit of above three hundred miles through a hostile and populous country, without having sustained any serious loss, without any desertion from the Spanish battalions incorporated with his own, and what was of more importance, having those battalions much increased by desertions from the enemy. In short, the great object of the expedition had been attained, the plan of relieving Zaragoza was entirely frustrated, and the organization of an efficient Spanish force retarded. But Monecy could hardly have expected to succeed against the town of Valencia; for to use Napoleon's words, '*a city with eighty thousand inhabitants, barricaded streets, and artillery placed at the gates, cannot be taken by the collar.*'

3. General Frere's useless march to Requena was very hurtful to the French, and the duke of Rovigo was rated by the emperor for his want of judgment upon the occasion: 'It was a folly,' the latter writes, 'to dream of reinforcing Monecy, because, if that marshal failed in taking the city by a sudden assault, it became an affair of artillery, and twenty thousand men, more or less, would not enable him to succeed.'—'Frere could do nothing at Valencia, but he could do a great deal at San Clemente; because from that post he could support either Madrid or general Dupont.'

4. Monecy was slightly blamed by the emperor for not halting within a day's march of Valencia, in order to break the spirit of the people, and make them feel the weight of the war; but this opinion was probably formed upon an imperfect knowledge of the local details. The marshal's line of operations from Cuenca was infested by insurgent bands, his ammunition was nearly exhausted, he could hear nothing of Chabran's division, the whole force of Murcia was collecting upon his flank and rear, the country behind him was favorable for his adversaries, and his army was encumbered by a number of wounded men; it was surely prudent, under such circumstances, to open his communication again with Madrid as quickly as possible.

By some authors, the repulse at Valencia has been classed with the inglorious defeat of Dupont at Baylen, but there was a wide difference between the events, the generals, and the results. Monecy, although an old man, was vigorous, active, and decided, and the check he received produced little effect. Dupont was irresolute, slow, and incapable, if not worse, as I shall hereafter show; but before describing his campaign, I must narrate the operations of the Gallician army.

CHAPTER VII.

Second operations of Bessieres—Blake's and Cuesta's armies unite at Benevente—Generals disagree—Battle of Rio Seco—Bessieres' endeavour to corrupt the Spanish generals fails—Bessieres marches to invade Galicia, is recalled, and falls back to Burgos—Observations.

OPERATIONS OF BESSIERES AGAINST BLAKE AND CUESTA.

WHILE Bessieres' moveable columns, ranging over the Asturian and Biscayan mountains, dispersed the insurgent patriots of those provinces, Cuesta, undismayed by his defeat at Cabezon, collected another army at Benevente, and prepared to advance again towards Burgos; and he was supported by the Gallician army, which Filanghieri had organized without difficulty, because the abundant supplies poured in from

England were beginning to be felt, and patriotism is never more efficacious than when supported by large sums of money. Taranco's soldiers joined to the garrisons of Ferrol and Coruña, had been reinforced with new levies, to twenty-five thousand men, and being well equipped, and provided with a considerable train of artillery, were assembled at Manzanal, a strong post in the mountains, twelve miles behind Astorga.

The situation of that city offered great advantages to the Spaniards, for the old Moorish walls which surrounded it were complete, and susceptible of being strengthened, so as to require a regular siege; but a siege could not be undertaken by a small force, while the army of Galicia was entrenched at Manzanal, and while Cuesta remained at Benevente; neither could Bessieres, with any prudence, attack the Gallicians at Manzanal while Cuesta was at Benevente, and while Astorga contained a strong garrison. Filanghieri, who appears to have had some notion of its value, had commenced forming an entrenched camp in the mountains; but being slain by his soldiers, Joachim Blake succeeded to the command, and probably fearing a similar fate, if the army remained stationary, left one division at Manzanal, and with the remainder marched towards Benevente to unite with Cuesta.

Bessieres immediately collected his scattered columns at Palencia, and his plan, founded upon instructions from Bayonne, was to make a rapid movement against Cuesta, in the hope of beating him, while Blake was still behind Leon; then wheeling to the right, to drive the Gallicians back to the mountains, to overrun the flat country with his numerous cavalry, to open a communication with Portugal, and after receiving certain reinforcements, preparing for him, to subdue Galicia, or assist Junot, as might seem most fitting at the time.*

At this period the king was on his journey to Madrid, and the military system of Napoleon was brought to its first great crisis; for unless Bessieres was successful, there could be no sure footing for the French in the capital; and as Madrid was the base of Monecy's and Dupont's operations, the farther prosecution of their plans depended upon the result of the approaching struggle in the plains of Leon. Napoleon, foreseeing this crisis, had directed Savary to occupy Segovia, to send general Gobert's division to Valladolid, and to hold Vedel's and Frere's, the one in La Mancha, a few marches from the capital, and the other at San Clemente, a central point connecting Monecy, Dupont, and Madrid. But Savary, unable to estimate justly the relative importance of the different operations, sent Vedel and Gobert into Andalusia, to reinforce Dupont, when he should rather have recalled the latter to the northern side of the Sierra Morena; he caused Frere, as we have seen, to quit San Clemente, and march by Requena against Valencia, at the moment when Monecy was retiring from that city through Murcia to San Clemente; thus he dispersed and harassed his reserves by long marches to the south without any definite object, when the essential interests were at stake in the north. Now, struck with fear at the approach of Cuesta and Blake, whose armies he had hitherto disregarded, he precipitately recalled Frere, Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont, to Madrid; too late to take part with Bessieres in the coming battle, but exactly timed to frustrate Monecy's projects, and, as we shall hereafter find, to ensure the ruin of Dupont. In this manner, steering his vessel against every wind that blew, he could not fail of storms.

Greatly was Napoleon discontented with these errors; he relied, and with reason, on the ability of Bessieres for a remedy, but to Savary he sent the following instructions, dated the 13th of July:

* Journal of Bessieres' Operations, MSS. Napoleon's notes.

'The French affairs in Spain would be in an excellent state if Gohert's division had marched upon Valladolid, and Frere's had occupied San Clemente, with a moveable column, three or four marches upon the route of general Dupont. Gohert having been directed upon Dupont, Frere being with Money, harassed and enfeebled by marches and countermarches, the position of the French army is become less advantageous.

'Marshal Bessieres is this day at Medina del Rio Seco with fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; the 15th or 16th he will attack Benevente, open a communication with Portugal, drive the rebels into Galicia, and seize upon Leon. If his operations succeed thus, and in a brilliant manner, the position of the French army will again be as good as it was.

'If general Cuesta retires from Benevente without fighting, he will move by Zamora and Salamanca to gain Avila and Segovia, certain that then Bessieres cannot pursue him, as, in that case, he would be menaced by the army of Galicia, whose advanced guard is at Leon. The general who commands at Madrid must then be able to assemble six or seven thousand men and march upon Cuesta; the citadel of Segovia must be occupied by three or four hundred convalescents, with some guns and six weeks' biscuit. It was a great fault not to have occupied this citadel when the major-general ordered it; of all the possible positions, Segovia is the most dangerous for the army; the capital of a province, and situated between two routes; it deprives the army of all its communications, and the enemy once posted in the citadel, the French army cannot dislodge him. Three or four hundred convalescents, a good commandant, and a squad of artillery, will render the castle of Segovia impregnable for some time, and will insure to the army the important position of Segovia.

'If general Cuesta throws himself into Galicia without fighting or suffering a defeat, the position of the army will become better; of course it will be still better if he does so, after having suffered a defeat.

'If marshal Bessieres faces Cuesta at Benevente without attacking him, or if he is repulsed by him, his object will always be to cover Burgos, and to hold the enemy in check as long as possible; he could, perhaps, be reinforced with the three thousand troops of the line which accompany the king, but then there would be no room for hesitation. If Bessieres retires without a battle, he must be reinforced instantly with six thousand men. If he retreats after a battle wherein he has suffered great loss, it will be necessary to make great dispositions; to recall Frere, Gohert, Caulaincourt, and Vedel, by forced marches to Madrid; to withdraw Dupont into the Sierra Morena, or even bring him nearer to Madrid (keeping him always, however, seven or eight marches off), then to crush Cuesta and all the Gallician army, while Dupont will serve as an advanced guard to hold the army of Andalusia in check.'

However, before Bessieres could collect his troops, Blake effected a junction with Cuesta, at Benevente, and three plans were open to those generals.

1. To remove into the mountains, and take a position covering Galicia.

2. To maintain the head of the Gallician army in advance of Astorga, while Cuesta, with his Castilians, pushing by forced marches through Salamanca and Avila, reached Segovia.

3. To advance farther into the plains, and try the fate of a battle.

This last was rash, seeing that Bessieres was well provided with horsemen, and that the Spaniards had scarcely any; but Cuesta, assuming the chief command, adopted it. He left a division at Benevente to protect his stores, and advanced, much against Blake's wishes, with twenty-five thousand regular infantry, a few hundred cavalry, and from twenty to thirty pieces of artillery, in the direction of Palencia. His march, as we have seen, dismayed Savary. To use Napoleon's expressions, he who had been 'hitherto acting as if the

army of Galicia was not in existence,' now acted 'as if Bessieres was already beaten;' but that marshal, firm and experienced, rather than risk an action of such importance with insufficient means, withdrew even the garrison from the important post of St. Ander, and having quickly collected fifteen thousand men and thirty pieces of artillery at Palencia, moved forward on the 12th of July to the encounter.

His line of battle consisted of two divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, and twenty-four guns, his reserve was formed of four battalions and some horse grenadiers of the imperial guards, with six pieces of artillery. On the 13th he halted at Ampudia and Torre de Mormojon, but advancing on the 14th in two columns, he drove in an advanced guard of one hundred and fifty Spanish cavalry, and arrived about nine o'clock in front of Rio Seco, where Cuesta's army was drawn up like some heavy, domestic animal, awaiting the spring of an active wild beast.*

BATTLE OF RIO SECO.

The first line of the Spaniards with all the heavy guns were posted along the edge of a step of land which had an abrupt fall towards the French. The second line, composed of the best troops, augmented but not strengthened by some eighteen thousand armed peasants, was displayed at a great distance behind the first, and the town of Rio Seco was in rear of the centre. Bessieres was at first startled at their numbers, and doubted if he should attack; but soon perceiving the vice of Cuesta's disposition, he ordered general Lasalle to make a feint, against the front, with the light cavalry, while he himself, marching obliquely to the right, outstretched the left of the Spaniards, and suddenly thrust Merle's and Mouton's divisions and the imperial guards, horse and foot, between the lines, and threw the first into confusion; at that moment Lasalle charged furiously, the Spanish front went down at once, and fifteen hundred dead bodies strewed the field.†

The victor's ranks were disordered, and Cuesta made a gallant effort to retrieve the day, for, supported by the fire of all his remaining artillery, he advanced with his second line upon the French, and his right wing falling on boldly, took six guns; but his left hung back, and the flank of the right was thus exposed. Bessieres, with great readiness, immediately charged on this naked flank with Merle's division and the horse grenadiers, while the fourteenth provisional regiment made head against the front; a fierce short struggle ensued, and the Spaniards were overborne, were broken and dispersed: meanwhile the first line rallied in the town of Rio Seco, but being a second time defeated by Mouton's division, fled over the plains, pursued by the light cavalry and suffering severely in their flight.‡

Five or six thousand Spaniards were killed and wounded on the field, twelve hundred prisoners, eighteen guns, and a great store of ammunition, remained in the hands of the French, and the vanquished sought safety in all directions, chiefly on the side of Benevente. || Blake and Cuesta separated in wrath with each other, the former made for the mountains of Galicia, and the latter towards Leon, while the division left at Benevente dispersed. The French who had lost fifty killed and three hundred wounded, remained at Rio Seco all the 15th, and the 16th advanced to Benevente, where they found many thousand English muskets and vast quantities of ammunition, clothing and provisions. The communication with Portugal was now open, and Bessieres at first resolved to give his hand to Junot, but hearing that the fugitives were likely to rally on the side of Leon, he pursued them by the road of Villafere. On his march, learning that Cuesta was gone to Mayorga, he turned aside to that place, and on the 22d

* S. Journal of Bessieres' Operations.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

|| Mr. Stuart's Papers.

captured there another great collection of stores; for the Spanish general with the usual improvidence of his nation, had established all his magazines in the open towns of the flat country.

After this Bessieres entered the city of Leon and remained there until the 29th, during which time he received the submission of the municipality, and prepared to carry the war into Galicia. Meanwhile the junta of Castile and Leon, whose power had hitherto been restrained by Cuesta, retired to Puente-Ferrada, assumed supreme authority, and the quarrel between the generals having become rancorous, they sided with Blake. This appeared to Bessieres a favourable occasion to tamper with the fidelity of the chiefs. He therefore sent his prisoners back, argued the hopeless state of the insurrection, offered the viceroyalty of Mexico to Cuesta, and promised military ranks and honours to Blake. But as neither would listen to him, he had reached Puente Orbigo the 31st, intending to break into Galicia, when he was suddenly recalled to protect the king; for Dupont had surrendered with a whole army in Andalusia. The victory of Rio Seco was rendered useless, the court was in consternation, and Bessieres immediately returned to Mayorga, where he took a defensive position.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. As Blake was overruled by Cuesta, he is not responsible for the errors of this short campaign; but the faults were gross on both sides, and it seems difficult to decide whether Savary or Cuesta made the greatest number. If Savary had sent Gobert's division to Valladolid, Bessieres would have had twenty-two thousand men and forty pieces of artillery in the field; a force not at all too great, when it is considered that the fate of three French armies depended upon a battle, to which the Spaniards might have brought at least double the number. On the other hand, Cuesta having determined upon an offensive movement, disregarded the powerful cavalry of his enemy, and chose a field of battle precisely in the country where that arm would have the greatest advantage; when he should have brought every man to bear upon the quarter which he did attack, he displayed his ignorance of the art of war, by fighting the battle of Rio Seco with twenty-five thousand men only, leaving ten thousand disciplined troops in the rear, to guard positions which could not be approached until he himself was first beaten. Neither was the time well chosen for his advance. Had he waited a few days, the port of St. Ander would have been attacked by eight English frigates, and a detachment of Spanish troops under the command of general da Ponte; an enterprise that would have distracted and weakened Bessieres, but which was relinquished in consequence of the battle of Rio Seco.

2. Once united to Blake, Cuesta's real base of operations was Galicia, and he should have kept all his stores within the mountains, and not have heaped them up in the open towns of the flat country, exposed to the marauding parties of the enemy; or covered, as at Benavente, by strong detachments which weakened his troops in the field and confined him to a particular line of operations in the plain.

3. The activity and good sense of marshal Bessieres overbalanced the errors of Savary, and the victory of Rio Seco was of infinite importance, because, as we have seen, a defeat in that quarter would have shaken the French military system to its centre; it would also have obliged the king, then on his journey to Madrid, to halt at Vittoria, until the distant divisions of the army were recalled to the capital, and a powerful effort made to crush the victorious enemy. Napoleon's observations are full of strong expressions of discontent at the imprudence of his lieutenant.—*A*

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check given to Dupont,' he says, 'would have a slight effect, but a wound received by Bessieres would give a locked jaw to the whole army. Not an inhabitant of Madrid, not a peasant of the valleys that does not feel that the affairs of Spain are involved in the affairs of Bessieres; how unfortunate, then, that in such a great event you have wilfully given the enemy twenty chances against yourself.' When he heard of the victory, he exclaimed, that it was the battle of Almanza, and that Bessieres had saved Spain. The prospect was indeed very promising; the king had arrived in Madrid, bringing with him the veteran brigade of general Rey and some French guards, and all fears upon the side of Leon being allayed, the affairs of Andalusia alone remained of doubtful issue; for Zaragoza, hard pushed by Verdier, was upon the point of destruction, in despite of the noble courage of the besieged.* Nor did the subjugation of Andalusia appear in reason a hard task, seeing that Moncey was then at San Clemente, and from that point threatened Valencia, without losing the power of succouring Dupont, while Frere's and Caulaincourt's troops were disposable for any operation. In fine the French army possessed the centre, the Spaniards were dispersed upon a variety of points on the circumference without any connexion with each other, they were in force only upon the side of Andalusia, and the great combinations of the French emperor were upon the point of being crowned with success, when a sudden catastrophe overturned his able calculations and raised the sinking hopes of Spain.

It was the campaign in Andalusia which produced such important effects, and it offers one of the most interesting and curious examples, recorded by history, of the vicissitudes of war; disorder, unaccompanied by superior valour, triumphed over discipline; inexperienced officers were successful against practised generals, and a fortuitous combination of circumstances enabled the Spaniards, without any skill, to defeat in one day an immense plan, wisely arranged, embracing a variety of interests, and until that moment happily conducted in all its parts. This blow, which felled Joseph from his throne, marked the French army with a dishonourable scar, the more conspicuous, because it was the only one of its numerous wounds that misbecame it.

CHAPTER VIII.

Dupont marches against Andalusia, forces the bridge of Alcolea, takes Cordoba—Alarm at Seville—Castanos arrives, forms a new army—Dupont retreats to Andujar, attacks the town of Jaen—Vedel forces the pass of Despenas Perros, arrives at Baylen—Spanish army arrives on the Guadalquivir—General Gobert defeated and killed—Generals Vedel and Darcour retire to Carolina—General Reding takes possession of Baylen—Dupont retires from Andujar—Battle of Baylen—Dupont's capitulation, eighteen thousand French troops lay down their arms—Observations—Joseph holds a council of war, resolves to abandon Madrid—Impolicy of so doing.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

DUPONT was ordered to march against Cadiz with a force composed of the Spanish-Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding—Barbou's division of French infantry; Fresia's division of cavalry—a marine battalion of the imperial guards, and eighteen pieces of artillery.† Three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, were to join him at Seville, from the army of Portugal; three other Swiss regiments were in Andalusia, and it was expected that both they, and the troops at San Roque, would join the French army.

In the latter end of May he traversed La Mancha, entered the Sierra Morena by the pass of Despenas Perros, and proceeded by Carolina and Baylen to An-

* Napoleon's Notes. † Journal of Dupont's Operations, MS.

dujar, where he arrived the 2d of June. There he was informed that a supreme junta of government was established at Seville, that minor juntas ruled in Granada, Jaen, and Cordoba; that war was formally declared against the French, that the whole of Andalusia, was in arms and the Swiss regiments ranged under the Spanish banners: lastly, that general Avril, commanding the detachment expected from Portugal, had halted in Tavora, and was preparing to return to Lisbon.

Alarmed by this intelligence, Dupont wrote to Murat and Savary to demand reinforcements, and in the mean time closed up the rear of his columns, and established an hospital in Andujar. The 6th he crossed the Guadalquivir, and continued his march towards Cordoba, following the left bank of the river. But two leagues from that ancient city the road recrossed the Guadalquivir by a long stone bridge, at the farthest end of which stood the village of Alcolea; and when the French general arrived there at daybreak on the 7th, his progress was opposed by the Spanish general Echevaria, who had fortified the head of the bridge, placed twelve guns in battery on the right bank, and was prepared to dispute the passage, with a force composed of three thousand regulars, supported by ten thousand new levies and smugglers. Besides these troops, a small reserve was left in a camp close to Cordoba, and a cloud of armed peasants, from the side of Jaen, hovered on the hills behind the French, ready to fall on the rear when they should attack the bridge.

Dupont having observed this disposition, placed the cavalry, the Swiss regiments, and the marine battalion in reserve, facing to the hills, and with the division of Barbou stormed the head of the bridge. The Spaniards there, making a feeble resistance, were driven across the river, and their whole line immediately fled to the camp at Cordoba. The multitude on the hills descended during the battle, but were beaten back by the cavalry with loss, and the French general, then leaving the marine battalion at Alcolea, to secure the bridge, marched with the rest of his forces to complete the victory. At his approach the Spaniards took refuge in the town, and opened a fire of musketry from the walls, whereupon the French, bursting the gates with their field-pieces, broke in, and after a short and confused fight Echevaria's men fled along the Seville road, pursued by the cavalry. As the inhabitants took no part in the contest, and received the French without any signs of aversion, the first disorders attendant on the action were soon suppressed, the town was protected from pillage, and Dupont, fixing his quarters there, sent patrols as far as Ecija without finding an enemy.

In Seville the news of this disaster, and the arrival of the fugitives, struck such a terror, that the junta were only prevented from retiring to Cadiz by their dread of the populace, they even entertained thoughts of abandoning Spain altogether, and flying to South America.* Castaños, who a few days before had been declared captain-general of the armies, and was at this time in march with seven thousand troops of the line from San Roque, repaired to Seville the 9th, and after a short conference with the junta, proceeded to take the command of Echevaria's forces; the greater part of these were re-assembled at Carmona, but in such confusion, and so moody, that Castaños returned immediately. Having persuaded the president Saavedra to accompany him, he fixed his head-quarters at Utrera, where he gathered two or three thousand regulars from the nearest garrisons, directed all the new levies to repair to him, and hastened the march of his own men from San Roque.† He also pressed general Spencer to disembark, and take up a position with the British forces at Xeres; but that officer, for reasons hereafter to be mentioned, sailed to Ayamonte,—a circumstance

which augmented the general distrust of the English, prevailing at the time, and secretly fomented by Morla, and by several members of the junta.

Andalusia was lost, if Dupont had advanced. His inactivity saved it. Instead of pushing his victory, he wrote to Savary for reinforcements, and to general Avril, desiring that he would, without delay, come to his assistance, remaining himself meanwhile in Cordoba, overwhelmed with imaginary dangers and difficulties. For although Castaños had in a few days collected at Carmona and Utrera, seven or eight thousand regulars, and above fifty thousand new levies; and although Dupont's desponding letters were intercepted and brought to him, such was the condition of affairs that, resigning all thoughts of making a stand, he had, under the pretence of completing the defences of Cadiz, embarked the heavy artillery and stores at Seville, resolving, if Dupont should advance, to burn the timbers and harness of his field artillery, and retreat to Cadiz. Nevertheless he continued the organization of his forces, filled up the old regiments with new levies, and formed fresh battalions, in which he was assisted by two foreigners; the marquis de Coupigny, a crafty French emigrant, of some experience in war, and Reding, a Swiss, a bold, enterprising, honest man, but without judgment, and of very moderate talents as an officer.

Castaños wished to adopt a defensive plan, to make Cadiz his place of arms, and to form an entrenched camp, where he hoped to be joined by ten or twelve thousand British troops, and, in security, to organize and discipline a large army; but, in reality, he had merely the name and the troubles of a commander-in-chief, without the power.* Morla was his enemy, and the junta, containing men determined to use their authority for their own emolument and the gratification of private enmity, were jealous lest Castaños should control their proceedings; they thwarted him, humoured the caprice and insolence of the populace, and meddled with affairs foreign to the matter in hand. But as the numbers at Utrera increased, the general confidence augmented, and a retreat was no longer contemplated; plans were laid to surround Dupont in Cordoba, and one detachment of peasants, commanded by regular officers, was sent to occupy the passes of the Sierra Morena, leading into Estremadura; another detachment marched from Grenada, accompanied by a regiment of the line, to seize Carolina, and cut off the communication with La Mancha; a third, under colonel Valderas, proposed to attack the French in Cordoba without any assistance; and this eagerness for action was increased by a knowledge of the situation of affairs in Portugal, and by rumours exaggerating the strength of Filanghieri and Cuesta. It was believed that the latter had advanced to Valladolid, and had offered Murat the option of abiding an attack, or retiring immediately to France by stated marches, and that, alarmed at Cuesta's power, the grand duke was fortifying the Retiro. These reports, so congenial to the wishes and vanity of the Andalusians, caused the defensive plan proposed by Castaños to be rejected; and when Dupont's despatches, magnifying his own danger and pressing in the most urgent manner for reinforcements, were again intercepted and brought to head-quarters, it was resolved to attack Cordoba immediately.

Dupont's fears outstripped the Spaniard's impatience. After ten days of inactivity, by which he lost the immediate fruit of his victory at Alcolea,—the lead in an offensive campaign, and all the imposing moral force of the French reputation in arms, he resolved to fall back to Andujar, because Savary would not promise any succour save what Moncey, after subduing Valencia, could give by the circuitous route of Murcia.† This

* Neillerto.

† Sir Hew Dalrymple's Papers.

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's Papers.

† Journal of Dupont's Operations.

retreat was commenced the 17th of June, and the French were followed as far as Carpio by the advanced guard of the Andalusians, under general Coupigny.*

Along the line of march, and in the town of Andujar, where he arrived the evening of the 18th, Dupont found terrible proofs of Spanish ferocity; his stragglers had been assassinated, and his hospital taken; the sick, the medical attendants, the couriers, the staff officers, in fine, all who had the misfortune to be weaker than the insurgents, were butchered, with circumstances of extraordinary barbarity, and upwards of four hundred men had perished in this miserable manner since the fight of Alcolea.† The fate of colonel Rene was horrible. He had been sent on a mission to Portugal, previous to the breaking out of hostilities, and was on his return, travelling in the ordinary mode, without arms, attached to no army, engaged in no operations of war, but being recognised as a Frenchman, he was seized, mutilated, and then being placed, living, between two planks was sawed in two.

At Andujar the French general collected provisions, and prepared to maintain himself until he should be reinforced; yet wishing to punish the city of Jaen, from whence the bands had come to murder his sick, he sent captain Baste, a naval officer, with a battalion of infantry and some cavalry, to accomplish that object. The soldiers, inflamed by the barbarity of their enemies, inflicted a severe measure of retaliation, because it is the nature of cruelty to reproduce itself in war; and for this reason, although the virtue of clemency is to all persons becoming, it is peculiarly so to an officer, the want of it leading to so many and such great evils. Meanwhile the Andalusian army remained quiet, and Dupont, who knew that general Vedel, with a division of infantry, and escorting a large convoy for the army, was marching through La Mancha, sent captain Baste with a second detachment to clear the pass of Despeñas Perros, which was now occupied by insurgents and smugglers from Grenada to the number of three thousand. This pass was of incredible strength, and the Spaniards had artillery, and were partially entrenched; however their commander, a colonel of the line, deserted to the enemy, and before Baste could arrive, Vedel had forced his way to Carolina, where he left a detachment, and then descended to Baylen, a small town sixteen miles from Andujar. But other insurgents came from Grenada, to Jaen, and would have moved on Despeñas Perros and Carolina, by the Linhares road; wherefore Vedel sent general Cassagne against them, Jaen was again taken, and the Grenadans were driven back with slaughter; but the French who lost two hundred men, returned on the 5th to Baylen without the provisions, to obtain which had been one object of the expedition.

Notwithstanding these successes, and that Vedel, besides his own division, brought reinforcements for Barbon's division and the cavalry, Dupont's fears increased. His position at Andujar covered the main road from Seville to Carolina; but eight miles lower down the river, it could be turned by the bridge of Marmolexo; sixteen miles higher up by the roads leading from Jaen to the ferry of Mengibar and Baylen; and beyond that line by roads from Jaen and Grenada to Uzeda, Linhares, and the passes of El Rey and Despeñas Perros. The dryness of the season had rendered the Guadalquivir fordable in many places; the regular force under Castaños was daily increasing in strength; the population around was actively hostile, and the young French soldiers were drooping under privations and the heat of the climate: six hundred were in hospital, and the whole were discouraged.‡ It

is in such situations that the worth of a veteran is found; in battle the ardour of youth often appears to shame the cool indifference of the old soldier, but when the strife is between the malice of fortune and fortitude, between human endurance and accumulating hardships, the veteran becomes truly formidable, when the young soldier resigns himself to despair.

After the actions at Jaen, Vedel posted general Ligier Bellair's brigade at the ferry of Mengibar, with a post beyond the river, but on the 13th this post was driven across the Guadalquivir, and on the 15th, Gohbert, who should have been at Rio Seco with Bessieres, arrived at Baylen with a division of infantry and some cuirassiers. Vedel then advanced to Mengibar, and it was full time, seeing that the whole Spanish army was on the opposite bank of the river.* For when Dupont's retreat from Cordoba had frustrated the plan of the Spaniards to surround him, Castaños would have returned to his old project of a rigorous defensive system, but the junta, although at first they acquiesced, were unsettled in their policy, and getting intelligence of Vedel's march, had ordered Castaños to attack Dupont at Andujar before the reinforcements could arrive.†

The Spanish general had twenty-five thousand regular infantry, two thousand cavalry, and a very heavy train of artillery. Large bodies of armed peasantry, commanded by officers of the line, attended this army, and the numbers varied from day to day, but the whole multitude that advanced towards the Guadalquivir could not have been less than fifty thousand men; hence the intelligence that Vedel had actually arrived did not much allay the general fierceness. Castaños, however, was less sanguine than the rest, and learning that Spencer had again returned to Cadiz with his division, he once more requested him to land and advance to Xeres, to afford a point of retreat in the event of a disaster, and the English general consented to disembark, but refused to advance farther than Port St. Mary.‡

From the 1st of July the Spanish army occupied a position extending from Carpio to Porcuñas, and the 11th, a council of war being held, it was resolved that Reding's division should cross the Guadalquivir at the ferry of Mengibar, and gain Baylen; || that Coupigny should cross at Villa Nueva, and support Reding; and that Castaños, with the other two divisions, advancing to the heights of Argonilla, should attack Andujar in front, while Reding and Coupigny should descend from Baylen and attack it in the rear: some detachments of light troops under colonel Cruz were also ordered to pass the Guadalquivir by Marmolexo, and to seize the passes leading through the Morena to Estremadura. The 13th, Reding, with the first division, and three or four thousand peasantry, marched towards Mengibar, and, as I have said, drove the French post over the Guadalquivir, while Coupigny, with the second division, took the road of Villa Nueva. § The 15th, Castaños crowned the heights of Argonilla, in front of Andujar, with two divisions of infantry, and a multitude of irregular troops; Coupigny skirmished with the French picquets at Villa Nueva, and Reding attacked Ligier Bellair, but when Vedel came up retired. ¶ When Dupont saw the heights of Argonilla covered with enemies he sent to Vedel for succour, broke the bridge of Marmolexo, occupied an old tower on the bridge of Andujar, and detached cavalry parties to watch the fords above and below the town. The 15th Castaños cannonaded the bridge of Andujar, while colonel Cruz, with four thousand men, crossed the river near Marmolexo. The 16th he attacked, and Cruz fell upon the French rear, but was chased into the hills by a single battalion, and about two o'clock Vedel, who had

* Napoleon's Notes.

† Whittingham. Journal of Dupont. Foy's History. Victoires et Conquêtes.

‡ Dupont's Journal. Foy's History.

* Vedel's *Precis of Operations*.

† Whittingham's Correspondence. MSS.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

¶ Ibid. Foy's

marched all night, arrived, which put an end to the action. *

During these events, Reding passed the Guadalquivir at Mengibar, and drove Ligier Bellair before him, Gohbert arrived, and renewed the action, but fell mortally wounded, and general Dufour succeeded him. The French then returned to Baylen, Reding to Mengibar, and Dufour, finding the Spaniards did not push their success, rashly credited a rumour that they were in march by Linhares, and therefore retreated to Carolina. Meanwhile Dupont, hearing, on the evening of the 16th, that Mengibar had been forced, sent Vedel again to Baylen, but with instructions so vague that he was induced to follow Dufour on the 17th, whereupon Reding, who, strange to say, had remained tranquil at Mengibar, being now reinforced by Coupigny, seized Baylen in the night, and throwing out a detachment on the side of Carolina, took a position facing Andujar with about twenty thousand men including a multitude of peasants.

The armies were thus interlaced in a singular manner, Dupont between Reding and Castaños, Reding between Dupont and Vedel, and the affair became one of time, yet Castaños remained tranquil in his camp, and Dupont, although he knew on the 17th of Vedel's march to Carolina, did not quit Andujar until the night of the 18th. His movement was unobserved by Castaños, and at day-break he reached the Tiedras, a torrent with rugged banks, only two miles from Reding's position which was strong, well shaded with olive-trees, and intersected by deep ravines. Dupont, hoping that Vedel would return, immediately passed the Tiedras, and leaving Barbou with a few battalions on that stream, to check Castaños if he should arrive during the action, fell on, yet feebly, and with few troops; for his march had been unilitary, and his best soldiers were employed guarding the baggage, which was enormous, and mixed with the columns. For some time the French appeared to gain ground, but fatigued by their night's work, and unable to force the principal points, they became discouraged; the Swiss then went over to the Spaniards, and about twelve o'clock, after losing two thousand men, killed and wounded, Dupont proposed an armistice with a view to a convention, which Reding, hard pressed, willingly granted.

Vedel had quitted Carolina at five in the morning of the 19th. The sound of battle became distinct as he advanced, yet he halted at Guaroman, two leagues from Baylen, and remained there until three o'clock, to refresh his men, and to ascertain if any enemy was at Linhares; † when the firing had entirely ceased, he resumed his march, and coming upon the rear of Reding, attacked, and after some fighting, captured two guns and made fifteen hundred prisoners: ‡ an aide-du-camp of Dupont's then brought him an order to cease the attack, whereupon he awaited the result of this singular crisis.

Castaños who did not discover Dupont's march until eight hours after the latter's departure from Andujar, had sent La Peña's division in pursuit, but remained himself in that town. || La Peña reached the Tiedras about five o'clock, and soon after, one Villoutreys passed his posts, going to ask Castaños' consent to the terms accepted by Reding, and on the 20th generals Marescot and Chabert likewise passed to Andujar, being empowered by Dupont to conclude a convention. § They demanded permission for the French army to retire peaceably upon Madrid, and Castaños was ready to grant this, but Savary's letter, written just before the battle of Rio Seco, to recal Dupont, was intercepted, and brought at this moment to the Spanish head-quarters.

The aspect of affairs immediately changed, and a convention was no longer in question. Dupont's troops were required to lay down their arms, and become prisoners of war, on condition of being sent by sea to France, and Vedel's division was to surrender, and be sent to France likewise, but not as prisoners of war: without hesitation these terms were accepted.

Meanwhile Vedel had proposed to Dupont to make a joint attack upon Reding, and general Privé gave a like counsel, but the French general refused, and sent Vedel orders to give up his prisoners, and retreat to Carolina. * Castaños menaced Dupont with death if Vedel did not return, and the latter, on receiving his commander's orders to that effect, did come back to Baylen the 22d, and surrendered. Thus above eighteen thousand French soldiers laid down their arms, before a raw army incapable of resisting half that number led by an able man. Nor did this end the disgraceful transaction, for Villoutreys, as if to show how far fear and folly combined, will carry men, passed the Morena with a Spanish escort, and gathering up the detachments left by Dupont in La Mancha, even to within a short distance of Toledo, sent them to Andujar as prisoners under the convention. Nay, he even informed Castaños how to capture two French battalions that had been left to guard the passes into La Mancha; and these unheard-of proceedings were quietly submitted to by men belonging to that army which for fifteen years had been the terror of Europe; a proof how much the character of soldiers depends upon their immediate chief.

This capitulation, shameful in itself, was shamefully broken. The French troops, instead of being sent to France, were maltreated, and numbers of them murdered in cold blood, especially at Lebrixa, where above eighty officers were massacred in the most cowardly manner. Armed only with their swords, they kept the assassins for some time at bay, and gathering in a company, upon an open space in the town, endeavoured to save their lives, but a fire from the neighbouring houses was kept up until the last of those unfortunate gentlemen fell. No distinction was made between Dupont's and Vedel's troops, and all who survived the march to Cadiz, after being exposed to every species of indignity, were cast into the hulks at Cadiz, whence a few hundreds escaped, two years afterwards, by cutting the cables of their prison-ship, and drifting in a storm upon a lee shore: the remainder, transported to the desert island of Cabrera, perished by lingering torments in such numbers, that few remained alive at the termination of the war. Dupont himself was permitted to return to France, and to take with him all the generals; and it is curious that general Privé, who had remonstrated strongly against the capitulation, and had pressed Dupont, on the field, to force a passage through Reding's army, was the only one left behind. †

Don Thomas Morla, after a vain attempt to involve lord Collingwood and sir Hew Dalrymple in the transaction, formally defended the conduct of the junta in breaking the capitulation; and soon afterwards betrayed his own country with the readiness that might be expected from his shameless conduct on this occasion.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The gross amount of Dupont's corps when it first entered Spain was about twenty-four thousand men, with three thousand five hundred horses; of these twenty-one thousand were fit for duty. ‡ It was afterwards strengthened by a provisional regiment of cuirassiers, a marine battalion of the guard, and the two Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding. It could not therefore have been less than twenty-four thousand fighting men when Dupont arrived in Andalusia; and as the whole of Vedel's, and the greatest part of Go-

* Vedel's *Precis*.

† Foy.

‡ Journal of Dupont's Operations. MSS.

|| Whittingham's Correspondence. MSS.

§ Ibid.

* Vedel's *Precis* of Operations.

† *Victoires et Conquêtes*.

‡ Return of the French army.

bert's division, had joined before the capitulation, and as eighteen thousand men laid down their arms at Baylen, Dupont must have lost by wounds, desertion, and deaths in hospital or the field, above five thousand men.

2. The order which directed his corps upon Cadiz was despatched from Bayonne before the Spanish insurrection broke out; it was therefore strange that Dupont should have persevered in his march, when he found affairs in such a different state, from that contemplated by Napoleon at the time the instructions for this expedition were framed. If the emperor considered it necessary to reinforce the division, which marched under Dupont's own command, with a detachment from the army in Portugal, before the insurrection broke out, it was evident that he never could have intended, that that general should blindly follow the letter of his orders, when a great and unexpected resistance was opposed to him, and that the detachment from Portugal was unable to effect a junction. The march to Cordoba was therefore an error, and it was a great error, because Dupont confesses in his memoir, he advanced under the conviction that his force was too weak to obtain success, and, consequently, having no object, his operations could only lead to a waste of lives.

3. At Cordoba, Dupont remained in a state of torpor for ten days. This was the second error of a series which led to his ruin; he should either have followed up his victory and attacked Seville in the first moment of consternation, or he should have retired to Andujar while he might do so without the appearance of being compelled to it. If he had followed the first plan, the city would inevitably have fallen before him, and thus time would have been gained for the arrival of the second and third division of his corps. It may be objected, that ten thousand men dared not penetrate so far into a hostile country; but at Alcolea, Dupont boasts of having defeated forty thousand men without any loss to himself: from such armies, then, he had nothing to fear, and the very fact of his having pushed his small force between the multitudes that he defeated upon the 7th, proves that he despised them.* 'He retired from Cordoba,' he says in his memoir, 'because to fight a battle when victory can be of no use, is against all discretion;' but to make no use of a victory when it is gained, comes to the same thing, and he should never have moved from Andujar, unless with the determination of taking Seville. These errors were, however, redeemable; the position behind the Guadalquivir, the checks given to the patriots at Jean after the arrival of Vedel at Carolina upon the 27th, above all, the opportune junction of Gobert at the moment when Castaños and Reding appeared in front of the French line, proved that it was not fortune, but common sense, that deserted Dupont. The Spanish forces divided, and extended from Argonilla to Mengibar, were exposed to be beaten in detail; but as their adversary was indulgent to them, their false movements were successful, and, amidst the mass of greater errors on both sides, appeared like acts of wisdom.

4. At Mengibar a variety of roads branch off, leading to Jaen, to Linhares, to Baylen, and other places. From Andujar, a road nearly parallel to the Guadalquivir runs to the ferry of Mengibar, and forms the base of a triangle, of which Baylen may be taken as the apex. The distance of this latter town from the ferry is about six miles, from the ferry to Andujar is about eighteen, and from the latter to Baylen the distance may be sixteen miles. Fifteen miles above Baylen, the town of Carolina, situated in the gorge of the Sierra Morena, was the point of communication with La Mancha, and the line of retreat for the French in the event of a defeat; hence Baylen, not Andujar, was the pivot of operations. The French force was infe-

rior in number to that under Castaños, yet Dupont spread his divisions upon several points, and the natural results followed. The Spaniards, although the most unwieldy body, took the lead and became the assailants; the French divisions were worn out by useless marches; the orders of their chief were mistaken or disobeyed; one position being forced, another was of necessity abandoned, confusion ensued; and finally Dupont says he surrendered with *eighteen thousand* men, because his fighting force was reduced to *two thousand*.* such an avowal saves the honour of his soldiers, but destroys his own reputation as a general. The first question to ask is, what became of the remainder? Why had he so few when ten thousand of his army never fired a shot? It must be confessed that Dupont, unless a worse explanation can be given of his conduct, was incapable to the last degree. But this worse explanation has been given. His own officers, as well as the Spaniards, assert that his baggage was filled with plunder, and that he surrendered to save it!

5. There were two plans, either of which promised a reasonable chance of success, under the circumstances in which the French army was placed on the 14th. 1st. To abandon Andujar, send all the incumbrances into La Mancha, secure the passes, unite the fighting men at Carolina, and fall in one mass upon the first corps of Spaniards that advanced: the result of such an attack could hardly have been doubtful, but if, contrary to all probability, the Spaniards had been successful, the retreat was open and safe. 2dly. To secure Carolina by a detachment, and placing small bodies in observation at Andujar and the ferry of Mengibar, to unite the army on the 15th at Baylen, and in that central position await the enemy. If the two corps of the Spanish army had presented themselves simultaneously upon both roads, the position was strong for battle, and the retreat open; if one approached before the other, each might have been encountered and crushed separately. Dupont had a force more than sufficient for this object, and fortune was not against him.

6. On the Spanish side the direction in which Reding marched was good, but it should have been followed by the whole army. The heights of Argonilla would have screened the march of Castaños, and a few troops with some heavy guns left in front of the bridge of Andujar, would have sufficed to occupy Dupont's attention. If the latter general had attacked Castaños upon the morning of the 16th, when Vedel's division arrived from Baylen, the twelve thousand men thus united by accident, would easily have overthrown the two Spanish divisions in front of Andujar; and Reding, if he had lost an hour in retreating to Jaen, might have been taken in flank by the victorious troops, and in front by Gobert, and so destroyed. Instead of availing himself of this opening, the French general sent Vedel back to Baylen, followed himself two days after, and being encountered by Reding, vainly hoped that the divisions, which with so much pains he had dispersed, would reunite to relieve him from his desperate situation.

7. In the action Dupont clung tenaciously to the miserable system of dividing his troops, when his only chance of safety was to force Reding before Castaños could arrive upon the Tiedras; it was a wretched misapplication of rules, to have a reserve watching that torrent, and to fight a formal battle with a first and second line, and half a dozen puny columns of attack. An energetic officer would have formed his troops in a dense mass, and broken at once through the opposing force upon the weakest point; there are few armies so good, that such an assault would not open a passage through them; seven thousand infantry with cavalry

* Dupont's Journal of Operations.

* Dupont's Journal, MSS.

and artillery is a powerful column of attack, and the Spanish line could not have withstood it for a moment. The battle should have been one of half an hour; Dupont, by his ridiculous evolutions, made it one of ten hours, and yet so badly did the patriots fight, that in all that time not a single prisoner or gun fell into their hands, and the fact of Reding's entering at all into a convention, proves his fears for the final result. It is truly astonishing that Dupont, who, from his rank, must have been well acquainted with Napoleon's Italian campaigns, should have caught so little of the spirit of his master. And then the capitulation of Vedel, after his retreat was actually effected! Vedel, who might have given battle and disputed the victory by himself without any great imprudence! Joseph called Dupont's capitulation, a '*defection*.'

8. Castaños, although active in preparation, discovered but little talent in the field; his movements were slow, uncertain, and generally false. The attempt to turn the French position at Andujar by detaching four thousand men across the river, was ill conceived and badly supported; it was of that class of combinations to which the separate march of Reding's corps belonged. To the latter general the chief honour of the victory is due; yet, if Vedel had returned from Carolina upon the 19th, with the rapidity which the occasion required, Reding would have repented taking post at Baylen; it was undoubtedly a daring step; but instead of remaining at that place, he should have descended instantly upon the rear of Dupont, leaving a corps of observation to delay the march of Vedel. Time not being taken into his calculation, Reding acted like a bold, but rash and unskilful officer. Fortune, however, favoured his temerity, and with her assistance war is but child's play.

Intelligence of the capitulation of Baylen was secretly spread among the Spaniards in Madrid as early as the 23d or 24th of July; but the French, although alarmed by rumours of some great disaster, were unable to acquire any distinct information, until the king sent two divisions into La Mancha to open the communication; these troops having reached Madridejos, one hundred and twenty miles from Baylen, met Villoutreys with his Spanish escort collecting prisoners, and apparently intending to proceed in his disgraceful task to the very gates of Madrid;* the extent of the disaster thus became known, and the divisions retraced their steps. Joseph then called a council of war, and it was proposed to unite all the French forces, place a small garrison in the Retiro, and fall upon the Spanish armies in succession as they advanced towards the capital. But a dislike to the war was prevalent amongst the higher ranks of the French army, the injustice of it was too glaring; hence the reasons for a retreat which might perchance induce Napoleon to desist, being listened to with more complacency than this proposal, it was resolved to abandon Madrid and retire behind the Ebro. The operation commenced on the 1st of August. The king marched by the Somosierra, and Bessieres, posted at Mayorga, covered the movement until the court reached Burgos, and then fell back himself; in a short time the French were all behind the Ebro, the siege of Zaragoza was raised, and the triumphant cry of the Spaniards was heard throughout Europe.

This retreat was undoubtedly hasty and ill considered; whether as a military or political measure it was unwise. Bessieres, with seventeen thousand victorious troops, and forty pieces of artillery, paralyzed the northern provinces; the Spanish army of Andalusia was too distant from that of Valencia to concert a combined movement, and if they had formed a junction, their united force could not have exceeded forty thousand fighting men, ill provided, and commanded by jealous independent chiefs.

Now the king, without weakening Bessieres' corps too much, could have collected twenty thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and eighty pieces of artillery; the battle of Rio Seco shows what such an army could have effected, and every motive of prudence and of honour called for some daring action to wipe off the ignominy of Baylen.

Let it be conceded that Joseph could not have maintained himself in Madrid; the line of the Duero was then the true position for the French army. Taking Aranda as a centre, and occupying the Somosierra, Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, Burgos, and Soria on the circumference, two ordinary marches would have carried the king to the succour of any part of his position, and the northern provinces would thus have been separated from the southern. Then Blake dared not have made a flank march to the Guadarama, Castaños dared not have remained in the basin of Madrid, and the siege of Zaragoza might have been continued; because from Aranda to Zaragoza the distance is not greater than from Valencia, or from Madrid, and from Soria it is only three marches; wherefore the king could have succoured Verdier if the Valencians attacked him, and it was impossible for Castaños to have arrived at Zaragoza under a month. Now by taking up the line of the Ebro, Napoleon's plan of separating the provinces, and confining each to its own exertions, was frustrated, and Joseph virtually resigned the throne; for however doubtful the prudence of opposing the French might have been considered before the retreat, it became imperative upon all Spaniards, to aid the energy of the multitude when that energy was proved to be efficient.

In this manner Napoleon's first effort against Spain was frustrated. Yet he had miscalculated neither the difficulties, nor the means to overcome them; for although Bessieres was the only general who perfectly succeeded in his operations, the plan of the emperor was so well combined, that it required the destruction of a whole army to shake it at all. Even when the king, by committing the great fault of abandoning Madrid and raising the siege of Zaragoza, had given the utmost force to Dupont's catastrophe, it was only the political position of the French which was shaken; their military hold of the country was scarcely loosened, and the Spaniards were unable to follow up their victory. But there was another operation, too great indeed for Joseph, yet such a one as in Napoleon's hands would have fixed the fate of the Peninsula. The king might have directed the troops before Zaragoza, and the detachments upon the communication with France, to have assembled round Pampeluna, while he, uniting with Bessieres, made, not a retreat, but a march with forty thousand men into Portugal. He would have arrived about the period of the battle of Vimiero, and the English would have been overwhelmed; a demonstration against Seville or Cadiz would then have sufficed to keep the Spanish armies from gathering on the Ebro, and three months later, Napoleon was on that river with two hundred thousand men!

The moral effect of the battle of Baylen was surprising; it was one of those minor events which, insignificant in themselves, are the cause of great changes in the affairs of nations. The defeat of Rio Seco, the preparations of Moncey for a second attack on Valencia, the miserable plight of Zaragoza, the desponding view taken of affairs by the ablest men of Spain, and, above all, the disgust and terror excited among the patriots by the excesses of the populace, weighed heavy on the Spanish cause. One victory more, and probably the moral as well as the physical force of Spain would have been crushed; but the battle of Baylen, opening as it were a new crater for the Spanish fire, all their pride, and vanity, and arrogance burst forth, the glory of past ages seemed to be renewed, every man conceived himself a second Cid, and perceived in the surrender of Dupont, not the

* Foy's History.

deliverance of Spain, but the immediate conquest of France. 'We are much obliged to our good friends the English,' was a common phrase among them when conversing with the officers of Sir John Moore's army; 'we thank them for their good-will, and we shall escort them through France to Calais; the journey will be pleasanter

than a long voyage, we shall not give them the trouble of fighting the French, but will be pleased at having them spectators of our victories.' This absurd confidence might have led to great things if it had been supported by wisdom, activity, or valour; but it was 'a voice, and nothing more.'

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

The Asturian deputies received with enthusiasm in England—Ministers precipitate—Imprudent choice of agents—Junot marches to Alcantara, joined by the Spanish contingent, enters Portugal, arrives at Abrantes, pushes on to Lisbon—Prince regent emigrates to the Brazils, reflections on that transaction—Dangerous position of the French army—Portuguese council of regency—Spanish contingent well received—General Taranco dies at Oporto, is succeeded by the French general Quesnel—Solano's troops retire to Badajoz—Junot takes possession of the Alentejo and the Algarves; exacts a forced loan; is created duke of Abrantes; suppresses the council of regency; sends the flower of the Portuguese army to France—Napoleon demands a ransom from Portugal—People unable to pay it—Police of Lisbon—Junot's military position; his character; political position—People discontented—Prophetic eggs—Sebastianists—The capture of Rossily's squadron known at Lisbon—Pope's nuncio takes refuge on board the English fleet—Alarm of the French.

THE uninterrupted success that, for so many years, attended the arms of Napoleon, gave him a moral influence doubling his actual force. Exciting at once terror, admiration, and hatred, he absorbed the whole attention of an astonished world, and, openly or secretly, all men acknowledged the power of his genius; the continent bowed before him, and in England an increasing number of absurd and virulent libels on his person and character, indicated the growth of secret fear. Hence, his proceedings against the Peninsula were viewed, at first, with anxiety, rather than with the hope of arresting their progress; yet when the full extent of the injustice became manifest, the public mind was vehemently excited; a sentiment of some extraordinary change being about to take place in the affairs of the world, prevailed among all classes of society; and when the Spanish people rose against the man that all feared, the admiration which energy and courage exact, even from the base and timid, became enthusiastic in a nation conscious of the same virtues.

No factious feelings interfered to check this enthusiasm. The party in power, anxious to pursue a warlike system, necessary to their own political existence, saw with joy that the stamp of justice and high feeling would, for the first time, be affixed to their policy. The party out of power having always derided the impotence of the ancient dynasties, and asserted that regular armies alone were insufficient means of defence, could not consistently refuse their approbation to a struggle originating with, and carried on entirely by the Spanish multitude. The people at large exulted that the superiority of plebeian virtue and patriotism was acknowledged.

The arrival of the Asturian deputies was, therefore,

universally hailed as an auspicious event; their wishes were forestalled, their suggestions were attended to with eagerness, their demands were readily complied with; nay, the riches of England were so profusely tendered to them by the ministers, that it can scarcely be doubted, the after arrogance and extravagance of the Spaniards, arose from the manner in which their first applications were met. There is a way of conferring a favour that appears like accepting one, and this secret being discovered by the English cabinet, the Spaniards soon demanded as a right, what they had at first solicited as a boon. In politics it is a grievous fault to be too generous; gratitude, in state affairs, is unknown, and as the appearance of disinterested kindness never deceives, it should never be assumed.

The capture of the Spanish frigates had placed Great Britain and Spain in a state of hostility without a declaration of war; the invasion of Napoleon produced a friendly alliance between those countries without a declaration of peace; for the cessation of hostilities was not proclaimed until long after succours had been sent to the juntas. The ministers seemed, by their precipitate measures, to be more afraid of losing the assistance of the Spaniards, than prepared to take the lead in a contest which could only be supported by the power and riches of Great Britain. Instead of adopting a simple and decisive policy towards Spain; instead of sending a statesman of high rank and acknowledged capacity to sustain the insurrection, and to establish the influence of England by a judicious application of money and other supplies; the ministers employed a number of obscure men in various parts of the Peninsula, who, without any experience of public affairs, were empowered to distribute succours of all kinds at their own discretion. Instead of sifting carefully the information obtained from such agents, and consulting distinguished military and naval officers in the arrangement of some comprehensive plan of operations, which, being well understood by those who were to execute it, might be supported vigorously, the ministers formed crude projects, parcelled out their forces in small expeditions without any definite object, altered their plans with every idle report, and changed their commanders as lightly as their plans.

Entering into formal relations with every knot of Spanish politicians that assumed the title of a supreme junta, the government dealt, with unsparing hands, enormous supplies at the demand of those self-elected authorities; they made no conditions, took no assurance that the succours should be justly applied; and with affected earnestness disclaimed all intention of interfering with the internal arrangements of the Spaniards, when

the ablest men in Spain expected and wished for such an interference to repress the folly and violence of their countrymen; and when England was entitled, both in policy and justice, not only to interfere, but to direct the councils of the insurgents.* The latter had solicited and obtained her assistance, the cause was become common to both nations; and for the welfare of both, a prudent, just, and vigorous interference on the part of the most powerful and enlightened, was necessary to prevent that cause from being ruined by a few ignorant, and conceited men, accidentally invested with authority.

The numbers and injudicious choice of military agents were also the source of infinite mischief, selected, as it would appear, principally because of their acquaintance with the Spanish language, few of those agents had any knowledge of war beyond the ordinary duties of a regiment, and there was no concert among them, for there was no controlling power vested in any; each did that which seemed good to him.† Readily affecting to consult men whose inexperience rendered them amenable, and whose friendship could supply the means of advancing their own interest in a disorganized state of society, the Spanish generals received the agents with a flattering and confidential politeness, that diverted the attention of the latter from the true objects of their mission. Instead of ascertaining the real numbers and efficiency of the armies, they adopted the inflated language and extravagant opinions of the chiefs, with whom they lived; and their reports gave birth to most erroneous notions of the relative strength and situation of the contending forces in the Peninsula. Some exceptions there were, but the ministers seemed to be better pleased with the sanguine than with the cautious, and made their own wishes the measure of their judgments. Accordingly, enthusiasm, numbers, courage, and talent, were gratuitously found for every occasion, but money, arms, and clothing, were demanded incessantly, and supplied with profusion; the arms were, however, generally left in their cases to rot, or to fall into the hands of the enemy; the clothing seldom reached the soldier's back; and the money, in all instances misapplied, was in some embezzled by the authorities, into whose hands it fell, in others employed to create disunion, and to forward the private views of the juntas, at the expense of the public welfare: it is a curious fact, that from the beginning to the end of the war, an English musket was rarely to be seen in the hands of a Spanish soldier. But it is time to quit this subject, and to trace the progress of Junot's invasion of Portugal, by which the whole circle of operations in the Peninsula will be completed, and the reader can then take a general view of the situation of all parties, at the moment when sir Arthur Wellesley, disembarking at the Mondego, commenced those campaigns which furnished the subject of this history.

INVASION OF PORTUGAL BY JUNOT.

Peremptory orders had obliged Junot to commence operations at an unfavourable time of year, before his preparations were completed, when the roads were nearly impracticable, and while some of his troops were still in the rear of Salamanca.‡ Hence his march from that town to Alcantara, where he effected his junction in the latter end of November, 1807, with the part of the Spanish force that was to act under his immediate orders, was very disastrous, and nearly disorganized his inexperienced army. The succours he expected to receive at Alcantara were not furnished, and the repugnance of the Spanish authorities to aid him, was the cause of so much embarrassment, that his chief officers doubted the propriety of continuing operations under

the accumulating difficulties of his situation; but Junot's firmness was unabated. He knew that no English force had landed at Lisbon; and as the cowardice of the Portuguese court was notorious, he without hesitation undertook one of those hardy enterprises which astound the mind by their success, and leave the historian in doubt if he should praise the happy daring, or stigmatise the rashness of the deed.

Without money, without transport, without ammunition sufficient for a general action, and with an auxiliary force of Spaniards by no means well disposed to aid him, Junot, at the head of a raw army, penetrated the mountains of Portugal on the most dangerous and difficult line by which that country can be invaded. He was ignorant of what was passing in the interior, he knew not if he was to be opposed, nor what means were prepared to resist him, but trusting to the inertness of the Portuguese government, to the rapidity of his own movements, and to the renown of the French arms, he made his way through Lower Beira, and suddenly appeared in the town of Abrantes, a fearful and unexpected guest. There he obtained the first information of the true state of affairs. Lisbon was tranquil, and the Portuguese fleet was ready to sail, but the court still remained on shore. On hearing this, Junot, animated by the prospect of seizing the prince regent, pressed forward, and reached Lisbon in time to see the fleet, having the royal family on board, clearing the mouth of the Tagus. One vessel dragged astern within reach of a battery, the French general himself fired a gun at her, and on his return to Lisbon, meeting some Portuguese troops, he resolutely commanded them to form an escort, for his person, and thus attended, passed through the streets of the capital. Nature alone had opposed the progress of the invaders, yet such were the hardships endured, that of a column which numbered twenty-five thousand at Alcantara, two thousand tired grenadiers only entered Lisbon with their general; fatigue, and want, and tempests, had scattered the remainder along two hundred miles of rugged mountains, inhabited by a warlike and ferocious peasantry, well acquainted with the strength of their fastnesses, and proud of the many successful defences made by their forefathers against former enemies. Lisbon itself contained three hundred thousand inhabitants, and fourteen thousand regular troops were collected there; a powerful British fleet was at the mouth of the harbour, and the commander, sir Sidney Smith, had urged the court to resist, offering to land his seamen and marines to aid in the defence of the town, but his offers were declined; and the people, disgusted with the pusillanimous conduct of their rulers, and confounded by the strangeness of the scene, evinced no desire to impede the march of events. Thus three weak battalions sufficed to impose a foreign yoke upon this great capital, and illustrated the truth of Napoleon's maxim:—*that in war the moral is to the physical force as three parts to one.*

The prince regent, after having, at the desire of the French government, expelled the British factory, sent the British minister plenipotentiary away from his court, sequestered British property, and shut the ports of Portugal against British merchants; after having degraded himself and his nation by performing every submissive act which France could devise to insult his weakness, was still reluctant to forego the base tenure by which he hoped to hold his crown. Alternately swayed by fear and indolence, a miserable example of helpless folly, he lingered until the reception of a Moniteur which, dated the 13th of November, announced, in startling terms, that the '*house of Braganza had ceased to reign.*' Lord Strangford, the British plenipotentiary whose efforts to make the royal family emigrate, had entirely failed, was then on board the squadron, with the intention of returning to England; but sir Sydney Smith,

* Mr. Stuart's Letters. Lord W. Bentinck's Ditto.

† Vide Instructions for Sir Tho. Dyer, &c. Parliamentary Papers, 1809.

‡ Thiebault.

seizing the favourable moment, threatened to bombard Lisbon, if the prince regent hesitated any longer, and thus urged on both sides, the latter embarked with his whole court, and sailed for the Brazils on the 29th of November, a few hours before Junot arrived.

Lord Strangford's despatch, relating this event, although dated the 29th of November, on board the *Hibernia*, was written the 19th December, in London, and was so worded, as to create a notion that his exertions during the 27th and 28th had caused the emigration, a notion quite contrary to the fact. For the prince regent of Portugal, yielding to the united pressure of the admiral's menaces, and the annunciation in the *Moniteur*, had embarked on the 27th, before lord Strangford reached Lisbon; and actually sailed on the 29th, without having had an interview with that nobleman, who consequently had no opportunity to advance or retard the event in question. Nevertheless, lord Strangford received the red riband, and sir Sydney Smith was neglected.

This celebrated emigration was beneficial to the Brazils in the highest degree, and of vast importance, to England in two ways, for it ensured great commercial advantages, and it threw Portugal completely into her power in the approaching conflict; but it was disgraceful to the prince, insulting to the brave people he abandoned, and impolitic, inasmuch as it obliged men to inquire how far subjects were bound to a monarch who deserted them in their need? how far the nation could belong to a man who did not belong to the nation? It has been observed by political economists, that where a gold and paper currency circulate together, if the paper be depreciated it will drag down the gold with it, and deteriorate the whole mass; but after a time, the metal revolts from this unnatural state, and asserts its own intrinsic superiority: so a privileged class, corrupted by power and luxury, drags down the national character. Yet there is a point when the people, like the gold, no longer suffering such a degradation, will separate themselves with violence from the vices of their effeminate rulers, and until that time arrives, a nation may appear to be sunk in hopeless lethargy, when it is really capable of great and noble exertions; and thus it was with the Portuguese who were at this time unjustly despised by enemies, and mistrusted by friends.

The invading army, in pursuance of the convention of Fontainebleau, was divided into three corps. * The central one, composed of the French troops, and a Spanish division under general Caraffa, had penetrated by the two roads, which from Alcantara lead, the one by Pedragoa, the other by Sobreira Formosa; but at Abrantes, Caraffa's division had separated from the French, and took possession of Thomar, and meantime the right, under general Taranco, marching from Galicia, had established itself at Oporto, while the marquis of Solano, with the left, entered the Alentejo, and fixed his quarters at Setuval. The Spanish troops did not suffer on their route: but such had been the distress of the French army, that three weeks afterwards, it could only muster ten thousand men under arms, and the privations encountered on this march led to excesses, which first produced that rancorous spirit of mutual hatred, so remarkable between the French and Portuguese. Young soldiers always attribute their sufferings to the ill-will of the inhabitants, it is difficult to make them understand that a poor peasantry have nothing to spare; old soldiers, on the contrary, blame nobody, but know how to extract subsistence, and in most cases without exciting enmity.

Junot passed the month of December in collecting his army, securing the great military points about Lisbon, and in preparations to supplant the power of a

council of regency, to whom the prince at his departure had delegated the sovereign authority. As long as the French troops were scattered on the line of march and the fortresses held by Portuguese garrisons, it would have been dangerous to provoke the enmity, or to excite the activity of this council, hence the members were treated with studious respect; yet they were of the same heaven as the court they emanated from, and the quick resolute proceedings of Junot soon deprived them of any importance conferred by the critical situation of affairs during the first three weeks.

The Spanish auxiliary forces were well received in the north and in the Alentejo, and as general Taranco died soon after his arrival at Oporto, the French general Quesnel was sent to command that province. Junot had meanwhile taken possession of Elvas, and detached general Maurin to the Algarves, with sixteen hundred men; and, when Solano was ordered by his court to withdraw from Portugal, nine French battalions and the cavalry, under the command of Kellerman, took possession of the Alentejo, and occupied the fortress of Setuval.* At the same time Caraffa's division, being replaced at Thomar, by a French force, was distributed in small bodies at a considerable distance from each other, on both sides of the Tagus, immediately round Lisbon.† As the provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau were unknown to the Portuguese, the Spanish troops met with a better reception than the French, and the treaty itself was disregarded by Junot, whose conduct plainly discovered that he considered Portugal to be a possession entirely belonging to France. For when all the stragglers were come up, and the army recovered from its fatigues, and when a reinforcement of five thousand men had reached Salamanca, on its march to Lisbon the French general assumed the chief authority.‡ Commencing by a forced loan of two hundred thousand pounds, he interfered with the different departments of state, and put Frenchmen into all the lucrative offices, while his promises, and protestations of amity, became loud and frequent in proportion to his encroachments.]]

At last being by Napoleon created duke of Abrantes, he threw off all disguise, suppressed the council of regency, seized the reins of government, and while he established many useful regulations, made the nation sensibly alive to the fact that he was a despotic conqueror. The flag and the arms of Portugal were replaced by those of France; eight thousand men were selected and sent from the kingdom under the command of the marquis d'Alorna and Gomez Freire, two noblemen of the greatest reputation for military talent among the native officers; five thousand more were attached to the French army, and the rest were disbanded. An extraordinary contribution of four million sterling, decreed by Napoleon, was then demanded under the curious title of a ransom for the state, but this sum was exorbitant, and Junot prevailed on the emperor to reduce it one half.§ He likewise on his own authority, accepted the forced loan, the confiscated English merchandise, the church plate, and the royal property, in part payment; yet the people were still unable to raise the whole amount, for the court had before taken the greatest part of the church plate and bullion of the kingdom, and had also drawn large sums of money from the people, under the pretext of defending the country; and with this treasure they departed, leaving the public functionaries, the army, private creditors, and even domestic servants, unpaid.

But, although great discontent and misery prevailed, the tranquillity of Lisbon, during the first month after the arrival of the French was remarkable; no disturbance took place, and the populace were completely

* Thiebault. Foy.

* Return of the French army.

† Foy.

† Ibid.

]] Thiebault.

‡ Foy.

controlled by the activity of a police, first established under the prince regent's government by the count de Novion, a French emigrant, and continued by Junot on an extended scale. No capital city in Europe suffers so much as Lisbon from the want of good police regulations, and the French general conferred an unmixed benefit on the inhabitants by giving more effect to Novion's plans; yet, so deeply rooted is the prejudice in favour of ancient customs, that no act gave the Portuguese more offence, than the having the streets cleansed, and the wild dogs, who infested them by thousands, killed. A French serjeant, distinguished by his zeal in destroying those disgusting and dangerous animals, was in revenge assassinated.

In the course of March and April, Junot's military system was completed.* The arsenal of Lisbon, one of the finest establishments in Europe, contained all kinds of naval and military stores in abundance, and ten thousand workmen excellent in every branch of business appertaining to war, hence the artillery, the carriages, the ammunition, with all the minor equipments of the army, were soon renewed and put in the best possible condition, and the hulks of two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and seven lighter vessels of war, were refitted, armed, and moored across the river to defend the entrance, and to awe the town. The army itself, perfectly recovered from its fatigues, reinforced, and better disciplined, was grown confident in its chief from the success of the invasion, and being well fed and clothed, was become a fine body of robust men, capable of any exertion. It was re-organized in three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. General La Borde commanded the first, general Loison the second, general Travot the third, general Margaron the fourth, and general Taviel directed the artillery. General Kellerman commanded in the Alentejo, general Quesnel in Oporto, general Maurin in the Algarves, and Junot himself in Lisbon.

The fortresses of Faro in Algrave, of Almeida, of Elva, La-Lippe, St. Lucie, Setuval, Palmela, and those between Lisbon and the mouth of the Tagus, of Ericia and Peniche, were furnished with French garrisons; Estremos, Aldea-Gallegos, Santarem, and Abrantes were occupied, and put in such a state of defence as their decayed ramparts would permit.

The whole army, including the French workmen and marines attached to it, amounted to above fifty thousand men, of which above forty-four thousand were fit for duty;† that is to say, fifteen thousand five hundred Spaniards, five thousand Portuguese, and twenty-four thousand four hundred French.

Of the latter 1000 were in Elvas and La Lippe,
1000 in Almeida,
1000 in Peniche,
1600 in the Algarves,
2892 in Setuval,
750 in Abrantes,
450 cavalry were kept in Valencia
d'Alcantara, in Spanish Estremadura,

and 350 distributed in the proportion of fifteen men to a post, guarded the lines of communication which were established from Lisbon to Elvas, and from Almeida to Coimbra. Above fifteen thousand men remained disposable.

Lisbon, containing all the civil, military, naval and greatest part of the commercial establishments; the only fine harbour, two-eighths of the population, and two-thirds of the riches of the whole kingdom, formed a centre, which was secured by the main body of the French, while on the circumference a number of strong posts gave support to the operations of their moveable columns. The garrison in Peniche secured the only

harbour between the Tagus and the Mondego, in which a large disembarkation of English troops could take place; the little port of Figueras, held by a small garrison, blocked the mouth of the latter river; the division at Thomar secured all the great lines of communication to the north-east, and in conjunction with the garrison of Abrantes, commanded both sides of the Zezere. From Abrantes to Estremos and Elvas, and to Setuval, the lines of communication were short, and through an open country suitable for the operations of the cavalry, which was all quartered on the south bank of the Tagus. Thus, without breaking up the mass of the army, the harbours were sealed against the English; a great and rich tract was enclosed by posts, and rendered so pervious to the troops, that any insurrection could be reached by a few marches, and immediately crushed; the connexion between the right and left banks of the Tagus at Lisbon was secured, and the entrance to the port defended by the vessels of war which had been refitted and armed. A light squadron was also prepared to communicate with South America, and nine Russian line-of-battle ships and a frigate, under the command of admiral Siniavin, which had taken refuge some time before from the English fleet, were of necessity engaged in the defence of the harbour, forming an unwilling, but not an unimportant auxiliary force.

These military arrangements were Junot's own, and suitable enough if his army had been unconnected with any other; but they clashed with the general views of Napoleon, who regarded the force in Portugal, only as a division of troops to be rendered subservient to the general scheme of subjecting the Peninsula; wherefore, in the month of May, he ordered, that general Avril, with three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and ten guns, should co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia; and that general Loison, with four thousand infantry, should proceed to Almeida, and from thence co-operate with Bessieres in the event of an insurrection taking place in Spain. General Thiebault complains of this order as injurious to Junot, ill combined, and the result of a foolish vanity, that prompted the emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it would be difficult to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril's division, if he had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would have ensured the capture of Seville; and if Dupont's defeat had not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison's division would have been eminently useful in controlling the country behind Bessieres, in case the latter invaded Galicia; moreover it was well placed to intercept the communication between the Castilian and the Estremaduran armies. The emperor's combinations, if they had been fully executed, would have brought seventy thousand men to bear on the defence of Portugal.

Such was the military attitude of the French in May, but their political situation was far from being so favourable. Junot's natural capacity, though considerable, was neither enlarged by study nor strengthened by mental discipline.* Of intemperate habits, indolent in business, prompt and brave in action, quick to give offence yet ready to forget an injury, he was, at one moment a great man, the next below mediocrity, and at all times unsuited to the task of conciliating and governing a people like the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity. He had many difficulties to encounter, and his duty towards France was in some instances incompatible with good policy towards Portugal, yet he was not without resources for establishing a strong French interest, if he had possessed the ability and disposition to soothe a nation that, without having suffered a defeat, was suddenly bowed to a foreign yoke.

* Thiebault.

† Return of the French army.

* Napoleon, in Las Casas. Foy.

But the pride and the poverty of the Portuguese, and the influence of ancient usages, interfered with Junot's policy. The monks, and most of the nobility, were inimical to it, and all the activity of the expelled British factory, and the secret warfare of spies and writers in the pay of England, were directed to undermine his plans, and to render him and his nation odious. On the other hand, he was in possession of the government and of the capital, he had a fine army, he could offer novelty, so dear to the multitude, and he had the name and the fame of Napoleon to assist him. The promises of power are always believed by the many, and there were abundance of grievances to remedy, and wrongs to redress, in Portugal. Among the best educated men, especially at the universities, there existed a strong feeling against the Braganza family, and such an earnest desire for reformed institutions, that steps were actually taken to have prince Eugene declared king of Portugal; * nor was this spirit extinguished at a much later date.

With these materials and the military vanity of the Portuguese to work upon, Junot might have established a powerful French interest; under an active government, the people would not long have regretted the loss of an independence that had no wholesome breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of an army, which was to be subsisted and paid by an impoverished people, soon gave rise to all kinds of oppression; private abuses followed close upon the heels of public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignanthumours broke out in quarrels and assassinations, and the severe punishments that ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous in the highest degree, created rage, not terror, for the nation had not tried its strength in battle, and would not believe that it was weak. Meanwhile the ports being rigorously blockaded by the English fleet, and the troubles in Spain having interrupted the commerce in grain, by which Portugal had been usually supplied from that country, the unhappy people suffered under the triple pressure of famine, war-contributions, and a foreign yoke. † With all external aliment thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation could not remain tranquil; yet the first five months of Junot's government was, with the exception of a slight tumult at Lisbon, when the arms of Portugal were taken down, undisturbed by commotion. Nevertheless the whole country was ripe for a general insurrection.

The harvest proved abundant, and Junot hailed the prospect of returning plenty as a relief from his principal difficulty; but as one danger disappeared, another presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the hopes of the Portuguese, and agents from the neighbouring juntas communicated secretly with the Spanish generals in Portugal; the capture of the French fleet in Cadiz became known, assassinations multiplied, the pope's nuncio fled on board the English fleet, and all things tended to an explosion. The English agents were, of course, actively engaged in promoting this spirit, and the appearance of two English fleets at different points of the coast, having troops on board, produced great alarm among the French, and augmented the impatient fierceness of the Portuguese.

Among the various ways in which the people discovered their hatred of the invaders, one was very characteristic; an egg being, by a chemical process, marked with certain letters, was exhibited in a church, and the letters were interpreted to indicate the speedy coming of don Sebastian, king of Portugal, who, like Arthur of Romantic memory, is supposed to be hidden in a secret island, waiting for the destined period to re-ap-

pear and restore his country to her ancient glory. The trick was turned against the contrivers; other eggs prophesied in the most unpatriotic manner, yet the belief of the Sebastianists lost nothing of its zeal; many people, and those not of the most uneducated classes, were often observed upon the highest points of the hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean, in the hopes of descrying the island in which their long-lost hero is detained.

CHAPTER II.

The Spanish general Bellesta seizes general Quesnel and retires to Galicia—Insurrection at Oporto—Junot disarms and confines the Spanish soldiers near Lisbon—General Avril's column returns to Estremoz—General Loison marches from Almeida against Oporto; is attacked at Mezam Frias; crosses the Douro; attacked at Castro d'Airo; recalled to Lisbon—French driven out of the Algarves—The fort of Figueras taken—Abrantes and Elvas threatened—Setuval in commotion—General Spencer appears off the Tagus—Junot's plan—Insurrection at Villa Viciosa suppressed—Colonel Marassin takes Beja with great slaughter of the patriots—The insurgents advance from Leiria, fall back—Action at Leiria—Loison arrives at Abrantes—Observations on his march—French army concentrated—The Portuguese general Leite, aided by a Spanish corps, takes post at Évora—Loison crosses the Tagus; defeats Leite's advanced guard at Montemor—Battle of Évora—Town taken and pillaged—Unfriendly conduct of the Spaniards—Loison reaches Elvas; collects provisions; is recalled by Junot—Observations.

THE first serious blow was struck at Oporto. The news of what had taken place all over Spain was known there in June, and general Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable and resolute part. He made the French general Quesnel, with his staff, prisoners; after which, calling together the Portuguese authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Galicia with his army and captives. The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the great question of resistance, but, after some vicissitudes, the boldest side was successful; the insurrection, although at one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established in Oporto, and soon extended along the banks of the Douro and the Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego and the sea-coast.

Junot being informed of this event, perceived that no time was to be lost in disarming the Spanish regiments quartered in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, which was not an easy operation. Carraffa's division was above six thousand men, and without employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, it was difficult to collect an equal force of French; the suspicions of the Spanish regiments had been already excited, they were reluctant to obey the French generals, and one, quartered at Alcacer do Sal, had actually resisted the orders of the general-in-chief himself.* To avoid a tumult was also a great object, because in Lisbon fifteen thousand Gallicians were ordinarily engaged as porters and water-carriers, and if a popular movement had been excited, these men would naturally have assisted their countrymen. Notwithstanding these difficulties, Junot, in the night of that day, upon which he received the information of Bellesta's defection, arranged all his measures, and the next day, the Spanish troops being under various pretexts assembled in such numbers and in such places, that resistance was useless, were disarmed, and placed on board the hulks in the Tagus, with exception of eight hundred of the regiment of Murcia and three hundred of that of Valencia, who escaped. Thus, in the course of twenty-four hours, and with very little bloodshed, Junot, by his promptness and dexterity, averted a very serious danger.

* Foy.

† Thiebault.

* Thiebault.

Although this stroke produced considerable effect, it did not prevent the insurrection from becoming general; all couriers and officers carrying orders, or commanding small posts of communications, were suddenly cut off; Junot, reduced by a single blow from fifty to twenty-eight thousand men, found himself isolated, and dependent upon his individual resources, and the courage of his soldiers, for the maintenance of his conquest, and even for the preservation of his army. The Russian squadron, indeed, contained six thousand seamen and marines, but while they consumed a great quantity of provisions, it was evident, from certain symptoms, that they could not be depended upon as useful allies, except in the case of an English fleet attempting to force the entrance of the river. In this situation the duke of Abrantes would have seized Badajoz, but was deterred by the assembling of an Estremaduran army, then under the command of general Galuzzo. However, Avril's column, having failed to join Dupont, returned to Estremos, and it is probable that Junot never intended that it should do otherwise.

Meanwhile Loison, then in Upper Beira, was ordered to march upon Oporto.* He had reached Almeida on the 5th of June, one day previous to Bellesta's defection, and on the 12th, when he read the order, partly by menace, partly by persuasion, got possession of Fort Concepcion, a strong, but ill-placed Spanish work on that frontier. He first attempted to penetrate the Entre-Minho e Douro by Amarante, but as his division was weak, and that it was possible Bellesta might return and fall upon his flank, he advanced timidly. At Mezam Frias he was opposed, and his baggage was at the same time menaced by other insurgents, whereupon he fell back to Villa Real, and after a trifling skirmish at that place, crossed the Douro at Lamego, and marched to Castro d'Airo, where he turned and defeated the armed peasants of the mountains, who had particularly harassed his flanks. From Castro d'Airo he moved upon Coimbra, whence he dislodged a body of insurgents, and was about to scour the country, when he received one of twenty-five despatches, the rest had been intercepted, sent by Junot to recall him to Lisbon. He immediately united his columns, placed his sick and weakly men in Almeida, raised the garrison up to twelve hundred and fifty men, and then having ruined the defences of Fort Concepcion, commenced his march to Lisbon by the way of Guarda.

But while these events were passing in the Beira an insurrection also broke out in the Algarves where general Maurin commanded. It begun near Faro, and Maurin himself, lying sick in that town, was made prisoner. Some Portuguese troops attached to the French force then joined the insurgents; the Spaniards from Andalusia prepared to cross the Guadiana, and general Spencer appeared off Ayamonte with five thousand British troops. The French colonel Maransin, who had succeeded Maurin, immediately retired to Mertola, leaving his baggage, military chest, and above a hundred prisoners, besides killed and wounded, in the hands of the patriots, who, finding that Spencer would not land, did not pursue beyond the Algarve mountains.

The circle of insurrection was now fast closing round Junot. Emissaries from Oporto excited the people to rise as far as Coimbra, where a French post was overpowered, and a junta was formed whose efforts spread the flame to Condeixa, Pombal, and Leira. A student named Zagalo, mixing boldness with address, obliged a Portuguese officer and a hundred men to surrender the fort of Figueras at the mouth of the Mondego; Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents of the valley of the Zezere, and the Spaniards, under Galuzzo, crossing the Guadiana, at Juramenha, occupied

that place and Campo Mayor; thus a great, although confused body of men menaced Kellerman at Elvas, yet, supported by the strength of the town and fort La-Lippe, he easily maintained himself. Avril remained unmolested at Estremos, and Evora, held by a small garrison, was tranquil; but the neighbourhood of Setuval was in commotion, the populace of Lisbon was unquiet, and, at this critical moment, general Spencer, who had quitted Ayamonte and whose force report magnified to ten thousand men, appeared at the mouth of the Tagus.*

Junot held a council of war, and after hearing the opinions of the principal general officers decided on the following plan: 1. To collect the sick in such hospitals as could be protected by the ships of war. 2. To secure the Spanish prisoners by mooring the hulks in which they were confined as far as possible from the city. 3. To arm and provision the forts of Lisbon, and remove the powder from the magazines to the ships. 4. To abandon all other fortresses in Portugal, with exception of Setuval, Almeida, Elvas, and Peniche, and to concentrate the army in Lisbon. In the event of bad fortune, the duke of Abrantes determined to defend the capital as long as he was able, and then crossing the Tagus, move upon Elvas, and from thence retreat to Madrid, Valladolid, or Segovia, as he might find it expedient. This well conceived plan was not executed, the first alarm soon died away, Spencer returned to Cadiz, and when the insurrection was grappled with, it proved to be more noisy than dangerous.

Kellerman having recalled Maransin from Mertola, was preparing to march on Lisbon, when the inhabitants of the town of Villa Viciosa rose on a company of French troops, and drove them into an old castle; yet when Avril came from Estremos to their succour, the Portuguese fled, and a very few were killed in the pursuit. The town of Beja followed the example of Villa Viciosa, but colonel Maransin, who was ready to retire from Mertola, marched in that direction with such rapidity, that he passed over forty miles in eighteen hours, and falling suddenly upon the patriots, defeated them with considerable slaughter, and pillaged the place. He had eighty men killed or wounded, and general Thiebault writes, that an obstinate combat took place in the streets. But the Portuguese never made head for a moment against a strong body during the whole course of the insurrection; how, indeed, was it possible for a collection of miserable peasants, armed with scythes, pitchforks, a few old fowling-pieces, and a little bad powder, under the command of some ignorant countryman, or fanatic friar, to maintain a battle against an efficient and active corps of French soldiers? For there is this essential difference to be observed in judging between the Spanish and Portuguese insurrections; the Spaniards had many great and strong towns free from the presence of the French, and large provinces in which to collect and train forces at a distance from the invaders; while in Portugal, the naked peasants were forced to go to battle the instant even of assembling. The loss which Maransin sustained must have arisen from the stragglers, who in a consecutive march of forty miles would have been numerous, having been cut off and killed by the peasantry.

This blow quieted the Alentejo for the moment, and Kellerman having cleared the neighbourhood of Elvas of all Spanish parties, placed a commandant in La-Lippe, concentrated the detachments under Maransin and Avril, and proceeded himself towards Lisbon, where the duke of Abrantes was in great perplexity. The intercepting of his couriers and isolated officers being followed by the detection of all his spies, had exposed him, without remedy, to every report which the fears of his army, or the ingenuity of the people,

* Thiebault.

* Thiebault.

could give birth to; and there are few nations that can pretend to vie with the Portuguese and Spaniards in the fabrication of plausible reports. Among those current, the captivity of Loison was one; but as nothing was certainly known, except that the insurgents from the valley of the Mondego were marching towards Lisbon, general Margaron was ordered to disperse them, and, if possible, to open a communication with general Loison. He advanced, with three thousand men and six pieces of artillery, to Leiria, whither the patriots had retired, in disorder, when they heard of his approach; the greater part dispersed at once, but those who remained were attacked on the 5th of July, and a scene similar to that of Beja ensued;* the French boasted of victory, the insurgents called it massacre and pillage. In a combat with armed peasantry, it is difficult to know where the fighting ceases and the massacre begins; men dressed in peasant's clothes are observed firing and moving about without order from place to place,—when do they cease to be enemies? They are more dangerous when single than together; they can hide their muskets in an instant and appear peaceable; the soldier passes, and is immediately shot from behind.

The example at Leiria did not however deter the people of Thomar from declaring against the French, and the neighbourhood of Alcobaça rose at the same time. Margaron was thus placed between two new insurrections at the moment he had quelled one; English fleets, with troops on board, were said to be hovering off the coast, and as the most alarming reports relative to Loison were corroborated, his safety was despaired of, when, suddenly, authentic intelligence of his arrival at Abrantes revived the spirits of the general-in-chief and the army.

After arranging all things necessary for the security of Almeida, he had quitted that town the 2d of July, at the head of three thousand four hundred and fifty men, and arrived at Abrantes upon the 8th; having in seven days passed through Guarda, Attalaya, Sarsedas, Corteja, and Sardoval. During this rapid march he dispersed several bodies of insurgents that were assembled on the line of his route, especially at Guarda and Attalaya, and it has been said that twelve hundred bodies were stretched upon the field of battle near the first town; but twelve hundred slain would give five thousand wounded, that is to say, six thousand two hundred killed and wounded by a corps of three thousand four hundred and fifty men in half an hour! and this without cavalry or artillery, and among fastnesses that vie in ruggedness with any in the world! The truth is, that the peasants, terrified by the reports that Loison himself spread to favour his march, fled on all sides, and if two hundred and fifty Portuguese were killed and wounded during the whole passage, it was the utmost. The distance from Almeida, to Abrantes is more than a hundred and eighty miles, the greatest part is a mountain pathway rather than a road, and the French were obliged to gather their provisions from the country as they passed; to forage, to fight several actions, to pursue active peasants well acquainted with the country so closely as to destroy them by thousands, and to march a hundred and eighty miles over bad roads, and all in seven days, is impossible.

The whole French army was now concentrated. But though Kellerman had quelled the insurrection at Alcobaça, and that of Thomar was quieted, the insurgents from Oporto were gathering strength at Coimbra, and the last of the native soldiers deserted the French colours; the Spanish troops at Badajos, strengthened by a body of Portuguese fugitives, and commanded by one Moretti, were also preparing to enter the Alemtejo, and that province was again in commotion; † for the

English admiral had opened a communication with the insurgents on the side of Setúbal, and the patriots were assembled in considerable numbers at Alcacer do Sal.

In this dilemma Junot resolved to leave the northern people quiet for a while, and attack the Alemtejo, because that was his line of retreat upon Spain, from thence only he could provision the capital, and there also, his cavalry could act with the most effect. Accordingly, Loison, with seven thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, crossed the Tagus the 25th of July, and marched by Os Pegoens, Vendanovas, and Montemor. At the latter place he defeated an advanced guard, which fled to Évora, where the Portuguese general Leite had assembled the mass of the insurgents, and assisted by three or four thousand Spanish troops under Moretti, had taken a position to cover the town. When Loison discovered them, he directed Margaron and Solignac to turn their flanks, and fell upon their centre himself; the battle was short, for the Spanish auxiliaries performed no service, and the Portuguese soon took to flight, but there was a great and confused concourse, a strong cavalry was let loose upon the fugitives, and many being cut off from the main body, were driven into the town, which had been deserted by the principal inhabitants; there, urged by despair, they endeavoured to defend the walls and the streets for a few moments, but were soon overpowered, the greater part slain, and the houses pillaged. The French lost two or three hundred men, and the number of the Portuguese and Spaniards that fell was very considerable;* disputes also arose between them, and the latter ravaged the country in their retreat with more violence than the French.

Loison, after resting two days at Évora, proceeded to Elvas, and drove away the numerous Spanish parties which had again infested the neighbourhood of that fortress, and were become obnoxious alike to Portuguese and French. He then scoured the country round, and was accumulating provisions to form magazines at Elvas, when he was suddenly interrupted by a despatch from the duke of Abrantes, recalling him to the right bank of the Tagus, for the British army, so long expected, had, at last, descended upon the coast, and manly warfare reared its honest front amidst the desolating scenes of insurrection.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Loison's expedition to the Alemtejo was an operation of military police, rather than a campaign. Junot wished to repress the spirit of insurrection by sudden and severe examples, and hence the actions of his lieutenant were of necessity harsh; but they have been represented as a series of massacres and cruelties of the most revolting nature, and Loison disseminated such stories to increase the terror which it was the object of his expedition to create. The credulity of the nation that produced the Sebastianists was not easily shocked, the Portuguese eagerly listened to tales so derogatory to their enemies, and so congenial to their own revengeful dispositions; but the anecdotes of French barbarity current for two years after the convention of Cintra were notoriously false, and the same stories being related by persons remote from each other is no argument of their truth. The report that Loison was captured, on his march from Almeida, reached Junot through fifty different channels; there were men to declare that they had beheld him bound with cords; † others to tell how he had been entrapped; some named the places he had been carried through in triumph, and his habitual and characteristic expressions were quoted; the story was complete, and the parts were consistent, yet the whole was not only false, but the rumour had not even the slightest foundation of truth.

* Thiebault. *Accursio de Neves*.

† Ibid. *Parliamentary Papers*, 1809.

* Thiebault.

† Ibid.

2. The Portuguese accounts of the events of this period are angry amplifications of every real or pretended act of French barbarity and injustice; the crimes of individuals are made matter of accusation against the whole army. The French accounts are more plausible, yet scarcely more safe as authorities, seeing that they are written by men who being for the most part actors in the scenes they describe, are naturally concerned to defend their own characters; their military vanity also has had its share in disguising the simple facts of the insurrection; for willing to enhance the merit of the troops, they have exaggerated the number of the insurgents, the obstinacy of the combats, and the loss of the patriots. English party writers, greedily fixing upon such relations, have changed the name of battle into massacre; and thus prejudice, conceit, and clamour, have combined to violate the decorum of history, and to perpetuate error.

3. It would, however, be an egregious mistake to suppose, that because the French were not monsters, there existed no cause for the acrimony with which their conduct has been assailed. The duke of Abrantes, although not cruel, nor personally obnoxious to the Portuguese, was a sensual and violent person, and his habits were expensive; such a man is always rapacious, and as the character of the chief influences the manners of those under his command, it may be safely assumed that his vices were aped by many of his followers.* Now the virtuous general Travot was esteemed, and his person respected, even in the midst of tumult, by the Portuguese, while Loison was scarcely safe from their vengeance when surrounded by his troops; the execrations poured forth at the mere mention of 'the bloody Maneta,' as, from the loss of his hand, he was called, proves that he must have committed many heinous acts; and Kellerman appears to have been as justly stigmatised for rapacity, as Loison was for violence.

4. It has been made a charge against the French generals, that they repressed the hostility of the Portuguese and Spanish peasants by military executions; but in doing so, they only followed the custom of war, and they are not justly liable to reproof, save where they may have carried their punishments to excess, and displayed a wanton spirit of cruelty. All armies have an undoubted right to protect themselves when engaged in hostilities. An insurrection of armed peasants is a military anarchy, and men in such circumstances cannot be restrained within the bounds of civilised warfare. They will murder stragglers, torture prisoners, destroy hospitals, poison wells, and break down all the usages that soften the enmities of modern nations; they wear no badge of an enemy, and their devices cannot, therefore, be guarded against in the ordinary mode; their war is one of extermination, and it must be repressed by terrible examples, or the civilised customs of modern warfare must be discarded, and the devastating system of the ancients revived. The usage of refusing quarter to an armed peasantry, and burning their villages, however unjust and barbarous it may appear at first view, is founded upon a principle of necessity, and is in reality a vigorous infliction of a partial evil, to prevent universal calamity: but however justifiable it may be in theory, no wise man will hastily resort to it, and no good man will carry it to any extent.

CHAPTER III.

Political and military retrospect.—Mr. Fox's conduct contrasted with that of his successors—General Spencer sent to the Mediterranean—Sir John Moore withdrawn from thence; arrives in England; sent to Sweden—Spencer arrives at Gibraltar—

Ceuta, the object of his expedition—Spanish insurrection diverts his attention to Cadiz; wishes to occupy that city—Spaniards averse to it—Prudent conduct of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord Collingwood—Spencer sails to Ayamonte; returns to Cadiz; sails to the mouth of the Tagus; returns to Cadiz—Prince Leopold of Sicily and the duke of Orleans arrive at Gibraltar—Curious intrigue—Army assembled at Cork by the Whig administration, with a view to permanent conquest in south America, the only disposable British force—Sir A. Wellesley takes the command—Contradictory instructions of the ministers—Sir John Moore returns from Sweden; ordered to Portugal—Sir Hew Dalrymple appointed commander of the forces—Confused arrangements made by the ministers.

THE subjugation of Portugal was neither a recent nor a secret project of Napoleon's. In 1806, Mr. Fox, penetrating this design, had sent lord Rosslyn, lord St. Vincent, and general Simcoe, on a politico-military mission to Lisbon, instructing them, to warn the court that a French army destined to invade Portugal was assembling at Bayonne, and to offer the assistance of a British force to meet the attack.* The cabinet of Lisbon affected to disbelieve the information, Mr. Fox died during the negotiation, and as the war with Prussia diverted Napoleon's attention to more important objects, he withdrew his troops from Bayonne. The Tory administration, which soon after overturned the Grenville party, thought no further of this affair, or at least did not evince as much foresight and ready zeal as its predecessors. They, indeed, sent sir Sydney Smith with a squadron to Lisbon, but their views seem to have been confined to the emigration of the royal family, and they intrusted the conduct of the negotiation to lord Strangford, a young man of no solid influence or experience.

But, the Russian squadron, under admiral Siniavin, suddenly entered the Tagus, and this unexpected event produced in the British cabinet, an activity which the danger of Portugal had not been able to excite. It was supposed, that as Russia and England were in a state of hostility, the presence of the Russian ships would intimidate the prince regent, and prevent him from passing to the Brazils, wherefore sir Charles Cotton, an admiral of higher rank than sir Sydney Smith, was sent out with instructions to force the entrance of the Tagus, and attack Siniavin.† General Spencer, then upon the point of sailing with five thousand men upon a secret expedition, was ordered to touch at Lisbon, and ten thousand men, under sir John Moore, were withdrawn from Sicily to aid this enterprise;‡ but before the instructions for the commanders were even written, the prince regent was on his voyage to the Brazils, and Junot ruled in Lisbon. When sir John Moore arrived at Gibraltar, he could hear nothing of sir Sydney Smith, nor of general Spencer, and proceeded to England, which he reached the 31st of December, 1807. From thence, after a detention of four months on ship-board, he was despatched upon that well-known and eminently-foolish expedition to Sweden, which ended in such an extraordinary manner;|| and which seems from the first to have had no other object, than the factious one of keeping an excellent general and a superb division of troops at a distance from the only country where their services were really required.

Meanwhile general Spencer's armament, long baffled by contrary winds, and once forced back to port, was finally dispersed in a storm, and a part arrived at Gibraltar, by single ships, the latter end of January, 1808. Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress, hearing, on the 5th of February, that a French fleet had just passed the Strait, and run up the Mediterranean, became alarmed for Sicily, and caused the first comers to proceed to that island on the 11th; but Spencer himself, whose instructions included an attack on Ceuta, did not arrive at Gibraltar until the 10th of March,

* Napoleon in Las Casas.

* Parliamentary Papers, 1809.

† Sir John Moore's Journal, MS.

† Ibid.

|| Ibid.

when the deficiency in his armament was supplied by a draft from the garrison, and a council was held to arrange the plan of attack on Ceuta; the operation was however finally judged impracticable.

The objects of Spencer's expedition were manifold. He was to co-operate with Moore against the Russian fleet in the Tagus; he was to take the French fleet at Cadiz; he was to assault Ceuta; and he was to make an attempt on the Spanish fleet at Port Mahon! But the wind which brought Moore to Lisbon blew Spencer from that port, and a consultation with admiral Purvis convinced him that the French fleet in Cadiz was invulnerable to his force; Ceuta was too strong; and it only remained to sail to Port Mahon, when the Spanish insurrection breaking out, drew him back to Cadiz with altered views. In the relation of Dupont's campaign, I have already touched upon Spencer's proceedings at Cadiz; but in this place it is necessary to give a more detailed sketch of those occurrences, which fortunately brought him to the coast of Portugal, at the moment when sir Arthur Wellesley was commencing the campaign of Vimiero.

When the French first entered Spain, general Castaños commanded the Spanish troops at San Roque. In that situation he was an object of interest to Napoleon, who sent two French officers privately to sound his disposition; Castaños, who had secretly resolved to oppose the designs of the emperor, thought those officers were coming to arrest him, and at first determined to kill them, and fly to Gibraltar, but on discovering his mistake treated them civilly, and prosecuted his original plans.* Through the medium of one Viali, a merchant of Gibraltar, he opened a communication with sir Hew Dalrymple, and the latter, who had been closely watching the progress of events, encouraged him in his views, and not only promised assistance, but recommended several important measures, such as the immediate seizure of the French squadron in Cadiz, the security of the Spanish fleet at Minorca, and a speedy communication with South America: however, before Castaños could mature his plans, the insurrection took place at Seville, and he acknowledged the authority of the junta.

Meanwhile Solano arrived at Cadiz, and general Spencer, in conjunction with admiral Purvis, pressed him to attack the French squadron, offering to assist if he would admit the English troops into the town. Solano, whose mind was not made up to resist the invaders, expressed great displeasure at this proposal to occupy Cadiz, and refused to treat at all with the British, an event not unexpected by sir Hew, for he knew that most of the Spaniards were mistrustful of the object of Spencer's expedition, and the offer was made without his concurrence. Thus a double intercourse was carried on between the British and Spanish authorities, the one friendly and confidential between sir Hew and Castaños, the other of a character proper to increase the suspicions of the Spaniards. And when it is considered that Spain and England were nominally at war; that the English commanders were acting without the authority of their government; that the troops, which it was proposed to introduce into Cadiz, were in that part of the world for the express purpose of attacking Ceuta, and had already taken the island of Perexil close to that fortress, little surprise can be excited by Solano's conduct. When he was killed, and Morla had succeeded to the command, Spencer and Purvis renewed their offers; but Morla also declined their assistance, and having himself forced the French squadron to surrender, by a succession of such ill-directed attacks, that some doubt was entertained of his wish to succeed, he commenced a series of low intrigues calculated to secure his own personal safety, while he held himself ready to betray his country if the French should prove the strongest.

After the reduction of the enemy's ships, the people were inclined to admit the English troops, but the local junta, swayed by Morla's representations, were averse to it;* and he, while confirming this disposition, secretly urged Spencer to persevere in his offer, saying that he looked entirely to the British force for the future defence of Cadiz: thus dealing, he passed with the people for an active patriot, yet made no preparations for resistance, and by his double falsehood preserved a fair appearance both with the junta and the English general. With these affairs sir Hew Dalrymple did not meddle, he early discovered that Morla was an enemy of Castaños, and having more confidence in the latter, carried on the intercourse at first established between them, without reference to the transactions at Cadiz. He also supplied the Spanish general with arms and two thousand barrels of powder, and placing one English officer near him as a military correspondent, sent another in the capacity of a political agent to the supreme junta at Seville.

When Castaños was appointed commander-in-chief of the Andalusian army, and had rallied Echevaria's troops, he asked for the co-operation of the British force, and offered no objection to their entering Cadiz, but he preferred having them landed at Almeria to march to Xeres. General Spencer confined his offers to the occupation of Cadiz, and when Morla pretended, that to fit out the Spanish fleet was an object of immediate importance, colonel sir George Smith, an officer employed by general Spencer to conduct the negotiations, promised, on his own authority, money to pay the Spanish seamen, who were then in a state of mutiny. However lord Collingwood and sir Hew Dalrymple refused to fulfil this promise, and the approach of Dupont causing Morla to wish Spencer's troops away, he persuaded that general to sail to Ayamonte, under the pretence of preventing Avril's division from crossing the Guadiana, although he knew well that the latter had no intention of doing so. The effect produced upon colonel Maransin by the appearance of the British force off Ayamonte has been already noticed. General Thiebault says that Spencer might have struck an important blow at that period against the French; but the British troops were unprovided with any equipment for a campaign, and to have thrown five thousand infantry, without cavalry and without a single place of arms, into the midst of an enemy who occupied all the fortresses, and who could bring twenty thousand men into the field, would have been imprudent to the greatest degree. General Spencer, who had by this time been rejoined by his detachment from Sicily, only made a demonstration of landing, and having thus materially aided the insurrection, returned to Cadiz, from whence he was almost immediately summoned to Lisbon, to execute a new project, which proved to be both ill-considered and fruitless.

Sir Charles Cotton, being unable to force the entrance of the Tagus without troops, had blockaded that post with the utmost rigour, expecting to force the Russian squadron to capitulate for want of provisions. This scheme, which originated with lord Strangford, never had the least chance of success, and only augmented the privations and misery of the wretched inhabitants; † Junot, therefore, had recourse to various expedients to abate the rigour of the blockade with regard to them, and among others, employed a Portuguese, named Sataro, to make proposals to the English admiral. This man, who at first pretended that he came without the privy of the French, led sir Charles to believe that only four thousand French troops remained in Lisbon, and under that erroneous impression, the latter desired general Spencer might join him, for the purpose of attacking the enemy while they were so weak. Spencer, by the advice of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence, MS.

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence.

† Mr. Canning to lord Castlereagh, 28th Dec. 1807.

Collingwood, obeyed the summons, but on his arrival was led to doubt the correctness of the admiral's information; * instead of four thousand, it appeared that there could not be less than fifteen thousand French in or near Lisbon, and the attack was of course relinquished. † Spencer returned to Cadiz, Castaños again pressed him to co-operate with the Spanish forces, and he so far consented, as to disembark them at the port of St. Mary, and even agreed to send a detachment to Xeres; yet deceived by Morla, who still gave him hopes of finally occupying Cadiz, he resolved to keep the greater part close to that city.‡

At this period the insurrection of Andalusia, attracted all the intriguing adventurers in the Mediterranean towards Gibraltar and Seville, and the confusion of Agramant's camp would have been rivalled, if the prudent firmness of sir Hew Dalrymple had not checked the first efforts of those political pests. Among the perplexing follies of the moment, one deserves particular notice, on account of some curious circumstances that attended it, the full explanation of which I must, however, leave to other historians, who may perhaps find in that and the like affairs, a key to that absurd policy, which in Sicily so long sacrificed the welfare of two nations to the whims and follies of a profligate court. The introduction of the salique law had long been a favourite object with the Bourbons of Spain; but it had never been promulgated with the formalities necessary to give it validity, and the nation was averse to change the ancient rule of succession; this law was, however, now secretly revived by some of the junta of Seville who wished to offer the regency to the prince of Sicily, because, Ferdinand and his brother dying without sons, the regent would then succeed to the prejudice of the princess Carlotta of Portugal. With this object in view, the chevalier Robertoni, a Sicilian agent, appeared early at Gibraltar, and from thence, as if under the auspices of England, attempted to forward the views of his court, until sir Hew Dalrymple, being accidentally informed that the British cabinet disapproved of the object of his mission, sent him away.¶

Meanwhile Castaños, deceived by some person engaged in the intrigue, was inclined to support the pretensions of the Sicilian prince to the regency, and proposed to make use of sir Hew Dalrymple's name to give weight to his opinions, a circumstance which would have created great jealousy in Spain, if sir Hew had not promptly refused his sanction. The affair then seemed to droop for a moment, but in the middle of July an English man of war suddenly appeared at Gibraltar, having on board prince Leopold of Sicily, a complete court establishment of chamberlains with their keys, and ushers with their white wands; § and the duke of Orleans, who attended his brother-in-law the prince, making no secret of his intention to negotiate for the regency of Spain, openly demanded that he should be received into Gibraltar. Sir Hew, foreseeing all the mischief of this proceeding, promptly refused to permit the prince or any of his attendants to land, and the captain of the ship, whose orders were merely to carry him to Gibraltar, refused to take him back to Sicily. Finally, to relieve his royal highness from this awkward situation, sir Hew consented to receive him as a guest, provided that he divested himself of his public character, and that the duke of Orleans departed instantly from the fortress.

Sir William Drummond, British envoy at Palermo, Mr. Viali, and the duke of Orleans, were the ostensible contrivers of this notable scheme, by which, if it had succeeded, a small party in a local junta, would have appointed a regency for Spain, paved the way for

altering the laws of succession in that country, established their own sway over the other juntas, and created interminable jealousy between England, Portugal, and Spain. With whom the plan originated does not very clearly appear. Sir William Drummond's representations induced sir Alexander Ball to provide the ship of war, nominally for the conveyance of the duke of Orleans, in reality for prince Leopold, with whose intended voyage sir Alexander does not appear to have been made acquainted. That the prince should have desired to be regent of Spain was natural, but that he should have been conveyed to Gibraltar in a British ship of the line, when the English government disapproved of his pretensions, was really curious. Sir William Drummond could scarcely have proceeded such lengths in an affair of so great consequence, without secret instructions from some member of his own government, yet lord Castlereagh expressed unqualified approbation of sir Hew's decisive conduct upon the occasion! Did the ministers act at this period without any confidential communication with each other? or was lord Castlereagh's policy secretly and designedly thwarted by one of his colleagues? But it is time to quit this digression and turn to

THE PROCEEDINGS IN PORTUGAL.

The bishop of Oporto being placed at the head of the insurrectional junta of that town, claimed the assistance of England. 'We hope,' said he, 'for an aid of three hundred thousand cruzado novas; of arms and accoutrements complete, and of cloth for forty thousand infantry and for eight thousand cavalry; three thousand barrels of cannon powder, some cargoes of salt fish, and other provisions, and an auxiliary body of six thousand men at least, including some cavalry.' This extravagant demand would lead to the supposition that an immense force had been assembled by the prelate, yet he could never at any time have put five thousand organized men in motion against the French, and had probably not even thought of any feasible or rational mode of employing the succours he demanded; the times were however favourable for extravagant demands, and his were not rejected by the English ministers, who sent agents to Oporto and other parts, with power to grant supplies. The improvident system adopted for Spain, being thus extended to Portugal, produced precisely the same effects, that is, cavils, intrigues, waste, insubordination, inordinate vanity and ambition, among the ignorant upstart men of the day. More than half a year had now elapsed since Napoleon first poured his forces into the Peninsula, every moment of that time was marked by some extraordinary event, and one month had passed since a general and terrible explosion, shaking the unsteady structure of diplomacy to pieces, had left a clear space for the shock of arms; yet the British cabinet was still unacquainted with the real state of public feeling in the Peninsula, and with the Spanish character; and although possessing a disposable army, of at least eighty thousand excellent troops, was totally unsettled in its plans, and unprepared for any vigorous effort.* Agents were indeed despatched to every accessible province, the public treasure was scattered with heedless profusion, and the din of preparation was heard in every department: but the bustle of confusion is easily mistaken for the activity of business, and time removing the veil of official mystery covering those transactions, has exposed all their dull and meagre features; it is now clear, that the treasure was squandered without judgment, and the troops dispersed without meaning. Ten thousand exiled to Sweden proved the truth of Oxenstiern's address to his son; as many more idly kept in Sicily were degraded into the guards of a vicious court; Gibraltar was unnecessarily filled with

* Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence.

† Parliamentary Papers, 1809.

‡ Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence. || Ibid. § Ibid.

* Parl. Pap. lord Castlereagh to sir A. Wellesley, 21st June.

fighting men, and general Spencer, with five thousand excellent soldiers, was doomed to wander between Ceuta, Lisbon, and Cadiz, seeking, like the knight of La Mancha, for a foe to combat.

A considerable force remained in England, but it was not ready for service, when the minister resolved to send an expedition to the Peninsula, and nine thousand men collected at Cork, formed the only disposable army for immediate operations. The Grey and Grenville administration, so remarkable for unfortunate military enterprises, had assembled this handful of men with a view to permanent conquests in South America! upon what principle of policy it is not necessary to inquire, but such undoubtedly was the intention of that administration, perhaps in imitation of the Roman senate, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at the gates of the city. The Tory administration relinquishing this scheme of conquest, directed sir Arthur Wellesley to inform general Miranda, the military adventurer of the day, not only that he must cease to expect assistance, but that all attempts to separate the colonies of Spain from the parent state would be discouraged by the English government; thus the troops assembled at Cork became available, and sir Arthur Wellesley being appointed to command them, sailed on the 12th of July, to commence that long and bloody contest in the Peninsula which he was destined to terminate in such a glorious manner.

Two small divisions were soon after ordered to assemble for embarkation at Ramsgate and Harwich, under the command of generals Anstruther and Acland, yet a considerable time elapsed before they were ready to sail, and a singular uncertainty in the views of the ministers at this period subjected all the military operations to perpetual and mischievous changes.* General Spencer, supposed to be at Gibraltar, was directed to repair to Cadiz, and there await sir Arthur's orders, and the latter was permitted to sail under the impression that Spencer was actually subject to his command;† other instructions empowered Spencer, at his own discretion, to commence operations in the south, without reference to sir Arthur Wellesley's proceedings;‡ admiral Purvis, who, after lord Collingwood's arrival, had no separate command, was also authorised to undertake any enterprise in that quarter, and even to control the operations of sir Arthur Wellesley by calling for the aid of his troops, that general being enjoined to 'pay all due obedience to any such requisition!'§ Yet sir Arthur himself was informed, that 'the accounts from Cadiz were bad;' that 'no disposition to move either there or in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar was visible,' and that 'the cabinet were unwilling he should go far to the southward, whilst the spirit of exertion appeared to reside more to the northward.' Again, the admiral, sir Charles Cotton, was informed that sir Arthur Wellesley was to co-operate with him in a descent at the mouth of the Tagus, but sir Arthur himself had no definite object given for his own operations, although his instructions pointed to Portugal. Thus in fact no one officer, naval or military, knew exactly what his powers were, with the exception of admiral Purvis, who, being only second in command for his own service, was really authorised to control all the operations of the land forces, provided he directed them to that quarter which had been declared unfavourable for any operations at all! These inconsistent orders were calculated to create confusion and prevent all vigour of action, but more egregious conduct followed.

In recommending Portugal as the fittest field of action, the ministers were chiefly guided by the advice of the

Asturian deputies. Yet having received sir Hew Dalrymple's despatches to a late date, their own information must have been more recent and more extensive than any that they could obtain from those deputies, who had left Spain at the commencement of the insurrection, who were ill informed of what was passing in their own province, utterly ignorant of the state of any other part of the Peninsula, and under any circumstances incapable of judging rightly in such momentous affairs.* But though sir Arthur Wellesley's instructions were vague and confined with respect to military operations, he was expressly told that the intention of the government, was to enable Portugal and Spain to throw off the French yoke, and ample directions were given to him as to his future political conduct in the Peninsula. He was informed how to demean himself in any disputes that might arise between the two insurgent nations, how to act with relation to the settlement of the supreme authority during the interregnum. He was directed to facilitate communications between the colonies and the mother country, and to offer his good offices to arrange any differences between them. The terms upon which Great Britain would acquiesce in any negotiation between Spain and France were imparted to him, and finally he was empowered to recommend the establishment of a paper system in the Peninsula, as a good mode of raising money, and attaching the holders of it to the national cause; the Spaniards were not, however, sufficiently civilised to adopt this recommendation, and barbarously preferred gold to credit, at a time when no man's life, or faith, or wealth, or power, was worth a week's purchase.

Sir Hew Dalrymple was also commanded to furnish sir Arthur with every information that might be of use in the operations, and when the tenor of these instructions, and the great Indian reputation enjoyed by sir Arthur Wellesley are considered, it is not possible to doubt that he was first chosen as the fittest man to conduct the armies of England at this important conjuncture.† Yet scarcely had he sailed when he was superseded, not for a man whose fame and experience might have justified such a change, but by an extraordinary arrangement, which can hardly be attributed to mere vacillation of purpose, he was reduced to the fourth rank in that army, for the future governance of which, he had fifteen days before received the most extended instructions. Sir Hew Dalrymple was now appointed to the chief command, and sir John Moore, who had suddenly and unexpectedly returned from the Baltic, having by his firmness and address saved himself and his troops from the madness of the Swedish monarch, was with marked disrespect, directed to place himself under the orders of sir Harry Burrard, and proceed to Portugal. Thus two men comparatively unknown and unused to the command of armies, superseded the only generals in the British service whose talents and experience were indisputable. The secret springs of this proceeding are not so deep as to baffle investigation; but that task scarcely belongs to the general historian, who does enough when he exposes the effects of envy, treachery, and base cunning, without tracing those vices home to their possessors.

Notwithstanding these changes in the command, the uncertainty of the minister's plans continued. The same day that sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to be commander-in-chief, a despatch, containing the following project of campaign, was sent to sir Arthur Wellesley:‡ 'The motives which have induced the sending so large a force to that quarter (the coast of Portugal,) are, 1st, to provide effectually for an attack upon the Tagus; and, 2dly, to have such an additional force disposable beyond what may be indispensably

* Parliamentary Papers, 1808.

† Ibid.

‡ Ld. Castlereagh to sir A. Wellesley, 30th June.

§ Ibid. Ld. Castlereagh to gen. Spencer, 28th and 30th June.

Do. to adm. Purvis, 28th June.

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* Parl. Pap. Ld. Castlereagh to sir A. Wellesley, 30th June.

† Parl. Pap. Ld. Castlereagh to sir H. Dalrymple, 28th June.

‡ Parl. Pap. Ld. Castlereagh to sir A. Wellesley, 15th July.

requisite for that operation, as may admit of a detachment being made to the southward, either with a view to secure Cadiz, if it should be threatened by the French force under general Dupont, or to co-operate with the Spanish troops in reducing that corps, if circumstances should favour such an operation, or any other that may be concerted. His Majesty is pleased to direct that the *attack upon the Tagus should be considered as the first object to be attended to*; and as the whole force of which a statement is enclosed, when assembled, will amount to not less than thirty thousand, *it is considered that both services may be provided for amply*. The precise distribution, as between Portugal and Andalusia, both as to time and proportion of force, must depend upon circumstances, to be judged of on the spot; and should it be deemed advisable to fulfil the assurance which lieutenant general sir Hew Dalrymple appears to have given to the supreme junta of Seville, under the authority of my despatch of (no date), that it was the intention of his Majesty to employ a corps of ten thousand men to co-operate with the Spaniards in that quarter; a corps of this magnitude may, I should hope, be detached without prejudice to the main operation against the Tagus, and may be reinforced, according to circumstances, after the Tagus has been secured. But if, previous to the arrival of the force under orders from England, Cadiz should be seriously threatened, it must rest with the senior officer of the Tagus, at his discretion to detach, upon receiving a requisition to that effect, such an amount of force as may place that important place out of the reach of immediate danger, *even though it should for the time suspend operations against the Tagus*.*

The inconsistent folly of this despatch is apparent, but the occupation of Cadiz was a favourite project with the Cabinet, which was not discouraged by Spencer's unsuccessful effort to gain admittance, nor by the representations of sir Hew Dalrymple, who had grounds to believe that the attempt would bring down the army under Castaños to oppose it by force. Neither did the minister consider that, in a political view, such a measure, pressed as a preliminary, would give a handle for misrepresentation, and that, in a military view, the burden of Cadiz would clog operations in Portugal. Adopting all projects, and weighing none, they displayed the most incredible confusion of ideas; for the plan of sending ten thousand men to Seville, was said to be in pursuance of a promise made by sir Hew Dalrymple to the junta, whereas the despatch of that general, quoted as authority for this promise of help, contained nothing of the kind, and was even written *before any junta existed*!

In England, at this period, personal enmity to Napoleon, and violent party prejudices, had so disturbed the judgments of men relative to that monarch, that any information speaking of strength or success for him, was regarded with suspicion even by the ministers, who, as commonly happens in such cases, becoming the dupes of their own practices, listened with complacency to all those tales of mutiny among his troops, disaffection of his generals, and insurrections in France, which the cunning or folly of their agents transmitted to them. Hence sprung such projects as the one above, the false calculations of which may be exposed by a short comparative statement. The whole English force was not much above thirty thousand men, distributed off Cadiz, off the coast of Portugal, on the eastern parts of England, and in the Channel. The French in Spain and Portugal were about a hundred and twenty thousand men, and they possessed all the Portuguese, and most of the Spanish fortresses. The English army had no reserve, no fixed plan, and it was to be divided, and to act upon a double line of operations. The French had a strong reserve at Bayonne, and the grand French army of four hundred thousand veterans was untouched,

and ready to succour the troops in the Peninsula if they required it.

Happily, this visionary plan was in no particular followed by the generals entrusted with the conduct of it. A variety of causes combined to prevent the execution. The catastrophe of Baylen marred the great combinations of the French emperor, fortune drew the scattered divisions of the English army together, and the decisive vigour of sir Arthur Wellesley sweeping away these cobweb projects, obtained all the success that the bad arrangements of the ministers would permit. In the next chapter, resuming the thread of the history, I shall relate the proceedings of the first British campaign in the Peninsula. But I judged it necessary to make an exposition of the previous preparations and plans of the cabinet, lest the reader's attention not being fully awakened to the difficulties cast in the way of the English generals by the incapacity of the government, should, with hasty censure, or niggard praise, do the former injustice; for, as a noble forest hides many noisome swamps and evil things, so the duke of Wellington's actions have covered the innumerable errors of the ministers.

CHAPTER IV.

Sir A. Wellesley quits his troops and proceeds to Coruña—Junta refuse assistance in men, but ask for and obtain money—Sir Arthur goes to Oporto; arranges a plan with the bishop; proceeds to the Tagus; rejoins his troops; joined by Spencer; disembarks at the Mondego; has an interview with general Freire d'Andrada; marches to Leria—Portuguese insurrection weak—Junot's position and dispositions—Laborde marches to Alcobaca, Loison to Abrantes—General Freire separates from the British—Junot quits Lisbon with the reserve—Laborde takes post at Rorica—Action of Rorica—Laborde retreats to Montechique—Sir A. Wellesley marches to Vimiero—Junot concentrates his army at Torres Vedras.

A FEW days after sailing from Cork, sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting the fleet, repaired in a frigate to Coruña, where he arrived the 20th of July, and immediately held a conference with the Gallician junta, by whom he was informed of the battle of Rio Seco.* The account was glossed over in the Spanish manner and the issue of that contest had caused no change of policy, if policy that may be called, which was but a desire to obtain money and to avoid personal inconvenience. The aid of troops was rejected, but arms and gold were demanded, and while the conference went on, the last was supplied, for an English frigate entered the harbour with two hundred thousand pounds. The junta recommended that the British should be employed in the north of Portugal, promised to aid them by sending a Spanish division to Oporto, and supported their recommendation with an incorrect statement of the number of men, Spanish and Portuguese, who, they asserted, were in arms near that city. They gave also a still more inaccurate estimate of the forces under Junot, and in this manner persuaded sir Arthur not to land in their province: yet, at the moment they were rejecting the assistance of the British troops, the whole kingdom of Galicia was lying at the mercy of marshal Bessieres, and there were neither men nor means to impede the progress of his victorious army.

Mr. Charles Stuart, appointed envoy to the Gallician junta, had arrived with sir Arthur Wellesley at Coruña, and quickly penetrated the flimsy veil of Spanish enthusiasm, informed his government of the true state of affairs; but his despatches were unheeded, while the inflated reports of the subordinate civil and military agents were blazoned forth, and taken as sure guides. Meanwhile sir Arthur proceeded to Oporto, where he found colonel Browne, an active, intelligent officer, em-

* Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.

ployed to distribute succours. From his reports it appears that no Spanish troops were in the north of Portugal, and that all the Portuguese force was upon the Mondego, to the south of which river the insurrection had already spread. A French division of eight thousand men was supposed to be in their front, and some great disaster was to be expected, for, to use colonel Browne's words, 'with every good will in the people, their exertions were so short-lived, and with so little combination, that there was no hope of their being able to resist the advances of the enemy;* in fact, only five thousand regulars and militia, half armed and associated with ten or twelve thousand peasants without any arms, were in the field at all. A large army was, however, made out upon paper by the bishop of Oporto, who, having assembled his civil and military coadjutors in council, proposed various plans of operation for the allied forces, none of which sir Arthur was inclined to adopt;† but after some discussion it was finally arranged that the prelate and the paper army should look to the defence of the *Tras os Montes* against Bessieres, and that the five thousand soldiers on the Mondego should co-operate with the British forces.

This being settled, sir Arthur Wellesley hastened to consult with sir Charles Cotton relative to the descent at the mouth of the Tagus, which had so long haunted the imaginations of the ministers. The strength of the French, the bar of the river, the disposition of the forts, and the difficulty of landing in the immediate neighbourhood, occasioned by the heavy surf playing upon all the undefended creeks and bays, convinced him that such an enterprise was unadvisable, if not impracticable. There remained a choice of landing to the north of Lisbon at such a distance as to avoid the danger of a disputed disembarkation; or of proceeding to the southward to join general Spencer, and commence operations in that quarter against Dupont.‡ Sir Arthur Wellesley decided against the latter, which promised no good result while Junot held Portugal and Bessieres hung on the northern frontier; for he foresaw that the jealousy of the Spaniards, evinced by their frequent refusal to admit English troops into Cadiz, would assuredly bring on a tedious negotiation, and waste the season of action before the army could obtain a place of arms; or that the campaign must be commenced without any secure base of operations.¶ Nothing was then known of the Spanish troops, except that they were inexperienced, and without good aid from them, it would have been idle with fourteen thousand men to take the field against twenty thousand, strongly posted in the Sierra Morena, and communicating freely with the main body of the French army. A momentary advance was useless! and if the campaign was protracted, the line of operations running nearly parallel to the frontier of Portugal, would have required a covering army on the Guadiana to watch the movements of Junot.

The double line of operations, proposed by lord Castlereagh, was contrary to all military principle, and as Spencer's despatches announced that his division was at St. Mary's, near Cadiz, and disengaged from any connexion with the Spaniards—a fortunate circumstance, scarcely to have been expected,—sir Arthur sent him orders to sail to the mouth of the Mondego, whether he himself also repaired, to join the fleet having his own army on board.

Off the Mondego he received the despatches announcing sir Hew Dalrymple's appointment and the sailing of sir John Moore's troops, but this mortifying intelligence did not relax his activity; he directed fast-sailing vessels to look out for Anstruther's armament, and conduct it to the Mondego, and having heard of

Dupont's capitulation, resolved without waiting for general Spencer's arrival, to disembark his own troops and commence the campaign—a determination that marked the cool decisive vigour of his character. He was, indeed, sure that, in consequence of Dupont's defeat, Bessieres would not enter Portugal; yet his information led him to estimate Junot's own force at sixteen to eighteen thousand men, a number, indeed, below the truth, yet sufficient to make the hardest general pause before he disembarked with only nine thousand men, and without any certainty that his fleet could remain even for a day in that dangerous offing:* another man, also, was coming to profit from any success that might be obtained, and a failure would have ruined his own reputation in the estimation of the English public, always ready to deride the skill of an Indian general.

It was difficult to find a good point of disembarkation. The coast of Portugal, from the Minho to the Tagus, presents with few exceptions, a rugged and dangerous shore; all the harbours formed by the rivers have bars, that render most of them difficult of access even for boats; with the slightest breeze from the sea-board, a terrible surf breaks along the whole line of coast, forbidding all approach; and when the south winds which commonly prevails from August to the winter months, blows, a more dangerous shore is not to be found in any part of the world.

The small peninsula of Peniché, about seventy miles northward of the Lisbon Rock, alone offered a safe and accessible bay, perfectly adapted for a disembarkation; but the anchorage was completely within range of the fort, which contained a hundred guns and a garrison of a thousand men. The next best place was the Mondego river, and as the little fort of Figueras, taken, as I have before related, by the student Zagalo, and now occupied by English marines, secured a free entrance, sir Arthur commenced landing his troops there on the 1st of August. The weather was calm, yet the operation was so difficult, that it was not completed before the 5th, and at that moment, by singular good fortune, general Spencer arrived; he had not received sir Arthur's orders, but with great promptitude had sailed for the Tagus the moment Dupont surrendered, and by sir Charles Cotton had been directed to Mondego.† The united forces, however, only amounted to twelve thousand three hundred men, because a veteran battalion, being destined for Gibraltar, was left on board the ships.

When the army was on shore, the British general repaired to Montemor Velho, to confer with don Bernardim Freire d' Andrada, the Portuguese commander-in-chief, who proposed that the troops of the two nations should relinquish all communication with the coast, and throwing themselves into the heart of Beira, commence an offensive campaign. He promised ample stores of provisions, but sir Arthur having already discovered the weakness of the insurrection, placed no reliance on those promises; wherefore furnishing Freire with five thousand stand of arms and ammunition, he refused to separate from his ships, and seeing clearly that the insurgents were unable to give any real assistance, resolved to act with reference to the probability of their deserting him in danger. The Portuguese general, disappointed at this refusal, reluctantly consented to join the British army, yet pressed sir Arthur to hasten to Leiria, lest a large magazine filled, as he affirmed, with provisions for the use of the British army, should fall into the enemy's hands. After this the two generals separated, and the necessary preparations being completed, the advanced guard of the English army quitted the banks of the Mondego on the 9th, taking the road to Leiria, and the 10th, sir Arthur Wellesley followed with the main body.

* Parliamentary Papers, 1809.

† Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative. Court of Inquiry. † Ibid.

¶ Sir H. Dalrymple's and lord Collingwood's Correspondence.

* Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative. Court of Inquiry. † Ib.

His plan embraced three principal objects :

1. To hold on by the sea-coast, as well for the sake of his supplies, as to avoid the drain upon his army, which the protection of magazines on shore would occasion, and also to cover the disembarkation of the reinforcements expected from England.

2. To keep his troops in a mass, that he might strike an important blow.

3. To strike that blow as near Lisbon as possible, that the affairs of Portugal might be quickly brought to a crisis.

He possessed very good military surveys of the ground in the immediate neighbourhood of Lisbon, and he was anxious to carry on his operations in a part of the country where he could avail himself of this resource ; * but the utter inexperience of his commissariat staff, and the want of cavalry, rendered his movements slow, and obliged him to be extremely circumspect ; especially as the insurrection, although a generous, was a feeble effort, and its prolongation rather the result of terror than of hope ; the blow had been hastily struck in the moment of suffering, and the patriots, conscious of weakness, trembled when they reflected on their own temerity. Bernardim Freire had received arms and equipments complete for five thousand soldiers, yet his army at Leiria did not exceed six thousand men of all arms fit for action, and besides this force, there were in all the provinces north of the Tagus only three thousand infantry, under the command of the marquis of Valladeres, half of whom were Spaniards : † hence it appears, that nothing could be more insignificant than the insurrection, nothing more absurd than the lofty style adopted by the junta of Oporto in their communications with the British ministers.

Upon the other side, Junot, who had received information of the English descent, in the Mondego, as early as the 2d, was extremely embarrassed by the distance of his principal force, and the hostile disposition of the inhabitants of Lisbon.‡ He also was acquainted with the disaster of Dupont, and exaggerated notions of the essential strength of the Portuguese insurgents were generated in his own mind, and in the minds of his principal officers. The patriots of the Alentejo and Algarves, assisted by some Spaniards, and animated by manifestos and promises assiduously promulgated from the English fleet, had once more assembled at Alcaer do Sal, from whence they threatened the garrisons of St. Ubes, and the French posts on the south bank of the Tagus, immediately opposite to Lisbon. That capital was very unquiet. The anticipation of coming freedom was apparent in the wrathful looks and stubborn manners of the populace, and superstition was at work to increase the hatred and the hopes of the multitude ; it was at this time the prophetic eggs, denouncing death to the French, and deliverance to the Portuguese, appeared. But less equivocal indications of approaching danger were to be drawn from the hesitations of Junot, who, wavering between his fear of an insurrection in Lisbon, and his desire to check the immediate progress of the British army, gave certain proof of an intellect yielding to the pressure of events.

Loison, having seven or eight thousand men, was now in the neighbourhood of Estremos ; two thousand five hundred men were in the fortresses of Elvas and Almeida, a few hundred were at Abrantes, a thousand in Santarem, and the same number in Peniché ; general Thomieres, with one brigade, was in the vicinity of Alcobaga, and the rest of the army was quartered at Lisbon and on a circuit round, including both sides of the river. The Tagus itself was guarded on the north

bank by the forts of Cascaes, St. Antonio, St. Julian's, Belem, and the citadel, between which smaller works kept up a continued line of offence against ships entering by the northern passage of the harbour. On the southern bank, fort Bugio, built upon a low sandy point, crossed its fire with St. Julian's in the defence of the entrance. Upon the heights of Almada or Palmela, stood the fort of Palmela, and St. Ubes and Trafaria completed the posts occupied by the French on that side.* The communication between the north and south banks was kept up by the refitted Portuguese ships of war, by the Russian squadron, and by the innumerable boats, most of them very fine and large, with which the Tagus is covered.

Such was the situation of the army on the 3d, when Junot ordered Loison to march by Portalegre and Abrantes, and from thence effect a junction with general Laborde, who, with three thousand infantry, five or six hundred cavalry, and five pieces of artillery, quitted Lisbon upon the 6th, and proceeded by Villa Franca, Rio Mayor, and Candeiros ; being charged to observe the movements of the British, and to cover the march of Loison, with whom he expected to form a junction at Leiria. Junot himself remained in Lisbon thinking to control the inhabitants by his presence.† He embarked all the powder from the magazines, took additional precautions to guard his Spanish prisoners, and put the citadel and forts into a state of siege ; but disquieted by the patriots, assembled at Alcaer do Sal, he sent general Kellerman with a moveable column to disperse them, directing him to scour the country between that place and Setuval, to withdraw the garrison from the latter, to abandon all the French posts on the south of the Tagus except Palmela, and to collect the whole force in one mass on the heights of Almada, where an entrenched camp had been already commenced. But Kellerman had scarcely departed, when two English regiments, the one from Madeira, the other from Gibraltar, arriving off the bar of Lisbon, distracted anew the attention of the French, and increased the turbulence of the populace ; and in this state of perplexity the duke of Abrantes lingered until the 15th, when the progress of Sir Arthur Wellesley forced him to assume the command of the army in the field.

Loison entered Abrantes the 9th, and the same day Laborde arrived at Candeiros, from which point he could, with facility, either move upon Alcobaga and Leiria, or form a junction with Loison upon the side of Santarem. The 10th, Loison halted at Abrantes, and Laborde moved to Alcobaga, where he was joined by Thomieres and the garrison of Peniché. Hence the armies on both sides were now in a state of attraction towards each other, indicated an approaching shock, and while the news of Bessieres' victory at Rio Seco produced a short lived exultation in the French camp, intelligence of Joseph's flight from Madrid reached the British army, and increased its confidence of victory.

Sir Arthur's advanced guard entered Leiria, and was there joined by Bernardim Freire and the Portuguese army, which immediately seized the magazine without making any distribution to the British troops, the main body of which only arrived the 11th, but the whole marched in advance upon the 12th.‡ Laborde had employed the 11th and 12th seeking for a position in the vicinity of Batalha, and finding the ground too extensive for his force, fell back in the night of the 12th to Obidos, a town with a Moorish castle built on a gentle eminence in the middle of a valley.¶ Occupying this place with his piquets, he placed a small detachment at the windmill of Brilos, three miles in front, and retired the 14th to Roriga, a village six miles to

* Sir A. Wellesley's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.

† Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. ‡ Thiebault.

* Thiebault.

† Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

† Ibid.

¶ Thiebault.

the southward, situated at the intersection of the roads leading to Torres Vedras, Montechique, and Alcoentre, and overlooking the whole valley of Obidos. This position enabled him to preserve his communication with Loison open, but as it uncovered Peniché, the fourth Swiss regiment, with the exception of the flank companies, was sent to re-garrison that important point, and at the same time three hundred men were detached to the right by Bombaral, Cadaval, and Segura, to obtain intelligence of Loison.

That general, by a demonstration on the side of Thomar the 11th, had ascertained that Leiria was in the hands of the British, and fell back the same day upon Torres Novas, then following the course of the Tagus he arrived at Santarem upon the 13th, but in such an exhausted state, that he was unable to renew his march until the 15th. Sir Arthur Wellesley's first movement had thus cut the line of communication between Loison and Laborde, caused a loss of several forced marches to the former, and obliged the latter to risk an action with more than twice his own numbers. But as the hostile troops approached each other, the Portuguese chiefs became alarmed; for, notwithstanding the confident language of their public manifestos and the bombastic style of their conversation, an internal conviction that a French army was invincible pervaded all ranks of the patriots. The leaders, aware of their own deficiency, and incredulous of the courage of the English soldiers, dreaded the being committed in a decisive contest; because a defeat would deprive them of all hope to make terms with the victors, whereas by keeping five or six thousand men together, they could at any time secure themselves by a capitulation. The junta of Oporto also, who were already aiming at supreme authority, foresaw that, in the event of a successful battle, it would be more advantageous for their particular views to be provided with an army untouched and entirely disconnected with a foreign general; and Freire being well instructed in the secret designs of this party, resolved not to advance a step beyond Leiria. However to cover his real motives, he required the British commander to supply him with provisions, choosing to forget the magazine which he had just appropriated to himself, and as readily forgetting the formal promises of the bishop of Oporto, who had undertaken to feed the English army.

This extraordinary demand, that an auxiliary army, just disembarked, should nourish the native soldiers, instead of being itself fed by the people, was met by sir Arthur Wellesley with a strong remonstrance. He easily penetrated the secret motive which caused it, yet feeling that it was important to have a respectable Portuguese force acting in conjunction with his own, he first appealed to the honour and patriotism of Freire, warmly admonishing him, that he was going to forfeit all pretension to either, by permitting the British army to fight without his assistance. This argument had no effect upon don Bernardim, and he parried the imputations, against his spirit and zeal, by pretending that his intention was to operate independently on the line of the Tagus; hence after some further discussion, sir Arthur changing his tone of rebuke to one of conciliation, recommended to him not to risk his troops by an isolated march, but to keep in the rear of the British and wait for the result of the first battle. This advice was agreeable to Freire, and at the solicitation of colonel Trant, a military agent, he consented to leave fourteen hundred infantry, and two hundred and fifty cavalry, under the immediate command of the English general. But the defection of the native force was a serious evil, it shed an injurious moral influence, and deprived sir Arthur of the aid of troops whose means of gaining intelligence, and whose local knowledge, might have compensated for his want of cavalry. Nevertheless, continuing his own march, his advanced

guard entered Caldas the 15th, on which day also Junot reluctantly quitted Lisbon, with a reserve composed of two thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and ten pieces of artillery, carrying with him his grand parc of ammunition, and a military chest, containing forty thousand pounds.

General Travot was left at Lisbon, with above seven thousand men, of which number two battalions were formed of stragglers and convalescents.* He held both sides of the Tagus, and Palmela, the Bugio fort, and the heights of Almada, were occupied by two thousand men, to protect the shipping from the insurgents of the Alemtejo, who, under the orders of the Monteiro Mor, were again gathering at Setuval; a thousand were on board the vessels of war to guard the Spanish prisoners, and the spare powder; two thousand four hundred were in the citadel and supporting the police; a thousand were distributed in the forts of Belem, St. Julian's, Cascaes, and Ericeia, which last is situated to the northward of the Rock of Lisbon, and commands a small harbour a few miles west of Mafra; finally, a thousand were at Santarem, protecting a large depot of stores. Thus, if the garrisons of Elvas, Peniché, and Almeida be included, nearly one-half of the French army was, by Junot's combinations, rendered inactive, and those in the field were divided into three parts, without any certain point of junction in advance, yet each too weak singly to sustain an action. The duke of Abrantes seems to have reigned long enough in Portugal, to forget that he was merely the chief of an advanced corps, whose safety depended upon activity and concentration.

The French reserve was transported to Villa Franca by water, from whence it was to march to Otta, but the rope ferry-boat of Saccavem being removed by the natives, it cost twenty four hours to throw a bridge across the creek at that place; and on the 17th when the troops were on their march, Junot hastily recalled them to Villa Franca, because of a report that the English had landed near the capital. This rumour, proving false, the reserve resumed the road to Otta, under the command of general Thiebault, and Junot himself pushed forward to Alcoentre, where he found Loison, and assumed the personal direction of that general's division. Meanwhile sir Arthur Wellesley was pressing Laborde. The 25th he had caused the post at Brilos to be attacked, and the pickets to be driven out of Obidos, but two companies of the 95th, and two of the 5th, battalion, 60th, after gaining the windmill without loss, pursued the retreating enemy with such inconsiderate eagerness, that at the distance of three miles from their support, they were out-flanked by two superior bodies of French, and were only saved by the opportune advance of general Spencer.† Two officers and twenty-seven men were killed and wounded in this slight affair, which gave a salutary check to the rashness, without lowering the confidence of the troops, and on the 16th, Laborde's position was examined.

The main road from Obidos passed through a valley, which was closed to the southward by some high table land, on which stood the village of Roriga, and the French being posted on a small plain immediately in front of that place, overlooked all the country as far as Obidos. All the favourable points of defence in front, and on the nearest hills at each side, were occupied by small detachments, and one mile in the rear, a steep ridge, extending about three quarters of a mile east and west, and consequently parallel to the French position, offered a second line of great strength. The main road led by a steep defile over this ridge, which was called the height of Zambugeira or Columbeira. Beyond it, very lofty mountains stretching from the

* Thiebault.

† Sir A. Wellesley's despatch.

sea-coast to the Tagus like a wall, filled all the space between that river and the ocean, down to the Rock of Lisbon; and the valley leading from Obidos to Rorica was bounded on the left by a succession of ridges rising like steps, until they were lost in the great mass of the Sierra de Baragueda, itself a shoot from the Monte Junto.

Laborde's situation was truly embarrassing, Loison was still at Alcoentre, and the reserve at Villa Franca, that is, one and two marches distant from Rorica; hence if he retired upon Torres Vedras, his communication with Loison would be lost, and to fall back on Montechique was to expose the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra; to march upon Alcoentre, and unite with Loison, was to leave open the shortest road to Lisbon, and to remain at Rorica was to fight three times his own force. Nevertheless, encouraged by the local advantages of his position, and justly confident in his own talents, Laborde resolved to abide his enemy's assault, in the feeble hope that Loison might arrive during the action.

COMBAT OF RORICA.

Early in the morning of the 17th, thirteen thousand four hundred and eighty infantry, four hundred and seventy cavalry, and eighteen guns issued from Obidos, and soon afterwards broke into three distinct columns of battle.

The left, commanded by general Ferguson, was composed of his own and Bowes' brigade of infantry, reinforced by two hundred and fifty riflemen, forty cavalry, and six guns, forming a total of four thousand nine hundred combatants. He marched by the crests of the hills adjoining the Sierra de Baragueda, being destined to turn the right flank of Laborde's position, and to oppose the efforts of Loison, if that general, who was supposed to be at Rio Mayor, should appear during the action.

The right, under colonel Trant, composed of a thousand Portuguese infantry, and fifty horse of the same nation, moved by the village of St. Amias, with the intention of turning the left flank of the French.

The centre, nine thousand in number, with twelve guns, was commanded by sir Arthur in person, and marched straight against the enemy by the village of Mahmed. It was composed of generals Hill's, Nightingale's, Catlin Crawford's, and Fane's brigades of British infantry, four hundred cavalry, two hundred and fifty of which were Portuguese, and there were four hundred light troops of the same nation.

As this column advanced, Fane's brigade, extending to its left, drove back the French skirmishers, and connected the march of Ferguson's division with the centre. When the latter approached the elevated plain upon which Laborde was posted, general Hill who moved upon the right of the main road, being supported by the cavalry, and covered by the fire of his light troops, pushed forward rapidly to the attack; on his left, general Nightingale displayed a line of infantry, preceded by the fire of nine guns, and Crawford's brigade, with the remaining pieces of artillery, formed a reserve. At this moment, Fane's riflemen crowned the nearest hills on the right flank of the French, the Portuguese troops showed the head of a column beyond St. Amias, upon the enemy's left, and general Ferguson was seen descending from the higher grounds in the rear of Fane. Laborde's position appeared desperate, yet with the coolness and dexterity of a practised warrior, he evaded the danger, and, covered by his excellent cavalry, fell back rapidly to the heights of Zambugeira, and a fresh disposition of the English became indispensable to dislodge him from that formidable post.

Colonel Trant now continued his march to turn the left of the new field of battle; Ferguson and Fane were united, and directed through the mountains to outflank the French right; Hill and Nightingale ad-

vanced against the front, which was of singular strength, and only to be approached by narrow paths winding through deep ravines. A swarm of skirmishers, starting forward, soon plunged into the passes, and spreading to the right and left, won their way among the rocks and tangled evergreens that overspread the steep ascent; with still greater difficulty the supporting columns followed, their formation being disordered in the confined and rugged passes, and while the hollows echoed with a continued roll of musketry, the shouts of the advancing troops were loudly answered by the enemy, while the curling smoke, breaking out from the side of the mountain, marked the progress of the assailants, and showed how stoutly the defence was maintained.

Laborde, watching anxiously for the arrival of Loison, gradually slackened his hold on the left, but clung tenaciously to the right, in the hope of yet effecting a junction with that general, and the ardour of the 9th and 29th regiments, who led the attack, favoured this skillful conduct. It was intended that those battalions should take the right-hand path of two leading up the same hollow, and thus have come in upon Laborde's flank in conjunction with Trant's column; but as the left path led more directly to the enemy, the 29th followed it the 9th being close behind, and both regiments advanced so vigorously, as to reach the plain above, long before the flank movements of Trant and Ferguson could shake the credit of the position. The right of the 29th arrived first at the top, under a heavy fire, and ere it could form, colonel Lake was killed, and some French companies coming in on the flank, gallantly broke through, carrying with them a major and fifty or sixty other prisoners. The head of the regiment thus pressed, fell back and rallied on the left wing, below the brow of the hill, and being there joined by the 9th, whose colonel, Stewart, also fell in this bitter fight, the whole pushed forward, and regained the dangerous footing above. Laborde, who brought every arm into action at the proper time and place, endeavoured to destroy these regiments before they could be succoured, and failing in that, he yet gained time to rally his left wing upon his centre and right; but the 5th regiment, following the right-hand path, soon arrived, the English gathered thickly on the heights, and Ferguson, who had at first taken an erroneous direction towards the centre, recovered the true line, and was rapidly passing the right flank of the position. The French general commenced a retreat by alternate masses, protecting his movements by vigorous charges of cavalry, and at the village of Zambugeira he attempted another stand; but the English bore on him too heavily, and thus disputing the ground, he fell back to the Quinta de Bugagliera, where he halted until his detachments on the side of Segura rejoined him. After this taking to the narrow pass of Runa, he marched all night to gain the position of Montechique, leaving three guns on the field of battle, and the road to Torres Vedras open for the victors.* The loss of the French was six hundred killed and wounded, among the latter Laborde himself; and the British also suffered considerably, for two lieutenant-colonels and nearly five hundred men were killed, taken, or wounded, and as not more than four thousand men were actually engaged, this hard-fought action was very honourable to both sides.

The firing ceased a little after four o'clock, when sir Arthur, getting intelligence that Loison's division was at Bombaral only five miles distant, took up a position for the night in an oblique line to that which he had just forced, his left resting upon a height near the field of battle, and his right covering the road to Lourinham. Believing that Loison and Laborde had effected their junction at the Quinta de Bugagliera, and that both were retiring to Montechique, the English general re-

* Thiebault.

solved to march the next morning to Torres Vedras, by which he would have secured an entrance into the mountains. But before night-fall he was informed that general Anstruther's and general Acland's divisions, accompanied by a large fleet of store ships, were off the coast, the dangerous nature of which rendered it necessary to provide for their safety by a quick disembarkation; he therefore changed his plans, and resolved to seek for some convenient post, that, being in advance of his present position, would likewise enable him to cover the landing of these reinforcements; the vigour of Laborde's defence had also an influence upon this occasion, for before an enemy so bold and skilful, no precaution could be neglected with impunity.*

CHAPTER V.

Portuguese take Abrantes—Generals Acland and Anstruther land and join the British army at Vimiero—Sir Harry Burrard arrives—Battle of Vimiero—Junot defeated—Sir Hew Dalrymple arrives—Armistice—Terms of it—Junot returns to Lisbon—Negotiates for a convention—Sir John Moore's troops land—State of the public mind in Lisbon—The Russian admiral negotiates separately—Convention concluded—The Russian fleet surrenders upon terms—Conduct of the people at Lisbon—The Monteiro Mor requires sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the convention—Sir John Hope appointed commandant of Lisbon; represses all disorders—Disputes between the French and English commissioners—Reflections thereupon.

WHILE the combat of Roriga was fighting, some Portuguese insurgents attacked Abrantes, and the garrison, being ill commanded, gave way and was destroyed; thus nothing remained for Junot but a battle, and as sir Arthur marched to Lourinham on the 18th, the French general quitted Cercal with Loison's division, and keeping the east side of the Baragueda ridge, crossed the line of Laborde's retreat, and pushed for Torres Vedras, which he reached in the evening of the same day. The 19th he was joined by Laborde, and the 20th by his reserve, when he re-organized his army, and prepared for a decisive action. Meanwhile Wellesley took a position at Vimiero, a village near the sea-coast, and from thence sent a detachment to cover the march of general Anstruther's brigade, which had, with great difficulty and some loss, been landed on the morning of the 18th on an open sandy beach called the bay of Maceira. The 20th the French cavalry scouring the neighbouring country, carried off some of the women from the rear of the English camp, and hemmed the army round so closely, that no information of Junot's position could be obtained; but in the night general Acland's brigade was disembarked, by which the army was increased to sixteen thousand fighting men, with eighteen pieces of artillery, exclusive of Trant's Portuguese, and of two British regiments, under general Beresford, which were with the fleet at the mouth of the Tagus. Thus the principal mass of the English army was irrevocably engaged in the operations against Junot, while the ministers were still so intent upon Cadiz, that they had sent Anstruther out with an appointment as governor of that city!

Estimating the whole French army at eighteen thousand men, sir Arthur Wellesley judged, that after providing for the security of Lisbon, Junot could not bring more than fourteen thousand into the field; he designed, therefore, not only to strike the first blow, but to follow it up so as to prevent the enemy from rallying and renewing the campaign upon the frontier. In this view he had, before quitting the Mondego, written to sir Harry Burrard an exact statement of his own proceedings and intentions, and recommended that sir

John Moore, with his division, should disembark at the Mondego, and march without delay to Santarem, by which he would protect the left of the army, block the line of the Tagus, and at the same time threaten the French communication between Lisbon and Elvas. And without danger, because Junot would be forced to defend Lisbon against the coast army; or if, relinquishing the capital, he endeavoured to make way to Almeida by Santarem, the ground there was so strong that sir John Moore might easily maintain it against him. Moreover, the marquis of Valladeras commanded three thousand men at Guarda, and general Freire, with five thousand men, was at Leiria, and might be persuaded to support the British at Santarem.

From Vimiero to Torres Vedras was about nine miles, and although the number and activity of the French cavalry, completely shrouded Junot's position, it was known to be strong, and very difficult of approach, by reason of a long defile through which the army must penetrate in order to reach the crest of the mountain; there was, however, a road leading between the sea-coast and Torres Vedras, which, turning the latter, opened a way to Mafra. Sir Arthur possessed very exact military surveys of the country through which that road led, and he projected, by a forced march on the 21st, to turn the position of Torres Vedras, and to gain Mafra with a strong advanced guard, while the main body, seizing some advantageous heights, a few miles short of that town, would be in a position to intercept the French line of march to Montechique.* The army was therefore reorganized during the 20th in eight brigades of infantry and four weak squadrons of cavalry, and every preparation was made for the next day's enterprise, but at that critical period of the campaign the ministerial arrangements, which provided three commanders-in-chief, begun to work. Sir Harry Burrard arrived in a frigate off the bay of Maceira, and sir Arthur, thus checked in the midst of his operations on the eve of a decisive battle, repaired on board the frigate, to make a report of the situation of affairs, and to renew his former recommendation relative to the disposal of sir John Moore's troops. Burrard, who had previously resolved to bring the latter down to Maceira, condemned this project, and forbade any offensive movement until the whole army should be concentrated, whereupon sir Arthur returned to his camp.

The ground occupied by the army, although very extensive, and not very clearly defined as a position, was by no means weak. The village of Vimiero, situated in a valley, through which the little river of Maceira flows, contained the parc and commissariat stores. The cavalry and the Portuguese were on a small plain close behind the village, and immediately in its front a rugged isolated height, with a flat top, commanded all the ground to the southward and eastward for a considerable distance. Upon this height Fane's and Anstruther's brigades of infantry, with six guns, were posted; the left of Anstruther's occupied a churchyard which blocked a road leading over the extremity of the height of the village; the right of Fane's rested on the edge of the other extremity of the hill, the base of which was washed by the Maceira.

A mountain, that commenced at the coast, swept in a half circle close behind the right of the hill upon which these brigades were posted, and commanded, at rather long artillery range, all its upper surface. Eight guns, and the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth brigades of infantry, occupied this mountain, which was terminated on the left by a deep ravine that divided it from another strong and narrow range of heights over which the road from Vimiero to Lourinham passed; the right of these last heights also overtopped the hill in front of the village, but the left, bending

* Sir A. Wellesley's Evidence. Court of Inquiry.

* Sir A. Wellesley's evidence. Court of Inquiry.

suddenly backward, after the form of a crook, returned to the coast, and ended in a lofty cliff. There was no water upon this last named ridge, wherefore, only the 40th regiment and some piquets were placed there. The troops being thus posted, on the night of the 20th, about twelve o'clock, sir Arthur was aroused by a German officer of dragoons, who galloped into the camp, and with some consternation reported, that Junot, at the head of twenty thousand men, was coming on to the attack, and distant but one hour's march. Undisturbed by this inflated report, he merely sent out patroles, warned the piquets to be on the alert, and before day-break had his troops, following the British custom, under arms; but the sun rose and no enemy appeared. However, at seven o'clock a cloud of dust was observed beyond the nearest hills, and at eight o'clock an advanced guard of horse was seen to crown the heights to the southward, sending forward scouts on every side. Scarcely had this body been discovered, when a force of infantry, preceded by other cavalry, was descried moving along the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham, and threatening the left of the British position; column after column followed in order of battle, and it soon became evident that the French were coming to fight, but that the right wing of the English was not their object.

The second, third, fourth, and eighth brigades were immediately directed to cross the valley behind the village, and to take post on the heights before mentioned as being occupied by the piquets only; as they reached the ground, the second and third were disposed in two lines facing to the left, and consequently forming a right angle with the prolongation of Fane and Anstruther's front. The fourth and eighth brigades were to have furnished a third line, but before the latter could reach the summit the battle commenced. From the flank of all these troops, a line of skirmishers was thrown out upon the face of the descent towards the enemy, the cavalry was drawn up in the plain a little to the right of the village of Vimiero, and the fifth brigade and the Portuguese were detached to the returning part of the crook to cover the extreme left, and to protect the rear of the army. The first brigade, under general Hill, remained on the mountain which the others had just quitted, and formed a support for the centre and a reserve for the whole. The ground between the two armies was so wooded and broken, that after the French had passed the ridge where they had been first descried, no correct view of their movements could be obtained, and the British, being weak in cavalry, were forced to wait patiently until the columns of attack were close upon them.

Junot had quitted Torres Vedras the evening of the 20th, intending to fall on the English army at day-break, but the difficulty of the defile in his front retarded his march for many hours, and fatigued his troops. When he first came in sight of the position of Vimiero, the British order of battle appeared to him as being on two sides of an irregular triangle, the apex of which, formed by the hill in front of the village, was well-furnished with men, while the left face appeared naked, for he could only see the piquets on that side, and the passage of the four brigades across the valley was hidden from him. Concluding, then, that the principal force was in the centre, he resolved to form two connected attacks, the one against the apex, the other against the left face; he thought that the left of the position was an accessible ridge, whereas a deep ravine, trenched as it were along the base, rendered it utterly impervious to an attack, except at the extremity, over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham passed. Junot had nearly fourteen thousand fighting men, organised in four divisions, of which three were of infantry and one of cavalry, with twenty-three pieces of very small artillery; each division was composed

of two brigades, and at ten o'clock, all being prepared, he commenced the

BATTLE OF VIMIERO.

Laborde marched with one brigade against the centre, general Brennier led another against the left, and Loison's brigades followed in the same order at a short distance.* Kellerman with a reserve composed of grenadiers, moved in one body behind Loison, and the cavalry under Margaron, about thirteen hundred in number, was divided, part being on the right of Brennier, part in the rear of the reserve. The artillery, distributed among the columns, opened its fire wherever the ground was favourable. It was designed that Laborde's and Brennier's attacks should be simultaneous, but the latter, coming unexpectedly upon the ravine before mentioned as protecting the English left, got entangled among the rocks and water-courses, and thus Laborde alone engaged Fane and Anstruther under a heavy and destructive fire of artillery, which played on his front and flank; for the eighth brigade being then in the act of mounting the heights where the left was posted, observing the advance of the French columns against the centre, halted, and opened a battery against their right.†

Junot, perceiving this failure in his combinations, ordered Loison to support Laborde's attack with one brigade of his division, and directed general Solignac, with the other, to turn the ravine in which Brennier was entangled, and to fall upon the extremity of the English line; general Fane seeing Loison's advance, and having a discretionary power to use the reserve artillery, immediately directed colonel Robe to bring it into action, and thus formed with the divisional guns a most powerful battery in opposition. Meanwhile, Loison and Laborde formed a principal and two secondary columns of attack, one of which advanced against Fane's brigade, while the other endeavoured to penetrate by a road which passed between the ravine and the church on the extreme left of Anstruther; but the main column, headed by Laborde in person, and preceded by a multitude of light troops, mounted the face of the hill with great fury and loud cries. The English skirmishers were forced in upon the lines in a moment, and the French masses arrived at the summit; yet shattered by the terrible fire of Robe's artillery, and breathless from their exertions, and in this state, first receiving a discharge of musketry from the fiftieth regiment at the distance of half-pistol shot, they were vigorously charged in front and flank, and overthrown. At the same time the remainder of Fane's brigade repulsed the minor attack, and colonel Taylor, with the very few horsemen he commanded, passing out by the right, rode fiercely among the confused and retreating troops, and scattered them with great execution; but then Margaron's cavalry came suddenly down upon Taylor, who was there slain, and the half of his feeble squadron cut to pieces.

Kellerman took advantage of this check to throw one half of his reserve into a pine wood flanking the line of retreat, and the other half he had before sent to reinforce the attack on the church. The forty-third regiment were engaged in a hot skirmish amongst some vineyards, when these French grenadiers arrived, at a brisk pace, and beat back the advanced companies, but to avoid the artillery which ransacked their left, they dipped a little into the ravine, and were taken on the other flank by the guns of the eighth and fourth brigades. Then, when the narrowness of the way and the sweep of the round shot was disordering the French ranks, the forty-third rallying in one mass, came furiously down upon the head of the column, and, after a short, desperate fight, drove it back in confusion, but the regiment suffered very severely.

* Thiebault. Foy.

† Sir A. Wellesley's despatch.

The French were now discomfited in the centre, the woods and hollows were filled with their wounded and straggling men, and seven guns were lost. They retired up the edge of the ravine in a direction almost parallel to the British line, leaving the road from Vimiero to Torres Vedras open to their opponents; sir Arthur Wellesley, however, strictly forbade any pursuit at that moment, partly because the grenadiers in the pine wood flanked the line of the French retreat, and partly because Margaron's horsemen, riding stiffly between the two armies were not to be lightly meddled with. Meanwhile, Brennier being still hampered in the ravine, general Solignac passed along the crest of the ridge above, and came upon general Ferguson's brigade, which was posted at the left of the English position; but where the French expected to find a weak flank, they encountered a front of battle, on a depth of three lines, protected by steep declivities on either side, a powerful artillery swept away their foremost ranks, and on their right the fifth brigade and the Portuguese were seen marching by a distant ridge towards the Lourinham road, threatening the rear.

Ferguson instantly taking the lead, bore down upon the enemy, the ridge widened as the English advanced, the regiments of the second line running up in succession, increased the front, and constantly filled the ground, and the French, falling fast under the fire, drew back fighting, until they reached the declivity of the ridge; their cavalry made several efforts to check the advancing troops, but the latter were too compact to be disturbed by these attempts. Solignac himself was carried from the field severely wounded, and his retiring column, continually outflanked on the left, was cut off from the line of retreat, and thrown into the low ground about the village of Perenza, where six guns were captured. General Ferguson leaving the eighty-second and seventy-first regiments to guard those pieces, was continuing to press the disordered columns, when Brennier having at last cleared the ravine, came suddenly in upon those two battalions, and retook the artillery; but his success was only momentary, the surprised troops rallied upon the higher ground, poured in a heavy fire of musquetry, and with a shout returning to the charge, overthrew him and recovered the guns. Brennier himself was wounded and made prisoner, and Ferguson having thus completely separated the French brigades from each other, would have forced the greatest part of Solignac's to surrender, if an unexpected order had not obliged him to halt: the discomfited troops then reformed under the protection of their cavalry with admirable quickness, and making an orderly retreat, were soon united to the broken brigades which were falling back from the attack on the centre.

Brennier, who, the moment he was taken, was brought to sir Arthur Wellesley, eagerly demanded if the reserve under Kellerman had yet charged? sir Arthur, ascertaining from other prisoners that it had, was then satisfied that all the enemy's attacks were exhausted, that no considerable body of fresh troops could be hidden among the woods and hollows in his front, and that the battle was won. It was only twelve o'clock, thirteen guns had been taken; the fourth and eighth brigades had suffered very little; the Portuguese, the fifth and the first brigades had not fired a shot, and the latter was two miles nearer to Torres Vedras than any part of the French army, which was moreover in great confusion. The relative numbers before the action were considerably in favour of the English, the result of the action had increased that disparity; a portion of the army had defeated the enemy when entire, a portion then could effectually follow up the victory; sir Arthur therefore resolved with the five brigades on the left to press Junot closely, hoping to drive him over the Sierra da Baragueda, and force him upon the Tagus, while Hill, Anstruther, and Fane, seizing the defile of Torres

Vedras, should push on to Montechique and cut him off from Lisbon.

If this able and decisive operation had been executed, Junot would probably have lost all his artillery and several thousand stragglers, and then, buffeted and turned at every point, would have been glad to seek safety under the guns of Almeida or Elvas; and even that, he could only have accomplished, because sir John Moore's troops were not landed in the Mondego. But sir Harry Burrard, who was present during the action, although partly from delicacy, and partly from approving of sir Arthur's arrangements, he had not hitherto interfered, now assumed the chief command; from him the order which arrested Ferguson in his victorious career had emanated, and by him further offensive operations were forbidden, for he resolved to wait in the position of Vimiero until the arrival of sir John Moore. The adjutant-general Clinton, and colonel Murray the quarter-master-general, supported sir Harry's views, and sir Arthur's earnest representations could not alter their determination.

Burrard's decision was certainly erroneous, yet error is common in an art which at best is but a choice of difficulties; the circumstances of the moment were imposing enough to sway most generals. The French had failed in the attacks, yet they rallied with surprising quickness under the protection of a strong and gallant cavalry; * sir Harry knew that his own artillery carriages were so shaken as to be scarcely fit for service; the draft horses were few and bad, and the commissariat, *parc* on the plain was in the greatest confusion, for the hired Portuguese carmen were making off with their carriages in all directions; the English cavalry was totally destroyed, and finally, general Spencer had discovered a line of fresh troops on the ridge behind that occupied by the French army. Weighing all these things in his mind, with the caution natural to age, Burrard was reluctant to hazard the fortune of the day upon what he deemed a perilous throw. Thus the duke of Abrantes, who had displayed all that reckless courage to which he originally owed his elevation, was enabled, by this unexpected cessation of the battle, to reform his broken infantry; twelve hundred fresh men joined him at the close of the contest, and then covered by his cavalry, he retreated with order and celerity until he regained the command of the pass of Torres Vedras, so that when the day closed, the relative position of the two armies was the same as on the evening before.

One general, thirteen guns, and several hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors, and the total loss of the French was estimated at three thousand men, an exaggeration, no doubt, but it was certainly above two thousand, for their closed columns had been exposed for more than half an hour to sweeping discharges of grape and musquetry, and the dead lay thickly together. General Thiebault, indeed, reduces the number to eighteen hundred, and asserts that the whole amount of the French army did not much exceed twelve thousand men, from which number he deducts nearly three thousand for the sick, the stragglers, and all those other petty drains which form the torment of a general-in-chief. But when it is considered that this army was composed of men selected and organized in provisional battalions, expressly for the occasion; † that one-half had only been in the field for a fortnight, and that the whole had enjoyed two days' rest at Torres Vedras, it is evident that the number of absentees bears too great a proportion to the combatants. A French order of battle found upon the field gave a total of fourteen thousand men, present under arms, of which thirteen hundred were cavalry; and this amount agrees too closely with other estimates, and with the observations made

* Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

† Thiebault.

at the time to leave any reasonable doubt of its authenticity or correctness.

The arrangements made by sir Harry Burrard did not remain in force a long time. Early on the morning of the 22d, sir Hew Dalrymple disembarked and assumed the chief command; and thus, in the short space of twenty-four hours, during which a battle was fought, the army fell successively into the hands of three men, who, coming from the ocean, with different views, habits, and information, had not any previous opportunity of communing even by letter, so as to arrange a common plan of operations: and they were now brought together at a critical moment, when it was more than probable they must all disagree, and that the public service must suffer from that want of vigour which is inherent to divided councils. For when sir Hew Dalrymple was appointed to the command, sir Arthur Wellesley was privately recommended to him, by the minister, as a person who should be employed with more than usual confidence; and this unequivocal hint was backed up with too much force by the previous reputation and recent exploits of the latter, not to produce some want of cordiality.* Sir Arthur could not do otherwise than take the lead in discussing affairs of which he had more than laid the foundation, and sir Hew would have forfeited all claims to independence in his command, if he had not exercised the right of judging for himself between the conflicting opinions of his predecessors.

After receiving information upon the most important points, and taking a hasty view of the situation of the army,—although the wounded were still upon the ground, and the wains of the commissariat were employed in removing them,—sir Hew decided to advance upon the 23d, and gave orders to that effect.† Nevertheless, he entirely agreed in opinion with sir Harry Burrard, that the operation was a perilous one, which it required the concentration of all his troops, and the application of all his means, to bring to a good conclusion; and for this reason he did not rescind the order directing sir John Moore to fall down to Maceira. This last measure was disapproved of by sir Arthur, who observed that the provisions on shore would not supply more than eight or nine days' consumption for the troops already at Vimiero; that the country would be unable to furnish any assistance, and that the fleet could not be calculated upon as a resource, because the first of the gales common at that season of the year would certainly send it away from the coast, if it did not destroy a great portion of it. Sir Hew thought the evil of having the army separated, would be greater than the chance of distress from such events. His position was certainly difficult. The bishop of Oporto had failed in his promise of assisting the troops with draft cattle,—as, indeed, he did in all his promises;‡ the artillery and commissariat were badly supplied with mules and horses; the cavalry was a nullity, and the enemy was, with the exception of his immediate loss in killed and wounded, suffering nothing from his defeat, which, we have seen, did not deprive him of a single position necessary to his defence. While weighing this state of affairs, he was informed that general Kellerman, escorted by a strong body of cavalry, was at the outposts, and demanded an interview. For Junot, after regaining Torres Vedras, had occupied Mafra, and was preparing to fight again, when he received intelligence that Lisbon was on the point of insurrection;|| wherefore, sending forward a false account of the action, he followed it up with a reinforcement for the garrison, and called a council of war to advise measures with respect to the English. It is an old and

sound remark that 'a council of war never fights,' and Kellerman's mission was the result of the above consultation.

That general being conducted to the quarters of the commander-in-chief, demanded a cessation of arms, and proposed the ground-work of a convention under which Junot offered to evacuate Portugal without further resistance. Nothing could be more opportune than this proposition, and sir Hew Dalrymple readily accepted of it, as an advantage, which would accrue, without any drawback to the general cause of the Peninsula. He knew, from a plan of operations, sketched by the chief of the French engineers, colonel Vincent, and taken by the Portuguese, that Junot possessed several strong positions in front of Lisbon; and that a retreat either upon Almeida, or across the river upon Elvas, was not only within the contemplation of that general, but considered in this report as a matter of course, and perfectly easy of execution. Hence the proposed convention was an unexpected advantage offered in a moment of difficulty, and the only subject of consideration was the nature of the articles proposed by Kellerman as a basis for the treaty. Sir Hew being necessarily ignorant of many details, had recourse to sir A. Wellesley for information, and the latter, taking an enlarged view of the question in all its bearings, coincided as to the sound policy of agreeing to a convention, by which a strong French army would be quietly got out of a country that it had complete military possession of;* and by which not only a great moral effect in favour of the general cause would be produced, but an actual gain made, both of men and time, for the further prosecution of the war in Spain. By the convention, he observed,

1. That a kingdom would be liberated, with all its fortresses, arsenals, &c., and that the excited population of the Peninsula might then be pushed forward in the career of opposition to France, under the most favourable circumstances.

2. That the Spanish army of Estremadura, which contained the most efficient body of cavalry in the Peninsula, could be reinforced with the four or five thousand Spanish soldiers who were prisoners on board the vessels in the Tagus; and would be enabled to unite with the other patriot armies at a critical period, when every addition of force must tend to increase the confidence and forward the impulse, which the victory of Baylen and the flight of Joseph had given to the Spaniards. Finally, that the sacrifice of lives to be expected in carrying the French positions in Portugal, all the difficulties of reducing the fortresses, and the danger of losing a communication with the fleet, would be avoided by this measure, the result of which would be as complete, as the most sanguine could expect, from the long course of uncertain and unhealthy operations which must follow a rejection of the proposal.† But, while admitting the utility of the measure itself, he differed with the commander-in-chief as to the mode of proceeding, and a long discussion, in which Sir H. Burrard took a part, followed the opening of Kellerman's mission. Sir Arthur's first objection was, that, in point of form, Kellerman was merely entitled to negotiate a cessation of hostilities; sir Hew Dalrymple judged that, as the good policy and the utility of the convention were recognized, it would be unwise to drive the French to the wall on a point of ceremony, and therefore accepted the proposition. The basis of a definitive treaty was then arranged, subject to the final approbation of sir Charles Cotton, without whose concurrence it was not to be binding.

Articles 1st and 2d declared the fact of the armistice, and provided for the mode of future proceedings.

Article 3d indicated the river Sisandre as the line of

* Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

† Sir H. Dalrymple's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.

‡ Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. || Thiebault.

* Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

† Ibid.

demarcation between the two armies. The position of Torres Vedras to be occupied by neither.

Article 4th. Sir Hew Dalrymple engaged to have the Portuguese included in the armistice, and their boundary line was to extend from Leiria to Thomar.

Article 5th declared, that the French were not to be considered as prisoners of war, and that themselves and their property, public and private, were, without any detainer, to be transported to France. To this article sir Arthur objected, as affording a cover for the abstraction of Portuguese property, whereupon Kellerman said, that it was to be taken in its fair sense of property justly obtained, and upon this assurance it was admitted.

Article 6th provided for the protection of individuals. It guaranteed from political persecution all French residents, all subjects of powers in alliance with France, and all Portuguese who had served the invaders, or become obnoxious for their attachment to them.

Article 7th stipulated for the neutrality of the port of Lisbon as far as the Russian fleet was concerned. At first Kellerman proposed to have the Russian fleet guaranteed from capture, with leave to return to the Baltic, but this was peremptorily refused; indeed, the whole proceeding was designed to entangle the Russians in the French negotiation, that, in case the armistice should be broken, the former might be forced into a co-operation with the latter.

Sir Arthur strenuously opposed this article; he argued, 1. That the interests of the two nations were not blended, and that they stood in different relations towards the British army. 2. That it was an important object to keep them separate, and that the French general, if pressed, would leave the Russians to their fate. 3. That as the British operations had not been so rapid and decisive as to enable them to capture the fleet before the question of neutrality could be agitated, the right of the Russians to such protection was undoubted; and in the present circumstances it was desirable to grant it, because independent of the chances of their final capture, they would be prevented from returning to the Baltic, which in fact constituted their only point of interest when disengaged from the French; but, that, viewed as allies of the latter, they became of great weight. Lastly, that it was an affair which concerned the Portuguese, Russians, and British, but with which the French could have no right to interfere. Sir Hew finding that the discussion of this question became lengthened, and considering that sir Charles Cotton alone could finally decide, admitted the article merely as a form, without acquiescing in the propriety of it.

Article 8th provided, that all guns of French calibre, and the horses of the cavalry, were to be transported to France.

Article 9th stipulated, that forty-eight hours' notice should be given of the rupture of the armistice.

To this article also sir Arthur objected; he considered it unnecessary for the interests of the British army, and favourable to the French; because, if hostilities recommenced, the latter would have forty-eight hours to make arrangements for their defence, for the passage of the Tagus, and for the co-operation of the Russian fleet. Upon the other hand, sir Hew thought it was an absolute advantage to gain time for the preparations of the British army, and for the arrival of sir John Moore's reinforcements.

By an additional article it was provided, that all the fortresses held by the French, which had not capitulated before the 25th of August, should be given up to the British; and the basis of a convention being thus arranged, general Kellerman returned to his chief, and colonel George Murray was ordered to carry the proposed articles to the English admiral.

Previous to his landing, sir Hew had received none

of the letters addressed to him by sir Arthur Wellesley, he had met with no person during his voyage from whom he could obtain authentic information of the state of affairs, and his time being at first occupied by the negotiations with Kellerman, he was uninformed of many details of importance. Now, the day after Kellerman's departure, don Bernardim Freire Andrada, the Portuguese commander-in-chief, came to remonstrate against the armistice just concluded; but, from the circumstances before-mentioned, it so happened that sir Hew was utterly ignorant of the existence of don Bernardim and his army, at the time the armistice was discussed, and it was therefore difficult for him to manage this interview with propriety, because Andrada had some plausible, although no real, ground of complaint. His remonstrances were, however, merely intended for the commencement of an intrigue, to which I shall hereafter revert.

Colonel Murray soon reached the fleet, and presented the articles of convention to sir Charles Cotton, but the latter refused to concur therein, declaring that he would himself conduct a separate treaty for the Russian ships. With this answer colonel Murray returned on the 24th, having first, in reply to a question put by the French officer who accompanied him on board the *Hibernia*, declared, that nothing had passed between him and sir Charles Cotton which ought to preclude further negotiation. Sir Hew Dalrymple was now urged by sir Arthur Wellesley to give notice, without further explanation, that hostilities would recommence, leaving it to Junot to renew propositions, if he chose to do so, separately from the Russians.* Sir Hew, however, felt himself, in honour, bound by colonel Murray's observation to the French officer, and would not take advantage of the occasion; he likewise felt disinclined to relinquish a negotiation which, from certain circumstances, he deemed upon the point of being crowned with success. He therefore despatched colonel Murray to Lisbon, with directions to inform Junot of the admiral's objection, and to give notice of the consequent rupture of the armistice, Murray himself being provided, however, with full powers to enter into and conclude a definitive treaty upon a fresh basis. The army was, at the same time, pushed forward to Ramalhãl, and sir J. Moore's troops were landed at Maceira Bay, but the order to repair to that place did not reach them until several regiments had been disembarked in the Mondego; † the re-shipping of these, together with contrary winds, had caused a delay of four days, and at Maceira great difficulty and some loss was sustained in getting on shore, an operation only effected by five days of incessant exertion on the part of the navy; the boats were constantly swamped by the surf, and such was its fury that not more than thirty remained fit for service at the conclusion.

On the 27th, information was received, from colonel Murray, that a fresh treaty was in agitation upon an admissible basis; and the next day the army took a new position, a part occupying Torres Vedras, and the remainder being placed in the rear of that town. Meanwhile, in Lisbon, the agitation of the public mind was excessively great; hope and fear were magnified by the obscurity of affairs, and the contradictory news which was spread by the French, and by those who held communication with the country, had increased the anxious feeling of joy or grief almost to phrensy. Junot made every effort to engage admiral Siniavin in the negotiation, and the necessity by which the latter was forced to put his ships in a hostile and guarded attitude, contributed powerfully to control the populace, and give strength to an opinion industriously spread, that he would make common cause with the French. Nevertheless Siniavin had no intention of

* Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

† Ibid.

this kind, and very early gave notice that he would treat separately; wherefore the French being thus left to themselves, had no resource but their own dexterity, and brought all the ordinary machinery of diplomatic subtlety into play. Among other schemes, Junot opened a separate communication with sir Hew Dalrymple at the moment when colonel Murray, invested with full powers, was engaged in daily conferences with Kellerman; and the difficulty of coming to a conclusion, was much increased by the natural sources of suspicion and jealousy incident to such a singular transaction, where two foreign nations were seen bargaining, and one of them honestly bargaining, for the goods and interests of a third, yet scarcely hinting even at the existence of the latter. The French being the weakest, were most subtle, and to protect the vital questions advanced extravagant claims; on the other hand, the Portuguese leaders, no longer fearing a defeat, protested against the convention, passed the line of demarcation, attacked the French patrols, and menaced an attack from the side of Santarem. This movement, and the breach of faith in attacking the patrols, were promptly and distinctly disavowed by sir Hew; yet they kept suspicion awake, and the mutual misunderstandings arose at last to such a height, that Junot, seeming for a moment to recover all his natural energy, threatened to burn the public establishments, and make his retreat good at the expense of the city; a menace which nothing could have prevented him from executing. Finally, however, a definitive treaty was concluded at Lisbon on the 30th, and soon afterwards ratified in form.

This celebrated convention, improperly called 'of Cintra,' consisted of twenty-two original, and three supplementary articles, upon the expediency of many of which, sir Arthur Wellesley, and the commander-in-chief disagreed, but as their disagreement had reference to the details and not to the general principle, the historical importance is not sufficient to call for remark. An informality on the part of Junot, caused some delay in the ratification of the instrument; the British army marched notwithstanding to take up the position near Lisbon, assigned to it by the 11th article of the treaty, and on the march, sir Hew Dalrymple met two Russian officers, who were charged to open a separate negotiation for the Russian squadron; he, however, refused to receive their credentials, and referred them to sir Charles Cotton. Thus baffled in an attempt to carry on a double treaty, for a naval one was already commenced, Siniavin, whose conduct appears to have been weak, was forced to come to a conclusion with the English admiral. At first he claimed the protection of a neutral port, but as singly he possessed none of that weight which circumstances had given him before the convention with Junot, his claim was answered by an intimation, that a British flag was flying on the forts at the mouth of the Tagus; and this was true, for the third and forty-second regiments, under the command of major-general Beresford, having landed and taken possession of them, in virtue of the convention, the British colours were improperly hoisted instead of the Portuguese. Foiled again by this proceeding, the justice of which is somewhat doubtful, Siniavin finally agreed to surrender upon the following terms:

1. The Russian ships, with their sails, stores, &c. were to be held by England, as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of a peace between the two governments of the contracting parties.

2. The admiral, officers, and seamen, without any restriction as to their future services, were to be transported to Russia, at the expense of the British government.

But two additional articles were, subsequently to the ratification of the original treaty, proposed by the Russians, and assented to by the English admiral. The

first stipulated that the imperial flag should be displayed, even in the British harbours, as long as the Russian admiral remained on board. The second provided that the ships themselves and their stores should be delivered again at the appointed time, in the same state as when surrendered. The rights of the Portuguese were not referred to, but sir Charles Cotton was justified by his instructions, which authorised him to make prize of the Russian fleet.* Siniavin thus suffered all the inconvenience of hostilities, and the shame of striking his colours without having violated in any manner the relations of amity in which his nation stood with regard to Portugal. On the other hand, for the sake of a few old and decaying ships, the British government made an injudicious display of contempt for the independence of their ally, because, with singular inconsistency, they permitted the officers and crews, the real strength of the squadron, to return to the Baltic, although scarcely a year had elapsed, since the national character was defiled in that quarter, to suppress a navy inimical to Great Britain. This inconsistency belonged wholly to the ministers; for the two original articles of the treaty only were confirmed by them, and they were copied from the Admiralty instructions delivered to sir Charles Cotton four months previous to the transaction.† Yet that officer, by the very men who had framed those instructions, was, with matchless effrontery, rebuked for having adopted a new principle of maritime surrender!

On the 2d of September head-quarters were established at Oyeras; the right of the army occupied the forts at the mouth of the river, the left rested upon the heights of Bellas. The French army concentrated in Lisbon, posted their piquets and guards as if in front of an enemy, and at night the sentries fired upon whoever approached their posts, the police disbanded of their own accord, and the city became a scene of turbulence, anarchy, and crime.‡ Notwithstanding the presence of their enemies, the inhabitants of the capital testified their joy, and evinced their vengeful feelings in a remarkable manner; they refused to sell any provisions, or to deal in any manner with the French; they sung songs of triumph in their hearing, and in their sight fabricated thousands of small lamps for the avowed purpose of illuminating the streets at their departure; the doors of many of the houses occupied by the troops were marked in one night; men were observed bearing in their hats lists of Portuguese or Frenchmen designed for slaughter, and the quarters of Loison were threatened with a serious attack. Yet amidst all this disorder and violence, general Travot, and some others of the French army, fearlessly and safely traversed the streets, unguarded save by the reputation of their just and liberal conduct when in power, a fact extremely honourable to the Portuguese, and conclusive of the misconduct of Loison.¶ Junot himself was menaced by an assassin, but he treated the affair with magnanimity, and in general he was respected, although in a far less degree than Travot.

The dread of an explosion, which would have compromised at once the safety of his army and of the city, induced the French general to hasten the period when an English division was to occupy the citadel and take charge of the public tranquillity. Meanwhile emissaries from the junta of Oporto fomented the disposition of the populace to commit themselves by an attack upon the French, the convention was reprobated, and endeavours were fruitlessly made to turn the tide of indignation even against the English, as abettors of the invaders. The judge of the people, an energetic, but turbulent fellow, issued an inflammatory address,

* Parl. Pap. 1809.

† Ibid. Admiralty Instructions to sir C. Cotton, 16th April, 1808. Mr. Wellesley Pole to sir C. Cotton, 17th Sept. 1808.

‡ Thiebault. ¶ Ibid.

in which, calling for a suspension of the treaty, he designated the French as robbers and insulters of religion; the Monteiro Mor, who commanded a rabble of peasantry, which he dignified with the title of an army, took possession of the south bank of the Tagus, and from his quarters issued a protest against the convention, the execution of which he had the audacity to call upon sir Charles Cotton to interrupt; the latter sent his communications to sir Hew Dalrymple, who treated them with the contemptuous indignation they merited.

Sir John Hope being appointed English commandant of Lisbon, took possession of the castle of Belem on the 10th, and of the citadel the 12th, and, by his firm and vigorous conduct, reduced the effervescence of the public mind, and repressed the disorders which had arisen to a height that gave opportunity for the commission of any villany. The duke of Abrantes, with his staff, embarked the 13th. The first division of his army sailed the 15th; it was followed by the second and third divisions; and on the 30th, all the French, except the garrisons of Elvas and Almeida, were out of Portugal.

But the execution of the convention had not been carried on thus far without much trouble and contestation. Lord Proby, the English commissioner appointed to carry the articles of the treaty into effect, was joined by major-general Beresford on the 5th, and their united labours were scarcely sufficient to meet the exigencies of a task, in the prosecution of which disputes hourly arose. Anger, the cupidity of individuals, and opportunity, combined to push the French beyond the bounds of honour and decency, and several gross attempts were made to appropriate property which no interpretation of the stipulations should give a colour to; amongst the most odious were the abstraction of manuscripts, and rare specimens of natural history, from the national museum; and the invasion of the *deposito publico*, or funds of money awaiting legal decision for their final appropriation. Those dishonest attempts were met and checked with a strong hand, and at last a committee, consisting of an individual of each of the three nations, was appointed by the commissioners on both sides. Their office was to receive reclamations, to investigate them, and to do justice by seizing upon all contraband baggage embarked by the French; a measure attended with excellent effect. It must, however, be observed, that the loud complaints and violence of the Portuguese, and the machinations of the bishop of Oporto, seem to have excited the suspicions of the British and influenced their acts, more than the real facts warranted; for the national character of the Portuguese was not then understood, nor the extent to which they supplied the place of true reports by the fabrication of false ones, generally known.

Party writers have not been wanting since to exaggerate the grounds of complaint. The English have imputed fraud and evasions of the most dishonourable kind to the French, and the latter have retorted by accusations of gratuitous insult, and breach of faith, inasmuch as their soldiers, when on board the British ships, were treated with cruelty in order to induce them to desert. It would be too much to affirm that all the error was on one side, but it does appear reasonable and consonant to justice to decide, that as the French were originally aggressors and acting for their own interest, and that the British were interfering for the protection of the Portuguese, an indecorous zeal on the part of the latter, if not commendable, was certainly more excusable than in their opponents. Upon the ground of its being impossible for Junot to know what was doing in his name, the British commissioners acquitted him of any personal impropriety of conduct, and his public orders, which denounced severe punishments for such malpractices corroborated this testimony; yet Kellerman, in his communications with sir Hew Dalrymple, did not scruple to insinuate matters to the

duke's disadvantage.* But, amidst all these conflicting accusations, the British commander's personal good faith and scrupulous adherence to justice has never been called in question.

To define the exact extent to which each party should have pushed their claims is not an easy task, yet an impartial investigator would begin by carefully separating the original rights of the French, from those rights which they acquired by the convention; and much of the subsequent clamour in England against the authors of that treaty sprung from the error of confounding these essentially distinct grounds of argument. Conquest being the sole foundation of the first, defeat, if complete, extinguished them; if incomplete, nullified a part only. Now the issue of the appeal to arms not having been answerable to the justice of the cause, an agreement ensued, by which a part was sacrificed for the sake of the remainder, and upon the terms of that agreement the whole question of right hinges. If the French were not prisoners of war, it follows that they had not forfeited their claims, founded on the right of conquest, but they were willing to exchange an insecure tenure of the whole, for a secure tenure of a part. The difficulty consisted in defining exactly what was conceded, and what should be recovered from them. With respect to the latter, the restitution of plunder acquired anterior to the convention was clearly out of the question; if officially obtained, it was part of the rights bargained for, if individually, to what tribunal could the innumerable claims which would follow such an article be referred? Abstract notions of right in such matters are misplaced. If an army surrenders at discretion, the victors may say with Brennus, 'Woe to the vanquished;' but a convention implies some weakness, and must be weighed in the scales of prudence, not in those of justice.

CHAPTER VI.

The bishop and junta of Oporto aim at the supreme power; wish to establish the seat of government at Oporto; their intrigues; strange proceedings of general Decken; reflections thereupon—Clamour raised against the convention in England and in Portugal; soon ceases in Portugal—The Spanish general Galuzo refuses to acknowledge the convention; invests fort Lallippe; his proceedings absurd and unjustifiable—Sir John Hope marches against him; he alters his conduct—Garrison of Lallippe—March to Lisbon—Embarked—Garrison of Almeida; march to Oporto; attacked and plundered by the Portuguese—Sir Hew Dalrymple and sir Harry Burrard recalled to England—Vile conduct of the daily press—Violence of public feeling—Convention, improperly called, of Cintra—Observations on the action of Rorica—On the battle of Vimiero—On the convention.

THE interview that took place at Vimiero, between don Bernardim Freire d'Andrada and sir Hew Dalrymple, has been already noticed as the commencement of an intrigue of some consequence. The Portuguese chief objected at the time to the armistice concluded with Kellerman, ostensibly upon general grounds, but really, as it appeared to sir Hew, because the bishop and junta of Oporto were not named in the instrument. At the desire of Freire, one Ayres Pinto de Souza was received at the English head-quarters as the protector of Portuguese interests during the subsequent negotiation, and he was soon apprised that a treaty for a definitive convention was on foot, himself and his general being invited to state their views and wishes before any further steps were taken. Neither of them took any notice of this invitation, but when the treaty was concluded clamoured loudly against it. The British army was, they said, an auxiliary force, and should only act as such; nevertheless, it had assumed the right of

* Sir H. Dalrymple's Narrative. Court of Inquiry.

treating with the French for Portuguese interests, and a convention had been concluded which protected the enemy from the punishment due to his rapine and cruelty; it was more favourable than the strength of the relative parties warranted, and no notice had been taken of the Portuguese government, or of the native army in the Alentejo; men who were obnoxious to their countrymen, for having aided the invaders, were protected from a just vengeance; finally the fortresses were bargained for, as acquisitions appertaining to the British army: a circumstance which must inevitably excite great jealousy both in Portugal and Spain, and injure the general cause, by affording an opportunity for the French emissaries to create disunion among the allied nations. They dwelt also upon the importance of the native forces, the strength of the insurrection, and insinuated that separate operations were likely to be carried on notwithstanding the treaty.

Noble words often cover pitiful deeds; this remonstrance, apparently springing from the feelings of a patriot whose heart was ulcerated by the wrongs his country had sustained, was but a cloak for a miserable interested intrigue. The bishop of Oporto, a meddling ambitious priest, had early conceived the project of placing himself at the head of the insurrectional authorities, and transferring the seat of government from Lisbon to Oporto. He was aware that he should encounter great opposition, and he hoped that by inveigling the English general to countenance these pretensions, he might, with the aid of Freire's force, and his own influence, succeed in the object of his wishes. With this view he wrote a letter to sir Charles Cotton dated the fourth of August, in which was enclosed, as the letter describes it, "The form of government with which they, the junta of Oporto, meant to govern Portugal when the city of Lisbon should be free from the French; and this letter, together with its enclosure, being transmitted to sir Arthur Wellesley, he placed them among other public documents in the hands of sir Hew Dalrymple when the latter first landed at Macieira. In the document itself it was declared that "The body of government had taken the glorious resolution of restoring the Portuguese monarchy in all its extent, and of recovering the crown of Portugal for its lawful sovereign, don Juan VI., their prince." But this "glorious resolution" was burdened with many forms and restrictions; and although the junta professed the intention of re-establishing a regency, they declared, "that if this new regency should be interrupted by a new invasion of the French, or by any other thing, the junta would immediately take the government on itself, and exercise the authority and jurisdiction which it had done ever since its institution."

Thus prepared for some cabal, sir Hew Dalrymple was at no loss for an answer to Freire's remonstrance. He observed, that if the government of Portugal had not been mentioned in the treaty, neither had that of England, nor that of France. The convention was purely military, and for the present concerned only the commanders in the field. With regard to the occupation of the fortresses, and the fact of the British army being an auxiliary force, the first was merely a measure of military precaution absolutely necessary, and the latter was in no way rendered doubtful by any act which had been committed; he sir Hew was instructed by his government to assist in restoring the prince regent of Portugal to his lawful rights, without any secret or interested motives; finally, the Portuguese general had been invited to assist in the negotiations, and if he had not done so, the blame rested with himself. To this sir Hew might have justly added, that the conduct of Freire in withdrawing his troops at the most critical moment of the campaign, by no means entitled him to assume a high tone towards those whom he had so disgracefully deserted in the hour of danger.

The Portuguese general was silenced by this plain and decided answer; yet the English general was quickly convinced that the bishop and his coadjutors, however incapable of conducting great affairs, were experienced plotters. In his first interview with Andrada, sir Hew Dalrymple had taken occasion to observe, that "no government lawfully representing the prince regent actually existed in Portugal;" in fact, a junta, calling itself independent, was likewise established in Algarvé, and the members of the regency legally invested by the prince with supreme authority were dispersed, and part of them in the power of the French. This observation, so adverse to the prelate's views, was transmitted to him by Freire, together with a copy of the armistice; and he was well aware that a definite convention, differing materially from the armistice, was upon the point of being concluded, the refusal of sir Charles Cotton to concur in the latter, having rendered it null and void. Nevertheless, preserving silence on that point, the bishop forwarded the copy of the armistice to the chevalier Da Souza, Portuguese minister in London, accompanied by a letter filled with invectives and misrepresentations of its provisions; the chevalier placed this letter with its inclosures, in the hands of Mr. Canning, the English secretary of state for foreign affairs, and at the same time delivering to him an official note, in which, adopting the style of the prelate and junta, he spoke of them as the representatives of his sovereign, and the possessors of the supreme power in Portugal.

Nor were the efforts of the party confined to formal communications with the ministers, the daily press teemed with invectives against the English general's conduct; ex-parte statements, founded on the provisions of an armistice that was never concluded, being thus palmed upon a public, always hasty in judging of such matters, a prejudice against the convention was raised before either the terms of, or the events which led to it, were known. For sir Hew, forgetting the ordinary forms of official intercourse, had neglected to transmit information to his government until fifteen days after the commencement of the treaty, and the ministers, unable to contradict or explain any of Souza's assertions, were thus placed in a mortifying situation, by which their minds were irritated and disposed to take a prejudiced view of the real treaty. Meanwhile the bishop pretended to know nothing of the convention, hence the silence of Freire during the negotiation; but that once concluded, a clamour was, by the party, raised in Portugal, similar to what had already been excited in England: thus both nations appeared to be equally indignant at the conduct of the general, when, in fact, his proceedings were unknown to either.

It would appear that the bishop had other than Portuguese coadjutors. The baron Von Decken, a Hanoverian officer, was appointed one of the military agents at Oporto; he was subject to sir Hew Dalrymple's orders, but as his mission was of a detached nature, he was also to communicate directly with the secretary of state in England. Von Decken arrived at Oporto upon the 17th August, and the same evening, in concert with the bishop, concocted a project admirably adapted to forward the views of the latter; they agreed that the prelate was the fittest person to be at the head of the government, and that as he could not or pretended he could not, quit Oporto, the seat of government ought to be transferred to that city.

Two obstacles to this arrangement were foreseen; first, the prince regent at his departure had nominated a regency, and left full instructions for the filling up of vacancies arising from death or other causes; secondly, the people of Lisbon and of the southern provinces would certainly resist any plan for changing the seat of government; hence to obviate these difficulties, Von Decken wrote largely in commendation of the proposed

arrangement, vilifying the conduct of the regency, and urging sir Hew not only to give his sanction to the ambitious project, but to employ the British troops in controlling the people of Lisbon, should they attempt to frustrate the bishop's plans. To conciliate the members of the regency, it was proposed to admit a portion of them into the new government, and Francisco Noronha, Francisco da Cunha, the Monteiro Mor, and the principal Castro, were named as being the only men who were faithful to their sovereign. Now the last had accepted the office of minister of worship under the French, and was consequently unfaithful; but he was the half brother of the bishop, Castro being legitimately born. Under the pretext of sparing the feelings of the people of Lisbon, it was further proposed to appoint a Portuguese commandant, subject to the British governor, yet with a native force under his orders, to conduct all matters of police, and the bishop took the occasion to recommend a particular general for that office. Finally, civil dissension and all its attendant evils were foretold as the consequences of rejecting this plan.

Sir Hew Dalrymple's answer was peremptory and decisive. He reprimanded general Von Decken, and at once put an end to the bishop's hopes of support from the English army. This second repulse, for sir Hew's answer did not reach Oporto until after Freire's report had arrived there, completed the mortification of the prelate and his junta, and they set no bounds to their violence. Efforts were made to stimulate the populace of Lisbon to attack both French and English, in the hope that the terrible scene which must have ensued, would effectually prevent the re-establishment of the old regency, and at the same time render the transfer of the seat of government to Oporto an easy task. Hence the outrageous conduct of the Monteiro Mor and of the judge of the people, and the former's insolent letter calling upon sir Charles Cotton to interrupt the execution of the convention.

The 3d September, sir Hew Dalrymple received instructions, from home, relative to the formation of a new regency, which were completely at variance with the plan arranged between the bishop and general Von Decken, yet no difficulty attended the execution; and here, as in the case of prince Leopold, we are arrested by the singularity of the transaction. General Charles Stewart, brother of lord Castlereagh, was the bearer of Von Decken's first letter; he would not knowingly have lent himself to an intrigue, subversive of his brother's views, as explained in the official instructions sent to sir Hew; neither is it likely that Von Decken should plunge into such a delicate and important affair in one hour after his arrival at Oporto, if he had not been secretly authorised by some member of the English cabinet: are we then to seek for a clue to these mysteries, in that shameful Machiavelian policy that soon afterwards forced lord Castlereagh to defend his public measures by a duel?

But the usual fate of plans laid by men more cunning than wise, attended the bishop of Oporto's projects; he was successful for a moment in rendering the convention of Cintra odious to the Portuguese, yet the great mass of the people soon acknowledged with gratitude the services rendered them by the English, rejoicing at the fulfilment of a treaty which freed their country at once from the invaders. And well might they rejoice when they beheld above twenty-five thousand bold and skilful soldiers, reluctantly quitting the strong holds of the kingdom, and to the last maintaining the haughty air of an army unsubdued, and capable, on the slightest provocation, of resorting once more to the decision of battle. The Portuguese people were contented, but the Spanish general Galluzzo appears to have favoured the views of the Oporto faction. Detachments of his troops, and Portuguese refugees principally from the northern provinces and commanded

by a Spaniard, were acting in conjunction with the insurgents of the Alemtejo. Many disputes had arisen between the two nations, as I have already related, for the Spaniards treated Portugal as a conquered country, denied the authority of the Portuguese general Leite, who was not of the bishop's party, and insulted him personally; they even seized his military chest at Campo Mayor, and in all things acted with the utmost violence and rapacity.

Galluzzo himself was required by his own government to join the Spanish armies concentrating on the Ebro; but instead of obeying, he collected his forces near Elvas, and when he heard of the convention concluded at Lisbon, invested Fort Lallipe, and refused to permit the execution of the treaty relative to that impregnable fortress. Colonel Girod de Novillard commanded the French garrison, and profiting from its situation, had compelled the inhabitants of Elvas to shut their gates also against the Spaniards, and to supply the fort daily with provisions. Galluzzo's proceedings were therefore manifestly absurd in a military point of view, for his attacks were confined to a trifling bombardment of Lallipe from an immense distance, and the utmost damage sustained or likely to be sustained by that fortress, was the knocking away the cornices and chimneys of the governor's house, every other part being protected by bomb proofs of the finest masonry.

Through lord Burghersh, who had been appointed to communicate with the Spanish troops in Portugal, Galluzzo was, early in September, officially informed of the articles of the convention, and that the troops of his nation, confined on board the hulks at Lisbon, were by that treaty released, and would be clothed, armed, and sent to Catalonia. Sir Hew Dalrymple also wrote to the Spanish general on the 5th of September to repeat this intelligence and to request that his detachment might be withdrawn from the Alemtejo, where they were living at the expense of the people; Galluzzo, however, took no notice of either communication; pretending that he had opened his fire against Lallipe before the date of the convention, and that no third party had a right to interfere, he declared he would grant no terms to the garrison, nor permit any but Portuguese to enter the fort. Yet at this moment the Spanish armies on the Ebro were languishing for cavalry, which he alone possessed; and his efforts were so despised by Girod, that the latter made no secret of his intention, if the fate of the French army at Lisbon should render such a step advisable, to blow up the works, and march openly through the midst of Galluzzo's troops.

Colonel Ross being finally detached, with the 20th regiment to receive the fort from colonel Girod, and to escort the garrison to Lisbon under the terms of the convention, sent a flag of truce, and major Colborne, who carried it, was also furnished with an autograph letter from Kellerman; he was received with civility, but Girod refused to surrender his post without more complete proof of the authenticity of the treaty, and with the view of acquiring that, he proposed that a French officer should proceed to Lisbon to verify the information. He did not affect to disbelieve Colborne's information, but he would not surrender his charge while the slightest doubt, capable of being removed, was attached to the transaction; and so acting he did well, and like a good soldier. General D'Arcy, who commanded the Spanish investing force, was persuaded to grant a truce for six days, to give time for the journey of the officers appointed to go to Lisbon, but on their return it was not without great difficulty and delay that they were permitted to communicate with colonel Girod; and no argument could prevail upon the obstinate Galluzzo to relinquish the siege. After a warm intercourse of letters, sir Hew Dalrymple ordered sir John Hope to advance to Estremos with a considerable body of troops, to give weight to his re-

monstrances, and, if pushed to extremity, even to force the Spaniard to desist from his unwarrantable pretensions; for it must be observed, that Galluzzo was not only putting aside the convention by which he profited himself, but violating the independence of the Portuguese, who desired his absence from their territory. He was likewise setting at nought the authority of his own government; for the army of Estremadura pretended to act under the orders of the junta of Seville, and Laguna, an accredited agent of that junta, at the moment receiving, from sir Hew Dalrymple, the Spanish prisoners liberated by the effect of the convention, together with money and arms, to prepare them for immediate service in Catalonia, whither they were to be transported in British vessels. One more effort was, however, made to persuade the intractable Galluzzo to submit to reason, before recourse was had to violent measures, which must have produced infinite evil. Colonel Graham repaired upon the 25th of September to Badajos, and his arguments backed up by the approach of the powerful division under Hope, were finally successful.

Colonel Girod evacuated the forts, and his garrison proceeded to Lisbon, attended by the 52d regiment as an escort; the rival troops agreed very well together, striving to outdo each other by the vigour and the military order of their marches, but the Swiss and French soldiers did not accord, and many of the latter wished to desert. At Lisbon the whole were immediately embarked, and the transports being detained for some time in the river, major de Bosset, an officer of the Chasseurs Britanniques, contrived to persuade near a thousand of the men to desert, who were afterwards received into the British service.* Girod complained of this as a breach of the convention, and it must be confessed that it was an equivocal act, yet one common to all armies, and if done simply by persuasion very excusable.

Almeida surrendered without any delay, and the garrison being marched to Oporto, were proceeding to embark, when the populace rose and would have slain them if great exertions had not been made by the British officers to prevent such a disgraceful breach of faith. The escort, although weak, was resolute to sustain the honour of their nation, and would have fired upon the multitude if the circumstances had become desperate, yet several of the French soldiers were assassinated, and, in spite of every effort, the baggage was landed, and the whole plundered, the excuse being, that church plate was to be found amongst it; an accusation easily made, difficult to be disproved to the satisfaction of a violent mob, and likely enough to be true.

This tumult gives scope for reflection upon the facility with which men adapt themselves to circumstances, and regulate their most furious passions, by the scale of self-interest. In Oporto, the suffering, in consequence of the invasion, was trifling compared to the misery endured in Lisbon, yet the inhabitants of the former were much more outrageous in their anger. In Lisbon, the very persons who had inflicted the worst evils upon the people were daily exposed, more or less, to violence, yet suffered none; while in Oporto, it was with extreme difficulty that men, until that moment unseen of the multitude, were rescued from their frantic revenge. In both cases fear regulated the degree of hatred shown, and we may conclude from hence, that national insurrections, however spontaneous and vehement, if the result of hatred only, will never successfully resist an organized force, unless the mechanical courage of discipline be grafted upon the first enthusiasm.

While the vexatious correspondence with Galluzzo was going on, sir Hew Dalrymple renewed his intercourse with Castaños, and prepared to prosecute the war in Spain. The Spanish prisoners, about four thou-

sand in number, were sent to Catalonia, and the British army was cantoned principally in the Alentejo along the road to Badajos; some officers were despatched to examine the roads through Beira, with a view to a movement on that line, and general Anstruther was directed to repair to the fortress of Almeida, for the purpose of regulating every thing which might concern the passage of the army, if it should be found necessary to enter Spain by that route. Lord William Bentinck was also despatched to Madrid, having instructions to communicate with the Spanish generals and with the central junta, and to arrange with them the best line of march, the mode of providing magazines, and the plan of campaign. But in the midst of these affairs, and before the garrison of Elvas arrived at Lisbon, sir Hew Dalrymple was called home to answer for his conduct relative to the convention; the command then devolved upon sir Harry Burrard, and he, after holding it a short time, also returned to England, there to abide the fury of the most outrageous and disgraceful public clamour that was ever excited by the falsehoods of venal political writers.

The editors of the daily press, adopting all the misrepresentations of the Portuguese minister, and concluding that the silence of government was the consequence of its dissatisfaction at the convention, broke forth with such a torrent of rabid malevolence, that all feelings of right and justice were overborne, and the voice of truth entirely stifled by their obstreperous cry. Many of the public papers were printed with mourning lines around the text which related to Portuguese affairs, all called for punishment, and some even talked of death to the guilty, before it was possible to know if any crime had been committed; the infamy of the convention was the universal subject of conversation, a general madness seemed to have seized all classes, and, like the Athenians after the sea-fight of Arginusæ, the English people, if their laws would have permitted the exploit, would have condemned their victorious generals to death.

A court was assembled at Chelsea to inquire into the transactions relating to the armistice and the definite convention. Sir Arthur Wellesley, sir Harry Burrard, sir Hew Dalrymple, and the principal generals engaged at Vimiero, were called before it; a minute investigation of all the circumstances took place, and a detailed report was made, at the end of which, it was stated that no further judicial measures seemed to be called for. This was not satisfactory to the government, and the members of the court were required to state, individually, whether they approved or disapproved of the armistice and convention. It then appeared, that four approved and three disapproved of the convention, and among the latter the earl of Moira distinguished himself by a laboured criticism, which, however, left the pith of the question entirely untouched. The proceedings of the board were dispassionate and impartial, but the report was not luminous; a circumstance to be regretted, because the rank and reputation of the members were sufficiently great to secure them from the revenge of party, and no set of men were ever more favourably placed for giving a severe and just rebuke to popular injustice.

Thus ended the last act of the celebrated convention of Cintra, the very name of which will always be a signal record of the ignorant and ridiculous vehemence of the public feeling; for the armistice, the negotiations, the convention itself, and the execution of its provisions, were all commenced, conducted and concluded, at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with which place they had not the slightest connexion, political, military, or local. Yet lord Byron has gravely sung, that the convention was signed in the marquis of Marialva's house at Cintra, and the author of the 'Diary of an Invalid,' improving upon the poet's discovery, detected the stains of ink split by Junot upon the occasion!

* Appendix to colonel De Bosset's Parga, p. 134. Thiebault.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. General Thiebault says, that the scattered state of the French army in the beginning of August rendered its situation desperate, and that the slowness of sir Arthur Wellesley saved it. Others again have accused the latter of rashness and temerity. Neither of these censures appear to be well founded. It is true that Junot's army was disseminated; yet to beat an army in detail, a general must be perfectly acquainted with the country he is to act in, well informed of his adversary's movements, and rapid in his own. Now rapidity in war depends as much upon the experience of the troops as upon the energy of the chief; but the English army was raw, the staff and commissariat mere novices, the artillery scantily and badly horsed, few baggage or draft animals were to be obtained in the country, and there were only a hundred and eighty cavalry mounted. Such impediments are not to be removed in a moment, and therein lies the difference betwixt theory and practice, between criticism and execution.

2. To disembark the army without waiting for the reinforcements, was a bold yet not a rash measure. Sir Arthur Wellesley knew that the French troops were very much scattered, although he was not aware of the exact situation of each division, and, from the bishop of Oporto's promises, he had reason to expect good assistance from the Portuguese, who would have been discouraged if he had not landed at once. Weighing these circumstances, he was justified in disembarking his troops, and the event proved that he was right; he had full time to prepare his army, his marches were methodical, and he was superior in numbers to his enemy in each battle; his plans were characterized by a due mixture of enterprise and caution, well adapted to his own force, and yet capable of being enlarged without inconvenience when the reinforcement should arrive.

3. In the action of Roriga there was a great deal to admire, and some grounds for animadversion. The movement against Laborde's first position was well conceived and executed, but the subsequent attack, against the heights of Zambugeira, was undoubtedly faulty, as the march of Ferguson's and Trant's divisions would have dislodged Laborde from that strong ridge without any attack on the front. It is said that such was sir Arthur's project, and that some mistake in the orders caused general Ferguson to alter the direction of his march from the flank to the centre. This, if true, does not excuse the error, because the commander-in-chief being present at the attack in front, might have restrained it until Ferguson had recovered the right direction; it is more probable that sir Arthur did not expect any very vigorous resistance, that wishing to press the French in their retreat he pushed on the action too fast, and Laborde, who was unquestionably no ordinary general, made the most of both time and circumstances.

4. Towards the close of the day, when the French had decidedly taken to the mountains, the line of Loison's march was in the power of the English general. If he had sent two thousand men in pursuit of Laborde, left one thousand to protect the field of battle, and with the remaining ten thousand marched against Loison, whose advanced guard could not have been far off, it is probable that the latter would have been surprised and totally defeated; at all events he could only have saved himself by a hasty retreat, which would have broken Junot's combinations and scattered his army in all directions. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, marched to Lourinham, to cover the immediate landing of his reinforcement and stores, and this was prudent, because a south-west wind would in one night have sent half the fleet on shore in a surf unequalled for fury; such indeed was the difficulty of a disembarkation, that a detachment from the garrison of Peniché would have sufficed to frustrate it. The existence of a French reserve, es-

timated by report at four thousand men, was known, its situation was unknown, and it might have been on the coast line; hence great danger to Anstruther, if he attempted a landing without being covered, greater still if he remained at sea. The reasons then for the march to Lourinham were cogent, and, perhaps, outweighed the advantages of attacking Loison, yet it seems to have been an error not to have occupied Torres Vedras on the 18th; the disembarkation of Anstruther's force would have been equally secured, while the junction of the French army, and the consequent battle of Vimiero would have been prevented.

5. It is an agreeable task to render a just tribute of applause to the conduct of a gallant although unsuccessful enemy, and there is no danger of incurring the imputation of ostentatious liberality, in asserting, that Laborde's operations were exquisite specimens of the art of war. The free and confident manner in which he felt for his enemy—the occupation of Brilos, Obidos, and Roriga in succession, by which he delayed the final moment of battle, and gained time for Loison—the judgment and nice calculation with which he maintained the position of Roriga—the obstinacy with which he defended the heights of Zambugeira, were all proofs of a consummate knowledge of war, and a facility of command rarely attained.

6. Sir Arthur Wellesley estimated Laborde's numbers at six thousand men, and his estimation was corroborated by the information gained from a wounded French officer during the action. It is possible that at Alcobaga there might have been so many, but I have thought it safer to rate them at five thousand, for the following reasons:—First, it is at all times very difficult to judge of an enemy's force by the eye, and it is nearly impossible to do so correctly when he is skilfully posted, and as in the present case, desirous of appearing stronger than he really was; secondly, the six hundred men sent on the 14th to Peniché, and three companies employed on the 16th and 17th to keep open the communication with Loison by Bombaral, Cadaval, and Segura must be deducted; thirdly, Laborde himself, after the convention, positively denied that he had so many as six thousand.* General Thiebault indeed says, that only one thousand nine hundred were present under arms, but this assertion is certainly inaccurate, and even injurious to the credit of Laborde, because it casts ridicule upon his really glorious deed of arms; it is surprising that a well-informed and able writer should disfigure an excellent work by such trifling.

7. Vimiero was merely a short combat, yet it led to important results, because Junot was unable to comprehend the advantages of his situation. Profitable lessons may however be drawn from every occurrence in war, and Vimiero is not deficient in good subjects for military speculation. To many officers the position of the British appeared weak from its extent, and dangerous from its proximity to the sea, into which the army must have been driven if defeated. The last objection is well founded, and suggests the reflection that it is unsafe to neglect the principles of the art even for a moment. The ground having been occupied merely as a temporary post, without any view to fighting a battle, the line of retreat by Lourinham was for the sake of a trifling convenience left uncovered a few hours. The accidental arrival of sir Harry Burrard arrested the advanced movement projected by sir Arthur Wellesley for the 21st, and in the mean time Junot took the lead, and had he been successful upon the left, there would have been no retreat for the British army. But the extent of the position at Vimiero, although considerable for a small army, was no cause of weakness, because the line of communication from the right to the left was much shorter and much easier for the British defence

* Sir A. Wellesley's evidence. Court of Inquiry.

than it was for the French attack; and the centre was very strong and perfectly covered the movement of the right wing. Sir Arthur, when he placed the bulk of the combatants in that quarter, did all that was possible to remedy the only real defect in his position, that of having no line of retreat.

8. The project of seizing Torres Vedras and Mafra, at the close of the battle, was one of those prompt daring conceptions that distinguish great generals, and it is absurd to blame sir Harry Burrard for not adopting it. Men are not gifted alike, and even if the latter had not been confirmed in his view of the matter by the advice of his staff, there was in the actual situation of affairs ample scope for doubt; the facility of executing sir Arthur's plan was not so apparent on the field of battle as it may be in the closet. The French cavalry was numerous, unharmed, and full of spirit; upon the distant heights behind Junot's army, a fresh body of infantry had been discovered by general Spencer, and the nature of the country prevented any accurate judgment of its strength being formed; the gun-carriages of the British army were very much shaken, and they were so badly and so scantily horsed, that doubts were entertained if they could keep up with the infantry in a long march; the commissariat was in great confusion, the natives, as we have seen, were flying with the country transport; the Portuguese troops gave no promise of utility, and the English cavalry was destroyed. To overcome obstacles in the pursuit of a great object is the proof of a lofty genius; but the single fact that a man of sir George Murray's acknowledged abilities was opposed to the attempt, at once exonerates sir Harry Burrard's conduct from censure, and places the vigour of sir Arthur Wellesley's in the strongest light. It was doubtless ill-judged of the former, aware as he was of the ephemeral nature of his command, to interfere at all with the dispositions of a general who was in the full career of victory, and whose superior talents and experience were well known; yet it excites indignation to find a brave and honourable veteran borne to the earth as a criminal, and assailed by the most puerile, shallow writers, merely because his mind was not of the highest class. Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was the first to declare before the court of inquiry that sir Harry Burrard had decided upon fair military reasons.

GENERAL PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.

1. Although double lines of operation are generally disadvantageous and opposed to sound principles, the expediency of landing sir John Moore's troops at the mouth of the Mondego, and pushing them forward to Santarem, was unquestionable; unless the probable consequences of such a movement are taken into consideration, sir Arthur Wellesley's foresight can not be justly appreciated.

Lisbon, situated near the end of the tongue of land lying between the sea-coast and the Tagus, is defended to the northward by vast mountains, that, rising in successive and nearly parallel ranges, end abruptly in a line extending from Torres Vedras to Alhandra on the Tagus; and as these ridges can only be passed at certain points by an army, the intersections of the different roads form so many strong positions. Moreover the great mass of the Monte Junto which appears to lead perpendicularly on to the centre of the first ridge, but stops short at a few miles distance, sends a rugged shoot, called the Sierra de Barragueda, in a slanting direction towards Torres Vedras, from which it is only divided by a deep defile.

From this conformation it results, that an army marching from the Mondego to Lisbon, must either pass behind the Monte Junto, and follow the line of the Tagus, or keeping the western side of that mountain, come upon the position of Torres Vedras.

If sir Arthur Wellesley had adopted the first line of operations, his subsistence must have been drawn by convoys from the Mondego, the enemy's numerous cavalry would then have cut his communications, and in that state he would have had to retreat, or to force the positions of Alhandra, Alverca, and finally the heights of Bellas, a strong position the right flank of which was covered by the creek of Saccavem, and the left flank by the impassable Sierra dos Infernos. On the other line, Torres Vedras was to be carried, and then Mafra or Montechique, following the direction of Junot's retreat. If Mafra was forced, and it could not well be turned, a line of march, by Cassim and Quelus, upon Lisbon, would have been open to the victors; but that route, besides being longer than the road through Montechique and Loures, would, while it led the English army equally away from the fleet, have entangled it among the fortresses of Ereceira, Sant Antonio, Cascaes, St. Julian's, and Belem. Again, supposing the position of Montechique to be stormed, the heights of Bellas offered a third line of defence; and lastly, the citadel and forts of Lisbon itself would have sufficed to cover the passage of the river, and a retreat upon Elvas would have been secure.

Thus it is certain, that difficulties of the most serious nature awaited the English army while acting on a single line of operations, and the double line proposed by sir Arthur was strictly scientific. For if sir John Moore, disembarking at the Mondego, had marched first to Santarem and then to Saccavem, he would have turned the positions of Torres Vedras and Montechique; and sir Arthur, on the other side, would have turned the heights of Bellas by the road of Quelus, and Junot's central situation could not have availed him, because the distance between the British corps would be more than a day's march, and their near approach to Lisbon would have caused an insurrection of the populace. The duke of Abrantes must then either have abandoned that capital and fallen vigorously upon sir John Moore, with a view to overwhelm him and gain Almeida or Elvas, or he must have concentrated his forces, and been prepared to cross the Tagus if he lost a battle in front of Lisbon. In the first case, the strength of the country afforded Moore every facility for a successful resistance, and sir Arthur's corps would have quickly arrived upon the rear of the French. In the second case, Junot would have had to fight superior numbers, with an inveterate populace in his rear, and if, fearing the result of such an encounter, he had crossed the Tagus, and pushed for Elvas, sir John Moore's division could likewise have crossed the river, and harassed the French in their retreat. The above reasoning being correct, it follows that to re-embark sir John Moore's army after it had landed at the Mondego, and to bring it down to Maceira bay, was an error which, no convention intervening, might have proved fatal to the success of the campaign; and this error was rendered more important by the danger incurred from the passage, for, as the transports were not sea-worthy, the greatest part would have perished had a gale of wind come on from the south-west.*

2. Sir Arthur Wellesley's project of seizing Mafra by a rapid march on the morning of the 21st, was exceedingly bold; its successful execution would have obliged Junot to make a hurried retreat by Enxara dos Cavalheiros to Montechique, at the risk of being attacked in flank during his march; if he had moved by the longer route of Ruña and Sobral, it is scarcely to be doubted that the British army would have reached Lisbon before him. But was it possible so to deceive an enemy, inured to warfare, as to gain ten miles in a march of sixteen? was it possible to evade the vigilance of an experienced general, who, being posted only nine

* Captain Pulteney, Malcolm's evidence. Court of Inquiry.

miles off, possessed a formidable cavalry, the efforts of which could neither be checked nor interrupted by the small escort of horse in the British camp? was it, in fine, possible to avoid a defeat, during a flank march, along a road, crossed and interrupted by a river, and several deep gullies which formed the beds of mountain torrents? These are questions which naturally occur to every military man. The sticklers for a rigid adherence to system would probably decide in the negative; sir Arthur Wellesley was, however, not only prepared to try at the time, but he afterwards deliberately affirmed that, under certain circumstances of ground, an operation of that kind would succeed. To investigate such questions is the best study for an officer.

A night march is the most obvious mode of effecting such an enterprise, but not always the best in circumstances where expedition is required; great generals have usually preferred the day-time, trusting to their own skill in deceiving the enemy, while their army made a forced march to gain the object in view; thus Turenne, at Landsberg, was successful against the archduke Leopold in broad day-light, and Cæsar in a more remarkable manner overreached Afranius and Petrieus, near Lerida. Nor were the circumstances at Vimiero unfavourable to sir Arthur Wellesley. He might have pushed a select corps of light troops, his cavalry, the marines of the fleet, the Portuguese auxiliaries, and a few field pieces, to the entrance of the defile of Torres Vedras before day break, with orders to engage the French outposts briskly, and to make demonstrations as for a general attack. There is no doubt that such a movement, if skilfully conducted, would have completely occupied the enemy's attention, while the main body of the army, marching in great coats, and hiding the glitter of their arms, might have profited from the woods and hollows through which the by-road to Mafra led, and gained such a start as would have insured the success of the enterprise.

Let us, however, take a view of the other side. Let us suppose that Junot, instructed by his spies and patrols, or divining the intention of the British general, held the masking division in check with a small force, and carrying the remainder of his army by the Puente de Roll, or some other cross road, and there were several, against the flank of the English, had fallen upon the latter while in march hemmed in, as they would be, between the sea and the mountains, and entangled among hollows and torrents. What then would have been the result? History answers, by pointing to Condé and the battle of Senef. It must, however, be confessed, that it could be no ordinary general that conceived such a project, and notwithstanding the small numbers of the opposing armies, success would have ranked sir Arthur high among the eminent commanders of the world, if he had never performed any other exploit. 'The statue of Hercules, cast by Lysippus, although only a foot high, expressed,' says Pliny, 'the muscles and bones of the hero more grandly than the colossal figures of other artists.'

3. So many circumstances combine to sway the judgment of an officer in the field which do not afterwards appear of weight, that caution should always be the motto of those who censure the conduct of an unfortunate commander; nevertheless, the duke of Abrantes' faults, during this campaign, were too glaring to be mistaken. He lingered too long at Lisbon; he was undecided in his plans; he divided his army unnecessarily; he discovered no skill on the field of battle. When the English army was landed, affairs were brought to a crisis, and Junot had only two points to consider. Could the French forces under his command defend Portugal without assistance, and if not, how were its operations to be made most available for furthering Napoleon's general plans against the Peninsula? The first point could not be ascertained until

a battle with sir Arthur had been tried; the second evidently required that Junot should keep his army concentrated, preserve the power of retreating into Spain, and endeavour to engage the British troops in the sieges of Elvas and Almeida. If the two plans had been incompatible, the last was certainly preferable to the chance of battle in a country universally hostile. But the two plans were not incompatible.

The pivot of Junot's movements was Lisbon; he had therefore to consider how he might best fall upon and overthrow the English army, without resigning the capital to the Portuguese insurgents during the operation. He could not hope to accomplish the first effectually without using the great mass of his forces, nor to avoid the last except by skilful management, and the utmost rapidity. Now the citadel and forts about Lisbon, were sufficiently strong to enable a small part of the French army to control the populace, and to resist the insurgents of the Alemtejo for a few days. The Russian admiral, although not hostile to the Portuguese, or favourable to the French, was forced, by his fear of the English, to preserve a guarded attitude, and in point of fact, did materially contribute to awe the multitude, who could not but look upon him as an enemy. The Portuguese ships of war which had been fitted out by Junot, were floating fortresses requiring scarcely any garrisons, yet efficient instruments to control the city, without ceasing to be receptacles for the Spanish prisoners, and safe depôts for powder and arms, which might otherwise have fallen into the power of the populace. Wherefore, instead of delaying so long in the capital, instead of troubling himself about the assemblage of Alcazar do Sal, instead of detaching Laborde with a weak division to cover the march of Loison, Junot should have taken the most vigorous resolutions in respect to Lisbon, the moment he heard of the English descent. He should have abandoned the left bank of the Tagus, with the exception of Palmela and the Bugio, which was necessary to the safety of his shipping; he should have seized upon the principal families of the capital, as hostages for the good behaviour of the rest; he should have threatened, and been prepared, to bombard the city if refractory; then, leaving nothing more than the mere garrisons of the citadel, forts, and ships behind him, have proceeded, not to Leiria, which was too near the enemy to be a secure point of junction with Loison, but to Santarem, where both corps might have been united without danger and without fatigue. General Thomieres, in the mean time, putting a small garrison in Peniche could have watched the movement of the British general, and thus from eighteen to twenty thousand men would have been assembled at Santarem by the 13th at farthest, and from thence, one march would have brought the whole to Batalha, near which place the lot of battle might have been drawn without trembling. If it proved unfavourable to the French, the ulterior object of renewing the campaign on the frontier was in no manner compromised. The number of large boats that Lisbon can always furnish, would have sufficed to transport the beaten army over the Tagus from Santarem in a few hours, especially if the stores had been embarked before Junot moved towards Batalha; and the French army, once in the Alemtejo, with a good garrison in Abrantes, could not have been followed until the forts at the mouth of the Tagus were reduced, and the fleet sheltered in the river. Thus, long before the British could have appeared in force in the Alemtejo, the fortress of Elvas would have been provisioned from the magazines collected by Loison after the battle of Evora, and the campaign could have been easily prolonged until the great French army, coming from Germany, crushed all opposition.

The above is not a theory broached after the event. That Junot would attempt something of the kind, was the data upon which the English general formed his

plans, and the intercepted memoir of colonel Vincent treated such an operation as a matter of course. Junot's threats during the negotiation prove that he was not ignorant of his own resources, but his mind was depressed, and his desponding mood was palpable to those around him; it is a curious fact, that Sattaro, the Portuguese agent, who, for some purpose or other was in the British camp, told sir Arthur Wellesley before the battle of Vimiero, that Junot would willingly evacuate Portugal upon terms.

4. When the French, being fourteen thousand in number, occupied Torres Vedras, that position was nearly impregnable; but though seventeen thousand British could scarcely have carried it by force, they might have turned it in a single march by the coast road, and Junot neither placed a detachment on that side, nor kept a vigilant watch by his patrols; hence, if sir Arthur Wellesley's intended movement had not been arrested by orders from Burrard, it must have succeeded, because Junot was entangled in the defiles of Torres Vedras from six o'clock in the evening of the 20th, until late in the morning of the 21st.* The two armies would thus have changed camps in the space of a few hours, without firing a shot; Junot would have lost Lisbon, and have been placed in the most ridiculous situation.

5. In the battle, the duke of Abrantes showed great courage, but no talent. His army was inferior in numbers, yet he formed two separate attacks, an evident error, that enabled sir Arthur to beat him in detail without difficulty. He was the less excusable, because the comparatively easy nature of the ground over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham led, and the manner in which the English army was heaped to the right when the position first opened to the view, plainly indicated the true line of attack. Junot should, with all his forces concentrated for one effort, have fallen in upon the left of his opponent's position: if victorious, the sea would have swallowed those who escaped his sword, if repulsed, his retreat was open, and his loss could not have been so great in a well-conducted single effort, as it was in the ill-digested, unconnected attacks that took place.

6. The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied, and recovered their order after such a severe check, was admirable, but their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised. Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, it may have been successful, but against the British it must always fail; because the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well-disciplined, to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short of the actual charge, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns, which blinded by smoke, unsteady of footing, and bewildered by words of command, coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion: hence no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm, and even victorious at the moment when the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, well managed columns are the very soul of military operations, in them is the victory, and in them also is

safety to be found after a defeat; the secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front.

ARMISTICE.—CONVENTION.

1. It is surprising, that Junot having regained Torres Vedras, occupied Mafra, and obtained an armistice, did not profit by the terms of the latter to prepare for crossing the Tagus and establishing the war on the frontiers. Kellerman ascertained during his negotiation, that sir John Moore was not arrived; it was clear that, until he did arrive, the position of Montechique could neither be attacked nor turned, and there was nothing in the armistice itself, nor the war in which it had been agreed to, which rendered it dishonourable to take such an advantage. The opening thus left for Junot to gain time, was sir Arthur Wellesley's principal objection to the preliminary treaty.

2. With regard to the convention, although some of its provisions were objectionable in point of form, and others imprudently worded, yet taken as a whole, it was a transaction fraught with prudence and wisdom. Let it be examined upon fair military and political grounds, let it even be supposed for the sake of argument, that sir Arthur, unimpeded by sir Harry Burrard, had pursued his own plan, and that Junot, cut off from Lisbon and the half of his forces, had been driven up the Tagus; he was still master of flying to Almeida or Elvas, the thousand men left in Santarem would have joined him in the Alemtejo, or fallen down to the capital, and what then would have been the advantages that could render the convention undesirable? The British army, exclusive of Moore's division, had neither provisions, nor means of transporting provisions for more than ten days, and the fleet was the only resource when that supply should be exhausted; but a gale from any point between south and north-west, would have driven the ships away or cast them on a lee-shore. It was therefore indispensable first to secure the mouth of the Tagus, for the safety of the fleet; and this could only be done by occupying Cascaes, Bugio, and St. Julian's, the last of which would alone have required ten days open trenches, and a battering train, which must have been dragged by men over the mountains; for the artillery horses were scarcely able to draw the field guns, and no country animals were to be found.* In the mean time, the French troops in Lisbon, upon the heights of Almada, and in the men-of-war, retiring tranquilly through the Alemtejo, would have united with Junot, or, if he had fallen back upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La-Lyppe. In this argument the Russians have not been considered, but whatever his secret wishes might have been, Siniavin must have surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner, or joined the French with his six thousand men; and it may here be observed, that even after the arrival of sir John Moore, only twenty-five thousand British infantry were fit for duty.

Let it now be supposed that the forts were taken, the English fleet in the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, the battering guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported to Abrantes by water; seventy miles of land remained to traverse, and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season, and in the most pestilential of situations, would have been the certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did the difficulty end there? No! Almeida remained, and in the then state of the roads of Portugal, and taking into consideration only the certain and foreseen obstacles, it is not too much to say, that six months more would have been wasted before the country would have been entirely freed from the invaders; but long before that period Napoleon's eagles would have soared over Lisbon again! The conclu-

* Thiebault.

* Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

sion is inevitable; the convention was a great and solid advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French.

With the momentary exception of Junot's threat to burn Lisbon if his terms were not complied with, we look in vain for any traces of that vigour which urged the march from Alcantara; we are astonished to perceive the man, who, in the teeth of an English fleet, in contempt of fourteen thousand Portuguese troops, and regardless of a population of three hundred thousand souls, dared, with a few hundred tired grenadiers, to seize upon Lisbon, so changed in half a year, so sunk in energy, that, with twenty-five thousand good soldiers, he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a

convention to save an army which was really in very little danger. But such and so variable is the human mind, a momentary slave of every attraction, yet ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot entered Portugal, power, honours, fame, even a throne was within his view; when he proposed the convention, the gorgeous apparition was gone; toil and danger were at hand, fame flitted at a distance, and he easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigour could not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly describes the convention in a few words. "I was going to send Junot before a council of war, when, fortunately, the English tried their generals, and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend!"

BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

Comparison between the Portuguese and Spanish people—The general opinion of French weakness and Spanish strength and energy, fallacious—Contracted policy of the English cabinet—Account of the civil and military agents employed—Many of them act without judgment—Mischievous effects thereof—Operations of the Spanish armies, after the battle of Baylen—Murcian army arrives at Madrid—Valencian army marches to the relief of Zaragoza—General Verdier raises the siege—Castanos enters Madrid—Contumacious conduct of Galuzo—Disputes between Blake and Cuesta—Dilatory conduct of the Spaniards—Sagacious observation of Napoleon—Insurrection at Bilboa; quelled by general Merlin—French corps approaches Zaragoza—Palafox alarmed, threatens the council of Castile—Council of war held at Madrid—Plan of operations—Castanos unable to march from want of money—Bad conduct of the junta of Seville—Vigorous conduct of major Cox—Want of arms—Extravagant project to procure them,

THE convention of Cintra followed by the establishment of a regency at Lisbon, disconcerted the plans of the bishop and junta of Oporto, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative tranquillity; for the Portuguese people, being of a simple character, when they found their country relieved from the presence of a French army readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors. Thus terminated what may be called the convulsive struggle of the Peninsular war. Up to that period a remarkable similarity of feeling and mode of acting betrayed the common origin of the Spanish and Portuguese people; a wild impatience of foreign aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, and a passionate reckless resentment, were common to both; but there the likeness ceased, and the finer marks of national character which had been impressed upon them by their different positions in the political world, became distinctly visible.

Spain, holding, from time immemorial, a high rank among the great powers, and more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily rejected all advice. Unconscious of her actual weakness and ignorance, and remembering only her former dignity, she, ridiculously, assumed an attitude which would scarcely have suited

her in the days of Charles V.; whereas Portugal, always fearing the ambition of a powerful neighbour, and relying for safety as much upon her alliances as upon her own intrinsic strength, was from habit inclined to prudent calculation, and readily submitted to the direction of England. The turbulence of the first led to defeat and disaster; the docility and patience of the second were productive of the most beneficial results.

The difference between these nations was, however, not immediately perceptible, at the period of the convention the Portuguese were despised, while a splendid triumph was anticipated for the Spaniards. It was affirmed and believed, that from every quarter enthusiastic multitudes of the latter were pressing forward to complete the destruction of a baffled and dispirited enemy; the vigour, the courage, the unmatched spring of Spanish patriotism, was in every man's mouth, Napoleon's power and energy seemed weak in opposition. Few persons doubted the truth of such tales, and yet nothing could be more unsound, more eminently fallacious, than the generally entertained opinion of French weakness and of Spanish strength. The resources of the former were unbounded, almost untouched; those of the latter were too slender even to support the weight of victory; in Spain the whole structure of society was shaken to pieces by the violence of an effort which merely awakened the slumbering strength of France. Foresight, promptitude, arrangement, marked the proceedings of Napoleon, but with the Spaniards the counsels of prudence were punished as treason, and personal interests, everywhere springing up with incredible force, wrestled against the public good. At a distance the insurrection appeared of towering proportions and mighty strength, when in truth, it was a fantastic object, stained with blood, and tottering from weakness. The helping hand of England alone was stretched forth for its support, all other assistance was denied, for the continental powers, although nourishing secret hopes of profit from the struggle, with calculating policy, turned coldly from the patriots' cause. The English cabinet was, indeed, sanguine, and resolute to act, yet the ministers, while anticipating success in a preposterous manner, displayed little

industry, and less judgment, in their preparations for the struggle; nor does it appear that the real freedom of the Peninsula was much considered in their councils. They contemplated this astonishing insurrection as a mere military opening through which Napoleon might be assailed, and they neglected, or rather feared, to look towards the great moral consequences of such a stupendous event,—consequences which were, indeed, above their reach of policy: they were neither able, nor willing, to seize such a singularly propitious occasion for conferring a benefit upon mankind.

It is, however, certain, that this opportunity for restoring the civil strength of a long degraded people, by a direct recurrence to first principles, was such as had seldom been granted to a sinking nation. Enthusiasm was aroused without the withering curse of faction; the multitude were ready to follow whoever chose to lead, the weight of ancient authority was, by a violent external shock, thrown off, the ruling power fell from the hands of the few, and was caught by the many, without the latter having thereby incurred the odium of rebellion, or excited the malice of mortified grandeur. There was nothing to deter the cautious, for there was nothing to pull down; the foundation of the social structure was already laid bare, and all the materials were at hand for building a noble monument of human genius and virtue, the architect alone was wanting; no anxiety to ameliorate the moral or physical condition of the people in the Peninsula was evinced by the ruling men of England, and if any existed amongst those of Spain, it evaporated in puerile abstract speculations. Napoleon, indeed, offered the blessing of regeneration in exchange for submission, but in that revolting form, accompanied by the evils of war, it was rejected, and amidst the clamorous pursuit of national independence, the independence of man was trampled under foot. The mass of the Spanish nation, blinded by personal hatred, thought only of revenge; the leaders, arrogant and incapable, neither sought nor wished for any higher motive of action: without unity of design, devoid of arrangement, their policy was mean and personal, their military efforts were abortive, and a rude, unscientific warfare disclosed at once the barbarous violence of the Spanish character, and the utter decay of Spanish institutions.

After Joseph's retreat from Madrid, the insurrection of Spain may be said to have ceased; from that period it became a war between France and the Peninsula; the fate of the latter was entrusted to organized bodies of men, and as the first excitement subsided, and danger seemed to recede, all the meaner passions resumed their empire. Hence the transactions of the memorable period which intervened between the battles of Baylen and Coruña were exceedingly confused, and the history of them must necessarily partake somewhat of that confusion. The establishment of a central supreme junta, the caprices of the Spanish generals, and their interminable disputes; the proceedings of the French army before the arrival of the emperor; the operations of the grand army after his arrival, and the campaign of the British auxiliary force; form so many distinct actions, connected indeed by one great catastrophe, yet each attended by a number of minor circumstances of no great historical importance taken separately, but when combined, showing the extent and complicated nature of the disease which destroyed the energy of Spain. For the advantage of clearness, therefore, it will be necessary to sacrifice chronological order; and as frequent reference must be made to the proceedings of a class of men whose interference had a decided, and in many cases a very disastrous influence upon the affairs of that period, I shall first give a brief account of the English agents, under which denomination both civil and military men were employed, yet the distinction was rather nominal than real, as generally speaking,

each person assumed the right of acting in both capacities.

The envoy, Mr. Charles Stuart, was the chief of the civil agents; the persons subordinate to him were, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Duff, and others, consuls and vice-consuls.

Mr. Stuart sailed with sir A. Wellesley, and was left at Coruña when that officer touched there, previous to the operations in Portugal.

Mr. Hunter was stationed at Gihon in the Asturias.

Mr. Duff proceeded to Cadiz, and the others in like manner were employed at different ports. They were all empowered to distribute money, arms, succours of clothing and ammunition, and the want of system and forethought in the cabinet was palpable from the injudicious zeal of these inferior agents, each of whom conceived himself competent to direct the whole of the political and military transactions; Mr. Stuart was even put to some trouble in establishing his right to control their proceedings.

The military agents were of two classes; those sent from England by the government, and those employed by the generals abroad.

Sir Thomas Dyer, assisted by major Roche and captain Patrick, proceeded to the Asturias. The last officer remained at Oviedo, near the junta of that province; major Roche went to the head-quarters of Cuesta; sir Thomas Dyer, after collecting some information, returned to England.

Colonel Charles Doyle, having organized the Spanish prisoners at Portsmouth, sailed with them to Coruña. He was accompanied by captain Carrol and captain Kennedy, and during the passage a singular instance of turbulent impatience occurred; the prisoners, who had been released, armed, and clothed by England, and who had been as enthusiastic in their expressions of patriotism as the most sanguine could desire, mutinied, seized the transports, carried them into different ports of the Peninsula, disembarked, and proceeded each to his own home.

Colonel Browne was despatched to Oporto, and major Green to Catalonia.

Those employed by the generals commanding armies were captain Whittingham, who was placed by sir Hew Dalrymple near general Castaños, he accompanied the head-quarters of the Andalusian army until the battle of Tudela put an end to his functions. Major Cox, appointed also by sir Hew Dalrymple, remained near the junta of Seville, where his talents and prudent conduct were of great service; it would have been fortunate if all the persons employed as agents had acted with as much judgment and discretion.

All the above named gentlemen were in full activity previous to the commencement of the campaign in Portugal; but when the convention of Cintra opened a way for operations in Spain, sir Hew Dalrymple sent lord William Bentinck to Madrid, that he might arrange a plan of co-operation with the Spanish generals, and transmit exact intelligence of the state of affairs. Such a mission was become indispensable. Up to the period of lord William's arrival in Madrid, the military intelligence received was very unsatisfactory. The letters from the armies contained abundance of common-place expressions relative to the enthusiasm and patriotism visible in Spain; vast plans were said to be under consideration, some in progress of execution, and complete success was confidently predicted; but by some fatality, every project proved abortive or disastrous, without lowering the confidence of the prognosticators, or checking the mania for grand operations, which seemed to be the disease of the moment.

The English ministers confirmed the appointment of lord William Bentinck, and at the same time reorganized the system of the military agents, by marking out certain districts, and appointing a general officer to superintend each. Thus, major-general Broderick was

sent to Galicia; major-general Leith, with a large staff, proceeded to the Asturias; major-general Sontag went to Portugal. At the same time, sir Robert Wilson, being furnished with arms, ammunition, and clothing for organizing three or four thousand men levied by the bishop of Oporto, took with him a large regimental staff, and a number of Portuguese refugees, and succeeded in forming a partizan corps, afterwards known as the Lusitanian legion.* Brigadier-general Decken, also a German, being first destined for Spain, was countermanded at sea and directed to Oporto, where he arrived on the 17th of August, and immediately commenced that curious intrigue which has been already mentioned in the campaign of Vimiero. The scope of general Leith's mission was wide; Biscay, Castille, Leon, and even Catalonia, were placed under his superintendence, and he appears to have had instructions to prepare the way for the disembarkation of an English army on the coast of Biscay.

When sir John Moore assumed the command of the army, he sent colonel Graham to reside at the Spanish head-quarters on the Ebro, and directed lord William Bentinck to remain at Madrid to forward the arrangements for commencing the campaign. Lord William found in Mr. Stuart an able coadjutor, and in the letters of these two gentlemen, and the correspondence of major Coxe, then at Seville, is to be found the history of the evils which at this period afflicted unhappy Spain, and ruined her noble cause. But the power of distributing supplies, and the independent nature of their appointments, gave to the military agents immediately employed by the minister, an extraordinary influence, which was very injudiciously exercised. They forgot the real objects of their mission, and in many cases took a leading part in affairs with which it was not politic in them to have meddled at all.

Thus Colonel Doyle having left captain Kennedy at Cornuã, and placed captain Carrol at the head-quarters of Blake's army, repaired in person to Madrid, where he was received with marked attention, obtained the rank of a general officer in the Spanish service for himself, that of lieutenant-colonel for captains Carrol and Kennedy, and from his letters it would appear, that he had a large share in conducting many important measures, such as the arrangement of a general plan of operations, and the formation of a central and supreme government. He seems to have attached himself principally to the duke of Infantado, a young man of moderate capacity, but with a strong predilection for those petty intrigues which constituted the policy of the Spanish court.† Captain Whittingham likewise gained the confidence of Castaños to such a degree, that he was employed by him to inspect the different Spanish corps on the Ebro early in September, and to report upon their state of efficiency previous to entering upon the execution of the plan laid down for the campaign.‡ But notwithstanding the favourable position in which these officers stood, it does not appear that either of them obtained any clear idea of the relative strength of the contending forces; their opinions, invariably and even extravagantly sanguine, were never borne out by the result.

The Spaniards were not slow to perceive the advantages of encouraging the vanity of inexperienced men who had the control of enormous supplies; and while all outward demonstrations of respect and confidence were by them lavished upon subordinate functionaries, especially upon those who had accepted of rank in their service, the most strenuous exertions of lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart were insufficient to procure the adoption of a single beneficial measure,|| or even to establish

the ordinary intercourse of official business. The leading Spaniards wished to obtain a medium through which to create a false impression of the state of affairs, and thus to secure supplies and succours from England, without being fettered in the application of them; the subordinate agents answered this purpose, and, satisfied with their docility, the generals were far from encouraging the residence of more than one British agent at their head-quarters. Captain Birch, an intelligent engineer officer, writing from Blake's camp, says, 'General Broderick is expected here; but I have understood that the appearance of a British general at these head-quarters, to accompany the army, might give jealousy.* General Blake is not communicative, yet captain Carrol appears to be on the best footing with him and his officers; and captain Carrol tells me that he informs him of more than he does any of his generals.' Soon after this, general Broderick did arrive, and complained, that 'general Blake's reserve was such that he could only get answers to the most direct and particular questions, but by no means candid and explicit replies to general inquiries.†'

No object could be more perfectly accomplished; nothing could be more widely different than Spanish affairs, judged of by the tenor of the military agents' reports, and Spanish affairs when brought to the test of battle; yet the fault did not attach so much to the agents as to the ministers who selected them. It was difficult for inexperienced men to avoid the snare. Living with the chiefs of armies actually in the field, being in habits of daily intercourse with them, holding rank in the same service, and dependent upon their politeness for every convenience, the agent was in a manner forced to see as the general saw, and to report as he wished; a simple spy would have been far more efficacious!

Sir John Moore, perceiving the evil tendency of such a system, recalled all those officers who were under his immediate control, and strongly recommended to ministers that only one channel of communication should exist between the Spanish authorities and the British army. He was convinced of the necessity of this measure, by observing, that each of the military agents considered the events passing under his own peculiar cognizance as the only occurrences of importance. Some of those officers treated sir Hew Dalrymple and himself, as persons commanding an auxiliary force which was to be moved, divided, and applied at the requisition of every inferior agent, and all the military stores of the British empire, as placed at their disposal. Mr. Hunter demanded English cavalry and horse artillery to act with the Spaniards in the Asturian plains, and infantry to garrison their seaport towns. Sir Thomas Dyer was convinced that the horsemen and guns should have been at Rio Seco, in Leon, and that, with the aid of two thousand British cavalry and twenty pieces of artillery, the Spaniards would in six weeks have all the French troops 'in a state of siege.' General Leith says: 'Whatever may be the plan of operations, and whatever the result, I beg leave, in the strongest manner, to recommend to your consideration, the great advantage of ordering all the disposable force, of horse or car artillery, and light infantry, mounted on horses or mules of the country, without a moment's delay to move on Palencia, where the column or columns will receive such intelligence as may enable them to give the most effectual co-operation.‡' Captain Whittingham, at the same period, after mentioning the wish of general Castaños that some British cavalry should join him, writes, 'I cannot quit this subject without once more repeating, that the efforts of the cavalry will decide the fate of the campaign. Should it be possible for

* Sir H. Dalrymple's Papers, MS.

† Sir John Moore's Correspondence, MS.

‡ Whittingham's Letters, MS.

|| Mr. Stuart's Letters, MS. Lord W. Bentinck's Letters, MS.

* Sir John Moore's Correspondence, MS.

† Letter to Mr. Stuart, MS. Sept. 13.

‡ Sir John Moore's Papers, MSS.

your excellency to send one thousand or fifteen hundred horse, the advantages that would result are incalculable.' And while these pressing recommendations came the one from Oviedo, the other from Tudela, colonel Doyle, writing from Madrid, thus expresses himself: 'Certain it is, that if your army were here, the French would evacuate Spain before you got within a week's march of them; indeed, even the light cavalry and two thousand light troops sent on cars, to keep up with the cavalry, to show our friends the nature of outpost duty, would, I think, decide the question.'—A respectable corps of British troops, landed in Catalonia, would so impose, that I have no doubt of the good effects.' This last proposition relative to Catalonia was a favourite plan of all the leading men at Madrid; so certain were they of success on the Ebro, that, finding no British force was likely to be granted, they withdrew eight or nine thousand men from the army near Tudela, and directed them upon Lerida.

Thus much I have thought it necessary to relate about the agents, and now quitting that subject, I shall narrate

THE OPERATIONS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BATTLE OF BAYLEN.

When that victory caused Joseph to abandon Madrid, the patriotic troops, guided by the caprice of the generals, moved in a variety of directions, without any fixed object in view, and without the slightest concert; all persons seemed to imagine that the war was at an end, and that rejoicing and triumph alone ought to occupy the minds of good Spaniards.

The Murcian and Valencian army separated. General Llamas, with twelve thousand infantry, and a few cavalry, took the road to Madrid, and arrived there before any of the other generals. St. Marc, a Fleming by birth, with greater propriety, carried the Valencians to the relief of Zaragoza. On the road he joined his forces with those of the baron de Versage, and the united troops, amounting to sixteen thousand, entered Zaragoza on the 15th, one day after Verdier and Lefebvre had broken up the siege and retired to Tudela, leaving their heavy guns and many stores behind them; they were pursued by the Valencians and Aragonese, but on the 19th their cavalry turned and defeated the Spanish advanced guard. On the 20th Lefebvre abandoned Tudela, and took a position at Milagro. On the 21st, St. Marc and Versage occupied Tudela, and the peasantry of the valleys, encouraged by the approach of a regular army, and by the successful defence of Zaragoza, assembled on the left flank of the French, and threatened their communications. Meanwhile Palafox gave himself up to festivity and rejoicing, and did not begin to repair the defences of Zaragoza until the end of the month; he also assumed supreme authority, and in various ways discovered inordinate and foolish presumption, decreeing, among other acts, that no Aragonese should be liable to the punishment of death for any crime.*

The army of Andalusia was the most efficient body of men in arms throughout Spain, it contained thirty thousand regular troops, provided with a good train of artillery and flushed with recent victory; yet it was constrained to remain idle by the junta of Seville, who detained it to secure a supremacy over the other juntas of Andalusia, and even brought back a part to assist at an ostentatious triumph in that city.† It was not until a full month after the capitulation of Dupont, that Castaños made his entry into the capital, at the head of a single division of seven thousand men; another of the same force was left at Toledo, and the rest of his army quartered at Puerto del Rey, St. Helena, and Carolina, in the Sierra Morena.‡

Of the Estremaduran army the infantry was at first composed only of new levies, but it was afterwards strengthened by some battalion of the Walloon and Royal Guards, and supplied by sir Hew Dalrymple with every needful equipment. Following the terms of a treaty between the juntas of Badajoz and Seville, the cavalry, four thousand strong, was to be given to Castaños, but, Cuesta excepted, no other general had any horsemen. This cavalry was useless in Estremadura, yet orders and entreaties and the interference of sir Hew Dalrymple, alike failed to make Galluzzo send it either to the capital or to Blake; nor would he, as we have seen, desist from his pretended siege of La-Lyppe, although it delayed the evacuation of Portugal. Meanwhile the Spanish captives, released by the convention of Cintra, were clothed, armed, and sent to Catalonia in British transports, which also carried ten thousand musquets, with ammunition, for the Catalans.*

It has been before stated, that one thousand five hundred Spaniards, commanded by the marquis of Valladeras, co-operated with the Portuguese during the campaign of Vimiero; they never penetrated beyond Guarda, and being destitute of money, were reduced to great distress, for they could not subsist where they were, nor yet march away: sir Hew, by a timely advance of ten thousand dollars, relieved them, and Valladeras joined Blake, when, after the defeat of Rio Seco, that general had separated from Cuesta, and sheltered himself from the pursuit of Bessieres in the mountains behind Astorga.† Blake's reserve division had not been engaged in that battle, and the resources of the province, aided by the succours from England, were sufficient to place him again at the head of thirty thousand infantry.‡ Hence, when Bessieres retired after the defeat of Baylen, Blake occupied Leon, Astorga, and the pass of Manzanal; and as he dared not enter the plains without cavalry, the junta of Castille and Leon, then at Ponteferrada, ordered Cuesta, who had one thousand dragoons at Arevalo, to transfer them to the Gallician army. Instead of obeying, the arbitrary old man, exasperated by his defeat, and his quarrel with Blake, retired to Salamanca, collected and armed ten thousand peasants, annulled the proceedings of the junta, and menaced the members with punishment for resisting his authority as captain-general.¶ On the other hand, Blake protected them, and while the generals disputed, three thousand French cavalry, descending the Douro, scoured the plains, and raised contributions in face of both their armies.

Finally, Blake, finding the obstinacy of Cuesta invincible, quitted his cantonments early in September, and skirting the plains on the north-east, carried his army by forced marches to the Mañana St. Ander, a rugged district, dividing Biscay from the Asturias. The junta of the latter province had received enormous and very timely succours from England, but made no exertions answerable to the amount of the assistance granted, or to the strength and importance of the district; eighteen thousand men were said to be in arms, but only ten thousand were promised to Blake, and but eight thousand joined his army.§

In Catalonia the war was conducted by both sides without much connexion, or dependance on the movements of the main armies, and at this period it had little influence on the general plan of campaign. Thus it appears, that one month after the capitulation of Dupont, only nineteen thousand infantry without cavalry, and those under the command of more than one general, were collected at Madrid; that only sixteen thousand men were in line upon the Ebro, and that the remainder of the Spanish armies, exclusive of that in Catalonia, computed at eleven thousand men, were ma-

* Cavallero. † Cox's Correspondence. MSS.

‡ Whittingham's Correspondence. MSS.

* Sir H. Dalrymple's Papers. MSS.

† Ibid.

‡ Doyle's Letters.

¶ Mr. Stuart's Correspondence

§ Capt. Carrol's Letters.

ny days' march from the enemy, and from one another; that the chiefs, at discord with their respective juntas, and at variance among themselves, were inactive, or, as in the case of Galluzzo, doing mischief.

These feeble and dilatory operations of the armies, were partly owing to the inaptitude of the generals, but the principal causes were the unbounded vanity, arrogance, and selfishness of the local governments, among whom the juntas of Galicia and Seville were remarkable for their ambition. The time which should have been passed in concerting measures for pushing the victory of Baylen, was spent by them in devising schemes to ensure the permanency of their own power, and the money and resources, both of England and Spain, were applied to further this pernicious object; in every part of the country a spirit of interested violence prevailed, the ardour of patriotism was chilled, and the exertions of sensible men were rendered nugatory, or served as a signal for their own destruction.

The argument to be drawn from this state of affairs is conclusive against the policy of Joseph's retreat. Without drafting a man from the garrisons of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian; without interfering with the moveable columns employed on the communications of Biscay and Navarre, that monarch drew together about fifty thousand good troops, in twenty days after he had abandoned his capital. At the head of such a force, or even of two-thirds of it, he might have bid defiance to the inactive, half-organized, and scattered Spanish armies, and it was so necessary to have maintained himself in Madrid, that scarcely any disproportion of numbers should have induced him to abandon it without an effort; but the disaster of Dupont had created in Joseph's mind a respect for Spanish prowess, while from his sagacious brother it only drew the following observation: '*The whole of the Spanish forces are not capable of beating twenty-five thousand French in a reasonable position.*' The error of abandoning the capital would, if the Spaniards had been capable of pursuing any general plan of action, have been fatal; but the stone of Cadmus had been cast among them, and the juntas, turning upon one another in hate, forgot the common enemy.

Ferdinand was now again proclaimed king of Spain, and the pomp and rejoicing, attendant on this event, put an end to all business, except that of intrigue. Castaños assumed the title of captain-general of Madrid; a step which seems to have been taken by him, partly to forward his being appointed generalissimo, and partly with a view to emancipate himself from the injurious control of the Seville junta; for, although the authority of the captains-general had been superseded in most of the provinces by the juntas, it was not universally the case. He expected, and with reason, to be appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies, but he was of an indolent disposition, and it was manifest that until a central and supreme government was established, such a salutary measure would not be adopted. In the mean time, the council of Castille, although not generally popular with the people, and hated by the juntas, was accepted as the provisional head of the state in the capital; yet its authority was merely nominal, and the necessity of showing some front to the enemy seems to have been the only link of connexion between the Spanish armies.

The evil consequences flowing from this want of unity were soon felt. Scarcely had the French quitted Madrid, when the people of Biscay prepared to rise, and such an event, prudently conducted and well supported, would have been of incalculable advantage, but the nicest arrangement, and the utmost prudence, were necessary to insure success; for the Biscayans had neither arms nor ammunition, the French were close to them, and the nearest Spanish force was the feeble Asturian levy. A previous junction of Blake's army with the latter was indispensable; that once effected, and

due preparation made, the insurrection of Biscay, protected by forty thousand regular troops, and supplied from the sea-board with money and stores, would have forced the French to abandon the Ebro or to fight a battle, which Blake might have risked, provided that the Andalusian, Murcian, Valencian, and Aragonese troops assembling about Tudela, were prepared to move at the same time against the left flank of the enemy. In every point of view it was an event pregnant with important consequences, and the impatience of the Biscayans should have been restrained rather than encouraged; yet the duke of Infantado, colonel Doyle, and others, at Madrid, made strenuous efforts to hasten the explosion, and the crude manner in which they conducted this serious affair is exposed in the following extracts from colonel Doyle's despatches:—

'I proposed to general Blake that he should send officers to Biscay to stir up the people there, and into the Asturias to beg that, of their 15,000 men, 8,000 might be pushed into Biscay to Bilbao, to assist the people, who were all ready, and only waited for arms and ammunition, for both of which I wrote to Mr. Hunter at Gihon, and learned from him that he had sent a large supply of both, and some money to Bilbao, where already 14,000 men had enrolled themselves. The remainder of the Asturias I begged might instantly occupy the passes from Castille into the Asturias and Biscay, that is to say, from Reynosa in the direction of Bilbao.' Some days after he says, 'My measures in Biscay and Asturias have perfectly succeeded; the reinforcements of arms, ammunition and men (5,000 stand of arms, and ammunition in proportion), have reached Bilbao in safety, and the Asturias have taken possession of the passes I pointed out, so that we are all safe in that part of the world.'

In this fancied state of security affairs remained until the 16th of August; Blake was still in the mountains of Galicia, but the English succours arrived in the port of Bilbao, and the explosion took place. General Merlin, with three thousand grenadiers, immediately came down on the unfortunate Biscayans, Bilbao was taken, and to use the gloomy expression of king Joseph, 'the fire of insurrection was quenched with the blood of twelve hundred men.' Fortunately, the stores were not landed, and the vessels escaped from the river. Thus, at a blow, one of the principal resources which Blake had a right to calculate upon in his future operations was destroyed; and although the number admitted by the Spaniards to have fallen was less than the above quotation implies, the spirit of resistance was severely checked, and the evil was unmixed and deplorable. This unfortunate event, however, created little or no sensation beyond the immediate scene of the catastrophe; triumphs and rejoicings occupied the people of Madrid and Zaragoza, and it is difficult to say how long the war would have been neglected, if Palafox had not been roused by the re-appearance of a French corps, which retook Tudela, and pushed on to the vicinity of Zaragoza itself.

This movement took place immediately after the expedition against Bilbao, it was intended to suppress the insurrection of the valleys, and to clear the left flank of the French army. Palafox thus roughly aroused, wrote intemperately to the council of Castille, ordering that all the troops in the capital should be forwarded to the Ebro, and menacing the members personally for the delay which had already occurred.* Being a young man without any weight of character, and his remonstrances founded only upon his own danger, and not supported by any general plan or clear view of affairs, the presumptuous tone of his letters gave general offence: he chiefly aimed at Castaños, who was not under his command, and moreover, the junta of Seville

* Whittingham's Letters. MSS.

refused to pay, or to subsist the Andalusian army, if it moved beyond the capital before a central government should be established. But the same junta resorted to every kind of intrigue, to retard, if not entirely to prevent the execution of the latter measure. It was, however, necessary to do something, and a council of all the generals commanding armies was held at Madrid on the 5th of September.* Castaños, Llamas, Cuesta, the duke of Infantado, and some others assembled; Blake gave his proxy to the duke, Palafox was represented by a colonel of his own staff.† Cuesta proposed that a commander-in-chief should be appointed, the others were too jealous to adopt this proposal, yet they agreed to pursue the following plan of operations :

Llamas, with the Murecians, to occupy Tarazona, Agreda, and Borja. La-Peña, with the two divisions of Andalusia already in the capital, to march by Soria, and take possession of Logroña and Najera. The other divisions of that army to follow in due time, and when La-Peña should be established in Logroña, Llamas was to advance to Cascante, Corella, and Calahorra.

This united force was to be called the army of the centre, and once securely fixed in its positions, Palafox, under whose command St. Marc's division acted, was to push forward to Sanguessa by the left bank of the Ebro, and thus turn the enemy on the Aragon river. In the mean time it was hoped that Blake would arrive at Palencia, and form his junction with the Asturians, and Cuesta promised to march upon Burgo del Osa, to fill up the space between Blake and the army of the centre. The head of La-Peña's column was to be at Soria on the 15th of September, and the junta confidently expected that this vicious plan, in which every sound military principle was violated, and the enemy's troops, considered with regard to position, as a fixed immovable mass, would cause the total destruction of the French army: the only fear entertained was, that a hasty flight into France would save it from Spanish vengeance! And captain Whittingham, echoing the sentiments of the Spanish generals with reference to this plan, writes, 'As far as my poor judgment leads me, I am satisfied that if the French persist in maintaining their present position, we shall, in less than six weeks, have a second edition of the battle of Baylen!'

But to enable La-Peña and Llamas to march, pecuniary aid was requisite, there was a difficulty in raising money at Madrid, and the maritime provinces intercepted all the English supplies. In this dilemma, colonel Doyle drew bills upon the English treasury, and upon the government at Seville, making the latter payable out of two millions of dollars just transmitted to the junta through Mr. Duff.‡ It is probable that such an unprincipled body would have dishonoured the bills, if, just before they were presented, major Cox had not remonstrated strongly upon the destitute condition of the army, and his representations, although at first haughtily and evasively received, became effectual when the junta discovered that a plot against their lives, supposed to have been concocted at Madrid, was on the eve of execution: in fact, they had become hateful from their domineering insolence and selfishness, and the public feeling was strongly against them. Alarmed for the consequences, they sent off 200,000 dollars to Madrid, and published a manifesto, in which they inserted a letter, purporting to be from themselves to Castaños, dated on the 8th, and giving him full powers to act as he judged fitting for the public good. Their objects were to pacify the people, and to save their own dignity by appearing to have acted volunta-

rily, but Castaños published the letter in Madrid with its true date of the 11th, and then it became manifest, that to major Cox's remonstrance, and not to any sense of duty, this change of conduct was due.

Doyle's bills having been negotiated, the troops in the capital were put in motion, and 40,000 fresh levies were enrolled, yet the foresight and activity of Napoleon in disarming the country had been so effectual, that only 3,200 firelocks could be procured. A curious expedient then presented itself to the imagination of the duke of Infantado, and other leading persons in Madrid: colonel Doyle, at their desire, wrote to sir Hew Dalrymple, in the name of the supreme council, to request that *the firelocks of Junot's army, and the arms of the Portuguese people*, might be forwarded to the frontier, and from thence carried by post to the capital. And this novel proposition was made at a time when England had already transmitted to Spain 160,000 muskets, a supply considerably exceeding the whole number of men organized throughout the country. Fifty thousand of these arms had been sent to Seville, where the junta shut them up in the arsenals, and left the armies defenceless; for to neglect or misuse real resources, and to fasten with avidity upon the most extravagant projects, is peculiarly Spanish.* No other people could have thought of asking for a neighbouring nation's arms at such a conjuncture. No other than Spanish rulers could have imagined the absurdity of supplying their levies, momentarily expecting to fight upon the Ebro, with the arms of a French army still unconquered in Portugal. But this project was only one among many proofs afforded at the time, that Cervantes was as profound an observer as he was a witty reprover of the extravagance of his countrymen.

CHAPTER II.

Internal political transactions—Factions in Galicia, Asturias, Leon, and Castile—Flagitious conduct of the junta of Seville—Mr. Stuart endeavours to establish a northern cortes—Activity of the council of Castile; proposes a supreme government agreeable to the public—Local juntas become generally odious—Cortes meet at Lugo; declare for a central and supreme government—Deputies appointed—Clamours of the Gallician junta and bishop of Orense—Increasing influence of the Castile—Underhanded proceedings of the junta of Seville, disconcerted by the quickness of the Bailly Valdez—Character of Cuesta; he denies the legality of the northern cortes, abandons the line of military operations, returns to Segovia, arrests the Bailly Valdez and other deputies from Lugo—Central and supreme government established at Aranjuez—Popular feeling in favour of the central junta; vain and interested proceedings of that body: its timidity, inactivity, and folly; refuses to name a generalissimo—Foreign relations—Mr. Canning leaves Mr. Stuart without any instructions for three months—Mr. Frere appointed envoy extraordinary, &c.

INTERNAL POLITICAL TRANSACTIONS.

With the military affairs, thus mismanaged, the civil and political transactions proceeded step by step, and in the same crooked path. Short as the period was between the first breaking forth of the insurrection, and the arrival of Mr. Stuart at Coruña, it was sufficient to create disunion of the worst kind.† The juntas of Leon, of the Asturias, and of Galicia, were at open discord, and those provinces were again split into parties, hating each other with as much virulence as if they had been of a hundred years' growth. The money and other supplies sent by the English ministers were considered, by the authorities into whose hands they fell, as a peculiar donation to themselves, and appropriated accordingly. The junta of one province would not as-

* Whittingham's Letters. MSS.

† Mr. Stuart's Letters. Parliamentary Papers.

‡ Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence. Doyle's Letters. Cox's Do.

* Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

† Mr. Stuart's Letters. Parliamentary Papers.

sist another with arms when there was a surplus, nor permit their troops to march against the enemy beyond the precincts of the particular province in which they were first organized.* The ruling power was in the hands of the provincial nobility and gentry, men of narrow contracted views, unused to business, proud, arrogant—as extreme ignorance suddenly clothed with authority will always be—and generally disposed to employ their newly acquired power in providing for their relations and dependants at the expense of the common cause, which with them was quite subordinate to the local interests of their own particular province. A jealousy of their neighbours regulated the proceedings of all the juntas, and the means they resorted to for increasing their own, or depressing a rival government's influence, were equally characterised by absurdity and want of principle.

The junta of Galicia did their utmost to isolate that province, as if with a view to a final separation from Spain and a connexion with Portugal. They complained, as of an injury, that the army of Estremadura had obeyed the orders of the junta of Seville, yet they formed an independent alliance with the junta of Oporto, and sent troops, as we have seen, under Valladeras, to aid the war in Portugal;† but, at the same time, they refused to unite in any common measure of defence with the provinces of Castille, until a formal treaty of alliance between them was negotiated, signed, and ratified; and their selfishness and incapacity created so much disgust in their own district, that plots were formed to overthrow their authority. The bishop of Orense and the archbishop of St. Jago were their decided enemies. The last-named prelate, an intriguing man, secretly endeavoured to draw Blake, with the army, into his views, and even wrote to him to desire that he would lead the troops against the government of Coruña;‡ the junta having intercepted the letters, arrested the archbishop, yet their own stability and personal safety were still so insecure, that many persons applied to Mr. Stuart to aid in changing the form of government by force. The Asturians were even worse; they refused to assist Blake when his army was suffering, although the stores required by him, and supplied by England, were rotting in the harbours where they were first landed; money also, sent out in the Pluto frigate for the use of Leon, was detained at Gihon, and Leon itself never raised a single soldier for the cause. Thus, only two months after the first burst of the insurrection, corruption, intrigue, and faction, even to the verge of civil war, were raging in the northern parts of Spain.

Like passions being at work in the south, the same consequences followed. The junta of Seville, still less scrupulous than that of Galicia, made no secret of their ambitious views. They stifled all local publications, and even suppressed the public address of Florida Blanca, who, as president of the Murcian junta, had recommended the formation of a supreme central government; they wasted their time in vain and frivolous disputes, and, neglecting every concern of real importance, sacrificed the general welfare to views of private advantage and interest. They made promotions in the army without regard to public opinion or merit; they overlaid all real patriotism, and bestowed on their own creatures places of emolument, to the patronage of which they had not a legal right; they even usurped the royal prerogative of appointing canons in the church, and their cupidity equalled their ambition. They intercepted, as I have already related, the pecuniary supplies necessary to enable the army to act, and they complained that *La Mancha* and *Madrid*, in whose defence they said '*their* troops were sacrificing

themselves,' did not subsist and supply the force with *Castañas*.* Under the pretence of forming a nucleus for disciplining thirty thousand levies as a reserve, they retained five battalions at Seville, and, having by this draft weakened the army in the field, they neglected the rest, and never raised a man. The canonries filled up by them had been vacant for several years, and the salaries attached to those offices had been appropriated to the public service; the junta now applied the money to their own and their creatures' emolument, and at one period they appeared to have contemplated an open partition of the funds received from England among themselves. Against this flagitious junta also, the public indignation was rife. A plot was formed to assassinate the members; the municipal authorities remonstrated with them, the archbishop of Toledo protested against their conduct, the junta of Grenada refused to acknowledge their supremacy;† and yet so great was their arrogance, so unprincipled their ambition, that the decided and resolute opposition of *Castañas* alone prevented them from commencing a civil war, by marching the victorious army of Baylen against the refractory Grenadans. Such was the real state of Spain, and such the patriotism of the juntas, who were at this time filling Europe with the sound of their own praise.

In the northern parts, Mr. Stuart endeavoured to reduce the chaos of folly and wickedness to some degree of order, and to produce that unity of design and action, without which, it was impossible to resist the mighty adversary that threatened the independence of the Peninsula. He judged that to abate the conflicting passions of the moment, a supreme authority, upon which the influence of Great Britain could be brought to bear with full force, was indispensable; and that to convoke the ancient cortes of the realm was the most certain and natural method of drawing the strength and energy of the nation into one compact mass; but there Napoleon again interfered, for by an able distribution of the French forces, all direct communication between the northern and southern provinces was intercepted. Bessieres, Dupont, and Monecy at that time occupied a circle round Madrid, and would have prevented the local governments of the north from uniting with those of the southern, if they had been inclined to do so.

A union of deputies from the nearest provinces, to be called the northern cortes, then suggested itself to Mr. Stuart as a preliminary step, which would ensure the convocation of a general assembly when such a measure should become practicable; accordingly he strenuously urged its adoption, but his efforts, at first, produced no good results,‡ It was in vain that he represented the danger of remaining in a state of anarchy, when so many violent passions were excited, and such an enemy was in the heart of the country. It was in vain that he pointed out the difficulties that the want of a supreme authority fastened on the intercourse with the British cabinet, which could not enter into separate relations with every provincial junta. The Spaniards, finding that the supplies were not withheld, that their reputation for patriotism was not lowered in England by actions which little merited praise; finding, in short, that the English cabinet was weak enough to gorge their cupidity, flatter their vanity, and respect their folly, assented to all Mr. Stuart's reasoning, but forwarded none of his propositions, and continued to nourish the disorders that were destroying the common cause.

The jarring interests which agitated the northern provinces were not even subdued by the near approach of danger; the result of the battle of Rio Seco rather inflamed than allayed the violence of party feeling, and if Bessieres had not been checked by the disaster of

* Mr. Stuart's Letters. Parliamentary Papers.

† Mr. Stuart's Letters. MS.

‡ Ibid.

* Sir H. Dalrymple's Papers. Cox's Correspondence.

† Ibid.

‡ Stuart's Correspondence. Parl. Pap.

Dupont, he would have encountered few obstacles in establishing Joseph's authority in Galicia and Old Castille. For the enthusiasm of those provinces never rose to a great pitch, and as Bessieres was prepared to use address as well as force, he would have found support amongst the factions, and the reinforcements continually arriving from France would have enabled him to maintain his acquisition. The ability of the emperor's dispositions would then have been apparent; for while Bessieres held Galicia, and Dupont hung on the southern frontier of Portugal with twenty-five thousand men, Junot could have securely concentrated his army in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, and have rendered an English disembarkation on the coast nearly impracticable.

Napoleon's combinations were overturned by the disgraceful capitulation of Baylen, and when Joseph evacuated Madrid a fresh impulse was given to the spirit of the people; but, unfortunately for Spain, as a wider scope for ambition was obtained, the workings of self-interest increased, fresh parties sprung up, and new follies and greater absurdities stifled the virtue of the country, and produced irremediable confusion, ending in ruin. The fact of Dupont's capitulation was made known to the council of Castille before king Joseph was informed of it, and the council, foreseeing all the consequences of such an event, immediately refused, as I have already related, to promulgate officially his accession to the throne. The king permitted this act of disobedience to pass without much notice, for he was naturally averse to violence, and neither he, nor his brother Napoleon, did at any period of the contest for Spain constrain a Spaniard to accept or retain office under the intrusive government.* Joseph went further. Before he abandoned Madrid, he released his ministers from their voluntary oath of allegiance to himself, leaving them free to choose their party once more. Don Pedro Cevallos and the marquis of Pinuelo seized the occasion to change with, what appeared to them, changing fortune; the five others remained steadfast, preferring an ameliorated government, under a foreign prince, to what they believed to be a hopeless struggle, but which, if successful, they knew must end in a degrading native despotism: perhaps, also, a little swayed by their dislike to England, and by the impossibility of obtaining that influence among their countrymen, which, under other circumstances, their talents and characters would have ensured.

The boldness of the council of Castille was not publicly chastised by the intruding monarch, yet secretly he punished the members by a dexterous stroke of policy. General Grouchy wrote to Castaños, saying, that as circumstances required the presence of the French troops in another quarter, he invited the Spanish general to take immediate possession of Madrid, for the preservation of public tranquillity. This was construed to mean the entire evacuation of Spain, and a report so congenial to the vanity and indolence of the Spaniards was greedily received; it contributed to the subsequent supineness of the nation in preparing for its defence, and Joseph, by appealing to Castaños, and affecting to treat the council of Castille as a body who had lost all influence with the nation, gave a handle to its enemies, which the latter failed not to lay hold of. The juntas dreaded that the influence of the council would destroy their own. That of Galicia would not even communicate with them, but affirmed that, individually, the members were attached to the French, and that, collectively, they had been the most active instrument of the usurper's government. The junta of Seville endeavoured not only to destroy the authority of the existing members, but to annul the body, as an acknowledged tribunal of the state.† This proscribed council, how-

ever, was not wanting to itself, the individuals composing it did not hesitate to seize the reins of government the moment the French had departed; and the prudence with which they preserved tranquillity in the capital, preventing all re-action, while it proves that they were not without merit, forms a striking contrast to the conduct of the provincial juntas, under whose savage sway every kind of excess was committed, and even encouraged.

Aware of the hostility they had to encounter, the members of the council lost no time in forming a party to support themselves. Don Arias Mon y Velarde, dean or president for the time being, wrote a circular letter to the local juntas, pointing out the necessity of establishing a central and supreme power, and proposing that deputies from each province, or nation, as they were sometimes called, should repair to Madrid, and there concert with the council the best mode of carrying such a measure into effect. If this proposal had been adopted, all power would inevitably have fallen into the hands of the proposers. Confessedly the first public body in the state, and well acquainted with the forms of business, the council must necessarily have had a preponderating influence in the assembly of delegates; and it appeared so reasonable that it should take the lead, when an efficient authority was required to direct the violence of the people in a useful channel, before the moment of safety was passed, that all the juntas trembled at the prospect of losing their misused power. The minor ones submitted, and agreed to send deputies, the stronger and more ambitious felt that subtlety would avail more than open opposition to the project.

The council followed up this blow by the publication of a manifesto, containing an accurate detail of the events of the revolution, defending the part taken by its members, and claiming a renewal of the confidence formerly reposed in them by the nation. This important state paper was so ably written, that a large party, especially at Valladolid, was immediately formed in favour of its authors, and the junta of Seville were so sensible of the increasing influence of the council, that they intercepted a copy of this manifesto, addressed to sir Hew Dalrymple, and strictly suppressed all writings favourable to the formation of a supreme central authority, nothing they dreaded more.* But it was no longer possible to resist the current, which had set strongly in favour of such a measure; the juntas, however they might oppose its progress, could not openly deny the propriety of it, and in every province, individuals of talent and consideration called for a change in the Hydra polity which oppressed the country, and was inefficient against the enemy.† Every British functionary, civil or military, in communication with the Spaniards, also urged the necessity of concentrating the executive power.

All the provincial juntas were become universally odious;‡ some of the generals alone, who had suddenly risen to command under their rule, were favourable to them. Palafox was independent, as a captain-general, whose power was confirmed by success; Castaños openly declared that he would no longer serve under their control; Cuesta was prepared to put them down by force, and to re-establish the royal audiencias and the authority of the captains-general according to the old practice. In this state of affairs, the retreat of Bessieres' army having freed the communication with the southern parts, removed all excuse for procrastination, and the juntas of Galicia, Castille, Leon, and the Asturias, giving way to the unceasing remonstrances of Mr. Stuart, at his instance agreed to meet in cortes, at Lugo; Galicia, however, first insisted upon a for-

* Azanza and O'Farril, Mem.

† Sir Hew Dalrymple's Papers. Cox's Correspondence.

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence. Cox's Correspondence.

† Mr. Stuart's Correspondence. † Ibid.

mal ratification of that treaty with Castille which has been already mentioned.

When the moment of assembling arrived, the Asturians, without assigning any reason, refused to fulfil the engagement they had entered into, and the three remaining juntas held the session without them. The bishop of Orense, and the junta of Galicia, were prepared to assert the supremacy of that province over the others. But the Bailly Valdez of Castille, an able and disinterested man, being chosen president of the convocation, proposed, on the first day of assembly, that deputies should be appointed to represent the three provinces in a supreme junta, to be assembled in some central place, for the purpose of convoking the ancient cortes of the whole kingdom, according to the old forms, and of settling the administration of the interior, and the future succession to the throne. This proposition was immediately carried by the superior number of the Castillians and Leonese, although the bishop of Orense protested against it, and the Gallician members strongly opposed an arrangement, by which their province was placed on the same footing as others; a glaring injustice, they urged, when the numbers of the Gallician army were taken into consideration, for the local feeling of ambition was uppermost, and the general cause disregarded. The other party answered, with great force, that the Gallician army was paid, armed, and clothed by England, and fed by Castille and Leon.

Meanwhile the influence of the council of Castille greatly increased, and the junta of Seville, quickened by fear, took the lead in directing what they could not prevent;* the convocation of the cortes they knew would be fatal to their own existence. Wherefore, in a public letter, addressed to the junta of Galicia, dated one day previous to the circular of don Arias Mon, but evidently written after the receipt of the latter, they opposed the assembling of the cortes, on the ground that it was 'the prerogative of the king to convoke that body; and if it was called together by any other authority, the provinces would not obey;' 'there would be no unanimity.' The futility of this argument is apparent; the question was not one of form, but of expediency. If the nation was in favour of such a step, and after facts proved that the people were not opposed to it, the same necessity which constituted the right of the junta to declare war against the French, another prerogative of the monarch, would have sufficed to legalize the convocation of the national assembly. But their sole object was to preserve their own power. They maintained that the juntas, being chosen by the nation, were the only legitimate depositaries of authority, that to members of their own bodies only could any of that authority be delegated; then adopting the suggestion contained in the letter of Arias Mon, they proposed that two deputies from each supreme junta should repair, not to Madrid, but to Ciudad Real, or Almagro, and at the moment of meeting be in fact constituted governors general of the kingdom, and as such obeyed; nevertheless, the local governments were, with due subordination to the central junta, to retain and exercise in their own provinces all the authority with which they had already invested themselves. Thus they had only to choose subservient deputies, and their power would be more firmly fixed than before; and this arrangement would, doubtless, have been adopted by the junta of Galicia, had not the rapidity with which Valdez carried his proposition, prevented that cause of discord from being added to the numerous disputes which already distracted the northern provinces.

Mr. Stuart proceeded to Madrid, and, wherever he passed found the same violence of local party feeling, the same disgust at the conduct of the oligarchical governments. Pride, vanity, corruption, and improvidence

were everywhere obtrusively visible. The dispute between Blake and Cuesta, which was raging at the period of the battle of Rio Seco, a period when division was most hurtful to the military operations, was now allayed between the generals; yet their political partizans waged war with more bitterness than ever, as if with the intent to do the greatest possible mischief, by continuing the feud among the civil branches of the government, when union was most desirable in that quarter. The seeds of division had taken deep root.* On the one side was the Bailey Valdez, deputy to the supreme junta, on the other Cuesta; a man not to be offended with impunity when he had power to punish, for he was haughty and incredibly obstinate. He had been president of the council of Castille, and he was captain-general of Castille and Leon when the insurrection first broke out; but disliking all revolutionary movements, although as inimical to a foreign domination as any of his countrymen, he endeavoured to repress the public effervescence, and to maintain the tranquillity of the country at the risk of losing his life as a traitor.

Cuesta was an honest man, inasmuch as the Spanish and French interests being put in competition, he would aid the former, yet, between his country's cause and his own passions, he was not honest. He disliked, and with reason, the sway of the local juntas, and, with consistency of opinion, wished to preserve the authority of the captains-general and the royal audiencias, both of which had been overturned by the establishment of those petty governments. But, sullen and ferocious in his temper, he supported his opinion with an authority and severity which had no guide save his own will; and he was prepared, if an opportunity offered, to exercise military influence over the supreme, as well as over the subordinate juntas. He had himself appointed one for Leon and Castille as a sort of council, subordinate to the authority of the captain-general; yet, after the battle of Rio Seco, the members fled to Ponteferada, assumed the supreme authority, and, putting themselves under the protection of his enemy Blake, disregarded Cuesta's orders, and commanded him, their superior, to deliver up his cavalry to the former general. Upon this he annulled all their proceedings at Ponteferada, and now asserting that the election of Valdez and his colleagues was void, as being contrary to the existing laws, directed new juntas to be assembled in a manner more conformable to existing usages, and a fresh election to be made.

His mandates were disregarded; Valdez and the other deputies proceeded in defiance of them towards the place appointed for the assembly of the central and supreme government. Cuesta, in return, without hesitation, abandoned the operations of the campaign, which, in the council of war held at Madrid, he had promised to aid, and falling back to Segovia with twelve thousand men, seized the deputies, and shut up Valdez a close prisoner in the tower of that place, declaring his intention to try him by a military tribunal for disobedience. And such was the disorder of the times, that he was not without plausible arguments to justify this act of stubborn violence, for the original election of members to form the junta of Castille and Leon had been anything but legal; several districts had been omitted altogether in the representations of those kingdoms, many deputies had been chosen by the city of Leon alone, and Valdez was named president, although neither a native nor a proprietor, and for those reasons ineligible to be a deputy at all: the kingdom of Leon also had appointed representatives for those districts in Castille which were under the domination of the French, and when the enemy retired, the Castillians in vain demanded a more equitable arrangement.

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence.

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence.

However, amidst all this confusion and violence, the plan of uniting to form a central government gained ground all over the kingdom. Seville, Catalonia, Aragon, Murcia, Valencia, and Asturias, appointed their deputies, and although fresh disputes relative to the place of assembly arose, after some time it was agreed to meet at Aranjuez. This royal residence was chosen contrary to the wishes of many, and notably against the opinion of Jovellanos, an eloquent person, and of great reputation for integrity, but of a pertinacious temper, unsuitable to the times: he urged, that the capital was the meetest spot, and he was answered, that the turbulent disposition of the inhabitants of Madrid would impede the formation of a government, and that the same objection would exist against the choice of any other large town. It is extraordinary that such an argument should be held in Spain at a moment when the people were, in all the official and public papers, represented as perfectly enthusiastic and united in one common sacred pursuit, and in the British parliament were denominated the 'universal Spanish nation!'

To seek thus for protection in a corner, instead of manfully and confidently identifying themselves with the people, and courting publicity, augured ill for the intentions of the deputies, nor was the augury belied by the event. The junta of Seville, who had so bitterly reviled the council of Castille, for having partially submitted to the usurper, had notwithstanding, chosen for their own deputies, don Vincent Hore, a known creature of the prince of peace, and the count de Tilly Guzman, who was under the stigma of a judicial sentence for robbery.* Hore declined the appointment, but Tilly, braving the public disgust, repaired to Aranjuez, and his place as resident with the head-quarters of the Andalusian army was filled up by Miñiano, another member of the junta, who received an enormous salary for performing the mischievous duties of that office. The instructions given by the different provinces to the deputies were to confine their deliberations and votes to such subjects as they should, from time to time, receive directions from their constituents to treat of, and Seville again took the lead in this fraudulent policy; and when public indignation, and the remonstrances of some right-minded persons, obliged the juntas of that town and of Valencia, to rescind these instructions, both substituted secret orders of the same tenor. In short, the greater part of the deputies were the mere tools of the juntas, agents, watching over the interests of their employers, and, conscious of demerit, anxious to hide themselves from the just indignation of the public until they had consolidated their power; hence the dislike to large towns, and the intrigues for fixing the government at Aranjuez. Count Florida Blanca, a man in the last stage of decrepitude, was chosen first president in rotation for three months, and all idea of forming an independent executive was abandoned; for when Jovellanos proposed to establish a regency selected from their own body, his plan was rejected on the ground that the members were not authorised to delegate their powers even to one another: it was palpable that the juntas had merely appeared to comply with the public wish for a central government, but were determined not to part with one iota of their own real power.

The first act of authority executed by the assembly, was a necessary assertion of its own dignity, which had been violated in the case of Valdez Cuesta, who was personally unpopular, and feared by the central, as well as by the provincial juntas, was summoned to release his captive, and to repair to Aranjuez, that cognizance might be taken of his proceedings; he was at the same time denounced by the juntas of Castille and Leon as a traitor, and exposed to great danger of pop-

ular commotion. At first, he haughtily repelled the interference of Castaños and Florida Blanca, yet finally he was forced to bend, and after a sharp correspondence with Mr. Stuart, whose influence was usefully employed to strengthen the central government, he released his prisoner, and quitting the command of the army, appeared at Aranjuez.* No formal proceedings were had upon the case, but after much mutual recrimination, Valdez was admitted to the exercise of his functions, and the old general was detained at the seat of government, a kind of state prisoner at large, until, for the misfortune of his country, he was, by subsequent events, once more placed at the head of an army. About this time lord William Bentinck joined Mr. Stuart at Madrid. Perfectly coinciding in opinions, they laboured earnestly to give a favourable turn to affairs, by directing the attention of the central junta to the necessity of military preparations, and active exertion for defence; but the picture of discord, folly, and improvidence exhibited in the provinces, was here displayed in more glaring colours. The lesser tribunals being called upon to acknowledge the authority of the assembled deputies, readily obeyed, and the council of Castille, reluctant to submit, yet too weak to resist, endeavoured to make terms, but was forced to an unconditional submission. A good management of the revenue, a single chief for the army, and, above all, the total suppression of the provincial juntas, were the three next objects of public anxiety.† With respect to the army, no doubt was at first entertained that Castaños would be appointed commander-in-chief, his services entitled him to the office, and his general moderation and conciliating manners fitted him for it at a time when so much jealousy was to be soothed, and so many interests to be reconciled. The past expenditure of the money received from England was also a subject of great importance, and it was loudly required that an account of its disbursement should be demanded of the local juntas, and a surrender of the residue instantly enforced.

These just expectations lasted but a short time. Scarcely were the deputies assembled, when every prospect of a vigorous administration was blasted.‡ Dividing themselves into sections, answering in number to the departments of state under the old king, they appointed a secretary not chosen from their own body, to each, and declared all and every one of these sections supreme and independent, having equal authority.

Florida Blanca informed Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck that Castaños would be named generalissimo, and the two last named were even directed to confer upon the plan of campaign for the British troops, then marching from Portugal to the assistance of the Spaniards. The necessity of having a single chief at the head of the armies was imperious, and acknowledged by every individual, military or civil, yet such was the force of jealousy, and so stubborn were the tools of the different juntas, that in despite of the exertions of Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck, and the influence of the British cabinet, the generals were all confirmed in their separate and independent commands. The old and miserable system of the Dutch deputies in Marlborough's time, and of the commissaries of the convention during the French revolution, was partially revived; and the English government were totally disregarded, at a time when it had supplied Spain with two hundred thousand muskets, clothing, ammunition of all kinds, in proportion, and sixteen millions of dollars.¶ Such ample succours, if rightly managed, ought to have secured unlimited influence; but as the benefits came through one set of

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence. Colonel Graham's Ditto.

† Mr. Stuart's Correspondence.

‡ Ibid.

¶ Mr. Canning's Instructions to Mr. Duff, MSS.

* Cox's Correspondence.

persons, and the demands through another, the first were taken as of right, the last unheeded, and thus the resources of Great Britain were wasted without materially improving the condition of Spain. The armies were destitute, the central government was without credit, and notwithstanding the ample subsidies, had contracted a large debt; yet with an insolence of tone appertaining rather to conquerors dictating terms, than to grateful allies demanding further assistance, they required from England an instant gift of ten millions of dollars, and stores to an amount that would have sufficed a well-governed army for many years.

The provincial juntas were still permitted to retain their power within their own districts, and the greatest timidity marked all the proceedings of the central government in relation to those obnoxious bodies. Attentive, however, to their own interests, the members of the supreme junta decreed, 1st. that their persons should be inviolable; 2d. that the president should have the title of highness, with a salary of 25,000 crowns a-year; 3d. that each of the deputies, taking the title of excellency, should have a yearly salary of 5000 crowns; lastly, that the collective body should be addressed by the title of majesty.* Thinking that they were then sufficiently confirmed in power to venture upon a public entry into Madrid, they made preparations to ensure a favourable reception from the populace; that is, they resolved to declare a general amnesty, to lower the duties on tobacco, and to fling large sums among the people during the procession; and in the midst of all this pomp and vanity, the presence of the enemy on the soil was scarcely remembered, and the details of business were totally neglected.† This last was a prominent evil which extended to the lowest branches of administration; self-interest, indeed, produced abundance of activity, but every department, almost every man, seemed struck with torpor when the public welfare was at stake, and withal, an astonishing presumption was common to the highest and the lowest.

To supply the place of a generalissimo, a council, or board of general officers was projected, on whose reports the junta proposed to regulate the military operations. Castaños was destined to be president, but some difficulty arising relative to the appointment of the other members, the execution of the plan was deferred, with the characteristic remark, 'that when the enemy was driven across the frontier, Castaños would have leisure to take his seat.‡' The idea of a defeat, the possibility of failure, never entered their minds; the government, evincing neither apprehension, nor activity, nor foresight, were contented if the people believed the daily falsehoods they promulgated relative to the enemy, and the people, equally presumptuous, were content to be so deceived; in fine, all the symptoms of a ruined cause were already visible to discerning eyes. The armies neglected even to nakedness; the soldier's constancy under privations cruelly abused; disunion, cupidity, incapacity, in the higher orders; the patriotic ardour visibly abating among the lower classes; the rulers grasping, improvident, boasting; the enemy powerful, the people insubordinate, the fighting men without arms or bread; as a whole, and in all its parts, the government unfitted for its task; the system, cumbrous and ostentatious, was, to use the comprehensive words of Mr. Stuart, 'neither calculated to inspire courage nor to increase enthusiasm.'

The truth of this picture will be recognized by men who are yet living, and whose exertions were as incessant as unavailing to remedy those evils at the time; it will be recognized by the friends of a great man, who fell a victim to the folly and base intrigues of the day; it will be recognized by that general and army, who,

winning their own unaided way through Spain, found that to trust Spaniards in war was to lean against a broken reed. To others it may appear exaggerated, for without having seen, it is difficult to believe the extent of a disorder that paralyzed the enthusiasm of a whole people.

EXTERNAL POLITICAL RELATIONS OF SPAIN.

At first these were of necessity confined to England, Sicily, and Portugal; the rest of the Old World was either subject to Buonaparte or directly under his influence, but in the New World it was different. The Brazils, after the emigration of the royal family of Braganza, became important under every point of view, and relations were established between the junta and that court, that afterwards, under the cortez, created considerable interest, and threatened serious embarrassments to the operations of the duke of Wellington. The ultra-marine possessions of Spain were also, of course, a matter of great anxiety to both sides, and Napoleon's activity balanced the natural preponderance of the mother-country. The slowness of the local juntas, or rather their want of capacity to conduct such an affair, gave the enemy a great advantage, and it was only owing to the exertions of Mr. Stuart in the north, and of sir Hew Dalrymple and lord Collingwood in the south, that, after the insurrection broke out, vessels were despatched to South America to confirm the colonists in their adherence to Spain, and to arrange the mode of securing the resources of those great possessions for the parent state.* The hold which Spain retained over her colonies was, however, very slight; her harsh restrictive system had long before weakened the attachment of the South Americans, and the expedition of Miranda, although unsuccessful, had kindled a fire which could not be extinguished; it was apparent to all able statesmen, that Spain must relinquish her arbitrary mode of governing, or relinquish the colonies altogether; the insurrection at home only rendered this more certain, every argument, every public manifesto put forth in Europe, to animate the Spaniards against foreign aggression, told against them in America; yet for a time the latter transmitted the produce of the mines, and many of the natives served in the Spanish armies.

Napoleon, notwithstanding his activity, and the offers which he made of the viceroyalty of Mexico to Cuesta, Castaños, Blake, and probably to others residing in that country, failed to create a French party of any consequence; for the Americans were unwilling to plunge into civil strife for a less object than their own independence. The arrogance and injustice of Old Spain, however, increased, rather than diminished, under the sway of the insurrectional government; and at last, as it is well known, a general rebellion of the South American states established the independence of the fairest portion of the globe, and proved how little the abstract love of freedom influenced the resistance of the old country to Napoleon.

The Spanish intercourse with the English court, which had been hitherto carried on through the medium of the deputies, who first arrived in London to claim assistance, was now placed upon a regular footing. The deputies themselves, at the desire of Mr. Canning, were recalled, admiral Apodaca was appointed minister plenipotentiary at St. James's, and Mr. John Hookham Frere was accredited, with the same diplomatic rank, near the central junta. Mr. Stuart, whose knowledge of the state of the country, whose acquaintance with the character of the leading persons, and whose able and energetic exertions had so much contributed to the formation of a central government, was superseded by this injudicious appointment; and thus the great political machine, with every wheel in

* Stuart's Correspondence. Lord W. Bentinck's Ditto.

† Lord W. Bentinck's Correspondence. † Ibid.

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MS. Sir Hew Dalrymple.

violent action, was, at the most critical moment, left without any controlling power or guiding influence. For Mr. Stuart, who, on his own responsibility, had quitted Coruña, and repaired to Madrid, and had remitted the most exact and important information of what was passing, remained for three months without receiving a single line from Mr. Canning, approving or disapproving of his proceedings, or giving him instructions how to act at this important crisis: a strange remissness, indicating the bewildered state of the ministers, who slowly and with difficulty followed, when they should have been prepared to lead. Their tardy abortive measures demonstrated, how wide the space between a sophist and a statesman, and how dangerous to a nation is that public feeling, which, insatiable of words, disregards the actions of men, esteeming more the interested eloquence and wit of an orator like Demades, than the simple integrity, sound judgment, and great exploits of a general like Phocion.

Such were the preparations made by Spain, in September and October, to meet the exigencies of a period replete with danger and difficulty. It would be instructive to contrast the exertions of the 'enthusiastic Spaniards' during these three months of their insurrection, with the efforts of 'discontented France' in the hundred days of Napoleon's second reign. The junta were, however, not devoid of ambition, for before the battle of Baylen, that of Seville was occupied with a project of annexing the Algarves to Spain, and the treaty of Fontainebleau was far from being considered as a dead letter.

CHAPTER III.

Political position of Napoleon; he resolves to crush the Spaniards; his energy and activity; marches his armies from every part of Europe towards Spain; his oration to his soldiers—Conference at Erfurth—Negotiations for peace—Petulant conduct of Mr. Canning—160,000 conscripts enrolled in France—Power of that country—Napoleon's speech to the senate—He repairs to Bayonne—Remissness of the English cabinet—Sir John Moore appointed to lead an army into Spain; sends his artillery by the Madrid road, and marches himself by Almeida—The central junta impatient for the arrival of the English army—Sir David Baird arrives at Coruna; is refused permission to disembark his troops—Mr. Frere and the marquis of Romana arrive at Coruna; account of the latter's escape from the Danish Isles—Central junta resolved not to appoint a generalissimo—Gloomy aspect of affairs.

NAPOLEON, surprised and chagrined at the disgrace which, for the first time, his armies had sustained, was yet nothing dismayed by a resistance which he had early contemplated as not improbable.* With a piercing glance he had observed the efforts of Spain, calculated the power of foreign influence in keeping alive the spirit of resistance, and assigning a just value to the succours which England could afford, foresaw the danger which might accrue, if he suffered an insurrection of peasants, which had already dishonoured the glory of his arms, to attain the consistency of regular government, to league with powerful nations, and to become disciplined troops. To defeat the raw levies which the Spaniards had hitherto opposed to his soldiers was an easy matter, but it was necessary to crush them to atoms, that a dread of his invincible power might still pervade the world, and the secret influence of his genius remain unabated. The constitution of Bayonne would, he was aware, weigh heavy in the scale against those chaotic governments, neither monarchical, nor popular, nor aristocratic, nor federal, which the Spanish revolution was throwing up; but before the benefit of that could be felt by the many, before he could draw any advantages from his moral

resources, it was necessary to develop all his military strength.

The moment was critical and dangerous. He was surrounded by enemies whose pride he had wounded, but whose means of offence he had not destroyed; if he bent his forces against the Peninsula, England might again excite the continent to arms, and Russia and Austria, once more banding together, might raise Prussia and renew the eternal coalitions. The designs of Austria, although covered by the usual artifices of that cunning, rapacious court, were not so hidden but that, earlier or later, a war with her was to be expected as a certain event, and the inhabitants of Prussia, subdued and oppressed, could not be supposed tranquil. The secret societies that, under the name of Tugenbunde, Gymnasiasts, and other denominations, have since been persecuted by those who were then glad to avail themselves of such assistance, were just beginning to disclose their force and plans.* A baron de Nostitz, Stein the Prussian councillor of state, generals Sharnhorst and Gneizenau, and colonel Schill, appear to have been the principal contrivers and patrons of these societies, so characteristic of Germans, who, regular and plodding even to a proverb in their actions, possess the most extravagant imaginations of any people on the face of the earth. But whatever the ulterior views of these associations may have been, at this period they were universally inimical to the French; their intent was to drive the latter over the Rhine, and they were a source of peril to the emperor, the more to be feared, as the extent of their influence could not be immediately ascertained. Russia, little injured by her losses, was more powerful perhaps from her defeats, because more enlightened as to the cause of them. Napoleon felt that it would tax all his means to repel the hostility of such a great empire, and that, consequently, his Spanish operations must be confined in a manner unsuitable to the fame of his arms. With a long-sighted policy, he had, however, prepared the means of obviating this danger, by what has been called the conference at Erfurth, whither he now repaired to meet the czar, confiding in the resources of his genius for securing the friendship of that monarch.

At this period, it may be truly said, that Napoleon supported the weight of the world; every movement of his produced a political convulsion; yet so sure, so confident was he, of his intellectual superiority, that he sought but to gain one step, and doubted not to overcome all resistance, and preserve his ascendancy; time was to him victory, if he gained the one, the other followed: hence, sudden and prompt in execution, he made one of those gigantic efforts which have stamped this age with the greatness of antiquity. His armies were scattered over Europe. In Italy, in Dalmatia, on the Rhine, the Danube, the Elbe; in Prussia, Denmark, Poland, his legions were to be found; over that vast extent, above five hundred thousand disciplined men maintained the supremacy of France. From those bands he drew the imperial guards, the select soldiers of the warlike nation he governed, the terror of the other continental troops; these and the veterans of Jena, of Austerlitz, of Friedland, reduced in number, but of confirmed hardihood, were marched towards Spain; a host of cavalry, unequalled for enterprise and knowledge of war, were also directed against that devoted land, and a long train of gallant soldiers followed, until two hundred thousand men, accustomed to battle, had penetrated the gloomy fastnesses of the western Pyrenees, while forty thousand of inferior reputation, drawn from the interior of France, from Naples, from Tuscany, and from Piedmont, assembled on the eastern ridges of those gigantic hills. The march of this multitude was incessant, and as the troops passed the capi-

* Letter to Murat. *Ias Casas*.

* Baron Fain's Campaign. 1813.

tal, Napoleon, neglectful of nothing which could excite their courage, and swell their military pride, addressed to them one of his nervous orations. In the tranquillity of peace it may seem inflated, but on the eve of battle it is thus a general should speak.

'Soldiers! after triumphing on the banks of the Vistula and the Danube, with rapid steps you have passed through Germany. This day, without a moment of repose, I command you to traverse France. Soldiers! I have need of you! The hideous presence of the leopard contaminates the peninsula of Spain and Portugal. In terror he must fly before you. Let us bear our triumphal eagles to the pillars of Hercules; there also we have injuries to avenge! Soldiers! you have surpassed the renown of modern armies, but have you yet equalled the glory of those Romans, who, in one and the same campaign, were victorious upon the Rhine and the Euphrates, in Illyria and upon the Tagus! A long peace, a lasting prosperity, shall be the reward of your labours, but a real Frenchman could not, ought not, to rest until the seas are free and open to all. Soldiers! all that you have done, all that you will do, for the happiness of the French people, and for my glory, shall be eternal in my heart!'

Thus saying, he sent his army towards the frontiers of Spain, and himself hastened to meet the emperor Alexander at Erfurth. Their conference, conducted upon the footing of intimate friendship, produced a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, and the fate of Spain was, by the one, with calm indifference, abandoned to the injustice of the other; but the accession of strength with this treaty, and the manifest personal partiality of Alexander, gave to the French emperor, inspired him perhaps with the idea, that the English cabinet would, if a fair occasion offered, gladly enter into negotiations for a general peace.

The two emperors wrote a joint letter to the king of England. 'The circumstances of Europe had,' they said, 'brought them together; their first thought was to yield to the wish and the wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification, the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppressed all nations. The long and bloody war which had torn the continent was at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. If many changes had taken place in Europe, if many states had been overthrown, the cause was to be found in the state of agitation and misery in which the stagnation of maritime commerce had placed the greatest nations; still greater changes might yet take place, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then, was, at once, the interest of the people of the continent, as it was the interest of the people of Great Britain. We entreat your majesty,' they concluded, 'we unite to entreat your majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, to silence that of the passions, to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object; to conciliate all interests, and thus, preserving all powers which exist, insure the happiness of Europe and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us.'

To this joint letter Mr. Canning replied by two letters addressed to the French and Russian ministers, accompanied by an official note. In that addressed to the Russian, he observed that, 'however desirous the king might be to reply personally to the emperor, he was prevented by the unusual mode of communication adopted, which had deprived it of a private and personal character. It was impossible to pay that mark of respect to the emperor, without at the same time acknowledging titles which he had never acknowledged. The proposition for peace would be communicated to Sweden, and to the existing government of Spain. It was necessary that his majesty should receive an immediate assurance, that France acknowledged the government of Spain as a party to the negotiation.'

That such was the intention of the emperor could not be doubted, when the lively interest manifested by his imperial majesty for the welfare and dignity of the Spanish monarchy was recollected. No other assurance was wanted, that the emperor could not have been induced to sanction by his concurrence or approbation, usurpations, the principles of which were not less unjust than their example was dangerous to all legitimate sovereigns.'

The letter addressed to Mons. de Champagny, duke of Cadore, merely demanded that Sweden and Spain should be admitted as parties to the negotiation. The official note commenced by stating the king's desire for peace, on terms consistent with his honour, his fidelity to his engagements, and the permanent repose of Europe. 'The miserable condition of the continent, the convulsions it had experienced, and those with which it was threatened, were not imputable to his majesty. If the cause of so much misery was to be found in the stagnation of commercial intercourse, although his majesty could not be expected to hear with unqualified regret, that the system, devised for the destruction of the commerce of his subjects, had recoiled upon its authors or its instruments; yet, as it was neither the disposition of his majesty, nor in the character of the people over whom he reigned, to rejoice in the privations and unhappiness even of the nations which were combined against him, he anxiously desired the termination of the sufferings of the continent.' The note then, after stating that the progress of the war had imposed new obligations upon Great Britain, claimed for Sicily, for Portugal, for Sweden, and for Spain, a participation in the negotiations. 'Treaties, it stated, existed with the three first, which bound them and England in peace and war. With Spain indeed no formal instrument had yet been executed, but the ties of honour were, to the king of England, as strong as the most solemn treaties; wherefore it was assumed, that the central junta, or government of Spain, was understood to be a party to any negotiation in which his majesty was invited to engage.'

The reply of Russia was peremptory. The claims of the sovereigns, allies of Great Britain, she would readily admit. But the insurgents of Spain, Russia would not acknowledge as an independent power. The Russians, and England it was said could recollect one particular instance, had always been true to this principle; moreover, the emperor had acknowledged Joseph Buonaparte as king of Spain, and was united to the French emperor for peace and for war; he was resolved not to separate his interests from those of Napoleon. After some further arguments touching the question, the reply concluded by offering to treat upon the basis of the 'uti possidetis,' and the respective power of the belligerent parties, or upon *any basis*, for the conclusion of an honourable, just, and equal peace.

The insulting tone of Mr. Canning's communication produced an insulting reply from Mons. de Champagny, which also finished by proposing the 'uti possidetis' as a basis for a treaty, and expressing a hope, that without losing sight of the inevitable results of the force of states, it would be remembered, that between great powers there could be no solid peace but that which was equal and honourable for both parties. Upon the receipt of these replies, the English minister broke off the negotiations, and all chance of peace vanished; but previous to the conclusion of this remarkable correspondence, Napoleon had returned to Paris.

What his real views in proposing to treat were, it is difficult to determine. He could not have expected that Great Britain would relinquish the cause of Spain; he must therefore have been prepared to make some arrangement upon that head, unless the whole proceeding was an artifice to sow distrust among his enemies. The English ministers asserted that it was so, but

what enemies were they among whom he could create this uneasy feeling? Sweden, Sicily, Portugal! the notion as applied to them was absurd; it is more probable that he was sincere. He said so at St. Helena, and the peculiar circumstances of the period at which the conferences of Erfurth took place, warrant a belief in that assertion.* The menacing aspect of Austria, the recent loss of Portugal, the hitherto successful insurrection of Spain, the secret societies of Germany, the desire of consolidating the Polish dominions, and placing, while he might, a barrier to the power of Russia on that side, the breach which the events of the Peninsula made in his continental system of excluding British goods, and the commercial distresses of Europe, were cogent reasons for a peace; they might well cause him to be suspicious of the future, and render him anxious for an excuse to abandon an unjust contest, in which he could not fail to suffer much, and to risk more than he could gain. In securing the alliance of Russia, he only disentangled a part of the Gordian knot of politics; to cut the remainder with his sword was, at this juncture, a task which even he might have been doubtful of. The fact that his armies were marching upon Spain, proves nothing to the contrary of this supposition. Time was to him of the utmost consequence. His negotiations proving abortive, it would have been too late to have reinforced his troops on the Ebro, and the event evinced the prudence of his measures in that respect.

The refusal to admit the Spaniards as a party to the conferences for peace is scarcely more conclusive; to have done that would have been to resign the weapon in his hands before he entered the lists. That England could not abandon the Spaniards is unquestionable, but that was not a necessary consequence of continuing the negotiations. There was a bar put to the admission of a Spanish diplomatist, but no bar was thereby put to the discussion of Spanish interests; the correspondence of the English minister would not of necessity have compromised Spanish independence, it need not have relaxed in the slightest degree the measures of hostility, nor retarded the succours preparing for the patriots. And when we consider the great power of Napoleon's arms, the subtlety and force of his genius, the good fortune which had hitherto attended his progress in war, the vast additional strength which the alliance of Russia conferred at the moment; and when, to oppose all this, we contrast the scanty means of Spain, and the confusion into which she was plunged, it does appear as if her welfare would have been better consulted by an appeal to negotiation rather than to battle. It is true that Austria was arming, yet Austria had been so often conquered, was so sure to abandon the cause of the patriots, and every other cause when pressed; so certain to sacrifice every consideration of honour or faith to the suggestions of self-interest, that the independence of Spain, through the medium of war could only be regarded as the object of uncertain hope; a prize to be gained, if gained at all, by wading through torrents of blood, and sustaining every misery that famine and the fury of devastating armies could inflict. To avoid, if possible, such dreadful evils by negotiating was worth trial, and the force of justice, when urged by the minister of a great nation, would have been difficult to withstand; no power, no ambition, can resist it and be safe.

But such an enlarged mode of proceeding was not in accord with the shifts and subterfuges that characterized the policy of the day, when it was thought wise to degrade the dignity of such a correspondence by a ridiculous denial of Napoleon's titles; and praiseworthy to render a state paper, in which such serious interests were discussed, offensive and mean, by miserable sar-

casm, evincing the pride of an author rather than the gravity of a statesman. There is sound ground also for believing that hope, derived from a silly intrigue carried on through the princess of Tour and Taxis, with Talleyrand and some others, who were even then ready to betray Napoleon, was the real cause of the negotiation having been broken off by Mr. Canning. Mr. Whitbread declared in the House of Commons, that he saw no reason for refusing to treat with France at that period, and although public clamour afterwards induced him to explain away this expression, he needed not to be ashamed of it; for if the opinion of Cicero, that an unfair peace is preferable to the justest war, was ever worthy of attention, it was so at this period, when the success of Spain was doubtful, her misery certain, her salvation only to be obtained through the baptism of blood!

Upon the 18th of October Napoleon returned to Paris, secure of the present friendship and alliance of Russia, but uncertain of the moment when the stimulus of English subsidies would quicken the hostility of Austria into life; yet, if his peril was great, his preparations to meet it were likewise enormous. He called out two conscriptions. The first, taken from the classes of 1806, 7, 8, and 9, afforded eighty thousand men arrived at maturity; these were destined to replace the veterans directed against Spain. The second, taken from the class of 1810, also produced eighty thousand, which were disposed of as reserves in the dépôts of France.* The French troops left in Germany were then concentrated on the side of Austria; Denmark was evacuated, and one hundred thousand soldiers were withdrawn from the Prussian states. The army of Italy was powerfully reinforced, and placed under the command of prince Eugene, who was assisted by marshal Massena. Murat also, who had succeeded Joseph in the kingdom of Naples, was directed to assemble a Neapolitan army on the shores of Calabria, and to threaten Sicily. In short, no measures that prudence could suggest were neglected by this wonderful man, to whom, the time required by Austria for the mere preparation of a campaign seemed sufficient for the subjection of the whole Peninsula.

The session of the legislative body was opened on the 24th of October; the emperor, in his speech from the throne, after giving a concise sketch of the political situation of Europe, touched upon Spain. 'In a few days I go,' said he, 'to put myself at the head of my armies, and, with the aid of God, to crown the king of Spain in Madrid! to plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon!' Then departing from Paris he repaired to Bayonne, but the labours of his ministers continued; their speeches and reports more elaborately explicit than usual, exposed the vast resources of France, and were well calculated to impress upon the minds of men the danger of provoking the enmity of such a powerful nation. From those documents it appeared that the expenses of the year, including the interest of the national debt, were under thirty millions sterling, and completely covered by the existing taxes, drawn from a metallic currency;† that no fresh burthens would be laid upon the nation; that numerous public works were in progress; that internal trade, and the commerce carried on by land were flourishing, and nearly one million of men were in arms!

The readiness with which Mr. Canning broke off the negotiation of Erfurth, and defied this stupendous power, would lead to the supposition that on the side of Spain at least he was prepared to encounter it with some chance of success; yet no trace of a matured plan is to be found in the instructions to the generals commanding in Portugal previous to the 25th of Sep-

* O'Meara. Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii.

* Imperial Decree, 11th Sept. 1808.

† Exposé de l'Empire, 1809.

tember, nor was the project then adopted, one which discovered any adequate knowledge of the force of the enemy, or of the state of affairs: indeed the conduct of the cabinet relative to the Peninsula was scarcely superior to that of the central junta itself. Several vague projects, or rather speculations, were communicated to the generals in Portugal, but in none of them was the strength of the enemy alluded to, in none was there a settled plan of operations visible! it was evident that the prodigious activity of the emperor was not taken into consideration, and that a strange delusion relative to his power, or to his intentions, existed among the English ministers.

It was the 6th of October before a despatch, containing the first determinate plan of campaign, arrived at Lisbon.* Thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry were to be employed in the north of Spain, of which ten thousand were to be embarked at the English ports, and the remainder to be composed of regiments, drafted from the army then in Portugal; sir John Moore was appointed to command the whole, and he was authorised, at his own discretion, to effect a junction by a voyage round the coast, or by a march through the interior. He chose the latter, 1. because a voyage at that season of the year would have been tedious and precarious; 2. because the intention of sir Hew Dalrymple had been to enter Spain by Almeida, and the few arrangements which that general had power to make were made with a view to such a march; 3. because he was informed that the province of Galicia would be scarcely able to equip the force coming from England, under the command of sir David Baird. But Moore was directed to take the field immediately, to fix upon some place, either in Galicia or on the borders of Leon, for concentrating the whole army, and the specific plan of operations was to be concerted afterwards with the Spanish generals! This was a light and idle proceeding, promising no good result, for the Ebro was to be the theatre of war, and the head of the great French host coming from Germany, was already in the passes of the Pyrenees; the local difficulties impeding the English general's progress were also abundant, and of a nature to make that which was ill begun, end worse, and that which was well arranged, fail. To be first in the field is a great and decided advantage, yet here the plan of operations was not even arranged, when the enemy's first blows were descending.

Sir John Moore had much to execute, and with little help.† He was to organize an army of raw soldiers, and in a poor and unsettled country; just relieved from the pressure of a harsh and gripping enemy, he was to procure the transport necessary for his stores, ammunition, and even for the conveyance of the officers' baggage. Assisted by an experienced staff, such obstacles do not very much impede a good general, but here, few of the subordinate officers had served a campaign, and every branch of the administration, civil and military, was composed of men, zealous and willing indeed, yet new to a service, where no energy can prevent the effects of inexperience from being severely felt. The roads through Portugal were very bad, and the rainy season, so baleful to an army, was upon the point of setting in; time pressed sorely when it was essential to be quick, and gold, which turneth the wheels of war, was wanting. And this, at all times a great evil, was the more grievously felt at the moment, inasmuch as the Portuguese, accustomed to fraud on the part of their own government, and to forced contributions by the French, could not readily be persuaded that an army of foreigners, paying with promises alone, might be trusted: nor was this natural suspicion allayed by

observing that, while the general and his troops were thus kept without money, all the subordinate agents dispersed throughout the country were amply supplied. Sir David Baird, who, with his portion of troops, was to land at Coruña, and to equip in a country already exhausted by Blake's army, was likewise encompassed with difficulties; for from Coruña, to the nearest point, where he could effect a junction with the forces marching from Lisbon, was two hundred miles, and he also was without money.

No general-in-chief was appointed to command the Spanish armies, nor was sir John Moore referred, by the English ministers, to any person with whom he could communicate at all, much less concert a plan of operations for the allied forces. He was unacquainted with the views of the Spanish government; and he was alike uninformed of the numbers, composition, and situation of the armies with whom he was to act, and those with whom he was to contend. Twenty-five thousand pounds in his military chest, and his own genius, constituted his resources for a campaign, which was to lead him far from the coast, and all its means of supply. He was first to unite the scattered portions of his forces by a winter march of three hundred miles; another three hundred were to be passed before he reached the Ebro; there he was to concert a plan of operations with generals acting each independent of the other, their corps reaching from the northern seacoast to Zaragoza, themselves jealous and quarrelsome, their men insubordinate, differing in customs, discipline, language, and religion from the English, and despising all foreigners; and all this was to be accomplished in time to defeat an enemy who was already in the field, accustomed to great movements, and conducted by the most rapid and decided of men. It must be acknowledged that the ministers' views were equally vast and inconsiderate, and their miscalculations are the more remarkable, as there was not wanting a man, in the highest military situation, to condemn their plan at the time, and to propose a better.

The duke of York, in a formal minute, drawn up for the information of the government, observed, that the Spanish armies being unconnected and occupying a great extent of ground, were weak; that the French being concentrated, and certain of reinforcement, were strong; that there could be no question of the relative value of Spanish and French soldiers, and that, consequently, the allies might be beaten before the British could arrive at the scene of action; the latter would then unaided have to meet the French army, and it was essential to provide a sufficient number of troops to meet such an emergency. That number he judged should not be less than sixty thousand men, and by a detailed statement, he proved that such a number could have been furnished without detriment to any other service, but his advice was unheeded.

At this period, also, the effects of that incredible folly and weakness, which marked all the proceedings of the central junta, were felt throughout Spain. In any other country, the conduct of the government would have been attributed to insanity. So apathetic with respect to the enemy as to be contemptible, so active in pursuit of self-interest as to become hateful; continually devising how to render itself at once despotic and popular, how to excite enthusiasm and check freedom of expression; how to enjoy the luxury of power without its labour, how to acquire great reputation without trouble, how to be indolent and victorious at the same moment.* Fear prevented the members from removing to Madrid after every preparation had been made for a public entrance into that capital. They passed decrees, repressing the liberty of the press on the ground of the deceptions practised upon the public,

* Lord Castlereagh's Despatch. Parl. Pap.

† Sir John Moore's Papers.

* Mr. Stuart's Letters, MS.

yet themselves never hesitated to deceive the British agents, the generals, the government, and their own countrymen, by the most flagitious falsehoods upon every subject, whether of greater or less importance. They hedged their own dignity round with ridiculous and misplaced forms, opposed to the vital principle of an insurrectional government, devoted their attention to abstract speculations, recalled the exiled Jesuits, and inundated the country with long and laboured state papers, while the pressing business of the moment was left uncared for. Every application on the part of lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, even for an order to expedite a common courier, was met by difficulties and delays, and it was necessary to have recourse to the most painful solicitations to obtain the slightest attention; nor did that mode always succeed.

Sir John Moore strenuously grappled with the difficulties besetting him, and well knowing the value of time in military transactions, urged forward the preparations with all possible activity. He was very desirous that troops who had a journey of six hundred miles to make previous to meeting the enemy, should not, at the commencement, be overwhelmed by the torrents of rain, which, in Portugal, descend at this period with such violence as to destroy the shoes, ammunition, and accoutrements of a soldier, and render him almost unfit for service. The Spanish generals recommended that the line of march should be conducted by Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Salamanca, Valladolid, and Burgos; and that the magazines for the campaign should be formed at one of the latter towns. This coincided with the previous preparations, and the army was therefore organized in three columns, two of which were directed upon Almeida, by the routes of Coimbra and Guarda, while the third, comprising the artillery, the cavalry, and the regiments quartered in the Alemtejo, was destined to move by Alcantara, upon Ciudad Rodrigo. Almeida itself was chosen for a place of arms, and all the reserve-stores, and provisions, were forwarded there, as time and circumstances would permit; but the want of money, the unsettled state of the country, and the inexperience of the commissariat, rendered it difficult to procure the means of transport even for the light baggage of the regiments, although the quantity of the latter was reduced so much as to create discontent. One Sataro, the same person who has been already mentioned as an agent of Junot's in the negotiation with sir Charles Cotton, engaged to supply the army, but dishonestly failing in his contract, so embarrassed the operations, that the general resigned all hope of being able to move with more than the light baggage, the ammunition necessary for immediate use, and a scanty supply of medicines; the formation of the magazines at Almeida was also retarded, and the future subsistence of the troops was thus thrown upon a raw commissariat, unprovided with money. The general, however, relying upon its increasing experience, and upon the activity of Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, did not delay his march, and he sent agents to Madrid and other places to make contracts, and to raise money; for such was the policy of the ministers, that they supplied the Spaniards with gold, and left the English army to get it back in loans.

Many of the regiments were actually in movement when an unexpected difficulty forced the commander-in-chief to make a fresh disposition of the troops. The state of the Portuguese roads north of the Tagus was unknown, but the native officers and the people had alike declared that they were impracticable for artillery; the opinion of colonel Lopez, a military commissary sent, by the Spanish government, to facilitate the march of the British, coincided with this information; and the report of captain Delancey, one of the most intelligent and enterprising of those officers of the quarter-master-general's department, who were employed

to examine the lines of route, corroborated the general opinion. Junot had indeed, with infinite pains, carried his guns along these roads, but his carriages had been broken, and the batteries rendered unserviceable by the operation; wherefore Moore reluctantly determined to send his artillery and cavalry by the south bank of the Tagus, to Talavera de la Reyna, from whence they might gain Naval Carneiro, the Escorial, the pass of the Guadarama mountains, Espinar, Arevalo, and Salamanca. He would have marched the whole army by the same route, if this disagreeable intelligence respecting the northern roads had been obtained earlier; but when the arrangements were all made for the supplies to go to Almeida, and when most of the regiments were actually in movement towards that town, it was too late to alter their destination.

This separation of the artillery, although it violated a great military principle, which prescribes that the point of concentration for an army should be beyond the reach of the enemy, was here a matter of apparent necessity; and no danger was apprehended from the offensive operations of an adversary, represented to be incapable of maintaining his own line of defence. Valladolid and Burgos were considered by the Spaniards as safe places for the English magazines; Moore shared so much of the universal confidence in the Spanish enthusiasm and courage, as to suppose, that Salamanca would not be an insecure point of concentration for his columns, while covered by such numerous patriotic armies as were said to be on the Ebro. One brigade of six-pounders he retained with the headquarters, but the remainder of his artillery, consisting of twenty-four pieces, the cavalry, amounting to a thousand troopers, the great part of the army, containing many hundred carriages and escorted by three thousand infantry, he sent by the road of Talavera, under the command of sir John Hope, an officer qualified by his talents, firmness, and zeal, to conduct the most important enterprises.

The rest of the army marched in three columns. The first by Alcantara and Coria, the second by Abrantes, the third by Coimbra, all having Ciudad Rodrigo as the point of direction; and with such energy did the general overcome all obstacles, that the whole of the troops were in movement, and headquarters quitted Lisbon the 26th of October, just twenty days after the receipt of the despatch which appointed him to the chief command; a surprising diligence, but rendered necessary by the pressure of circumstances. 'The army,' to use his own words, 'run the risk of finding itself in front of the enemy with no more ammunition than the men carried in their pouches: but had I waited,' he adds, 'until every thing was forwarded, the troops would not have been in Spain until the spring, and I trust that the enemy will not find out our wants as soon as they will feel the effects of what we have.'

The Spaniards, however, who expected 'every body to fly, except themselves,' thought him slow, and were impatient, and from every quarter indeed letters arrived, pressing him to advance. Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, witnesses of the sluggish incapacity of the Spanish government, judged that such a support was absolutely necessary to sustain the reeling strength of Spain. The central junta was awakened for a moment. Hitherto, as a mask for its ignorance, it had treated the French power with contempt, and the Spanish generals and the people echoed the sentiments of the government; but now, a letter addressed by the governor of Bayonne to general Jourdan, stating that sixty thousand infantry, and seven thousand cavalry, would reinforce the French armies between the 16th of October and the 16th of November, was intercepted, and made the junta feel that a crisis for which it was unprepared was approaching: then with the folly usually attendant on improvidence, these men, who had been

so slow themselves, required that others should be supernaturally quick as danger pressed.

In the mean time sir David Baird's forces arrived at Coruña. Lord William Bentinck had given intimation of their approach, and the central junta had repeatedly assured him, that every necessary order was given, and that every facility would be afforded, for their disembarkation and supply. This was untrue; no measures of any kind had been taken, no instructions issued, no preparations made; the junta of Coruña disliked the personal trouble of a disembarkation in that port, and in the hope that Baird would be driven to another, refused him permission to land, until a communication was had with Aranjuez;* yet fifteen days elapsed, before an answer could be obtained from a government, who were daily pestering sir John Moore with complaints of the tardiness of his march.

Sir David Baird came without money; sir John could only give him £8000, a sum which might have been mistaken for a private loan, if the fact of its being public property were not expressly mentioned;† yet at this time Mr. Frere, the plenipotentiary, arrived at Coruña, with two millions of dollars, intended for the use of the Spaniards; and while such large sums contrary to the earnest recommendations of Mr. Stuart and major Cox, were lavished in that quarter, the penury of the English general obliged him to borrow the funds in Mr. Frere's hands. Thus assisted the troops were put in motion, but wanting all the equipments essential to an army, they were forced to march by half battalions, conveying their scanty stores on country cars, hired from day to day; nor was that meagre assistance obtained but at great expense, and by compliance with a vulgar mercenary spirit predominant among the authorities of Galicia. The junta frequently promised to procure the carriages, but did not; the commissaries, pushed to the wall by the delay, offered an exorbitant remuneration; the cars were then forthcoming, and the procrastination of the government proved to be a concerted plan to defraud the military chest. In fine, the local rulers were unfriendly, crafty, fraudulent, the peasantry suspicious, fearful, rude, disinclined toward strangers, and indifferent to public affairs; a few shots only were required to render theirs a hostile instead of a friendly greeting.

With Mr. Frere came a fleet, conveying a Spanish force, under the marquis of Romana. When the insurrection first broke forth, that nobleman commanded fourteen or fifteen thousand troops, who were serving with the French armies, and how to recover this disciplined body of men from the enemy was a subject of early anxiety with the junta of Seville.‡ Castaños, in his first intercourse with sir Hew Dalrymple, signified his wish that the British government should adopt some mode of apprising Romana, that Spain was in arms, and should endeavour to extricate him and his army from the toils of the enemy, and finally a gentleman named M'Kenzie was employed by the English ministers to conduct the enterprise. The Spanish troops were quartered in Holstein, Sleswig, Jutland, and the islands of Funen, Zealand, and Langeland; Mr. M'Kenzie, through the medium of one Robertson, a catholic priest, opened a communication with Romana, and as neither the general, nor the soldiers he commanded, hesitated, a judicious plan was concerted. Sir Richard Keats, with a squadron detached from the Baltic fleet, suddenly appeared off Nyborg, in the island of Funen, and a majority of the Spanish regiments quartered in Sleswig immediately seized all the craft in the different harbours of that coast, and pushed across the channel to Funen; Romana, with the assis-

tance of Keats, had already seized the port and castle of Nyborg without opposition, save from a small Danish ship of war that was moored across the mouth of the harbour, and from thence the Spaniards passed to Langeland, where they embarked above nine thousand strong, on board the English fleet commanded by sir James Saumarez. The rest of the troops either remained in Sleswig or were disarmed by the Danish force in Zealand. This enterprise was conducted with prudent activity, and the unhesitating patriotism of the Spanish soldiers was very honourable, but the danger was slight to all but Mr. Robertson. Romana, after touching at England, repaired to Coruña; his troops did not, however, land at that port, but at St. Andero, where they were equipped from the English stores, and proceeded by divisions to join Blake's army in Biscay.

Among the various subjects calling for sir John Moore's attention, there was none of greater interest than the appointment of a generalissimo to the Spanish armies. Impressed with the imminent danger of procrastination or uncertainty in such a matter, he desired lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart to urge the central government with all their force upon that head; to lord Castlereagh he represented the injury that must accrue to the cause, if the measure was delayed; and he proposed to go himself to Madrid, with a view of adding weight to these representations. Subsequent events frustrated this intention, and there seems no reason to imagine, that his personal remonstrances would have influenced a government described by Mr. Stuart, after a thorough experience of its qualities, as 'never having made a single exertion for the public good, neither rewarding merit nor punishing guilt,' and being for all useful purposes 'absolutely null.' The junta's dislike to a single military chief was not an error of the head, and reason is of little avail against the suggestions of self-interest.

The march of the British troops was as rapid as the previous preparations had been; but general Anstruther had, unadvisedly, halted the leading column in Almeida, and when Moore reached that town on the 8th of November, he found the whole of the infantry assembled there, instead of being on the road to Salamanca. The condition of the men was, however, superb, and their discipline exemplary; on that side all was well, yet from the obstacles encountered by sir David Baird, and the change of direction in the artillery, it was evident that no considerable force could be brought into action before the end of the month. Meanwhile, the Spaniards were hastening events. Despatches from lord William Bentinck announced that the enemy remained stationary on the Ebro, although reinforced by ten thousand men; that Castaños was about to cross that river at Tudela; and that the army of Aragon was moving by Sor upon Roncevalles, with a view to gain the rear of the French, while Castaños assailed their left flank. Moore, judging that such movements would bring on a battle, the success of which must be very doubtful, became uneasy for his own artillery. His concern was increased by observing, that the guns might have kept with the other columns; 'and if any thing adverse happens, I have not,' he wrote to general Hope, 'necessity to plead; theroad we are now travelling, that by Villa Velha and Guarda, is practicable for artillery; the brigade under Wilmot has already reached Guarda, and, as far as I have already seen, the road presents few obstacles, and those easily surmounted; this knowledge was, however, only acquired by our own officers, when the brigade was at Castello Branco, it was not certain if it could proceed.' He now desired Hope no longer to trust any reports, but seek a shorter line, by Placentia, across the mountains to Salamanca.

Up to this period, all reports from the agents, all information from the government at home, all communi-

* Capt. Kennedy's Letter. Parl. Pap.

† Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, 27th Oct.

‡ Sir Hew Dalrymple's Correspondence.

cations public and private, coincided upon one subject. *The Spaniards were an enthusiastic, an heroic people, a nation of unparalleled energy! their armies were brave, they were numerous, they were confident! one hundred and eighty thousand men were actually in line of battle, extending from the sea-coast of Biscay to Zaragoza; the French, reduced to a fourth of this number, cooped up in a corner, were shrinking from an encounter; they were deserted by the emperor, they were trembling, they were spiritless!* Nevertheless, the general was somewhat distrustful; he perceived the elements of disaster in the divided commands, and the lengthened lines of the Spaniards, and early in October he had predicted the mischief that such a system would produce. "As long as the French remain upon the defensive," he observed, "it will not be so much felt, but the moment an attack is made, some great calamity must ensue;" however, he was not without faith in the multitude and energy of the patriots, when he considered the greatness of their cause.

Castañas was at this time pointed out by the central junta as the person with whom to concert a plan of campaign, and sir John Moore, concluding that it was a preliminary step towards making that officer generalissimo, wrote to him in a conciliatory style, well calculated to ensure a cordial co-operation. It was an encouraging event, the English general believed it to be the commencement of a better system, and looked forward with more hope to the opening of the war, but this favourable state soon changed; far from being created chief of all, Castañas was superseded in the command he already held, the whole folly of the Spanish character broke forth, and confusion and distress followed. At that moment also clouds arose in a quarter, which had hitherto been all sunshine; the military agents, as the crisis approached, lowered their sanguine tone, and no longer dwelt upon the enthusiasm of the armies; they admitted, that the confidence of the troops was sinking, and that even in numbers they were inferior to the French. In truth, it was full time to change their note, for the real state of affairs could no longer be concealed; a great catastrophe was at hand; but what of wildness in their projects, or skill in the enemy's, what of ignorance, vanity, and presumption in the generals, what of fear among the soldiers, and what of fortune in the events, combined to hasten the ruin of the Spaniards, and how that ruin was effected, I, quitting the English army for a time, will now relate.

CHAPTER IV.

Movements of the Spanish generals on the Ebro; their absurd confidence, their want of system and concert—General opinion that the French are weak—Real strength of the king—Marshal Ney and general Jourdan join the army—Military errors of the king exposed by Napoleon, who instructs him how to make war—Joseph proposes six plans of operation—Operations thereupon.

In the preceding chapters I have exposed the weakness, the folly, the improvidence of Spain, and shown how the bad passions and sordid views of her leaders were encouraged by the unwise prodigality of England. I have dissected the full boast and meagre preparations of the governments in both countries, laying bare the bones and sinews of the insurrection, and by comparing their loose and feeble structure, with the strongly knitted frame and large proportions of the enemy, prepared the reader for the inevitable issue of a conflict between such ill-matched champions. In the present book, I shall recount the sudden and terrible manner in which the Spanish armies were overthrown, during the tempestuous progress of the French emperor. Yet, previous to relating these disasters, I must revert to the

period immediately following the retreat of king Joseph, and trace those early operations of the French and Spanish forces, which, like a jesting prologue to a deep tragedy, unworthily ushered in the great catastrophe.

CAMPAIGN OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH ARMIES BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE EMPEROR.

After general Cuesta was removed from the command, and the junta of Seville had been forced by major Coxé to disgorge so much of the English subsidy as sufficed for the immediate relief of the troops in Madrid, all the Spanish armies closed upon the Ebro.

General Blake, reinforced by eight thousand Asturians, established his base of operations at Reynosa, opened a communication with the English vessels off the port of St. Andero, and directed his views towards Biscay.*

The Castilian army, conducted by general Pignatelli, resumed its march upon Burgo del Osma and Logroña.

The two divisions of the Andalusian troops under Lapeña, and the Murcian division of general Llamas, advanced to Tarazona and Tudela.†

Palafox, with the Aragonese and Valencian divisions of St. Marc, operated from the side of Zaragoza.‡

The comde de Belvidere, a weak youth, not twenty years of age, marched with fifteen thousand Estremadurans upon Logroña, as forming part of Castañas' army, but soon received another destination.¶

Between all these armies there was neither concert nor connexion, their movements were regulated by some partial view of affairs, or by the silly caprices of the generals, who were ignorant of each other's plans, and little solicitous to combine operations. The weak characters of many of the chiefs, the inexperience of all, and this total want of system, opened a field for intriguing men, and invited unqualified persons to interfere in the direction of affairs: thus we find colonel Doyle, making a journey to Zaragoza, and priding himself upon having prevailed with Palafox to detach seven thousand men to Sanguessa. Captain Whittingham, without any knowledge of Doyle's interference, earnestly dissuading the Spaniards from such an enterprise. The first affirming that the movement would "turn the enemy's left flank, threaten his rear, and have the appearance of cutting off his retreat." The second arguing, that Sanguessa, being seventy miles from Zaragoza, and only a few leagues from Pampeluna, the detachment would itself be cut off. Doyle judged that, drawing the French from Caparosa and Milagro, it would expose those points to Llamas and La-Peña; that it would force the enemy to recall the reinforcements said to be marching against Blake, enable that general to form a junction with the Asturians, and then with the forty thousand men thus collected, possess himself of the Pyrenees; and if the French army, estimated at thirty-five thousand men, did not fly, cut it off from France, or, by moving on Miranda, sweep clear Biscay and Castille. Palafox, pleased with this plan, sent Whittingham to inform Llamas and La-Peña, that O'Neil would, with six thousand men, march on the 15th of September to Sanguessa. Those generals disapproved of the movement as dangerous, premature, and at variance with the plan arranged in the council of war held at Madrid, but Palafox, regardless of their opinion, persisted; § O'Neil accordingly occupied Sanguessa, drew the attention of the enemy, and was immediately driven across the Alagon river.

In this manner all their projects, characterized by a profound ignorance of war, were lightly adopted and as lightly abandoned, or ended in disasters; yet victory

* General Broderick's Correspondence.

† Capt. Whittingham.

‡ Colonel Doyle.

¶ Castanos' Vindication. § Whittingham's Correspondence.

was more confidently anticipated, than if consummate skill had presided over the arrangements; and this vain-glorious feeling, extending to the military agents, was by them propagated in England, where the fore-boasting was nearly as loud, and as absurd, as in the Peninsula. The delusion was universal; even lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart, deceived by the curious consistency of the Spanish falsehoods, doubted if the French army was able to maintain its position, and believed that the Spaniards had obtained a moral ascendancy in the field.*

Drunk with vanity and folly, and despising the 'remnants' of the French army on the Ebro, which they estimated at from thirty-five to forty thousand men, the Spanish government proposed that the British army should be directed upon Catalonia; and when they found that this proposal was not acceded to, they withdrew ten thousand men from the Murcian division, and sent them to the neighbourhood of Lerida. The innate pride and arrogance of the Spaniards were also nourished by the timid and false operations of king Joseph. Twenty days after the evacuation of Madrid, that monarch was at the head of above fifty thousand fighting men, exclusive of eight thousand employed to maintain the communications, and to furnish the garrisons of Pampeluna, Tolosa, Irun, St. Sebastian and Bilbao; exclusive also of the Catalanian army, which was seventeen thousand strong, and distinct from his command. A strong reserve assembled at Bayonne, under general Drouet, supplied reinforcements, and was itself supported by drafts from the interior of France; six thousand men, forming moveable columns, watched the openings of the Pyrenees, from St. John Pied de Port to Rousillon, and guarded the frontier against Spanish incursions; and a second reserve, composed of Neapolitans, Tuscans, and Piedmontese, was commenced at Belgarde, with a view of supporting Duhesme in Catalonia. How the king quelled the nascent insurrection at Bilbao, and how he dispersed the insurgents of the valleys in Aragon, I have already related; but after those operations, the French army made no movement. It was re-organized, and divided into three grand divisions and a reserve. Bessieres retained the command of the right wing, Moncey assumed that of the left, and Ney, arriving from Paris, took charge of the centre; the reserve, chiefly composed of detachments from the imperial guard, remained near the person of the king, and the old republican general Jourdan, a man whose day of glory belonged to another æra, re-appeared upon the military stage, and filled the office of major-general to the army.

With such a force, and so assisted, there was nothing in Spain, turn which way he would, capable of opposing king Joseph's march, but the incongruity of a camp with a court is always productive of indecision and of error; the truncheon does not fit every hand, and the French army soon felt the inconvenience of having at its head a monarch who was not a warrior. Joseph remained on the defensive, without understanding the force of the maxim, '*that offensive movements are the foundation of a good defence*;' he held Bilbao, and, contrary to the advice of the generals who conducted the operations on his left, abandoned Tudela, to choose for his field of battle, Milagro, a small town situated near the confluence of the Arga and Aragon with the Ebro.† While Bessieres held Burgos in force, his cavalry commanded the valley of the Duero, menaced Palencia and Valladolid, and scouring the plains, kept Blake and Cuesta in check; instead of reinforcing a post so advantageous, the king relinquished Burgos as a point beyond his line of defence, and Bessieres' troops were posted in successive divisions behind it, as far as Pu-

ente Lara on the Ebro. Ney's force then lined that river down to Logroño, the reserve was quartered behind Miranda, and Trevino, a small obscure place, was chosen as the point of battle, for the right and centre.*

In this disadvantageous situation the army, with some trifling changes, remained from the middle of August until late in September, during which time the artillery and carriages of transport were repaired, magazines were collected, the cavalry remounted, and the preparations made for an active campaign when the reinforcements should arrive from Germany. But the line of resistance thus offered to the Spaniards evinced a degree of timidity, which the relative strength of the armies by no means justified; the left of the French evidently leaned towards the great communication with France, and seemed to refuse the support of Pampeluna; Tudela was abandoned, and Burgos resigned to the enterprise of the Spaniards; all this indicated fear, a disposition to retreat if the enemy advanced. The king complained with what extreme difficulty he obtained intelligence, yet he neglected by forward movements to feel for his adversaries; wandering as it were in the dark, he gave a loose to his imagination, and conjuring up a phantom of Spanish strength, which had no real existence, anxiously waited for the development of their power, while they were exposing their weakness by a succession of the most egregious blunders.

Joseph's errors did not escape the animadversion of his brother, whose sagacity enabled him, although at a distance, to detect, through the glare of the insurrection, all its inefficiency; he dreaded the moral effect produced by its momentary success, and was preparing to crush the rising hopes of his enemies; but despising the Spaniards as soldiers, Joseph's retreat, and subsequent position, displeased him, and he desired his brother to check the exultation of the patriots, by acting upon a bold and well-considered plan, of which he sent him the outline. His notes, dictated upon the occasion, are replete with genius, and evince his absolute mastery of the art of war. "It was too late," he said, "to discuss the question, whether Madrid should have been retained or abandoned; idle to consider, if a position, covering the siege of Zaragoza, might not have been formed; useless to examine, if the line of the Duero was not better than that of the Ebro for the French army. The line of the Ebro was actually taken, and it must be kept; to advance from that river without a fixed object would create indecision, this would bring the troops back again, and produce an injurious moral effect. But why abandon Tudela, why relinquish Burgos? Those towns were of note, and of reputation, the possession of them gave a moral influence, and moral force constituted two-thirds of the strength of armies. Tudela and Burgos had also a relative importance; the first, possessing a stone bridge, was on the communication of Pampeluna and Madrid, it commanded the canal of Zaragoza, it was the capital of a province. When the army resumed offensive operations, their first enterprise would be the siege of Zaragoza; from that town to Tudela, the land carriage was three days, but the water carriage was only fourteen hours, wherefore to have the besieging artillery and stores at Tudela, was the same as to have them at Zaragoza; if the Spaniards got possession of the former, all Navarre would be in a state of insurrection, and Pampeluna exposed. Tudela then was of vast importance, but Milagro was of none, it was an obscure place, without a bridge, and commanding no communication; in short, it was without interest, defended nothing! led to nothing! A river," said this great commander, "though it should be as large as the Vistula, and as rapid as the

* Lord W. Bentinck's Correspondence. MS. Doyle's correspondence. MS.

† Napoleon's notes.

* S. Journal of the king's operations. MS.

Danube at its mouth, is nothing, unless there are good points of passage, and a head quick to take the offensive; the Ebro as a defence was less than nothing, a mere line of demarcation! and Milagro was useless. The enemy might neglect it, be at Estella, and from thence gain Tolosa, before any preparation could be made to receive him; he might come from Soria, from Logroño, or from Zaragoza.

'Again, Burgos was the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army; to occupy it in force, and offensively, would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda, and even Madrid. It is necessary,' observed the emperor, 'to have made war a long time to conceive this; it is necessary to have made a number of offensive enterprises, to know how much the smallest event, or even indication, encourages or discourages, and decides the adoption of one enterprise instead of another.' 'In short, if the enemy occupies Burgos, Logroño, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful position. It is not known if he has left Madrid; it is not known what has become of the Gallician army, and there is reason to suspect that it may have been directed upon Portugal; in such a state, to take up, instead of a bold, menacing, and honourable position like Burgos, a confined, shameful one like Trevino, is to say to the enemy, you have nothing to fear, go elsewhere, we have made our dispositions to go farther: or we have chosen our ground to fight, come there, without fear of being disturbed. But what will the French general do if the enemy marches the next day upon Burgos? Will he let the citadel of that town be taken by six thousand insurgents? if the French have left a garrison in the castle, how can four or five hundred men retire in such a vast plain? and, from that time, all is gone; if the enemy masters the citadel, it cannot be retaken. If, on the contrary, we should guard the citadel, we must give battle to the enemy, because it cannot hold out more than three days, and if we are to fight a battle, why should Bessieres abandon the ground where we wish to fight?

These dispositions appear badly considered, and when the enemy shall march, our troops will meet with such an insult as will demoralize them if there are only insurgents or light troops advancing against them. If fifteen thousand insurgents enter Burgos, retrench themselves in the town, and occupy the castle, it will be necessary to calculate a march of several days to enable us to post ourselves there, and to retake the town, which cannot be done without some inconvenience; and if, during this time, the real attack is upon Logroño or Pampeluna, we shall have made counter-marches without use, which will have fatigued the army. If we hold it with cavalry only, is it not to say we do not intend stopping, and to invite the enemy to come there? It is the first time that an army has quitted all its offensive positions to take up a bad defensive line, and to affect to choose its field of battle, when the thousand and one combinations which might take place, and the distance of the enemy, did not leave a probability of being able to foresee if the battle would take place at Tudela, between Tudela and Pampeluna, between Soria and the Ebro, or between Burgos and Miranda.' Then followed an observation which may be studied with advantage by those authors who, unacquainted with the simplest rudiments of military science, censure the conduct of generals, and are pleased, from some obscure nook, to point out their errors to the world; authors who, profoundly ignorant of the numbers, situation, and resources of the opposing armies, pretend, nevertheless, to detail with great accuracy the right method of executing the most difficult and delicate operations of war. As the rebuke of Turenne, who frankly acknowledged to Louvois that he could pass

the Rhine at a particular spot, if the latter's finger were a bridge, has been lost upon such men, perhaps the more recent opinion of Napoleon may be disregarded. 'But it is not permitted,' says that consummate general, '*it is not permitted, at the distance of three hundred leagues, and without even a state of the situation of the army, to direct what should be done!*'

After having thus protected himself from the charge of presumption, the emperor proceeded to recommend certain dispositions for the defence of the Ebro. The Spaniards, he said, were not to be feared in the field; twenty-five thousand French in a good position would suffice to beat all their armies united, and this opinion he deduced from the events of Dupont's campaign, of which he gave a short analysis. Let Tudela, he said, be retrenched if possible; at all events it should be occupied in force, and offensively towards Zaragoza. 'Let the general commanding there, collect provisions on all sides, secure the boats, with a view to future operations when the reinforcements should arrive, and maintain his communication with Logroño by the right bank if he can, but certainly by the left; let his corps be considered as one of observation. If a body of insurgents only approach, he may fight them, or keep them constantly on the defensive by his movements against their line or against Zaragoza; if regular troops attack him, and he is forced across the Ebro, let him then operate about Pampeluna until the general-in-chief has made his dispositions for the main body: in this manner no prompt movement upon Estella and Tolosa can take place, and the corps of observation will have amply fulfilled its task.

Let marshal Bessieres, with all his corps united, and reinforced by the light cavalry of the army, encamp in the wood near Burgos: let the citadel be well occupied, the hospital, the dépôts, and all encumbrances sent over the Ebro; let him keep in a condition to act, be under arms every day at three o'clock in the morning, and remain until the return of his patrols: he should also send parties to a great extent, as far as two days' march. Let the corps of the centre be placed at Miranda and Briviesca, and all the encumbrances be likewise sent across the Ebro behind Vittoria; this corps should be under arms every morning, and send patrols by the road of Soria, and wherever the enemy may be expected: and it must not be lost sight of, that these two corps, being to be united, they should be connected as little as possible with Logroño, and consider the left wing as a corps detached, having a line of operations upon Pampeluna, and a separate part to act. Tudela is preserved as a post contiguous to the line. Be well on the defensive, he continues, in short, make war! that is to say, get information from the alcaldes, the curates, the posts, the chiefs of convents, and the principal proprietors, you will then be perfectly informed. The patrols should always be directed upon the side of Soria, and of Burgos, upon Palencia, and upon the side of Aranda, they could thus form three posts of interception, and send three reports of men arrested; these men should be treated well, and dismissed after they had given the information desired of them. Let the enemy then come, and we can unite all our forces, hide our marches from him, and fall upon his flank at the moment he is meditating an offensive movement.'

With regard to the minor details, the emperor thus expressed himself: 'Soria is not, I believe, more than two short marches from the actual position of the army, and that town has constantly acted against us; an expedition sent there to disarm it, to take thirty of the principal people as hostages, and to obtain provisions, would have a good effect. It would be useful to occupy St. Ander, it will be of advantage to move by the direct road of Bilbao to St. Ander. It will be necessary to occupy and disarm Biscay and Navarre, and

every Spaniard taken in arms there should be shot.* The manufactories of arms at Placencia should be watched, to hinder them from working for the rebels. The port of Pancorbo should be armed and fortified with great activity, ovens and magazines of provisions and ammunition should be placed there; situated nearly half way between Madrid and Bayonne, it is an intermediate post for the army, and a point of support for troops operating towards Galicia. The interest of the enemy,' he resumes, 'is to mask his forces; by hiding the true point of attack, he operates in such a manner, that the blow he means to strike is never indicated in a positive way, and the opposing general can only guess it by a well-matured knowledge of his own position, and of the mode in which he makes his offensive system act, to protect his defensive system.

We have no accounts of what the enemy is about, it is said that no news can be obtained, as if this case was extraordinary in an army, as if spies were common; they must do in Spain as they do in other places. Send parties out. Let them carry off, sometimes the priest, sometimes the alcalde, the chief of a convent, the master of the post or his deputy, and, above all, the letters. Put these persons under arrest until they speak; question them twice each day, or keep them as hostages; charge them to send foot messengers, and to get news. When we know how to take measures of vigour and force, it is easy to get intelligence. All the posts, all the letters must be intercepted; the single motive of procuring intelligence will be sufficient to authorise a detachment of four or five thousand men, who will go into a great town, will take the letters from the post, will seize the richest citizens, their letters, papers, gazettes, &c. It is beyond doubt, that even in the French lines, the inhabitants are all informed of what passes, of course, out of that line they know more; what, then, should prevent you from seizing the principal men? Let them be sent back again without being ill treated. It is a fact that when we are not in a desert, but in a peopled country, if the general is not well instructed, it is because he is ignorant of his trade. The services which the inhabitants render to an enemy's general are never given from affection, nor even to get money; the truest method to obtain them is by safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their goods, their towns, or their monasteries!'

Joseph, although by no means a dull man, seems to have had no portion of his brother's martial genius. The operations recommended by the latter did not appear to the king to be applicable to the state of affairs; he did not adopt them, but proposed others, in discussing which, he thus defended the policy of his retreat from Madrid. 'When the *defection* of twenty-two thousand men (Dupont's) caused the king to quit the capital, the disposable troops remaining were divided in three corps, namely, his own, marshal Bessieres', and general Verdier's, then besieging Zaragoza; but these bodies were spread over a hundred leagues of ground, and with the last the king had little or no connexion. His first movement was to unite the two former at Burgos, afterwards to enter into communication with the third, and then the line of defence on the Ebro was adopted; an operation, said the king, dictated by sound reason—Because when the events of Andalusia forboded a regular and serious war, prudence did not permit three corps, the strongest of which was only eighteen thousand men, to separate to a greater distance than six days' march, in the midst of eleven millions of people in a state of hostility. But fifty thousand French could defend with success a line of sixty leagues, and could guard the two grand communications

of Burgos and Tudela, against enemies who had not, up to that period, been able to carry to either point above twenty-five thousand men. In this mode fifteen thousand French could be united upon either of those roads.'

Joseph was dissatisfied with Napoleon's plans, and preferred his own. The disposable troops at his command, exclusive of those at Bilbao, were fifty thousand, which he distributed as follows. The right wing occupied Burgos, Pancorbo, and Puente Lara. The centre was posted between Haro and Logroño. The left extended from Logroño to Tudela, and the latter town was not occupied. He contended, that this arrangement, at once offensive and defensive, might be advantageously continued if the great army, directed upon Spain, arrived in September, since it tended to refit the army already there, and menaced the enemy; but that it could not be prolonged until November, because in three months the Spaniards must make a great progress, and would very soon be in a state to take the offensive, with grand organized corps obedient to a central administration, which would have time to form in Madrid. Everything announced, he said, that the month of October was one of those decisive epochs which gave, to the party who knew how to profit from it, the priority of movements and success, the progress of which it was difficult to calculate.

In this view of affairs, the merits of six projects were discussed by the king.

First project. To remain in the actual position. This was declared to be unsustainable, because the enemy could attack the left with forty thousand, the centre with forty thousand, the right with as many. Tudela and Navarre, as far as Logroño, required twenty-five thousand men to defend them. Burgos could not be defended but by an army in a state to resist the united forces of Blake and Cuesta, which would amount to eighty thousand men; it was doubtful if the twenty thousand bayonets which could be opposed to them, could completely beat them; if they did not, the French would be harassed by the insurgents of the three provinces, Biscay, Navarre, and Guipuscoa, who would interpose between the left wing and France.

Second project. To carry the centre and reserve by Tudela, towards Zaragoza or Albazan. United with the left, they would amount to thirty thousand men, who might seek for, and, doubtless, would defeat the enemy, if he was met with on that side. In the meantime, the right wing, leaving garrisons in the citadel of Burgos and the fort of Pancorbo, could occupy the enemy, and watch any movements in the Montaña St. Ander, or disembarkations that might take place at the ports. But this task was considered difficult, because Pancorbo was not the only defile accessible to artillery; three leagues from thence another road led upon Miranda, and there was a third passage over the point of the chain which stretched between Haro and Miranda.

Third project. To leave the defence of Navarre to the left wing. To carry the centre, the reserve, and the right wing, to Burgos, and to beat the enemy before he could unite; an easy task, as the French would be thirty thousand strong. Meanwhile, Monecy would keep the Spaniards in check on the side of Tudela, or, if unable to do that, he was to march up the Ebro, by Logroño and Briviesca, and join the main body: the communication with France would be thus lost, but the army might maintain itself until the arrival of the emperor. A modification of this project was, that Monecy, retiring to the entrenched camp of Pampeluna, should there await either the arrival of the emperor, or the result of the operations towards Burgos.

Fourth project. To pass the Ebro in retreat, and to endeavour to tempt the enemy to fight in the plain between that river and Vittoria.

* Navarre and Biscay being within the French line of defence, the inhabitants were, according to the civilians, *de facto* French subjects.

Fifth project. To retire, supporting the left upon Pampeluna, the right upon Montdragon.

Sixth project. To leave garrisons, with the means of a six weeks' defence, in Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Pancorbo, and Burgos. To unite the rest of the army, march against the enemy, attack him wherever he was found, and then wait, either near Madrid or in that country, into which the pursuit of the Spaniards, or the facility of living should draw the army. This plan relinquished the communications with France entirely, but it was said that the grand army could easily open them again; the troops, already in Spain, would be sufficiently strong to defy all the efforts of the enemy, to disconcert all his projects, and to wait in a noble attitude the general impulse which would be given by the arrival of the emperor.

Of all these projects, the last was the favourite with the king, who strongly recommended it, and asserted, that if it was followed, affairs would be more prosperous when the emperor arrived than could be expected from any other plan. Marshal Ney and general Jourdan approved of it, but it would appear that Napoleon had other views, and too little confidence in his brother's military judgment, to entrust so great a matter to his guidance.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. It is undoubted, that there must always be some sympathy of genius in the man who is to execute another's conception in military affairs. Without that species of harmony between their minds, the thousand accidental occurrences and minor combinations which must happen contrary to expectation, will inevitably embarrass the executor to such a degree, that he will be unable to see the most obvious advantages; and in striving to unite the plan he has received with his own views, he will adopt neither, but steering an unsteady reeling course between both, will fail of success. The reason of this appears to be, that a strong, and, if the term may be used, inveterate attention must be fixed upon certain great principles of action in war, to enable a general to disregard the minor events and inconveniences which cross his purpose: minor they are to the great object, but in themselves sufficient to break down the firmness and self-possession of any but extraordinary men.

2. The original memoir from which Joseph's projects have been extracted, is so blotted and interlined, that it would be unfair to consider it as a mature production. The great error which pervades it, is the conjectured data upon which he founds his plans, and the little real information which he appears to have had relative to the Spanish forces, views, or interior policy. His plans were based upon the notion that the central junta would be able and provident, the Spaniards united, the armies strong and well guided, none of which was true. Again, he estimated Cuesta and Blake's armies at eighty thousand, and considered them as one body; but they were never united at all, and if they had, they would scarcely have amounted to sixty thousand. The bold idea of throwing himself into the interior came too late, he should have thought of that before he quitted Madrid, or at least before the central government was established at that capital. His operations might have been successful against the miserable armies opposed to him, but against good and moveable troops they would not, as the emperor's admirable notes prove. The first project, wanting those offensive combinations discussed by Napoleon, was open to all his objections, as being timid and incomplete. The second was crude and ill-considered, for, according to the king's estimate of the Spanish force, thirty thousand men on each wing might oppose the heads of his columns, while sixty thousand could still have been united at Logroño; these might pass the Ebro, excite an insurrection in Navarre, Guipuseoa, and Biscay, seize Tolosa and Mi-

landa, and fall upon the rear of the French army, which, thus cut in two, and its communications intercepted, would have been extremely embarrassed. The third was not better judged. Burgos, as an offensive post, protecting the line of defence, was very valuable, and to unite a large force there was so far prudent; but if the Spaniards retired, and refused battle with their left, while the centre and right operated by Logroño and Sanguessa, what would have been the result? the French right must, without any definite object, either have continued to advance, or remained stationary without communication, or returned to fight a battle for those very positions which they had just quitted. The fourth depended entirely upon accident, and is not worth argument. The fifth was an undisguised retreat. The sixth was not applicable to the actual situation of affairs, the king's force was no longer an independent body, it was become the advanced guard of the great army, marching under Napoleon. It was absurd, therefore, to contemplate a decisive movement, without having first matured a plan suitable to the whole mass that was to be engaged in the execution: in short, to permit an advanced guard to determine the operations of the main body, was to reverse the order of military affairs, and to trust to accident instead of design. It is curious, that while Joseph was proposing this irruption into Spain, the Spaniards and the military agents of Great Britain were trembling lest he should escape their power by a precipitate flight. "*War is not a conjectural art!*"

CHAPTER V.

Position and strength of the French and Spanish armies—Blake moves from Reynosa to the Upper Ebro; sends a division to Bilbao; French retire from that town—Ney quits his position near Logrono, and retakes Bilbao—The armies of the centre and right approach the Ebro and the Aragon—Various evolutions—Blake attacks and takes Bilbao—Head of the grand French army arrives in Spain—The Castilians join the army of the centre—The Asturians join Blake—Apathy of the central junta—Castanos joins the army; holds a conference with Palafox; their dangerous position; arrange a plan of operations—The Spaniards cross the Ebro—The king orders a general attack—Skirmish at Sanguessa, at Logrono, and Lerin—The Spaniards driven back over the Ebro—Logrono taken—Colonel Cruz, with a Spanish battalion, surrenders at Lerin—Francisco Palafox, the military deputy, arrives at Alfaro; his exceeding folly and presumption; controls and insults Castanos—Force of the French army increases hourly; how composed and disposed—Blake ascends the valley of Durango—Battle of Zornosa—French retake Bilbao—Combat at Valmaceda—Observations.

THE emperor overruled the offensive projects of the king, and the latter was forced to distribute the centre and right wing in a manner more consonant to the spirit of Napoleon's instructions; but he still neglected to occupy Tudela, and covered his left wing by the Aragon river.

The 18th of September, the French army was posted in the following manner:—*

	Under Arms.	
Right wing, Marshal Bessieres	15,595	Three divisions of infantry in front of Pancorbo, at Briviesca, Santa Maria, and Cuba; light cavalry behind Burgos.
Centre . Marshal Ney . . .	13,756	
Left wing Marshal Monecy . .	16,636	Logrono, Nalda, and Najera.
Reserve of the king.		Milagro, Lodosa, Caparosa, and Alfaro, the garrison of Pampeluna was also under Monecy's command.
General Saligny . . .	5,413	
Imperial guard.		
General Dorsenne . . .	2,423	Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara.
Total	7,833	
Garrisons	6,004	Pampeluna.

* Journal of the king's operations, MS.

General Monthion	1,500	Bilbao.
General La Grange	6,979	Composed of small garrisons and moveable columns, guarding the communications of Biscay, Alava, and Guipuscoa.
Grand reserve.		
Moveable columns	1,984	Bayonne, and watching the valleys of the Pyrenees opening into Navarre.
Stationary	20,005	
Total, commanded by } General Drouet }	21,989	

Total 98,289 present under arms, exclusive of the troops in Catalonia; and when the communications were secured, the fortresses garrisoned and the fort of Pancorbo armed, there remained above fifty thousand sabres and bayonets disposable on a line of battle extending from Bilbao to Alfaro.

To oppose this formidable force the Spanish troops were divided into three principal masses, denominated the armies of the right, centre, and left.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.	First Line.	
The first composed of the divisions of St. Marc and O'Neill, numbered about	17,500	500	24	Men.	Guns.
The second, composed of the divisions of La-pena, Llamas, and Caro	26,000	1,300	36	75,400	86
The third consisting entirely of Gallicians, about	30,000	100	26		
In the second line the Castilians were at Segovia	12,000	—	—	Second Line.	
The Estremadurans at Talavera	13,000	—	—		
Two Andalusian divisions were in La Mancha	14,000	—	—		
And the Asturians (posted at Llanes) were called	18,000	—	—		
				57,000	—

This estimate, founded upon a number of contemporary returns and other documents, proves the monstrous exaggerations put forth at this time to deceive the Spanish people and the English government. The Spaniards pretended that above one hundred and forty thousand men in arms were threatening the French positions on the Ebro, whereas less than seventy six thousand were in line of battle, and those exceedingly ill-armed and provided. The right under Palafox, held the country between Zaragoza and Sangnessa, on the Aragon river; the centre under Castaños, occupied Borja, Tarazona, and Agreda; the left under Blake, was posted at Reynosa, near the sources of the Ebro. The relative position of the French and Spanish armies was also very disadvantageous to the latter. From the right to the left of their line, that is, from Reynosa to Zaragoza, was twice the distance between Bayonne and Vittoria, and the roads more difficult; the reserve under Drouet was consequently in closer military communication with king Joseph's army than the Spanish wings were with another.

The patriots were acting without concert upon double external lines of operation, and against an enemy far superior in quickness, knowledge, and organization, and even in numbers.

The French were superior in cavalry, and the base of their operations rested on three great fortresses,—Bayonne, St. Sebastian, and Pampeluna; they could in three days carry the centre and the reserve to either flank, and unite thirty thousand combatants without drawing a man from their garrisons.

The Spaniards held but one fortress, Zaragoza, and being divided in corps, under different generals of equal authority, they could execute no combined movement with rapidity or precision, nor under any circumstances could they unite more than 40,000 men at a given point.

In this situation of affairs, general Blake, his army organized in six divisions, each five thousand strong, broke up from Reynosa on the 17th of September.* One division advanced on the side of Burgos, to cover the march of the main body, which, threading the valley of Villarcayo, turned the right of marshal Bessieres,

and reached the Ebro; two divisions occupied Traspaderna and Frias, and established a post at Oña, on the right bank of that river; a third division took a position at Medina; a fourth held the town of Erran and the Sierra of that name; a fifth halted in the town of Villarcayo, to preserve the communication with Reynosa; and at the same time 8000 Asturians, under general Acevedo, quitted the camp at Llanes, and advanced to St. Ander.

General Broderick arrived in the Spanish camp, Blake importuned him for money, and obtained it; but treated him otherwise with great coldness, and withheld all information relative to the movements of the army. English vessels hovering on the coast were prepared to supply the Biscayans with arms and ammunition, and Blake thinking himself in a situation to revive the insurrection in that province, and to extend it to Guipuscoa, detached his fourth division, and five guns, under the command of the marquis of Portazgo, to attack general Monthion at Bilbao.* The king getting knowledge of the march of this division, ordered a brigade from his right wing to fall on its flank by the valley of Orduña, and caused general Merlin to reinforce Monthion by the valley of Durango, while Bessieres aided these dispositions with a demonstration on the side of Frias. The combination was made too late, Portazgo was already master of Bilbao;† Monthion had retired on the 20th to Durango, and Bessieres fell back with his corps to Miranda, Haro, and Puente Lara, having first injured the defences of Burgos.

The king then took post with the reserve at Vittoria, and Ney immediately abandoning his position on the Ebro, carried his whole force, by a rapid march, to Bilbao, where he arrived on the evening of the 26th; at the same time, general Merle's division executed a combined movement from Miranda upon Osma and Barbaceña. Portazgo being thus overmatched, occupied the heights above Bilbao, until nightfall, and then retreated to Valmaceda, where he found the third division, for Blake had changed his position, and now occupied Frias with his right, Quinceos with his centre, and Valmaceda with his left; all the Spanish artillery was in the town of Villarcayo, guarded by a division; and in this situation, holding the passes of the mountains, Blake awaited the arrival of the Asturians, who were marching by the valley of Villarcayo. Thus the second effort to raise Biscay failed of success.‡

In the mean time, O'Neil, following colonel Doyle's plan before mentioned, entered Sangnessa, and was beaten out of it again, with the loss of two guns. However, the Castilian army approached the Ebro by the road of Soria; General La-Peña occupied Logroño, Nalda, and Najera;|| Llamas and Caro occupied Corella, Cascante, and Calahorra, and O'Neil took post in the mountains, on the left bank of the Aragon, facing Sangnessa. The peasantry of the valleys assembled in considerable numbers, the country between Zaragoza and the Aragon river appeared to be filled with troops, and Moncey withdrawing from the Ebro, took a position, with his left flank at the pass of Sangnessa, his centre at Falces, and his right at Estella. Ney also, leaving Murlin with three thousand men at Bilbao, returned to the Ebro, but finding that Logroño was occupied in force by the Spaniards, halted at Guardia on the 5th of October, and remained in observation.§

On the 4th, the king and Bessieres, at the head of Mouton's and Merle's divisions, quitted Miranda, and advanced along the road of Osma, with the intention of feeling for Blake on the side of Frias and Medina; the Spaniards were then in force at Valmaceda, but Joseph, deceived by false information, imagined that

* Correspondence of general Leith.

† Journal of the king's Operations, MS.

‡ Correspondence of general Leith.

|| Journal of the king's Operations, MS.

§ Ibid.

* Correspondence of Captain Carrol. Ibid. General Broderick.

they were again in march towards Bilbao, and therefore pushed on to Lodio, with the intention of attacking Blake during the movement; at Lodio he ascertained the truth, and being uneasy about Moncey, returned the 7th to Murquía, where he left Merle to protect the rear of the troops at Bilbao, and then proceeded to Miranda with the division of Mouton. On the 12th, Blake, still intent upon the insurrection of Biscay, placed a division at Orduña, and attacked Bilbao with eighteen thousand men.* Merlin retired fighting up the valley of Durango as far as Zornosa, but being joined there by general Verdier, with six battalions, turned and checked the pursuit. At this time, however, the leading columns of the great French army were passing the Spanish frontier; Laval's division advanced to Durango; Sebastiani, with six thousand men, relieved Merle at Murquía, who repaired to Miranda; Verdier returned to Vittoria, and Lefebvre, duke of Dantzic, assumed the command of the three divisions posted at Durango.

On the Spanish side, the marquis of Romana's division had disembarked on the 9th at St. Ander, and the infantry, eight thousand strong, completely equipped and provided from the English stores, proceeded by slow marches to join Blake. The Asturians had halted at Villareayo, but the Estremaduran army, under the conde de Belvedere, was put in motion, and the Castilian forces arrived upon the Ebro; the first and third divisions of the Andalusian army were on the march from La Mancha, and Castaños, quitting Madrid, proceeded towards Tudela. All things announced the approach of a great crisis, yet such was the apathy of the supreme junta, that the best friends of Spain hoped for a defeat, as the only mode of exciting sufficient energy in the government to save the state, and by some it was thought that even that sharp remedy would be insufficient. A momentary excitement was, however, caused by the intercepted letter to Jourdan before spoken of; the troops in the second line were ordered to proceed to the Ebro by forced marches, letters were written, pressing for the advance of the British army, and Castaños was enjoined to drive the enemy, without delay, beyond the frontier. But this sudden fury of action ended with those orders. Sir David Baird's corps was detained in the transports at Coruña, waiting for permission to land; no assistance was afforded to sir John Moore; and although the subsidies, already paid by England, amounted to ten millions of dollars,† and that Madrid was rich, and willing to contribute to the exigencies of the moment, the central junta, while complaining of the want of money, would not be at the trouble of collecting patriotic gifts, and left the armies 'to all the horrors of famine, nakedness, and misery.‡' The natural consequence of such folly and wickedness ensued; the people ceased to be enthusiastic, and the soldiers deserted in crowds.

The conduct of the generals was not less extraordinary. Blake had voluntarily commenced the campaign without magazines, and without any plan, except that of raising the provinces of Biscay and Guipuscoa. With the usual blind confidence of a Spaniard, he pressed forward, ignorant of the force or situation of his adversaries, never dreaming of a defeat; and so little experienced in the detail of command, that he calculated upon the ordinary quantity of provisions contained in an English frigate, which cruised off the coast, as a resource for his army, if the country should fail to supply him with subsistence;|| his artillery had only seventy rounds for each gun, his men were without great-coats, many without shoes, and the snow was beginning to fall in the mountains.§ That he was able to make any impression is a proof that king Joseph pos-

sessed little military talent; the French, from the habitude of war, were indeed able to baffle Blake without difficulty, but the strategic importance of the valley of Orduña they did not appreciate, or he would have been destroyed: the lesson given by Napoleon, when he defeated Wurmser in the valley of the Brenta, might have been repeated, under more favourable circumstances, at Orduña and Durango.

But if genius was asleep with the French, it was dead with the Spaniards. As long as Blake remained between Frias and Valmaceda, his position was tolerably secure from an attack, because the Montaña St. Ander is exceedingly rugged, and the line of retreat by Villareayo was open; nevertheless he was cooped up in a corner, and ill placed for offensive movements, which were the only operations he thought of. Instead of occupying Burgos, and repairing the citadel, he descended on Bilbao with the bulk of his army, thereby discovering his total ignorance of war; for several great valleys, the upper parts of which were possessed by the French, met near that town, and it was untenable, the flank of his army was always exposed to an attack from the side of Orduña, and his line of retreat was in the power of Bessieres. To protect his flank and rear, Blake detached largely, but that weakened the main body without obviating the danger; nor did he make amends for his bad dispositions by diligence; for his movements were slow, his attacks without vigour, and his whole conduct displayed temerity without decision, rashness without enterprise.

The armies of the centre and right were not better conducted. Castaños having quitted Madrid on the 8th of October, arrived at Tudela on the 17th, and on the 20th held a conference with Palafox at Zaragoza. The aggregate of their forces did not much exceed forty-five thousand men, of which from two to three thousand were cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery followed the divisions; which were posted in the following manner:—

ARMY OF THE CENTRE,—27,000.

General Pignatelli, with ten thousand Castilian infantry, one thousand five hundred cavalry, and fourteen guns, at Logroño.

General Grimarest, with the second division of Andalusia, five thousand men, at Lodosa.

General La-Peña, with the fourth division, five thousand infantry, at Callahorra.

The parc of artillery, and a division of infantry, four thousand, at Centruenigo.

The remainder at Tudela and the neighbouring villages.

ARMY OF ARAGON,—18,000.

O'Neil with seven thousand five hundred men, held Sor, Lumbar, and Sanguessa.

Thirty miles in the rear, St. Marc occupied Exca, with five thousand five hundred men.

Palafox, with five thousand men, remained in Zaragoza.

The Ebro rolled between these two corps, but viewed as one army their front lines occupied two sides of an irregular triangle, of which Tudela was the apex, Sanguessa and Logroño the extremities of the base. From the latter points, the rivers Ebro and Aragon, which meet at Milagro, describe, in their double course, an arc, the convex of which was opposed to the Spaniards. The streams of the Ega, the Arga, and the Zidasco rivers, descending from the Pyrenees in parallel courses, cut the chord of this arc at nearly equal distances, and fall, the two first into the Ebro, the last into the Aragon, and all the roads leading from Pampeluna to the Ebro follow the course of those torrents.

Marshal Moncey's right was at Estella on the Ega, his centre held Falces and Tafalla on the Arga and the Zidasco, his left was in front of Sanguessa on the Aragon; the bridges of Olite and Peralta were secured by

* Journal of the king's Operations, MS.

† Parliamentary Papers. ‡ Vindication of Castanos.

|| General Broderick's Letter. Parl. Pap.

§ Birch's Letters to Leith. MS.

advanced parties, and Caparosa, where there was another bridge, was occupied in force. In this situation he could operate freely between the torrents, which intersected his line, he commanded all the roads leading to the Ebro, and he could, from Caparosa, at any moment, issue forth against the centre of the Spanish armies. Now from Tudela to Sangüessa is fifty miles, from Tudela to Logroño sixty miles, but from Tudela to Caparosa is only twelve miles of good road; wherefore, the extremities of the Spanish line were above one hundred miles, or six days' march from each other, while a single day would have sufficed to unite the French within two hours' march of the centre. The weakness of the Spaniards' position is apparent.

If Palafox, crossing the Aragon at Sangüessa, advanced towards Pampeluna, Moncey would be on his left flank and rear; if he turned against Moncey, the garrison of Pampeluna would fall upon his right; if Castaños, to favour the attack of Palafox, crossed the Ebro at Logroño, Ney, being posted at Guardia, was ready to take him in flank; if the two wings endeavoured to unite, their line of march was liable to be intercepted at Tudela by Moncey, and the rear of Castaños be attacked by Ney, who could pass the Ebro at Logroño or Lodosa. If they remained stationary, they might easily be beaten in detail.

Any other than Spanish generals would have been filled with apprehension on such an occasion; but Palafox and Castaños, heedless of their own danger, tranquilly proceeded to arrange a plan of offensive operations singularly absurd.* They agreed that the army of the centre, leaving a division at Lodosa and another at Calahorra, should make a flank march to the right, and take a position along the Aragon, the left to be at Tudela, the right at Sangüessa; that is, with less than twenty thousand men to occupy fifty miles of country close to a powerful and concentrated enemy. In the meantime, Palafox, with the Aragonese, crossing the river at Sangüessa, was to extend in an oblique line to Roncesvalles, covering the valleys of Talay, Escay, and Roncal, with his centre, and reinforcing his army by the armed inhabitants, who were ready to flock to his standard.† Blake was invited to co-operate, in combination, by Guipuscoa, so as to pass in the rear of the whole French army, unite with Palafox, and thus cut off the enemy's retreat into France, and intercept his reinforcements at the same time.

Castaños returned to Tudela on the 23d, and proceeded to Logroño on the 25th, the grand movement being to commence on the 27th. But on the 21st, Grimaire had pushed forward strong detachments across the Ebro to Mendavia, Andosilla, Sesma, and Carcur, and one over the Ega to Lerim—the Castillian outposts occupied Viana on the left bank of the Ebro—the Aragonese divisions were already closing upon Sangüessa, and a multitude of peasants crowded to the same place in the hope of obtaining arms and ammunition. Moncey, deceived by this concourse of persons, estimated the force in Sangüessa at twenty thousand, when, in fact, it was only eight thousand regular troops; and his report, and the simultaneous movement of the Spaniards on both extremities, made the king to apprehend a triple attack from Logroño, Lodosa, and Sangüessa. He immediately reinforced Ney with Merlin's division from Bessieres' corps, and directed him to clear the left bank of the Ebro, while Bonnet's division, also taken from Bessieres, descended the right bank from Haro to Briones.‡ A division of Moncey's corps, stationed at Estella, received orders to follow the course of the Ega, and second Ney's operations; and a part of the garrison of Pampeluna, posted at Montreal and Salinas, was commanded to advance up-

on Nardues, and make a demonstration against Sangüessa.

When Castaños arrived at Logroño these operations were in full activity. Ney had, on the 24th, driven back the Castillian outposts, crowned the height opposite that town on the 25th, and was cannonading the Spaniards' position. On the 26th, he renewed his fire briskly until twelve o'clock, at which time Castaños, after giving Pignatelli strict orders to defend his post unless he was turned by a force descending the right bank of the Ebro, proceeded himself to Lodosa and Calahorra.* Meanwhile the French from Estella falling down the Ega, drove the Spanish parties out of Mendavia, Andosilla, Carcur, and Sesma; and Grimaire retired from Lodosa to La Torre with such precipitation, that he left colonel Cruz, a valuable officer, with a light battalion, and some volunteers, at Lerim, where he was taken after a creditable resistance.†

Pignatelli, regardless of Castaños' orders, retired from Logroño, and abandoned all his guns at the foot of the Sierra de Nalda, only a few miles from the enemy; then crossing the mountains, he gained Centruenigo in such disorder, that his men continued to arrive for twenty-four hours consecutively. On the right, O'Neil skirmished with the garrison of Pampeluna, and lost six men killed, and eight wounded, but in the Spanish fashion, announced, that, after a hard action of many hours, the enemy was completely overthrown. On the 27th, Merlin's division rejoined Bessieres at Miranda, and Bonnet, retiring from Briones, took post in front of Pancorbo. Castaños, incensed at the ill conduct of the Castillians, dismissed Pignatelli and incorporated his troops with the Andalusian divisions; fifteen hundred men of the latter, being sent back to Nalda under the conde de Cartoajal, recovered the lost guns, and brought them safe to Centruenigo.

Dissensions followed these reverses. Palafox arrogantly censured Castaños, and a cabal, of which general Coupigny appears to have been the principal mover, was formed against the latter. The junta, exasperated that Castaños had not already driven the enemy beyond the frontier, encouraged his traducers, and circulated slanderous accusations themselves, as if his inaction alone had enabled the French to remain in Spain; they sent Francisco Palafox, brother of the captain-general, and a member of the supreme junta, to head-quarters, avowedly to facilitate, but really to control the military operations, and he arrived at Alfaro on the 29th, accompanied by Coupigny, and the conde de Montijo, a turbulent factious man, shallow and vain, but designing and unprincipled. Castaños waited upon this representative of the government, and laid before him the denuded state of the army;‡ the captain-general, Palafox, also came up from Zaragoza, and a council of war was held at Tudela, on the 5th of November. The rough manner in which the Spaniards had just been driven from the left bank of the Ebro, made no impression on the council, which persisted in the grand project of getting in the rear of the French, although it was known that sixty thousand fresh men had joined the latter. Deeming it, however, fitting that Blake should act the first, it was resolved to await his time, and, as an intermediate operation, it was agreed that the army of the centre, leaving six thousand men at Calahorra, and a garrison at Tudela, should cross the Ebro and attack Caparosa.§ French parties had, however, pushed as far as Valtierra, and in the skirmishes which ensued, the conduct of the Castillian battalions was discreditable.¶ Joseph Palafox then re-

* Whittingham's Correspondence. MS.

† Colonel Graham's Correspondence. MS.

‡ Castanos' Vindication.

§ Colonel Graham's Correspondence. MS.

¶ Whittingham's Correspondence. MS.

* Sir John Moore's Papers. Colonel Graham's Correspondence.

† Ibid. Colonel Doyle's Correspondence.

‡ Journal of the king's Operations. MS.

turned to Zaragoza, and the deputy separated himself from Castaños.

The loss sustained by desertion and the previous combats was considerable, but some Murcian levies, and a part of the first and third Andalusian divisions joined the army of the centre, which now mustered twenty-six thousand infantry, and nearly three thousand cavalry under arms, with fifty or sixty pieces of artillery. The positions of the army extended from Calahorra, by Haro, to Tudela. La-Peña held the first town with five thousand men; Grimarest and Caro commanded eight thousand at the second; head-quarters, with thirteen thousand five hundred men, were fixed in the last; Cartoajal remained with eleven hundred in the Sierra de Nalda, and eight hundred were posted at Ansejo.* From these points, in pursuance of the plan arranged, the troops were actually in movement to cross the Ebro, when despatches from Blake announced that he had met with some disaster on the 31st, the extent of which he did not communicate.

This news arrested the attack, and the preposterous transactions that ensued, resembled the freaks of Caligula rather than the operations of real war. First, it was arranged that the army should abandon Tudela, and take a position in two lines, the extremities of the one to rest on Calahorra and Amedo, the second to extend from Alfaro to Fitero, and the deputy ordered O'Neil, with the army of Aragon, to occupy the latter of these lines forthwith;† O'Neil, however, refused to stir without instructions from the captain-general. This was on the 9th, on the 10th the plan was changed. Castaños fixed his head-quarters at Centruenigo, and the deputy proposed that O'Neil should descend the right bank of the Aragon river, and attack Caparosa in the rear; that the troops in Tudela should attack it in front; and that a division should make a demonstration of passing the Ebro in boats, opposite to Milagro, in order to favour this attack. Castaños assented, and on the 12th a division assembled opposite Milagro, while La-Peña, with two divisions, marched against Caparosa; suddenly, the whimsical deputy sent them orders to repair to Lodosa, forty miles higher up the Ebro, to attack the bridge at that place, while Grimarest, crossing in the boats at Calahorra, should ascend the left bank of the Ebro, and take it in rear. La-Peña and Villarcayo, confounded by this change, wrote to Castaños for an explanation, and this was the first intimation that the latter, who was lying sick at Centruenigo, received of the altered dispositions.‡ He directed his lieutenants to obey; but being provoked beyond endurance, wrote sharply to the junta, demanding to know who was to command the army; and after all this insolence and vapouring no operation took place: Francisco Palafox declaring, that his intention was merely to make a demonstration, ordered the troops to their quarters, and then, without assigning any reason, deprived La-Peña of his command, and appointed Cartoajal in his place.||

It was at this time that sir John Moore's letter arrived, but Castaños, no longer master of his own operations, could ill concert a plan of campaign with the general of another army; he could not even tell what troops were to be at his nominal disposal! for the Estremaduran force, originally destined for his command, was now directed by the junta upon Burgos, and the remainder of his first and third division was detained in Madrid. His enemies, especially Montijo, were active in spreading reports to his disadvantage, the deserters scattered over the country declared that all the generals were traitors, and the people of the towns and villages, deceived by the central junta, and excited by

false rumours, respected neither justice nor government, and committed the most scandalous excesses.* Blake's situation was not more prosperous. The road from Bayonne to Vittoria was encumbered with the advancing columns of the great French army.

An imperial decree, issued early in September, incorporated the troops already in Spain with the grand army then marching from Germany, and the united forces were to compose eight divisions, called 'Corps d'Armée,' an institution analogous to the Roman legion; because each 'Corps d'Armée,' although adapted for action as a component part of a large army, was also provided with light cavalry, a pare, and train of artillery, engineers, sappers and miners, and a complete civil administration, to enable it to take the field as an independent force. The imperial guards and the heavy cavalry of the army were, however, not included in this arrangement; the first had a constitution of their own, and at this time all the heavy cavalry, and all the artillery, not attached to the 'Corps d'Armée,' were formed into a large reserve. As the columns arrived in Spain, they were united to the troops already there, and the whole was disposed conformably to the new organization.

Marshal Victor, duke of Belluno, commanded the	First Corps.
Marshal Bessieres, duke of Istria . . .	Second Corps.
Marshal Marmont, duke of Comogiano . . .	Third Corps.
Marshal Lefebvre, duke of Dantzic . . .	Fourth Corps.
Marshal Mortier, duke of Treviso . . .	Fifth Corps.
Marshal Ney, duke of Elchingen . . .	Sixth Corps.
General St. Cyr . . .	Seventh Corps.
General Junot, duke of Abrantes . . .	Eighth Corps.

The seventh corps was appropriated to Catalonia, but the remainder were, in the latter end of October, assembled or assembling in Navarre and Biscay. General Merlin, with a division, held Zornosa, and observed Blake, who remained tranquilly at Bilbao. Two divisions of the fourth corps occupied Durango and the neighbouring villages. One division and the light cavalry of the first corps was at Vittoria, a second division of the same corps guarded the bridge of Murguia on the river Bayas, and commanded the entrance to the valley of Orduña.† Haro, Puente, Lara, Miranda, and Pancorbo were maintained by the infantry of the king's body guard and the second corps; and the light cavalry of the latter covered the plains close up to Briviesca. The reinforcements were daily crowding up to Vittoria, and the king, restrained by the emperor's orders to a rigorous system of defence, occupied himself with the arrangements attendant on such an immense accumulation of force, and left Blake in quiet possession of Bilbao. The latter mistook this apparent inactivity for timidity; he was aware that reinforcements, in number equal to his whole army, had joined the enemy, yet, with wonderful rashness, resolved to press forward, and readily agreed to attempt a junction with Palafox, in the rear of the French position.

At this time Romana's infantry were approaching Bilbao, and the Estremadurans were in march for Burgos; but the country was nearly exhausted of provisions, both armies felt the scarcity, desertion prevailed among the Spaniards, and the Biscayans, twice abandoned, were fearful of a third insurrection. Prudence dictated a retreat towards Burgos, but Blake resolved to advance. First he posted general Acevedo with the Asturians and the second division at Orduña; then he left a battalion at Miravelles, to preserve the communication with Bilbao;‡ finally he marched himself, on the 24th, at the head of seventeen thousand fighting men, divided in three columns, to attack Zornosa. The right column ascended the valley of Durango by Galdacano, the centre by Larabezua, the left by Rigoytia;

* Whittingham's Correspondence. MSS.

† Graham's Correspondence. MS.

‡ Castanos' Vindication.

|| Graham's Correspondence. MS.

* Vindication of Castanos.

† Journal of the king's operations. MS.

‡ Carrol's Correspondence.

and general Acevedo penetrated through the mountains of Gorbea by Ozoco and Villaro, with a view to seize Manares and St. Antonia d'Urquitiola. It was intended by this operation to cut the communication between Miranda on the Ebro, and the town of Durango, and thus to intercept the retreat of marshal Ney, and oblige him to surrender with sixteen thousand men;* for Blake was utterly ignorant of his adversary's position, and imagined that he had only two corps to deal with. He believed that the king, with one, was in his front at Durango and Mont Dragon, and that Ney with the other, was at Miranda; but, in fact, the latter was at that moment attacking Pignatelli at Logroño.

As the Spanish army approached Zornosa, Merlin, abandoning the town, drew up on some heights in the rear. Bad weather, and the want of provisions, checked further operations until the evening of the 25th, when the Spanish division at Rigoytia attempted to turn the right flank of the French; at the same time Blake marched against the centre and left, and Merlin fell back to Durango. The duke of Dantzic, alarmed by these movements, concentrated Sebastiani's and Laval's division, and a Dutch brigade of infantry at Durango; and as his third division, under general Valence, was not come up, the king reinforced him with Villatte's division of the first corps, and ordered Merlin's force, which was composed of detachments, to join their respective regiments.†

Until the 30th the armies remained quiet, but at day-break on the 31st, the Spaniards were formed in a chequered order of battle across the Durango road, five miles beyond Zornosa, and close to the enemy's position. The duke of Dantzic, apprised by the previous movements that he was going to be attacked, became impatient; the state of the atmosphere prevented him from discovering the order of march, or the real force of the Spaniards, but he knew that Blake had the power of uniting nearly fifty thousand men, and concluding that such a force was in his front, he resolved to anticipate his adversaries by a sudden and vigorous assault.‡ In fact, the Spanish generals were so little guided by the rules of war, that before their incapacity was understood, their very errors being too gross for belief, contributed to their safety. Blake had commenced a great offensive movement, intending to beat the troops in his front, and to cut off and capture Ney's corps of sixteen thousand men. In six days, although unopposed, he advanced less than fifteen miles; and so disposed his forces, that out of thirty-six thousand men, he had only seventeen thousand infantry, without artillery, upon the field of battle. His adversary, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, formed in three columns of attack, then descended from the heights.||

COMBAT OF DURANGO.

A thick fog covering the mountain sides, filled all the valleys, and a few random shots alone indicated the presence of the hostile armies, when suddenly Villatte's division appearing close to the Spanish vanguard, with a brisk onset forced it back upon the third division; Sebastiani's and Laval's followed in succession; a fire of artillery, to which Blake could make no reply, opened along the road, the day cleared, and the Spanish army, heaped in confused masses, was, notwithstanding the example of personal courage given by Blake, and the natural strength of the country, driven from one position to another. At mid-day it was beyond Zornosa, and at three o'clock in full flight for Bilbao, which place it gained, in a state of great confusion, during the night; but the next day Blake crossed the Salcedon, and took a position at Nava.§ The duke of

Dantzic pursued as far as Gueñes, and then leaving general Villatte, with seven thousand men, to observe the enemy, returned to Bilbao. Twelve vessels, laden with English stores, were in the river, but contrived to escape.

The king was displeased with the precipitancy of marshal Lefebvre, but to aid him ordered the division of the first corps, stationed at Murguía, to descend the valley of Orduña, as far as Amurio; at the same time, Mouton's division was detached from the second corps towards Barbareña, from whence it was, according to circumstances, either to join the troops in the valley of Orduña, or to watch Medina and Quinceos, and press Blake in his retreat, if he retired by Vallarcayo. The French were ignorant of the situation of general Acevedo, but the day of the action at Zornosa, that general was at Villaro, from whence he endeavoured to rejoin Blake, by marching to Valmaceda; he reached Miravalles, in the valley of Orduña, on the 3d, at the moment when the head of the French troops coming from Murguía appeared in sight, and after a slight skirmish, the latter, thinking they had to deal with the whole of Blake's army, retired to Orduña.

Acevedo immediately pushed for the Salcedon river, and Villatte who first got notice of his march, dividing his own troops, posted one half at Orantia, on the road leading from Miravalles to Nava, the other on the road to Valmaceda, thus intercepting the Spaniards' line of retreat.* Blake, informed of Acevedo's danger, in the night of the 4th, promptly passed the bridge of Nava, meaning to fall suddenly upon the nearest French; but they were aware of his intention, and sending a detachment to occupy Gordujuela, a pass in the mountains, leading to Bilbao, rejoined Villatte on the Valmaceda road. Five Spanish divisions and some of Romana's troops were now assembled at Orantia, Blake left two in reserve, detached one against Gordujuela, and with the other two drove Villatte across the Salcedon. That general rallied on the left bank and renewed the action, but at this moment Acevedo appeared in sight, and sending two battalions by a circuit to gain the rear of the French, with the remainder joined in the combat. Villatte then retired fighting, and encountering the two battalions in his retreat, broke through them, and reached Gueñes, yet with considerable loss of men, and he also left one gun and part of his baggage in the hands of the Spaniards. Thus ended a series of operations and combats, which had lasted for eleven days.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The duke of Dantzic's attack at Durango was founded upon false data; it was inconsistent with the general plan of the campaign, hasty, ill-combined, and feebly followed up; and it was an unpardonable fault to leave Villatte without support; close to an army that had met with no signal defeat, and that was five times his strength. The march of Victor's division was too easily checked at Miravalles, and for five days, general Acevedo, with at least eight thousand men, wandered unmolested in the midst of the French columns, and finally escaped without any extraordinary effort.

2. General Blake's dispositions, with the exception of his night-march from Nava to Orantia, will, if studied, afford useful lessons in an inverse sense. From the 24th of October to the 4th of November, he omitted no error that the circumstances rendered it possible to commit; and then, as if ashamed of the single judicious movement that occurred, he would not profit by it. When Romana's infantry had partly arrived, and the remainder were in the vicinity of Nava, the whole Spanish army was, contrary to all reasonable expectation, concentrated; above thirty thousand fighting men were united in one mass, harassed, but not much dis-

* Broderick's Correspondence.

† S. Journal of the king's operations. MS. † Ibidem.

‡ Carroll's Correspondence.

§ S. Journal of operations. MS. Leith's Correspondence. MS.

* S. Journal of operations. MS. Captain Carroll.

couraged, and the conde de Belvedere, with twelve thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery, was close to Burgos. If Blake had been at all acquainted with the principles of his art, he would then have taken advantage of Villatte's retreat, to march by Espinosa, and Villarcayo, to the upper Ebro; from thence he could have gained Burgos, brought up the artillery from Reynosa, and uniting Belvedere's troops to his own, have opened a communication with the English army. In that position, with a plentiful country behind him, his retreat open, and his army provided with cavalry, he might have commenced a regular system of operations; but with incredible obstinacy and want of judgment, he now determined to attack Bilbao again, and to renew the ridiculous attempt to surround the French army and unite with Palafox at the foot of the Pyrenees.

Such were the commanders, the armies, the rulers, upon whose exertions the British cabinet relied for the security of sir John Moore's troops, during their double march from Lisbon and Coruña! It was in such a state of affairs that the English ministers, anticipating the speedy and complete destruction of the French forces in Spain, were sounding the trumpet for an immediate invasion of France! Of France, defended by a million of veteran soldiers, and governed by the mightiest genius of two thousand years! As if the vast military power of that warlike nation had suddenly become extinct, as if Baylen were a second Zama, and Hannibal flying to Adrumetum instead of passing the Iberus!* But Napoleon, with an execution more rapid than other men's thoughts, was already at Vittoria, and his hovering eagles cast a gloomy shadow over Spain.

* Lord W. Bentinck's Correspondence.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

Napoleon arrives at Bayonne—Blake advances toward Bilbao—The count Belvedere arrives at Burgos—The first and fourth corps advance—Combat of Gueñes—Blake retreats—Napoleon at Vittoria; his plan—Soult takes the command of the second corps—Battle of Gamonal—Burgos taken—Battle of Espinosa—Flight from Reynosa—Soult overruns the Montagna de St. Ander, and scours Leon—Napoleon fixes his head-quarters at Burgos, changes his front, lets 10,000 loose cavalry upon Castille and Leon—Marshals Lasnes and Ney directed against Castanos—Folly of the central junta—General St. Juan occupies the pass of the Somosierra—Folly of the generals on the Ebro—Battle of Tudela.

AFTER the opening of the legislative sessions, the emperor repaired to Bayonne. He arrived there on the 3d of November. It was his intention that the presumption of the Spanish generals should be encouraged by a strict defensive system until the moment when the blow he was prepared to strike could fall with the greatest effect; hence the precipitate attack at Zornosa displeased him, nor was he satisfied with the subsequent measures of the king, for he thought that Mouton's division would be endangered between the army of Blake and that of the conde de Belvedere.* To prevent any accident, he judged it necessary that Eesieres should advance with the whole of the second corps to Burgos; that marshal Victor should march by Amurio to Valmaceda; and that marshal Lefebvre should immediately renew his attack on that position from the side of Bilbao. Thus at the very moment when Blake was leading his harassed and starving troops back to Bilbao, two corps, amounting to fifty thousand men, were in full march to meet him, and a third, having already turned his right flank, was on his rear.

The Spanish general advanced from Valmaceda on the 7th, and thinking that only fifteen hundred men were in Gueñes, prepared to surround them.† Two divisions, making a circuit to the left, passed through Abellana and Sopoerte, with a view to gain the bridge of Sodupe, in the rear of Gueñes, while two other

divisions attacked that position in front; the remainder of the army followed at some distance, but the advanced guard of the 4th corps was in Gueñes, and after an action of two hours, the Spaniards were thrown into such confusion that night alone saved them from a total rout. The same day, one of their flanking divisions was encountered and beaten near Sopoerte, and the retreat of the other being intercepted on the side of Abellana, it was forced to make for Portagalete on the sea-coast, and from thence to St. Andero.* Blake, whose eyes were now opening to the peril of his situation, resolved to retire upon Espinosa de los Monteros, a mountain position, two marches distant, where he designed to rest his troops, and draw supplies from his magazines at Reynosa. Falling back to Valmaceda in the night, he gained Nava the next day, and on the 9th was at Espinosa. The late division of Romana's infantry joined him on the march, and with exception of the men cut off at Abellana; the whole army was concentrated on strong ground commanding the intersection of the roads from St. Andero, Villarcayo, and Reynosa.

Napoleon, accompanied by the dukes of Dalmatia and Montebello, quitted Bayonne the morning of the 8th, and reached Vittoria in the evening. He was met by the civil and military chiefs at the gates of the town, but refusing to go to the house prepared for his reception, jumped off his horse, entered the first small inn that he observed, and calling for his maps, and a report of the situation of the armies on both sides, proceeded to arrange the plan of his campaign.

The first and fourth corps, after uniting at Valmaceda, had separated again at Nava on the 9th, Victor was therefore pursuing the track of Blake, and Lefebvre was marching upon Villarcayo by Medina. The second corps was concentrating at Briviesca. The third corps occupied Tafalla, Peraltes, Caparosa, and Estrela. The sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve, were distributed from Vittoria to Miranda, and a division, under the command of general La Grange, was at

* S. Journal of the king's operations. MS.

† Captain Carol's Correspondence.

* General Leith's Correspondence.

Guardia, connecting the positions of the third and sixth corps. The fifth corps was still behind the frontier, and the eighth, composed of the troops removed from Portugal by the convention of Cintra, was marching from the French sea-ports, where it had disembarked.

On the Spanish side, the conde de Belvedere was at Burgos; Castaños and Palafox, unknowing of their danger, were planning to cut off the French army, and Blake was flying to Espinosa. The English army were scattered from Coruña to Talavera de la Reyna. On these facts, and in two hours the emperor had arranged his plans.

Moncey was directed to leave a division in front of Pampeluna, in observation of the Spaniards on the Aragon, to concentrate the remainder of the third corps at Lodosa, and remain on the defensive until further orders. La Grange was reinforced by Colbert's brigade of light cavalry from the sixth corps, and directed upon Logroño. The first and fourth corps were to press Blake without intermission. The sixth to march towards Aranda de Duero. The duke of Dalmatia appointed to command the 2d corps, was ordered to fall headlong upon the conde de Belvedere, and the emperor, with the imperial guards and the reserve, followed the movement of the second corps.*

These instructions being issued, the enormous mass of the French army was put in motion with a celerity that marked the vigour of Napoleon's command. Marshal Soult departed on the instant for Briviesca, arrived at day-break on the 9th, received the second corps from Bessieres, and in a few hours was in full march for the terrace of Monasterio, which overlooks the plains of Burgos; head-quarters were established there, during the night, and Franceschi's light cavalry took the road of Zaldueño to Arlanzon, with orders to cross the river of that name, to descend the left bank, cut the communication with Madrid, and prevent the Spaniards rallying at the convent of the Chartreuse, if defeated near Burgos.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 10th, Soult was again in march from Monasterio, and at six o'clock general Lassalle's cavalry reached Villa Fria. The conde de Belvedere, being informed of their approach, posted the Spanish army at Gamonal, and taking four thousand infantry, eight guns, and the whole of his cavalry, fell upon Lassalle. The latter skirmished for a while, and then, following his orders, retired slowly to Rio Bena, but at eight o'clock, the French infantry, which had advanced by two roads, was reunited at this town, and immediately pushed forward on Villa Fria, Belvedere was driven back upon Gamonal, and the Spanish army was discovered in line of battle. The right was in a wood, leaving a clear space of some extent unoccupied between it and the river Arlanzon; the left was posted in the walled park of Vellimer; thirty pieces of artillery covered the front, and seven or eight thousand armed peasants were arrayed on the heights, immediately behind the regular troops; these latter amounted to eleven thousand one hundred and fifty infantry, and eleven hundred and fifty cavalry. This was the best army at that time in Spain; it was composed of the Walloon and Spanish guards, the regiments of Mayorca, Zafra, and Valencia de Alcantara; † the hussars of Valencia, the royal carbineers, and some volunteers of good families; it was completely equipped, and armed principally from the English stores, yet its resistance was even more feeble than that made by the half-famished peasants of Blake's force.

BATTLE OF GAMONAL.

Lassalle, with the light cavalry, leading down upon the Spanish right, filled the plain between the river and the wood, and at the same moment the Spanish

artillery opened along the whole of the line; then the French infantry, formed in columns of regiments, arrived, and Mouton's division, composed of old soldiers, broke at once into the wood at a charging pace. General Bonnet followed closely, but so rapid and effectual was the assault of Mouton's veterans that the Spaniards fled in disorder before Bonnet's troops could fire a shot; their left wing, although not attacked, followed the example of the right, and the whole mass, victors and vanquished, rushed into the town of Burgos with extraordinary violence and uproar. Bessieres, who retained the command of all the heavy cavalry, passed at full gallop toward the Madrid road, where it crosses the Arlanzon, sabring the fugitives, and taking all the guns which had escaped Mouton, while, on the other side of the river, Franceschi was seen cutting in pieces some Catalan light troops stationed there, and barring all hopes of flight. Never was a defeat more instantaneous, or more complete. Two thousand five hundred Spaniards were killed; twenty guns, thirty ammunition wagons, six pair of colours, and nine hundred men were taken on the field; four thousand muskets were found unbroken, and the fugitives dispersed far and wide. Belvedere himself escaped to Lerma, where he arrived in the evening of the day on which the battle was fought, and meeting some battalions, principally composed of volunteers, on their march to join his army, retired with them to Aranda de Duero during the night; but first, with true Spanish exaggeration, wrote a despatch, in which he asserted that the French, repulsed in two desperate attacks, had, after thirteen hours' hard fighting, succeeded in a third.

All the ammunition and stores of the defeated army were captured in Burgos; and the indefatigable Soult, who was still upon the post-horse which he had mounted at Briviesca, who had travelled from Bayonne to Burgos, taken the latter town, and gained a decisive victory all within the space of fifty hours, now detached one column in pursuit on the side of Lerma, another towards Palencia and Valladolid, and marched himself with a third, on the very day of the battle, towards Reynosa, where he hoped to intercept Blake's line of retreat to the plains of Leon.* This last-mentioned general had reached Espinosa, as we have seen, on the evening of the 9th, with six divisions, including Romana's infantry, who also dragged with them six guns of a small calibre; but the separation of the fourth division at Abellana, the deserters, and the losses sustained in battle, had reduced his army below twenty-five thousand fighting men; and the park of ammunition and artillery, guarded by two thousand infantry, were behind Reynosa, at Aguilar del Campo, on the road to Leon; yet his position was strong, and he hoped to remain in it for some days unmolested. His left wing, composed of the Asturians and the first division, occupied some heights which covered the road of St. Andero; the centre, consisting of the third division, and the reserve, formed a line across the road of Reynosa, which leads through Espinosa directly to the rear; the second division was established on a commanding height, a little on the right hand of the town; Romana's infantry were posted in a wood, two miles in advance of the right, and the vanguard, with six guns, formed a reserve behind the centre of the position.†

BATTLE OF ESPINOSA.

On the 10th, the duke of Belluno came up, and at two o'clock in the afternoon, the head of a French column driving back Romana's infantry, seized the wood, but the Spaniards, reinforced by the third division, renewed the combat; a second column then opened its fire upon the Spanish centre, thus weakened by the advance of the third division, and at the same

* S. Marshal Soult's operations, MSS.

† S. Journal of operations. MS.

* Carrol's Correspondence.

† Ibid.

time some light troops ascending the heights on the left, menaced that wing of Blake's army. Meanwhile the contest on the right was maintained with vigour, and the Spaniards supported by the fire of the six guns in their centre, even appeared to be gaining ground, when the night closed and put an end to the action, leaving the French in possession of the wood, and of a ridge of hills, which at the distance of a cannon shot, run parallel to the centre of the position.

The generals S. Roman and Riquelmé were mortally wounded on the Spanish side, and at daylight the next morning, Victor, who had relieved his left with fresh troops during the night, renewed the attack. General Maison, throwing out a cloud of skirmishers along the front of the Spanish centre and left wing, under cover of their fire, passed rapidly to his own right, and fell upon the Asturians and the first division. Blake, observing this movement, detached a column of grenadiers to reinforce the latter, and advanced in person with three regiments from the centre to take Maison in flank during his march, but it was too late; three Asturian generals fell at the first fire and the troops of that kingdom fled without waiting for the enemy: they were soon followed by the first division, and Maison continuing his course without a check, intercepted the line of retreat by St. Andero, and also that by the town of Espinosa. In the mean time, the French troops posted on the parallel ridge, before spoken of, attacked the centre, and when the division in the wood also advanced against the right, the whole Spanish army gave way in terrible confusion; crowding heavily towards the river Trueba which swept with a bound round the rear, the men endeavoured to escape, some by the fords, some by the town, some by the hills on the right; but the weather was bad, the road steep, the overthrow fatal. Those whom the sword missed, went to their own provinces, carrying dismay into the remotest parts of Galicia, Leon, Castille, and the Asturias. Blake himself reached Reynosa on the 12th, and then rallied about seven thousand fugitives, without artillery, without arms, without spirit, and without hope.

It has been said that, Spartan-like, Romana's soldiers died to a man in their ranks; yet in 1812, captain Hill of the royal navy, being at Cronstadt, to receive Spaniards taken by the Russians during Napoleon's retreat, found that the greater portion were men who had escaped with Romana from the Danish Isles in 1808; captives at Espinosa, they had served Napoleon for four years, passed the ordeal of the Moscow retreat, and were still above four thousand strong!

A line of retreat by Aguilar del Campo, where his artillery remained, was still open to Blake, who thought to remain at Reynosa, to restore order, and then retire through Leon upon sir David Baird's division, the head of which was now near Astorga. But his total ignorance of the French operations and strength again misled him; he looked only to the side of Espinosa, and already Soult's cavalry was upon his line of retreat, and the duke of Dantzic was hastening by the valley of Villarcayo towards Reynosa.* Upon the 13th, he was attacked by Soult's advanced guard, and being now utterly confounded, he fled with four or five thousand men through the valley of Cabuerniga, and took refuge at Arnedo, in the heart of the Asturian mountains, where the marquis of Romana joined him, and assumed the command of all that remained of this unfortunate army.

Blake being thus disposed of, marshal Lefebvre, after a halt of a few days to refresh his troops, took the road of Carrion and Valladolid, while Soult concentrated the 2d corps at Reynosa, and seized St. Ander where he captured a quantity of English stores. This done, the duke of Dalmatia spread his columns over

the whole of the Montaña, pursuing, attacking, and dispersing every body of Spaniards which yet held together, and filling all places with alarm. Every thing military belonging to the patriots was thus driven over the snowy barrier of the Asturian hills, and Soult having left a detachment at San Vicente de Barqueira, scoured the banks of the Deba, took the town of Potes, and overrun Leon with his cavalry as far as Sahagun and Saldana. Meanwhile the duke of Belluno, quitting Espinosa, joined the emperor, whose head-quarters were fixed at Burgos, after the defeat of Belvedere.*

These battles of Espinosa and Gamonal, and the subsequent operations of marshal Soult, laid the north of Spain prostrate, secured the whole coast from St. Sebastian to the frontier of the Asturias, and by a judicious arrangement of small garrisons, and moveable columns, the provinces of Guipuscoa, Navarre, Biscay, and the Baston de Laredo were fettered. Thus the communication of the army with France could no longer be endangered by insurrection in the rear; the wide and fertile plains of Old Castille and Leon were thrown open to the French, and forbidden to the separated divisions of the British army. These great advantages, the result of Napoleon's admirable combinations, the fruits of ten days of active exertion, obtained so easily, and yet so decisive of the fate of the campaign, prove the weakness of the system upon which the Spanish and British governments were at this time acting; if that can be called a system where no one general knew what another had done, was doing, or intended to do.

But Burgos, instead of Vittoria, was now become the pivot of operations, and the right of the army being secured, the emperor prepared to change his front, and bear down against the armies of Castaños and Palafox, with a similar impetuosity. It was however first necessary to ascertain the exact situation of the British force. Napoleon believed that it was concentrated at Valladolid, and he detached three divisions of cavalry and twenty-four pieces of artillery, by Lerma and Palencia, with orders to cross the Douero, to turn the flank of the English, threaten their communications with Portugal, and thus force them to retire; it was, however, soon discovered that the heads of their columns had not penetrated beyond Salamanca and Astorga, and that many days must elapse before they could be concentrated, and in a condition to act offensively. Certain of this fact, the emperor let loose his three divisions of cavalry, and eight thousand horsemen sweeping over the plains, vexed all Leon and Castille; the captain general Pignatelli shamefully fled, and the authorities every where shrunk from the tempest; the people displayed no enthusiasm, and disconcerted by the rapid movements of the French spread a thousand confused and contradictory reports, while the incursions of the cavalry extended to the neighbourhood of Astorga, to Benevente, Zamora, Toro, Tordesilla, and even to the vicinity of Salamanca. Such was the fear or the apathy of the inhabitants, that thirty dragoons were sufficient to raise contributions at the gates of the largest towns;† and after the overthrow of Espinosa was known, ten troopers could safely traverse the country in any direction.

The front of the French army being now changed, the second corps, hitherto the leading column of attack, became a corps of observation, covering the right flank, and protecting the important point of Burgos, where large magazines were establishing, and upon which the reinforcements continually arriving from France were directed. Of the other corps, the first, the guards, and a part of the reserve were at Burgos; Ney, with the sixth, was at Aranda de Douero; this officer's march from Ebro had been made to intercept the Estremadurans on the side of Madrid, and although their

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

* S. Journal of operations. MS. † Sir John Moore's Papers.

sudden destruction at Gamonal rendered this unnecessary, Ney was equally well placed to cut Castaños off from the capital. Meanwhile as Lagrange had occupied Logroño, and Monecy was with three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry at Lodosa, the Spanish army of the centre was turned, menaced, and excised from Madrid, before Castaños was even aware that the campaign had commenced.

In passing the mountains near Tolosa, Lasnes, duke of Montebello, fell from his horse, and was left at Vittoria, and his hurts were dangerous; a rapid and interesting cure was however effected by wrapping him in the skin of a sheep newly slain,* and the emperor then directed him to assume the command of Lagrange's division and Colbert's light cavalry, to unite them with the third corps at Lodosa, and to fall upon Castaños in front. At the same time he ordered Ney to ascend the course of the Douero with the light cavalry and two divisions of the sixth corps, to connect his left with the right of Lasnes, and to gain Agreda by the road of Osma and Soria, from whence he could intercept the retreat of Castaños, and place himself on the rear of the Spanish army. To support this operation, the first corps, and Latour Maubourg's division of heavy cavalry being drawn from the reserve, proceeded by Lerma and Aranda, and from thence slowly followed the direction of Ney's march. The emperor, with the guards, and the remainder of the reserve, continued at Burgos, where the citadel was repaired and armed, magazines formed, and arrangements made to render it the great dépôt of the army; and all the reinforcements coming from France were directed upon this town, and proclamations were issued, assuring the country people of protection, if they would be tranquil and remain in their houses.

Ten days had now elapsed since Napoleon, breaking forth from Vittoria, had deluged the country with his troops, and each day was marked by some advantage gained over the Spaniards, but these misfortunes were still unknown at Tudela and disregarded at the capital. The remnants of Belvedere's army had rallied in the pass of the Somosierra, and on the side of Segovia;† the troops belonging to the army of the centre, which had been detained in Madrid, were forwarded to the former place, those left behind from Cuesta's levies were ordered to the latter. General St. Juan, an officer of reputation, took the command at the Somosierra,‡ general Heredia repaired to Segovia, an intermediate camp of detachments was formed at Sepulveda, and the men thus collected were, by the junta, magnified into a great army sufficient to protect Madrid. That the left wing of the French army was still unbroken upon the Ebro, the central junta attributed, not to the enemy's strength, but to the dilatory proceedings of Castaños;§ wherefore depriving him of the command, they gave it to Romana, precisely at the moment when it was impossible for the latter general to reach the army he was to lead; but the junta wanted a battle, and, uncorrected by Blake's destruction, doubted not of victory.

The proceedings at Tudela also continued to be worthy of the time, for the madness of the generals, and the folly of the deputy had increased rather than abated. The freaks of Francisco Palafox, and their ridiculous termination on the 12th of November, I have already related, and a few days sufficed to give birth to new plans equally absurd, but more dangerous, as the crisis approached nearer. This time Castaños took the lead. He knew upon the 10th that the Estremaduran army was at Burgos, and that the French were marching on that town; from that moment, despairing of the junction of the British army, and likewise of

his own first and third divisions which had been left in Madrid, he sent orders to Belvedere to unite himself with Blake.* His letters never reached that officer, who was defeated before they were written, and Castaños, feeling that he himself was in a dangerous position, and that some decided measure was required, conceived so extraordinary a plan, that it would be difficult to credit it upon any authority but his own. He proposed to carry the army of the centre, reduced in numbers and ill-disciplined as it was, by the Concha de Haro and Soria, towards Burgos, to fall upon the emperor's rear-guard, and, as a preliminary step, he determined to beat the army in his front;† but Palafox had also a plan for attacking Monecy on the side of Sanguessa, and the first measure necessary was to combine these double operations. It was agreed therefore that Caparosa should be garrisoned by four thousand infantry, that the bridge head at that place should be fortified, and that O'Neil should be reinforced at Sanguessa by detachments from the centre until his troops amounted to nineteen thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry;‡ he was then to break down the bridge, place guards at all the passages on the Aragon, come down to Caparosa, cross the river, and threaten Peraltes and Olite on the 17th; but on the 18th, he was to turn suddenly to the left, and get in rear of Lodosa, while La-Peña and Coupigny, marching from Centruenigo, should attack Monecy in front.

This great movement was openly talked of at the head-quarters of the Spanish generals for several days before its execution;§ and these extraordinary commanders, who were ignorant of Blake's disasters, announced their intention of afterwards marching towards Vittoria to lighten the pressure on that officer if he should be in difficulty; or if, as his dispatches of the 5th had assured them he was successful, to join in a general pursuit. Castaños, however, concealed his real project, which was to move by the Concha de Haro towards Burgos.

It was found impossible to procure a sufficient number of boats to lay a bridge over the Ebro at Alfaro, thus the reinforcements, intended for O'Neil, were forced to make a circuit by Tudela, and lost three or four days;§ however, on the 14th O'Neil arrived at Caparosa, after breaking the bridge of Sanguessa, and on the 15th the reinforcements joined him. The 17th, the day appointed for the execution of the plan, Castaños received notice of his own dismissal from the command, yet he persevered in his project. La-Peña and Coupigny were put in motion to pass the bridges of Logroño and Lodosa, and the fords between them, but general O'Neil, instead of executing his part, first refused to stir without an order from Joseph Palafox, who was at Zaragoza, and then changing his ground, complained that he was without bread.¶ Castaños besought him to move upon the 18th, urging the necessity of the measure, and the danger of delay; but the deputy, Palafox, who had hitherto approved of the project, suddenly quitted the head-quarters, and went to Caparosa, from whence, in concert with O'Neil, he wrote to demand a further reinforcement from the centre, of six thousand infantry and some more cavalry, without which, they affirmed that it would be dangerous to pass the Aragon river. Castaños preserved his temper, invited the deputy to return to the right bank of the Ebro, and opposed the demand for more troops on the ground of the delay it would cause; but now the captain-general Palafox, agreeing with neither side, proposed a new plan, and it is difficult to say how long these strange disputes would have continued, if an umpire had not interposed, whose award was too strongly enforced to be disregarded.

* Baron Larrey's Surgical Campaigns.

† Mr. Stuart. Lord W. Bentinck. MSS.

‡ Ibid.

† Ibid.

* Castanos' Vindication.

† Colonel Graham's Correspondence. MSS.

‡ Ibid.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

¶ Castanos' Vindication.

Castaños was with the divisions of Coupigny and La-Pe a at Calahorra on the 19th, when he received information that a French corps was advancing upon Logroño;* it was Lasnes, with Lagrange's and Colbert's troops, yet the Spaniard concluded it to be Ney, for he was ignorant of the changes which had taken place since the 8th of the month. It was likewise reported, that Moncey, whose force he estimated at twelve thousand, when it really was above twenty thousand, had concentrated at Lodosa, and, at the same time, the bishop of Osma announced that twelve thousand men, under Dessolles, were marching from the side of Aranda de Duero. On the 21st, the intelligence that Dessolles had passed Almazan, and that Moncey was in motion, was confirmed;† Castaños then relinquishing his offensive projects, prepared to retire, and it was full time; for marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, had passed Almazan on the 20th, dispersed several small bands of insurgents, and entered Soria on the 21st, so that when Castaños determined to fall back on the 21st, his flank was already turned, and his retreat upon Madrid in the enemy's power. The Spanish artillery was at Centruenigo, and a large detachment was with O'Neil at Caparosa; but during the night of the 21st and 22d Castaños retired to the heights which extend from Tudela by Cascante, Novellas, Tarazona, and Monteguda.‡

On the morning of the 22d Lasnes was seen marching upon Calahorra; at this moment the only supply of money which the central junta had transmitted for his army arrived at Tudela, and, to complete the picture of distracted councils, O'Neil refused to fall back upon Caparosa without the order of Palafox. Fortunately the latter arrived at the moment in Tudela, and a conference taking place between him and Castaños the same day, they agreed that the Aragonese army should cross the Ebro, and occupy the heights over Tudela, while the rest of the troops should stretch away in line as far as Tarazona; nevertheless, in defiance of all orders, entreaties, or reasoning, the obstinate O'Neil remained in an olive-wood on the right bank of the river during the night of the 22d, leaving the key of the position open to the enemy.

A council of war was held, the discussion was turbulent, and the opinions discordant; Palafox insisted on the defence of Aragon, as the principal or rather the only object to be attended to;|| and he wished the whole army to pass to the left bank of the Ebro, and confine its operations to the protection of Zaragoza on that side,—a proposal which alone was sufficient to demonstrate his total incapacity for military affairs. Castaños reasoned justly against this absurdity, but the important moments passed in useless disputation, and the generals came to no conclusion. Meanwhile, marshal Lasnes, bringing with him Maurice Mathieu's division of the sixth corps, which had just arrived from France, concentrated above thirty thousand infantry, four or five thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery, and marching by Alfaro, appeared, at eight o'clock in the morning of the 23d, in front of the Spanish outposts, close to Tudela, just at the moment when the Aragonese were passing the bridge and ascending their position.

BATTLE OF TUDELA.

From forty to fifty guns were distributed along the front of the Spanish army, which, numbering about forty-five thousand fighting men, was extended on a range of easy hills from Tudela to Tarazona, a distance of more than ten miles. Two divisions of the army of the centre connected the Aragonese with the fourth division, which occupied Cascante, three divisions were in Tarazona, and there were no intermediate

posts between these scattered bodies. The weakness attendant on such an arrangement being visible to the enemy at the first glance, Lasnes hastened to make his dispositions, and at nine o'clock general Morlot, with one division, attacked the heights above the town. Maurice Mathieu, supported by the cavalry of Lefebvre Desnouettes, assailed the centre, and general Lagrange advanced against Cascante. The Aragonese resisted Morlot with vigour, and even pressed him in the plain at the foot of the hills, but Maurice Mathieu having gained possession of an olive-wood, and a small ridge which was connected with the centre of the Spanish position, after some sharp fighting pierced the line, and then Lefebvre, breaking through the opening with his cavalry, wheeled up to the left, and threw the right wing into hopeless confusion. The defeated soldiers fled towards the bridge of Tudela, pursued by the victorious horsemen. In the meantime La-Peña, descending from Cascante with the fourth division, drove in Lagrange's advanced guard of cavalry, yet he was soon encountered at a charging pace by the infantry, was beaten, and fell back to Tarazona, where three divisions had remained during the whole of the action, which, strictly speaking, was confined to the heights above Tudela. Palafox was not in the battle, and O'Neil, with the right wing and the centre, fled to Zaragoza with such speed, that some of the fugitives are said to have arrived there the same evening.

When La Peña was driven back upon Tarazona, the left wing had commenced an orderly retreat towards Borja, when some cavalry, detached by Ney from the side of Soria, coming in sight, caused great confusion; a magazine blew up, in the midst of the disorder cries of treason were heard, the columns dissolved in a few moments, and the road to Borja was covered with a disorganized multitude. This ended the celebrated battle of Tudela, in which forty thousand men were beaten and dispersed by an effort that, being in itself neither very vigorous nor well sustained, was nevertheless sufficient to demonstrate the incapacity of Spanish generals, and the want of steadiness in Spanish soldiers.

Several thousand prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, and all the ammunition and baggage, fell into the hands of the French, who rated the killed and wounded very high. The total loss may be estimated at eight or nine thousand men.* Fifteen thousand escaped to Zaragoza, a detachment of two thousand, under the comde de Cartoajal and general Lilli, left in the mountains of Nalda, were cut off by the result of the action, and two divisions, whose numbers were increased by fugitives from the others, were rallied at Calatayud on the 25th, but they were half starved and mutinous. At Calatayud, Castaños received two despatches from the central junta, virtually restoring him to the command, for the first empowered him to unite the Aragonese army with his own, and the second desired him to co-operate with St. Juan in the Somosierra to protect the capital.† The battle of Tudela disposed of the first despatch, the second induced Castaños to march by Sigüenza upon Madrid.

In the meantime, Napoleon, recalling the greatest part of his cavalry from the open country of Castille, and having left seven or eight thousand men in Burgos, had fixed his head-quarters at Aranda de Duero on the 23d; but from the difficulty of transmitting despatches through a country in a state of insurrection, intelligence of the victory at Tudela only reached him on the 26th, and he was exceedingly discontented that Castaños should have escaped the hands of Ney.‡ That marshal had been instructed to reach Soria by the 21st, to remain there until Lasnes should be in front of the

* Castanos' Vindication.

† Castanos' Account of the Battle of Tudela.

‡ Ibid. || Ibid. and his Vindication.

* Eleventh Bulletin. Victoires et Conquêtes.

† Castanos' Account of the Battle of Tudela, and Vindication.

‡ S. Journal of operations. MS. Eleventh Bulletin.

Spaniards, and then to pass by Agreda, and intercept the retreat of the latter, and on the evening of the 21st, general Jomini and colonel D'Esmeard, staff-officers of the sixth corps, arrived with an escort of eighty cavalry at Scria. This town is situated upon a rocky height, with a suburb below, and the conde de Cartoajal, who was retiring from the mountains of Nalda, happening to be in the upper part, the magistrates endeavoured to entrap the French officers. For this purpose, they were met at dusk by the municipality, and invited to enter the town with great appearance of cordiality; but their suspicions were excited, the plan failed, Cartoajal marched during the night, and the next day the sixth corps occupied the place.

General Jomini, whose profound knowledge of the theory of war enabled him to judge accurately of the events that were likely to occur, urged Ney to continue his march upon Calatayud, without any rest; the marshal, however, either offended with the heat of Jomini's manner, or from some other cause, resolved to follow the letter of his instructions, and remained at Soria the 23d and 24th, merely sending out some light cavalry on the side of Medina Celi and Agreda. On the 25th he marched to the latter town, and the 26th crossed the field of battle, passing through Cascante; the 27th, he arrived with one division, at Mallen, a town between Tudela and Zaragoza, his advanced guard being at Arlazon on the Xalon.* To the erroneous direction and dilatory nature of these movements, Castaños owed the safety of the troops, which were reassembled at Calatayud.

Ney must have been acquainted with the result of the battle on the 25th, and it is remarkable that he should have continued on the road towards Agreda, when a single march by Medina Celi would have brought him upon the line of retreat from Calatayud to Sigüenza. By some writers these errors have been attributed to Ney's jealousy of marshal Lasnes; by others it has been asserted that the plunder of Soria detained him. The falsehood of the latter charge is, however, evident from the fact, that with the exception of a requisition for some shoes and great coats, no contribution was exacted from Soria, and no pillage took place at all; and with respect to the former accusation, a better explanation may be found in the peculiar disposition of this extraordinary man, who was notoriously indolent, and unlearned in the abstract science of war. It was necessary for him to see, in order to act, and his character seemed to be asleep until some imminent danger aroused all the marvellous energy and fortitude with which nature had endowed him.

The success at Tudela fell short of what Napoleon had a right to expect from his previous dispositions, yet it sufficed to break the Spanish strength on that side, and to lay open Aragon, Navarre, and New Castille, as the northern part of Spain had been before opened by the victory of Espinosa. From the frontiers of France to those of Portugal, from the sea-coast to the Tagus, the country was now overwhelmed: Madrid, Zaragoza, and the British army, indeed, lifted their heads a little way above the rising waters, but the eye looked in vain for an efficient barrier against the flood, which still poured on with unabated fury. And as the divided, weak state of the English troops led the emperor to conclude that sir John Moore would instantly retire into Portugal, he ordered Lasnes to pursue Palafox—to seize the important position of Monte Torrero—to summon Zaragoza, and to offer a complete amnesty to all persons in the town, without reservation, thus bearing testimony to the gallantry of the first defence. His own attention was fixed on Madrid. That capital was the rallying point of all the broken Spanish, and of all his own pursuing divisions, and

it was the centre of all interests; a commanding height from whence a beneficial stream of political benefits might descend to allay, or a driving storm of war pour down to extinguish the fire of insurrection.*

CHAPTER II.

Napoleon marches against the capital; forces the pass of the Somosierra—St Juan murdered by his men—Tumults in Madrid—French army arrives there; the Retiro stormed—Town capitulates—Remains of Castanos's army driven across the Tagus; retire to Cuenca—Napoleon explains his policy to the nobles, clergy, and tribunals of Madrid—His vast plans, enormous force—Defenceless state of Spain.

THE French patrols sent towards the Somosierra ascertained, on the 21st, that above six thousand men were entrenching themselves in the gorge of the mountains; that a small camp at Sepulveda blocked the roads leading upon Segovia; and that general Heredia was preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon having, however, resolved to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue the army of the centre without intermission, and directed the fourth corps to continue its march from Carrion by Palencia, Valladolid, Olmedo, and Segovia. The movement of this corps is worthy of the attention of military men. We shall find it confusing the spies and country people—overawing the flat country of Leon and Castille—protecting the right flank of the army—menacing Galicia and Salamanca—keeping the heads of Moore's and Baird's columns from advancing and rendering it dangerous for them to attempt a junction—threatening the line of Hope's march from the Tagus to the Guadarama—dispersing Heredia's corps, and finally turning the pass of Somosierra, without ever ceasing to belong to the concentric movement of the great army upon Madrid.

But the time lost in transmitting intelligence of the victory at Tudela was productive of serious consequences.† The officer despatched with these fresh instructions, found Ney and Moncey (Lasnes was sick at Tudela), each advanced two days' march in the wrong direction. The first, as we have seen, was at Mallen, preparing to attack Zaragoza; the second was at Almunio, near Calatayud, pursuing Castaños. They were consequently obliged to countermarch, and during the time thus lost, the people of Zaragoza, recovering from the consternation into which they were at first thrown by the appearance of the flying troops, made arrangements for a vigorous defence. Castaños also escaped to Sigüenza, without any further loss than what was inflicted in a slight action at Burvieca, where general Maurice Mathieu's division came up with his rear-guard.

The emperor quitted Aranda on the 28th with the guards, the first corps, and the reserve, and marched towards Somosierra. Head-quarters were at Boucequillas on the 29th, and a detachment being sent to attack the camp at Sepulveda, was beaten, with a loss of fifty or sixty men; yet, the Spaniards, struck with a panic after the action, quitted their post, which was very strong, and fled in disorder towards Segovia. The 30th, the French advanced guard reached the foot of the Somosierra, where general St. Juan, whose force now amounted to ten or twelve thousand men, was judiciously posted. Sixteen pieces of artillery, planted in the neck of the pass, swept the road along the whole ascent, which was exceedingly steep and favourable for the defence; the infantry, advantageously placed on the right and left, were in lines, one above another, and some entrenchments, made in the more open parts, strengthened the whole position.

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

† Ibid.

PASSAGE OF THE SOMOSIERRA.*

At day-break, three French battalions attacked St. Juan's right, three more assailed his left, and as many marched along the causeway in the centre, supported by six guns. The French wings, spreading over the mountain side, commenced a warm skirmishing fire, which was as warmly returned, while the frowning battery at the top of the causeway was held in readiness to crush the central column, when it should come within range. At that moment Napoleon rode into the mouth of the pass, and attentively examined the scene before him; the infantry were making no progress, and a thick fog mixed with smoke hung upon the ascent; suddenly, as if by inspiration, he ordered the Polish cavalry of his guard to charge up the causeway, and seize the Spanish battery. In an instant the foremost ranks of the first squadron were levelled with the earth by the fire of the great battery, and the remainder were thrown into confusion, but general Krazinski as suddenly rallied them, and covered by the smoke and the morning vapour led them sword in hand up to the mountain. As these gallant horsemen passed, the Spanish infantry on each side fired and fled towards the summit of the causeway, and when the Poles, cutting down the gunners, took the battery, the whole army was in flight abandoning arms, ammunition, and baggage.

This surprising exploit, in the glory it conferred upon one party, and the disgrace it heaped upon the other, can hardly be paralleled in the annals of war. It is indeed almost incredible, even to those who are acquainted with Spanish armies, that a position, in itself nearly impregnable, and defended by twelve thousand men, should, without any panic, but merely from a deliberate sense of danger, be abandoned, at the wild charge of a few squadrons, which two companies of good infantry would have effectually stopped: yet some of the Spanish regiments so shamefully beaten here, had been victorious at Baylen a few months before, and general St. Juan's dispositions at Somosierra were far better than Reding's at the former battle! The charge itself, viewed as a simple military operation, was extravagantly rash; but taken as the result of Napoleon's sagacious estimate of the real value of Spanish troops, and his promptitude in seizing the advantage offered by the smoke and fog that clung to the side of the mountain, it was a most felicitous example of intuitive genius. The routed troops were pursued towards Buitrago by the French cavalry. St. Juan himself broke through the French on the side of Sepulveda, and gained the camp of Heredia at Segovia, but the cavalry of the fourth corps approached, and the two generals crossing the Guadarama, united some of the fugitives from Somosierra, on the Madrid side of the mountains, and were about to enter that capital, when the appearance of a French patrol terrified the vile cowards that followed them; the multitude once more fled to Talavera de la Reyna, and there consummated their intolerable villany by murdering their unfortunate general, and fixing his mangled body to a tree, after which, dispersing, they carried dishonour and fear into their respective provinces.*

The Somosierra being forced, the imperial army came down from the mountains—the sixth corps hastened on from the side of Alcalá and Guadalaxara—the central junta fled from Aranjuez, and the remnant of the forces under Castaños, being intercepted on the side of Madrid, and pressed by Ney in the rear, turned towards the Tagus. The junta flying with indecent haste, spread a thousand false reports, and with more than ordinary pertinacity, endeavoured to deceive the people and the English general; a task in which they were strongly aided by the weak credulity of Mr. Frère,

the British plenipotentiary, who accompanied them in their flight toward Badajoz; Mr. Stuart, however, being endowed with greater discretion and firmness, remained at Madrid until the enemy had actually commenced the investment of that town.

Castaños, after the combat of Burvieca, had continued his retreat unmolested by Ney, who never recovered the time lost by the false movement upon Malen; but although the Spaniards escaped the sword, their numbers daily diminished, their sufferings increased, and their insubordination kept pace with their privations. At Alcazar del Rey, Castaños resigned the command to general La-Peña, and proceeded to Truxillo himself, with an escort of thirty infantry and fifteen dragoons, a number scarcely sufficient to protect his life from the ferocity of the peasants, who were stirred up and prepared, by the falsehoods of the central junta, and the villany of the deserters, to murder him.* Meanwhile Madrid was in a state of anarchy seldom equalled. A local and military junta were formed to conduct the defence, the inhabitants took arms, a multitude of peasants from the neighbourhood entered the place, and the regular forces, commanded by the marquis of Castellar, amounted to six thousand men, with a train of sixteen guns; the pavement was taken up, the streets were barricaded, the houses were pierced, and the Retiro, a weak irregular work, which commanded the city, was occupied in strength. Don Thomas Morla and the prince of Castelfranco were the chief men in authority; the people demanded ammunition, and when they received it, discovered, or said, that it was mixed with sand, and as some person accused the marquis of Perales, a respectable old general, of the deed, a mob rushed to his house, murdered him, and dragged his body about the streets; many others of inferior note also fell victims to this fury, for no man was safe, none dared assume authority to control, none dared give honest advice; the houses were thrown open, the bells of the convent and churches rung incessantly, and a band of ferocious armed men traversed the streets in all the madness of popular insurrection. Eight days had now elapsed since the first preparations for defence were made, and each day the public effervescence had increased, the dominion of the mob had become more decisive, their violence more uncontrollable; the hubbub was extreme, when, on the morning of the 2d of December, three heavy divisions of French cavalry suddenly appeared on the high ground to the north-west, and like a dark cloud overhanging the troubled city.

At twelve o'clock the emperor arrived, and the duke of Istria, by his command, summoned the town, but the officer employed was upon the point of being massacred by the irregulars, when the Spanish soldiers, ashamed of such conduct, rescued him. This determination to resist was, however, notwithstanding the fierceness displayed at the gates, very unpalatable to many of the householders, numbers of whom escaped from different quarters;† deserters also came over to the French, and Napoleon, while waiting for his infantry, examined all the weak points of the city.

Madrid was for many reasons incapable of defence. There were no bulwarks; the houses, although strong and well built, were not, like many Spanish towns, fire proof; there were no outworks, and the heights on which the French cavalry were posted, the palace, and the Retiro, completely commanded the city; the perfectly open country around would have enabled the French cavalry to discover and cut off all convoys, and no precaution had been taken to provide subsistence for the hundred and fifty thousand people contained within the circuit of the place. The desire of the central junta, that this metropolis should risk the hor-

* Colonel Graham's Correspondence.

* Castanos' Vindication.

† Fourteenth Bulletin.

rors of a storm, was therefore equally silly and barbarous; their own criminal apathy had deprived Madrid of the power of procrastinating its defence until relieved from without, and there was no sort of analogy between the situation of Zaragoza and this capital. Napoleon knew it well; he was not a man to plunge headlong into the streets of a great city, among an armed and excited population; he knew that address in negotiation, a little patience, and a judicious employment of artillery, would soon reduce the most outrageous to submission, and he had no wish to destroy the capital of his brother's kingdom.

In the evening the infantry and artillery arrived, and were posted at the most favourable points. The night was clear and bright, and in the French camp all was silent and watchful, but a tumultuous noise was heard from every quarter of the city, as if some mighty beast was struggling and howling in the toils.* At midnight a second summons was sent through the medium of a prisoner, and the captain-general Castellar attempted to gain time by an equivocal reply; but the French light troops stormed the nearest houses, and one battery of thirty guns opened against the Retiro, while another threw shells from the opposite quarter, to distract the attention of the inhabitants. This building, situated on a rising ground, was connected with another range of buildings erected on the same side of the Prado, which is a public walk nearly encircling the town, and into which some of the principal streets opened, upon the above mentioned range. In the morning, a practicable breach was made in the Retiro wall, and the difference between military courage and ferocity became apparent; for Villatte's division breaking in, easily routed the garrison, and, pursuing its success, seized all the public buildings connected with it, and then crossing the Prado, gained the barriers erected at the entrance of the streets, and took possession of the immense palace of the duke of Medina Celi, which was in itself the key to the city on that side.

Such a vigorous commencement created great terror, the town was summoned for the third time, and in the afternoon, Morla and another officer came out to demand a suspension of arms, necessary, they said, to persuade the people to surrender. The emperor addressed Morla in terms of great severity, reproaching him for his scandalous conduct towards Dupont's army. 'Injustice and bad faith,' he exclaimed, 'always recoil upon those who are guilty of either.' A saying well applied to that Spaniard, and Napoleon himself confirmed its philosophic truth in after times. 'The Spanish ulcer destroyed me!' was an expression of deep anguish which escaped from him in his own hour of misfortune.

Morla returned to the town, his story was soon told: before six o'clock the next morning Madrid must surrender or perish! Dissensions arose. The violent excitement of the populace was considerably abated, but the armed peasantry from the country, and the poorest inhabitants still demanded to be led against the enemy, and a constant fire was kept up from the houses in the neighbourhood of the Prado, by which the French general Maison was wounded, and general Bruyeres killed. Nevertheless the disposition to fight became each moment weaker, and finally Morla and Castelfranco prepared a capitulation; the captain-general Castellar, however, refused to sign it, and as the town was only invested on one side, he effected his escape with the regular troops during the night, carrying with him sixteen guns. The people then sunk into a quiescent state, and at eight o'clock in the morning of the 4th, Madrid surrendered.

That Morla was a traitor there is no doubt, and his personal cowardice was excessive; but Castelfranco appears to have been rather weak and ignorant than treacherous, and certainly the surrender of Madrid was

no proof of his guilt; that event was inevitable. The boasting uproar of the multitude, when they are permitted to domineer for a few days, is not enthusiasm; the retreat of Castellar with the troops of the line during the progress of the negotiation was the wisest course to pursue, and proves that he acquiesced in the propriety of surrendering. That the people neither could nor would defend the city is quite evident; for it is incredible that Morla and Castelfranco should have been able to carry through a capitulation in so short a period, if the generals, the regular troops, the armed peasantry, and the inhabitants, had been all, or even a part of them, determined to resist.

Napoleon, cautious of giving offence to a population so lately and so violently excited, carefully provided against any sudden reaction, and preserved the strictest discipline; a soldier of the imperial guard was shot in one of the squares for having a plundered watch in his possession; the infantry were placed in barracks and convents, the cavalry were kept ready to scour the streets on the first alarm, and the Spaniards were all disarmed. The emperor then fixed his own quarters at Chamartin, a country house four miles from Madrid, and in a few days everything presented the most tranquil appearance, the shops were opened, the public amusements recommenced, and the theatres were frequented. The inhabitants of capital cities are easily moved, and easily calmed, self-interest and sensual indulgence unfit them for noble and sustained efforts; they can be violent, ferocious, cruel, but are seldom constant and firm.

During the operations against Madrid, La-Peña, after escaping from the sixth corps, arrived at Guadalajara with about five thousand men; on the 2d, the dukes of Infantado and Albuquerque leaving the capital, joined him; and, on the 4th, Venegas came up with two thousand men. While these generals were hesitating what course to pursue, Napoleon, apprized of their vicinity, directed Bessieres with sixteen squadrons upon Guadalajara, supporting him by Ruffin's division of the first corps; at the approach of this cavalry, the main body retired through the hills by Santorcaz towards Aranjuez, and the artillery crossed the Tagus at Sacedon; Ruffin's division immediately changed its direction, and cut the Spaniards off from La Mancha by the line of Ocaña. Meanwhile a mutiny among the Spanish troops forced La-Peña to resign, and the duke of Infantado was chosen in his place. The Tagus was then crossed at several points, and after some slight actions with the advanced cavalry of the French, this miserable body of men finally saved themselves at Cuenca, where many deserters and fugitives, and the brigades of Cartoajal and Lilli, which had escaped the different French columns, also arrived, and the duke proceeded to organize another army.

On the French side, the fourth corps reached Segovia, passed the Guadarama, dispersed some armed peasants assembled at the Escorial, and then marched toward Almaraz, to attack general Galluzzo, who, having assembled five or six thousand men to defend the left bank of the Tagus, had, with the usual skill of a Spanish general, occupied a line of forty miles.* The first French corps entered La Mancha at the same time, and Toledo immediately shut its gates; but, although the junta of that town publicly proclaimed their resolution to bury themselves under the ruins of the city, at the approach of a French division, they betrayed a most contemptible cowardice. Thus, six weeks had sufficed to dissipate the Spanish armies; the glittering bubble was burst, and a terrible reality remained. From St. Sebastian to the Asturias, from the Asturias to Talavera de la Reyna, from Talavera to the gates of the noble city of Zaragoza, all was submission, and beyond that boundary, all was apathy or dread. Ten

* Fourteenth Bulletin.

* Sir John Moore's Papers.

thousand French soldiers could safely, as regarded the Spaniards, have marched from one extremity of the Peninsula to the other.

After the fall of Madrid, king Joseph remained at Burgos, issuing proclamations, and carrying on a sort of underplot, through the medium of his native ministers; the views of the latter naturally turned towards the Spanish interests as distinct from the French, and a source of infinite mischief to Joseph's cause was thus opened, for that monarch, anxious to please and conciliate his subjects, ceased to be a Frenchman without becoming a Spaniard. At this time, however, Napoleon assumed and exercised all the rights of conquest, and it is evident, from the tenor of his speeches, proclamations, and decrees, that some ulterior project, in which the king's personal interests were not concerned, was contemplated by him. It appeared as if he wished the nation, in imitation of the old king, to offer the crown to himself a second time, that he might obtain a plausible excuse for adopting a new line of policy by which to attract the people, or at least to soften their pride, which was now the main obstacle to his success.

An assemblage of the nobles, the clergy, the corporations, and the tribunals of Madrid, waited upon him at Chamartin, and presented an address, in which they expressed their desire to have Joseph among them again.* The emperor's reply was an exposition of the principles upon which Spain was to be governed, and offers a fine field for reflection upon the violence of those passions which induce men to resist positive good, and eagerly seek for danger, misery, and death, rather than resign their prejudices.

'I accept,' said he, 'the sentiments of the town of Madrid. I regret the misfortunes that have befallen it, and I hold it as a particular good fortune that I am enabled, under the circumstances of the moment, to spare that city, and to save it from yet greater misfortunes.'

'I have hastened to take measures fit to tranquillize all classes of citizens, knowing well that to all people, and to all men, uncertainty is intolerable.'

'I have preserved the religious orders, but I have restrained the number of monks; no sane person can doubt that they are too numerous. Those who are truly called to this vocation by the grace of God will remain in their convents; those who have lightly or from worldly motives adopted it, will have their existence secured among the secular ecclesiastics, from the surplus of the convents.'

'I have provided for the wants of the most interesting and useful of the clergy, the parish priests.'

'I have abolished that tribunal against which Europe and the age alike exclaimed. Priests ought to guide consciences, but they should not exercise any exterior or corporal jurisdiction over men.'

'I have taken the satisfaction which was due to myself and to my nation, and the part of vengeance is completed. Ten of the principal criminals bend their heads before her; but for all others there is absolute and entire pardon.'

'I have suppressed the rights usurped by the nobles during civil wars, when the kings have been too often obliged to abandon their own rights to purchase tranquillity and the repose of their people.'

'I have suppressed the feudal rights, and every person can now establish inns, mills, ovens, weirs, and fisheries, and give free play to their industry; only observing the laws and customs of the place. The self-love, the riches, and the prosperity of a small number of men, was more hurtful to your agriculture than the heats of the dog-days.'

'As there is but one God, there should be in one estate but one justice; wherefore all the particular

jurisdictions having been usurped, and being contrary to the national rights, I have destroyed them. I have also made known to all persons that which each can have to fear, and that which they may hope for.'

'The English armies I will drive from the Peninsula. Zaragoza, Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced either by persuasion or by the force of arms.'

'There is no obstacle capable of retarding for any length of time the execution of my will. But that which is above my power, is to constitute the Spaniards a nation, under the orders of the king, if they continue to be imbued with the principle of division, and of hatred towards France, such as the English partizans and the enemies of the continent have instilled into them. I cannot establish a nation, a king, and Spanish independence, if that king is not sure of the affection and fidelity of his subjects.'

'The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe. The divisions in the royal family were concerted by the English; it was not either king Charles or his favorite, but the duke of Infantado, the instrument of England, that was upon the point of overturning the throne. The papers recently found in his house prove this; it was the preponderance of England that they wished to establish in Spain. Insensate project! which would have produced a land war without end, and caused torrents of blood to be shed.'

'No power influenced by England can exist upon the continent; if any desire it, their desire is folly, and sooner or later will ruin them; I shall be obliged to govern Spain, and it will be easy for me to do it by establishing a viceroy in each province. However, I will not refuse to concede my rights of conquest to the king, and to establish him in Madrid, when the thirty thousand citizens assemble in the churches, and on the holy sacrament take an oath, not with the mouth alone, but with the heart, and without any jesuitical restriction, "to be true to the king, to love and to support him." Let the priests from the pulpit and in the confessional, the tradesmen in their correspondence and their discourses, inculcate these sentiments in the people; then I will relinquish my rights of conquest, then I will place the king upon the throne, and I will take a pleasure in showing myself the faithful friend of the Spaniards.'

'The present generation may differ in opinions; too many passions have been excited; but your descendants will bless me as the regenerator of the nation: they will mark my sojourn among you as memorable days, and from those days they will date the prosperity of Spain. These are my sentiments, go consult your fellow citizens, choose your part, but do it frankly, and exhibit only true colours.'

The ten criminals were the dukes of Infantado, of Híjar, Medini Celi, and Ossuna; marquis Santa Cruz; counts Fernán, Miñez, and Altamira; prince of Castello Franco, Pedro Cevallos, and the bishop of St. Ander, were proscribed, body and goods, as traitors to France and Spain.

Napoleon now made dispositions indicating a vast plan of operations. It would appear that he intended to invade Galicia, Andalusia, and Valencia, by his lieutenants, and to carry his arms to Lisbon in person. Upon the 20th December the sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve, were assembled under his own immediate control. The first corps was stationed at Toledo, and the light cavalry attached to it scoured the roads leading to Andalusia, up to the foot of the Sierra Morena. The fourth corps was at Talavera, on the march towards the frontier of Portugal. The second corps was on the Carrion river, preparing to advance against Galicia. The eighth corps was broken up: the divisions composing it were ordered to join the second, and Junot, who commanded it, repaired to the third corps, to supply the place of marshal Momey, who was called to Madrid for a particular service,—doubt-

less an expedition against Valencia. The fifth corps, which had arrived at Vittoria, was directed to reinforce the third, then employed against Zaragoza. The seventh was always in Catalonia.

Vast as this plan of campaign appears, it was not beyond the emperor's means; for, without taking into consideration his own genius, activity, and vigour, there were on his muster rolls, above three hundred and thirty thousand men, and above sixty thousand horses; two hundred pieces of field artillery followed the corps to battle, and as many more remained in reserve. Of this monstrous army, two hundred and fifty-five thousand men, and fifty thousand horses, were actually under arms, with their different regiments, while thirty-two thousand were detached or in garrisons, preserving tranquillity in the rear, and guarding the communications of the active force. The remainder were in hospital, and so slight had been the resistance of the Spanish armies, that only nineteen hundred prisoners were to be deducted from this multitude. Of the whole host two hundred and thirteen thousand were native Frenchmen, the residue were Poles, Germans, and Italians; thirty-five thousand men and five thousand horses, were available for fresh enterprise, without taking a single man from the service of the lines of communication. What was there to oppose this fearful array? What consistency or vigour in the councils? What numbers? What discipline and spirit in the armies of Spain? What enthusiasm among the people? What was the disposition, the means, what the activity of the allies of that country? The answers to these questions demonstrate that the fate of the Peninsula hung at this moment upon a thread, and that the deliverance of that country was due to other causes than the courage, the patriotism, or the constancy of the Spaniards.

First, with regard to their armies. The duke of Infantado resided with, rather than commanded, a few thousand wretched fugitives at Cuenca, destitute, mutinous, and cowed in spirit. At Valencia there was no army, for that which belonged to the province was shut up in Zaragoza, and dissensions had arisen between Palafox and the local junta in consequence.* In the passes of the Sierra Morena were five thousand raw levies, hastily made by the junta of Seville, after the defeat of St. Juan. Galluzzo, who had undertaken to defend the Tagus, with six thousand timid and ill-armed soldiers, was at this time in flight, having been suddenly attacked and defeated at Almaraz by a detachment of the fourth corps. Romana was near Leon, at the head of eighteen or twenty thousand runaways, collected by him after the dispersion at Reynosa;† but of this number only five thousand were armed, and none were subordinate, or capable of being disciplined, for, when checked for misconduct, the marquis complained that they deserted. In Galicia there was no army, and in the Asturias the local government were so corrupt, so faithless, and so oppressive, that the spirit of the people was crushed, and patriotism reduced to a name.

The members of the central junta had at first thought of going to Badajos, but, being terrified, fled to Seville,‡ and their inactivity was more conspicuous in this season of adversity than before, contrasting strangely with the pompous and inflated language of their public papers: all their promises were fallacious, their incapacity glaring, their exertions ridiculous, abortive, and the junta of Seville, still actuated by their own ambitious views, had now openly reassumed all their former authority. In short, the strength and spirit of Spain was broken, the enthusiasm was null, except in a few places, and the emperor was, with respect to the Span-

iards, perfectly master of operations. He was in the centre of the country; he held the capital, the fortresses, the command of the great lines of communication between the provinces; and on the wide military horizon, no cloud intercepted his view, save the heroic city of Zaragoza on the one side, and a feeble British army on the other. Sooner or later, he observed, and with truth, that the former must fall, as it was an affair of artillery calculation. The latter he naturally supposed to be in full retreat for Portugal; but as the fourth corps was nearer to Lisbon than the British general, a hurried retreat alone could bring the latter in time to that capital, and consequently no preparations for defence could be made sufficient to arrest the sixty thousand Frenchmen which the emperor could carry there at the same moment. The subjugation of Spain appeared inevitable, when the genius and vigour of Sir J. Moore frustrated Napoleon's plans at the very moment of execution; the Austrian war breaking out at the instant, drew the master-spirit from the scene of contention, and England then put forth her vast resources, which being fortunately wielded by a general equal to the task of delivering the Peninsula, it was delivered. But through what changes of fortune, by what unexpected helps, by what unlooked-for and extraordinary events, under what difficulties, by whose perseverance, and in despite of whose errors, let posterity judge, for in that judgment only will impartiality and justice be found.

CHAPTER III.

Sir John Moore arrives at Salamanca; hears of the battle of Espinosa—His dangerous position; discovers the real state of affairs; contemplates a hardy enterprise; hears of the defeat at Tudela; resolves to retreat; waits for general Hope's division—Danger of that general; his able conduct—Central junta fly to Badajos—Mr. Frere, incapable of judging rightly, opposes the retreat; his weakness and levity; insults the general; sends Colonel Charnilly to Salamanca—Manly conduct of sir John Moore; his able and bold plan of operations.

OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

WHILE at Madrid, Napoleon heard that sir John Moore, having relinquished his communication with Lisbon, was menacing the French line of operations on the side of Burgos; this intelligence obliged him to suspend all his designs against the south of Spain and Portugal, and to fix his whole attention upon that general's movements. The reasons which induced Moore to divide his army, and to send general Hope with one column by the Tagus, while the other marched under his own personal command, by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, have been already related; as likewise the arrangements which brought sir David Baird to Coruña, without having permission to land his troops, and without money to equip them, when they were suffered to disembark.

The 8th of November, sir John Moore was at Almeida, on the frontier of Portugal, his artillery was at Truxillo, in Spanish Estremadura, and sir David Baird's division was at Coruña. General Blake, pursued by fifty thousand enemies, was that day flying from Nava to Espinosa; Castaños and Palafox were quarrelling at Tudela. The conde de Belvedere was at Burgos, with thirteen thousand bad troops, and Napoleon was at Vittoria, with one hundred and seventy thousand good troops.

At this time the letters of lord William Bentinck and colonel Graham, exposing all the imprudence of the Spanish generals, were received, and disquieted the English general. He already foresaw that his junction with the other divisions of his army might be impeded by the result of an action, which the Span-

* Infantado's Letters. Narrative of Moore's Campaign. Stuart's and Frere's Letters. † Sir John Moore's Papers.

‡ Stuart.

iards appeared to be courting, contrary to all sound policy; but as no misfortune had yet befallen them, he continued his march, hoping 'that all the bad which might happen, would not happen.'

The 11th he crossed the frontier of Spain, and marched to Ciudad Rodrigo; on that day Blake was completely discomfited at Espinosa, and the Estremaduran army, beaten the day before at Gamonal, was utterly ruined and dispersed.

The 13th the head of the British columns entered Salamanca, at the moment when Blake's fugitive force was finally disorganized at Reynosa, leaving the first, second, and fourth, French corps, amounting to near seventy thousand men, free to act against any quarter.

Sir John Moore participated at first in the universal belief, that the nation was enthusiastic, and fixed in a determination to dispute every step with the invaders; and after he had detected the exaggerations of the military agents, and perceived the want of capacity in the Spanish generals and rulers, he still trusted that the spirit of the people would compensate for their deficiency of skill. What then was his surprise to find, that the defeat of the conde de Belvedere, an event which laid Castille open to the incursions of the enemy, which uncovered the march of the British, and compromised their safety, had created no sensation among the people; that the authorities had spread no alarm, taken no precautions, delivered out no arms, although many thousands were stored in the principal towns, and neither encouraged the inhabitants by proclamations, nor enrolled any of them for defence! He himself was not informed of this important occurrence until a week after it happened, and then only through a single official channel.

Valladolid, where the enemy's cavalry were, was but three marches from Salamanca, and as not more than four thousand of Moore's infantry had come up to the latter town, it was evident that if the French advanced in force, the British must fall back towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Nevertheless the general, assembling the local authorities, explained the nature of his position, endeavoured to excite their ardour, and, notwithstanding the apathetic state of the public mind, resolved not to retire unless forced back by superior numbers; he even hastened the arrival of his rear divisions, but sent orders to both Hope and Baird to concentrate their troops and be prepared for a retreat. His exhortations produced no effect upon the junta or the people; the former were stupefied and timid, the latter, although declaring their hatred of the invaders, would not stir in defence; the first feeling of indignation against the French was exhausted, and there was nothing to supply its place; the fugitives from the armies passed daily without shame, and unrepined by their countrymen. In this state the English general remained until the 18th, his army was closing up, and the French cavalry withdrew from Valladolid to Palencia, when the news of Blake's defeat reached Salamanca, not by rumour, or by any direct communication from the Montaña St. Ander, but through Mr. Stuart, eight days subsequent to the date of the action; the central junta did not even inform the minister plenipotentiary until thirty hours after having received official intelligence of it themselves.*

Want of transport and supplies had obliged the British to march in small and successive divisions, it was, therefore, the 23d of November before the centre, consisting of twelve thousand infantry, and a battery of six guns, was concentrated at Salamanca. On that day, Castaños and Palafox being defeated at Tudela, and their armies scattered without a chance of rallying again in the field, the third and sixth French corps became disposable. The emperor also, victorious on both flanks, and with a fresh base of operations fixed

at Burgos, was then free to move, with the guards and the reserve, either against Madrid or in the direction of Salamanca; detachments of his army were already in possession of Valladolid, the very town which, a few days before, the Spanish government had indicated for the base of sir John Moore's operations, and the formation of his magazines.* The 26th the head of sir David Baird's column was in Astorga, but the rear extended beyond Lugo, while the head of Hope's division was at the Escorial, and the rear at Talavera. But the second French corps was on the Deba, threatening Leon and the Asturias; the cavalry covered the plains; the fourth corps was descending by Carrion and Valladolid, to seize the pass of the Guadarama; the emperor himself was preparing to force the Somosierra.

From this summary of contemporary events, it is evident, that, notwithstanding sir John Moore had organised, equipped, and supplied his army, and marched four hundred miles, all in the space of six weeks, he was too late in the field; the campaign was decided against the Spaniards before the British had, strictly speaking, entered Spain as an army. And it is certain, that if, instead of being at Salamanca, Escorial, and Astorga, on the 23d, the troops had been united at Burgos on the 8th, such was the weakness of the Spanish forces, the strength of the enemy, and such the skill with which Napoleon directed his movements, that a difficult and precarious retreat was the utmost favour that could be expected from Fortune by the English.

Sir John Moore's situation on his arrival at Salamanca, gave rise to serious reflections. He had been sent forward without a plan of operations, or any data upon which to found one; his instructions merely directed him to open communication with the Spanish authorities, for the purpose of 'framing the plan of campaign.' But general Castaños, with whom he was desired to correspond, was superseded immediately afterwards, and the marquis of Romana, his successor, was engaged in rallying the remains of Blake's force in the Asturias, at a distance of two hundred miles from the only army with which any plan of co-operation could be formed, and of whose proceedings he also was ignorant. No channel of intelligence had been pointed out to Moore, and as yet a stranger in the country, and without money, he could not establish any certain one for himself. It was the will of the people of England, and the orders of the government, that he should push forward to the assistance of the Spaniards, and he had done so, without magazines, and without money to form them; trusting to the official assurance of the minister, that above a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers covered his march, that the people were enthusiastic and prepared for any exertion to secure their own deliverance, but he found them supine and unprepared; the French cavalry, in parties as weak as twelve men, traversed the country, and raised contributions, without difficulty or opposition. This was the state of Castille, and the letters of Mr. Stuart and lord William Bentinck amply exposed the incapacity, selfishness, and apathy of the supreme government at Aranjuez. The correspondence of colonel Graham painted in the strongest colours the confusion of affairs on the Ebro, the jealousy, the discord of the generals, the worse than childish folly of the deputy Palafox and his creatures. Sir David Baird's experience proved, that in Galicia the people were inert as in Castille and Leon, and the authorities more absurd and more interested. General Hope expressed a like opinion as to the ineptitude of the central junta; and even the military agents, hitherto so sanguine, had lowered their tone of exultation in a remarkable manner.

Napoleon's enormous force was unknown to sir John

* Mr. Frer's Letter to the Junta.

* Sir John Moore's Papers.

Moore, but he knew that it could not be less than eighty thousand fighting men, and that thirty thousand more were momentarily expected, and might have arrived; he knew that Blake and the conde de Belvedere were totally defeated, and that Castaños must inevitably be so if he hesitated to retreat. The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts was, that the Spaniards were unable, or unwilling, to resist the enemy, and that the British would have to support the contest alone, unless they could form a junction with Castaños, before the latter was entirely discomfited and destroyed; but there was no time for such an operation, and the first object was, to unite the parcelled divisions of the English army.

From Astorga to Salamanca was five marches; from Salamanca to the Escurial was six marches; but it would have required five days to close up the rear upon Salamanca, six days to enable Hope to concentrate at the Escurial, and sixteen to enable Baird to assemble at Astorga. Hence twenty days were required for the English army to unite and act in a body, and to have advanced in their divided state would have been equally contrary to military principle and to common sense. A retreat, although it was prescribed by the rules of scientific war, and in unison with the instructions of the government, which forbade the general to commit his troops in any serious affair before the whole were united, would have been, while the Spanish army of the centre still held the field, ungenerous: the idea was repugnant to the bold and daring spirit of Moore. Rather than resort to such a remedy for the false position his government had placed him in, he contemplated a hardy and dangerous enterprise, such as none but great minds are capable of. He proposed, if he could draw the extended wings of his army together in good time, to abandon all communication with Portugal, and throwing himself into the heart of Spain, to rally Castaños' army, if it yet existed, upon his own, to defend the southern provinces, and trust to the effect which such an appeal to the patriotism and courage of the Spaniards would produce.

But Moore also considered, that the question was not purely military; the Spanish cause was not one which could be decided by the marches of a few auxiliary troops; its fate rested on the vigour of the rulers, the concert of the generals, the unity of the exertions, and the fixed resolution of the people to suffer all privations, and die rather than submit; to him it appeared doubtful that such a spirit, or the means of creating it, existed, and more doubtful that there was capacity in the government to excite or to direct it when aroused; no men of talent had yet appeared, and good-will was in itself nothing if improperly treated. Wherefore he turned to the English plenipotentiary, who had just superseded Mr. Stuart near the central junta; for he had been directed by the ministers to communicate with him upon all important points, to receive with deference his opinion and advice, and the present was an occasion to which those instructions were peculiarly applicable. Mr. Frere had come fresh from the English government, he was acquainted with its views, he was in the most suitable position to ascertain what degree of elasticity the Spanish cause really possessed, and the decision of the question belonged as much to him as to the general, because it involved the whole policy of the English cabinet with respect to Spain; it was likewise the more proper to consult him because, as a simple operation of war, the proposed movement was rash. All the military and many political reasons called for a retreat upon Portugal, which would take the army back upon its own resources, ensure its concentration, increase its strength, protect British interests, and leave it free either to return to Spain, if a favourable opportunity should occur, or to pass by sea to Andalusia, and commence the campaign in the south.

Such were the reflections that induced sir John Moore to solicit Mr. Frere's opinion upon the general policy of the proposed operation. But in so doing he never had the least intention of consulting him upon the mode of executing the military part, of which he conceived himself to be the best judge, and while awaiting the reply, he directed sir David Baird, if the enemy showed no disposition to molest him, to push the troops on to Salamanca as fast as they should arrive at Astorga. Sir David was proceeding to do so, when Blake advised him that a considerable French force was collecting at Rio Seco and Ampudia, with a view of interrupting the march; this arrested his movement, he was even preparing to fall back, when he was stopped by Moore, whose information led him to believe that Blake's report was false. Valuable time was thus lost, but it was the march of the fourth corps then traversing the line from Carrion to the Guadarama, that gave rise to this contradictory intelligence, for the many various changes in the French positions, and the continual circulation of their light cavalry through the plains, bewildered the spies and the peasants. The force of the enemy on different points also confused the higher agents, who, believing the greatest amount of the invading army to be from a hundred to a hundred and twenty thousand men, could never reconcile the reports with this standard, and therefore concluded that Napoleon exaggerated his real numbers to create terror.

Moore had written to Mr. Frere on the 27th of November, Baird was to march by Benevente on the 1st, and Hope by Tordesillas; the troops at Salamanca by Zamora and Toro, and all the arrangements for the execution of the project were completed when, in the night of the 28th, a despatch from Mr. Stuart made known the disaster at Tudela. This again changed the aspect of affairs; the question proposed to Mr. Frere was no longer doubtful. The projected movement had been founded upon the *chance of rallying the Spanish armies behind the Tagus*, a hazardous and daring experiment when first conceived, but now that Castaños had no longer an army, now that the strength of Spain was utterly broken, to have persisted in it would have been insanity; the French could be over the Tagus before the British, and there were no Spanish armies to rally. The defeat at Tudela took place the 23d of November; Baird's brigades could not be united at Astorga before the 4th of December, and to concentrate the whole of the army at Salamanca, required a flank march of several days over an open plain; an operation not to be thought of, within a few marches of a skilful enemy, who possessed such an overwhelming force of artillery and cavalry.

As long as Castaños and Palafox kept the field, there was reason to believe that the French stationed at Burgos would not make any serious attempt on the side of Astorga, but that check being now removed, an unilitary flank march would naturally draw their attention, and bring them down upon the parcelled divisions of the English troops. The object of succouring the Spaniards called for great, but not for useless sacrifices. The English general was prepared to confront any danger and to execute any enterprise which held out a chance of utility, but he also remembered that the best blood of England was committed to his charge, that not an English army, but the very heart, the pith of the military power of his country was in his keeping, it was entrusted to his prudence, and his patriotism spurned the idea of seeking personal renown by betraying that sacred trust. The political reasons in favour of marching towards Madrid, scarcely balanced the military objections before the battle of Tudela; after that event, the latter acquiring double force, left no room for hesitation in the mind of any man capable of reasoning at all, and sir John Moore resolved to fall back into Portugal.

He ordered sir David Baird to regain Coruña or Vigo, and to carry his troops by sea to Lisbon; yet wishing, if possible, to unite with Hope before the retrograde movement commenced, he directed Baird to show a bold front for a few days in order to attract the enemy's attention. The negligence, the false intelligence, the frauds, the opposition approaching to hostility, experienced by sir David Baird during his march from Coruña, had so reduced that general's hopes, that he prepared for this retreat without reluctance; he was in direct communication with Romana, but the intercourse between them had rather confirmed than weakened the impression on Baird's mind, that it was impossible to depend upon the promises, the information, or the judgment of any Spanish general. In the mean time, Napoleon forced the Somosierra, and summoned Madrid: the supreme junta fled towards Badajoz; St. Juan was murdered at Talavera, the remnant of Castaños's army was driven towards the Tagus; the fourth corps approached Segovia, and sir John Hope's situation became very critical.

His column, consisting of three thousand infantry, nine hundred cavalry, the artillery, and the great parc of ammunition had been obliged, from the want of money and supplies, to move in six divisions, each being a day's march behind the other.* At Almaraz, he endeavoured to discover a way across the mountains to Ciudad Rodrigo, and a road did exist, but the peasants and muleteers declared it to be impracticable for carriages, and consequently unfit for the convoy; the truth of their assertions was much doubted, but sir John was daily losing horses from the glanders, and, with a number but just sufficient to drag his guns and convoy along a good road, he feared to explore a difficult passage over the Sierras.

When his leading division had reached Talavera, don Thomas Morla, then secretary at war, anxious to have the troops more minutely divided, proposed that the regiments should march through Madrid in ten divisions on as many successive days, the first to reach the capital on the 22d of November, which would exactly have brought the convoy into the jaws of the French army.† Hope immediately repaired in person to Madrid, held a conference with Morla, and quickly satisfied himself that every thing was in confusion, and that the Spanish government had neither arranged a general plan, nor was capable of conducting one. Convinced of this unfortunate truth, he paid no attention to Morla's proposition, but carried his troops at once by the road of Naval Carnero to the Escorial, where he halted to close up the rear, and to obtain bullocks to assist in dragging the parc over the Guadarama. The 28th, he crossed the mountain, and entered the open flat country; the 28th and 29th the infantry and guns were at Villa Castin and St. Antonia, the parc was at Espinar, and the cavalry advanced on the road to Arevalo. General Heredia was then at Segovia, but the duke of Dantzic was at Valladolid and Placencia, and his patrols were heard of at Coca, only a few miles from Arevalo, and in the course of the day a despatch from Mr. Stuart announced the catastrophe at Tudela, and the dispersion of the camp at Sepulveda; at the same time the outposts of cavalry in the front reported that four hundred French horse were at Olmedo, only twelve miles from Arevalo, and that four thousand others were in the neighbourhood; the scouts at St. Garcia, on the right, also tracked the French again at Añaya, near Segovia.

Hope's situation was now truly embarrassing. If he fell back to the Guadarama, the army at Salamanca would be without ammunition or artillery.‡ If he advanced, it must be by a flank movement of three days, with a heavy convoy, over a flat country, and

within a few hours' march of a very superior cavalry. If he delayed where he was, even for a few hours, the French on the side of Segovia might get between him and the pass of Guadarama, and then, attacked in front, flank, and rear, he would be reduced to the shameful necessity of abandoning his convoy and guns to save his men in the mountains of Avila. A man of less intrepidity and calmness would have been ruined. Hope, as enterprising as he was prudent, without any hesitation ordered the cavalry to throw out parties cautiously towards the French, and maintain a confident front if the latter approached, then moving the infantry and guns from Villacastin, and the convoy from Espinosa, by cross roads, to Avila, he continued his march day and night until they reached Peneranda. Meanwhile the cavalry to cover this movement closed gradually to the left, and finally occupied Fontiveros on the 2nd of December. The infantry and the draught animals were greatly fatigued; but the danger was not over; the patrols reported that the enemy, to the number of ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and forty guns, were still in Olmedo; this was the eternal fourth corps, which thus traversing the country, continually crossed the heads of the English columns, and seemed to multiply the forces of the French at all points. Hope immediately drew his infantry and cavalry up in position, and obliged the artillery and the convoy to proceed without rest to Alba de Tormes, where a detachment from Salamanca met them, and covered their march to that town. This vigorous and skilful march was thus concluded, for the division remaining at Peneranda collected its stragglers, and pushed outposts to Medino del Campo, Madrigal, and Torecilla, while the fourth corps unwittingly pursued its march to the Guadarama.

Sir John Moore's resolution to retreat upon Portugal created a great sensation at Madrid and at Aranjuez. The junta feared, and with reason, that such a palpable proof of the state to which their negligence and incapacity had reduced the country, would endanger their authority and perhaps their lives;* and although they were on the point of flying to Badajoz themselves, they were anxious that others should rush headlong into danger. Morla, and those who, like him, were prepared to abandon the cause of their country, felt mortified at losing an opportunity of commemorating their defection by a single act of perfidy; and the English plenipotentiary was surprised and indignant that a general of experience and reputation should think for himself, and decided upon a military operation without a reference to his opinion.

Mr. Frere, although a person of some scholastic attainments, was very ill qualified for the duties of his situation, which at this moment required temper, sagacity, and judgment. Greatly overrating his own talents for public affairs, he had come out to Spain impressed with false notions of what was passing in that country, and tenaciously clinging to the pictures of his imagination, resented the intrusion of reason, and petulantly spurned at facts. The defeat of the conde de Belvedere at Gamonal, a defeat that broke the centre of the Spanish line, uncovered the flank and rear of Castaños' army, opened a way to Madrid and rendered the concentration of the British divisions unsafe if not impossible, he curiously called the 'unlucky affair of the 10th at Burgos.' After the battle of Tudela he estimated the whole French army on the side of Burgos and Valladolid at eleven thousand men, when they were above one hundred thousand; and yet, with information so absurdly defective, he was prompt to interfere with, and eager to control, the military combinations of the general, which were founded upon the true and acknowledged principles of the art of war.†

* Sir John Moore's Papers. Hope's Letters.

† Lord W. Bentinck's Letters. ‡ Gen. Hope's Reports, MS.

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence.

† Narrative of Moore's Campaign.

Moore, while anxiously watching the dangerous progress of sir John Hope, was suddenly assailed by the representations and remonstrances of all these offended, mortified, and disappointed persons, and as the question of retiring was, by the defeat of Tudela, rendered so purely military, and the necessity of it so palpable, the general, although anticipating some expressions of discontent from the Spanish government, was totally unprepared for the torrent of puerile impertinences with which he was overwhelmed.

Morla, a subtle man, endeavoured first to deceive Mr. Stuart, by treating the defeat of Castaños lightly, and stating officially that he had saved the greatest part of his army at Sigüenza, and was on the march to join St. Juan at the Somosierra;* to this he added, that there were only small bodies of French cavalry in the flat country of Castille and Leon, and no force on that side capable of preventing the junction of sir John Moore's army. This was on the evening of the 30th, but the emperor had forced the pass of the Somosierra on that morning, and the duke of Dantzig was at Valladolid. The same day Mr. Frere, writing from Aranjuez in answer to the general's formal communication, and before he was acquainted with his intention to fall back, deprecated a retreat upon Portugal, and asserted that the enthusiasm of the Spanish was unbounded, except in Castille and Leon, where, he admitted, they were more passive than they should be.† He even stated, that twenty thousand men were actually assembled in the vicinity of the capital, and that Castaños was falling back upon them; that reinforcements were arriving daily from the southern provinces, and that the addition of the British army would form a force greatly superior to any the French could bring against that quarter, in sufficient time. It was certain, he said, that the latter were very weak, and would be afraid to advance, while the whole country, from the Pyrenees to the capital, was in arms upon their left flank. Rumours also were rife that the conscription had been resisted, and this was the more probable, because every great effort made by France was accompanied by weakness and internal disturbance, and a pastoral letter of the bishop of Carcassonne seemed to imply that it was so at that time. 'Good policy, therefore, required, that the French should be attacked before their reinforcements joined them, as any success obtained at that moment would render a conscription for a third attempt infinitely difficult, if not impracticable; but if, on the other hand,' said this inconsiderate person, 'the French are allowed, with their present forces, to retain their present advantages, and to wait the completion of their conscription, they would pour into Spain with a number of troops which would give them immediate possession of the capital and the central provinces.' Two days after the date of this letter, the emperor was actually at the capital; and Mr. Frere, notwithstanding the superior Spanish force which his imagination had conjured up, was, with the junta, flying in all haste from those very central provinces, France remaining, meanwhile, strong, and free from internal dissension.

This rambling epistle was not despatched when the general's intention to fall back upon Portugal was made known to Mr. Frere, but he thought it so admirably calculated to prevent a retreat, that he forwarded it, accompanied by a short explanatory note, which was offensive in style, and indicative of a petulant disposition. At the same time, Augustin Bueno and Ventura Escalante, two generals deputed by the junta to remonstrate against sir John Moore's intended retreat, arrived at head-quarters, and they justified the choice of their employers, being in folly and presumptuous

ignorance the very types of the government they represented. Asserting, that St. Juan, with twenty thousand men under his command, had so fortified the pass of the Somosierra, that it could not be forced by any number of enemies, and that reinforcements were daily joining him, they were proceeding to create immense Spanish armies, when the general stopped their garrulity by introducing colonel Graham, who had been a witness of the dispersion of Castaños's army, and had just left the unfortunate St. Juan at Talavera, surrounded by the villanous runagates, who murdered him the next day.* It may be easily supposed, that such representations, and from such men, could have no weight with the commander of an army; in fact, the necessity of retreating was rendered more imperious by these glaring proofs that the junta and the English plenipotentiary were totally ignorant of what was passing around them.

But Napoleon was now in full career; he had raised a hurricane of war, and, directing its fury as he pleased, his adversaries were obliged to conform their movements to his, and as the circumstances varied from hour to hour, the determination of one moment was rendered useless in the next. The appearance of the French cavalry in the plains of Madrid, had sent the junta and Mr. Frere headlong towards Badajos, yet the people of Madrid, as we have seen, shut their gates, and displayed the outward signs of a resolution to imitate Zaragoza; the neighbouring peasants flocked in to aid the citizens, and a military junta, composed of the duke of Infantado, the prince of Castel Franco, the marquis of Castellar, and don Thomas Morla, was appointed to manage the defence. Morla, being resolved to make a final effort to involve the British army in the destruction of his own country, easily persuaded the duke of Infantado to quit Madrid on a mission to the army of the centre; and thus the traitor was left sole master of the town, because the duke and himself only, had any influence with that armed mob which had murdered the marquis of Perales, and filled the city with tumult.

When the French emperor summoned the junta to surrender, Morla, in concert with the prince of Castel Franco, addressed a paper to sir John Moore, in which it was stated that 'twenty-five thousand men under Castaños, and ten thousand from the Somosierra, were marching in all haste to the capital, where forty thousand others were in arms. Nevertheless, apprehending an increase of force on the enemy's side, the junta hoped the English army would either march to the assistance of Madrid, or take a direction to fall upon the rear of the French; and not doubting that the English general had already formed a junction with Blake's army,' which they well knew had been dispersed, 'they hoped he would be quick in his operations.' This paper was sent by a government messenger to Salamanca, but ere he could reach that place, Morla, who had commenced negotiations before the despatch was written, capitulated, and Napoleon was in Madrid. This communication alone would not have been sufficient to arrest Moore's retrograde movement, for he was become too well acquainted with what facility Spanish armies were created on paper, to rely on any statement of their numbers; but Mr. Stuart also expressed a belief that Madrid would make a vigorous resistance, and the tide of false information having set in with a strong current, every moment brought fresh assurances that a great spirit had arisen.

On the day that Morla's communication arrived, there also appeared at head-quarters, one Charnilly, a French adventurer. This man, who has been since denounced in the British parliament as an organizer of assassination in St. Domingo, and a fraudulent

* Moore's Papers. Mr. Stuart's Correspondence.

† Moore's Papers. Frere's Correspondence.

* Moore's Papers.

bankrupt in London, came as the confidential agent of Mr. Frere. He has been in Madrid during the night of the first, and left it immediately after having held a conference with Morla, the next morning. Taking the road to Talavera, he met with the plenipotentiary, to whom he spoke with such enthusiasm of the spirit and preparations of the inhabitants in the capital, that Mr. Frere, readily confiding in him, and imparting his own views, not only entrusted him, a stranger, with letters to the British general, but charged him with a mission to obstruct the retreat into Portugal. Thus instructed, Charnilly hastened to Salamanca, and presented Mr. Frere's first missive, in which that gentleman, after alluding to former representations, and to the information of which colonel Charnilly was the bearer, viz. the enthusiasm in the capital, made a formal remonstrance, to the effect that propriety and policy demanded an immediate advance of the British to support this generous effort. Charnilly also demanded a personal interview, which was granted, yet Moore, having some suspicion of the man, whom he had seen before, listened to his tale of the enthusiasm and vigorous character displayed at Madrid, with an appearance of coldness that baffled the penetration of the adventurer, who retired under the impression that a retreat was certain.

But for many years so much ridicule had been attached to the name of an English expedition, that weak-headed men claimed a sort of prescriptive right to censure, without regard to subordination, the conduct of their general. It had been so in Egypt, where a cabal was formed to deprive lord Hutchinson of the command, it had been so at Buenos Ayres, at Ferrol, and in Portugal, it was so at this time in sir John Moore's army; and it will be found, in the course of this work, that the superlative talents, vigour, and success of the duke of Wellington, could not even at a late period of the war secure him from such vexatious folly. The three generals who commanded the separate divisions of the army, and who were in consequence acquainted with all the circumstances of the moment, were perfectly agreed as to the propriety of a retreat, but in other quarters indecent murmurs were so prevalent among officers of rank as to call for rebuke; and Charnilly, ignorant of the decided character of the general-in-chief, concluding that this temper was favourable to the object of his mission, presented a second letter, which Mr. Frere had charged him to deliver, should the first fail of effect. The purport of it was to desire, that if sir John Moore still persisted in his intention of retreating, *'the bearer might be previously examined before a council of war,'* in other words, that Mr. Frere, convinced of sir John Moore's incapacity and want of zeal, was determined to control his proceedings even by force. And this to a British general of long experience and confirmed reputation, and by the hands of a foreign adventurer!!! The indignation of a high spirit at such a foolish, wanton insult, may be easily imagined. He ordered Charnilly to quit the cantonments of the British army instantly. His anger, however, soon subsided. Quarrels, among the servants of the public, could only prove detrimental to his country, and he put his personal feelings on one side. The information brought by Charnilly, separated from the indecorum of his mission, was in itself important; it confirmed the essential fact, that Madrid was actually resisting, and that the spirit and energy of the country was awaking.

Hitherto his own observation had led sir John Moore to doubt, if the people took sufficient interest in the cause to make any effectual effort, all around himself was apathetic and incapable; his correspondents, with the exceptions of Mr. Frere, nay, even the intercepted letters of French officers, had agreed in describing the general feeling of the country as subsiding into indif-

ference, and to use his own words, *'Spain was without armies, generals, or a government.'* But now the fire essential to the salvation of the nation seemed to be kindling, and Moore feeling conscious of ability to lead a British army, hailed the appearance of an enthusiasm which promised success to a just cause, and a brilliant career of glory to himself. That the metropolis should thus abide the fury of the conqueror was indeed surprising, it was a great event and full of promise, and the situation of the army was likewise improved, general Hope's junction was accomplished; and as the attention of the French was turned towards Madrid, there was no reason to doubt that Baird's junction could likewise be effected. On the other hand, there was no certainty that the capital would remain firm when danger pressed, none that it would be able to resist, none that the example would spread; yet without it did so, nothing was gained, because it was only by an union of heart and hand throughout the whole country, that the great power of the French could be successfully resisted.

In a matter so balanced, Moore, as might be expected from an enterprising general, adopted the boldest and most generous side. He ordered Baird, who, after destroying some stores, had fallen back to Villa Franca, to concentrate his troops at Astorga, and he himself prepared for an advance; but as he remained without any further information of the fate of Madrid, he sent colonel Graham to obtain intelligence of what was passing, and to carry his answer to Morla. This resolution being taken, he wrote to Mr. Frere, calmly explaining the reasons for his past conduct, and those which actuated him in forming a fresh plan of operation. *'I wish anxiously,'* said this noble-minded man in conclusion, *'I wish anxiously, as the king's minister, to continue upon the most confidential footing with you, and I hope as we have but one interest, the public welfare, though we occasionally see it in different aspects, that this will not disturb the harmony which should subsist between us. Fully impressed as I am with these sentiments, I shall abstain from any remarks upon the two letters, from you, delivered to me last night and this morning by colonel Charnilly, or on the message which accompanied them. I certainly at first did feel and expressed much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me. Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be created towards you again.'*

The plan of operations now occupied his mind. The Somosierra and the Guadarama were both in possession of the enemy, wherefore no direct movement could be made towards Madrid, and as the rear of Baird's troops was still several marches behind Astorga, a general movement on the side of the capital could not commence before the 12th of the month. Zaragoza, the general knew, was determined to stand a second siege, and he had the guarantee of the first that it would be an obstinate stand; he had received from the junta of Toledo a formal assurance of their resolution to bury themselves under the ruins of the town, sooner than submit; and he was informed from several quarters that the southern provinces were forwarding crowds of fresh levies. Romana at this time also was in correspondence with him, and, with the usual exaggeration of a Spaniard, declared his ability to aid him with an army of twenty thousand men. Upon this data sir John Moore formed a plan, bearing the stamp of genuine talent and enterprise, whether it be examined as a political or a military measure.

He supposed the French emperor to be more anxious to strike a heavy blow against the English, and to shut them out of Spain, than to overrun any particular province, or get possession of any town in the Peninsula. He resolved, therefore, to throw himself upon

the communications of the French army, hoping, if fortune was favourable, to inflict a severe loss upon the troops which guarded them before aid could arrive. If Napoleon, suspending his operations against the south, should detach them largely, Madrid would thereby be succoured; if he did not detach largely, the British could hold their ground. Moore knew well that a great commander would in such a case be more likely to unite his whole army, and fall upon the troops which thus ventured to place themselves on his line of operations; but, to relieve the Spaniards at a critical moment, and to give time for the southern provinces to organize their defence and recover courage, he was willing thus to draw the whole of the enemy upon himself. He felt that, in doing so, he compromised the safety of his own army, that he must glide along the edge of a precipice, that he must cross a gulf on a rotten plank: but he also knew the martial qualities of his soldiers, he had confidence in his own genius, and the occasion being worthy of a great deed, he dared essay it even against Napoleon.

Colonel Graham returned on the 9th, bringing the first intimation of the capitulation of the capital. He had been able to proceed no farther than Talavera, where he encountered two members of the supreme junta. By them he was told that the French, being from twenty to thirty thousand strong, possessed the Retiro; that the people retained their arms, and that La-Peña, with thirty thousand men of the army of the centre, was at Guadalaxara; that fourteen thousand of St. Juan's and Heredia's forces were assembled at Almarez; and that Romana, with whom they anxiously desired the English should unite, had likewise an army of thirty thousand fighting men: finally, they assured colonel Graham that the most energetic measures were in activity wherever the enemy's presence did not control the patriots.

Mortifying as it was to find that Madrid, after so much boasting, should have held out but one day, the event itself did not destroy the ground of Moore's resolution to advance. Undoubtedly it was so much lost; it diminished the hope of arousing the nation, and it increased the danger of the British army, by letting loose a greater number of the enemy's troops; but as a diversion for the south it might still succeed, and as long as there was any hope, the resolution of the English general was fixed, to prove that he would not abandon the cause, even when the Spaniards were abandoning it themselves.

CHAPTER IV.

British army advances towards Burgos—French outposts surprised at Rueda—Letter from Berthier to Soult intercepted—Direction of the march changed—Mr. Stuart and a member of the junta arrive at head quarters—Arrogant and insulting letter of Mr. Frere—Noble answer of Sir John Moore—British army united at Mayorga; their force and composition—Inconsistent conduct of Romana; his character—Soult's position and forces; concentrates his army at Carrión—Combat of Cavalry at Sahagún—The British army retires to Benevente—The emperor moves from Madrid, passes the Guadarama, arrives at Tordesillas, expects to interrupt the British line of retreat, fails—Bridge of Castro Gonzalo destroyed—Combat of cavalry at Benevente—General Lefebvre taken—Soult forces the bridge of Mansilla; takes Leon—The emperor unites his army at Astorga; hears of the Austrian war: orders marshal Soult to pursue the English army, and returns to France.

THE forward movement of the British army commenced on the 11th of December. Moore's first intention was to march with his own and Hope's division to Valladolid, with a view to cover the advance of his stores and to protect the junction of sir David Baird's troops, the rear of which was still behind Astorga; nevertheless preparations for a retreat upon Portugal were continued,

and sir David was ordered to form magazines at Benevente, Astorga, Villa Franca, and Lugo, by which arrangement two lines of operation were secured, and a greater freedom of action obtained.

The 13th head-quarters were at Alaejos; two brigades and lord Paget's cavalry at Toro; general Hope at Torrecilla; general Charles Stewart's horsemen at Rueda, having the night before surprised there fifty infantry and thirty dragoons, who declared, that in the French army it was believed that the English were retreating to Portugal.

At Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the prince of Neufchatel was brought to head-quarters, and the contents were important enough to change the direction of the march. It was addressed to the duke of Dalmatia, and described Madrid as perfectly tranquil, the shops open, and the public amusements going forward as in a time of profound peace. The fourth corps of the army was said to be at Talavera, on its way towards Badajos, and this movement, it was observed, would force the English to retire to Portugal, if, contrary to the emperor's belief, they had not already done so. The fifth corps was on the march to Zaragoza, and the eighth to Burgos. Soult was therefore directed to drive the Spaniards into Galicia, to occupy Leon, Benevente, and Zamora, and to keep the flat country in subjection, for which purpose his two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry brigades of Franceschi and Debelles, were considered sufficient.

It is remarkable that this the first correct information of the capitulation of Madrid should have been thus acquired from the enemy, ten days after the event had taken place; nor is it less curious, that while Mr. Frere's letters were filled with vivid descriptions of Spanish enthusiasm, Napoleon should have been so convinced of their passiveness, as to send this important despatch by an officer, who rode post, without an escort, and in safety, until his abusive language to the post-master at Valdestillos created a tumult, in which he lost his life. Captain Waters, an English officer sent to obtain intelligence, happening to arrive in that place, heard of the murder, and immediately purchased the despatch for twenty dollars; and the accidental information thus obtained was the more valuable, as neither money nor patriotism had hitherto induced the Spaniards to bring any intelligence of the enemy's situation, and each step the army had made was in the dark. It was now however certain that Burgos was or would be strongly protected, and that Baird's line of march was unsafe if Soult, following these instructions, advanced. On the other hand, as the French appeared to be ignorant of the British movements, there was some chance of surprising and beating the second corps before Napoleon could come to its succour. Hope, therefore, was ordered to pass the Duero at Tordesillas, and direct his march upon Villepando; head-quarters were removed to Toro; and Valderas was given as the point of junction to Baird's division, the head of which was now at Benevente.

The 16th Mr. Stuart arrived at Toro, accompanied by Don F. X. Caro, a member of the Spanish government, who brought two letters, the one from the junta, the other from Mr. Frere.* That from the junta complained, that when Romana proposed to unite fourteen thousand picked men to the British army, with a view to make a forward movement, his offer had been disregarded, and a retreat determined upon, in despite of his earnest remonstrances; this retreat they declared to be uncalled for, and highly impolitic, 'as the enemy was never so near his ruin as in that moment.' If the Spanish and British armies should unite, they said, it would give 'liberty to the Peninsula,' that 'Romana, with his fourteen thousand select men,' was still ready to join sir John Moore, and that 'thirty thousand fresh

* Sir John Moore's Papers. MSS.

levies would, in a month, be added to the ranks of the allied force.'

This tissue of falsehoods, for Romana had approved of the intention to retreat, and never had above six thousand men armed, was addressed to Mr. Frere, and by him transmitted to the general, together with one from himself, which, in allusion to the retreat upon Portugal, contained the following extraordinary passages: * 'I mean the immense responsibility with which you charge yourself by adopting, upon a supposed military necessity, a measure which must be followed by immediate, if not final, ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources you are entrusted.' 'I am unwilling to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence, which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite, but this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose.'

These letters were dated at Truxillo; for the junta, not thinking themselves safe at Badajos, had proceeded so far on their way to Seville, and on that side the French had continued to advance, the remnants of the Spanish armies to fly, and every thing bore the most gloomy appearance. Mr. Frere knew this. In a subsequent letter he acknowledged that the enthusiasm was extinguished, and a general panic commencing at the moment when he was penning these offensive passages. He was utterly ignorant of the numbers, the situation, and the resources of the enemy, but he formed hypotheses, and upon the strength of them insulted sir John Moore, and endangered the interests of his country. In this manner the British general, while struggling with unavoidable difficulties, had his mind harassed by a repetition of remonstrances and representations, in which common sense, truth, and decency were alike disregarded; but he did not fail to show how little personal feelings weighed with him in opposition to the public welfare. He had reason to suppose Mr. Frere had received his letter relative to Charmilly's mission, yet as it was not acknowledged, he took advantage of the omission, and with singular propriety and dignity thus noticed the plenipotentiary's second insulting communication. '*With respect to your letter delivered to me at Toro by Mr. Stuart, I shall not remark upon it. It is in the style of the two which were brought to me by colonel Charmilly, and consequently was answered by my letter of the 6th, of which I send you a duplicate; that subject is I hope at rest!*'

At Toro sir John Moore ascertained that Romana, although aware of the advance of the British, and engaged to support them, was retiring into Galicia. Nominally commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies, he was at the head of a few thousand miserable soldiers, for the Spaniards, with great ingenuity, contrived to have no general when they had an army, and no army when they had a general.† After the dispersion of Blake's people at Reynosa, Romana rallied about five thousand men at Renedo, in the valley of Caber-nuigo, and endeavoured to make a stand on the borders of the Asturias, but without any success, for the vile conduct of the Asturian junta, joined to the terror created by the French victories, had completely subdued the spirit of the peasantry, and ruined the resources of that province. Romana complained that, when checked for misconduct, his soldiers quitted their standards: indeed, that any should have been found to join their colors is to be admired; for, among the sores of Spain,

there were none more cankered, more disgusting, than the venality, the injustice, the profligate corruption of the Asturian authorities. Without a blush, they openly divided the English subsidies, and defrauded, not only the soldiers of their pay and equipments, but the miserable peasants of their hire, doubling the wretchedness of poverty, and deriding the misery they occasioned by pompous declarations of their own virtue.

From the Asturias Romana had led the remnants of Blake's force to Leon about the period of Moore's arrival at Salamanca; like others, he had been deceived as to the real state of the country, and at this time repented that he had returned to Spain. He was a person of talent, quickness, and information, but disqualified by nature for military command; a lively principle of error pervaded all his notions of war, and no man ever bore the title of a general who was less capable of commanding an army. Neither was he exempt from the prevailing weakness of his countrymen. At this moment, when he had not strength to stand upright, his letters were teeming with gigantic offensive projects; and although he had before approved of the intention to retreat, he was now as ready to urge a forward movement, promising to co-operate with twenty thousand soldiers when he could scarcely muster a third of that number, and those only half armed, and scarcely capable of distinguishing their own standards: and at the very time he made the promise, he was retiring into Galicia, not meaning to deceive, for he was as ready to advance as to retreat, but this species of boasting is inherent in his nation. It has been asserted that Caro offered the chief command of the Spanish armies to sir John Moore, and that the latter refused it. This is not true. Caro had no power to do so, and there were no armies to command; but that gentleman, in his interview, either was, or affected to be, satisfied of the soundness of the English general's views, and ashamed of the folly of the junta.

The 18th, head-quarters were at Castro Nuevo, from which place Moore wrote to Romana, informing him of his intention to fall upon Soult; he desired his co-operation, and requested that the marquis would, according to his own plan given to the British minister in London, reserve the Asturias for his own line of communication, and leave Galicia to the British. The latter were now in full march. Baird was at Benavente, Hope at Villepando, and the cavalry scouring the country on the side of Valladolid, had several successful skirmishes and took a number of prisoners; the French could be no longer ignorant of the movement, and the English general brought forward his columns rapidly. On the 20th, the whole of the forces were united, the cavalry at Melgar Abaxo, the infantry at Mayorga and as much concentrated as the necessity of obtaining cover in a country devoid of fuel, and deep with snow, would permit; the weather was exceedingly severe, and the marches long, but a more robust set of men never took the field, their discipline was admirable, and there were very few stragglers, the experience of one or two campaigns alone was wanting to make a perfect army. The number was however small; nominally it was nearly thirty-five thousand, but four regiments were still in Portugal, and three more were left by sir David Baird at Lugo and Astorga; one thousand six hundred and eighty-seven men were detached, and four thousand and five were in hospital; hence the actual number present under arms on the 19th of December, was only nineteen thousand and fifty-three infantry, two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight cavalry, and one thousand three hundred and fifty-eight gunners; forming a total of twenty-three thousand five hundred and eighty-three men, with sixty pieces of artillery. They were organized in three divisions, a reserve, two light brigades of infantry, and one division of cavalry; four batteries were attached to the infantry, two to the cavalry, and one

* Sir John Moore's Papers. MSS.

† Ibid. Colonel Syme's Correspondence. General Leith.

was kept in reserve. Meanwhile Romana, who had been able to bring forward very few men, promised to march in two columns by Almanzar and Guarda, and sent some information of the enemy's position. But sir John Moore depended little upon his intelligence, when he found him, even so late as the 19th of December, upon the faith of information from the junta, representing Madrid as still holding out; and, when the advanced posts were already engaged at Sahagun, proposing an interview at Benevente to arrange the plan of operations.

On the French side, Soult was concentrating his force on the Carrion. After his rapid and brilliant success at the opening of the campaign, his corps was ordered to remain on the defensive, until the movements against Tudela and Madrid were completed, and the despatches directing him to recommence his offensive operations, were, as we have seen, intercepted on the 12th; but on the 16th he became acquainted with the advance of the English army.* At that period general Bonnet's division occupied Barquera de San Vincente and Potes, on the Deba, watching some thousand Asturians whom Ballasteros had collected near Llanes; Merle's and Mermet's divisions were on the Carrion, Franceschi's dragoons at Valladolid, Debelle's at Sahagun. The whole formed a total of sixteen or seventeen thousand infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry, present under arms, of which only eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry could, without uncovering the important post of St. Andero, be opposed to the advance of the British.† Soult, alarmed at this disparity of force, required general Mathieu Dumas, commandant at Burgos, to direct all the divisions and detachments, passing through that town, whatever might be their original destination, upon the Carrion, and this decisive conduct was approved of by the emperor.‡

On the 21st, Bonnet's division was still on the Deba, but Mermet's was in the town of Carrion, Merle's at Saldaña; Franceschi's cavalry had retired from Valladolid to Riberos de la Cuesca, Debelle's continued at Sahagun, and thirteen hundred dragoons, under general Lorge, arrived at Palencia from Burgos. Meantime, the fifteenth and tenth British hussars having quitted Melgar Abaxo during the night, came close to Sahagun before daylight on the 21st. The tenth marched straight to the town, while the fifteenth turned it by the right, and endeavoured to cut off the enemy; a patrol gave the alarm, and when four hundred of the fifteenth had reached the rear of the village, they were opposed by a line of six hundred French dragoons. The tenth were not in sight, but lord Paget, after a few movements, charged with the 15th, broke the enemy's line, and pursued them for some distance. Some twenty killed, two lieutenant-colonels, and eleven other officers, with a hundred and fifty-four men prisoners, were the result of this affair, which lasted about twenty minutes. Debelle then retired to Santerbas; the English infantry occupied Sahagun, and head-quarters were established there. During these events Romana remained at Mancilla, and it was evident that no assistance could be expected from him. The truth was, that, ashamed of exposing the weakness and misery of his troops, he kept away, for, after all his promises, he could not produce six thousand fighting men. His letters however, were, as usual, extremely encouraging. *The French force in Spain was exceedingly weak, Palafox had not been defeated at Tudela; Soult, including Bonnet's division, had scarcely nine thousand men of all arms; it was an object to surround and destroy him before he could be succoured;*—and other follies of this nature.

The English troops having now outmarched their

supplies, halted the 22d and 23d, and Soult, whose intention was to act on the defensive, hastened the march of the reinforcements from the side of Burgos, yet being fearful for his communication with Placentia, he abandoned Saldaña on the 23d, and concentrated his infantry at Carrion.* Debelle's cavalry again advanced to Villatilla and Villacuenta, Franceschi remained at Riberos, the dragoons of general Lorge occupied Paredes, and general Dumas pushed on the divisions of the eighth corps, of which Laborde's was already arrived at Palencia: Loison's and Heudelet's followed at the distance of two days' march, but they were weak. Sir John Moore's plan was to move during the night of the 23d, so as to arrive at Carrion by daylight on the 24th, to force the bridge, and afterwards ascending the river, to fall upon the main body of the enemy, which his information led him to believe was still at Saldaña. This attack was, however, but a secondary object, his attention was constantly directed towards Madrid. To beat the troops in his front would be a victory of little value beyond the honour, because the third and fourth corps were so near; the pith of the operation was to tempt the emperor from Madrid, and his march from that capital was to be the signal for a retreat, which sooner or later was inevitable.

To draw Napoleon from the south was Moore's design, and it behoves the man to be alert who interposes between the lion and his prey. On the 23d, Romana first gave notice that the French were in motion from the side of Madrid; and in the night of the 23d, when the troops were actually in march towards Carrion; this intelligence was confirmed by the general's own spies, all their reports agreed that the whole French army was in movement to crush the English: the fourth corps had been halted at Talavera, the fifth at Vittoria, the eighth was closing up to reinforce the second, and the emperor in person was marching towards the Guadarama. The principal objects of sir John Moore's advance were thus attained; the siege of Zaragoza was delayed, the southern provinces were allowed to breathe, and it only remained for him to prove, by a timely retreat, that this offensive operation, although hazardous, was not the result of improvident rashness, nor weakness of mind, but the hardy enterprise of a great commander acting under peculiar circumstances. As a military measure, his judgment condemned it; as a political one, he thought it of doubtful advantage, because Spain was really passive; but he had desired to give the Spaniards an opportunity of making one more struggle for independence. That was done. If they could not, or would not profit of the occasion, if their hearts were faint or their hands feeble, the shame and the loss were their own; the British general had done enough; enough for honour, enough for utility, more than enough for prudence, the madness of the times required it. His army was already on the verge of destruction, the enemy's force was hourly increasing in his front, the first symptoms of a retreat would bring it headlong on, and in the mean time the emperor threatened the line of communication with Galicia, and by the rapidity of his march left no time for consideration.

After the first burst, by which he swept the northern provinces, and planted his standards on the banks of the Tagus, that monarch had put all the resources of his subtle genius into activity, endeavouring to soften the public mind, and by engrafting benefits on the terror his victories had created, to gain over the people; but, at the same time, he was gathering in his extended wings, and preparing for a new flight, which would have carried him over the southern kingdoms of the Peninsula, and given him the rocks of Lisbon as a resting-place for his eagles. Madrid was tranquil, and

* S. Journal of operations. MS. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

Toledo, notwithstanding her heroic promises, had never shut her gates; one division of the first corps occupied that town, another was in Ocaña, and the light cavalry scoured the whole of La Mancha, even to the borders of Andalusia; the fourth corps, and Milhaud's and Lasalle's horsemen, were at Talavera, preparing to march to Badajos, and sixty thousand men, with one hundred and fifty guns and fifteen days' provisions in carts, were reviewed at the gates of Madrid upon the 19th; three days afterwards they were in full march to intercept the line of sir John Moore's retreat.

Napoleon was informed of that general's advance on the 21st, and in an instant the Spaniards, their juntas, and their armies, were dismissed from his thoughts; his corps were arrested in their different movements, ten thousand men were left to control the capital, and on the evening of the 22d, fifty thousand men were at the foot of the Guadarama. A deep snow choked the passes of the Sierra, and, after twelve hours of ineffectual toil, the advanced guards were still on the wrong side; the general commanding reported that the road was impracticable, but Napoleon, dismounting, placed himself at the head of the column, and, amidst storms of hail and drifting snow, led his soldiers over the mountain. Many men and animals died during the passage, which lasted two days, but the emperor personally urging on the troops with unceasing vehemence, reached Villacastin, fifty miles from Madrid, on the 24th, and the 26th he was at Tordesillas with the guards and the divisions of Lapisse and Dessoles; the dragoons of La Houssaye entered Valladolid on the same day, and marshal Ney, with the sixth corps, was at Rio Seco.

From Tordesillas Napoleon communicating with Soult, informed him of these movements, concluding his despatch thus: '*Our cavalry scouts are already at Benevente. If the English pass to day in their position, they are lost; if, on the contrary, they attack you with all their force, retire one day's march; the farther they proceed, the better for us. If they retreat, pursue them closely.*'* Then, full of hope, he hastened himself to Valderas, but had the mortification to learn that, notwithstanding his rapid march, having scarcely rested night or day, he was twelve hours too late. The British were across the Esla! In fact Soult was in full pursuit when this letter was written, for sir John Moore, well aware of his own situation, had given orders to retreat the moment the intelligence of Napoleon's march from Madrid reached him, and the heavy baggage was immediately moved to the rear, while the reserve, the light brigades, and the cavalry remained at Sahagun, the latter pushing patrols up to the enemy's lines, and skirmishing to hide the retrograde march.

The 24th, general Hope, with two divisions, had gone back by the road of Mayorga, Baird, with another, by that of Valencia de San Juan, where there was a ferry-boat to cross the Esla river. The marquis of Romana undertook to guard the bridge of Mansilla. The enemy's dragoons, under Lorge, arrived the same day at Frechilla, and the division of Laborde entered Paredes. The 25th the general-in-chief, with the reserve and light brigades, followed the route of Hope's column to Valderas, and the 26th Baird passed the Esla at Valencia, and took post on the other side, but with some difficulty, for the boat was small, the fords deep, and the river rising. The troops, under the commander-in-chief, approached the bridge of Castro Gonzalo early in the morning of the 26th, but the stores were a long time passing, a dense fog intercepted the view, and so nicely timed was the march, that the scouts of the imperial horsemen were already infesting the flank of the column, and even carried off some of the baggage.

As the left bank of the river commanded the bridge,

general Robert Crawford remained with a brigade of infantry and two guns to protect the passage, for the cavalry was still in the rear, watching Soult, who, aware of the retreat, was pressing forward in pursuit. Meanwhile lord Paget, after passing Mayorga, was intercepted by a strong body of horse, which belonged to Ney's corps and was embattled on a swelling ground close to the road. Though the soil was deep, and soaked with snow and rain, two squadrons of the tenth, riding stiffly up, gained the summit, and notwithstanding the enemy's advantage of numbers and position, killed twenty men and captured one hundred. This was a bold and hardy action; but the English cavalry had been engaged more or less for twelve successive days, with such fortune and bravery, that above five hundred prisoners had already fallen into their hands, and their leaders being excellent, their confidence was unbounded.

From Mayorga lord Paget proceeded to Benevente; but the duke of Dalmatia, with great judgment, now pushed for Astorga by the road of Mancilla, whereupon Romana, leaving three thousand men and two guns to defend the bridge at the latter place, fell back to Leon.* Thus, by a critical march, Moore recovered his communications with Galicia, and had so far baffled the emperor, but his position was by no means safe, or even tenable.

The town of Benevente, a rich open place, remarkable for a small, but curious Moorish castle, containing a fine collection of ancient armour, is situated in a plain that, extending from the Galician mountains to the neighbourhood of Burgos, appears to be boundless. The river Esla winded through it, about four miles in front of Benevente, and the bridge of Castro Gonzalo was the key to the town; but the right bank of the Esla was completely commanded from the further side, and there were many fords. Eighteen miles higher up, at Valencia de San Juan, a shorter road from Mayorga to Astorga, crossed the river by the ferry-boat; and at Mancilla, the passage being only defended by Spaniards, was, in a manner, open to Soult, for Romana had not destroyed the arches of the bridge. Beyond Mancilla, under the hills skirting this great plain, stood the town of Leon, which was inclosed with walls and capable of resisting a sudden assault.

Moore aware of his incapacity resolved to remain no longer than was necessary to clear out his magazines at Benevente, and to cover the march of his stores. But the road to Astorga by Leon was much shorter than that through Benevente, and as Romana was inclined to retreat to Galicia Sir John requested that he would maintain himself at Leon as long as he could, and repeated his desire to have that province left open for the English army. Romana, who assented to both these requests, had a great rabble with him, and as Leon was a walled place, and a number of citizens and volunteers were willing, and even eager to fight, the town might have made resistance. Moore hoped that it would do so, and gave orders to break down the bridge at Castro Gonzalo in his own front, the moment the stragglers and baggage should have passed; but at this time the bad example of murmuring given by men of high rank had descended lower, many regimental officers neglected their duty, and what with the dislike to a retreat, the severity of the weather, and the inexperience of the army, the previous fine discipline of the troops was broken down: such disgraceful excesses had been committed at Valderas, that the general issued severe orders, justly reproaching the soldiers for their evil deeds, and appealing to the honour of the army to amend them.

On the night of the 26th, the light cavalry of the imperial guard, riding close up to the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, captured some women and baggage, and en-

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

deavoured to surprise the post, which gave rise to a remarkable display of courage and discipline. John Walton and Richard Jackson, private soldiers of the forty-third, being posted beyond the bridge, were directed, on the approach of an enemy, the one to stand firm, the other to fire and run back to the brow of the hill, to give notice whether there were many or few. Jackson fired, but was overtaken, and received twelve or fourteen sabre cuts in an instant; nevertheless he came staggering on, and gave the signal, while Walton, with equal resolution, stood his ground, and wounded several of the assailants, who then retired, leaving him unhurt, but his cap, knapsack, belts, and musket were cut in above twenty places, his bayonet was bent double, and notched like a saw. The 27th, the cavalry and the stragglers being all over the river, general Crawford commenced the destruction of the bridge amidst torrents of rain and snow, and while half the troops worked the other half kept the enemy at bay from the heights on the left bank, for the cavalry scouts of the imperial guard were spread over the plain.

At ten o'clock at night a large party of French following some waggons, again endeavoured to pass the piquets and gallop down to the bridge; that failing, a few dismounted, and extending to the right and left, commenced a skirmishing fire, while others remained ready to charge, if the position of the troops, which they expected to ascertain by this scheme, should offer an opportunity. The event did not answer their expectations, and this anxiety to interrupt the work induced general Crawford to destroy two arches of the bridge, and to blow up the connecting buttress; yet the masonry was so solid and difficult to pierce, that it was not until twelve o'clock in the night of the 28th that all the preparations were completed. The troops then descended the heights on the left bank, and passing with the greatest silence, by single files, over planks laid across the broken arches, gained the other side without loss; an instance of singular good fortune, for the night was dark and tempestuous, the river rising rapidly with a roaring noise, was threatening to burst over the planks, and the enemy was close at hand. To have resisted an attack in such an awkward situation would have been impossible, but happily the retreat of the troops was undiscovered, and the mine was sprung with good effect.

Crawford marched to Benevente, where the cavalry and the reserve still remained. Here several thousand infantry slept in the upper part of an immense convent built round a square, and a frightful catastrophe was impending; for the lower galleries were so thickly stowed with the horses of the cavalry, that it was scarcely possible to pass them, there was but one entrance, and two officers of the forty-third, returning from the bridge, on entering the convent, perceived that a large window-shutter was on fire, that in a few moments the straw under the horses would ignite, and six thousand men and animals must inevitably perish in the flames. One of these officers, captain Lloyd, a man of great strength, activity, and of a presence of mind which never failed, made a sign of silence to his companion, and then springing on to the nearest horse, ran along the backs of the others, until he reached the blazing shutter, which he tore off its hinges and cast out of the window, and then awakening a few men, cleared the passage without any alarm, which in such a case would have been as destructive as the fire.

Two days' rest had been gained at Benevente, but as very little could be done to remove the stores, the greatest part were destroyed. The army was and had been from the first without sufficient means of transport, the general had no money to procure it, and the ill-will of the Spaniards, and the shuffling conduct of the juntas added infinitely to their difficulties. But time pressed. Hope and Fraser marched by La Baneza, and reached Astorga the 29th, where Baird joined them

from Valencia de San Juan; on the same day the reserve and Crawford's brigade quitted Benevente. The cavalry remained in the town, having parties to watch the fords of the Esla. In this state of affairs general Lefebvre Desnouettes, seeing only a few cavalry posts on the great plain, rather hastily concluded that there was nothing to support them, and crossing the river at daybreak, by a ford a little way above the bridge, with six hundred horsemen of the imperial guard, advanced into the plain. The piquets under major Loftus Otway retired fighting, and being joined by a part of the third German hussars, even charged the leading French squadrons with some effect. General C. Stewart then took the command, and the ground was obstinately disputed, but the enemy advanced. At this moment the plain was covered with stragglers, baggage-mules, and followers of the army, the town was filled with tumult, the distant piquets and videttes were seen galloping in from the right and left, the French were pressing forward boldly, and every appearance indicated that the enemy's whole army was coming up and passing the river.

Lord Paget ordered the tenth hussars to mount and form under the cover of some houses at the edge of the town, for he desired to draw the enemy, whose real situation he had detected at once, well into the plain before he attacked; in half an hour, every thing was ready, and he gave the signal. Then the tenth hussars galloped forward, the piquets that were already engaged closed together, and the whole charged. The scene changed instantly; the enemy were seen flying at full speed towards the river, the British following close at their heels, until the French squadrons, without breaking their ranks, plunged into the stream, and gained the opposite heights, where, like experienced soldiers, they wheeled instantly, and seemed inclined to come forward a second time, but a battery of two guns opened upon them, and after a few rounds they retired. During the pursuit in the plain, an officer was observed separating himself from the main body, and making towards another part of the river, being followed, and refusing to stop, he was wounded and brought in a prisoner. It was general Lefebvre Desnouettes.

Although the imperial guards were outnumbered in the end, they were very superior at the commencement of this action, which was stiffly fought on both sides, for the British lost fifty men, and the French left fifty-five killed and wounded on the field, besides the general and other officers; according to Baron Larrey, seventy of those who recrossed the river were also wounded, making a total loss of above two hundred excellent soldiers.* Lord Paget maintained his posts on the Esla, under an occasional cannonade, until the evening, and then withdrew to La Baneza; and while these things were passing, Napoleon arrived at Valderas, Ney at Villaton, and Lapisse at Toro. The French troops were worn down with fatigue, yet the emperor still urged them on. The duke of Dalmatia, he said, would intercept the English at Astorga, and their labours would be finally rewarded. Nevertheless, the destruction of the bridge of Castro Gonzalo was so well accomplished, that twenty-four hours were required to repair it, the fords were now impassable, and it was the 30th before Bessieres could cross the Esla, but on that day he passed through Benevente with nine thousand cavalry, and bent his course towards La Baneza;† the same day Franceschi carried the bridge of Mansilla de las Mulas by a single charge of his light horsemen, and captured the artillery and one half of the Spanish division left to protect it. Romana immediately abandoned Leon and many stores, and the 31st the duke of Dalmatia entered that town without firing a shot, while the duke of Istria, with his cavalry, took possession of La Baneza; the advanced posts

* Larrey's Surgical Campaign.

† Bulletin.

were then pushed forward to the Puente d'Orvigo on one side, and the Puente de Valembré on the other.* The rear of the English army was still in Astorga, the head-quarters having arrived there only the day before.

In the preceding month large stores had been gradually brought up to this town by sir David Baird, and as there were no means of transport to remove them, orders were given, after supplying the immediate wants of the army, to destroy them; but Romana, who would neither defend Leon nor Mansilla, had, contrary to his promises, pre-occupied Astorga with his fugitive army, and when the English divisions marched in, such a tumult and confusion arose, that no orders could be executed with regularity, no distribution made, nor the destruction of the stores be effected. The disorder thus unexpectedly produced was very detrimental to the discipline of the troops, which the unwearied efforts of the general had partly restored; the resources which he had depended on for the support of his soldiers became mischievous, and contributed to disorganise instead of nourishing them. And he had the further vexation to hear Romana, the principal cause of this misfortune, proposing, with troops unable to resist a thousand light infantry, to recommence offensive operations on a plan, in comparison with which the visions of Don Quixote were wisdom.

On the 31st, the flank brigades separated from the army at Bonillas, and bent their course by cross roads towards Orense and Vigo, being detached to lessen the pressure on the commissariat, and to cover the flanks of the army; Fraser's and Hope's divisions entered Villa Franca, and Baird's division was at Bembibre; the reserve, with the head-quarters, halted at Cambarros, a village six miles from Astorga, until the cavalry fell back in the night to the same place, and then the reserve marched to Bembibre. The marquis of Romana, after doing so much mischief by crossing the line of march, left his infantry to wander as they pleased, and retired with his cavalry and some guns to the valley of the Minho, and the rest of his artillery mixed with the British army, but most of it was captured before reaching Lugo.

Upon the 1st of January the emperor took possession of Astorga, where seventy thousand French infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and two hundred pieces of artillery, after many days of incessant marching, were now united. The congregation of this mighty force, while it evinced the power and energy of the French monarch, attested also the genius of the English general, who, with a handful of men, had found the means to arrest the course of the conqueror, and to draw him, with the flower of his army, to this remote and unimportant part of the Peninsula, at the moment when Portugal, and the fairest provinces of Spain, were prostrate beneath the strength of his hand. That Spain, being in her extremity, sir John Moore succoured her, and in the hour of weakness intercepted the blow, which was descending to crush her, no man of candour and honesty can deny. For what troops, what preparations, what courage, what capacity was there in the south to have resisted, even for an instant, the progress of a man, who, in ten days, and in the depth of winter, crossing the snowy ridge of the Carpentinos, had traversed two hundred miles of hostile country, and transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga in a shorter time than a Spanish courier would have taken to travel the same distance?

This stupendous march was rendered fruitless by the quickness of his adversary; but Napoleon, though he had failed to destroy the English army, resolved, nevertheless, to cast it forth of the Peninsula, and being himself recalled to France by tidings that the Austrian storm was ready to burst, had fixed upon the

duke of Dalmatia to continue the pursuit. For this purpose three divisions of cavalry, and three of infantry were added to his former command; but of these last, the two commanded by generals Loison and Heudelet were several marches in the rear, and general Bonnet's remained always in the Montaña de St. Ander. Hence the whole number bearing arms which the duke led immediately to the pursuit, was about twenty-five thousand men, of which four thousand two hundred were cavalry, composing the divisions of Lorges, La Houssaye, and Franceschi.* Fifty-four guns were with the columns, Loison's and Heudelet's divisions followed by forced marches, and Soult was supported by Ney with the sixth corps, wanting its third division, but mustering above sixteen thousand men under arms, the flower of the French army, together with thirty-seven pieces of artillery. Thus including Laborde, Heudelet, and Loison's division, nearly sixty thousand men and ninety-one guns were put on the track of the English army. Meanwhile the emperor returned to Valladolid, where he received the addresses of the notables and deputies from Madrid and other great towns, and strove, by promises and other means, to win the good opinion of the public. Appointing Joseph to be his lieutenant-general, he allotted separate provinces for each 'corps d'armée,' and directing the imperial guard to return to France, after three days' delay he departed himself with scarcely any escort, but with an astonishing speed that frustrated the designs which the Spaniards had as some say formed against his person.

CHAPTER V.

Sir John Moore retreats towards Vigo; is closely pursued—Miserable scene at Bembibre—Excesses at Villa Franca—Combat at Calcabellos—Death of general Colbert—March to Nogales—Line of retreat changed from Vigo to Coruna—Skillful passage of the bridge of Constantino; skirmish there—The army halts at Lugo—Sir John Moore offers battle; it is not accepted; he makes a forced march to Betanzos; loses many stragglers; rallies the army; reaches Coruna—The army takes a position—Two large stores of powder exploded—Fleet arrives in the harbour; army commences embarking—Battle of Coruna—Death of sir John Moore—His character.

THE duke of Dalmatia, a general, who, if the emperor be excepted, was no wise inferior to any of his nation, commenced his pursuit of the English army with a vigor that marked his eager desire to finish the campaign in a manner suitable to the brilliant opening at Gamonal. The main body of his troops followed the route of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada; a second column took the road of Cambarros and Bembibre; Franceschi entered the valley of the Syl, and moving up that river, turned the position of Villa Franca del Bierzo.†

Thus sir John Moore, after having twice baffled the emperor's combinations, was still pressed in his retreat with a fury that seemed to increase every moment. The separation of his light brigades, a measure which he reluctantly adopted by the advice of his quartermaster-general, had weakened the army by three thousand men, yet he still possessed nineteen thousand of all arms, good soldiers to fight, and strong to march, although shaken in discipline by the disorders at Valderas, and Astorga; for the general's exertions to restore order and regularity were by many officers slightly seconded, and by some with scandalous levity disregarded. There was no choice but to retreat. The astonishing rapidity with which the emperor had brought up his overbearing numbers, and thrust the English army into Galicia, had rendered the natural strength of that country unavailing; the resources

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

† Ibid.

were few, even for an army in winter quarters, and for a campaign in that season, there were none at all. All the draught cattle that could be procured would scarcely have supplied the means to transport ammunition for two battles, whereas the French, sweeping the rich plains of Castille with their powerful cavalry, might have formed magazines at Astorga and Leon, and from thence have been supplied in abundance, while the English were starving.

Before he advanced from Salamanca, Moore, foreseeing that his movement must sooner or later end in a retreat, had sent officers to examine the roads of Galicia and the harbours which offered the greatest advantages for embarkation; by the reports of those officers, which arrived from day to day, and by the state of the magazines which he had directed to be formed, his measures were constantly regulated.* The magazines of Astorga, Benevente, and Labaneza, were, by untoward circumstances, and the deficiency of transport, rendered, as we have seen, of no avail beyond the momentary supply they afforded, and part of their contents falling into the enemy's hands, gave him some cause of triumph; but those at Villa Franca and Lugo contained about fourteen days' consumption, and there were other small magazines formed on the line of Orense and Vigo.

More than this could not have been accomplished. It was now only the fifteenth day since sir John Moore had left Salamanca, and already the torrent of war, diverted from the south, was foaming among the rocks of Galicia. Nineteen thousand British troops, posted in strong ground, might have offered battle to very superior numbers, but where was the use of merely fighting an enemy who had three hundred thousand men in Spain? Nothing could be gained by such a display of courage, and the English general, by a quick retreat, might reach his ships unmolested, embark, and carrying his army from the narrow corner in which it was cooped to the southern provinces, establish there a good base of operations, and renew the war under favorable circumstances. It was by this combination of a fleet and army, that the greatest assistance could be given to Spain, and the strength of England become most formidable. A few days' sailing would carry the troops to Cadiz, but six weeks' constant marching would not bring the French army from Galicia to that neighbourhood. The northern provinces were broken, subdued in spirit, and possessed few resources; the southern provinces had scarcely seen an enemy, were rich and fertile, and there also was the seat of government. Sir John Moore reasoning thus, resolved to fall down to the coast and embark, with as little loss or delay as might be; but Vigo, Coruña, and Ferrol were the principal harbours, and their relative advantages could not be determined except by the reports of the engineers, none of which, so rapidly had the crisis of affairs come on, were yet received; and as those reports could only be obtained from day to day, the line of retreat became of necessity subject to daily change.

When the duke of Dalmatia took the command of the pursuing army, Hope's and Frazer's divisions were, as I have said, at Villa Franca, Baird's at Bemibire, the reserve and cavalry at Cambarros, six miles from Astorga. Behind Cambarros, the mountains of Galicia rose abruptly, but there was no position, because, after the first rise at the village of Rodrigatos, the ground continually descended to Calcabellos, a small town, only four miles from Villa Franca, and the old road of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada, which turned the whole line, was choked with the advancing columns of the enemy.† The reserve and the cavalry therefore marched during the night to Bemibire, and on their arrival Baird's division proceeded to Calca-

bellos; but in the immense wine vaults of Bemibire many hundred of his men remained behind inebriated, the followers of the army crowded the houses, and a number of Romana's disbanded men were mixed with this heterogeneous mass of marauders, drunkards, muleteers, women, and children; the weather was dreadful, and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the general-in-chief, when the reserve marched the next morning, the number of those unfortunate wretches was not diminished. Leaving a small guard to protect them, sir John Moore proceeded to Calcabellos, yet scarcely had the reserve marched out of the village, when some French cavalry appeared, and in a moment the road was filled with the miserable stragglers, who came crowding after the troops, some with shrieks of distress and wild gestures, others with brutal exclamations, while many, overcome with fear, threw away their arms, while those who preserved them were too stupidly intoxicated to fire, and kept reeling to and fro, alike insensible to their danger and to their disgrace. The enemy's horsemen perceiving this, bore at a gallop through the disorderly mob, cutting to the right and left as they passed, and riding so close to the columns, that the infantry were forced to halt in order to check their audacity.

At Calcabellos the reserve took up a position. Baird then marched to Herrerias, and the general-in-chief went on to Villa Franca. But in that town great excesses had been committed by the preceding divisions; the magazines were plundered, the bakers driven away from the ovens, the wine stores forced, and the commissaries prevented from making the regular distributions; the doors of the houses were broken, and the scandalous insubordination of the soldiers proved that a discreditable relaxation of discipline on the part of the officers had taken place. Moore arrested this disorder, and caused one man taken in the act of plundering a magazine to be hanged in the market-place; then issuing severe orders to prevent a recurrence of such inexcusable conduct, he returned to Calcabellos, which the enemy were now approaching.

The Guia, a small, but at this season of the year a deep stream, run through that town, and was crossed by a stone bridge. On the Villa Franca side a lofty ridge, rough with vineyards and stone walls, was occupied by two thousand five hundred infantry, with a battery of six guns; four hundred riflemen, and about the same number of cavalry, were posted on a hill two miles beyond the river, to watch the two roads of Bemibire and Foncevadon. In this situation, on the 3d of January, a little after noon, the French general Colbert approached with six or eight squadrons, but observing the ground behind Calcabellos so strongly occupied, demanded reinforcements. Soult, believing that the English did not mean to make a stand, replied by ordering Colbert to charge without delay, and the latter, stung by the message, obeyed with precipitate fury. From one of those errors so frequent in war, the British cavalry, thinking a greater force was riding against them, retired at speed to Calcabellos, and the riflemen, who, following their orders, had withdrawn when the French first came in sight, were just passing the bridge, when a crowd of staff-officers, the cavalry, and the enemy, came in upon them in one mass; in the confusion thirty or forty men were taken, and Colbert, then crossing the river, charged on the spur up the road. The remainder of the riflemen had however thrown themselves into the vineyards, and when the enemy approached within a few yards, opened such a deadly fire, that the greatest number of the French horsemen were killed on the spot, and among the rest Colbert himself; his fine martial figure, his voice, his gestures, and, above all, his great valour, had excited the admiration of the British, and a general feeling of sorrow was predominant when the gallant soldier fell. Some French voltigeurs now crossed the river, and a few

* Sir John Moore's Papers. MSS.

† See colonel Carmichael Smith's report.

of the 52d regiment descended from the upper part of the ridge to the assistance of the riflemen, when a sharp skirmish commenced, in which two or three hundred men of both sides were killed or wounded. Towards evening, Merle's division of infantry appeared on the hills in front of the town, and made a demonstration of crossing opposite to the left of the English position, but the battery of the latter checked this movement, and night coming on the combat ceased.

As the road from Villa Franca to Lugo led through a rugged country, the cavalry were now sent on to the latter town at once, and during the night the French patrols breaking in upon the rifle piquets, wounded some men, but were beaten back without being able to discover that the English troops had abandoned the position. This however was the case, and the reserve reached Herrerias, a distance of eighteen miles, on the morning of the 4th, Baird's division being then at Nogales, Hope's and Fraser's near Lugo.

At Herrerias, the English general, who constantly directed the movements of the rearguard himself, received the first reports of the engineers relative to the harbours. It appeared that Vigo, besides its greater distance, offered no position to cover the embarkation, but Coruña and Betanzos did. The march to Vigo was of necessity abandoned, the ships were directed round to Coruña, and Moore, who now deeply regretted the separation of his light brigades, sent forward instructions for the leading division to halt at Lugo, where he designed to rally the army, and give battle if the enemy would accept it. These important orders were carried to sir David Baird by one of the aides de camp of the commander-in-chief, but sir David forwarded them by a private dragoon, who got drunk and lost the despatch. This blameable irregularity was ruinous to general Frazer's troops; in lieu of resting two days at Lugo, that general, unwitting of the order, pursued his toilsome journey towards St. Jago de Compostella, and then returning without food or rest, lost more than four hundred stragglers.

On the 5th, the reserve having, by a forced march of thirty-six miles, gained twelve hours' start of the enemy, reached Nogales, at which place they met a large convoy of English clothing, shoes, and ammunition, intended for Romana's army, yet moving towards the enemy,—a circumstance characteristic of the Spanish mode of conducting public affairs. There was a bridge at Nogales which the engineers failed to destroy, but this was a matter of little consequence; the river was fordable above and below, and the general was unwilling, unless for some palpable advantage, which seldom presented itself, to injure the communications of a country that he was unable to serve: moreover, the bridges were commonly very solidly constructed, and the arches having little span, could be rendered passable again in a shorter time than they could be destroyed. At this period of the retreat also the road was covered with baggage, sick men, women, and plunderers, all of whom would have been thus sacrificed; for the peasantry, although armed, did not molest the enemy, but fearing both sides alike, carried their effects into the mountains: even then the villanous marauders followed them, and in some cases were by the Spaniards killed,—a just punishment for quitting their colours. Under the most favourable circumstances, the tail of a retreating force exhibits terrible scenes of distress, and on the road near Nogales the followers of the army were dying fast from cold and hunger. The soldiers, barefooted, harassed, and weakened by their excesses at Bembibre and Villa Franca, were dropping to the rear by hundreds, while broken carts, dead animals, and the piteous appearance of women with children, struggling or falling exhausted in the snow, completed a picture of war, which, like Janus, has a double face.

Francisco who, after turning Villa Franca, had

secured the valley of the Syl and captured many Spanish prisoners and baggage, now regained the line of march at Becerea, and towards evening the French army, recovering their lost ground, passed Nogales, galling the rear-guard with a continual skirmish, and here it was that dollars to the amount of twenty-five thousand pounds were abandoned.* This small sum was kept near head-quarters to answer sudden emergencies, and the bullocks that drew it being tired, the general, who could not save the money without risking an ill-timed action, had it rolled down the side of the mountain, whence part of it was gathered by the enemy, part by the Gallician peasants. The returns laid before parliament in 1809 made the sum 60,000*l.*, and the whole loss during the campaign nearly 77,000*l.*, but it is easier to make an entry of one sum for a treasury return, than to state the details accurately; the money-agents were, like the military-agents, acting independently, and all losses went down under the head of abandoned treasure. Officers actually present, agree, that the only treasure abandoned by the army was that at Nogales, and that the sum was 25,000*l.* When it was ordered to be rolled over the brink of the hill, two guns, and a battalion of infantry, were engaged with the enemy to protect it, and some person in whose charge the treasure was, exclaiming, 'It is money!' the general replied, 'so are shot and shells.' Accidents will happen in wars. An officer of the guards had charge of the cars that drew this treasure, and in passing a village, another officer observing that the bullocks were exhausted, took the pains to point out where fresh and strong animals were to be found, but the escorting officer, either ignorant of, or indifferent to his duty, took no notice of this recommendation, and continued his march with the exhausted cattle.

Towards evening the reserve approached Constantino, the French were close upon the rear, and a hill within pistol-shot of the bridge offered them such an advantage, that there was little hope to effect the passage without great loss. Moore however posted the riflemen and the artillery on the hill, so as to mask the hasty passage of the reserve, and the enemy, ignorant of the vicinity of a river, were cautious, until they saw the guns go off at a trot, and the rifleman follow at full speed; then they pursued briskly, but when they reached the bridge the British were over, and a good line of battle was formed on the other side. A fight commenced, and the assailants were continually reinforced as their columns of march arrived, yet general Paget maintained the post with two regiments until nightfall, and then retired to Lugo, in front of which the whole army was now assembled.

A few of the French cavalry showed themselves on the 6th, but the infantry did not appear, and, the 7th, sir John Moore, in a general order, gave a severe but just rebuke to the officers and soldiers for their previous want of discipline, at the same time announcing his intention to offer battle. It has been well said, that a British army may be gleaned in a retreat, but cannot be reaped, whatever may be their misery, the soldiers will always be found clean at review, ready at a fight; and scarcely was this order issued, when the line of battle, so attenuated before, was filled with vigorous men, full of confidence and valour. Fifteen hundred had fallen in action or dropped to the rear, but as three fresh battalions, left by sir David Baird when he first advanced from Astorga, had rejoined the army between Villa Franca and Lugo, nineteen thousand combatants were still under arms.

The right of the English position was in comparatively flat ground, and partially protected by a bend of the Minho. The centre was amongst vineyards, with low stone walls. The left, which was somewhat withdrawn, rested on the mountains, being supported

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

and covered by the cavalry. It was the intention of the general to engage deeply with his right and centre, before he closed with his left wing, in which he had posted the flower of his troops, thinking thus to bring on a decisive battle, and trusting to the valour of the men to handle the enemy in such sort as that he should be glad to let the army continue its retreat un molested. Other hope, to re-embark the troops without loss, there was none, save by stratagem. Soult, an experienced general, commanding soldiers habituated to war, might be tempted, but could never be forced, to engage in a decisive battle among those rugged mountains, where whole days would pass in skirmishing, without any progress being made towards crippling an adversary.

It was mid-day before the French marshal arrived in person at the head of ten or twelve thousand men, and the remainder of his power followed in some disorder, for the marches had not been so easy but that many even of the oldest soldiers had dropped behind. As the columns came up, they formed in order of battle along a strong mountainous ridge fronting the English, and as the latter were not distinctly seen, from the inequalities of the ground, Soult doubted if they were all before him; wherefore taking four guns, and some squadrons commanded by colonel Lallemande, he advanced towards the centre, and opened a fire, which was immediately silenced by a reply from fifteen pieces. The marshal being then satisfied that something more than a rear-guard was in his front, retired. About an hour after he made a feint on the right, and at the same time sent a column of infantry and five guns against the left. On that side the three regiments which had lately joined were drawn up, and the French pushing the outposts hard, were gaining the advantage, when Moore arrived, rallied the light troops, and with a vigorous charge breaking the adverse column, treated it very roughly in the pursuit. The estimated loss of the French was between three and four hundred men.

As it was now evident that the British meant to give battle, the duke of Dalmatia hastened the march of Laborde's division, which was still in the rear, and requested marshal Ney, who was then at Villa Franca, to detach a division of the sixth corps by the Val des Orres to Orense; Ney, however, merely sent some troops into the valley of the Syl, and pushed his advanced posts in front as far as Nogales, Poyo, and Dancos.* At daybreak on the 8th the two armies were still embattled. On the French side, seventeen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery were in line, but Soult deferred the attack until the 9th.† On the English part, sixteen thousand infantry, eighteen hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of artillery, impatiently awaited the assault, and blamed their adversary for delaying a contest which they ardently desired; yet the darkness fell without a shot having been fired, and with it fell the English general's hope to engage his enemy on equal terms. What was to be done? assail the French position? remain another day in expectation of a battle? or, in secrecy, gain a march, and get on board without being molested, or at least obtain time to establish the army in a good situation to cover the embarkation? The first operation was warranted neither by present nor by future advantages, for how could an inferior army expect to cripple a superior one, posted as the French were, on a strong mountain, with an overbearing cavalry to protect their infantry, should the latter be beaten; and when twenty thousand fresh troops were at the distance of two short marches in the rear? The British army was not provided to fight above one battle; there were no draught cattle, no means of transporting reserve ammunition, no magazines, no hospitals, no second line, no provisions, a defeat would have been

ruin, a victory useless. A battle is always a serious affair, but two battles under such circumstances, though both should be victories, would have been destruction. But why fight at all, after the army had been rallied, and the disasters of the march from Astorga had been remedied? What, if beating first Soult and then Ney, the British had arrived once more above Astorga, with perhaps ten thousand infantry, and half as many hundred cavalry. From the mountains of Galicia their general might have cast his eyes as far as the Sierra Morena, without being cheered by the sight of a single Spanish army, none existed to aid him, none to whom he might give aid. Even Mr. Frere acknowledged that at this period six thousand ill-armed men collected at Despeñas Peros, formed the only barrier between the French and Seville, and sir John Moore was sent out not to waste English blood in fruitless battles, but to assist the universal Spanish nation!

The second proposition was decided by the state of the magazines; there was not bread for another day's consumption remaining in the stores at Lugo. It was true that the army was in heart for fighting, but distressed by fatigue and bad weather, and each moment of delay, increased privations that would soon have rendered it inefficient for a campaign in the south, the only point where its services could now be effectual.* For two whole days Moore had offered battle, this was sufficient to rally the troops, to restore order, and to preserve the reputation of the army. Lugo was strong ground in itself, but it did not cover Coruña, the road leading from Orense to St. Jago da Compostella turned it, the French ought to have been on that line, and there was no reason to suppose that they were not; Soult, as we have seen, pressed Ney to follow it. It was then impossible to remain at Lugo, and useless if it had been possible. The general adopted the third plan, and prepared to decamp in the night; he ordered the fires to be kept bright, and exhorted the troops to make a great exertion, which he trusted would be the last required of them.

The country immediately in the rear of the position was intersected by stone walls and a number of intricate lanes, precautions were taken to mark the right tracks, by placing bundles of straw at certain distances, and officers were appointed to guide the columns. At ten o'clock the regiments silently quitted their ground, and retired in excellent order; but a moody fortune pursued sir John Moore throughout this campaign, baffling his prudence, and thwarting his views, as if resolved to prove the unyielding firmness of his mind. A terrible storm of wind and rain, mixed with sleet, commenced as the army broke up from the position, the marks were destroyed, and the guides lost the true direction; only one of the divisions gained the main road, the other two were bewildered, and when daylight broke, the rear columns were still near to Lugo. The fatigue, the depression of mind, occasioned by this misfortune, and the want of shoes, broke the order of the march, and the stragglers were becoming numerous, when, unfortunately, Baird, who was with the leading division, thinking to relieve the men during a halt which took place in the night, desired them to take refuge from the weather in some houses a little way off the road. Complete disorganization followed this imprudent act, from that moment it became impossible to make the soldiers keep their ranks, plunder succeeded, the example was infectious, and what with real suffering, and evil propensity encouraged by this error of inexperience, the main body of the army, which had bivouacked for six hours in the rain, arrived at Betanzos on the evening of the 9th, in a state very discreditable to its discipline.

The commander-in-chief, with the reserve and the cavalry, as usual, covered the march, and in the course

* S. Journal of operations. MS.

† Ibid.

* Sir John Moore's Papers.

of it he ordered several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers failed of success in every attempt.* Fortunately, the enemy did not come up with the rear before the evening, and then only with their cavalry, otherwise many prisoners must have fallen into their hands; for the number of stragglers uncovered by the passage of the reserve was so numerous, that when pressed, they united, under sergeant Newman, of the 43d regiment, and repulsed the French cavalry themselves: a signal proof that the disorder was occasioned as much by insubordination in the regiments as by the fatigue of the march. The reserve commanded by general Edward Paget, an officer distinguished during the retreat by his firmness, ability, and ardent zeal, remained in position, during the night, a few miles from Betanzos; the rest of the army was quartered in that town, and as the enemy could not gather in strength on the 10th, the commander-in-chief halted that day, and the cavalry passed from the rear-guard to the head of the column. The 11th, the French interrupted those employed to destroy the bridge of Betanzos, but from some mismanagement, although the twenty-eighth regiment repulsed the first skirmishers, the bridge, constructed of wood, was only partially destroyed. In the meantime sir John Moore assembled the army in one solid mass. The loss of men in the march from Lugo to Betanzos had been greater than that in all the former part of the retreat, added to all the waste of the movement in advance and the loss sustained in the different actions: nevertheless, fourteen or fifteen thousand infantry were still in column, and by an orderly march to Coruña under the personal direction of the commander-in-chief, demonstrated, that inattention and the want of experience in the officers, was the true cause of those disorders, which had afflicted the army far more than the sword of the enemy or the rigour of the elements.

As the troops approached Coruña, the general's looks were directed towards the harbour, but an open expanse of water painfully convinced him, that to Fortune at least he was no way beholden; contrary winds still detained the fleet at Vigo, and the last consuming exertion made by the army was rendered fruitless! The men were put into quarters, and their leader awaited the progress of events.

The bridge of El Burgo was destroyed, and also that of Cambria, situated a few miles up the Mero river, but the engineer employed at the latter, mortified at the former failures, was so anxious to perform his duty in an effectual manner, that he remained too near the mine, and was killed by the explosion. Meanwhile three divisions occupied the town and suburbs of Coruña, and the reserve was posted between the village of El Burgo, and the road of St. Jago de Compostella. For twelve days these hardy soldiers had covered the retreat, during which time they had traversed eighty miles of road in two marches, passed several nights under arms in the snow of the mountains, were seven times engaged with the enemy, and now assembled at the outposts, having fewer men missing from the ranks, including those who had fallen in battle, than any other division in the army: an admirable instance of the value of good discipline, and a manifest proof of the malignant injustice with which sir John Moore has been accused of precipitating his retreat beyond the measure of human strength.

The town of Coruña, although sufficiently strong to oblige an enemy to break ground before it, was weakly fortified, and to the southward commanded by some heights close to the walls. Sir John Moore therefore caused the land front to be strengthened, and occupied the citadel, but disarmed the sea face of the works, and the inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joined

in the labour, although they were fully aware that the English intended to embark, and that they would incur the enemy's anger by taking a part in the military operations. Such flashes of light from the dark cloud which at this moment covered Spain may startle the reader, and make him doubt if the Spaniards could have been so insufficient to their own defence as they have been represented in the course of this history. I answer, that the facts were as I have told them, and that it was such paradoxical indications of character that deceived the world at the time, and induced men to believe that that reckless, daring defiance of the power of France so loudly proclaimed by the patriots would be strenuously supported. Of proverbially vivid imagination and quick resentments, the Spaniards feel and act individually rather than nationally, and during this war, that which appeared constancy of purpose, was but a repetition of momentary fury; a succession of electric sparks generated by a constant collision with the French army, and daily becoming fainter as custom reconciled them to those injuries and insults which are commonly the attendants of war.

Procrastination and improvidence are the besetting sins of the nation. At this moment large magazines of arms and ammunition, which had been sent in the early part of the preceding year from England, were still in Coruña unappropriated and unregarded by a nation infested with three hundred thousand enemies, and having a hundred thousand soldiers unclothed and without weapons. Three miles from the town they had piled four thousand barrels of powder in a magazine built upon a hill, and a smaller quantity, collected in another storehouse, was at some distance from the first. To prevent them falling a prey to the enemy, Moore caused both to be exploded on the 13th, and the inferior one blew up with a terrible noise, which shook the houses in the town; but when the train reached the great store, there ensued a crash like the bursting forth of a volcano; the earth trembled for miles, the rocks were torn from their bases, and the agitated waters rolled the vessels as in a storm; a vast column of smoke and dust, shooting out fiery sparks from its sides, arose perpendicularly and slowly to a great height, and then a shower of stones, and fragments of all kinds, bursting out of it with a roaring sound, killed many persons who remained too near the spot. Stillness, slightly interrupted by the lashing of the waves on the shore, succeeded, and the business of the war went on. The next measure was a painful one; for the ground in front of Coruña is impracticable for cavalry, and as the horses were generally foundered, and it was impossible to embark them all in the face of an enemy, a great number were reluctantly ordered to be shot; these poor animals, already worn down and feet broken, would otherwise have been distributed among the French cavalry, or used as draft cattle, until death relieved them from procrastinated sufferings.

But the French were now collecting in force on the Mero, and it became necessary to choose a position of battle. A chain of rocky elevations, commencing on the sea-coast north-west of the place, and ending on the Mero just behind the village of El Burgo, offered an advantageous line of defence, covered by a branch of the Mero, which washing a part of the base, would have obliged the enemy to advance by the road of Compostella. This ridge was however too extensive for the English army, and if not wholly occupied, the French might have turned it by the right, and moved along a succession of eminences to the very gates of Coruña. There was no alternative, but to take possession of an inferior range, enclosed as it were within the other, and completely commanded by it within cannon-shot; here therefore the army was posted. Meanwhile the French army had been so exhausted with

* Mr. James Moore's Narrative.

continual toil, that it was not completely assembled on the Mero before the 12th. On that day the infantry took post opposite El Burgo, the cavalry of La Hous-saye lined the river as far as the ocean, and Franceschi, crossing at the bridge of Celas, seven miles higher up the river, intercepted some stores arriving from St. Jago, and made a few prisoners. The 14th, the bridges at El Burgo being rendered practicable for artillery, two divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, passed the river, and to cover this march some guns opened on the English posts but were soon silenced by a superior fire. In the evening, the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and soon after entered the harbour of Coruña, and the dismounted cavalry, the sick, all the best horses, and fifty-two pieces of artillery, were embarked during the night, eight British and four Spanish guns only being retained on shore ready for action.

On the 15th, Laborde's division arrived. The French then occupied the great ridge enclosing the British position, placed their right on the intersection of the roads leading from St. Jago and Betanzos, and their left upon a rocky eminence which overlooked both lines;* after this they extended their cavalry, supported by some troops on their own left, and a slight skirmish took place in the valley below. The English piquets opposite the right of the French also got engaged, and were so galled by the fire of two guns, that colonel M'Kenzie, of the fifth regiment, pushed out with some companies to seize the battery; a line of infantry, hitherto concealed by some stone walls, immediately arose, and poured in such a fire of musquetry, that the colonel was killed, and his men forced back with loss.

In the course of the night, Soult with great difficulty established a battery of eleven heavy guns on the rocks which closed the left of his line of battle, and then formed his order of battle.† Laborde's division was posted on the right, having one half on the high ground, and the other half on the descent towards the river. Merle's division was in the centre. Mermet's division formed the left. The position was covered in front of the right by the villages of Palavia Abaxo and Portosa, and in front of the centre by a wood. The left was secured by the rugged heights where the great battery was established, which was about twelve hundred yards from the right of the British line, and midway the little village of Elvina was held by the piquets of the fiftieth British regiment.‡ The late arrival of the transports, the increasing force of the enemy, and the disadvantageous nature of the ground had greatly augmented the difficulty and danger of the embarkation, and several general officers now proposed to the commander-in-chief, that he should negotiate for leave to retire to his ships upon terms. There was little chance of such a proposal being agreed to by the enemy, and there was no reason to try. The army had suffered, but not from defeat, its situation was dangerous, but far from desperate; wherefore the general would not consent to remove the stamp of energy and prudence, which marked his retreat, by a negotiation that would have given an appearance of timidity and indecision to his previous operations, as opposite to their real character as light is to darkness; his high spirit and clear judgment revolted at the idea, and he rejected the degrading advice without hesitation.

All the encumbrances of the army were shipped in the night of the 15th and morning of the 16th, and everything was prepared to withdraw the fighting men as soon as the darkness would permit them to move without being perceived; and the precautions taken would, without doubt, have insured the success of this difficult operation, but a more glorious event was destined to give a melancholy but graceful termination to

the campaign. About two o'clock in the afternoon a general movement along the French line gave notice of an approaching battle, and the British infantry, fourteen thousand five hundred strong immediately occupied the inferior range of hills already spoken of. The right was formed by Baird's division, and, from the oblique direction of the ridge, approached the enemy, while the centre and left were of necessity withheld in such a manner that the French battery on the rocks raked the whole of the line.* General Hope's division, crossing the main road, prolonged Baird's line to the left, and occupied strong ground abutting on the muddy bank of the Mero. A brigade of Baird's division remained in column behind the right wing, and in like manner a brigade of Hope's division was behind the left wing, while Paget's reserve, posted at Airis, a small village in rear of the centre, looked down the valley which separated Baird's right from the hills occupied by Franceschi's cavalry; a battalion detached from the reserve kept these horsemen in check, and was itself connected with the main body by a chain of skirmishers extended across the valley. Fraser's division held the heights immediately before the gates of Coruña, watching the coast road, but it was also ready to succour any point.

These dispositions were dictated by the nature of the ground, which was very favourable to the enemy; for Franceschi's cavalry reached nearly to the village of San Cristoval, a mile beyond Baird's right, and hence sir John Moore was forced to weaken his front and keep Fraser's division in reserve until Soult's attack should be completely unfolded. There was, however, one advantage on the British side; many thousand new English muskets, found in the Spanish stores, were given to the troops in lieu of their rusty, battered arms, and as their ammunition was also fresh, their fire was far better sustained than that of the enemy.

BATTLE OF CORUNA.

When Laborde's division arrived, the French force was not less than twenty thousand men, and the duke of Dalmatia made no idle evolutions of display, for distributing his lighter guns along the front of his position, he opened a fire from the heavy battery on his left, and instantly descended the mountain with three columns, covered by clouds of skirmishers. The British piquets were driven back in disorder, and the village of Elvina was carried by the first French column, which then dividing, attempted to turn Baird's right by the valley, and to break his front at the same time. The second column made against the English centre, and the third attacked Hope's left at the village of Palavia Abaxo. The weight of Soult's guns overmatched the English six-pounders, and the shot swept the position to the centre; but sir John Moore observing that, according to his expectations, the enemy did not show any body of infantry beyond that which moving up the valley outflanked Baird's right, ordered general Paget to carry the whole of the reserve to where the detached regiment was posted, and, as he had before arranged with him, to turn the left of the French attack and menace the great battery. Meanwhile, he directed Fraser to support Paget, and then throwing back the fourth regiment, which formed the right of Baird's division, he opened a heavy fire upon the flank of the troops penetrating up the valley, while the fiftieth and forty-second regiments met those breaking through Elvina. The ground about that village being intersected by stone walls and hollow roads, a severe scrambling fight ensued, the French were forced back with great loss, and the fiftieth regiment entering the village with them, after a second struggle drove them beyond it. Seeing this, the general ordered up a battalion of the guards to fill the void in the line made by the ad-

* Noble's Expedition de Gallice.

† Sir John Moore's Letter to Ld. Castlereagh.

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† Ibid.

* Vide Plan of the Battle.

vance of those regiments, whereupon the forty-second, with the exception of its grenadiers, mistaking his intention, retired, and at that moment the enemy, being reinforced, renewed the fight beyond the village; the officer commanding the fiftieth* was wounded and taken prisoner, and Elvina then became the scene of a second struggle, which being observed by the commander-in-chief, he addressed a few animating words to the forty-second, and caused it to return to the attack. During this time Paget, with the reserve, had descended into the valley, and the line of the skirmishers being thus supported, vigorously checked the advance of the enemy's troops in that quarter, while the fourth regiment galled their flank; at the same time the centre and left of the army also became engaged, sir David Baird was severely wounded, and a furious action ensued along the line, in the valley, and on the hills.

Sir John Moore, while earnestly watching the result of the fight about the village of Elvina, was struck on the left breast by a cannon shot; the shock threw him from his horse with violence, but he rose again in a sitting posture, his countenance unchanged, and his stedfast eye still fixed upon the regiments engaged in his front, no sign betraying a sensation of pain. In a few moments, when he was satisfied that the troops were gaining ground, his countenance brightened, and he suffered himself to be taken to the rear. Then was seen the dreadful nature of his hurt. The shoulder was shattered to pieces, the arm was hanging by a piece of skin, the ribs over the heart were broken, and bared of flesh, and the muscles of the breast torn into long strips, which were interlaced by their recoil from the dragging of the shot. As the soldiers placed him in a blanket his sword got entangled, and the hilt entered the wound; captain Hardinge, a staff officer, who was near, attempted to take it off, but the dying man stopped him, saying, '*It is as well as it is. I had rather it should go out of the field with me;*' and in that manner, so becoming to a soldier, Moore was borne from the fight.†

Meanwhile the army was rapidly gaining ground. The reserve overthrowing every thing in the valley, obliged La Houssaye's dragoons, who had dismounted, to retire, turned the enemy on that side, and even approached the eminence upon which the great battery was posted; on the left, colonel Nicholls, at the head

of some companies of the fourteenth, carried Palavia Abaxo, which general Foy defended but feebly; in the centre, the obstinate dispute for Elvina had terminated in favour of the British, and when the night set in, their line was considerably advanced beyond the original position of the morning, while the French were falling back in confusion. If at this time general Fraser's division had been brought into action along with the reserve, the enemy could hardly have escaped a signal overthrow; for the little ammunition Soult had been able to bring up was nearly exhausted, the river Mero, with a full tide, was behind him, and the difficult communication by the bridge of El Burgo was alone open for a retreat. On the other hand, to continue the action in the dark was to tempt fortune; the French were still the most numerous, and their ground was strong, moreover the disorder they were in, offered such a favourable opportunity to get on board the ships, that sir John Hope, upon whom the command of the army had devolved, satisfied with having repulsed the attack, judged it more prudent to pursue the original plan of embarking during the night. This operation was effected without delay, the arrangements being so complete that neither confusion nor difficulty occurred. The piquets, kindling a number of fires, covered the retreat of the columns, and being themselves withdrawn at daybreak, were embarked, under the protection of general Hill's brigade, which was posted near the ramparts of the town.

When the morning dawned, the French, observing that the British had abandoned their position, pushed forward some battalions to the heights of St. Lucie, and about midday succeeded in establishing a battery, which playing upon the shipping in the harbour caused a great deal of disorder among the transports; several masters cut their cables, and four vessels went ashore, but the troops being immediately removed by the men of war's boats, the stranded vessels were burnt, and the whole fleet at last got out of harbour. General Hill's brigade then embarked from the citadel, while general Beresford, with a rear guard, kept possession of that work until the 18th, when the wounded being all put on board, his troops likewise embarked; the inhabitants faithfully maintained the town against the French, and the fleet sailed for England. The loss of the British was never officially published, but was estimated at eight hundred, and that of the French at three thousand. The latter is undoubtedly an exaggeration, yet it must have been very great, for the arms of the English were all new, the ammunition fresh, and whether from the peculiar construction of our muskets, the physical strength and coolness of the men, or from all combined, it is certain that the fire of an English line is the most destructive known. The nature of the ground also prevented any movement of artillery on either side, and the French columns in their attack were exposed to grape, which they could not return because of the distance of their batteries.

* The author's eldest brother; he was said to be slain. When the French renewed the attack on Elvina, he was somewhat in advance of that village, and alone, for the troops were scattered by the nature of the ground. Being hurt in the leg, he endeavoured to retire, but was overtaken, and thrown to the ground with five wounds; a French drummer rescued him, and when a soldier with whom he had been struggling made a second attempt to kill him, the drummer once more interfered. The morning after the battle marshal Soult sent his own surgeon to major Napier, and, with a kindness and consideration very uncommon, wrote to Napoleon, desiring that his prisoner might not be sent to France, which, from the system of refusing exchanges, would have ruined his professional prospects; the drummer also received the cross of the legion of honour. When the second corps quitted Coruna, marshal Soult recommended his prisoner to the attention of marshal Ney, and the latter treated him rather with the kindness of a friend than the civility of an enemy; he lodged him with the French consul, supplied him with money, gave him a general invitation to his house, and not only refrained from sending him to France, but when by a flag of truce he knew that major Napier's mother was mourning for him as dead, he permitted him, and with him the few soldiers taken in the action, to go at once to England, merely exacting a promise that none should serve until exchanged. I would not have touched at all upon these private adventures, were it not that gratitude demands a public acknowledgment of such generosity, and that demand is rendered more imperative by the after misfortunes of marshal Ney. That brave and noble-minded man's fate is but too well known! He who had fought five hundred battles for France, not one against her, was shot as a traitor! Could the bitterest enemy of the Bourbons have more strongly marked the difference between their interests and those of the nation?

† Mr. James Moore's Narrative. Hardinge's Letter.

Thus ended the retreat to Coruña; a transaction which, up to this day, has called forth as much of falsehood and malignity as servile and interested writers could offer to the unprincipled leaders of a base faction, but which posterity will regard as a genuine example of ability and patriotism. From the spot where he fell, the general, who had conducted it, was carried to the town by a party of soldiers, his blood flowed fast, and the torture of his wound was great, yet such was the unshaken firmness of his mind, that those about him, judging from the resolution of his countenance that his hurt was not mortal, expressed a hope of his recovery; hearing this, he looked stedfastly at the injury for a moment, and then said, '*No, I feel that to be impossible.*'* Several times he caused his attendants to stop and turn him round, that he might

* Captain Hardinge's Letter.

behold the field of battle, and when the firing indicated the advance of the British, he discovered his satisfaction, and permitted the bearers to proceed. Being brought to his lodgings, the surgeons examined his wound, but there was no hope, the pain increased, and he spoke with great difficulty. At intervals he asked if the French were beaten, and addressing his old friend, colonel Anderson, he said, '*You know that I always wished to die this way.*'* Again he asked if the enemy were defeated, and being told they were, observed, '*It is a great satisfaction to me, to know we have beaten the French.*' His countenance continued firm and his thoughts clear; once only, when he spoke of his mother, he became agitated; but he often inquired after the safety of his friends, and the officers of his staff, and he did not even in this moment forget to recommend those whose merit had given them claims to promotion. His strength failed fast, and life was just extinct, when with an unsubdued spirit, as if anticipating the baseness of his posthumous calumniators, he exclaimed, '*I hope the people of England will be satisfied! I hope my country will do me justice!*' In a few minutes afterwards he died, and his corpse, wrapped in a military cloak, was interred by the officers of his staff in the citadel of Coruña, the guns of the enemy paid his funeral honours, and Soult, with a noble feeling of respect for his valour, raised a monument to his memory.

Thus ended the career of sir John Moore, a man whose uncommon capacity was sustained by the purest virtue, and governed by a disinterested patriotism more in keeping with the primitive than the luxurious age of a great nation. His tall graceful person, his dark searching eyes, strongly defined forehead, and singularly expressive mouth, indicated a noble disposition and a refined understanding, while the lofty sentiments of honour habitual to his mind, being adorned by a subtle playful wit, gave him, in conversation, an ascendancy that he always preserved by the decisive vigour of his actions. He maintained the right with a vehemence bordering on fierceness, and every important transaction in which he was engaged increased his reputation for talent, and confirmed his character as a stern enemy to vice, a steadfast friend to merit, a just and faithful servant of his country. The honest loved him, the dishonest feared him; for while he lived he did not shun, but scorned and spurned the base, and with characteristic propriety, they spurned at him when he was dead.

A soldier from his earliest youth, Moore thirsted for the honours of his profession, and feeling that he was worthy to lead a British army, hailed the fortune that placed him at the head of the troops destined for Spain. As the stream of time passed, the inspiring hopes of triumph disappeared, but the austere glory of suffering remained, and with a firm heart he accepted that gift of a severe fate. Confiding in the strength of his genius, he disregarded the clamours of presumptuous ignorance, and opposing sound military views to the foolish projects so insolently thrust upon him by the ambassador, he conducted his long and arduous retreat with sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude; no insult disturbed, no falsehood deceived him, no remonstrance shook his determination; fortune frowned without subduing his constancy; death struck, but the spirit of the man remained unbroken when his shattered body scarcely afforded it a habitation. Having done all that was just towards others, he remembered what was due to himself; neither the shock of the mortal blow, nor the lingering hours of acute pain which preceded his dissolution, could quell the pride of his gallant heart, or lower the dignified feeling with which, conscious of merit, he at the last moment asserted his right to the gratitude of the country he had served so truly.

If glory be a distinction, for such a man death is not a leveller!

CHAPTER VI.

OBSERVATIONS—GENERAL VIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Observations—The conduct of Napoleon and that of the English cabinet compared—The emperor's military dispositions examined—Propriety of sir John Moore's operations discussed—Diagram, exposing the relative positions of Spanish, French, and English armies—Propriety of Sir John Moore's retreat discussed; and the question, whether he should have fallen back on Portugal or Galicia, investigated—Sir John Moore's judgment defended; his conduct calumniated by interested men for party purposes; eulogised by marshal Soult, by Napoleon, by the duke of Wellington.

MR. CANNING, in an official communication to the Spanish deputies in London, observed, that 'the conduct of the campaign in Portugal was unsatisfactory, and inadequate to the brilliant successes with which it opened.' In the relation of that campaign, it has been shown how little the activity and foresight of the cabinet contributed to those successes, and the following short analysis will prove that, with respect to the campaign in Spain also, the proceedings of the ministers were marked alike by tardiness and incapacity.

Joseph abandoned Madrid the 3d of August, and on the 11th of the same month, the French troops from the most distant parts of Europe were in motion to remedy the disasters in the Peninsula.

The 1st of September a double conscription, furnishing one hundred and sixty thousand men, was called out to replace the troops withdrawn from Poland and Germany.

The 4th of September the emperor announced to the senate, that 'he was resolved to push the affairs of the Peninsula with the greatest activity, and to destroy the armies which the English had disembarked in that country.'

The 11th, the advanced guard of the army coming from Germany reached Paris, and was there publicly harangued by the emperor.

The 8th of November that monarch broke into Spain at the head of three hundred thousand men, and the 5th of December, not a vestige of the Spanish armies remaining, he took possession of Madrid.

Now the Asturian deputies arrived in London the 6th of June, and yet on the 20th of August—the battle of Vimiero being then unfought, and, consequently, the fate of the campaign in Portugal uncertain,—the English minister invited sir Hew Dalrymple to discuss three plans of operations in Spain, each founded upon data utterly false, and all objectional in detail. He also desired that sir Arthur Wellesley should go to the Asturias to ascertain what facilities that country offered for the disembarkation of an English army; and the whole number of troops disposable for the campaign, exclusive of those already in Portugal, he stated to be twenty thousand, of which one half was in England and the other in Sicily. He acknowledged that no information yet received had enabled the cabinet to decide as to the application of the forces at home, or the ulterior use to be made of those in Portugal, yet, with singular rashness, the whole of the southern provinces, containing the richest cities, finest harbours, and most numerous armies, were discarded from consideration; and sir Hew Dalrymple, who was well acquainted with that part of Spain, and in close and friendly correspondence with the chiefs, was directed to confine his attention to the northern provinces, of which he knew nothing.

The reduction of Junot's army in Portugal, and the discomfiture of Joseph on the Ebro, were regarded as certain events, and the observations of the minister were principally directed, not to the best mode of attack, but to the choice of a line of march that would ensure the utter destruction or captivity of the whole French army; nay, elated with extravagant hopes, and strangely despising Napoleon's power, he instructed Lord William Bentinck to urge the central junta to

* Mr. James Moore's Narrative.

an invasion of France, as soon as the army on the Ebro should be annihilated. Thus it appears that the English ministers were either profoundly ignorant of the real state of affairs, or that, with a force scattered in England, Portugal, and Sicily, and not exceeding forty-five thousand men, they expected in one campaign, first to subdue twenty-six thousand French under Junot, then to destroy eighty thousand under Joseph, and turning the tide of war, to invade France.

The battle of Vimiero took place, and sir Arthur Wellesley naturally declined a mission more suitable to a staff captain than a victorious commander; but before sir Hew's answer, exposing the false calculations of the minister's plans, could be received in England, a despatch, dated the 2d of September, announced the resolution of the government to employ an army in the northern provinces of Spain, and directed twenty thousand men to be held in readiness to unite with other forces to be sent from England. Nevertheless, this project also was so immature, that no intimation was given how the junction was to be effected, whether by sea or land; nor had the minister even ascertained that the Spaniards would permit English troops to enter Spain at all. Three weeks later, lord William Bentinck, writing from Madrid, says, 'I had an interview with Florida Blanca, he expressed his surprise that there should be a doubt of the Spaniards wishing for the assistance of the English army.' Such also was the confusion at home, that lord Castlereagh repeatedly expressed his fears lest the embarkation of Junot's troops should have absorbed all the means of transport in the Tagus, when a simple reference to the transport office in London would have satisfied him, that although the English army should also be embarked, there would still remain a surplus of twelve thousand tons.

When the popular cry rose against the convention of Cintra, the generals-in-chief were recalled in succession, as rapidly as they had been appointed, the despatches addressed to one generally fell into the hands of his successor; but the plans of the ministers becoming at last mature, on the 6th of October sir John Moore was finally appointed to lead the forces into Spain. At this period the head of the grand French army was already in the passes of the Pyrenees, the hostile troops on the Ebro coming to blows, the Spaniards weak and divided, and the English forty marches from the scene of action: yet, said the minister to sir John Moore, 'there will be full time to concert your plan of operations with the Spanish generals before the equipment of your army can be completed.' Was this the way to oppose Napoleon? Could such proceedings lead to aught but disaster? It has been said that sir Hew Dalrymple's negligence was the cause of this delay, that he should have had the troops in readiness. But that general could not prudently incur the expense of equipping, for a march, an army that was likely to be embarked; he could not, in short, divine the plans of the ministers before they were formed, and it is evident that the error attaches entirely to the government.

The incapacity of the Spanish generals has been already sufficiently exposed by occasional observations in the narrative, their faults, glaring and fatal, call for no further remark; but the exact combinations, the energy and rapidity of the French emperor, merit the most careful examination. His operations were not, as they have been generally considered, a pompous display of power, to create an appearance of conquest that was unreal; not a mere violent irruption with a multitude of men, but a series of skilful and scientific movements, worthy of so great a general and politician. It is true that his force was immense, and that the Spaniards were but contemptible soldiers, yet he never neglected the lessons of experience, nor deviated from

the strictest rules of art. With astonishing activity, and when we consider the state of his political relations on the continent, we may add, with astonishing boldness, he first collected ample means to attain his object; then deceiving his enemies with regard to his numbers, position, and intentions, and choosing his time with admirable judgment, he broke through the weak part of their line, and seized Burgos, a central point, which enabled him to envelope and destroy the left wing of the Spaniards, before their right could hear of his attack, the latter being itself turned by the same movement, and exposed to a like fate. This position also enabled him to menace the capital, to keep the English army in check, and to cover the formation of those magazines and stores which were necessary to render Burgos the base and pivot of further operations.

Napoleon's forces were numerous enough to have attacked Castaños and Palafox, while Blake was being pursued by the first and fourth corps; but trusting nothing to chance, he waited for twelve days, until the position of the English army was ascertained, the strength of the northern provinces quite broken, and a secure place of arms established. Then leaving the second corps to cover his communication, and sending the fourth corps into the flat country, to coast, as it were, the heads of the English columns, and to turn the passes of the Carpentino mountains, he caused the Spanish right wing to be destroyed, and himself approached the capital, at a moment when not a vestige of a national army was left; when he had good reason to think that the English were in full retreat; when the whole of his own corps were close at hand, and consequently when the greatest moral effect could be produced, and the greatest physical power concentrated at the same time to take advantage of it. Napoleon's dispositions were indeed surprisingly skilful; for, although marshal Lefebvre's precipitation at Zornoza, by prolonging Blake's agony, lost six days of promise, it is certain, that even reverses in battle could neither have checked the emperor, nor helped the Spaniards.

If Soult had been beaten at Gamonal, Napoleon was close at hand to support the second corps, and the sixth corps would have fallen upon the flank and rear of the Spaniards.

If the first corps had been defeated at Espinosa, the second and fourth corps, and the emperor's troops, would have taken Blake in flank and rear.

If Lasnes had been defeated at Tudela, he could have fallen back on Pampeluna, the fifth and eighth corps were marching to support him, and the sixth corps would have taken the Spaniards in flank.

If the emperor had been repulsed at the Somosierra, the sixth corps would have turned that position by Guadalaxara, and the fourth corps by Guadarama.

If sir John Moore had retreated on Portugal, the fourth corps was nearer to Lisbon than he was; and if he had overthrown Soult, the fifth and eighth corps were ready to sustain that marshal, while Napoleon, with fifty thousand men, as we have seen, was prepared to cut the British line of retreat into Galicia. In short, no possible event could have divided the emperor's forces, and he constantly preserved a central position which enabled him to unite his masses in sufficient time to repair any momentary disaster. By a judicious mixture of force and policy also, he obliged Madrid to surrender in two days, and thus prevented the enthusiasm which would doubtless have arisen if that capital had been defended for any time, and the heart burnings if it had been stormed. The second sweep that he was preparing to make when sir John Moore's march called off his attention from the south would undoubtedly have put him in possession of the remaining great cities of the Peninsula. Then the civil benefits promised in his decrees and speeches

would have produced their full effect, and the result may be judged of by the fact, that in 1811 and 12, Aragon, Valencia, and Andalusia were, under the able administration of marshals Soult and Suchet, as submissive as any department of France. Both generals raised Spanish battalions, and employed them not only to preserve the public peace, but to chase and put down the guerillas of the neighbouring provinces.

Sir John Moore's talents saved the Peninsula at this crisis; and here only a military error of Napoleon's may be detected. Forgetting his own maxim that war is not a conjectural art, he took for granted that the English army was falling back to Portugal, and without ascertaining that it was so, acted upon the supposition. This apparent negligence, so unlike his usual circumspection, leads to the notion, that through Morla he might have become acquainted with the peculiar opinions and rash temper of Mr. Frere, and trusted that the treacherous arts of the Spaniard, in conjunction with the presumptuous disposition of the plenipotentiary, would so mislead the English general, as to induce him to carry his army to Madrid, and thus deliver it up entire and bound. It was an error; but Napoleon could be deceived or negligent only for a moment. With what vigour he recovered himself, and hastened to remedy his error! How instantaneously he relinquished his intentions against the south, turned his face away from the glittering prize, and bent his whole force against the only man among his adversaries that had discovered talent and decision! Let those who have seen the preparations necessary to enable a small army to act, even on a pre-conceived plan, say what uncontrollable energy that man possessed, who, suddenly interrupted in such great designs, could, in the course of a few hours, put fifty thousand men in movement on a totally new line of operations, and in the midst of winter execute a march of two hundred miles, with a rapidity hardly to be equalled under the most favourable circumstances.

The indefatigable activity of the duke of Dalmatia greatly contributed to the success of the whole campaign; and it is a remarkable circumstance, that Soult and Napoleon, advancing from different bases, should have so combined their movements, that, after marching, the one above a hundred, and the other above two hundred miles, through a hostile country, they effected their junction at a given point, and at a given hour, without failure: nor is it less remarkable, that such a decided and well-conducted operation should have been baffled by a general at the head of an inexperienced army.

When Sylla, after all his victories, styled himself a happy, rather than a great general, he discovered his profound knowledge of the military art. Experience had taught him that the speed of one legion, the inactivity of another, the obstinacy, the ignorance, or the treachery of a subordinate officer, was sufficient to mar the best concerted plan—nay, that the intervention of a shower of rain, an unexpected ditch, or any apparently trivial accident, might determine the fate of a whole army. It taught him that the vicissitudes of war are so many, that disappointment will attend the wisest combinations; that a ruinous defeat, the work of chance, often closes the career of the boldest and most sagacious of generals, and that to judge of a commander's conduct by the event alone, is equally unjust and unphilosophical, a refuge for vanity and ignorance.

These reflections seem to be peculiarly applicable to sir John Moore's campaign, which has by sundry writers been so unfairly discussed. Many of the subsequent disasters of the French can now be distinctly traced to the operations of the British army. It can be demonstrated that the reputation of that excellent man was basely sacrificed at the period of his death,

and that the virulent censures passed upon his conduct have been as inconsiderate as they were unmerited and cruel. The nature of the commands held by sir John Moore in the years 1807-8-9 forced him into a series of embarrassments, from which few men could have extricated themselves. After refusing the charge of the absurd expedition to Egypt in 1806, which ended, as he judged it must do, unfavourably, he succeeded to the command of the troops in Sicily, a situation which immediately involved him in unpleasant discussions with the queen of Naples and the British envoy; discussions to which the subsequent well-known enmity of the cabinet of that day may be traced. By his frank conduct, clear judgment, and firm spirit, he soon obtained an influence over the wretched court of Palermo that promised the happiest results; the queen's repugnance to a reform was overcome, the ministers were awed, and the miserable intrigues of the day abated, the Sicilian army was reorganized, and a good military system was commenced under the advice of the British general.

This promising state of affairs lasted but a short time; the Russian fleet put into the Tagus, the French threatened Portugal, and Sicily was no longer considered! Sir John Moore was ordered to quit that island, and to assemble a large force at Gibraltar for a special service; but the troops to be gathered were dispersed in the Mediterranean from Egypt to the straits, and their junction could not be effected at all, unless the English ambassador at Constantinople should succeed in bringing a negotiation, then pending between the Turks and Russians, to a happy issue.* Now this special service in question had two objects, 1. to aid sir Sydney Smith in carrying off the royal family of Portugal to the Brazils; 2. to take possession of Madeira; yet neither were made known to the general before his arrival at Gibraltar, which was not until after Junot had taken possession of Lisbon. Sir John Moore then, following his instructions, proceeded home, and thus our interests in Sicily were again abandoned to the vices and intrigues of the court of Palermo. On the passage he crossed general Spenser going with a force against Ceuta, and soon after he had reached England, he was despatched to Sweden, without any specific object, and with such vague instructions, that an immediate collision with the unfortunate Gustavus was the consequence.

Having with much dexterity and judgment withdrawn himself and his army from the capricious violence of that monarch, sir John was superseded and sent to Portugal, with the third rank in an army which at that time no man had such good claims to command as himself; the mode of doing this was also offensive, and it was evident that the ministers desired to drive him into private life. Their efforts were, however, powerless against his pure and elevated patriotism. In a personal conference with lord Castlereagh, he expressed his indignation at the insults offered to him, and then repaired to his station at Portsmouth, where an official letter followed him, the purport being that his remonstrance being disrespectful, it would be referred to the king for reprehension, and that measures would be taken to remove him from what appeared to be a disagreeable situation: in other words, that his resignation was demanded. Without a moment's hesitation, he replied to this menace, in a letter which breathed the very spirit of manly dignity and patriotism. 'I am,' he wrote, 'this moment honoured with your lordship's letter (by messenger) of yesterday's date. As I have already had the honour to express my sentiments to your lordship fully at my last interview, it is, I think, unnecessary to trouble you with a repetition of them now. I am about to proceed on the service on

* Sir John Moore's Journal. MS

which I have been ordered, and it shall be my endeavour to acquit myself with the same zeal by which I have ever been actuated when employed in the service of my country. The communication which it has been thought proper to make to his majesty cannot fail to give me pleasure; I have the most perfect reliance on his majesty's justice, and shall never feel greater security than when my conduct, my character, and my honour are under his majesty's protection.' He heard no more on that subject.

The good fortune of England was never more conspicuous than at this period, when her armies and fleets were thus bandied about, and a blind chance governed the councils at home. For first a force collected from all parts of the Mediterranean was transported to the Baltic at a time when an expedition composed of troops, which had but a short time before come back from the Baltic, were sailing from England to the Mediterranean. An army intended to conquer South America was happily assembled in Ireland at the moment when an unexpected event called for their services in Portugal. A division destined to attack the Spaniards at Ceuta, arrived at Gibraltar, at the instant when the insurrection of Andalusia fortunately prevented them from making an attempt that would have materially aided Napoleon's schemes against the Peninsula. Again, three days after sir John Moore had withdrawn his army from Sweden, orders arrived to employ it in carrying off the Spanish troops under Romana,—an operation for which it was not required, and which would have retarded, if not entirely frustrated, the campaign in Portugal; but the ministers were resolved at any cost to prevent Moore from commanding the army destined for Portugal. Nor was it the least part of England's fortune that in such long-continued voyages in bad seasons, no disaster befel the huge fleets thus employed in bearing her strength from one extremity of Europe to the other.

After the convention of Cintra, Moore was again placed at the head of an army, an appointment unexpected by him, for the frank and bold manner in which he expressed himself to the ministers left him little to hope; but the personal goodwill of the king, and his own towering reputation, crushed all opposition. Thus, in a few months after he had quitted Sweden, Moore, with an army not exceeding twenty-four thousand men, was in the heart of Spain, opposed to Napoleon, who having passed the Pyrenees at the head of three hundred and thirty thousand men, could readily bring two hundred thousand to bear on the British; a vast disproportion of numbers, and a sufficient answer to all the idle censures passed upon the retreat to Coruña.

The most plausible grounds of accusation against sir John Moore's conduct, rest on three alleged errors:—

- 1st, That he divided his forces;
- 2dly. That he advanced against Soult;
- 3dly. That he made a precipitate and unnecessary retreat.

When a general aware of the strength of his adversary, and of the resources to be placed at his own disposal, arranges a plan of campaign, he may be strictly judged by the rules of art; but if, as in the case of sir John Moore, he is suddenly appointed to conduct important operations without a plan being arranged, or the means given to arrange one, then it is evident that his capacity or incapacity must be judged of by the energy he displays, the comprehensive view he takes of affairs, and the rapidity with which he accommodates his measures to events, that the original vice of his appointment will not permit him to control. Sir Walter Scott, in his *Life of Napoleon*, with that intrepidity of error which marks the work, has asserted, 'That Moore sent ten thousand men, under sir D. Baird, by sea, to Coruña.' That 'the general science of war, upon the most extended scale, seems to have been so little un-

derstood or practised by the English generals at this time, that instead of the country being carefully reconnoitred by officers of skill, the march of the army was arranged by such hasty and inaccurate information as could be collected from the peasants;' and that 'by these reports sir John Moore was induced to divide his army.'

The second of these assertions is devoid of reason, and both are contrary to fact. Sir David Baird was never at Lisbon, but was sent with his troops, by the ministers direct from England to Coruña. The 'general science of war upon the most extended scale,' is an inflated and unmeaning expression, the most contracted operation requires that good information should be obtained; and as to the fact, sir John Moore employed his own staff officers to examine the roads, sought information equally from noble and peasant, and, like all great commanders, regulated his proceedings by the general result of his inquiries.

The first dividing of the army was, therefore, the act of the ministers, who sent Baird to Coruña; the after separation of the artillery was sir John Moore's, the reasons for which have been already stated; but it is worth while to examine what the effect of that measure was, and what it might have been. And here it may be observed, that, although a brigade of light six-pounders did accompany the troops to Almeida, the road, in a military sense, was *not practicable*, for the guns were in some places let down the rocks by ropes, and in others carried over the difficult places! a practicable affair with one brigade, but how could the great train of guns and ammunition-waggons that accompanied sir John Hope, have passed such places without a loss of time that would have proved more injurious to the operations than the separation of the artillery? The advance of the army was guided by three contingent cases, any one of which arising would have immediately influenced the operations; 1. Blake on the left, or Castaños and Palafox upon the right, might have beaten the French, and advanced to the Pyrenees. 2. They might have maintained their position on the Ebro. 3. The arrival of reinforcements from France might have forced the Spaniards to fall back upon the upper Duero, on one side, and to the mountains of Guadalupe on the other. In the first case, there was no risk of marching by divisions towards Burgos, which was the point of concentration given by the British and Spanish ministers. In the second case, the army could safely unite at Valladolid. In the third case, if the division of sir David Baird had reached Toro early in November, and this it was reasonable to expect, because that general arrived at Coruña the 13th of October, the retrograde movement of the Spanish armies would probably have drawn the English to the Guadarama, as a safe and central point between the retiring Spanish wings.

Now the artillery marching from the Alemtejo by the roads of Talavera and Naval Carnero, to Burgos, would pass over one hundred and two Spanish leagues; to Aranda de Duero, eighty-nine leagues; to Valladolid, ninety-two leagues; while the columns that marched by Almeida and Salamanca would pass over one hundred and sixteen leagues to Burgos, and ninety-eight to Valladolid. Wherefore, supposing the Spaniards successful, or even holding their own, the separation of the artillery was an advantage, and if the Spaniards were driven back, their natural line of retreat would have brought them towards Madrid, Blake by Aranda to the Somosierra, and Castaños and Palafox by Sigüenza and Tarancón, to cover the capital, and to maintain an interior communication between the Somosierra and the Henares river. The British artillery would then have halted at Espinar, after a march of only eighty leagues, and Baird and Moore's corps uniting at Salamanca early in November, might by a flank march

to Arevalo, have insured the concentration of the whole army.

Thus, in the three anticipated cases, the separation of the artillery was prudent, and promised to be advantageous. There was, indeed, a fourth case, that which really happened. All the Spanish armies were dispersed in an instant! utterly effaced! But sir John Moore could not have divined such a catastrophe, while his ears were ringing with the universal clamour about the numbers and enthusiasm of the patriots, and if he had foreseen even a part of such disasters, he would never have advanced from Portugal. With the plans of the Spanish government he was unacquainted, but he was officially informed that above one hundred and forty thousand Spanish soldiers were between him and a feeble dispirited enemy; and as the intercepted letter from the governor of Bayonne stated, that the reinforcements would only arrive between the 18th of October and the 18th of November, it was reasonable to suppose the French would not commence offensive operations before the latter period, and that ample time would be afforded to concentrate the English troops under the protection of the Spanish armies.

If sir John Moore could have suspected the delusion under which the British government acted; if he could have divined the incredible folly of the central junta and the Spanish generals, or the inaccuracy of the military agents; if he could have supposed that the Spanish armies were weak in numbers, weaker in spirit, and destitute of food and clothing, or that, while the Spanish authorities were pressing him to advance, they would wantonly detain sir David Baird's troops seventeen days on board the transports; if he could have imagined all this, undoubtedly his arrangements ought and would have been different, his army would have been kept together, and the road to Salamanca through Coria, however difficult, would have been preferred to a divided march.

Now the dangerous and absurd position of the Spanish armies, and the remote situation of the British troops in October, may be explained by the annexed diagram. Lisbon being taken as a centre, and the distance *a* between Lisbon and Coruña, being the radius, let a circle passing through Madrid be described, and let the tangential line *c* be drawn perpendicular to the radius *a*, meeting the secant *b* at Sanguessa. Then it will be seen that as the extreme right of the Spaniards was posted at Sanguessa, and Castaños at Calahorra, while Blake was near Durango, and the main body of the French was at Vittoria, the latter not only divided the Spaniards, but was actually twenty-five miles nearer to Burgos and Valladolid (the points of concentration for Moore's and Baird's corps,) than either Castaños or Blake; and seventy-five miles nearer than Palafox. On the 10th, the emperor struck the first blow, by beating Belvedere and seizing Burgos; but sir David Baird did not quit Coruña until the 12th, and did not bring up the whole of his troops to Astorga before the 4th of December; hence it is clear, that whatever road the artillery had taken, the British army could not have averted the ruin of the Spaniards.

Let us suppose the troops assembled at Salamanca on the 13th of November. They must have advanced either to Valladolid or to Madrid. If to Valladolid, the emperor was at Burgos with the imperial guards, ten or twelve thousand cavalry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; the first corps was within a day's march, the second and fourth corps within three marches, and the sixth corps within two marches. Above a hundred thousand French soldiers could, therefore, have been concentrated in three days, and it is to be observed that sir John Moore never had twenty-five thousand in the field. It is said, he might have gone to Madrid; in that case the separation of the artillery would have been a decided advantage, and the separation of Baird's

corps, which was not the general's arrangement, the error. The army could not have marched from Salamanca to Madrid in less than seven days, and hence before the 21st of November, twenty-four thousand British soldiers could not have been collected in the capital; but the fourth French corps, which reached Segovia the 1st of December, would meanwhile have cut off the communication with Portugal, and the emperor with forty thousand men was at Aranda de Duero. Castaños, who had been defeated on the 23d of November, was indeed with the remnant of an army at Guadalaxara about the 1st of December, but the sixth corps was close in pursuit.

Moore must then have done one of three things. Advanced to the succour of Castaños, joined St. Juan at the Somosierra, or retreated across the Tagus. In the first case, the emperor would have forced the Somosierra, and uniting with the fourth corps, have placed sixty thousand men upon the English rear; in the second case, the sixth and fourth corps, turning both flanks, would have effected a junction behind the Somosierra, and cut them off from Madrid, while Napoleon, with forty thousand men, assailed them in front. To retreat over the Tagus was to adopt the southern provinces for a new base of operations, and might have been useful if the Spaniards would have rallied round him with enthusiasm and courage; but would they have done so when the emperor was advancing with his enormous force? After-experience proves that they would not. The duke of Dalmatia, in 1810, with an army very inferior to that under Napoleon, reached the gates of Cadiz without a serious blow being struck to oppose him, and at this time the people of the south were reckless of the opportunity procured for them by sir John Moore's march on Sahagun.

It has, however, been said, that twenty-four thousand British troops acting vigorously, could have checked the emperor, and raised the courage of the Spaniards. To such an observation I will oppose a fact. In 1815, Napoleon crossed the Sambre with one hundred and fifteen thousand men, and the two hundred and ten thousand regular troops in his front, among which were more than thirty thousand English, could with difficulty stop his progress after four days' fighting, in three of which he was successful. If sir John Moore, at a subsequent period, was willing to risk the danger of a movement on the capital, it was because he was misinformed of the French strength, and the Spaniards were represented to be numerous and confident; he was also unacquainted with the defeat at Tudela. His object was, by assisting Castaños, to arouse the spirit of the patriots, and nothing more strongly evinces his hardihood and prompt judgment; for, in his letter to Mr. Frere, he distinctly stated the danger to be incurred, and carefully separating the military from the political reasons, only proposed to venture the army, if the envoy was satisfied that the Spanish government and people would answer to such an appeal, and that the British cabinet would be willing to incur the risk for such an object. If he did not follow up his own proposal, it was because he had discovered that the army of Castaños was, not simply defeated, but destroyed; because the Somosierra had been forced by a charge of cavalry; and because the passes of the Guadarama, on his line of march to Madrid, were seized by the enemy before his own army could be concentrated.

Why then did he not retreat into Portugal? Because Napoleon, having directed his forces against the capital, the British army was enabled to concentrate; because Madrid had shut her gates; because Mr. Frere and the Spanish authorities endeavored to deceive him by false information; because the solemn declaration of the junta of Toledo, that they would bury themselves under the ruins of that town rather than surren-

der, joined to the fact that Zaragoza was fighting heroically, seemed to guarantee the constancy and vigour of that patriotic spirit which was apparently once more excited; because the question was again become political, and it was necessary to satisfy the English people, that nothing was left undone to aid a cause which they had so much at heart; because the peculiar position of the French army at the moment, afforded the means of creating a powerful diversion in favour of the southern provinces. These are the unanswerable reasons for the advance towards Sahagun. In the details of execution, that movement may be liable to some trifling objections; perhaps it would have been better to have carried the army on the 21st at once to Carrion and neglected Sahagun and Saldanha; but in its strategic and political character, it was well conceived and well timed, hardy and successful.

The irritating interference that sir John Moore was called upon to repel, and the treachery and the folly, equal in its effects to treachery, that he was obliged to guard against, have been sufficiently dwelt upon already; yet before discussing the retreat from Astorga, it may be of some military interest to show that the line of Portugal, although the natural one for the British army to retire upon, was not at this period necessarily either safe or useful, and that greater evils than those incurred by a retreat through Galicia would probably have attended a retrograde march upon Lisbon.

The rugged frontier of Portugal lying between the Duero and the Tagus, is vulnerable in many points to an invading army of superior force. It may be penetrated between the Duero and Pinhel, and between Pinhel and Guarda, by roads leading into the valleys of the Zezere and the Mondego. Between the Sierra de Estrella and the Sierra de Gata, by the road from Alfayates to Sabugal and Penamacor, or that by Guarda and Coria. Again, it may be pierced between the Sierra de Gata and the Tagus by Idanha Velha, Castello Branco, and Sobreira Formosa; and from the Tagus to the Guadiana, a distance of about twenty leagues, the Alemtejo presents an open country without any strong fortress, save La-Lippe, which may be disregarded and passed without danger. Now sir John Moore commenced his forward movement from Salamanca on the 12th of December, and at that period the fourth corps, being at Talavera de la Reyna, was much nearer to Lisbon than the British army was, and the emperor was preparing to march on that capital with the sixth corps, the guards, and the reserve. He could, as the duke of Berwick did, penetrate by both sides of the Tagus; and what was to prevent him from reaching Lisbon before the British force, if the latter had retreated from Salamanca? he marched on a shorter line and a better road, and he could supply his troops by requisitions, a system that, however fatal it may be in the end, is always advantageous at first; but Moore must, from a scanty military chest, have purchased his supplies from a suspicious peasantry, rendered more distrustful by the retreat.

It is true that in Lisbon, sir John Cradock commanded six thousand infantry and two hundred and fifty-eight cavalry; but the Portuguese provisional government, who had only organized a few ill-composed battalions, were so inactive, that it was not until the 11th of December that a proclamation, calling on the people to arm, was issued. In the arsenal there were scarcely muskets and equipments for eight thousand men, and the new levies were only required to assemble when the country should be actually invaded. Sir Robert Wilson, having with great activity organized about two thousand of the Lusitanian legion, had marched in the middle of December from Oporto, and this was all that could be opposed to an army more numerous, more favourably situated for invasion, and incomparably better commanded than that with which Massena invaded the country in 1810. Thus it

may be affirmed, that if a retreat upon Lisbon was advisable before Napoleon took Madrid, it was not a safe operation after that event, and it is clear that sir John Moore neither lightly nor injudiciously adopted the line of Galicia.

The arguments of those who deny the necessity of falling back, even behind the Eslla, are scarcely worth notice, a simple reference to the numbers under the emperor, and the direction of his march, is sufficient to expose their futility; but the necessity of the continued and, as it has been unjustly called, the precipitate retreat to Coruña, may not be quite so obvious. The advance to Sahagun was intended to create a diversion, and give the Spaniards an opportunity of making head in the south, it succeeded in drawing away the enemy, yet the Spaniards did not make any head, the central junta displayed no energy or wisdom; a few slight demonstrations by the marquis of Palacios, on the side of the Sierra Morena, and by the duke of Infantado on the side of Cuenca, scarcely disturbed the first corps which remained in La Mancha; ten thousand men were sufficient to maintain Madrid in perfect tranquillity, and a part of the fourth corps even marched from Talavera by Placentia on Salamanca. By the letters of Mr. Stuart, and the reports of his own spies, the English general was informed of all these disheartening circumstances, yet the intelligence arrived slowly and at intervals, and he, hoping that the Spaniards would finally make an effort, announced his intention to hold the Gallicias; Mr. Stuart's correspondence at last deprived him of that hope, and the presence of the emperor, the great amount of his force, and the vehemence with which he pressed forward, confirmed the unhappy truth that nothing could be expected from the south.

Sir John Moore could not with twenty-three thousand men maintain himself against the whole French army, and until he reached Astorga his flanks were always exposed; from thence he retreated in comparative security, but the natural strength of the country between that town and Coruña misled persons of shallow judgment, who have since inconsiderately advanced many vague accusations, such as that passes where a hundred men could stop an army were lightly abandoned; that the retreat was a flight, and the general's judgment clouded by the danger of his situation. There might be some foundation for such observations if military commanders were like prize-fighters, bound to strike always at the front, but as long as armies are dependent for their subsistence and ammunition upon lines of communication, the safety of their flanks and rear must be considered as of consequence. Moore was perfectly aware that he could fight any number of men in some of the mountainous positions on the road to Coruña; yet unless he could make a permanent defence, such battles would have been worse than useless, and a permanent defence was impossible, inasmuch as there were none but temporary magazines nearer than Coruña, and there were neither carriages of transport, nor money to procure them; moreover a severe winter had just set in, the people were disinclined to aid the troops, and as the province was poor, few resources could be drawn from the vicinity. Neither was there a single position that could be maintained for more than a few days against a superior force.

That of Rodrigatos could be turned by the old road leading to Villa Franca, Villa Franca itself by the valley of the Syl, and from thence the whole line to Coruña might be turned by the road of Orense, which also led directly to Vigo; and until he reached Nogales, Moore's intention was to retire to Vigo. The French could have marched through the richest part of Galicia to St. Jago and Coruña on the left, or from the Asturias, by the way of Mondonedo, on the right; and if it be asked, why they did not do so? the answer is

prompt, the emperor having quitted the army, the jealousies and misunderstandings usual between generals of equal rank impeded the operations. A coolness subsisted between marshal Ney and the duke of Dalmatia, and without entering into the grounds of their difference, it is plain that, in a military point of view, the judgment of the latter was the soundest. The former committed a great error by remaining at Villa Franca instead of pushing his corps, or a part of it as recommended by Soult, along the valley of Orense to St. Jago de Compostella, the British army would have been lost if the sixth corps had reached Coruña before it; and what would have been the chances in the battle if three additional French divisions had been engaged? Granting, therefore, that the troops could have been nourished during the winter, Villa Franca, Nogales, Constantino and Lugo, were not permanently defensible by an army whose base of operations was at Coruña. Hence it was that sir John Moore resolved to regain his ships with the view to renew the war in the south, and Hannibal himself could have done no more.

Nor was the mode of executing the retreat at all unbecoming the character of an able officer. Lord Bacon observes, that 'honourable retreats are no ways inferior to brave charges, as having less of fortune, more of discipline, and as much of valour.' That is an honourable retreat in which the retiring general loses no trophies in fight, sustains every charge without being broken, and finally, after a severe action, re-embarks his army in the face of a superior enemy, without being seriously molested. It would be honourable to effect this before a foe only formidable from numbers, but it is infinitely more creditable, when the commander, while struggling with bad weather and worse fortune, has to oppose veterans with inexperienced troops, and to contend against an antagonist of eminent ability, who scarcely suffers a single advantage to escape him during this long and vigorous pursuit. All this sir John Moore did, and finished his work by a death as firm and glorious as any that antiquity can boast of.

Put to lord Bacon's test, in what shall the retreat to Coruña be found deficient? something in discipline perhaps, but that fault does not attach to the general. Those commanders who have been celebrated for making fine retreats were in most instances well acquainted with their armies; and Hannibal, speaking of the elder Scipio, derided him, although a brave and skilful man, for that, being unknown to his own soldiers, he should presume to oppose himself to a general who could call to each man under his command by name; thus inculcating, that unless troops be trained in the peculiar method of a commander, the latter can scarcely achieve any thing great. Now Moore had a young army suddenly placed under his guidance, and it was scarcely united, when the superior numbers of the enemy forced it to a retrograde movement under very harassing circumstances; he had not time, therefore, to establish a system of discipline, and it is in the leading events, not the minor details, that the just criterion of his merits is to be sought for.

Was the retreat uncalled for? Was it unnecessarily precipitate? Was any opportunity of crippling the enemy lost? Was any weakness to be discovered in the personal character of the general? These are the questions that sensible men will ask. The first has been already examined, the second is a matter of simple calculation. The rear guard quitted Astorga on the 1st of January, on the 3d it repulsed the enemy in a sharp skirmish at Calcabellos, the 6th it rejoined the main body at Lugo, having three times checked the pursuers during the march; it was unbroken, had lost no gun, suffered no misfortune. The whole army offered battle at Lugo for two successive days, it was not accepted, and the retreat recommencing, the troops reached Be-

tanzos on the morning of the 10th, and Coruña on the 11th; thus in eleven days, three of which were days of rest, a small army passed over a hundred and fifty miles of good road. Now Napoleon, with fifty thousand men, left Madrid on the 22d of December, and the 28th he was at Villapando, having performed a march, on bad roads, of a hundred and sixty-four miles in seven days. The retreat to Coruña was consequently not precipitate, unless it can be shown, that it was unnecessary to retreat at all beyond Villa Franca; neither can it be asserted, that any opportunity of crippling the enemy was lost. To fight a battle was the game of the French marshal, and if any censure will apply to his able campaign, it is that he delayed to attack at Lugo; victorious or beaten, it would have increased the embarrassments of his adversary, who must have continued his retreat encumbered with the wounded, or the latter must have been abandoned without succour in the midst of winter.

At Coruña the absence of the fleet necessarily brought on a battle. That it was honourable to the British troops is clear from the fact that they embarked without loss after the action. That it was absolutely necessary to embark notwithstanding the success, is a certain proof how little advantage could have been derived from any battle fought farther inland; and sir John Moore's prudence in declining an action the moment he had rallied his army at Lugo, and restored that discipline which the previous movements had shaken. But, notwithstanding the clamour with which this campaign has been assailed, as if no army had ever yet suffered such misfortunes, it is certain that the nominal loss was small, the real loss smaller, and that it sinks into nothing when compared with the advantages gained. An army which, after marching in advance or retreat above five hundred miles before an enemy of immensely superior force, has only lost, including those killed in battle, four thousand men, or a sixth part of its numbers, cannot be said to have suffered severely, nor would the loss have been so great but for the intervention of the accidental occurrences mentioned in the narrative. Night marches are seldom happy, that from Lugo to Betanzos cost the army in stragglers more than double the number of men lost in all the preceding operations; nevertheless, the reserve in that, as in all the other movements, suffered little, and it is a fact, that the light brigades detached by the Vigo road, which were not pursued, made no forced marches, slept under cover, and were well supplied, left, in proportion to their strength, as many men behind as any other part of the army; thus proof upon proof accumulates that inexperience was the primary and principal cause of the disorders which attended the retreat. Those disorders were sufficiently great, but many circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of suffering and disorganization which was not real.

Sir John Moore's intention was to have proceeded to Vigo, in order to restore order before he sailed for England, instead of which the fleet steered home directly from Coruña, and a terrible storm scattered it; many ships were wrecked; and the remainder, driving up the channel, were glad to put into any port. The soldiers, thus thrown on shore, were spread from the Land's End to Dover. Their haggard appearance, ragged clothing, and dirty accoutrements, things common enough in war, struck a people only used to the daintiness of parade with surprise; the usual exaggerations of men just escaped from perils and distresses were increased by the uncertainty in which all were as to the fate of their comrades; a deadly fever, the result of anxiety, and of the sudden change from fatigue to the confinement of a ship, filled the hospitals at every port with officers and soldiers, and thus the miserable state of sir John Moore's army became the

topic of every letter, and the theme for every country newspaper along the coast. The nation, at that time unused to great operations, forgot that war is not a harmless game, and judging of the loss positively, instead of comparatively, was thus disposed to believe the calumnies of interested men, who were eager to cast a shade over one of the brightest characters that ever adorned the country. Those calumnies triumphed for a moment, but Moore's last appeal to his country for justice will be successful; posterity, revering and cherishing his name, will visit such of his odious calumniators as are not too contemptible to be remembered with a just and severe retribution, for thus it is that time freshens the beauty of virtue and withers the efforts of baseness. And if authority be sought for in a case where reason speaks so plainly, future historians will not fail to remark, that the man whose talents exacted the praises of Soult, of Wellington, and of Napoleon, could be no ordinary soldier.

'Sir John Moore,' says the first, 'took every advantage that the country afforded to oppose an active and vigorous resistance, and he finished by dying in a combat that must do credit to his memory.'

Napoleon more than once affirmed, that if he committed a few trifling errors, they were to be attributed to his peculiar situation, for that his talents and firmness alone had saved the English army from destruction.*

'In sir John Moore's campaign,' said the duke of Wellington, 'I can see but one error; when he advanced to Sahagun he should have considered it as a movement of retreat, and sent officers to the rear to mark and prepare the halting-places for every brigade. But this opinion I have formed after long experience of war, and especially of the peculiarities of a Spanish war, which must have been seen to be understood; finally, it is an opinion formed after the event.'

* Vivian's Conversations at Eiba. Voice from St. Helena.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

Slight effect produced in England by the result of the campaign—Debates in Parliament—Treaty with Spain—Napoleon receives addresses at Valladolid—Joseph enters Madrid—Appointed the emperor's lieutenant—Distribution of the French army—The duke of Dantzig forces the bridge of Almaraz—Toledo entered by the first corps—Infantado and Palacios ordered to advance upon Madrid—Cuesta appointed to the command of Galluzzo's troops—Florida Blanca dies at Seville—Succeeded in the presidency by the marquis of Astorga—Money arrives at Cadiz from Mexico—Bad conduct of the central junta—State of the Spanish army—Constancy of the soldiers—Infantado moves on Tarancon—His advanced guard defeated there—French retire towards Toledo—Disputes in the Spanish army—Battle of Ucles—Retreat of Infantado—Cartoajal supersedes him, and advances to Ciudad Real—Cuesta takes post on the Tagus, and breaks down the bridge of Almaraz.

THE effect produced in England, by the unfortunate issue of sir John Moore's campaign, was not in proportion with the importance of the subject. The people trained to party politics, and possessed of no real power to rebuke the folly of the cabinet, regarded both disasters and triumphs with factious rather than with national feelings, and it was alike easy to draw their attention from affairs of weight or to fix it on matters of little moment. Thus, the duke of York's conduct being at this time made the object of parliamentary inquiry, to drag his private frailties before the world was thought essential to the welfare of the nation, while the incapacity which had caused England and Spain to mourn in tears of blood, was left unprobed. An insular people, who are by their situation protected from the worst evils of war, may suffer themselves to be thus deluded; but if an unfortunate campaign were to bring a devastating enemy into the heart of the country, the honour of a general, and the military policy of the cabinet, would no longer be considered as mere subjects for a vile sophist's talents in misrepresentation.

It is true that the misfortunes of the campaign were by many orators, in both houses of parliament, treated with great warmth, but the discussions were chiefly remarkable, as examples of astute eloquence without any knowledge of facts. The opposition speakers, eager to criminate the government, exaggerated the disasters of the retreat, and comprehending neither the motives nor the movements of sir John Moore, urged several untenable charges against the ministers, who, disunited by personal feelings, did not all adopt the same grounds of defence. Thus, lord Castlereagh and lord Liverpool, passing over those errors of the cabinet, which left the general only a choice of difficulties at his outset, asserted, and truly, that the advantages derived from the advance to Sahagun, more than compensated the loss in the subsequent retreat; and both those statesmen paid an honorable tribute to the merits of the commander; but Mr. Canning, unscrupulously resolute to defend Mr. Frere, assented to all the erroneous statements of the opposition, and then with malignant dexterity endeavoured to convert them into charges against the fallen general. Sir John Moore was, he said, wholly answerable for the campaign. Whether glorious or distressing, whether to be admired or deplored, it was his own, he had kept the government quite ignorant of his proceedings! Being closely pressed on this point by Mr. C. Hutchinson and Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Canning deliberately repeated the assertion, yet not long afterwards, sir John Moore's letters to the ministers, written almost daily, and furnishing exact and copious information of all that was passing in the Peninsula, were laid before the house!

While the dearest interests of the nation were thus treated in parliament, the ardour of the English people was somewhat abated; yet the Spanish cause, so rightful in itself, was still popular, and a treaty was concluded with the supreme junta by which the contracting powers bound themselves to make common cause against France, and to agree to no peace except

by common consent. But the ministers although professing unbounded confidence in the result of the struggle, already looked upon the Peninsula as a secondary object; for the warlike preparations of Austria, and the reputation of the archduke Charles, whose talents were foolishly said to exceed Napoleon's, had awakened the dormant spirit of coalitions; and it was more agreeable to the aristocratic feeling of the English cabinet, that the French should be defeated by a monarch in Germany, than by a plebeian insurrection in Spain. The obscure intrigues of the princess of Tour and Taxis, and the secret societies on the continent emanating as they did from patrician sources, excited the sympathy of the ministers, engaged their attention, and nourished those distempered feelings which made them see only weakness and disaffection in France, when throughout that mighty empire, few desired and none dared to oppose the emperor's wishes; when even secret discontent was confined to some royalist chiefs and splenetic republicans whose influence was never felt, until after Napoleon had suffered the direst reverses.

Unable to conceive the extent of that monarch's views, or to measure the grandeur of his genius, the ministers attributed the results of his profound calculations to a blind chance, his victories to treason, to corruption, to any thing, but that admirable skill, with which he wielded the most powerful military force that ever obeyed the orders of a single chief. Thus self-deluded, and misjudging the difficulties to be encountered, they adopted every idle project, and squandered their resources without any great or decided effort. While negotiating with the Spanish junta for the occupation of Cadiz, they were planning an expedition against Italy, and while loudly asserting their resolution to defend Portugal, reserved their principal force for a secret blow in Holland; their preparations being however marked by a pomp and publicity totally unsuited to war. With what a mortal calamity that pageant closed, shall be noticed hereafter; at present it is fitting, to trace the operations in Spain, which were coincident with the retreat of sir John Moore.

It has already been stated that when Madrid surrendered, Napoleon refused to permit Joseph to return there unless the public bodies and the heads of families would unite to demand his restoration, and swear, without any mental reservation, to be true to him.* Registers had consequently been opened in the different quarters of the city, and twenty eight thousand six hundred heads of families inscribed their names, and voluntarily swore in presence of the host, that they were sincere in their desire to receive Joseph.† After this, deputations from all the councils, from the junta of commerce and money, the hall of the Alcades, and from the corporation, waited on the emperor at Valladolid, and being there joined by the municipality of that town, and by deputies from Astorga, Leon, and other places, presented the oath, and prayed that Joseph might be king. Napoleon thus entreated, consented that his brother should reassume his kingly functions.

It would be idle to argue from this apparently voluntary submission to the French emperor, that a change favourable to the usurpation had been produced in the feelings of the Spanish people; but it is evident that Napoleon's victories and policy had been so far effectual, that in the capital, and many other great towns, the multitude as well as the notables were, either from fear or conviction, submissive to his will; and it is but reasonable to suppose, that if his conquests had not been interrupted by extraneous circumstances, this example would have been generally followed, in preference to the more glorious, but ineffectual, resistance made by the inhabitants of those cities, whose fortitude

and whose calamities have forced from mankind a sorrowful admiration. The cause of Spain at this moment, was in truth lost, if any cause, depending upon war, which is but a succession of violent changes, can be called so; for the armies were dispersed, the government bewildered, the people dismayed, the cry of resistance hushed, and the stern voice of Napoleon, answered by the tread of three hundred thousand French veterans, was heard throughout the land. But the hostility of Austria arrested the conqueror's career, and the Spanish energy revived at the abrupt cessation of his terrific warfare.

Joseph, escorted by his French guards, in number between five and six thousand, entered Madrid the 23d of January. He was, however, a king without revenues, and he would have been without even the semblance of authority, if he had not been likewise nominated the emperor's lieutenant in Spain, by virtue of which title he was empowered to move the French army at his will. This power was one extremely unacceptable to the marshals, and he would have found it difficult to enforce it, even though he had restrained the exercise to the limits prescribed by his brother; but disdaining to separate the general from the monarch, he conveyed his orders to the French army, through his Spanish ministers, and the army in its turn disdained and resisted the assumed authority of men, who, despised for their want of military knowledge, were also suspected as favouring interests essentially differing from those of the troops.*

The iron grasp, that had compressed the pride and the ambitious jealousy of the marshals, being thus relaxed, the passions which had ruined the patriots began to work among their enemies, producing indeed less fatal effects, because their scope was more circumscribed, but sufficiently pernicious to stop the course of conquest. The French army, no longer a compact body, terrible alike from its massive strength, and its flexible activity, became a collection of independent bands, each formidable in itself, but, from the disunion of the generals, slow to combine for any great object; and plainly discovering, by irregularities and insubordination, that they knew, when a warrior, and when a voluptuous monarch was at their head. These evils were however only felt at a later period, and the distribution of the troops, when Napoleon quitted Valladolid, still bore the impress of his genius.

The first corps was quartered in La Mancha.

The second corps was destined to invade Portugal.

The third and fifth corps carried on the siege of Zaragoza.

The fourth corps remained in the valley of the Tagus.

The sixth corps, wanting its third division, was appointed to hold Galicia.

The seventh corps continued always in Catalonia.

The imperial guards, directed on Vittoria, contributed to the security of the great communication with France until Zaragoza should fall, and were yet ready to march when wanted for the Austrian war.

General Dessolles, with the third division of the sixth corps, returned to Madrid. General Bonnet, with the fifth division of the second corps, remained in the Montagna St. Andero.

General Lapisse, with the second division of the first corps, was sent to Salamanca, where he was joined by Maupetit's brigade of cavalry, which had crossed the Sierra de Bejar.

The reserve of heavy cavalry being broken up, was distributed, by divisions, in the following order:—

Latour Maubourg's joined the first corps. Lorge's and Lahoussaye's were attached to the second corps. Lassalle's was sent to the fourth corps. The sixth

* Nellereto.

† Azanza and O'Farril.

* King's correspondence captured at Vittoria, MSS.

corps was reinforced with two brigades. Milhaud's division remained at Madrid, and Kellennan's guarded the lines of communication between Tudela, Burgos, and Palencia.

Thus, Madrid being still the centre of operations, the French were so distributed, that by a concentric movement on that capital, they could crush every insurrection within the circle of their positions; and the great masses, being kept upon the principal roads diverging from Madrid to the extremities of the Peninsula, intercepted all communication between the Provinces: while the second corps, thrust out, as it were, beyond the circumference, and destined, as the fourth corps had been, to sweep round from point to point, was sure of finding a supporting army, and a good line of retreat, at every great route leading from Madrid to the yet unsubdued provinces of the Peninsula. The communication with France was, at the same time, secured by the fortresses of Burgos, Pampeluna, and St. Sebastian, and by the divisions posted at St. Ander, Burgos, Bilbao, and Vittoria; it was also supported by a reserve at Bayonne.

The northern provinces were parcelled out into military governments, the chiefs of which corresponded with each other, and by the means of moveable columns, repressed every petty insurrection. The third and fifth corps, having their base at Pampeluna, and their line of operations directed against Zaragoza, served as an additional covering force to the communication with France, and were themselves exposed to no flank attacks; except from the side of Cuença, where the duke of Infantado commanded; but that general was himself watched by the first corps.

All the lines of correspondence, not only from France but between the different corps, were maintained by fortified posts, having greater or lesser garrisons, according to their importance. Between Bayonne and Burgos there were eleven military stations. Between Burgos and Madrid, by the road of Aranda and Somosierra, there were eight; and eleven others protected the more circuitous route to the capital, by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guadarama.* Between Valladolid and Zaragoza, the line was secured by fifteen intermediate points. The communication between Valladolid and St. Ander contained eight posts; and nine others connected the former town with Villa Franca del Bierzo, by the route of Benevente and Astorga; finally, two were established between Benevente and Leon.

At this period, the force of the army, exclusive of Joseph's French guards, was three hundred and twenty-four thousand four hundred and eleven men, about thirty-nine thousand being cavalry.

Fifty-eight thousand men were in hospital.

The depôts, governments, garrisons, posts of correspondence, prisoners, and '*battalions of march*,' composed of stragglers, absorbed about twenty-five thousand men.

The remainder were under arms, with their regiments, and consequently, more than two hundred and forty thousand men were in the field; while the great line of communication with France (the military reader will do well to mark this, the key-stone of Napoleon's system) was protected by above fifty thousand men, whose positions were strengthened by three fortresses and sixty-four posts of correspondence, each more or less fortified.

Having thus shewn the military state of the French, I shall now proceed with the narrative of their operations, following, as in the first volume, a local rather than a chronological arrangement of events.

OPERATIONS IN ESTREMADURA AND LA MANCHA.

The defeat of Galluzzo has been incidentally touched upon before. The duke of Dantzic having observed,

that the Spanish general pretended, with six thousand raw levies, to defend a river line of forty miles, made a feint of crossing the Tagus at Arzobispo, and then suddenly descending to Almaraz, forced a passage over that bridge, on the 24th of December, killing and wounding many Spaniards, and capturing four guns; and so complete was the dispersion, that for a long time after, not a man was to be found in arms throughout Estremadura. The French cavalry followed the fugitives, but intelligence of sir John Moore's advance to Sahagun, being received, the pursuit ceased at Merida, and the fourth corps, which had left eight hundred men in garrison at Segovia, then occupied Talavera and Placentia; the duke of Dantzic was recalled to France, and Sebastiani succeeded to his command. At this period also, the first corps, (of which Lapisse's division only had followed the emperor to Astorga,) entered Toledo without opposition, and the French outposts were pushed towards Cuença, and towards the Sierra Morena.

Meanwhile, the central junta, changing its first design, retired to Seville, instead of Badajos, and being continually urged, both by Mr. Stuart and Mr. Frere, to make some effort to lighten the pressure on the English army, ordered Palafox and the duke of Infantado to advance; the one from Zaragoza towards Tudela, the other from Cuença towards Madrid. The marquis of Palacios, who had been removed from Catalonia, and was now at the head of five or six thousand levies in the Sierra Morena, was also directed to advance into La Mancha; and Galluzzo, deprived of his command, was constituted a prisoner, along with Cuesta, Castaños, and a number of other culpable or unfortunate officers, who, vainly demanding a judgment on their cases, were dragged from place to place by the government.

Cuesta was, however, so popular in Estremadura, that the central junta, although fearing and detesting him, were forced to place him at the head of Galluzzo's fugitives, part of whom had, when the pursuit ceased, rallied behind the Guadiana, and were now, with the aid of fresh levies, again taking the form, rather than the consistence of an army. This appointment was an act of deplorable incapacity; the moral effect was to degrade the government by exposing its fears and weakness, and, in a military view, it was destructive, because Cuesta was physically and mentally incapable of command. Obstinate, jealous, and stricken in years, he was heedless of time, circumstances, dispositions or fitness; to punish with a barbarous severity, and to rush headlong into battle, constituted, in his mind, all the functions of a general.

The president, Florida Blanca, eighty-one years of age, died at Seville, and the marquis of Astorga succeeded him, but the character of the junta was in no manner affected by the change. Some fleeting indications of vigour had been produced by the imminence of the danger during the flight from Aranjuez, but a large remittance of silver, from South America, having arrived at Cadiz, the attention of the members was absorbed by this object, and the public weal was blotted from their remembrance; even Mr. Frere, ashamed of their conduct, appeared to acquiesce in the justness of sir John Moore's estimate of the value of Spanish co-operation.

The number of men to be enrolled for the defence of the country had been early fixed at five hundred thousand, but scarcely one-third had joined their colours; nevertheless, considerable bodies were assembling at different points, because the people, especially those of the southern provinces, although dismayed, were obedient, and the local authorities, at a distance from the actual scene of war, rigorously enforcing the law of enrolment, sent the recruits to the armies; hoping thereby either to stave the war off from their own dis-

* Muster-rolls of the French army. MSS.

tricts, or to have the excuse of being without fighting men, to plead for quiet submission. The fugitive troops also readily collected again at any given point, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed their defeats to the treachery of their generals, and partly that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the government, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the enemy had invariably suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons mentioned in the commencement of this history, men were to be had in abundance, but, beyond assembling them and appointing some incapable person to command, nothing was done for defence. The officers, who were not deceived, had no confidence either in their own troops or in the government, nor were they themselves confided in or respected by their men: the latter starved, misused; ill-handled, possessed neither the compact strength of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under such a system, the peasantry could not be rendered energetic soldiers, nor were they active supporters of the cause; but with a wonderful constancy they endured for it, fatigue, sickness, nakedness and famine, displaying in all their actions, and in all their sentiments, a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy, although rendered nugatory by the vices and follies of the juntas and leading men, hallowed the people's efforts, and the flagitious violence of the invasion almost justified their ferocity.

Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above mentioned, advanced, with five thousand men, to Vilharta, in La Mancha; and the duke of Infantado, anticipating the instructions of the junta, was already in motion from Cuença, his army, reinforced by the divisions of Cartoajal and Lilli and by fresh levies, being about twenty thousand men, of which two thousand were cavalry. To check the incursions of the French horsemen, he had a few days after the departure of Napoleon from Madrid, detached general Senra and general Venegas with eight thousand infantry and all the horse to scour the country round Tarancon and Aranjuez, and the former entered Horcajada, while the latter endeavored to cut off a French detachment, but was himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior force. Marshal Victor, nevertheless, withdrew his advanced posts, and, concentrating Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions of infantry and Latour Maubourg's cavalry, at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of Toledo, left Venegas in possession of Tarancon. But, among the Spanish generals, mutual recriminations succeeded their failure: the duke of Infantado possessed neither authority nor talents to repress their disputes, and in this untoward state of affairs receiving the orders of the junta, he projected a movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place and Aranjuez, break down the bridges, and maintain the line of the Tagus.

The 10th he quitted Cuença, with ten thousand men, intending to join Venegas, who, with the rest of the army, was at Tarancon.

The 13th, he met a crowd of fugitives near Carascosa, and heard, with equal surprise and consternation, that the division under Venegas was beaten, and the pursuers close at hand.

ROUT OF UCLES.

It appeared that Victor, ignorant of the exact situation and intentions of the Spanish generals, and yet uneasy at their movements, had marched from Toledo to Ocaña the 10th, and that Venegas then abandoned Tarancon and took post at Ucles. The French again advanced on the 12th in two columns, of which one, composed of Ruffin's division and a brigade of cavalry, lost its way, and arrived at Alcazar; the other, led by Victor in person, arrived in front of the Spanish position at Ucles early in the morning of the 13th. This

meeting was unexpected by either party, but the French attacked without hesitation, and the Spaniards, making towards Alcazar, were cut off by Ruffin, and totally discomfited. Several thousands were taken, others fled across the fields, and one body preserving some order, marched towards Oca, a where meeting the French parc, it received a heavy discharge of grape, and dispersed. Of the whole force, only one small detachment, under general Giron, forced a passage by the road of Carascosa, and so reached the duke of Infantado, who immediately retreated safely to Cuença, as the French cavalry was too much fatigued to pursue him briskly.

From Cuença he sent his guns towards Valencia by the road of Tortola, but marched his infantry and cavalry by Chinchilla, to Tobarra on the frontiers of Murcia, and then to Santa Cruz de Mudela, a town situated near the entrance to the defiles of the Sierra Morena. This place he reached in the beginning of February, having made a painful and circuitous retreat of more than two hundred miles, in a bad season; his artillery had been captured at Tortola, and his force was reduced by desertion and straggling, to a handful of discontented officers, and a few thousand men, worn out with fatigue and misery. Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the province of Cuença and disposing of his prisoners, made a sudden march upon Vilharta, intending to surprise Palacios, but that officer aware of Infantado's retreat had already effected a junction with the latter at Santa Cruz de Mudela; wherefore the French marshal relinquished the attempt and re-occupied his former position at Toledo.

The captives taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid; those who were weak and unable to walk, being, says Mr. Rocca, shot by order of Victor, because the Spaniards had hanged some French prisoners.* If so, it was a barbarous and a shameful retaliation, unworthy of a soldier, for what justice or propriety is shewn in revenging the death of one innocent person by the murder of another?

After the French had thus withdrawn, Infantado and Palacios proceeded to re-organize their forces, under the name of the Carolina Army, and when the levies in Grenada and other parts came up, the duke of Albuquerque, at the head of the cavalry, endeavoured to surprise a French regiment of dragoons at Mora, but the latter rallied quickly, fought stoutly, and effected a retreat with scarcely any loss; Albuquerque then retired to Consuegra, where he was attacked the next day by superior numbers, and got off with difficulty. The duke of Infantado was now displaced by the junta, and general Urbina, Conde de Cartoajal, the new commander, having restored some discipline, advanced to Ciudad Real, and took post on the left bank of the Upper Guadiana. From thence he opened a communication with Cuesta, whose army had been increased to sixteen thousand men, of which three thousand were cavalry; for the Spaniards suffered more in flight than in action, and the horsemen escaping with little damage, were more easily rallied, and in greater relative numbers than the infantry. With these forces, Cuesta had advanced to the Tagus, when Moore's march upon Sahagun had drawn the fourth corps across that river; the latter, however, by fortifying an old tower, still held the bridge of Arzobispo. Cuesta extended his line from the mountains in front of that place, to the Puerto de Mirabete, and broke down the bridge of Almaraz, a magnificent structure, the centre arch of which was above one hundred and fifty feet high.

In these positions both sides remained tranquil in La Mancha, and in Estremadura, and so ended the Spanish exertions to lighten the pressure upon the British army; two French divisions of infantry, and as many

* Rocca's Memoirs.

brigades of cavalry, had more than sufficed to baffle them, and thus the imminent danger, of the southern provinces, when sir John Moore's vigorous operations drew the emperor to the north, may be justly estimated.

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Aragon—Confusion in Zaragoza—The third and fifth corps invest that city—Fortification described—Monte Torrero taken—Attack on the suburb repulsed—Mortier takes post at Calatayud—The convent of San Joseph taken—The bridge-head carried—Huerba passed—Device of the Spanish leaders to encourage the besieged—Marquis of Lazan takes post on the Sierra de Alcubierre—Lasnes arrives in the French camp—Recals Mortier—Lazan defeated—Gallant exploit of Mariano Galindo—The walls of the town taken by assault—General Lacoste and colonel San Genis slain.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON.

FROM the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives from O'Neil's, and a great part of those from Castaños's army, fled to Zaragoza, and with such speed as to bring the first news of their own disaster. With the troops, also, came an immense number of carriages, and the military chests, for the roads were wide and excellent, and the pursuit was slack. The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry were astounded at this quick and unexpected calamity. They had, with a natural credulity, relied on the boasting promises of their chiefs, and being necessarily ignorant of the true state of affairs, never doubted that their vengeance would be sated, by a speedy and complete destruction of the French. When their hopes were thus suddenly blasted, when they beheld troops, from whom they expected nothing but victory, come pouring into the town with all the tumult of panic; when the peasants of all the villages through which the fugitives passed, came rushing into the city along with the scared multitude of flying soldiers and camp followers, every heart was filled with consternation, and the date of Zaragoza's glory would have ended with the first siege, if the success at Tudela had been followed up by the French with that celerity and vigour which the occasion required.

Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confusion and terror would arrive, had, with his usual prudence, provided the means, and given directions for such an instantaneous and powerful attack, as would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of the eastern provinces: but the sickness of marshal Lasnes, the difficulty of communication, the consequent false movements of Moncey and Ney, in fine, the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in war, baffled the emperor's long-sighted calculations. The leaders had time to restore order amongst the multitude, to provide stores, to complete the defensive works, and, by a ferocious exercise of power, to insure implicit obedience: the danger of resisting the enemy appeared light when a suspicious word or gesture was instantly punished by death.

The third corps having missed the favourable moment for a sudden assault, and being reduced by sickness, by losses in battle, and by detachments, to seventeen thousand four hundred men including the engineers and artillery,* was too weak to invest the city in form, and therefore, remained in observation on the Xalon river, while a battering train of sixty guns, with well-furnished pares, which had been by Napoleon's orders previously collected in Pampeluna, was carried to Tudela and embarked upon the canal leading to Zaragoza. Marshal Mortier, with the fifth corps, was directed to assist in the siege, and he was in march to join Moncey, when his progress also, was arrested by sir John

Moore's advance towards Burgos; but the scope of that general's operation being determined by Napoleon's counter-movement, Mortier resumed his march to re-inforce Moncey, and, on the 20th of December, 1808, their united corps, forming an army of thirty-five thousand men of all arms, advanced against Zaragoza. At this time, however, confidence had been restored in the town, and all the preparations necessary for a vigorous defence were completed.*

The nature of the plain in which Zaragoza is situated, the course of the rivers, the peculiar construction of the houses, and the multitude of convents, have been already described, but the difficulties to be encountered by the French troops were no longer the same as in the first siege. At that time little assistance had been derived from science; now, instructed by experience, and inspired as it were by the greatness of their resolution, neither the rules of art nor the resources of genius were neglected by the defenders.

Zaragoza offered four irregular fronts. The first, reckoning from the right of the town, extended from the Ebro to a convent of bare-footed Carmelites, and was about three hundred yards wide.

The second, twelve hundred yards in extent, reached from the Carmelites to a bridge over the Huerba.

The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards, stretched from this bridge to an oil manufactory built beyond the walls.

The fourth, being on an opening of four hundred yards, reached from the oil manufactory to the Ebro.

The first front, fortified by an ancient wall and flanked by the guns on the Carmelite, was strengthened by new batteries and ramparts, and by the Castle of Aljaferia, commonly called the Castle of the Inquisition, which standing a little in advance, was a square fort, having a bastion and tower at each corner, and a good stone ditch, and it was connected with the body of the place by certain walls loop-holed for musketry.†

The second front was defended by a double wall, the exterior one of recent erection, faced with sun-dried bricks, and covered by a ditch, with perpendicular sides, fifteen feet deep and twenty feet wide. The flanks of this front were formed from the convent of the Carmelites, by a large circular battery standing in the centre of the line, by a fortified convent of the Capuchins, called the Trinity, and by some earthen works protecting the head of the bridge over the Huerba.

The third front was covered by the river Huerba, the deep bed of which was close to the foot of the ramparts. Behind this stream a double entrenchment was carried from the bridge head to a large projecting convent of Santa Engracia, a distance of two hundred yards. Santa Engracia itself was very strongly fortified and armed, and, from thence to the oil manufactory, the line of defence was prolonged by an ancient Moorish wall, on which several terraced batteries were raised, to sweep all the space between the rampart and the Huerba. These batteries, and the guns in the convent of Santa Engracia, likewise overlooked some works raised to protect a second bridge, that crossed the river, about cannon-shot below the first.

Upon the right bank of the Huerba, and a little below the second bridge, stood the convent of San Joseph, the walls of which had been strengthened and protected by a deep ditch with a covered way and palisade. It was well placed, as an advanced work, to impede the enemy's approach, and to facilitate sallies on the right bank of the river, and it was open in the rear, to the fire from the works at the second bridge, both being overlooked by the terraced batteries, and by the guns of Santa Engracia.

The fourth front was protected, by the Huerba, by

* Cavalhero. Doyle's Correspondence, MSS.

† Rogniat's Siege of Zaragoza. Cavalhero's Siege of Zaragoza.

* Muster roll of the French Army, MSS.

the continuation of the old city wall, by new batteries and entrenchments, and by several armed convents and large houses.

Beyond the walls, the Monte Torrero, which commanded all the plain of Zaragoza, was crowned by a large ill-constructed fort, raised at the distance of eight-hundred yards from the convent of San Joseph. This work was covered by the royal canal, the sluices of which were defended by some field-works open to the fire of the fort itself.

On the left bank of the Ebro the suburb, built in a low marshy plain, was protected by a chain of redoubts and fortified houses, and, some gun boats, manned by seamen from the naval arsenal of Carthage, completed the circuit of defence. The artillery of the place was, however, of too small a calibre.* There were only sixty guns carrying more than twelve-pound balls, and there were but eight large mortars: there was, however, no want of small arms, and colonel Doyle had furnished many English muskets.

These were the regular external defences of Zaragoza, most of which were constructed at the time, according to the skill and means of the engineers; but the experience of the former siege had taught the people not to trust to the ordinary resources of art, and, with equal genius and resolution, they had prepared an internal system of defence infinitely more efficacious.

It has been already observed, that the houses of Zaragoza were fire-proof, and, generally, of only two stories, that, in all the quarters of the city, the massive convents and churches rose like castles above the low buildings, and that the greater streets, running into the broad-way called the Cosso, divided the town into a variety of districts, unequal in size, but each containing one or more large structures. Now, the citizens, sacrificing all personal convenience, and resigning all idea of private property, gave up their goods, their bodies, and their houses to the war, and, being promiscuously mingled with the peasantry and the regular soldiers, the whole formed one mighty garrison, well suited to the vast fortress into which Zaragoza was transformed: for the doors and windows of the houses were built up, their fronts loop-holed, internal communications broken through the party walls, the streets trenched and crossed by earthen ramparts mounted with cannon, and every strong building turned into a separate fortification. There was no weak point, because there could be none in a town which was all fortress, and where the space covered by the city, was the measurement for the thickness of the ramparts.

Nor in this emergency were the leaders unmindful of moral force. The people were cheered by a constant reference to the former successful resistance, their confidence was raised by the contemplation of the vast works that had been executed, and it was recalled to their recollection that the wet, usual at that season of the year, would spread disease among the enemy's ranks, impairing, if not entirely frustrating, his efforts. Neither was the aid of superstition neglected: processions imposed upon the sight, false miracles bewildered the imagination, and terrible denunciations of the divine wrath shook the minds of men, whose former habits and present situation rendered them peculiarly susceptible of such impressions. Finally, the leaders were themselves so prompt and terrible in their punishments, that the greatest cowards were likely to show the boldness bearing in their wish to escape suspicion.

To avoid the danger of any great explosion, the powder was made as occasion required, which was the more easily effected, because Zaragoza contained a royal dépôt and refinery for saltpetre, and there were powder-mills in the neighbourhood, which furnished workmen familiar with the process. The houses and trees beyond the walls were all demolished and cut

down, and the materials carried into the town. The public magazines contained six months' provisions, the convents were well stocked, the inhabitants had laid up their own stores for several months, and general Doyle sent a convoy into the town from the side of Catalonia; and there was abundance of money, because, in addition to the resources of the town, the military-chest of Castaños's army, which had been filled only the night before the battle of Tudela, was, in the flight, carried to Zaragoza.* Some companies of women were enrolled to attend the hospitals and to carry provisions and ammunition to the combatants; they were commanded by the countess of Burita, a lady of an heroic disposition, who is said to have displayed the greatest intelligence and the noblest character during both sieges.

There were thirteen engineer officers, eight hundred sappers and miners, composed of excavators formerly employed on the canal, and from fifteen hundred to two thousand cannoneers.† The regular troops that fled from Tudela, being joined by two small divisions, which retreated, at the same time, from Sangüessa and Caparosa, formed a garrison of thirty thousand men, and, with the inhabitants and peasantry, presented a mass of fifty thousand combatants, who, with passions excited almost to phrensy, awaited an assault amidst those mighty entrenchments, where each man's home was a fortress and his family a garrison. To besiege, with only thirty-five thousand men, a city so prepared was truly a gigantic undertaking!

SECOND SIEGE OF ZARAGOZA.

The 20th of December, the two marshals, Moncey and Mortier, having established their hospitals and magazines at Alagon on the Xalon, advanced in three columns against Zaragoza.‡

The first, composed of the infantry of the third corps, marched by the right bank of the canal.

The second, composed of general Suchet's division of the fifth corps, marched between the canal and the Ebro.

The third, composed of general Gazan's division of infantry, crossed the Ebro opposite to Tauste, and from thence made an oblique march to the Gallego river.

The right and centre columns arrived in front of the town that evening. The latter, after driving back the Spanish advanced guards, halted at a distance of a league from the Capuchin convent of the Trinity; the former took post on both sides of the Huerba, and, having seized the aqueduct by which the canal is carried over that river, proceeded, in pursuance of Napoleon's orders, to raise batteries, and make dispositions for an immediate assault on Monte Torrero. Meanwhile general Gazan, with the left column, marching by Cartejon and Zuera, reached Villa Nueva, on the Gallego river, without encountering an enemy.

The Monte Torrero was defended by five thousand Spaniards, under the command of general St. Marc; but, at day-break on the 21st, the French opened their fire against the fort, and one column of infantry having attracted the attention of the Spaniards, a second, unseen, crossed the canal under the aqueduct, and, penetrating between the fort and the city, entered the former by the rear; at the same time, a third column stormed the works protecting the great sluices. These sudden attacks, and the loss of the fort,|| threw the Spaniards into confusion, and they hastily retired to the town, which so enraged the plebeian leaders that the life of St. Marc was with difficulty saved by Palafox.

It had been concerted among the French that general Gazan should assault the suburb, simultaneously with the attack on the Torrero, and that officer, having en-

* Cavalhero.

* Doyle's Correspondence, MS.

† Cavalhero, Siege of Zaragoza. ‡ Rognat. || Cavalhero.

countered a body of Spanish and Swiss troops placed somewhat in advance, drove the former back so quickly that the Swiss, unable to make good their retreat, were, to the number of three or four hundred, killed or taken.* But notwithstanding this fortunate commencement, Gazan did not attack the suburb itself, until after the affair at Monte Torrero was over, and then only upon a single point, without any previous examination of the works; hence the Spaniards, recovering from their first alarm, reinforced this point, and Gazan was forced to desist, with the loss of four hundred men. This important failure more than balanced the success against the Monte Torrero; it restored the shaken confidence of the Spaniards at a most critical moment, and checking in the French, at the outset, that impetuous spirit, that impulse of victory, which great generals so carefully watch and improve, threw them back upon the tedious and chilling process of the engineer.

The 24th of December the investment of Zaragoza was completed on both sides of the Ebro. Gazan occupied the bridge over the Gallego with his left, and covered his front from sorties, by inundations and cuts, that the low, marshy plain where he was posted, enabled him to make without difficulty.

General Suchet occupied the space between the Upper Ebro and the Huerba.

Morlot's division of the 3d corps encamped in the broken hollow that formed the bed of that stream.

Meusnier's division crowned the Monte Torrero, and general Grandjean continuing the circuit to the Lower Ebro, communicated with Gazan's post on the other side. Several Spanish detachments that had been sent out to forage were thus cut off, and could never re-enter the town, and a bridge of boats constructed on the Upper Ebro completed the circle of investment, insuring a free intercourse between the different quarters of the army.

General Lacoste, an engineer of reputation, and aide-camp to the Emperor, directed the siege. His plan was, that one false and two real attacks should be conducted by regular approaches on the right bank of the Ebro, and he still hoped to take the suburb by a sudden assault. The trenches were opened the night of the 29th, the 30th the place was summoned, and the terms dictated by Napoleon when he was at Aranda de Duero, being offered, the example of Madrid was cited to induce a surrender. Palafox replied, that—If Madrid had surrendered, Madrid had been sold: Zaragoza would neither be sold nor surrender! On the receipt of this haughty answer the attacks were commenced, the right being directed against the convent of San Joseph, the centre against the upper bridge over the Huerba, the left, which was the false one, against the castle of Aljaferia.

The 31st Palafox made sorties against all the three attacks. From the right and centre he was beaten back with loss, and he was likewise repulsed on the left at the trenches; but some of his cavalry, gliding between the French parallel and the Ebro, surprised and cut down a post of infantry, stationed behind some ditches that intersected the low ground on the bank of that river. This trifling success exalted the enthusiasm of the besieged, and Palafox gratified his personal vanity by boasting proclamations, some of which bore the marks of genius, but the greater part were ridiculous.

The 1st of January the second parallels of the true attacks were commenced, and the next day Palafox caused the attention of the besiegers to be occupied on the right bank of the Ebro, by slight skirmishes, while he made a serious attack from the side of the suburb on Gazan's lines of contravallation. This sally was repulsed with loss, but, on the right bank, the Spaniards obtained some success.

Marshal Moncey being called to Madrid, Junot now assumed the command of the third corps, and, about the same time, marshal Mortier was directed to take post at Calatayud, with Suchet's division, for the purpose of securing the communication with Madrid. The gap in the circle of investment left by this draft of eight thousand men, being but scantily stopped by extending Morlot's division, a line of contravallation was constructed at that part to supply the place of numbers. Meanwhile the besieged, hoping and expecting each day that the usual falls of rain would render the besiegers' situation intolerable, continued their fire briskly, and worked counter approaches to the right of the French attacks: but the season was unusually dry, and a thick fog rising each morning covered the besieger's advances and protected their workmen, both from the fire and from the sorties of the Spaniards.

The 10th of January, thirty-two pieces of French artillery battered in breach, both the convent of San Joseph and the head of the second bridge on the Huerba, and the town also was bombarded. San Joseph was so much injured by this fire that the Spaniards, resolving to evacuate it, withdrew their guns; nevertheless, two hundred of their men making a vigorous sally at midnight, pushed close up to the French batteries, but being taken in flank with a discharge of grape, retired, with loss of half their number.

The 11th, the besiegers' batteries having continued to play on San Joseph, the breach became practicable, and, at four o'clock in the evening, some companies of infantry, with two field-pieces, attacked by the right, while a column was kept in readiness to assail the front, when this attack should have shaken the defence, and two other companies of chosen men were directed to search for an entrance by the rear, between the fort and the river.

The defences of the convent were now reduced to a ditch eighteen feet deep, and a covered way, which falling back on both flanks to the Huerba, extended along the bank for some distance, and was occupied by a considerable number of men, but when some French guns raked it from the right, the Spaniards, crossing the bed of the river in confusion, took refuge in the town, and at that moment the front of the convent was assaulted. The depth of the ditch and the Spanish fire checked the assailants a moment, yet the chosen companies, passing round the works, found a small bridge, crossed it, and entered by the rear, and the next instant the front was stormed, and the defenders were all killed or taken.

The French, who had suffered but little in this assault, immediately lodged themselves in the convent, raised a rampart along the edge of the Huerba, and commenced batteries, against the body of the place and against the works at the head of the upper bridge, from whence, as well as from the town, they were incommoded by the fire that played into the convent.

The 15th, the bridge-head, in front of Santa Engracia, was carried with the loss of only three men; the Spaniards cut the bridge itself, and sprung a mine under the works, but the explosion occasioned no mischief, and the third parallels being soon completed, the trenches of the two attacks were united, and the defences of the besieged were confined to the town itself; they could no longer make sallies on the right bank of the Huerba without overcoming the greatest difficulties. The passage of the Huerba was then effected by the French, and breaching and counter-batteries, mounting fifty pieces of artillery, were constructed against the body of the place, and as the fire also reached the bridge over the Ebro, the communication between the suburb and the town, was interrupted.

Unshaken by this aspect of affairs, the Spanish leaders, with great readiness of mind, immediately forged intelligence of the defeat of the emperor, and, with

* Rogniat.

the sound of music, and amidst the shouts of the populace, proclaimed the names of the marshals who had been killed; asserting, also, that Palafox's brother, the marquis of Lazan, was already wasting France. This intelligence, extravagant as it was, met with implicit credence, for such was the disposition of the Spaniards throughout this war, that the imaginations of the chiefs were taxed to produce absurdities proportionable to the credulity of their followers; hence the boasting of the leaders and the confidence of the besieged, augmented as the danger increased, and their anticipations of victory seemed realized when the night-fires of a succouring force were discerned, blazing on the hills behind Gazan's troops.

The difficulties of the French were indeed fast increasing, for while enclosing Zaragoza, they were themselves encircled by insurrections, and their supplies so straitened that famine was felt in their camp. Disputes amongst the generals also diminished the vigour of the operations, and the bonds of discipline being relaxed, the military ardour of the troops naturally became depressed. The soldiers reasoned openly upon the chances of success, which, in times of danger, is only one degree removed from mutiny.

The nature of the country about Zaragoza was exceedingly favourable to the Spaniards. The town, although situated in a plain, is surrounded at some miles' distance by high mountains, and to the south, the fortresses of Mequinenza and Lerida afforded a double base of operations for any forces that might come from Catalonia, and Valencia. The besiegers drew their supplies from Pampeluna, and their line of operation running through Alagon, Tudela, and Caparosa, was harassed by the insurgents, who were in considerable numbers, on the side of Epila and in the Sierra de Muela, threatening Alagon; while others, descending from the mountains of Soria, menaced the important point of Tudela. The marquis of Lazan also, anxious to assist his brother, had drafted five thousand men from the Catalan army, and taking post in the Sierra de Liciñena, or Alcubierre, on the left of the Ebro, drew together all the armed peasantry of the valleys as high as Sangnessa. Extending his line from Villa Franca on the Ebro to Zuera on the Gallego, he hemmed in the division of Gazan, and sent detachments as far as Caparosa, to harass the French convoys coming from Pampeluna.

To maintain their communications and to procure provisions, the besiegers had placed between two and three thousand men in Tudela, Caparosa, and Tafalla, and some hundreds in Alagon and at Montalbarra. Between the latter town and the investing army, six hundred and fifty cavalry were stationed; a like number were posted at Santa Fé to watch the openings of the Sierra de Muela; finally sixteen hundred cavalry and twelve hundred infantry, under the command of general Wathier, were pushed towards the south as far as Fuentes. Wathier, falling suddenly upon an assemblage of four or five thousand insurgents at Belchite, dispersed them, and then taking the town of Alcanitz, established himself there, in observation, for the rest of the siege. Lazan, however, still maintained himself in the Alcubierre.

In this state of affairs marshal Lasnes, having recovered from his long sickness, arrived before Zaragoza, and took the supreme command of both corps on the 22d of January. The influence of his firm and vigorous character was immediately perceptible; recalling Suchet's division from Calatayud, where it had been lingering without necessity, he sent it across the Ebro, ordered Mortier to attack Lazan, and at the same time directed a smaller detachment against the insurgents in Zuera,* meanwhile, repressing all dis-

putes, he restored discipline in the army, and pressed the siege with infinite resolution.

The detachment sent to Zuera defeated the insurgents, and took possession of that place and of the bridge over the Gallego. Mortier encountered the Spanish advanced guard at Perdeguera, and pushed it back to Nuestra Señora de Vagallar, where the main body, several thousand strong, was posted, and where, after a short fight, he defeated it, took four guns, and then spreading his troops in a half circle, extending from Huesca, to Pina on the Ebro, awed the country between those places and Zaragoza, and checked further insurrection.

Before Lasnes arrived, the besieged had been much galled by a mortar battery, situated behind the second parallel of the centre attack, and one Mariano Galindo undertook, with eighty volunteers, to silence it. He surprised the guard of the trenches, and entered the battery, but the French reserve arrived in his front, the guard of the trenches rallied, and, thus surrounded, Galindo, fighting bravely, was wounded and taken, and his comrades perished, with as much glory as simple soldiers can attain to. After this, the armed vessels in the river, attempted to flank the batteries raised against the Aljaferia, but the French guns obliged them to retire, and the besiegers' works being carried over the Huerba, in the nights between the 21st and 26th of January, the third parallels of the true attack were completed. The oil manufactory, and other advantageous posts, on the left bank of that river, were then incorporated with the lines of approach, and the second parallel of the false attack was commenced at one hundred and fifty yards from the Aljaferia. These advantages were, however, not obtained without pain; for the Spaniards frequently sallied, spiked two guns, and burnt a post on the right of the besiegers' line.

The French fire now broke the walls rapidly; two practicable breaches were opened in front of the San Joseph, a third was commenced in the Santa Augustino, facing the oil manufactory, a broad way was made into the Santa Engracia, and at twelve o'clock on the 29th of January, four chosen columns rushing forth, from the trenches, burst upon the ruined walls of Zaragoza.

On the right, the assailants twice stormed an isolated stone house that defended the breach of Saint Augustin, and twice they were driven back with loss.

In the centre, regardless of two small mines that exploded at the foot of the walls, they carried the breach fronting the oil manufactory, and then endeavoured to break into the town; but the Spaniards retrenched within the place, opened such a fire, of grape and musquetry, that the French were finally content to establish themselves on the summit of the breach, and to connect their lodgement with the trenches by new works.

The third column was more successful; the breach was carried, and the neighbouring houses also, as far as the first large cross street; beyond that, the French could not penetrate, but they were enabled to establish themselves within the walls of the town, and immediately brought forward their trenches, so as to comprehend the lodgement within their works.

The fourth column, composed of the Polish soldiers of the Vistula, vigorously stormed the San Engracia and the convent adjoining it; and then, unchecked by the fire from the houses, and undaunted by the explosion of six small mines planted on their path, swept the ramparts to the left, as far as the first bridge on the Huerba. The guards of the trenches, excited by this success, now rushed forward tumultuously, mounted the walls, bayoneted the artillery men at the guns in the Capuchin, and then continuing their career, endeavoured, some to reach the semicircular battery and the Misericordia, others to break into the city.

* Rogniat.

This wild assault was soon checked, by grape from two guns planted behind a traverse on the ramparts, and by a murderous fire from the houses, and as the ranks of the assailants were thinned, their ardour sunk, while the courage of their adversaries increased. The French were driven back upon the Capuchins, and the Spaniards were already breaking into that convent in pursuit, when two battalions, detached by general Morlot from the trenches of the false attack, arrived, and secured possession of that point, which was inorever untenable by the Spaniards, inasmuch as the guns of the convent of Santa Engracia saw it in reverse. The French lost, on this day, more than six hundred men, but La Coste immediately abandoned the false attack against the castle, fortified the Capuchin convent and a house situated at an angle of the wall abutting upon the bridge over the Huerba, and then joining them by works to his trenches, the ramparts of the town became the front line of the besiegers.

The walls of Zaragoza thus went to the ground, but Zaragoza herself remained erect, and as the broken girdle fell from the heroic city, the besiegers started at the view of her naked strength. The regular defences had, indeed, crumbled before the skill of the assailants, but the popular resistance was immediately called, with all its terrors, into action! and, as if Fortune had resolved to mark the exact moment when the ordinary calculations of science should cease, the chief engineers on both sides were simultaneously slain. The French general, La Coste, a young man, intrepid, skilful, and endowed with genius, perished like a brave soldier. The Spanish colonel, San Genis, died, not only with the honour of a soldier, but the glory of a patriot. Falling in the noblest cause, his blood stained the ramparts which he had himself raised for the protection of his native place.

CHAPTER III.

System of terror—The convent of St. Monica taken—Spaniards attempt to retake it, but fail—St. Augustin taken—French change their mode of attack—Spaniards change their mode of defence—Terrible nature of the contest—Convent of Jesus taken on the side of the suburb—Attack of the suburb repulsed—Convent of Francisco taken—Mine exploded under the university fails, and the besieged are repulsed—The Cosso passed—Fresh mines worked under the university, and in six other places—French soldiers dispirited—Lasnes encourages them—The houses leading down to the quay carried by storm—An enormous mine under the university being sprung, that building is carried by assault—The suburb is taken—Baron Versage killed, and two thousand Spaniards surrender—Successful attack on the right bank of the Ebro—Palafox demands terms, which are refused—Fire resumed—Miserable condition of the city—Terrible pestilence, and horrible sufferings of the besieged—Zaragoza surrenders—Observations.

THE war being now in the streets of Zaragoza, the sound of the alarm-bell was heard in every quarter; the people crowded into the houses nearest to the lodgements of the enemy, additional barricades were constructed across the principal thoroughfares, mines were prepared in the more open spaces, and the internal communications from house to house were multiplied, until they formed a vast labyrinth, the intricate windings of which, were only to be traced by the weapons and the dead bodies of the defenders. The junta, become more powerful from the cessation of regular warfare, urged the defence with redoubled energy, yet increased the horrors of the siege, by a ferocity pushed to the verge of frenzy; every person who excited the suspicions of these furious men, or of those immediately about them, was instantly put to death. Amidst the noble bulwarks of war, a horrid array of gibbets was seen, on which crowds of wretches were each

night suspended, because their courage sunk under accumulating dangers, or that some doubtful expression, some gesture of distress, had been misconstrued by their barbarous chiefs.*

From the height of the walls which he had conquered, Lasnes contemplated this terrific scene, and judging that men so passionate, and so prepared, could not be prudently encountered in open battle, he resolved to proceed by the slow, certain process of the mattock and the mine;† this also was in unison with the emperor's instructions, and hence until the 2d of February, the efforts of the French were only directed to the enlargement of their lodgements on the ramparts. This they effected with severe fighting and by means of explosions, working through the nearest houses, and sustaining many counter-assaults, of which the most noted and furious was made by a friar on the Capuchins' convent.

It has been already observed, that the large streets divided the town into certain small districts, or islands of houses. To gain possession of these, it was necessary not only to mine but to fight for each house; and to cross the great intersecting streets it was indispensable to construct traverses above, or to work by underground galleries; a battery raked each street, and each house was defended by a garrison that, generally speaking, had only the option, of repelling the enemy in front or dying on the gibbet erected behind. As long as the convents and churches remained in possession of the Spaniards, the progress of the French among the islands of small houses was of little advantage to them; the strong garrisons in the greater buildings, enabled the defenders, not only to make continual and successful sallies, but to countermine their enemies, whose superior skill in that kind of warfare, was often frustrated by the numbers and persevering energy of the besieged.

To overcome these obstacles, the batteries opposite the fourth front, had breached the convents of Augustin and Santa Monica, and the latter had been taken the 31st of January; for while the attack was hot, a part of the wall in another direction was blown in by a petard, and the besiegers pouring through took the main breach in rear, cleared the convent and several houses behind it. Nevertheless the Spaniards opened a gallery from the Augustines and worked a mine that night under Santa Monica, but the French discovered it and stifled the miners. The next day the breach in the Augustin becoming practicable, the attention of the defenders was drawn to it, while the French springing a mine, which they had carried under the wall, from the side of Santa Monica, entered by the opening, and the Spaniards thus again unexpectedly taken in the rear, were easily driven out. Rallying a few hours after, they vainly attempted to retake the structure, and the besiegers then broke into the neighbouring houses, and at one push, reached the point where the Quemada-street joined the Cosso; but the Spaniards renewed the combat with such a fury, that the French were beaten out of the houses again, and lost more than two hundred men.

On the side of San Engracia a contest still more severe took place; the houses in the vicinity were blown up, yet the Spaniards fought so obstinately for the ruins, that the Polish troops were scarcely able to make good their lodgement—although two successive and powerful explosions had, with the buildings, destroyed a number of the defenders.

The experience of these attacks induced a change in the mode of fighting on both sides. Hitherto the play of the French mines had reduced the houses to ruins, leaving the soldiers exposed to the fire from the next Spanish posts; the engineers, therefore, diminished the

* Cavalhero.

† Rogniat.

quantity of powder, that the interior only might fall and the outward walls stand, and this method was found successful. Whereupon the Spaniards, with ready ingenuity, saturated the timbers of the houses with rosin and pitch, and setting fire to those which could no longer be maintained, interposed a burning barrier, which often delayed the assailants for two days, and always prevented them from pushing their successes during the confusion that necessarily followed the bursting of the mines. The fighting was, however incessant; a constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continued echo of musquetry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and dust clouding the atmosphere, lowered continually over the heads of the combatants, as hour by hour, the French, with a terrible perseverance, pushed forward their approaches to the heart of the miserable but glorious city.

Their efforts were chiefly directed from two points, namely, San Engracia, which may be denominated the left attack, and Saint Augustin, which constituted the right attack. At San Engracia they laboured on a line perpendicular to the Cosso, from which they were only separated by the large convent of the Daughters of Jerusalem, and by the hospital for madmen, which was entrenched, although in ruins since the first siege; the line of this attack was protected on the left by the convent of the Capuchins, which La Coste had fortified to repel the counter-assaults of the Spaniards. The attack from the Augustin was more diffused, because the localities presented less prominent features to determine the direction of the approaches. But the French having mounted a number of light six-inch mortars, on peculiar carriages, drew them from street to street, and house to house, as occasion offered; on the other hand the Spaniards continually plied their enemies with hand grenades, which seem to have produced a surprising effect. In this manner the never-ceasing combat was prolonged until the 7th of February, when the besiegers, by dint of alternate mines and assaults, had worked their perilous way at either attack to the Cosso, yet not without several changes of fortune and considerable loss; and they were unable to obtain a footing on that public walk, for the Spaniards still disputed every house with undiminished resolution. Meanwhile, Lasnes having caused trenches to be opened on the left bank of the Ebro, played twenty guns against an isolated structure called the Convent of Jesus, which covered the right of the suburb line; on the 7th of February this convent was carried by storm, with so little difficulty, that the French, supposing the Spaniards to be panic stricken, entered the suburb itself, but were quickly driven back, they, however, made good their lodgement in the convent.

On the town side the 8th, 9th, and 10th were wasted by the besiegers in vain attempts to pass the Cosso. They then extended their flanks; to the right with a view to reach the quay, and so connect this attack with that against the suburb; to the left to obtain possession of the large and strongly built convent of St. Francisco, in which, after exploding an immense mine and making two assaults they finally established themselves.

The 11th and 12th, mines, in the line of the right attack, were exploded under the university, a large building on the Spanish side of the Cosso, yet their play was insufficient to open the walls, and the storming party was beaten, with the loss of fifty men. Nevertheless, the besiegers continuing their labours during the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th, passed the Cosso by means of traverses, and prepared fresh mines under the university, yet deferred their explosion until a simultaneous effort could be combined on the side of the suburb. At the left attack also, a number

of houses, bordering on the Cosso, being gained, a battery was established that raked that great thoroughfare above ground, while under it, six galleries were carried, and six mines loaded to explode at the same moment.

But the spirit of the French army was now exhausted. They had laboured and fought without intermission for fifty days; they had crumbled the walls with their bullets, burst the convents with their mines, and carried the breaches with their bayonets;—fighting above and beneath the surface of the earth, they had spared neither fire nor sword, their bravest men were falling in the obscurity of a subterranean warfare, famine pinched them, and Zaragoza was still unconquered!

'Before this siege,' they exclaimed, 'was it ever known, that twenty thousand men should besiege fifty thousand? Scarcely a fourth of the town is won, and we are already exhausted. We must wait for reinforcements, or we shall all perish among these cursed ruins, which will become our own tombs, before we can force the last of these fanatics from the last of their dens.*'

Marshal Lasnes, unshaken by these murmurs, and obstinate to conquer, endeavoured to raise the soldiers' hopes. He told them that the losses of the besieged so far exceeded their own, that the Spaniards' strength would soon be exhausted and their courage sink, that the fierceness of their defence was already abating; and that if contrary to expectation, they should renew the example of Numantia, their utter destruction must quickly be effected, by the united evils of battle, pestilence, and misery. His exhortations were successful, and on the 18th of February, all combinations being completed, a general assault took place.

The French at the right attack opened a party-wall by the explosion of a petard, made a sudden rush through some burning ruins, and then carried, without a check, the whole island of houses leading down to the quay, with the exception of two buildings; the Spaniards were thus forced to abandon all the external fortifications between St. Augustin and the Ebro, which they had preserved until that day. During this assault the mines under the university containing three thousand pounds of powder were sprung, and the walls tumbling with a terrific crash,—a column of the besiegers entered the place, and after one repulse secured a lodgement. Meanwhile fifty pieces of artillery thundered upon the suburb, ploughed up the bridge over the Ebro, and by midday opened a practicable breach in the great convent of Saint Lazar, which was the principal defence on that side. Lasnes, observing that the Spaniards seemed to be shaken by this overwhelming fire, ordered an assault there also, and Saint Lazar being carried forthwith, the retreat to the bridge was thus intercepted, and the besieged falling into confusion, and their commander, Baron Versage, being killed, were all destroyed or taken, with the exception of three hundred men, who, braving the terrible fire to which they were exposed, got back into the town. General Gazan immediately occupied the abandoned works, and having thus cut off more than two thousand men that were stationed on the Ebro, above the suburb, forced them also to surrender.

This important success being followed on the 19th, by another fortunate attack on the right bank of the Ebro, and by the devastating explosion of sixteen hundred pounds of powder, the constancy of the besieged was at last shaken. An aid-de-camp of Palafox came forth to demand certain terms, before offered by the marshal, adding thereto, that the garrison should be allowed to join the Spanish armies, and that a certain number of covered carriages should follow them.

* Rogniat.

Lasnes rejected these proposals, and the fire continued, but the hour of surrender was come! Fifty pieces of artillery on the left bank of the Ebro, laid the houses on the quay in ruins. The church of Our Lady of the Pillar, under whose especial protection the city was supposed to exist, was nearly effaced by the bombardment, and the six mines under the Cosso loaded with many thousand pounds of powder, were ready for a simultaneous explosion, which would have laid a quarter of the remaining houses in the dust. In fine, war had done its work, and the misery of Zaragoza could no longer be endured.

The bombardment which had never ceased since the 10th of January, had forced the women and children to take refuge in the vaults, with which the city abounded: there the constant combustion of oil, the closeness of the atmosphere, unusual diet, and fear and restlessness of mind, had combined to produce a pestilence which soon spread to the garrison. The strong and the weak, the daring soldier and the shrinking child, fell before it alike, and such was the state of the atmosphere and the predisposition to disease, that the slightest wound gangrened and became incurable. In the beginning of February the daily deaths were from four to five hundred; the living were unable to bury the dead; and thousands of carcases, scattered about the streets and court-yards, or piled in heaps at the doors of the churches, were left to dissolve in their own corruption, or to be licked up by the flames of the burning houses as the defence became contracted. The suburb, the greatest part of the walls and one-fourth of the houses were in the hands of the French; sixteen thousand shells thrown during the bombardment, and the explosion of forty-five thousand pounds of powder in the mines had shaken the city to its foundations, and the bones of more than forty thousand persons of every age and sex, bore dreadful testimony to the constancy of the besieged.*

Palafox was sick, and of the plebeian chiefs, the curate of St. Gil, the lemonade seller of the Cosso, and the Tios, Jorge, and Marin, having been slain in battle, or swept away by the pestilence, the obdurate violence of the remaining leaders was so abated, that a fresh junta was formed, and after a stormy consultation, the majority being for a surrender, a deputation waited upon Marshal Lasnes on the 20th of February, to negotiate a capitulation. They proposed that the garrison should march out with the honours of war; that the peasantry should not be considered as prisoners; and at the particular request of the clergy, they also demanded that the latter should have their full revenues guaranteed to them, and punctually paid. This article was rejected with indignation, and, according to the French writers, the place surrendered at discretion; but the Spanish writers assert, that Lasnes granted certain terms, drawn up by the deputation at the moment, the name of Ferdinand the 7th being purposely omitted in the instrument, which in substance ran thus:—

The garrison to march out with the honours of war; to be constituted prisoners, and marched to France; the officers to retain their swords, baggage, and horses; the men their knapsacks; persons of either class, wishing to serve Joseph, to be immediately enrolled in his ranks; the peasants to be sent to their homes; property and religion to be guaranteed.

With this understanding the deputies returned to the city, where fresh commotions had arisen during their absence. The party for protracting the defence, although the least numerous, were the most energetic; they had before seized all the boats on the Ebro, fearing that Palafox and others, of whom they entertained suspicions, would endeavour to quit the town; and

they were still so menacing and so powerful, that the deputies not daring to pass through the streets, retired outside the walls to the castle of Aljaferia, and from thence sent notice to the junta of their proceedings. The dissident party would, however, have fallen upon the others the next day, if the junta had not taken prompt measures to enforce the surrender; the officer in command of the walls near the castle, by their orders, gave up his post to the French during the night, and on the 21st of February, from twelve to fifteen thousand sickly beings, laid down those arms which they were scarcely able to handle, and this cruel and memorable siege was finished.

OBSERVATIONS.—1.—When the other events of the Spanish war shall be lost in the obscurity of time, or only traced by disconnected fragments, the story of Zaragoza, like some ancient triumphal pillar standing amidst ruins, will tell a tale of past glory, and already men point to the heroic city, and call her Spain, as if her spirit were common to the whole nation; yet it was not so, nor was the defence of Zaragoza itself the effect of unalloyed virtue. It was not patriotism, nor was it courage, nor skill, nor fortitude, nor a system of Terror, but all these combined under peculiar circumstances, that upheld the defence; and this combination, and how it was brought about, should be well considered; for it is not so much by catching at the leading resemblances, as by studying the differences of great affairs, that the exploits of one age can be made to serve as models for another.

2.—The defence of Zaragoza may be examined under two points of view; as an isolated event, and as a transaction bearing on the general struggle in the Peninsula. With respect to the latter, it was a manifest proof, that neither the Spanish people, nor the government, partook of the Zaragozaan energy. It would be absurd to suppose that, in the midst of eleven millions of people animated by an ardent enthusiasm, fifty thousand armed men could for two months be besieged, shut in, destroyed, they and their works, houses and bodies, mingled in one terrible ruin, by less than thirty-five thousand adversaries, without one effort being made to save them! Deprive the transaction of its dazzling colours, and the outline comes to this: Thirty-five thousand French, in the midst of insurrections, did, in despite of a combination of circumstances peculiarly favourable to the defence, reduce fifty thousand of the bravest and most energetic men in Spain. It is true, the latter suffered nobly; but was their example imitated? Gerona, indeed, although less celebrated, rivalled, and perhaps more than rivalled, the glory of Zaragoza; elsewhere her fate spoke, not trumpet-tongued to arouse, but with a wailing voice, that carried dismay to the heart of the nation.

3d.—As an isolated transaction, the siege of Zaragoza is very remarkable, yet it would be a great error to suppose, that any town, the inhabitants of which were equally resolute, might be as well defended. Fortune and bravery will do much, but the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. There are no miracles in war! If the houses of Zaragoza had not been nearly incombustible, the bombardment alone would have caused the besieged to surrender, or to perish with their flaming city.

4th.—That the advantages offered by the peculiar structure of the houses, and the number of convents and churches, were ably seized by the Spaniards, is beyond doubt. General Rogniat, Lacoste's successor, treats his opponents' skill in fortification with contempt; but colonel San Genis' talents are not to be judged of by the faulty construction of a few out-works, at a time when he was under the control of a disorderly and ferocious mob; he knew how to adapt his system of defence to the circumstances of the moment, and no stronger proof of real genius can be given. "Do not

* Cavalhero. Rogniat. Suchet.

consult me about a capitulation,' was his common expression. '*I shall never be of opinion that Zaragoza can make no further defence.*' Yet neither the talents of San Genis, nor the construction of the houses, would have availed, if the people within had not been of a temper adequate to the occasion; and to trace the passions by which they were animated to their true causes is a proper subject for historical and military research. That they did not possess any superior courage is evident from the facts; the besieged, although twice the number of the besiegers, never made any serious impression by their sallies, and they were unable to defend the breaches. In large masses, the standard of courage which is established by discipline, may be often inferior to that produced by fanaticism or any other peculiar excitement; but the latter never lasts long, neither is it equable, because men are of different susceptibility, following their physical and mental conformation; hence a system of terror has always been the resource of those leaders who, being engaged in great undertakings, were unable to recur to discipline. Enthusiasm stalked in front of their bands, but punishment brought up the rear, and Zaragoza was no exception to this practice.

5th.—It may be said that the majority of the besieged, not being animated by any peculiar fury, a system of terror could not be carried to any great length; a close examination explains this seeming mystery. The defenders were composed of three distinct parties,—the regular troops, the peasantry from the country, and the citizens; the citizens, who had most to lose, were naturally the fiercest, and, accordingly, amongst them, the system of terror was generated. The peasantry followed the example, as all ignorant men, under no regular control, will do. The soldiers meddled but little in the interior arrangements, and the division of the town into islands of posts rendered it perfectly feasible for violent persons, already possessed of authority, to follow the bent of their inclinations: there was no want of men, and the garrison of each island found it their own interest to keep those in front of them to their posts, that the danger might be the longer staved off from themselves.

6th.—Palafox was only the nominal chief of Zaragoza, the laurels gathered in both sieges should adorn plebeian brows, but those laurels dripped with kindred as well as foreign blood. The energy of the real chiefs, and the cause in which that energy was exerted, may be admired; the acts perpetrated were, in themselves, atrocious, and Palafox, although unable to arrest their savage proceedings, can claim but little credit for his own conduct. For more than a month preceding the surrender, he never came forth of a vaulted building, which was impervious to shells, and in which, there is too much reason to believe, that he and others, of both sexes, lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting contrast to the wretchedness that surrounded them.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRENCH OPERATIONS.

1. Before the arrival of marshal Lasnes, these operations were conducted with little vigour. The want of unity, as to time, in the double attack of the Monte Torrero and the suburb, was a flagrant error, which was not redeemed by any subsequent activity; after the arrival of that marshal, the siege was pursued with singular intrepidity and firmness; and although general Rogiat appears to disapprove of Suchet's division having been sent to Calatayud, it seems to have been a judicious measure, inasmuch as it was necessary,—

1. To protect the line of correspondence with Madrid.
2. To have a corps at hand, lest the duke of Infantado should quit Cuença, and throw himself into the Guadalaxara district, a movement that would have been extremely embarrassing to the king. Suchet's division,

while at Calatayud, fulfilled these objects, without losing the power of succouring Tudela, or of intercepting the duke of Infantado if he attempted to raise the siege of Zaragoza; but, when the Spanish army at Cuença was directed to Ucles, and that the marquis of Lazan was gathering strength on the left bank of the Ebro, it was undoubtedly proper to recall Suchet.

2.—It may not be misplaced here to point out the errors of Infantado's operations. If, instead of bringing on a battle with the first corps, he had marched to the Ebro, established his dépôts, and placed arms at Mequinenza and Lerida, opened a communication with Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and joined the marquis of Lazan's troops to his own; he might have formed an entrenched camp in the Sierra de Alcubierre, and from thence have carried on a methodical war with, at least, twenty-five thousand regular troops. The insurrections on the French flanks and line of communication with Pampeluna would then have become formidable, and, in this situation, having the fortresses of Catalonia behind him, with activity and prudence he might have raised the siege.

3.—From a review of all the circumstances attending the siege of Zaragoza, we may conclude that fortune was extremely favourable to the French. They were brave, persevering, and skilful, and they did not lose above four thousand men, but their success partly resulting from the errors of their opponents, was principally due to the destruction caused by the pestilence within the town; for, of all that multitude said to have fallen, six thousand Spaniards only were slain in battle; and although thirteen convents and churches had been taken; yet, when the town surrendered, forty remained to be forced !*

Such were the principal circumstances of this memorable siege. I shall now relate the contemporary operations in Catalonia.

CHAPTER IV.

Operations in Catalonia—St. Cyr commands the seventh corps—Passes the frontier—State of Catalonia—Palacios fixes his head-quarters at Villa Franca—Duhesme forces the line of the Llobregat—Returns to Barcelona—English army from Sicily designed to act in Catalonia—Prevented by Murat—Duhesme forages El Vallés—Action of San Cugat—General Vives supersedes Palacios—Spanish army augments—Blockade of Barcelona—Siege of Rosas—Folly and negligence of the junta—Entrenchments in the town carried by the besiegers—Marquis of Lazan, with six thousand men, reaches Gerona—Lord Cochrane enters the Trinity—Repulses several assaults—Citadel surrenders 5th December—St. Cyr marches on Barcelona—Crosses the Ter—Deceives Lazan—Turns Hostalrich—Defeats Milans at San Celoni—Battle of Cardadeu—Caldagues retires behind the Llobregat—Negligence of Duhesme—Battle of Molino del Rey.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

It will be remembered, that when the second siege of Gerona was raised, in August, 1808, general Duhesme returned to Barcelona, and general Reille to Figueras, after which, the state of affairs obliged those generals to remain on the defensive. Napoleon's measures to aid them were as prompt as the occasion required; for while the siege of Gerona was yet in progress, he had directed troops to assemble at Perpignan in such numbers, as to form with those already in Catalonia, an army of more than forty thousand men, to be called the '*7th corps*,' and to be commanded by general Gouvion St. Cyr, to whom he gave this short but emphatic order; '*Preserve Barcelona for me. If that place be lost, I cannot retake it with 80,000 men.*'†

The troops assembled at Perpignan were, the great-

* Rogiat.

† St. Cyr's Journal of Operations.

est part, raw levies; Neapolitans, Etruscans, Romans, and Swiss, mixed, however, with some old regiments; but as the preparations for the grand army under the emperor absorbed the principal attention of the administration in France, general St. Cyr was straitened in the means necessary to take the field, and his undisciplined troops, suffering severe privations, were depressed in spirit, and inclined to desert. On the 1st of November, Napoleon, who was at Bayonne, sent orders to the '7th corps' to commence operations; St. Cyr, therefore, put his division in motion on the 3d, and crossing the frontier, established his head-quarters at Figueras on the 5th.

Meanwhile in Catalonia, as in other parts of Spain, lethargic vanity, and abuses of the most fatal kind, had succeeded the first enthusiasm and withered the energy of the people. The local junta had, indeed, issued abundance of decrees, and despatched agents to the supreme junta, and to the English commanders in the Mediterranean and Portugal, all charged with the same instructions, namely, to demand arms, ammunition, and money, and although the central junta treated their demands with contempt, the English authorities answered them generously and freely. Lord Collingwood lent the assistance of his fleet; from Malta and Sicily arms were obtained, and sir Hew Dalrymple having completely equipped the Spanish regiments released by the convention of Cintra, despatched them to Catalonia in British transports. Yet it may be doubted if the conduct of the central junta were not the wisest, for the local government established at Tarragona had already become so neglected, or so corrupt, that the arms thus supplied were, instead of being used in defence of the country, sold to foreign merchants!* Such being the political state of Catalonia, it naturally followed that the military affairs should be ill conducted.

The count of Caldagues, after having relieved Gerona, returned by Hostalrich, and resumed the line of the Llobregat; fifteen hundred men, drawn from the garrison of Carthagera, reached Taragona, and the marquis of Palacios, accompanied by the junta, quitted the latter town, and fixed his quarters at Villa Franca, within twenty miles of Caldagues, and the latter then disposed his troops, five thousand in number, on different points between Martorel and San Boy, covering a line of eighteen miles, along the left bank of the river.†

Meanwhile Duhesme who had rested but a few days, marched in the night from Barcelona with six thousand men, and having arrived the 2d of September at day-break on the Llobregat, attacked Caldagues' line on several points, but principally at San Boy and Molino del Rey. The former post was carried, and the Spaniards were pursued to Vegas, a distance of seven or eight miles, but at Molino del Rey the French were repulsed, and Duhesme then returned to Barcelona.

It was the intention of the British ministers, that an auxiliary force should have sailed from Sicily about this period, to aid the Catalans, and doubtless it would have been a wise and timely effort, but Napoleon's foresight prevented the execution. He directed Murat to menace Sicily, and that prince, feigning to collect forces on the coast of Calabria, spread many reports of armaments being in preparation, while, as a preliminary measure, general Lamarque carried the island of Capræ; here sir Hudson Lowe first became known to history, by losing, in a few days, a post that, without any pretensions to celebrity, might have been defended for as many years. Murat's demonstrations sufficed to impose upon sir John Stuart, and from ten to twelve thousand British troops were thus paralysed at a most critical period; and such will always be the result of

a policy which has no fixed, definite object in view. When statesmen cannot see their own way clearly, the executive officers will seldom act with vigour.

During September the Spanish army daily increased, the tercios of Migueletes were augmented, and a regiment of hussars, that had been most absurdly kept in Majorca ever since the beginning of the insurrection, arrived at Taragona. Palacios however remained at Villa Franca, Caldagues continued to guard the Llobregat, and Mariano Alvarez commanded the advanced guard, composed of the garrisons of Gerona and Rosas, the corps of Juan Claros, and other partizan chiefs. Francisco Milans and Milans de Bosch, with six thousand Migueletes, kept the mountains, northward and eastward of Barcelona; the latter hemming in the French right, the former covering the district of El Vallés, and watching, like a bird of prey, the enemy's foragers in the plain of Barcelona. The little port of Filieu de Quixols, near Palamos Bay, was filled with privateers, and the English frigates off the coast, besides aiding the Spanish enterprizes, carried on a littoral warfare in the gulf of Lyons with great spirit and success. Many petty skirmishes happened between the Migueletes and the French; but on the 10th of October, Duhesme attacked Milans de Bosch at St. Gerony beyond the Besos, and completely dispersed his corps, and the 11th, sent colonel Devaux, with two thousand men, against Granollers, which the Spaniards deserted, although it was their chief dépôt. Devaux having captured and destroyed a considerable quantity of stores returned the 12th to Mollet, where a column of equal strength was stationed in support, and then occupied the pass of Moncada, while general Millossewitz proceeded with the second column to forage El Vallés. Meanwhile, Caldagues drawing together three thousand infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and six guns, marched by the back of the hills towards Moncada, hoping to intercept the French on their return to Barcelona, thus Millossewitz and he met unexpectedly at San Culgat.* In the confused action which ensued the French were beaten, and retreated across the mountains to Barcelona, while Caldagues, justly proud of his soldier-like movement, returned to his camp on the Llobregat.†

The 28th of October, Palacios was ordered to take the command of the levies then collecting in the Sierra Morena, and general Vives succeeded him in Catalonia. The army was now reinforced with more infantry from Majorca; the Spanish troops, released by the convention of Cintra, arrived at Villa Franca; seven or eight thousand Grenadian levies were brought up to Taragona by general Reding, and, at the same time, six thousand men drafted from the army of Arragon, reached Lerida, under the command of the marquis of Lazan. The whole were organized in six divisions: the troops in the Ampurdan forming one, and including the garrisons of Hostalrich, Gerona, and Rosas, this *army of the right*, as it was called, amounted to thirty-six thousand men, of which twenty-two thousand foot and twelve hundred horse were near Barcelona or in march for it.

Vives seeing himself at the head of such a power and in possession of all the hills and rivers surrounding Barcelona, resolved to storm that city, and all things seemed to favour the attempt. The inhabitants were ready to rise, a battalion of the Walloon guards who had been suffered to remain in the city in a species of neutrality plotted to seize one of the gates, and the French were so uneasy that Duhesme actually resolved to abandon the town and confine his defence to the citadel and Montjouik; a resolution from which he was only diverted by the remonstrances of the chief engineer Lafaille. In this state of affairs, Vives trans-

* Lord Collingwood's Correspondence.

† Cabanes.

* Lafaille campagne de Catalonia.

† Vacani.

ferring his quarters to Martorel, directed a general attack on the French outposts, but he was repulsed at every point, and returned to the mountains; the Walloon guards were then disarmed, the inhabitants awed, and the defences of the town increased. From that period to the raising of the blockade the warfare of the Spanish general was contemptible, although disputes amongst his adversaries had arisen to such a height, that Duhesme was advised to send Lecchi a prisoner to France.

Catalonia was now a prey to innumerable disorders. Vives, a weak, indolent man, had been the friend of Godoy, and was not popular; he had, when commanding in the islands, retained the troops in them with such tenacity as to create doubts of his attachment to the cause, yet the supreme junta while privately expressing their suspicions, and requesting lord Collingwood to force him to an avowal of his true sentiments, wrote publicly to Vives in the most flattering terms, and, finally, appointed him captain-general of Catalonia.* By the people, however, he and others were vehemently suspected, and, as the mob governed throughout Spain, the authorities, civil and military, were more careful to avoid giving offence to the multitude, than anxious to molest the enemy, and hence although Catalonia was full of strong places, they were neither armed nor provisioned, for all persons were confident that the French only thought of retreating.

Such was the state of the province and of the armies, when Napoleon, being ready to break into the northern parts of Spain, ordered St. Cyr to commence operations. His force (including a German division of six thousand men, not yet arrived at Perpignan) amounted to more than thirty thousand men; ill-composed, however, and badly provided, and St. Cyr himself was extremely discontented with his situation.† The emperor had given him discretionary powers to act as he judged fitting, only bearing in mind the importance of relieving Barcelona, but marshal Berthier neglected the equipment of the troops, and Duhesme declared that his magazines would not hold out longer than December. To march directly to Barcelona was neither an easy nor an advantageous movement. That city could only be provisioned from France, and, until the road was cleared by the taking of Gerona and Hostalrich, no convoys could pass except by sea. To attack those places with prudence, it was essential to get possession of Rosas; not only to secure an intermediate port for French vessels passing with supplies to Barcelona, but to deprive the English of a secure harbour, and the Spaniards of a point from whence they could, in concert with their allies, intercept the communications of the French army and even blockade Figueras, which, from the want of transport, could not be provisioned at this period. These considerations having determined St. Cyr to commence by the siege of Rosas, he repaired to Figueras, in person, the 6th of November, and, on the 7th, general Reille being charged to conduct the operation, after a sharp action, drove in the Spaniards before that place and completed the investment.

SIEGE OF ROSAS.

This town was but a narrow slip of houses built along the water's edge, at the head of the gulf of the same name. The citadel, a large irregular pentagon, stood on one side, and, on the other, the mountains that skirt the flat and swampy plain of the Ampurdan, rose, bluff and rocky, at the distance of half a mile. An old redoubt was built at the foot of the hills, and, from thence to the citadel, an entrenchment had been drawn to cover the houses, hence, Rosas, looking towards the land, had the citadel on the left hand, the mountains on the right, and the front covered by this

entrenchment. The roadstead permitted ships of the line to anchor within cannon-shot of the place, and on the right hand, coming up the gulf, a star fort, called the Trinity, crowned a rugged hill about a mile and a quarter distant from the citadel; the communication between it and the town being by a narrow road carried between the foot of the mountain and the water's edge.

The garrison of Rosas consisted of nearly three thousand men; two bomb-vessels, and an English seventy-four (the *Excellent*), were anchored off the town, and captain West, the commodore, reinforced the garrisons of the Trinity and the citadel with marines and seamen from these vessels; but the damages sustained in a former siege had been only partially repaired; both places were ill-found in guns and stores, and the Trinity was commanded at the distance of pistol-shot from a point of the mountains called the Puig Rom.

The force under Reille, consisting of his own and Pino's Italian division, skirmished daily with the garrison; but the rain flooded the Ampurdan, the roads became impassable for the artillery, and the opening of the trenches was delayed. Meanwhile Souham's division took post between the Fluvia and Figueras, to cover the siege on the side of Gerona, and general Chabot's Italian brigade was sent to Rabos and Espollas, to keep down the Somatenes. Before Chabot's arrival, Reille had detached a battalion to that side, and being uneasy for its safety sent three more to its assistance, but too late, for two companies had been cut off by the Somatenes. This loss however proved beneficial, it enraged the Italians and checked a disposition to desert; and St. Cyr, unwilling to pursue the system of burning villages and yet desirous to repress the insidious hostility of the peasants, seized, in reprisal for the loss of his companies, an equal number of villagers, whom he sent to France.*

At Rosas the inhabitants embarked or took refuge in the citadel, leaving the houses and the entrenchment covering them, to the French; the latter were however prevented by the fire of the English ships from making any permanent lodgement, and in a few days, a mixed detachment of soldiers and townsmen re-established a post there.† This done, on the 8th captain West, in conjunction with the governor, made a sally but was repulsed, and on the 9th several yards of the citadel's ramparts crumbled away. Fortunately the enemy did not perceive the accident which was repaired in the night, and on the 15th an obstinate assault made on the Trinity was repulsed, the English seamen bearing a principal share in the success.

The 16th the roads became passable, and the French battering-train was put in motion. The way leading up to the Puig Rom was repaired, two battalions were posted there, on the point commanding the Trinity, and on the 19th three guns were mounted. The trenches were then opened at the distance of four hundred yards from the citadel, and the 20th the fire of the French mortars obliged the vessels of war to anchor beyond the range of the shells.

During this time, Souham was harassed by the Migueletes from the side of Gerona, and the French cavalry, unable to find forage, were sent back to France. Napoleon, meanwhile rendered uneasy by the reports of General Duhesme, directed the seventh corps to advance to Barcelona, so as to arrive there by the 26th of November, yet St. Cyr refused to abandon the siege of Rosas without a more positive order.‡ On the other side the assistance afforded to the besieged by captain West was represented to the Catalonian government as an attempt to possess himself of the place, and the junta readily believing the tale, entered into an angry correspondence with don Pedro O'Daly, the governor, relative to the supposed treachery, yet took no measures

* Lord Collingwood's Correspondence.

† Muster rolls of the French army, MSS. St. Cyr.

* St. Cyr. † Captain West's despatch.

‡ St. Cyr.

to raise the siege. Pending the correspondence, however, the *Excellent* sailed from Rosas, and was succeeded by the *Fame*, captain Bennet, who immediately landed some men under the *Trinity*, and endeavoured, but ineffectually, to take the battery opposed to that fort.

The 27th the besiegers assaulted the Spaniards, who had entrenched themselves in the deserted houses of the town; a hundred and sixty were taken, fifty escaped into the citadel, and the rest were slain. Breaching batteries were then commenced among the ruins of the houses, and the communication with the shipping rendered so unsafe, that Lazan, who had come from Lerida to Gerona with six thousand men, and had collected provisions and stores at the mouth of the *Fluvia*, with the intention of supplying Rosas by sea, abandoned his design.*

Reille observing the dilapidated state of the citadel now sent another summons, but the governor was firm, and meanwhile as the engineers reported the breach in the *Trinity* to be practicable, an assault there was ordered for the 30th of November. An Italian officer, who had formerly served in the fort, being appointed to lead the storming party, asserted that the breach was a false one; his remonstrance was unheeded, and indeed the Spanish commandant thought the post so untenable, that two days before, the marines of the *Fame* had been withdrawn by captain Bennet. But at this moment lord Cochrane, a man of infinite talent in his profession, and of surpassing courage and enterprise, threw himself with eighty seamen into the fort. He found the breach really practicable, yet broken into an old gallery, which he immediately filled with earth and hammocks, and so cut off the opening; hence the unfortunate Italian could do nothing, and fell with all his followers, except two who escaped to their own side, and two, who being spared by the seamen, were drawn up with ropes. A second assault, made a few days after, was likewise repulsed.

While this passed at the *Trinity*, the breaching batteries opened against the citadel, and a false attack was commenced on the opposite side; the next night the garrison made a sally with some success, but the walls were completely broken by the French fire, and the 5th of December O'Daly, hopeless of relief, surrendered with two thousand four hundred men: lord Cochrane then abandoned the *Trinity*, first blowing up the magazine.

St. Cyr observes that the garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried off, at night, by the British shipping. To embark two thousand five hundred men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether by night or day, is not an easy operation, yet the censure seems well founded, because sufficient preparation might have been previously made. Nor can the defence of the place (with the exception of lord Cochrane's exploit) be deemed brilliant, whether with relation to the importance of the place, the assistance that might have been rendered from the sea, or the number of the garrison compared with that of the besiegers. It held out, however, thirty days, and, if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards outside, the loss of the garrison would have been amply repaid; but Vives, wholly occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas; a fruitless attack on Souham's posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther progress of the enemy: Lazan, although at the head of six or seven thousand men, could not rely upon more than three thousand, and his applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded.†

The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to the relief of Barcelona, and he resolved to do so, although the project, at first sight, appeared rather insane than

hardy; for the roads, by which Gerona and Hostalrich, were to be turned, being mere paths impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition, could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions. The Germans had not yet arrived at Perpignan, it was indispensable to leave Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and Figueras, and these deductions being made, less than eighteen thousand men, including the cavalry, which had been recalled from France, remained disposable for the operation: but, on the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were twenty-five thousand men in the camp before Barcelona, and ten thousand others, under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. The Spanish troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. Two-thirds of the *Migueletes* carried pikes, and many were without any arms at all; there was no sound military system; the Spanish generals were ignorant of the French movements and strength, and their own indolence and want of vigilance drew upon them the contempt and suspicion of the people.*

The 8th of December St. Cyr united his army on the left bank of the *Fluvia*. The 9th he passed that river, and driving the Spaniards over the *Ter*, established his head-quarters at *Mediūya*, ten miles from Gerona. He wished, before pursuing his own march, to defeat Lazan, lest the latter should harass the rear of the army, but, finding that the marquis would not engage in a serious affair, he made a show of sitting down before Gerona on the 10th, hoping thereby to mislead Vives, and render him slow to break up the blockade of Barcelona;† this succeeded, the Spaniard remained in his camp, irresolute and helpless, while his enemy was rapidly passing the defiles and rivers between Gerona and the *Besos*.‡

The nature of the country between Figueras and Barcelona has been described in the first volume, and referring to that description, the reader will find that the only carriage routes by which St. Cyr could march were, one by the sea-coast, and one leading through Gerona and Hostalrich. The first, exposed to the fire of the English vessels, had been broken up by lord Cochrane, in August; and to use the second, it was necessary either, to take the fortresses, or to turn them by marching for three days through the mountains. St. Cyr adopted the last plan, trusting that rapidity and superior knowledge of war would enable him to separate Lazan and Alvarez from Vives, and so defeat them all in succession.

The 11th of December he crossed the *Ter* and reached *La Bisbal*; here he left the last of his carriages, delivered out four days' biscuit and fifty rounds of ammunition to the soldiers, and with this provision, a drove of cattle, and a reserve of only ten rounds of ammunition for each man, he commenced his hardy march, making for Palamos. On the route he encountered and beat some *Migueletes* that Juan Claros had brought to oppose him, and, when near Palamos, he suffered a little from the fire of the English ships, but he had gained a first step, and his hopes were high.

The 13th, he turned his back upon the coast, and, by a forced march, reached *Vidreras* and *Llagostera*, thus placing himself between Vives and Lazan, for the latter had not yet passed the heights of *Casa de Selva*.

The 14th, marching by *Mazanet de Selva* and *Martorel*, he reached the heights above Hostalrich, and encamped at *Grions* and *Masanas*. During this day's journey, his rear was slightly harassed by Lazan and Claros, but he was well content to find the strong banks of the *Tordera* undefended by Vives. His situation was, however, extremely critical; Lazan and Claros had, the one on the 11th, the other on the 12th, informed Vives of the movement, hence the bulk of the Spanish

* Doyle's Correspondence, MSS.

† Ibid.

* Cabanes.

† St. Cyr.

‡ Cabanes.

force before Barcelona might be expected, at any moment, in some of the strong positions in which the country abounded; the troops from Girona were, as we have seen, close in the rear, the Somatenes were gathering thickly on the flanks, Hostalrich was in front, and the French soldiers had only sixteen rounds of ammunition.

St. Cyr's design was to turn Hostalrich, and get into the main road again behind that fortress. The smugglers of Perpignan had affirmed that there was no pathway, but a shepherd assured him that there was a track by which it could be effected, and, when the efforts of the staff-officers to trace it failed, St. Cyr himself discovered it, but nearly fell into the hands of the Somatenes during the search.

The 15th, at day-break, the troops being put in motion, turned the fortress and gained the main road, and the garrison of the place, endeavouring to harass their rear, was repulsed; yet the Somatenes on the flanks, emboldened because the French, to save ammunition, did not return their fire, became exceedingly troublesome, and near San Celoni, the head of the column encountered some battalions of Migueletes, which Francisco Milans had brought up from Arenas de Mar, by the pass of Villa Gorguin.

Milans, not being aware of St. Cyr's approach, was soon beaten, and his men fell back, part to Villa Gorguin, part to the heights of Nuestra Señora de Cordera: the French thus gained the defile of Treintapazos, but they were now so fatigued that all desired to halt, save the general, who insisted upon the troops clearing that defile, and reaching a plain on the other side, which was not effected before ten o'clock. Lazan's troops did not appear during the day, but Vives' army was in front, and its fires were seen on the hills between Cardadeu and Llinas.

Information of St. Cyr's march, as I have already observed, had been transmitted to Vives on the 11th, and there was time for him to have carried the bulk of his forces to the Tordera, before the French could pass that river; but intelligence of the battle of Tudela, and of the appearance of the French near Zaragoza, arrived at the same moment, and the Spanish general betrayed the greatest weakness and indecision; at one moment resolving to continue before Barcelona, at another designing to march against St. Cyr.* He had, on the 9th, sent Reding with six guns, six hundred cavalry, and one thousand infantry, to take the command in the Ampurdan, and, the 12th, after receiving Lazan's report, he reinforced Reding, who was still at Granollers, and directed him upon Cardadeu. The 14th, he ordered Francisco Milans to march by Mattaro and Arenas de Mar, to examine the coast road, and, if the enemy was not in that line, to repair also to Cardadeu. The 15th, Milans, as we have seen, was beaten at St. Celoni, but, in the night, he rallied his whole division on the heights of Cordera, thus flanking the left of the French forces at Llinas.

A Spanish council of war had been held on the 13th. Caldagues advised that four thousand Migueletes should be left to observe Duhesme, and that the rest of the army should march at once to fight St. Cyr; good and soldier-like counsel; but Vives was loth to abandon the siege of Barcelona, and adopting half-measures, left Caldagues, with the right wing of the army, to watch Duhesme, and carried the centre and the left, by the route of Granollers, to the heights between Cardadeu and Llinas, where, exclusive of Milans' division, he united, in the night of the 15th, about eight thousand regulars, besides several thousand Somatenes. Duhesme immediately occupied the posts abandoned by Vives, and thus separated him from Caldagues, yet St. Cyr's position, on the morning of the 16th, would have been very dangerous, if he

had been opposed by any but Spanish generals and Spanish troops.

Vives and those about him, irresolute and weak as they were in action, were not deficient in boasting words; they called the French army, in derision, '*the succour*;' and, in allusion to the battle of Baylen, announced that a second '*bull-fight*,' in which Reding was again the '*matador*,' would be exhibited.* Dupont and St. Cyr were, however, men of a different temper: the latter knowing that the Spaniards were not troops to stand the shock of a good column, united his army in one solid mass at day-break on the 16th, and without hesitation marched against the centre of the enemy, ordering the head of the column to go headlong on, without either firing or forming line.

BATTLE OF CARDADEU.

The hills occupied by the Spanish army were high and wooded. Vives, in person, commanded on the left; the other wing was under Reding, and the Somatenes clustered upon a lofty ridge which was separated from the right of the position by the little river Mogent. The main road from Llinas led through the centre of the line, and a second road branching off from the first, and running between the Mogent and Reding's ground, went to Mattaro.

The flank of the French attacking column was galled by the Somatenes, and halted, general Pino, who led it, instead of falling on briskly, sent for fresh instructions, and meanwhile extended his first brigade in a line to his left. St. Cyr reiterated the order to fight in column; but he was sorely troubled at Pino's error, for Reding advancing against the front and flank of the extended brigade, obliged it to commence a fire, which it could not nourish from the want of ammunition.

In this difficulty the French general acted with great ability and vigour; Pino's second brigade was directed to do that which the first should have done, two companies were sent to menace the left of the Spaniards, and St. Cyr himself rapidly carried Souham's division, by the Mattaro road, against Reding's extreme right. The effect was instantaneous and complete, the Spaniards overthrown on their centre and right, and charged by the cavalry, were beaten, and dispersed in every direction, leaving their artillery, ammunition, and two thousand prisoners behind.

Vives escaped on foot across the mountain to Mattaro, where he was taken on board an English vessel, but Reding fled on horseback by the main road, and the next day, having rallied some of the fugitives at Monmalo, retreated by the route of San Culgat to Molino del Rey. The loss of the French was only six hundred men, and the battle, which lasted one hour, was so decisive, that St. Cyr resolved to push on to Barcelona immediately, without seeking to defeat Milans or Lazan, whom he judged too timid to venture an action: moreover, he hoped that Duhesme, who had been informed, on the 7th, of the intended march, and who could hear the sound of the artillery, would intercept and turn back the flying troops.

The French had scarcely quitted the field of battle when Milans arrived, and, finding how matters stood, retired to Arenas de Mar, giving notice to Lazan, who retreated to Girona; St. Cyr's rear was thus cleared. Meanwhile Duhesme, heedless of what was passing at Cardadeu, instead of intercepting the beaten army, sent Lecchi to attack Caldagues, who having concentrated his division on the evening of the 16th, repulsed Lecchi, and then retired behind the Llobregat, leaving behind some artillery and the large magazines which Vives had collected for the siege. Thus St. Cyr reached Barcelona without encountering any of Duhesme's troops, and, in his Memoirs of this campaign, he represents that general as astonishingly negligent;

* Cabanes. Doyle's Correspondence, MS.

* St. Cyr.

seeking neither to molest the enemy nor to meet the French army; treating every thing belonging to the service with indifference; making false returns, and conniving at gross malversation in his generals. Duhesme, however, has not wanted defenders.

St. Cyr, now reflecting upon the facility with which his opponents could be defeated, and the difficulty of pursuing them, resolved to rest a few days at Barcelona, in hopes that the Spaniards, if unmolested, would re-assemble in numbers behind the Llobregat, and enable him to strike an effectual blow, for his design was to disperse their forces so as they should not be able to interrupt the sieges which he meditated; nor was he deceived in his calculations. Reding joined Caldagues, rallied from twelve to fifteen thousand men behind the Llobregat, and Vives who had relanded at Sitjes, sent orders to Lazan and Milans to join him there by the way of Vallés; the arrival of the latter was, however, so uncertain that the French general, who knew of these orders, judging it better to attack Reding at once, united Chabran's division to his own, and on the 20th, advanced to St. Felieu de Llobregat.

The Spaniards were drawn up on the heights behind the village of San Vincente, and their position lofty and rugged, commanded a free view of the approaches from Barcelona; the Llobregat covered the front, and the left was secured from attack, except at the bridge of Molino del Rey, which was entrenched, guarded by a strong detachment, and protected by heavy guns. Reding's cavalry amounted to one thousand, and he had fifty pieces of artillery, the greatest part of which were in battery at the bridge of Molino del Rey; his right was, however, accessible, because the river was fordable in several places. The main road to Villa Franca led through this position, and, at the distance of ten or twelve miles in the rear, the pass of Ordal offered another post of great strength.

Vives was at San Vincente on the 19th, but returned to Villa Franca the same day; hence, when the French appeared on the 20th, the camp was thrown into confusion, and a council of war being held, one party was for fighting, another for retreating to Ordal; * finally an officer was sent to Vives for orders, and he returned with a message, that Reding might retreat if he could not defend his post, but the latter fearing that he should be accused, and perhaps sacrificed for returning without reason, resolved to fight, although he anticipated nothing but disaster. The season was extremely severe, snow was falling, and both armies suffered from cold and wet; but the Spanish soldiers were dispirited by past defeats, and the despondency and irresolution of their generals could not escape observation, while the French and Italian troops were confident in their commander, and flushed with success. In these dispositions the two armies passed the night.

BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY.

St. Cyr observing that Reding's attention was principally directed to the bridge of Molino, ordered Chabran's division to that side, with instructions to create a diversion by opening a fire from some artillery, and then retiring as if his guns could not resist the weight of the Spanish metal; in short, to persuade the enemy that a powerful effort would be made there; but when the centre and right of the Spaniards should be attacked, Chabran was to force the passage of the bridge, and assail the heights beyond it. This stratagem succeeded; Reding accumulated troops on his left, and neglected his right, which was the real point of attack.

The 21st, Pino's division crossing the Llobregat at daylight, by a ford in front of St. Felieu, marched against the right of the Spanish position; Chabot's division followed; Souham's which had passed at a ford lower down, and then, ascended by the right bank,

covered Pino's passage; the light cavalry were held in reserve behind Chabot's division, and a regiment of cuirassiers was sent to support Chabran at Molino del Rey.

The Spanish position consisted of two mountain heads, separated by a narrow ravine and a torrent, and as the troops of the right wing were exceedingly weakened, they were immediately chased off their headland by the leading brigade of Pino's division. Reding then seeing his error, changed his front, drawing up on the other mountain, on a new line, nearly perpendicular to the Llobregat, but he still kept a strong detachment at the bridge of Molino, which was thus in rear of his left. The French divisions formed rapidly for a fresh effort, Souham was on the right, Pino in the centre, Chabot on the left; and the latter gained ground in the direction of Villa Franca, endeavouring to turn the Spaniards' right, and cut off their retreat, while the light cavalry making way between the mountain and the river, sought to connect themselves with Chabran at Molino. The other two columns, having crossed the ravine that separated them from the Spaniards, ascended the opposite mountain. The Catalans forming quickly, opposed their enemies with an orderly but ill directed fire, and their front line advancing, offered to charge with an appearance of great intrepidity, but their courage sinking, they turned as the hostile masses approached, and the reserve immediately opened a confused volley upon both parties; in this disorder, the road to Villa Franca being intercepted by Chabot, the right was forced upon the centre, the centre upon the left, and the whole pushed back in confusion upon Molino del Rey. Meantime a detachment from Chabran's division, passing the Llobregat above Molino, blocked the road to Martorel, and in this miserable situation the Spaniards being charged by the light cavalry, scarcely a man would have escaped if Chabran had obeyed his orders, by pushing across the bridge of Molino upon their rear. But that general, at all times feeble in execution, remained a tranquil spectator of the action, until the right of Souham's division reached the bridge; thus the routed troops escaped by dispersion, throwing away every thing that could impede their flight across the mountains. Vives reached the field of battle just as the route was complete, and was forced to fly with the rest. The victorious army pursued in three columns; Chabran's in the direction of Igualada; Chabot's by the road of San Sadurni, which turned the pass of Ordal; Souham's by the royal route of Villa Franca, at which place the head quarters were established on the 22d. The posts of Villa Nueva and Sitjes were immediately occupied by Pino, while Souham pushed the fugitives to the gates of Tarragona.

The loss of the Spaniards, owing to their swiftness, was less than might have been expected; not more than twelve hundred fell into the hands of the French, but many superior officers were killed or wounded, and, on the 22d, the count de Caldagues was taken, a man apparently pedantic in military affairs, and wanting in modesty, but evidently possessed of both courage and talent. The whole of the artillery, vast quantities of powder, and a magazine of English muskets, quite new, were captured, yet many of the Miguelites were unarmed, and the junta were unceasing in their demands for succours of this nature! but the history of any one province was the history of all Spain.

CHAPTER V.

Tumult in Tarragona—Reding proclaimed general—Reinforcements join the Spaniards—Actions at Bruch—Lazan advances, and fights at Castel Ampurias—He quarrels with Reding, and marches towards Zaragoza—Reding's plans—St. Cyr breaks Reding's line at Llacuna—Actions at Capelades,

* Cabanes.

Igualada, and St. Magi—French general, unable to take the abbey of Creuz, turns it, and reaches Villaradona—Joined by Souham's division, takes post at Valls and Pla—Reding rallies his centre and left wing—Endeavours to reach Tarragona—Battle of Valls—Weak condition of Tortosa—St. Cyr blockades Tarragona—Sickness in that city—St. Cyr resolves to retire—Chabran forces the bridge of Molino del Rey—Conspiracy in Barcelona fails—Colonel Briche arrives with a detachment from Aragon—St. Cyr retires behind the Llobregat—Pino defeats Wiupfen at Tarrasa—Reding dies—His character—Blake is appointed captain-general of the *Coronilla*—Changes the line of operations to Aragon—Events in that province—Suchet takes the command of the French at Zaragoza—Colonel Perena and Baget oblige eight French companies to surrender—Blake advances—Battle of Alcanitz—Suchet falls back—Disorder in his army—Blake neglects Catalonia—St. Cyr marches by the valley of Congosto upon Vich—Action at the defile of Garriga—Lecchi conducts the prisoners to the Fluvia—St. Cyr hears of the Austrian war—Barcelona victualled by a French squadron—Observations.

BARCELONA was now completely relieved, and the captured magazines supplied it for several months; there was no longer a Spanish army in the field, and in Tarragona, where some eight or nine thousand of the Spanish fugitives, from this and the former battle, had taken refuge, there was terrible disorder. The people rose tumultuously, broke open the public stores, and laying hands on all the weapons they could find, rushed from place to place, as if searching for something to vent their fury upon; they called aloud for the head of Vives, and to save his life he was cast into prison by Reding, who was proclaimed general-in-chief.* The regular officers were insulted by the populace, and there was as usual a general cry to defend the city, mixed with furious menaces against traitors; but there were neither guns, nor ammunition, nor provisions, and during the first moment of anarchy, St. Cyr might certainly have rendered himself master of Tarragona by a vigorous effort.† The opportunity soon passed away; the French general seeking only to procure subsistence, occupied himself in forming a train of field artillery, while Reding, who had been almost without hope, proceeded to rally the army, and place the town in a state of defence.

The 1st of January eleven thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry re-assembled at Tarragona and Reus; a Swiss regiment from Majorca, and two Spanish regiments from Grenada, increased this force, and the 5th three thousand four hundred men arrived from Valencia, from whence also five thousand muskets, ammunition in proportion, and ten thousand pikes fresh from England, were forwarded to Tarragona, and a supply of money, obtained from the British agents at Seville, completed the list of fortuitous events following the disaster of Molino del Rey.‡ These fortunate circumstances and the inactivity of St. Cyr, who seemed paralyzed, restored the confidence of the Catalans, yet their system remained unchanged, for in Spain confidence often led to insubordination, but never to victory.

A part of the fugitives from Molino had taken refuge at Bruch, where, being joined by the Somatenes, they chose major Green, an English military agent, for their general, thinking to hold that post which was considered impregnable ever since the defeats of Chabran and Swartz. St. Cyr, glad of this opportunity to retrieve the honour of the French arms, detached Chabran himself the 11th January to take his own revenge, but as that general was still depressed by the recollection of his former defeat, to encourage him, Chabot was directed from San Sadurn upon Igualada, by which the defile of Bruch was turned, and a permanent defence rendered impossible.¶ Green made little or no resistance; eight guns were taken, a considerable number of men

were killed, the French pursued to Igualada, and a detachment, without orders, even assailed and took Montserrat itself, and rejoined the main body without loss. Chabot was then recalled to San Sadurn, and Chabran was quartered at Martorel.

While these events were passing beyond the Llobregat, the marquis of Lazan advanced, with seven or eight thousand men, towards Castellon de Ampurias. The 1st of January he drove back a battalion of infantry upon Rosas with considerable loss, but the next day general Reille, having assembled about three thousand men, intercepted his communications, and attacked him in his position behind the Muga; the victory seems to have been undecided, and in the night, Lazan regaining his communications, returned to Gerona.

The battle of Molino del Rey having abated, for a time, the ardour of the Catalans, Reding was enabled to avoid serious actions, while the Somatenes harassed the enemy; and this plan being followed during the months of January and February, was exceedingly troublesome to St. Cyr, because he was obliged to send small parties continually to seek for provision, which the country people hid with great care, striving hard to protect their scanty stores. In the beginning of February the country between the Llobregat and Tarragona was almost exhausted of food; the English ships continued to vex the coast-line, and the French, besides deserters, lost many men, killed and wounded, in the innumerable petty skirmishes sustained by the marauding parties. Still St. Cyr maintained his positions, until the country people, tired of a warfare in which they were the chief sufferers, clamoured against Reding, that he, with a large regular force, should look calmly on, until the last morsel of food was discovered, and torn from their starving families; the townspeople, also feeling the burden of supporting the troops, impatiently urged the general to fight, nor was this insubordination confined to the rude multitude. Lazan, although at the head of nine thousand men, remained perfectly inactive after the skirmish at Castellon de Ampurias; but when Reding required him to leave a suitable garrison in Gerona, and bring the rest of his troops to Igualada, he would not obey, and their dispute was only terminated by Lazan's marching, with five thousand men, to the assistance of Zaragoza. His operations there have been related in the narrative of that siege.

The army immediately under Reding was very considerable, the Swiss battalions were numerous and good, and some of the most experienced of the Spanish regiments were in Catalonia; every fifth man of the robust population had been called out after the defeat of Molino del Rey, and, although the people, averse to serve as regular soldiers, did not readily answer the call, the force under Reding was, in the beginning of February, not less than twenty-eight thousand men. The urban guards were also put in activity, and above fifteen thousand Somatenes assisted the regular troops; but there was more show than real power, for Reding was incapable of wielding the regular troops skilfully, and the Migueletes being ill armed, without clothing and insubordinate, devastated the country equally with the enemy. The Somatenes, who only took arms for local interests, would not fight, except at the times, in the manner, and in the place that suited themselves; they neglected the advice of the regular officers, reviled all who would not adopt their own views, and caused many to be removed from their commands. The Spanish generals never obtained from them good information of the enemy's movements; yet their own plans were always made known to the French, for at Reding's headquarters, as at those of Castanos before the battle of Tudela, every project was openly and ostentatiously discussed. Reding himself was a man of no military talent, his activity was of body, not of

* Cabanes.

† St. Cyr.

‡ Doyle's Correspondence, MSS.

¶ St. Cyr.

mind; but he was brave and honourable; and popular, because, being without system, arrangement, or deep design, and easy in his nature, he thwarted no man's humours, and thus floated in the troubled waters until their sudden reflux left him on the rocks.

The Catalan army was now divided into four distinct corps.

Alvarez, with four thousand men, held Gerona and the Ampurdan.

Lazan, with five thousand, was near Zaragoza.

Don Juan Castro, an officer, accused by the Spaniards of treachery, and who afterwards did attach himself to Joseph's party, occupied, with sixteen thousand men, a line extending from Olesa, on the upper Llobregat, to the pass of San Cristina, near Tarragona; this line running through Bruch, Igualada, and Llacuna, was above sixty miles long.

The remainder of the army, amounting to ten or twelve thousand men under Reding himself, was quartered at Tarragona, Reus, and the vicinity of those places.

The troops were fed from Valencia and Aragon, the convoys from the former being conveyed in vessels along the coast; but the magazines being accumulated on one or two points of the line, and chosen without judgement, fettered Reding's movements and regulated those of the French, whose only difficulty, in fact, was to procure food.

Early in February, St. Cyr, having exhausted the country about him, and finding his communications much vexed by the Somatenes and by descents from the English ships, concentrated his divisions in masses at Vendril, Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and Martorel. The seventh corps having been reinforced by the German division, and by some conscripts, amounted at this period to forty-eight thousand men, of which forty-one thousand were under arms, but the force immediately with St. Cyr did not exceed twenty-three thousand combatants. The relative position of the two armies was, however, entirely in favour of the French general; his line extending from Vendril, by Villa Franca, to Martorel, was not more than thirty miles, and he had a royal road by which to retreat on Barcelona; whereas the Spanish posts covering an extent of above sixty miles, formed a half-circle round the French line, and their communications were more rugged than those of St. Cyr. Nevertheless, it is not to be doubted that, by avoiding any serious action, the Catalans might have obliged the French to abandon the country between the Llobregat and Tarragona; famine and the continued drain of men, in a mountain warfare, would have forced the latter away, nor could they have struck any formidable blow to relieve themselves, seeing that all the important places were fortified towns requiring a regular siege. The never-failing arrogance of the Spanish character, and the unstable judgement of Reding, induced him to forego these advantages. The closing of the French posts and some success in a few petty skirmishes were magnified, the last into victories, and the first into a design on the part of the enemy to fly; and an intercourse opened with some of the inhabitants of Barcelona gave hopes of regaining that city by means of a conspiracy within the walls. The Catalans had before made proposals to general Lecchi to deliver up the citadel of that place, nor is there any thing that more strongly marks the absurd self-sufficiency of the Spaniards, during this war, than the repeated attempts they made to corrupt the French commanders. As late as the year 1810, Martin Carrera, being at the head of about two thousand ragged peasants, half-armed, and only existing under the protection of the English outposts, offered to Marshal Ney, then investing Ciudad Rodrigo, rank and honours in the Spanish army if he would desert!

Reding, swayed by the popular clamour, which this state of affairs produced, resolved to attack, and in this view directed Castro to collect his sixteen thousand men to fall upon the right flank and rear of St. Cyr, by the routes of Llacuna and Igualada; and to send a detachment to seize the pass of Ordal, to cut off the French line of retreat to Barcelona; meanwhile, advancing with eight thousand by the road of Vendril and St. Cristina, he, himself, was to attack the enemy in front. All the Migueletes and Somatenes between Gerona and the Besos were to aid in these operations, the object being to surround the French, a favourite project with the Spaniards at all times; and as they publicly announced this intention, the joy was universal, the destruction of the hostile army being as usual anticipated with the utmost confidence.

The Catalans were in motion on the 14th of February, but St. Cyr had kept his army well in hand and seeing the Spaniards were ready to break in upon him, resolved to strike first. Wherefore leaving Souham's division at Vendril, to hold Reding in check, on the 16th St. Cyr marched from Villa Franca, with Pino's division, and overthrew Castro's advanced posts which were at Lacueta and Saint Quinti. The Spanish centre was thus pierced, their wings completely separated, and Castro's right was thrown back upon Capellades.

The 17th, the French general continuing his movement with Pino's division, reached Capellades, where he expected to unite with Chabot and Chabran, who had orders to concentrate there,—the one from San Sadurni, the other from Martorel. By this skilful movement he avoided the pass of Bruch, and concentrated three divisions on the extreme right of Castro's left wing and close to his magazines, which were at Igualada.

Chabot arrived the first, and, being for a little time unsupported, was attacked and driven back with loss, but when the other divisions came up, the action was restored, and the Spaniards put to flight. They rallied again at Poble de Claramunt, between Capellades and Igualada, a circumstance agreeable to St. Cyr, because he had sent Mazzuchelli's brigade from Llacuna direct upon Igualada, and if Chabot had not been so hard pressed, the action at Capellades was to have been delayed until Mazzuchelli had got into the rear; scarcely however was the head of that general's column descried, when Castro, who was at Igualada with his reserves, recalled the troops from Poble de Claramunt.* The French were close at their heels, and the whole passed through Igualada, fighting and in disorder, after which, losing all courage, the Spaniards threw away their arms, and fled by the three routes of Cervera, Calaf, and Manresa. They were pursued all the 17th, yet the French returned the next day with few prisoners, because, says St. Cyr, "*the Catalans are endowed by nature with strong knees.*"

Having thus broken through the centre of the Spanish line, defeated a part of the left wing and taken the magazines, St. Cyr posted Chabot and Chabran at Igualada, to keep the beaten troops in check, while himself, with Pino's division, marched on the 18th to fight Reding, whose extreme left was now at St. Magi. Souham also had been instructed, when by preconcerted signals he should know that the attack at Igualada had succeeded, to force the pass of Cristina, and push forward to Villa Radoña, upon which town St. Cyr was now marching.

The position of St. Magi, being attacked at four o'clock in the evening of the 18th, was carried without difficulty, but it was impossible to find a single peasant to guide the troops, on the next day's march to the abbey of Santa Creus. In this perplexity, a wounded Spanish captain, who was prisoner, having demanded

* St. Cyr.

to be allowed to go to Tarragona, St. Cyr assented, offering to carry him to the Creus, and thus the prisoner unconsciously acted as a guide to his enemies.* The march was long and difficult, and it was late ere they reached the abbey, which was a strong point occupied in force by the troops that had been beaten from San Magi the evening before, wherefore the French, after a fruitless demonstration of assaulting it, took a position for the night. Meanwhile, Reding hearing of Castro's defeat, made a draft of men and guns from the right wing and was marching by Pla and the pass of Cabra, intending to rally his left; his road run just behind St. Creus, and he was passing at the moment when the French appeared before that place, but as neither general was aware of the other's presence, each continued his particular movement.

The 20th St. Cyr crossing the Gaya river under a fire from the abbey, continued his rapid march upon Villa Radoña, near which place he dispersed a small corps, but finding that Souham was not come up, he sent an officer, escorted by a battalion, to hasten that general, whose non-arrival gave reason to believe that the staff-officers and spies, sent with the previous instructions, had all been intercepted. This caused the delay of a day and a half, which would otherwise have sufficed to crush Reding's right wing, surprised as it would have been, without a chief, in the plain of Tarragona.

While the French rested at Villa Radoña, Reding pursued his march to St. Coloma de Queralt, where he rallied many of Castro's fugitives, and thus the aspect of affairs was totally changed; for Souham, after forcing the pass of San Cristina, reached Villa Radoña the 21st, and, at the same time, the weakly men, who had been left at Villa Franca, also arrived; hence more than two-thirds of the whole French army were concentrated at Villa Radoña at the moment when the Spanish commander, being joined by the detachment beaten from San Cristina and by the troops from the abbey of Creus, had also rallied the greatest part of his forces, at St. Coloma de Queralt. Each general could now, by a rapid march, overwhelm his adversary's right wing; but the troops left by Reding, in the plain of Tarragona, could retire upon that fortress, while those left by St. Cyr at Igualada, were without support. When, therefore, the French general, who, continuing his movement on Tarragona, had reached Valls the 22d, heard of Reding's march, he immediately returned with Pino's division to Pla, resolved, if the Spanish general should advance towards Igualada, to follow him with a sharp spur.

The 23d the French halted; Souham at Valls to watch the Spanish troops in the plain of Tarragona; Pino's division at Pla, but sending detachments to the abbey of Creus and towards Santa Coloma to feel for Reding. In the evening these detachments returned with some prisoners; the one reported that the abbey was abandoned; the other that the Spanish general was making his way back to Tarragona, by the route of Sarreal and Momblanch. St. Cyr, therefore, retaining Pino's division at Pla, pushed his advanced posts on the right to the abbey, and in front to the defile of Cabra, designing to encounter the Spaniards, if they returned by either of these roads; and he ordered Souham to take post in front of Valls, with his left on the Francoli river, his right towards Pla, and his advanced guard at Pixa Moxons, to watch for Reding by the road of Momblanch.

The 24th the Spanish general, being in St. Coloma, called a council of war, at which colonel Doyle, the British military agent, assisted. One party was for fighting St. Cyr, another for retreating to Lerida, a third for attacking Chabran at Igualada, a fourth for

regaining the plain of Tarragona. There were many opinions, but neither wisdom nor resolution, and finally, Reding, leaving general Wimpfen, with four thousand men, at San Coloma, decided to regain Tarragona, and took the route of Momblanch with ten thousand of his best troops, following the Spanish accounts, but St. Cyr says with fifteen thousand. The Catalan general knew that Valls was occupied, and his line of march intercepted; but he imagined the French to be only five or six thousand, for the exact situation and strength of an enemy were particulars that seldom troubled Spanish commanders.

BATTLE OF VALLS.

While in full march without any scouts, at day-break on the 25th of February, the head of Reding's column was suddenly fired upon at Pixa Moxons by Souham's detachment, which was immediately driven in upon the main body; and this attack being vigorously followed, the whole of that general's division gave way. Under cover of this fight the Spanish baggage and artillery passed the Francoli river, and the road to Tarragona being thus opened, Reding might have effected his retreat without difficulty; but he continued to press Souham until St. Cyr, who had early intelligence of what was passing, came down from Pla upon the left flank of the Spanish army. When the French dragoons, which preceded their infantry, appeared in Souham's line, Reding re-crossed the Francoli and took a position behind that river intending to retreat from thence in the evening, but his able opponent obliged him again to fight.

At three o'clock the action recommenced. The banks of the Francoli were steep and rugged, and the position beyond strong and difficult of access, yet the French general wishing, as he himself states, to increase the moral ascendancy of his soldiers, forbade the artillery, although well placed for execution, to play on Reding's battalions, lest they should fly before the infantry could reach them! Under this curious arrangement the action was begun by the light troops.

The French, or rather Italian infantry, were superior in number to the Spaniards, and the columns, covered by the skirmishers, passed the river with great alacrity, and ascended the heights under an exceedingly regular fire, which was continued until the attacking troops had nearly reached the summit of the position; then both Swiss and Catalans wavered, and breaking ere the infantry could close with them, were instantly charged by the French cavalry. Reding, after receiving several sabre wounds, saved himself at Tarragona, where the greatest number of the vanquished also took refuge, while the remainder fled in the greatest disorder by the routes of Tortosa and Lerida; the count of Castel d'Orius and many other superior officers, the artillery and the baggage were taken, and four thousand men were killed or wounded. During all these movements and actions, Reding received no assistance from the Somatenes; nor is this surprising, for it may be received as an axiom in war, that armed peasants are only formidable to stragglers and small detachments: when the regular forces engage, the poor countryman, sensible of his own weakness, wisely quits the field.

St. Cyr lost only a thousand men, and on the 26th Souham entered the rich town of Reus, where, contrary to the general custom, the inhabitants remained; Pino then occupied Pla, Alcover, and Valls, detachments were sent to Salou and Villa Seca, on the sea-coast west of Tarragona, and Chabot, recalled from Igualada, was posted at the Santa Creuz, to watch Wimpfen, who still remained at Santa Coloma de Queralt.

The battle of Valls finished the regular warfare in Catalonia. Those detachments, which by the previous movements had been cut off from the main body of the

* St. Cyr.

army, joined the Somatenes, and as partizan corps, troubled the communications of the French; but St. Cyr had no longer a regular army to deal with in the field, and Tortosa, which was in a miserably defenceless condition, without provisions, must have fallen, if after the battle any attempt had been made against it. Lazan, indeed, after his defeat near Zaragoza, carried a few men to Tortosa, where he declared himself independent of Reding's command, but this battle and the fall of Zaragoza had stricken terror far and wide, the neighbouring provinces fearing and acting each for its own safety, had no regard to any general plan, and the confusion was universal.

Meanwhile, the fugitives from Valls, joined to the troops already in Tarragona, crowded the latter place, and an infectious disorder breaking out, a great mortality ensued; wherefore, St. Cyr, satisfied that sickness should do the work of the sword, begirt the city with a resolution to hold his positions while food could be procured. In this policy he remained steadfast until the middle of March, although Wimpfen attacked and drove Chabran in succession from Igualada, Llacuna, and St. Quinti, to Villa Franca; and although the two Milans and Claros, acting between the Besos and the Llobregat, had cut his communication with Barcelona, and in conjunction with the English squadron, renewed the blockade of that city. This plan appears injudicious; the sickness in Tarragona did not cause it to surrender, and the subjugation of Catalonia was certainly retarded by the cessation of offensive operations. The object of the French general should have been to seize some strong places, such as Tortosa, Tarragona, Gerona, or Lerida, while the terror of defeat was fresh; his inactivity after the battle of Molino del Rey and at this period, enabled the Catalonians to recover confidence, and to put those towns in a state of defence; thus he gained nothing but the barren glory of victory.

Towards the middle of March the resources of the country being all exhausted, he at last determined to abandon the plains of Tarragona, and take some position where he could feed his troops, cover the projected siege of Gerona, and yet be at hand to relieve Barcelona. The valleys about Vich alone offered all these advantages, but as Claros and the Milans were in force at Molino del Rey, he ordered Chabran to drive them from that point, that the sick and wounded men might be first transferred from Valls to Barcelona.

The 10th of March, Chabran sent a battalion with one piece of artillery on that service, and the Migueletes thinking it was the advanced guard of a greater force, abandoned the post, but being undeceived, returned, beat the battalion, and took the gun. The 12th, Chabran received orders to march with his whole division, consisting of eight battalions and three squadrons, and he reached the bridge, yet he returned without daring to attack. St. Cyr repeated his orders, and on the 14th the troops, apparently ashamed of their general's irresolution, fell on vigorously, carried the bridge and established themselves on the heights at both sides of the river.*

The communication thus opened, it was found that Duhesme, pressed by the Migueletes without, was also extremely fearful of conspiracies within the walls; his fears, and the villainous conduct of his police, had at last excited the inhabitants to attempt that which their enemies seemed so much to dread.† In March, an insurrection was planned in concert with the Migueletes and the English squadron, and the latter coming close in cannonaded the town on the 10th, expecting that Wimpfen, the Milans, and Claros would have assaulted the gates, which was to have been the signal for the insurrection within. The inhabitants were sanguine of success, because there were above

two thousand Spanish prisoners in the city, and outside the walls there were two tercios secretly recruited and maintained by the citizens; and these men being without uniforms, constantly passed in and out of the town, yet Duhesme was never able to discover or to prevent them. This curious circumstance is illustrative of the peculiar genius of the Spaniards, which in all matters of surprise and stratagem is unrivalled. The project against the city was, however, baffled by Chabran's actions at Molino del Rey, which occupied the partizan corps outside the walls, and the British squadron exposed to a heavy gale, and disappointed in the co-operation from the land side, sailed away the 11th.

St. Cyr intended to commence his retrograde movement the 18th, but the 17th a cannonade was heard on the side of Momblanck, which was ascertained to proceed from a detachment of six hundred men, with two guns, under the command of colonel Briche. This officer being sent by Mortier to open the communication after the fall of Zaragoza, had forced his way through the Spanish partizan corps, and to favour his return the army halted two days; but the enterprize, after a trial, appeared so dangerous, that he relinquished it, and attached himself to the seventh corps.

Meanwhile the inactivity that succeeded the battle of Valls, and the timidity displayed by Chabran in the subsequent skirmishes, had depressed the spirits of the troops; they contemplated the approaching retreat with great uneasiness, and many officers infected with fear advised the general to hide his movements from the enemy; but he, anxious to restore their confidence, took the part of giving the Spaniards a formal notice of his intentions, desiring Reding to send proper officers to take over the hospitals which had been fitted up at Valls, as well as some French, wounded, that could not be moved. This done, the army commenced its retreat, reached Villa Franca the 21st of March, and the 22d passed the Llobregat, followed, but not molested, by some feeble Spanish detachments. The 23d Wimpfen, who had rallied the Migueletes of Claros and the Milans, at Tarrasa after the affair of the 24th, was beaten by general Pino, who pursued him to near Manresa, and then foraging the country, returned with provisions sufficient to feed the army without drawing on the magazines of Barcelona.

During these proceedings, Reding died in Tarragona of his wounds. He had been received there with such dissatisfaction after the battle of Valls, that the interference of the British consul was necessary, to save him from the first fury of the populace, who were always ready to attribute a defeat to the treachery of the general. His military conduct was, by his own officers, generally and justly condemned, and his skill in war was slight, but his courage and honesty were unquestionable, and he was of distinguished humanity; at this unhappy period, when the French prisoners in every part of Spain were tortured with the most savage cruelty, and when to refrain from such deeds was to incur suspicion, Reding had the manliness, not only to repress all barbarities within the range of his command, but even to conclude a convention with St. Cyr, under which the wounded men on both sides were to receive decent treatment, and to be exchanged as soon as their hurts were cured.* In his last moments he complained that he had been ill-served as a general; that the Somatenes had not supported him; that his orders were neglected, his plans disclosed to the enemy, and that he could never get true intelligence; complaints which the experience of Moore, Baird, Cradock, and, above all, of Wellington, proved to be applicable to every part of Spain, at every period of the war. Coupigny succeeded Reding, but was soon superseded by Blake, who was appointed

* St. Cyr. † Ibid.

* St. Cyr.

captain general of the Coronilla, or little crown, a title given to the union of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia. The warfare in Aragon being thus ultimately connected with that in Catalonia, a short account of what was passing in the former province will be useful.

When Zaragoza fell, Lasnes returned to France, and Mortier, who succeeded him, sent detachments against Monzon, Jaca, Mequinenza and Lerida. The fort of Monzon commanding a passage over the Cinca river, was abandoned by the Spaniards, and Jaca surrendered, by which a new and important line of communication was opened with France; but the demonstration against Mequinenza failed, and the summons to Lerida was fruitless. Mortier then quartered his troops on both sides of the Ebro, from Barbastro to Alcanitz, and sent colonel Briche, as we have seen, to open a communication with the seventh corps. This was in March, and in April Mortier moved with the fifth corps to Castile, leaving Junot with the third corps to hold Aragon; but that officer being sick, soon returned to France, and was replaced by general Suchet. The third corps was now very much reduced, one brigade was employed to protect the communication with Navarre, another was escorting the prisoners from Zaragoza to Bayonne, and many artillery-men and non-commissioned officers had been withdrawn to serve in Germany: thus the number of disposable troops in Aragon did not exceed twelve thousand men under arms.

The weakness of the army gave the new general great uneasiness, which was not allayed when he found that men and officers were discontented and dispirited. Suchet was, however, no ordinary man; with equal vigour and prudence he commenced a system of discipline in his corps, and of order in his government, that afterwards carried him, with scarcely a check, from one success to another, until he obtained for himself the rank of a marshal; and for his troops the honor of belonging to the only French army in Spain that never suffered any signal reverse. He at first hoped that the battle of Valls, and other defeats sustained by the Spaniards at this period, would give him time to re-organize his corps in tranquillity—but this hope soon vanished. The peasantry, observing the weakness of the third corps, only waited for a favourable opportunity to rise, and the Migueletes and Somatenes of the mountains about Lerida and Mequinenza, were, under the command of Pereña and Baget, already in activity.

While Junot still held the command, Blake drawing troops from Valencia and Tarragona, had joined Lazan, and fixed his quarters at Morella, on the frontier of Aragon. Designing to operate in that province rather than in Catalonia, he endeavoured to re-kindle the fire of insurrection; nor was fortune adverse to him, for a part of the garrison of Monzon having made an unsuccessful marauding excursion beyond the Cinca, the citizens fell upon those who remained, and obliged them to abandon that post, which was immediately occupied by Pereña. The duke of Abrantes then sent eight companies of infantry and thirty cuirassiers to retake the place, but Baget reinforced Pereña, the French were repulsed, and the Cinca suddenly overflowing behind them, cut off their retreat; the cavalry, plunging with their horses into the river, escaped by swimming; the infantry, finding the lower passages guarded by the garrison of Lerida, and the upper cut off by the partisan corps, after three days marching and skirmishing surrendered. The prisoners were carried to Tarragona, and soon afterwards exchanged, in pursuance of a convention made by Reding and St. Cyr.

This slight success excited the most extravagant hopes, and the garrison of Mequinenza having contrived to burn the bridge of boats which the French had

thrown over the Ebro at Caspe, Blake drove the French from Becçyta and Val de Ajoña, and entered Alcanitz. The beaten troops retired with loss to Samper and Ixar; and it was at this moment when the quarters on both sides of the Ebro were harassed, and the wings of the third corps separated by the destruction of the bridge at Caspe, that Suchet arrived to take the command of the third corps. Finding his troops spread over a great tract of country, and in danger of being beaten in detail, he immediately ordered general Habert to abandon the left bank of the Ebro, cross that river at Fuentes, and follow in reserve upon Ixar, where Suchet himself rallied all the rest of the troops, with the exception of a small garrison left in Zaragoza.

BATTLE OF ALCANITZ.

The French battalions were fearful and disorderly: but the general, anxious to raise their spirits, marched towards Blake on the 23d of May.* The latter was in position in front of Alcanitz; a bridge over the Gualdupe was immediately behind his centre, which was covered by a hill, and his left was well posted near some pools of water, but his right was rather exposed. The French had about eight thousand infantry and seven hundred cavalry in the field, and the Spaniards about twelve thousand of all arms.

Suchet, observing Blake's dispositions, judged, that if he could carry the hill in the centre and so separate the Spanish wings, the latter would be cut off from the bridge of Alcanitz, and obliged to surrender. In this design he directed a column against each wing to draw Blake's attention to his flanks, and when the skirmishers were well engaged, three thousand men, pushing rapidly along the main road, attacked the hillock; but a brisk fire of musketry and artillery checked their progress, the Spaniards stood firm, and the French, after a feeble effort to ascend the hill, began to waver, and finally fled outright. Suchet, who was himself slightly wounded, rallied them in the plain, and remained there for the rest of the day, but without daring to renew the action. In the night, he retreated, but, although not pursued, his troops were seized with panic, and, at day-light, came pouring into Samper with all the tumult and disorder of a rout. Blake's inactivity enabled the French general to restore order, and he caused the man who first commenced the alarm to be shot; then encouraging the troops, that they might not seem to fly, he rested in position two whole days, after which he retreated to Zaragoza.

This action at Alcanitz was a subject of triumph and rejoicing all over Spain; the supreme junta conferred an estate upon Blake; the kingdom of Murcia was added to his command, his army rapidly augmented, and he, greatly elated, and confirmed in a design he had formed to retake Zaragoza, turned his whole attention to Aragon, and totally neglected Catalonia. To the affairs of that province it is now time to return.

St. Cyr remained in Barcelona for a considerable period, during which he endeavoured to remedy the evils of Duhesme's government, and to make himself acquainted with the political disposition of the inhabitants. He also filled the magazines with three months' provisions, and, as the prisoners within the walls were an incumbrance on account of their subsistence, and a source of uneasiness from their numbers, he resolved to send them to France. The 15th of April, having transferred his sick and weakly men to the charge of Duhesme, and exchanged Chabran's for Lecchi's division, he marched to Granollers, giving out that he was returning to the frontier of France, lest the Catalans should remove their provisions from Vich, and thus frustrate his principal object.

The Migueletes, under Milans and Claros, had taken

* Suchet's Memoirs.

post on each side of the long and narrow defile of Garriga, in the valley of the Congosto, which they barricaded with trees and pieces of rock, and mined in several places; Wimpfen with his corps was also at a little distance, ready to join them at the first alarm. Hence, when on the 16th Lecchi's division, escorting two thousand prisoners, appeared at the head of the defile, an action commenced, but in an hour the Migueletes fled on all sides; for St. Cyr, fully aware of the strength of the position, had secretly detached Pino to attack Wimpfen, and, while Lecchi was engaged at the entrance, Souham and Chabot, traversing the mountains, arrived, the one upon the flank, the other at the further end of this formidable pass.

The 18th, the French were established at Vich; the inhabitants had fled to the hills with their effects, but left their provisions behind. Chabot's and Pino's division were immediately posted at Centellas, San Martin, Tona, and Col de Sespino, to guard the entrances into the valley, but Souham's division remained near the town, his right being at Roda and Manlieu on the Ter, and his advanced posts at Gulp, St. Sebastian, and St. Eularia. General Lecchi then marched with the prisoners by Filieu de Pallerols to Besalu, and although he was attacked several times on the march, delivered his charge to general Reille, and returned without loss, bringing news of Napoleon's arrival in Paris, and of the approaching war with Austria. On the other side, a moveable column sent to Barcelona brought back the pleasing intelligence that admiral Cosmao's squadron, baffling the extreme vigilance of Lord Collingwood, had reached that city with ample supplies. Thus, in May, what may be called the irregular movements in Catalonia terminated, and the more methodical warfare of sieges commenced; but this part was committed to other hands; general Verdier had succeeded Reille in the Ampurdan, and marshal Augereau was on the road to supersede St. Cyr.

OBSERVATIONS.—1. Although his marches were hardy, his battles vigorous, and delivered in right time and place; St. Cyr's campaign may be characterised as one of great efforts without corresponding advantages. He himself attributes this to the condition of the seventh corps, destitute and neglected, because the emperor disliked and wished to ruin its chief; a strange accusation, and unsustained by reason or facts. What! Napoleon wilfully destroy his own armies! sacrifice forty thousand men, to disgrace a general, whom he was not obliged to employ at all. St. Cyr acknowledges, that when he received his instructions from the emperor, he observed the affliction of the latter at the recent loss of Dupont's force, yet he would have it believed, that, in the midst of this regret, that monarch, with a singular malice, was preparing greater disasters for himself, merely to disgrace the commander he was talking to, and why? because the latter had formerly served with the army of the Rhine! Yet St. Cyr met with no reverses in Catalonia, and was afterwards made a marshal by this implacable enemy.

2.—That the seventh corps was not well supplied, and its commander thereby placed in a difficult situation, is not to be disputed in the face of the facts stated by St. Cyr; but if war were a state of ease and smoothness, the fame which attends successful generals would be unmerited. Napoleon selected St. Cyr because he thought him a capable commander; in feeble hands, he knew, the seventh corps would be weak, but, with St. Cyr at its head, he judged it sufficient to overcome the Catalonians, nor was he much mistaken. Barcelona, the great object of solicitude, was saved; Rosas was taken; and if Tarragona and Tortosa did not also fall, the one after the battle of Molino del Rey, the other after that of Valls, it was because the French general did not choose to attack them. Those towns were without the slightest preparation for defence,

moral or physical, and must have surrendered; nor can the unexpected and stubborn resistance of Gerona, Zaragoza, and Valencia be cited against this opinion; these cities were previously prepared and expectant of a siege, yet, in two instances, there was a moment of dismay and confusion, not fatal, only because the besieging generals wanted that ready vigour which is the characteristic of great captains.

3.—St. Cyr, aware that a mere calculation of numbers and equipment, is but a poor measure of the strength of armies, exalts the enthusiasm and the courage of the Catalans, and seems to tremble at the danger which, owing to Napoleon's suicidal jealousy, menaced, at that period, not only the seventh corps but even the south of France. In answer to this, it may be observed that M. de St. Cyr did not hesitate, with eighteen thousand men, having no artillery and carrying only sixty rounds of musket-ammunition, to plunge into the midst of those terrible armies; to march through the mountains for whole weeks; to attack the strongest positions with the bayonet alone, nay, even to dispense with the use of his artillery, when he did bring it into action, lest his men should not have a sufficient contempt for their enemies. And who were these undaunted soldiers, so high in courage, so confident, so regardless of the great weapon of modern warfare? Not the select of the imperial guards, the conquerors in a hundred battles, but raw levies; the dregs and scrapings of Italy, the refuse of Naples and of Rome; states which to name as military was to ridicule. With such soldiers, the battles of Cardadeu, Molino, Igualada, and Valls, were gained; yet St. Cyr does not hesitate to call the Migueletes, who were beaten at those places, the best light troops in the world. The best *light troops* are neither more nor less than the best troops in the world; but if, instead of fifteen thousand Migueletes, the four thousand men composing Wellington's light division had been on the heights of Cardadeu, St. Cyr's sixty rounds of ammunition would scarcely have carried him to Barcelona. The injurious force with which personal feelings act upon the judgement are well known, or it might excite wonder, that so good a writer and so able a soldier should advance such fallacies.

4.—St. Cyr's work, admirable in many respects, bears, nevertheless, the stamp of carelessness. Thus, he affirms that Dupont's march to Andalusia encouraged the tumults of Aranjues, yet the tumults of Aranjues happened in the month of March, nearly three months previous to Dupont's movement, which took place in May and June. Again, he says, that, Napoleon, to make a solid conquest in the Peninsula, should have commenced with Catalonia, instead of over-running Spain by the northern line of operations; an opinion quite unsustainable. The progress of the seventh corps was impeded by the want of provisions, not by the enemy's force; twenty thousand men could beat the Spaniards in the field, but they could not subsist. To have increased the number would only have increased the difficulty. Would it have given a just idea of Napoleon's power, to employ the strength of his empire against the fortified towns in Catalonia? In what would the greater solidity of this plan have consisted? While the French were thus engaged, the patriots would have been organizing their armies; England would have had time to bring all her troops into line, and two hundred thousand men placed between Zaragoza and Tortosa, or breaking into France by the western Pyrenees, while the Austrians were advancing to the Rhine, would have sorely shaken the solidity of general St. Cyr's plan.

5.—The French emperor better understood what he was about. He saw a nation intrinsically powerful and vehemently excited, yet ignorant of war and wanting the aid which England was eager to give. All

the elements of power existed in the Peninsula, and they were fast approximating to a centre, when Napoleon burst upon that country, and as the gathering of a water-spout is said to be sometimes prevented by the explosion of a gun, so the rising strength of Spain was dissipated by his sudden and dreadful assault; if the war was not then finished, it was because his lieutenants were tardy and jealous of each other. St. Cyr also appears to have fallen into an error, common enough in all times, and one very prevalent among the French generals in Spain. He considered his task as a whole in itself, instead of a constituent part of a greater system. He judged very well what was wanting for the seventh corps, to subjugate Catalonia in a solid manner, but he did not discern that it was fitting that the seventh corps should forget Catalonia, to aid the general plan against the Peninsula. Rosas surrendered at the very moment when Napoleon, after the victories of Baylen, Espinosa, Tudela, and the Somosierra, was entering Madrid as a conqueror; the battles of Cardadeu and Molino del Rey may, therefore, be said to have completely prostrated Spain, because the English army was isolated, the Spanish armies destroyed, and Zaragoza invested. Was that a time to calculate the weight of powder and the number of pick-axes required for a formal siege of Tarragona? The whole Peninsula was shaken to the centre, the proud hearts of the Spaniards sunk with terror, and in that great consternation, to be daring, was, on the part of the French generals, to be prudent. St. Cyr was not in a condition to besiege Tarragona formally, but he might have assaulted it with less danger than he incurred by his march to Barcelona. The battle of Valls was another epoch of the same kind; the English army had re-embarked, and the rout of Ucles had taken place; Portugal was invaded and Zaragoza had just fallen. That was a time to render victory fruitful, yet no attempt was made against Tortosa.

6.—St. Cyr, who justly blames Palacios and Vives for remaining before Barcelona instead of carrying their army to the Ter and the Fluvia, seems inclined to applaud Reding for conduct equally at variance with the true principles of war. It was his own inactivity after the battle of Molino that produced the army of Reding, and the impatient folly of that army, and of the people, produced the plan which led to the rout of Igualada and the battle of Valls. Instead of disseminating thirty thousand men in a line of sixty miles, from Tarragona to the Upper Llobregat, Reding should have put Tarragona and Tortosa into a state of defence, and leaving a small corps of observation near the former, have made Lerida the base of his operations. In that position, keeping the bulk of his force in one mass, he might have acted on St. Cyr's flanks and rear effectually, by the lines of Cervera and Momblanch—and without danger to himself; nor could the French general have attempted aught against Tarragona.

But it is not with reference to the seventh corps alone that Lerida was the proper base of the Spanish army. Let us suppose that the supreme junta had acted for a moment upon a rational system; that the Valencian troops, instead of remaining at Morella, had been directed on Lerida, and that the duke of Infantado's force had been carried from Cuenca to the same place instead of being routed at Ucles. Thus, in the beginning of February, more than fifty thousand regular troops would have been assembled at Lerida, encircled by the fortresses of Monzon, Belaguer, Mequinenza, Tarragona, and Tortosa. Its lines of operations would have been as numerous as the roads. The Seu d'Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia, would have supplied corn, and the communication with Valencia would have been direct and open. From this central and menacing position, such a force might have held the seventh corps in check, and even raised

the siege of Zaragoza; nor could the first corps have followed Infantado's movements without uncovering Madrid and abandoning the system of the emperor's operations against Portugal and Andalusia.

7.—The French general praises Reding's project for surrounding the French, and very gravely observes that the *only method* of defeating it was by taking the offensive himself. Nothing can be juster; but he should have added that it was a *certain method*; and, until we find a great commander acting upon Reding's principles, this praise can only be taken as an expression of civility towards a brave adversary. His own movements were very different; he disliked Napoleon personally, but he did not dislike his manner of making war. Buonaparte's campaign in the Alps against Beaulieu, was not unheeded by his lieutenant. For one proceeding of St. Cyr's, however, there is no precedent, nor is it likely that it will ever be imitated. He stopped the fire of his artillery, when it was doing infinite execution, the better to establish the moral ascendancy of his troops. What a sarcasm on the courage of his enemies! What a complete answer to his own complaints that Napoleon had maliciously given him a hopeless task! But, he says, his adversaries were numerous and fought bravely! Surely he could not have commanded so long without knowing that *there is in all battles a decisive moment, when every weapon, every man, every combination of force that can be brought to bear, is necessary to gain the victory.* Wilfully to neglect the means of reducing the enemy's strength, previous to that critical period of an action, is a gross folly.

8.—If general St. Cyr's own marches and battles did not sufficiently expose the fallacy of his opinions relative to the vigour of the Catalans, lord Collingwood's correspondence would supply the deficiency. That able and sagacious man, writing at this period, says,—

'In Catalonia, every thing seems to have gone wrong since the fall of Rosas. The Spaniards are in considerable force, yet are dispersed and panic-struck whenever the enemy appears.'—'The applications for supplies are unlimited; they want money, arms, and ammunition, of which no use appears to be made when they get them.'—In the English papers, I see accounts of successes, and convoys cut off, and waggons destroyed, which are not true. What has been done in that way has been by the boats of our frigates, which have, in two or three instances, landed men and attacked the enemy with great gallantry. The Somanes range the hills in a disorderly way, and fire at a distance, but retire on being approached.'—'The multitudes of men do not make a force.'

Add to this the Spanish historian Cabanes' statements that the Migueletes were always insubordinate, detested the service of the line, and were many of them armed only with staves, and we have the full measure of the Catalans' resistance.

It was not the vigour of the Catalans, but of the English, that in this province, as in every part of the Peninsula, retarded the progress of the French. Would St. Cyr have wasted a month before Rosas? Would he have been hampered in his movements by his fears for the safety of Barcelona? Would he have failed to besiege and take Tarragona and Tortosa, if a French fleet had attended his progress by the coast, or if it could even have made two runs in safety? To lord Collingwood, who, like the Roman Bibulus, perished of sickness on his decks rather than relax in his watching,—to his keen judgement, his unceasing vigilance, the resistance made by the Catalans was due. His fleet it was, that interdicted the coast line to the French, protected the transport of the Spanish supplies from Valencia, assisted in the defence of the towns, aided the retreat of the beaten armies; in short, did

that which the Spanish fleets in Cadiz and Carthage should have done. But the supreme junta, equally disregarding the remonstrances of lord Collingwood, the good of their own country, and the treaty with England, by which they were bound to prevent their ships from falling into the hands of the enemy, left their fleets to rot in harbour, although money was advanced, and the assistance of the British seamen offered to fit them out for sea.

Having now related the principal operations that

took place in the eastern and central provinces of Spain, which were so suddenly overrun by the French emperor; having shown that, however restless the Spaniards were, under the yoke imposed upon them, they were unable to throw it off; I shall turn to Portugal, where the tide of invasion still flowing onward, although with diminished volume, was first stayed, and finally forced back, by a counter flood of mightier strength.

BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

Transactions in Portugal—State of that country—Neglected by the English cabinet—Sir J. Cradock appointed to command the British troops—Touches at Coruna—At Oporto—State of this city—Lusitanian legion—State of Lisbon—Cradock endeavours to reinforce Moore—Mr. Villiers arrives at Lisbon—Pikes given to the populace—Destitute state of the army—Mr. Frere, and others, urge Cradock to move into Spain—The reinforcements for sir J. Moore halted at Castello Branco—General Cameron sent to Almeida—French advanced guard reaches Merida—Cradock relinquishes the design of reinforcing the army in Spain, and concentrates his own troops at Saccavem—Discontents in Lisbon—Defenceless state and danger of Portugal—Relieved by sir J. Moore's advance to Sahagun.

TRANSACTIONS IN PORTUGAL.

WHEN sir John Moore marched from Portugal, the regency, established by sir Hew Dalrymple, nominally governed that country; but the weak characters of the members, the listless habits engendered by the ancient system of misrule, the intrigues of the Oporto faction, and the general turbulence of the people soon produced an alarming state of anarchy. Private persons usurped the functions of government, justice was disregarded, insubordination and murder were hailed as indications of patriotism, and war was the universal cry; yet military preparations were wholly neglected, for the nation, in its foolish pride, believed that the French had neither strength nor spirit for a second invasion.

In Lisbon there was a French faction, the merchants were apprehensive, the regency unpopular, and the public mind unsettled; in Oporto, the violence of both people and soldiers was such, that sir Harry Burrard sent two British regiments there, by sea, to preserve tranquillity; in fine, the seeds of disorder were widely cast and sprouting vigorously, before the English cabinet thought fit to accredit a responsible diplomatist near the government, or to place a permanent chief at the head of the forces left by sir John Moore. The convention of Cintra was known in England in September; the regency was established and the frontier fortresses occupied by British troops in the same month; yet it was not until the middle of December that Mr. Villiers and sir John Cradock, charged with the conduct of the political and military proceedings in Portugal, reached Lisbon; thus the important interval, between the departure of Junot and their arrival, was totally neglected by the English cabinet.

Sir Hew Dalrymple, who had nominated the regency; sir Arthur Wellesley, who, to local knowledge and

powerful talents, added the influence of a victorious commander, Burrard, Spencer, were all removed from Portugal at the very moment when the presence of persons acquainted with the real state of affairs, was essential to the well-being of the British interests in that country. And this error was the offspring of passion and incapacity; for, if the convention of Cintra had been rightly understood, the ministers, appreciating the advantages of that treaty, would have resisted the clamour of the moment, and the generals would not have been withdrawn from the public service abroad, to meet unjust and groundless charges at home.

It may be disputed whether Portugal was the fittest theatre for the first operations of a British army; but, when that country was actually freed from the presence of an enemy; when the capital and the frontier fortresses were occupied by English troops; when sir John Moore leaving his hospitals, baggage, and magazines there, as in a place of arms, had marched to Spain, the question was no longer doubtful. The ancient relations between England and Portugal, the greatness of the port of Lisbon, the warlike disposition of the Portuguese, above all, the singularly happy circumstance, that there was neither court nor monarch to balance the English influence, and that even the nomination of the regency was the work of an English general, offered such great and obvious advantages as could no where else be obtained. It was a miserable policy that, neglecting such an occasion, retained sir Arthur Wellesley in England, while Portugal, like a drunken man, at once weak and turbulent, was reeling on the edge of a precipice.

The 5th of December, 1803, sir John Cradock, being on his voyage to Lisbon, touched at Coruña. Fifteen hundred thousand dollars had just arrived there in the *Lavinia* frigate, but sir John Moore's intention to retreat upon Portugal being known, Cradock divided this sum, and carried away eight hundred thousand dollars; proposing to leave a portion at Oporto, and to take the remainder to Lisbon, that Moore might find, on whatever line he retreated, a supply of money.

From Coruña he proceeded to Oporto, where he found that sir Robert Wilson had succeeded in organizing, under the title of the Lusitanian Legion, about thirteen hundred men, and that others were on their way to reinforce him; but this excepted, nothing, civil or military, bespoke either arrangement or common sense. The bishop, still intent upon acquiring supreme rule, was deeply engaged with secret intrigues, and, under him,

a number of factious and designing persons, instigated the populace to violent actions with a view to profit from their excesses.

The formation of this Lusitanian Legion was originally a project of the chevalier da Souza, Portuguese minister in London; he was one of the bishop's faction, and this force was raised not so much to repel the enemy, as to support that party against the government. The men were promised higher pay than any other Portuguese soldiers, to the great discontent of the latter; and they were clad in uniforms differing in colour from the national troops. The regency, who dreaded the machinations of the turbulent priest, entertained the utmost jealousy of this legion, which, in truth, was a most anomalous force, and as might be expected from its peculiar constitution, was productive of much embarrassment.

Sir John Cradock left three hundred thousand dollars at Oporto, and directed the two British battalions which were in that neighbourhood to march to Almeida, then taking on board a small detachment of German troops, he set sail for Lisbon. Before his departure, he strongly advised sir Robert Wilson to move such of his legionaries as were sufficiently organized to Villa Real, in Tras os Montes, a place appointed by the regency for the assembly of the forces in the north; sir Robert, tired of the folly and disgusted with the insolence and excesses of the ruling mob, readily adopted this advice, so far as to quit Oporto, but having views of his own, went to Almeida instead of Villa Real.

The state of the capital was little better than that of Oporto. There was arrangement neither for present nor for future defence, and the populace, albeit less openly encouraged to commit excesses, were quite uncontrolled by the government. The regency had a keener dread of domestic insurrection than of the return of the French, whose operations they regarded with even less anxiety than the bishop did, as being further removed than he was from the immediate theatre of war. Their want of system and vigilance was evinced by the following fact. Sattaro and another person, having contracted for the supply of the British troops, demanded, in the name of the English general, all the provisions in the public stores of Portugal, and then sold them to the English commissaries for his own profit.

Sir John Cradock's instructions directed him to reinforce Moore's army, and not to interfere with that general's command if the course of events brought him back to Portugal. In fact, his operations were limited to the holding of Elvas, Almeida, and the capital; for, although he was directed to encourage the formation of a native army upon a good and regular system, and even to act in concert with it on the frontier, he was debarred from political interference; even his relative situation as to rank, was left unsettled until the arrival of Mr. Villiers, to whose direction all political and many military arrangements were entrusted.

It is evident that the influence of a general thus fettered, and commanding only a small scattered force, must be feeble and insufficient to produce any real amelioration in the military situation of the country; yet the English ministers, attentive only to the false information obtained from interested agents, still imagined that not only the Spanish, but the Portuguese armies were numerous, and to be relied upon; and they confidently expected, that the latter would be able to take an active part in the Spanish campaign. Cradock, feeling the danger of this illusion, made it his first object to transmit home exact information of the real strength and efficiency of the native regular troops. They were nominally twenty thousand; but Miguel Pereira Forjas, military secretary to the regency, and the ablest public man Portugal possessed, acknowledged that this force was a nullity, and that there were not more than ten thousand stand of serviceable

arms in the kingdom, the greatest part of which were English.* The troops themselves were undisciplined and unruly; the militia and the "*ordenanza*," or armed peasantry, animated by a spirit of outrage rather than of enthusiasm, evinced no disposition to submit to regulation; neither was there any branch of administration free from the grossest disorder.

The Spanish dollar had a general acceptance in Portugal. The regency, under the pretence that a debased foreign coin would drive the Portuguese coin out of circulation, deprived the dollar of its current value. This regulation, true in principle, and applicable, as far as the Portuguese gold coin (which is of peculiar fineness) was concerned, had, however, a most injurious effect. The Spanish dollar was in reality finer than the Portuguese silver cruzado-nova, and would finally have maintained its value, notwithstanding this decree, if the slur thus thrown upon it by the government, had not enabled the money changers to run its value down for the moment; a matter of infinite importance, for the English soldiers and sailors being all paid in these dollars, at four shillings and sixpence, which was the true value, were thus suddenly mulcted fourpence in each, by the artificial depreciation of the moment. The men attributed this to fraud in the shopkeepers, the retail trade of Lisbon was interrupted, and quarrels between the tradesmen and the soldiers took place hourly. To calm this effervescence, a second decree was promulgated, directing that the dollar should be received at the mint and in the public offices at its real value; it then appeared that the government could profit by coining the dollar of four shillings and sixpence into cruzado-novas, a circumstance which gave the whole affair the appearance of an unworthy trick to recruit the treasury. This happened in October, and as the financial affairs were ill managed, and the regency destitute of vigour or capacity, the taxes were unpaid, the hard cash exhausted, and the treasury paper at a heavy discount when Cradock arrived.

Upon the scroll thus unfolded he could only read confusion, danger and misfortune; such being the fruits of victory, what could be expected from disaster, and at this period (the middle of December) sir John Moore was supposed to be in full retreat upon Portugal, followed by the emperor with one French army, while another threatened Lisbon by the line of the Tagus. The English troops in the kingdom did not amount to ten thousand men, including the sick, and they were ill equipped and scattered; moreover, the capital was crowded with women and children, with baggage and non-combatants, belonging as well to the army in Spain as to that in Portugal. There were in the river three Portuguese ships of the line, two frigates, and eight other smaller vessels of war, but none were in a state for sea, and the whole likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, for in the midst of this confusion sir Charles Cotton was recalled, without a successor being appointed. The zeal and talents of captain Halket, the senior officer on the station, amply compensated for the departure of the admiral, as far as professional duties were concerned, but he could not aid the general, nor deal with the regency, as vigorously as an officer of higher rank, and formally accredited, could have done.

Sir John Cradock, although fully sensible of his own difficulties, with a very disinterested zeal, resolved to make the reinforcing of sir John Moore's army his first care, but his force at this time was, as I have already said, less than ten thousand men of all arms. It consisted of eight British and four German battalions of infantry, four troops of dragoons, and thirty pieces of artillery, of which, however, only six were horsed so as to take the field. There was, also, a battalion of the 60th regiment, composed principally of Frenchmen

* Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

recruited from the prison ships, but it had been sent back from Spain, as the soldiers could not be trusted near their countrymen.* Of these thirteen battalions two were in Abrantes, one in Elvas, three at Lamego on the Duero. One in Almeida, and the remaining six at Lisbon. Three of the four battalions in the north were immediately directed to join sir John Moore by the route of Salamanca, and of those in the south, two, accompanied by a demi-brigade of artillery, were sent to him from Abrantes, by the road of Castello Branco and Ciudad Rodrigo.

Meanwhile Mr. Villiers arrived, and sir John Cradock forwarded to the regency a strong representation of the dangerous state of Portugal. He observed that there was neither activity in the government nor enthusiasm among the people; that the army, deficient in numbers, and still more so in discipline, was scattered and neglected, and, notwithstanding that the aspect of affairs was so threatening, the regency were apparently without any system, or fixed principle of action. He proposed, therefore, that a general enrolment of all the people should take place, and from the British stores he offered a supply of a thousand muskets and ten thousand pikes.† This giving of pikes to the people, which appears to have been in compliance with Mr. Villiers' wishes, betrayed more zeal than prudence; a general levy, and arming with pikes of the turbulent populace of a capital city, at such a conjuncture, was more likely to lead to confusion and mischief than to any effectual defence. The main objects pressing upon the general's attention were however sufficiently numerous and contradictory, to render it difficult for him to avoid errors.

It was a part of his instructions, and of manifest importance, to send reinforcements to sir John Moore; yet it was equally necessary to keep a force towards the frontier on the line of the Tagus, seeing that the fourth French corps had just passed that river at Almaraz, had defeated Galluzzo's army and menaced Badajos, which was without arms, ammunition, or provisions; moreover, the populace there, were in commotion and slaying the chief persons. Now, sir John Cradock's instructions directed him to keep his troops in a position that would enable him to abandon Portugal, if a very superior force should press him; but as, in such a case, he was to carry off the British army, and the Portuguese navy and stores, destroying what he could not remove, and to receive on board his vessels all the natives who might be desirous of escaping, it was of pressing necessity to ship the women, children, baggage, and other encumbrances belonging to Moore's army, immediately, that his own rear might be clear for a sudden embarkation. In short, he was to send his troops to Spain, and yet defend Portugal; to excite confidence in the Portuguese, and yet openly to carry on the preparations for abandoning that country.

The populace of Lisbon were, however, already uneasy at the rumours of an embarkation, and it was doubtful if they would permit even the British non-combatants to get on board quietly, much less suffer the forts to be dismantled, and the ships of war to be carried off, without a tumult, which, at such a conjuncture, would have been fatal to all parties. Hence it was imperative to maintain a strong garrison in Lisbon and in the forts commanding the mouth of the river, and this draft, together with the troops absorbed by the fortresses of Almeida and Elvas, reduced the fighting men in the field to insignificance.

The regency, knowing the temper of the people, and fearing to arm them, were not very eager to enforce the levy; anxious, however, to hide their weakness, they promised, at the urgent solicitations of the English general, to send six thousand troops to Alcantara,

on the Spanish frontier, with a view to observe the march of the fourth corps.—a promise which they never intended, and indeed were unable, to perform. Forjas, who was supposed to be very inimical to the British influence, frankly declared that they neither could nor would move without an advance of money, and sir John Cradock, although he recommended that this aid should be given, had no power to grant it himself.

Letters from sir John Moore, dated at Salamanca, now reached Lisbon; they increased the anxiety to reinforce the army in Spain, but, as they clearly shewed that reverses were to be expected, Cradock, although resolved to maintain himself in Portugal as long as it was possible to do so without a breach of his instructions, felt more strongly that timely preparation for an embarkation should be made; especially as the rainy season, in which south-west winds prevail, had set in, and rendered the departure of vessels from the Tagus very uncertain.* Meanwhile the internal state of Portugal was in no wise amended, or likely to amend.

The government had, indeed, issued a decree, on the 23d of December, for organizing the population of Lisbon in sixteen legions, but only one battalion of each was to parade at the same moment for exercise, and those only on Sundays, nor were the legions, at any time, to assemble without the order of the general commanding the province; this regulation, which rendered the whole measure absurd, was dictated by the fears of the regency. A proposal to prepare the Portuguese vessels for sea was acceded to, without any apparent dissatisfaction, but the government secretly jealous of their allies, fomented or encouraged discontent and suspicion among the people. No efforts were made to improve the regular force, none to forward the march of troops to Alcantara, and so inactive or so callous were the regency to the rights of humanity, that a number of French prisoners, captured at various periods by the Portuguese, and accumulated at Lisbon, were denied subsistence; sir John Cradock, after many fruitless representations, was forced to charge himself with their supply, to avert the horror of seeing them starved to death. The provisions necessary for Fort La Lippe were also withheld, and general Leite, acting upon the authority of the regency, strenuously urged that the British troops should evacuate that fortress.

The march of the reinforcements for sir John Moore left only three hundred dragoons and seven battalions available for the defence of Portugal, of which four were necessarily in garrison, and the remainder were unable to take the field in default of mules, of which animal the country seemed bereft; yet, at this moment, as if in derision, Mr. Frere, the central junta, the junta of Badajos, and the regency of Portugal, were, with common and characteristic foolishness, pressing sir John Cradock to march into the south of Spain, although there was scarcely a Spanish soldier there in arms to assist him; and such a movement, if it had been either prudent or practicable, was directly against his instructions.†

Towards the end of December, the communication with sir John Moore was suddenly interrupted, and the line of the Tagus acquired great importance. The troops going from Elvas to the army in Spain were therefore directed to halt at Castello Branco, and general Richard Stewart, who commanded them, being reinforced with two hundred cavalry, was ordered, for the moment, to watch the roads by Salvatierra and the two Idanhas, and to protect the flying bridges at Abrantes and Vilha Velha from the enemy's incursions. At the same time, a promise was obtained from the regency that all the Portuguese troops in the Alientejo should be collected at Campo Mayor and Portalegre.

Sir John Cradock fixed upon Sacavem as the posi-

* Sir J. Cradock's Papers, MSS.

† Sir J. Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

* Sir J. Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

† Ibid

tion in which his main body should be concentrated, intending to defend that point as long as he could with so few troops; and as he knew that Almeida, although full of British stores, and important in every way, was, with respect to its own defence, utterly neglected by the regency, who regarded with jealousy even the presence of a British force there; he sent brigadier-general A. Cameron, with instructions to collect the convalescents of Moore's army, to unite them with the two battalions still at Almeida, and then to make his way to the army in Spain; but if that should be judged too dangerous, he was to return to Lisbon.* In either case, the stores and the sick men lying at Almeida were to be directed upon Oporto.

The paucity of cavalry was severely felt on the frontier; it prevented the general from ascertaining the real strength and objects of the enemy's parties, and the Portuguese reports were notoriously contradictory and false. The 14th dragoons, seven hundred strong, commanded by major-general Cotton, had been disembarked since the 22d of December, and were destined for the army in Spain. But the commissary doubted if he could forward that small body even by detachments, such was the penury of the country, or rather the difficulty of drawing forth its resources; many debts of sir John Moore's army, were also still unpaid, and a want of confidence prevented the country people from bringing in supplies upon credit.

In the midst of these difficulties, rumours of reverses in Spain became rife, and acquired importance, when it became known that four thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry, the advanced guard of thirty thousand French troops, were actually at Merida, on the road to Badajos; the latter town being, not only in a state of anarchy, but destitute of provisions, arms, and ammunition. Had the Portuguese force been assembled at Alcantara, sir John Cradock would have supported it with the British brigades, from Abrantes and Castello Branco, but not a man had been put in motion, and he feeling no confidence either in the troops or promises of the regency, resolved to concentrate his own army near Lisbon. General Stewart was, therefore, directed to destroy the bridges of Vilha Velha and Abrantes, and fall back to Sacavem. Meanwhile, the Lisbon populace, supposing that the English general designed to abandon them without necessity, were violently excited. The regency, either from fear or folly, made no effort to preserve tranquillity, and the people proceeded from one excess to another, until it became evident that, in a forced embarkation, the British would have to fight their allies as well as their enemies. At this gloomy period when ten marches would have brought the French to Lisbon, when a stamp of Napoleon's foot would have extinguished that spark of war which afterwards blazed over the Peninsula, sir John Moore made his daring movement upon Sahagun, and Portugal, gasping as in a mortal agony, was instantly relieved.

CHAPTER II.

French retire from Merida—Send a force to Plasencia—The direct intercourse between Portugal and sir J. Moore's army interrupted—Military description of Portugal—Situation of the troops—Cradock again pressed, by Mr. Frere and others, to move into Spain—The ministers ignorant of the real state of affairs—Cradock hears of Moore's advance to Sahagun—Embarks two thousand men to reinforce him—Hears of the retreat to Coruna, and re-lands them—Admiral Berkeley arrives at Lisbon—Ministers more anxious to get possession of Cadiz than to defend Portugal—Five thousand men, under general Sherbrooke, embarked at Portsmouth—Sir George Smith reaches Cadiz—State of that city—He demands troops

from Lisbon—General Mackenzie sails from thence, with troops—Negotiations with the junta—Mr. Frere's weak proceedings—Tumult in Cadiz—The negotiation fails.

It was the advanced guard of the fourth corps that had approached Merida with the intention of proceeding to Badajos, and the emperor was, as we have seen, preparing to follow; but, in the night of the 26th of December, an officer carrying the intelligence of Moore's movement, reached Merida, and, next morning, the French marching hastily to the Tagus, crossed it, and rejoined their main body, from which another powerful detachment was immediately directed upon Placentia. This retrograde movement obviated the immediate danger, and sir John Cradock endeavoured to pacify the people of Lisbon. Ordering Stewart's brigade, which had been strengthened by two German battalions, to halt at Santarem, he explained his own motives to the Portuguese, and urged the regency to a more frank and vigorous system, than they had hitherto followed; for like the Spanish juntas, they promised every thing, and performed nothing; neither would they, although consenting, verbally, to all the measures proposed, ever commit themselves by writing, having the despicable intention of afterwards disclaiming that which might prove disagreeable to the populace, or even to the French. Sir John Cradock, however, had no power beyond his own personal influence to enforce attention to his wishes; no successor to sir Charles Cotton had yet arrived, and Mr. Villiers seems to have wanted the decision and judgement required to meet such a momentous crisis.

In the north, general Cameron, having sent the sick men and part of the stores from Almeida towards Oporto, gave up that fortress to sir Robert Wilson, and on the 5th of January, marched, with two British battalions and a detachment of convalescents, by the *Tras os Montes* to join the army in Spain. On the 9th, hearing of sir John Moore's retreat to Coruña, he would have returned to Almeida, but Lapisse, who had taken Zamora, threatened to intercept his line of march, whereupon he made for Lamego, and advised sir R. Wilson to retire to the same place. Colonel Blunt, with seven companies, escorting a convoy for Moore's army, was likewise forced to take the road to Oporto, and on that city all the British stores and detachments were now directed.

Notwithstanding the general dismay, sir R. Wilson, who had been reinforced by some Spanish troops, Portuguese volunteers, and straggling convalescents of the British army, rejected Cameron's advice, and proceeded to practise all the arts of an able partizan—that is to say, enticing the French to desert, spreading false reports of his own numbers, and, by petty enterprizes and great activity, arousing a spirit of resistance throughout the Ciudad Rodrigo country.

The continued influx of sick men and stores at Oporto, together with the prospect of general Cameron's arrival there, became a source of uneasiness to sir John Cradock. Oporto, with a shifting bar and shoal water, is the worst possible harbour for vessels to clear out, and one of the most dangerous for vessels to lie off, at that season of the year; hence, if the enemy advanced in force, a great loss, both of men and stores, was to be anticipated. The departure of sir Charles Cotton had diminished the naval means, and, for seventeen successive days, such was the state of the wind that no vessel could leave the Tagus; captain Halket, however, contrived at last to send to Oporto tonnage for two thousand persons, and undertook to keep a sloop of war off that place.* Sir Samuel Hood also despatched some vessels from Vigo, but the weather continued for a long time so unfavourable that these transports could not enter the harbour, and the

* Sir J. Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

* Sir J. Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

encumbrances hourly increasing, at last produced the most serious embarrassments.

Sir John Moore having now relinquished his communications with Portugal, sir John Cradock had to consider how, relying on his own resources, he could best fulfil his instructions and maintain his hold of that country, without risking the utter destruction of the troops intrusted to his care. For an inferior army Portugal has no defensible frontier. The rivers generally running east and west, are fordable in most places, subject to sudden rises and falls, offering but weak lines of resistance, and with the exception of the Zézere, presenting no obstacles to the advance of an enemy penetrating by the eastern frontier. The mountains, indeed, afford many fine and some impregnable positions, but such is the length of the frontier line and the difficulty of lateral communications, that a general who should attempt to defend it against superior forces would risk to be cut off from the capital if he concentrated his troops; and if he extended them his line would be immediately broken. The possession of Lisbon constitutes, in fact, the possession of Portugal, south of the Duero, and an inferior army can only protect Lisbon by keeping close to the capital.

Sensible of this truth, sir John Cradock adopted the French colonel Vincente's views for the defence of Lisbon, and proceeded, on the 4th of January, with seventeen hundred men, to occupy the heights behind the creek of Sacavem—leaving, however, three thousand men in the forts and batteries at Lisbon. At the earnest request of the regency, who in return promised to assemble the native troops at Thomar, Abrantes, and Vilha Velha, he ordered general Stewart's brigade, two thousand seven hundred strong, to halt at Santarem; but the men had been marching for a month under incessant rain, their clothes were worn out, their equipments ruined, and in common with the rest of the army they wanted shoes.*

Cameron being now on the Douro, Kemmis with the 40th regiment at Elvas, and the main body under Cradock between Santarem and Lisbon, this army not exceeding ten thousand men, but with the encumbrances of an army of forty thousand, was placed on the three points of a triangle, the shortest side of which was above a hundred and fifty miles. The general commanding could not bring into the field above five thousand men, nor could that number be assembled in a condition for service at any one point of the frontier, under three weeks or a month; moreover, the uncertainty of remaining in the country at all, rendered it difficult to feed the troops, for the commissioners being unable to make large contracts for a fixed time, were forced to carry on, as it were, a retail system of supply.

At this moment of extreme weakness, Mr. Frere, with indefatigable folly, was urging sir John Cradock to make a diversion in Spain, by the line of the Tagus, and Mr. Villiers was as earnest that he should send a force by sea to Vigo. His own instructions prescribed the preservation of Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida; the assembling, in concert with the native government, of an Anglo-Portuguese army on the frontier, and the sending of succours to sir John Moore. Cradock's means were so scanty that the attainments of any one of those objects was scarcely possible, yet Mr. Canning writing officially to Mr. Villiers at this epoch, as if a mighty and well furnished army was in Portugal, enforced the "*necessity of continuing to maintain possession of Portugal, as long as could be done with the force intrusted to sir John Cradock's command, remembering always that not the defence of Portugal alone, but the employment of the enemy's military force, and the diversion which would be thus created in favour of the south of Spain, were objects not to be abandoned, except in case of the most extreme necessity.*" The enemy's

military force! It was three hundred thousand men, and this despatch was a pompous absurdity. The ministers and their agents eternally haunted by the phantoms of Spanish and Portuguese armies, were incapable of perceiving the palpable bulk and substance of the French hosts; the whole system of the cabinet was one of shifts and expedients, every week produced a fresh project, and minister and agent, alike, followed his own views, without reference to any fixed principle; the generals were the only persons not empowered to arrange military operations.

The number of officers employed to discover the French movement, enabled Cradock, although his direct communications were interrupted, to obtain intelligence of Moore's advance towards Sahagun; wherefore, he again endeavoured to send a reinforcement into Spain by the way of Almeida. The difficulty of getting supplies, however, finally induced him to accede to Mr. Villiers' wishes, and on the 12th of January he shipped six hundred cavalry and thirteen hundred infantry, meaning to send them to Vigo; but while they were still in the Tagus, intelligence of the retreat upon Coruña was received, and the troops were disembarked.*

The 14th of January the Conqueror line-of-battle-ship, having admiral Berkely on board, reached Lisbon, and for the first time since sir John Cradock took the command of the troops in Portugal, he received a communication from the ministers in England.† It now appeared that their thoughts were less intently fixed upon the defence of Portugal than upon getting possession of Cadiz. Their anxiety upon this subject had somewhat subsided after the battle of Vimeira, but it revived with greater vigour when sir John Moore, contemplating a movement in the south, suggested the propriety of securing Cadiz as a place of arms, and in January an expedition was prepared to sail for that town, with the design of establishing a new base of operations for the English army. This project failed, but the following particulars of the transaction afford ample proof of the perplexed unstable nature of the minister's policy.

NEGOTIATION FOR THE OCCUPATION OF CADIZ.

While it was still unknown in England that the supreme junta had fled from Aranjuez, sir George Smith, who had conducted Spencer's negotiation in 1808, was again sent to Cadiz to prepare the way for the reception of an English garrison.‡ Four thousand men destined for this service were then embarked at Portsmouth, general Sherbrooke who commanded them, was first directed to touch at Lisbon on his way to Cadiz; he was afterwards desired to make for Coruña to be at the order of sir J. Moore, yet finally, his force being increased to five thousand men, he sailed on the 14th of January for Cadiz, under his first instructions. Mr. Frere was then directed to negotiate for the admission of these troops into Cadiz, as the only condition upon which a British army could be employed to aid the Spanish cause in that part of the Peninsula.

As the reverses in the north of Spain became known, the importance of Cadiz increased, and the importance of Portugal decreased in the eyes of the English ministers. Sir John Cradock was made acquainted with Sherbrooke's destination, and was himself commanded to obey any requisition for troops that might be made by the Spanish junta; and so independent of the real state of affairs were the ministerial arrangements, that Cradock, whose despatches had been one continued complaint of his inability to procure horses for his own artillery, was directed to furnish them for Sherbrooke's.

Sir George Smith, a man somewhat hasty, but of

* Sir John Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

* Sir John Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

† Cradock's Papers, MSS.

‡ Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.

remarkable zeal and acuteness, left England about the middle of December; and, on his arrival at Cadiz, at once discovered that there, as in every other part of the Peninsula, all persons being engaged in theories or intrigues, nothing useful for defence was executed. The ramparts of the city were in tolerable condition, but scarcely any guns were mounted, while, two miles in front of the town, an outwork had been commenced upon such a scale that it could not possibly be finished under four months, and, after the slow mode of Spanish proceedings, would have taken as many years to complete.

For a solid defence of all the fortifications, sir George Smith judged that twenty thousand good troops would be requisite, but that ten thousand would suffice for the city, there were, however, only five thousand militia and volunteers in the place, and not a regular soldier under arms, neither any within reach. The number of guns mounted and to be mounted exceeded four hundred; to serve them, two hundred and fifty peasants and volunteers were enrolled, and, being clothed in uniforms, were called artillery-men.

Knowing nothing of sir John Moore's march to Sagun, sir George Smith naturally calculated upon the immediate approach of the French; wherefore seeing the helpless state of Cadiz, and being assured that the people would willingly admit an English garrison, he wrote to sir John Cradock for troops. The latter, little thinking that, at such a conjuncture, the supreme junta would be more jealous of their allies than fearful of their enemies; judging also, from the tenor of his latest instructions, that obedience to this requisition would be consonant to the minister's wishes; immediately ordered colonel Kemmis to proceed from Elvas with the fortieth regiment, by the route of Seville, and, at the same time, embarking three thousand of the best troops at Lisbon, sent them to Cadiz.* This force, commanded by major-general Mackenzie, sailed the 2d February, and reached their destination the 5th of the same month.

Meanwhile, Mr. Frere, although acquainted with the sailing of Mackenzie's armament, was ignorant that sir George Smith had applied to the governor of Cadiz for permission to take military possession of that town;† for Smith had no instructions to correspond with Mr. Frere, and the latter had opened a separate negotiation with the central junta at Seville, in which he endeavoured to pave the way for the occupation by proposing to have the troops admitted as guests, and he sent Mr. Stuart to arrange this with the local authorities. Mr. Frere had, however, meddled much with the personal intrigues of the day, he was, moreover, of too slender a capacity to uphold the dignity and just influence of a great power on such an occasion, and the flimsy thread of his negotiation snapped under the hasty touch of sir George Smith. The supreme junta, averse to every thing that threatened to interrupt their course of sluggish indolence, had sent the marquis de Villel, a member of their own body, to Cadiz, avowedly to prepare the way for the admission of the troops, but, in reality, to thwart that measure; hence the circumstance of Mackenzie's arrival, with an object different from that announced by Mr. Frere, was instantly taken advantage of to charge England with treachery. The junta, knowing Mr. Frere to be their own dupe, believed, or affected to believe, that he was also the dupe of the English minister, and that the whole transaction was an artifice, on the part of the latter, to get possession of the city with a felonious intent.‡ The admission of the British troops was nevertheless earnestly desired by the inhabitants of Cadiz, and of the neighbouring towns; and this feeling was so well understood by Mr. Stuart and sir George

Smith, that they would, notwithstanding the reluctance of the supreme junta, have brought the affair to a good conclusion; but, at the most critical period of the negotiation, the former was sent on a secret mission to Vienna, by the way of Trieste, and the latter, who was in bad health, died about the same period; thus the negotiation failed for want of a head to conduct it.

General Mackenzie, like sir George Smith, thought that the object might be attained: he observed, indeed, that the people, far from suspecting any danger, were ignorant of, or incredulous of the reverses in the north, that nothing had been done towards equipping the fleet for sea, and that, notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of admiral Purvis and Mr. Stuart, the Spaniards would neither work themselves nor permit the English sailors to work for them; but he also saw that the public feeling was favourable to the British troops and the good will of the people openly expressed. The affair was, however, now in the hands of Mr. Frere.

In the course of the negotiations carried on by that minister, the supreme junta had proposed,

1. That the troops should land at Port St. Mary's, to be quartered there and in the neighbouring towns.—
2. That they should join Cuesta's army.—3. That they should go to Catalonia.—4. That they should be parcelled out in small divisions, to be attached to the different Spanish armies. Nay, untaught by their repeated disasters, and pretending to hold the English soldiery cheap, those self-sufficient men proposed that the British should garrison the minor fortresses on the coast, in order to release an equal number of Spaniards for the field.

Mr. Frere wished to accept the first of these proposals, but general Mackenzie, sir George Smith, and Mr. Stuart agreed that it would be injurious for many reasons; not the least urgent of which was, that as the troops could not have been embarked again without some national dishonour, they must have marched towards Cuesta, and thus have been involved in the campaign without obtaining that which was their sole object, *the possession of Cadiz as a place of arms.*

Mr. Frere then suggested a modification of the second proposal, namely, to leave a small garrison in Cadiz, and to join Cuesta with the remainder of the troops. At this time sir G. Smith was dead; Mr. Stuart had embarked for Trieste; and general Mackenzie, reluctant to oppose Mr. Frere's wishes, consented to march, if the necessary equipments for his force could be procured; but he observed, that the plan was contrary to his instructions, and to the known wishes of the English government, and liable, in part, to the same objections as the first proposition. This was on the 18th of February; on the 22d, a popular tumult commenced in Cadiz.

The supreme junta, desirous to shew that the city did not require an English garrison for its protection, had sent there two regiments, composed of Poles, Germans, and Swiss, deserters or prisoners. The people, aware that the junta disliked and intended to disarm the volunteers of Cadiz, were justly offended that deserters should be trusted in preference to themselves; they stopped the courier, opened the despatches from Seville, and imprisoned the marquis de Villel, who was obnoxious, because, while mild to persons suspected of favouring the French, he had harshly or rather brutally punished some ladies of rank. Proceeding from one violence to another, the populace endeavoured to kill the state prisoner, and being prevented in that, committed other excesses, and murdered don Joseph Heredia, the collector of public rents. During the tumult, which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was repeatedly called for by the mob, and two British officers being sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and obeyed

* Sir J. Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

† Parl. Papers 1809

‡ Ibid.

with respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken by sir George Smith.

The 24th, tranquillity was restored; the 25th, general Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. Frere an answer to his letter of the 18th, suggested that of the three English battalions then in the harbour, two should be placed in Cadiz, and that the third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with the 40th regiment, and both together march to join Cuesta. Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the junta with an authority and dignity becoming the representative of a great nation, on whose support the independence of the whole Peninsula rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. The object was one that England had a right to seek, the Spanish rulers no right to refuse, for the people wished to further it, and the threat of an appeal to them would soon have silenced the feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government. Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single and enlarged view, pressed a variety of trifling points, and discussed them with the secretary of the junta, with more regard to epistolary dexterity than to useful diplomacy; and when his opponent conceded the great point of admitting troops at all, broke off the negotiation, upon the question, whether the number to be admitted should be one or two thousand men; as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost.

Self-baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, turning towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta, and one much feared by them, sought to secure his assistance by holding out the lure of having a British force added to his command, but the sarcastic old general derided the diplomatist. "Although I do not," said he, "discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things, which should prevent his British majesty's troops from garrisoning Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which your excellency proposes, I am far from supposing that the supreme junta, which is fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is not grounded in its objections; and your excellency knows that it is sufficient that they should have them, to prevent my giving any opinion on so important a measure, *unless they should consult me.*"* With regard to the 4,300 men, which your excellency is pleased to mention, there is no doubt that I stand in need of them; but I flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estremadura, will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly if, from any change of circumstances, the supreme junta should no longer manifest the repugnance we speak of."

This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, Mr. Frere, conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, returned with renewed ardour to the task of directing the military affairs, in every part of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of Soult's, addressed to the king, in which the project of penetrating into Portugal was mentioned; and immediately concluding that general Mackenzie's troops would be wanted for the defence of that kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon; but the general, who knew that, even should he return, a successful defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the last extremity, observed, that "the danger of Lisbon rendered the occupation of Cadiz more important."

General Mackenzie's reply was written the 26th of February. On the 3d of March he received another despatch from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and the danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the writer's mind, and were unnoticed; entering into a minutely inaccurate statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he observed, that Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate Portugal by the Minho, it

was impossible from the position of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese, that he could persevere in his plan. Wherefore, he proposed that the British force then in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed immediately to Tarragona, to aid Reding, and this wild scheme was only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from sir John Cradock, recalling the troops to Lisbon. They arrived there on the 12th of March; and thus ended a transaction clearly indicating an unsettled policy, shallow combinations, and a bad choice of agents on the part of the English cabinet, and a most unwise and unworthy disposition in the supreme junta.

General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the latter to French influence; Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of sir George Smith, and to fear, lest the junta of Seville, who were continually on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the part of the supreme government. It is, however, evident that the true cause was the false position in which the English ministers had originally placed themselves, by inundating Spain with arms and money, without at the same time asserting a just influence, and making their assistance the price of good order and useful exertion.

CHAPTER III.

Weakness of the British army in Portugal—General Cameron marches to Lisbon—Sir R. Wilson remains near Ciudad Rodrigo—Sir J. Cradock prepares to take a defensive position at Passo d'Arcos—Double dealing of the regency—The populace murder foreigners, and insult the British troops—Anarchy in Oporto—British government ready to abandon Portugal—Change their intention—Military system of Portugal—The regency demand an English general—Beresford is sent to them—Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's troops arrive at Lisbon—Beresford arrives there, and takes the command of the native force—Change in the aspect of affairs—Sir J. Cradock encamps at Lumiar—Relative positions of the allied and French armies—Marshal Beresford desires sir J. Cradock to march against Soult—Cradock refuses—Various unwise projects broached by different persons.

THE effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal on the part of sir John Cradock. The absence of his best troops exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the regency, and to the grossest insults from the populace; with his reduced force, he could not expect to hold even a contracted position at the extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely to invade Portugal; and as there was neither a native force nor a government to be depended upon, there remained for him only the prospect of a forced and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation, and the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow disaster.

In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida no longer contained British troops, his attention was necessarily fixed upon Lisbon and upon Oporto, which the violence of the gales had rendered a sealed port; meanwhile, the hospitals and magazines of Almeida, and even those of Salamanca being sent to Lamego, had crowded that place with fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts and hourly accumulating stores. The Douro had overflowed, the craft could not ply, one large boat attempting to descend was upset, and eighty persons, soldiers and others, had perished. General Cameron also, hearing of this confusion, relinquished the idea of embarking at Oporto, and, recrossing the Douro, made for Lisbon, where he arrived the beginning of February, with two thousand men, who were worn with fatigue, having marched eight hundred miles under continued rains. Sir Robert Wilson had sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of Idanha Nova; but, partly from a spirit of adventure,

* Parl. Papers, 1810.

partly from an erroneous idea that sir John Cradock wished him to defend the frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by a Spanish detachment under Don Carlos d'España, and by some volunteers, but it was still weak, and his operations were necessarily confined to a few trifling skirmishes: yet, like many others, his imagination so far outstripped his judgement, that, when he had only felt the advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether.

Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations, he was informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore, and he knew too well the vigour and talent of that general to doubt that he had been oppressed by an overwhelming force; he knew also that Zaragoza had fallen, and that twenty-five thousand French troops, were thus free to act in other quarters; he knew that Soult, with at least twenty thousand men, was on the Minho; that Romana was incapable of making any head; that Portugal was one wide scene of helpless confusion, and that a French army was again in the neighbourhood of Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus; in fine, that his own embarrassments were hourly increasing, and that the moment was arrived when the safety of his troops was the chief consideration. The tenor of the few despatches he had received from England led him to suppose that the ministers designed to abandon Portugal; but, as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained, he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first instructions, and to keep his hold of the country as long as it was possible to do so without risking the utter destruction of his army. To avoid that danger, he put every incumbrance at Lisbon on board the transports in the Tagus; proceeded to dismantle the batteries at the mouth of the river, and in concert with the admiral, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the military and naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time, he renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto; but the weather continued so unfavourable, that he was finally obliged to remove the invalids and stores by land, yet he could not procure carriages for the whole.

After the arrival of Cameron's detachment, the effective British force under arms, including convalescents and fifteen hundred stragglers from sir John Moore's army, was about eight thousand men, yet when the security of the forts and magazines, and the tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for, only five thousand men, and those not in the best order, could be brought into the field. As this force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town as Lisbon, the general judged that it would be unwise to take up a position in advance, whence he should be obliged to retreat through the midst of a turbulent and excited population, which had already given too many indications of ill-temper to leave any doubt of its hostility under such circumstances. He, therefore, came to the resolution of withdrawing from Saccavem and Lisbon, to concentrate his whole force on a position at Passa d'Arcos near the mouth of the river, where he could embark with least danger, and where he had the best chance of defending himself, if necessary, against superior numbers.

This reasoning was sound, and Cradock's intention was, undoubtedly, not to quit Portugal, unless driven from it by force, or in pursuance of orders from England, his arrangements, however, seem to have carried more the appearance of alarm than was either politic or necessary; the position of Passa d'Arcos might have been prepared, and the means necessary for an embarkation secured, and yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment. To display a

bold and confident front in war is, of all things, the most essential, as well to impose upon friends as upon enemies; sir John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of this maxim. The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses in Spain, yet, like all the people in the Peninsula, confident in their own prowess and resolution until the very moment of attack, became extremely exasperated; the regency, partly from their natural folly and insincerity, but more from the dread of the lower orders, countenanced, if they did not instigate, the latter to commit excesses, and to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval and military authorities. The measures of precaution relative to the forts had originated with the regency, yet they now formally protested against them, and, with a view to hamper the general, encouraged their subalterns to make many false and even ridiculous charges against the British executive officers; and it would appear that the remonstrances of the admiral and generals were but imperfectly supported by Mr. Villiers.

In this manner the people's violence was nourished until the city was filled with tumult; mobs, armed with English pikes and muskets, collected night and day in the streets and on the high-roads, and under the pretext of seeking for and killing Frenchmen, attacked indiscriminately all foreigners, even those in the British service wearing the British uniform. The guards, who endeavoured to protect the victims of this ferocity, were insulted; couriers, passing with despatches, were intercepted and deprived of their papers; English officers were outraged in the streets, and such was the audacity of the people that the artillery was placed in the squares, in expectation of an affray. The state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at the period of Junot's convention, and if the British had abandoned the country at this time, they would have been assailed with as much obloquy by the Portuguese; for such has been, and will be, the fate of all unsuccessful auxiliaries: a reflection that should render historians cautious of adopting accusations upon the authority of native writers on the like occasions.

This spirit was not confined to Lisbon. In Oporto the disposition to insult the British was more openly encouraged than in the capital, the government of the multitude was more decidedly pronounced; from the cities it spread to the villages. The people of the Alemtejo frontier were, indeed, remarkably apathetic, but, from the Minho to the Tagus, the country was in horrible confusion; the soldiers were scattered, without regard to military system, and being unpaid lived at free quarters; the peasantry of the country assembling in bands, and the populace of the towns in mobs, intercepted the communications, appointed or displaced the generals at their pleasure, and massacred all persons of whom they were suspicious; the ammunition which had been supplied from England was wasted, by constant firing in token of insubordination, and as if the very genius of confusion was abroad, some of the British troops, principally *malingersers*,* of sir John Moore's army, added their quota of misconduct, to increase the general distress.

The leading instigator of the excesses at Oporto was one Raymundo, a coadjutor and creature of the bishop's, a turbulent and cruel fellow, who by taking a share in the first insurrection against the French, obtained a momentary influence, and has since been elevated, by a very credulous writer, into a patriotic hero. He was, however, a worthless coward, fitted for secret villany, and incapable of a noble action.

This state of affairs, productive of so much misery and danger, continuing, without intermission, caused

* An appellation given among soldiers to men who, under pretence of sickness, shrink from the performance of their duties in the field.

many of the upper classes to despair of their country's safety by war, and increased the number of those who wishing to attach themselves to the fortune of France, were ready to accept of a foreign prince for their sovereign, if with him they could obtain tranquillity and an ameliorated constitution: and when soon afterwards, the edge of the enemy's sword, falling upon the senseless multitude, filled the streets of Oporto with blood, there was a powerful French party in Portugal. The bulk of the people were, however, stanch in their country's cause; they were furious and disorderly, but imbued with hatred of the French, ready at the call of honour, and susceptible of discipline, without any loss of energy.

The turbulence of the citizens, the remonstrances of the regency, and the representations of Mr. Villiers, who was in doubt for the personal safety of the British subjects residing in Lisbon, convinced sir John Cradock that political circumspection and adroitness, were as important as military arrangements to prevent a catastrophe at this critical period; hence, as contrary to what might have been expected, the enemy had not yet made any actual movement across the frontier, he suspended his design of falling back to Passa d'Arcos.

In this unsettled state, affairs remained until March, when intelligence arrived that the French fleet was at sea, whereupon two of the line-of-battle ships in the Tagus were despatched to reinforce sir Thomas Duckworth's squadron, and the batteries at the mouth of the river were again armed. Meanwhile, Soult was making progress in the north, the anarchy at Oporto was continually increasing, and the English government had certainly come to the resolution of abandoning Portugal if the enemy advanced; for, although sir John Cradock was not informed of their views, an officer in England, well acquainted with Portuguese customs, actually received orders, and was embarking, to aid the execution of this measure, when suddenly, the policy of the cabinet once more changed, and it was resolved to reinforce the army. This resolution, which may be attributed partly to the Austrian war, partly to the failure at Cadiz, partly to the necessity of satisfying public opinion in England, was accompanied by a measure, which laid the first solid basis on which to build a reasonable hope of success.

The Portuguese Government, either spontaneously, or brought thereto by previous negotiation, had offered the command of their troops, with the title of marshal, to an English general, and the British ministers accepted this offer, promised supplies of arms, ammunition, clothing, and a subsidy for the payment of a certain number of regular soldiers; thus obtaining a firm hold of the military resources of Portugal, and gaining for the first time a position in the Peninsula suitable to the dignity of England and the contest in which she was engaged. The Portuguese desired to have sir Arthur Wellesley, but he refused the offer, and it is said that sir John Murray, (he who afterwards failed at Taragona,) sir John Doyle, and even the marquis of Hastings, a man undoubtedly well qualified, sought for the office, but that powerful parliamentary interest prevailing, Major-general Beresford was finally chosen, and at the same time received the local rank of lieutenant-general; to the great discontent of several officers of superior rank, who were displeased that a man without any visible claim to superiority should be placed over their heads.

Information of this change was immediately sent to sir John Cradock, and general Sherbrooke was ordered to repair to Lisbon. The latter was close to Cadiz harbour when the orders overtook him, and his and Mackenzie's divisions arrived together in the Tagus on the 12th of March, thus the fate of Portugal was again fixed by England. But if Mr. Frere's plan had been followed—if Mackenzie had proceeded to Taragona,

and nothing but foul weather prevented him—if Sherbrooke's voyage had not been delayed by storms, and that sailing about from port to port, he had, as is most probable, been engaged in some other enterprise—if Victor, obeying his orders, had marched to Abrantes—if any of these events had happened, sir John Cradock must have abandoned Portugal, and then how infinitely absurd the proceedings of the English ministers would have appeared, and how justly their puerile combinations would have excited the scorn of Europe.

Marshal Beresford reached Lisbon early in March, and after some negotiation, received from the regency, power to appoint British officers to the command of regiments, and to act without control in any manner he should judge fitting to ameliorate the condition and discipline of the Portuguese forces; and this was the more important, as the military polity of Portugal, although fallen into disuse, was severe, precise, and admirably calculated to draw forth the whole strength of the nation. The army could be completed by coercion; the militia were bound to assemble by regiments, and liable to any service within the frontiers; and the whole of the remaining male population could be enrolled under the name of *ordenancas*, numbered by battalions in their different districts, and obliged under very severe penalties to assemble, at the orders of the local magistrates, either to work, to fight, to escort convoys, or in any manner to aid the operations of the army.

This affair arranged, Beresford fixed his quarters at Thomar, collected the Portuguese troops in masses, and proceeded to recast their system on the model of the British army; commencing with stern but wholesome rigour, a reform that, in process of time, raised out of chaos an obedient, well disciplined, and gallant force, worthy of a high place among the best in Europe; for the Portuguese people, though easily misled and excited to wrath, are of a docile orderly disposition, and very sensible of just and honourable conduct in their officers. This reform was, however, not effected at once, nor without many crosses and difficulties being raised by the higher orders and by the government—difficulties that general Beresford could never have overcome, if he had not been directed, sustained, and shielded, by the master spirit under whom he was destined to work. The plan of giving to English officers the command of the Portuguese troops was at first proceeded on with caution; but after a time, the ground being supposed safe, it was gradually enlarged, until almost all the military situations of importance were held by Englishmen, which combined with other causes, gave rise to numerous intrigues, not confined to the natives, and as we shall find, in after times, seriously threatening the power of the marshal, the existence of the British influence, and the success of the war.

Sir John Cradock's situation was now materially alleviated. The certainty of the Austrian war produced a marked change in the disposition of the regency; the arrival of Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's divisions increased the British force to fourteen thousand men, and the populace became more cautious of offering insults. About the middle of March, two thousand men being left to maintain tranquillity in Lisbon, the remainder of the army was encamped at Lumiar and Saccavem, and while these things were passing at Lisbon, the aspect of affairs changed also in other parts of the kingdom.

The bulk of the Portuguese regular troops, amounting to ten or twelve thousand men, was collected by marshal Beresford, between the Tagus and the Mondego. Beyond the valley of the Mondego, colonel Trant had assembled a small corps of volunteers, students from the university, and general Vittoria was at

the head of two regular battalions in Upper Beira. The bishop of Oporto was preparing to defend that town, with a mixed, but ferocious and insubordinate multitude. General Silveira, with four or five thousand men, had taken post in the *Tras os Montes*, and Romana, who had collected seven or eight thousand at Monterey, was in communication with him. Sir Robert Wilson, who was at the head of about three thousand men, had withdrawn the legion from Almeida, and sent a detachment to Bejar, but remained himself on the *Agueda*, watching the advanced posts of Lapisse. A few Portuguese regiments were extended from *Salvaterra* and *Idanha* to *Alcantara*. A permanent bridge of boats was laid over the *Tagus* at *Abrantes*, and there were small garrisons in that town and at *Elvas*.

All these forces united would not, however, with the exception of the British, have been capable of sustaining the shock of ten thousand French soldiers for half an hour, and the whole mass of the latter, then hanging on the frontier of Portugal, was above fifty thousand; gathering like clouds on the horizon, they threatened many points, but gave no certain indication of where the storm would break. Soult, indeed, with about twenty thousand men, was endeavouring to pass the *Minho*; but Lapisse, although constantly menacing *Ciudad Rodrigo*, kept his principal masses at *Salamanca* and *Ledesma*, and Victor had concentrated his between the *Alberche* and the *Tietar*. Hence Lapisse might join either Soult or Victor, and the latter could march by *Placencia* against *Ciudad Rodrigo*, while Soult attacked Oporto; or he might draw Lapisse to him, and penetrate Portugal by *Alcantara*; he might pass the *Tagus*, attack *Cuesta*, and pursue him to *Seville*; or, after defeating him, he might turn short to the right, and enter the *Alemtejo*.

In this uncertainty, sir John Cradock, keeping the British concentrated at *Lumiar* and *Saccavem*, waited for the enemy to develop his plans, and, in the mean time, endeavoured to procure the necessary equipments for an active campaign. He directed magazines to be formed at *Coimbra* and *Abrantes*; urged the regency to exertion, took measures to raise money, and despatched officers to *Barbary* to procure mules. But while thus engaged, intelligence arrived that Victor having suddenly forced the passage of the *Tagus* at *Almaraz*, was in pursuit of *Cuesta* on the road to *Merida*; that Soult, having crossed the *Minho*, and defeated *Romana* and *Silveira*, was within a few leagues of Oporto, and that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting *Ciudad Rodrigo*. The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency, and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop's party, proposed that sir John Cradock uniting a part of the British forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal *Beresford*, should march to the succour of Oporto.* *Beresford* was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command, among the disorderly multitude of that city, but he thought the whole of the British army should move in a body to *Leiria*, and from thence either push on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to follow this plan.

It was doubtful, he said, if Victor and Soult intended to co-operate in a single plan, but, on the supposition that it was so, he considered it essential to drive back or to overcome one before the other could come to his assistance. Victor was then in pursuit of *Cuesta*; if he continued that pursuit, it must be to enter *Seville*, or to cripple his opponent previous to the invasion of Portugal; in either case he would be in the *Sierra Morena* before he could hear of the march from *Leiria*, and, as Cradock had daily intelligence of his movements, there would be full time to relieve Oporto,

and return again to the defence of *Lisbon*. If, however, Soult depended on the co-operation of Victor, he would probably remain on the right of the *Duero* until the other was on the *Tagus*, and Lapisse also would be contented for the present with capturing *Ciudad Rodrigo* and *Almeida*.

This unsound reasoning did not weigh with sir John Cradock, who resolved to preserve his central position, covering the capital at such a distance as to preclude the danger of being cut off from it by one army while he was engaged with another. Portugal, (he observed,) was in a state of anarchy equally incompatible with firm resistance and rapid movements; the peasantry were tumultuous and formidable to everybody but the enemy; *Beresford* himself acknowledged that the regular forces were mutinous, disregarding their officers, choosing when and where to rest, when to fight, when to remain in quarters, and altogether unfit to be trusted within the circle of the Oporto mischief. The British troops, therefore, were the only solid resource; but they were too few to divide, and must act in a body, or not at all. *Lisbon* and Oporto were the enemy's objects; which was it most desirable to protect?—the former was of incomparably greater importance than the latter; the first was near, the second two hundred miles off; and, although the utmost exertions had been made, the army was not yet equipped for an active campaign. The troops were ill-clothed, and wanted shoes; the artillery was unhorsed; the commissariat possessed only a fourth part of the transport necessary for the conveyance of provisions and ammunition, and no activity could immediately supply these deficiencies, inasmuch as some of the articles required were not to be had in the country; to obtain others, the interference of the regency was necessary, but hitherto all applications to that quarter had been without any effect. Was it wise then to commence offensive operations in the north? The troops of Soult and Lapisse united were estimated at thirty thousand men, of which above five thousand were cavalry; the British could only bring fifteen guns and twelve thousand men, of all arms, into the field; yet, if they marched with the avowed intention of relieving Oporto, they must accomplish it, or be dishonoured!

Was it consistent with reason to march two hundred miles in search of a combat, which the very state of Oporto would render it almost impossible to gain, and for an object perhaps already lost? Suspicion was alive every where, if Oporto was already taken, the army must come back; that would be the signal for fresh tumults—for renewed cries that the country was to be abandoned; *Lisbon* would instantly be in a state of insurrection, and would be even more formidable to the British than the enemy; besides, it was impossible to reckon upon *Cuesta's* aid in keeping Victor employed. He was personally inimical to the English, and his principal object was to gain time for the increase and discipline of his own force. Victor was apparently pursuing *Cuesta*, but his parties had already appeared in the neighbourhood of *Badajos*, and there was nothing but a weak Portuguese garrison in *Elvas* to impede his march through the *Alemtejo*. To cover *Lisbon* and the *Tagus* was the wisest plan; fixed in some favourable position, at a prudent distance from that capital, he could wait for the reinforcements he expected from England. He invited the Portuguese troops to unite with him; a short time would suffice to establish subordination; and then the certainty that the capital could not be approached, except in the face of a really formidable army, would not only keep the enemy in check, but, by obliging him to collect in greater numbers for the attempts, would operate as a diversion in favour of Spain.

The general soundness of this reasoning is apparent, and it must not be objected to sir John Cradock that

* Sir John Cradock's Correspondence. MSS.

he disregarded the value of a central position, which might enable him to forestall the enemy; if the latter should march on his flank against Lisbon, the difficulty of obtaining true intelligence from the natives and his own want of cavalry rendered it utterly unsafe for him to divide his army, or to trust it any distance from the capital. Marshal Beresford's plan, founded on the supposition that Cradock could engage Soult at Oporto, and yet quit him and return at his pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious; the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive data: it was conjectural that they could relieve Oporto, it was positive that they would endanger Lisbon. The proposition was, however, not made upon partial views; but at this period, other men, less qualified to advise, pestered sir John Cradock with projects of a different stamp, yet deserving of notice, as showing that the mania for grand operations, which I have before marked as the malady of the time, was still raging.

To make a suitable use of the British army was the object of all these projectors, but there was a marvellous variety in their plans. The regency desired that the Portuguese and British troops should co-operate for the relief of Oporto, and yet protect Lisbon, objects which were incompatible. Beresford advised that the whole English army should march. The bishop was importunate to have some British soldiers placed under his command, and he recalled sir Robert Wilson to the defence of Oporto. It appeared reasonable that the legion should defend the city in which it was raised, but Mr. Frere wrote from Seville, that Sir Robert would do better to remain; he therefore accepted Spanish rank, and refusing obedience to the prelate's orders, retained his troops. The regency, glad of the opportunity, approved of this proceeding, and adopted the legion as a national corps. Meanwhile Romana was earnest with Cradock for money, and wanted to have a thousand British soldiers sent to aid the insurrection at Vigo; but at the same time, Mr. Frere, and colonel D'Urban, a corresponding officer placed by Cradock at Cuesta's head-quarters, proposed other plans of higher pretensions.*

Zaragoza, said the latter, has fallen, and ten thousand French troops being thus released, are marching towards Toledo; this is the moment to give a fatal blow to Marshal Victor! It is one of those critical occasions that seldom recur in war! In a day or two sir Robert Wilson will be on the Tietar with two thousand five hundred men; † augment his force with a like number of Portuguese, who may be drawn from Sobreira, Idanha, and Salvatierra, he shall thus turn the right and rear of Victor's army, and his movement cannot be interrupted by the French force now at Salamanca and Alva, because the communication from thence to the Tagus by the passes of Banos and Torneveas is sealed up; while sir Robert Wilson thus gets in the rear of Victor with five thousand men, Cuesta, with twelve thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, shall attack the latter in front; a matter of easy execution, because Cuesta can throw a pontoon bridge over the Tagus, near Almaraz, in an hour and a half, and the conde de Cartoajal, who is at Manzanares in La Mancha, with ten thousand infantry and two thousand horse, will keep Sebastiani in check. The hope is great, the danger small, and if a few British troops can be added to the force on the Tietar, the success will be infallible!

There were, however, some grave objections to this infallible plan. General Cuesta was near Almaraz,

sir John Cradock was at Lisbon, and sir Robert Wilson was at Ciudad Rodrigo. Their circuitous line of correspondence was thus above four hundred miles long, and it is not very clear how the combination was to be effected with that rapidity, which was said to be essential to the success; neither is it very evident, that operations to be combined at such a distance, and executed by soldiers of different nations, would have been successful at all. On the one side, twenty thousand raw Portuguese and Spanish levies were to act on double external lines of operation; on the other, twenty-five thousand French veterans waited in a central position, with their front and flanks covered by the Tagus and the Tietar. In such a contest it is possible to conceive a different result from that anticipated by colonel d'Urban.

Mr. Frere's plans were not less extensive, or less sanguine. When his project for assisting Catalonia had been frustrated, by the recal of general Mackenzie from Cadiz, he turned his attention to the north. Soult, he wrote to sir John Cradock, tired of the resistance he has met with, will probably desist from his '*unaccountable project of entering Portugal, and occupying Galicia at the same time.*' Let the British army, therefore, make a push to drive the enemy out of Salamanca, and the neighbouring towns, while the Asturians, on their side, shall take possession of Leon and Astorga, and thus open the communication between the northern and southern provinces. Fearing, however, that if this proposal should not be adopted, the English general might be at a loss for some enterprise, Mr. Frere also recommended that the British army should march to Alcantara, and that the fortieth regiment, which hitherto he had retained at Seville, contrary to sir John Cradock's wishes, should join it at that place; and then, said he, the whole operating by the northern bank of the Tagus, may, in concert with Cuesta, '*beat the French out of Toledo, and consequently out of Madrid.*'

Now, with respect to the first of these plans, Soult never had the intention of holding Galicia, which was Marshal Ney's province; but he did propose to penetrate into Portugal, and he was not likely to abandon his purpose, because the only army capable of opposing him was quitting that kingdom, and making a '*push*' of four hundred miles to drive Lapisse out of Salamanca; moreover, the Asturians were watched by general Bonnet's division on one side, and by Kellerman on the other, and the fifth corps, not ten but fifteen thousand strong, having quitted Zaragoza, were at this time in the Valladolid country, close to Leon and Astorga.*

With respect to the operations by the line of the Tagus, which were to drive Joseph out of Madrid, and consequently to attract the attention of all the French corps, it is to be observed, that sir John Cradock could command about twelve thousand men, Cuesta sixteen thousand, Cartoajal twelve thousand, making a total of forty thousand. But Soult had twenty three thousand, Lapisse nine thousand, Victor was at the head of twenty-five thousand, Sebastiani could dispose of fifteen thousand, Mortier of a like number, the King's guards and the garrison of Madrid were twelve thousand, making a total of nearly a hundred thousand men. Hence while Mr. Frere and colonel D'Urban, confiding in Soult's inactivity, were thus plotting the destruction of Victor and Sebastiani, the first marshal stormed Oporto; the second, unconscious of his danger, crossed the Tagus, and defeated Cuesta's army at Medellin, and at the same moment Sebastiani routed Cartoajal's at Ciudad Real.

* Sir J. Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

† Ibid.

* Muster rolls of the French Army, MSS.

BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

Coruna and Ferrol surrender to Soult—He is ordered, by the emperor, to invade Portugal—The first corps is directed to aid this operation—Soult goes to St. Jago—Distressed state of the second corps—Operations of Romana and state of Galicia—Soult commences his march—Arrives on the Minho—Occupies Tuy, Vigo, and Guardia—Drags large boats over land from Guardia to Campo Saucos—Attempts to pass the Minho—Is repulsed by the Portuguese peasantry—Importance of this repulse—Soult changes his plan—Marches on Orense—Defeats the insurgents at Franquera, at Ribadavia, and in the valley of the Avia—Leaves his artillery and stores in Tuy—Defeats the Spanish insurgents in several places, and prepares to invade Portugal—Defenceless state of the northern provinces of that kingdom—Bernadim Friere advances to the Cavado river—Silveira advances to Chaves—Concerts operations with Romana—Disputes between the Portuguese and Spanish troops—Ignorance of the generals.

HAVING described the unhappy condition of Portugal and given a general view of the transactions in Spain, I shall now resume the narrative of Soult's operations; thus following the main stream of action; for the other marshals were appointed to tranquillize the provinces already overrun by the emperor, or to war down the remnants of the Spanish armies, but the duke of Dalmatia's task was to push onward in the course of conquest. Nor is it difficult to trace him through the remainder of a campaign, in which, traversing all the northern provinces, fighting in succession the armies of three different nations, and enduring every vicissitude of war, he left broad marks of his career, and certain proofs that he was an able commander and of a haughty resolution in adversity.

It has been observed, in a former part of this work, that the inhabitants of Coruña honourably maintained their town until the safety of the fleet which carried sir John Moore's army from the Spanish shores was secure; they were less faithful to their own cause. Coruña might have defied irregular operations, and several weeks must have elapsed before a sufficient battering train could have been brought up to that corner of the Peninsula; yet, a short negotiation sufficed to put the French in possession of the place on the 19th of January, and the means of attacking Ferrol were immediately organized from the resources of Coruña.

The harbour of Ferrol contained eight sail of the line, and some smaller ships of war. The fortifications were regular, there was an abundance of artillery, ammunition, and a garrison of seven or eight thousand men, consisting of soldiers, sailors, citizens, and armed countrymen, but their chiefs were treacherous. After a commotion in which the admiral Obregon was arrested, his successor Melgarejo surrendered upon somewhat better terms than those granted to Coruña, and thus in ten days were reduced two regular fortresses, which with more resolution might have occupied thirty thousand men for several months.

While yet before Ferrol the duke of Dalmatia received the following despatch, prescribing the immediate invasion of Portugal:—*

"Before his departure from this place, (Valladolid,) the emperor foreseeing the embarkation of the English army, drew up instructions for the ultimate operations

of the duke of Elchingen and yourself. He orders that when the English army shall be embarked you will march upon Oporto with your four divisions, that is to say, the division of Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet, the dragoons of Lorge, and La Housaye, and Franceschi's light cavalry, with the exception of two regiments that his majesty desires you to turn over to the duke of Elchingen, in order to make up his cavalry to four regiments."

"Your '*corps d'armee*,' composed of seventeen regiments of infantry and ten regiments of cavalry, is destined for the expedition of Portugal, in combination with a movement the duke of Belluno is going to effect. General Loison, some engineers, staff and commissariat officers, and thirteen Portuguese, all of whom belonged to the army formerly in Portugal under the duke of Abrantes, have received instructions to join you immediately, and you can transmit your orders for them to Lugo. This is the 21st of January, and it is supposed you cannot be at Oporto before the 5th of February, or at Lisbon before the 16th. Thus, at that time, namely, when you shall be near Lisbon, the '*corps d'armee*' of the duke of Belluno, composed of his own three divisions, of the division Leval, and of ten or twelve regiments of cavalry, forming a body of thirty thousand men, will be at Merida, to make a strong diversion in favour of your movement, and in such a mode, as that he can push the head of a column upon Lisbon if you find any great obstacles to your entrance, which it is, however, presumed will not be the case."

"General Lapisse's division of infantry, which is at this moment in Salamanca, and general Maupetit's brigade of cavalry, will, when you shall be at Oporto, receive the duke of Istria's orders to march upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, where this division will again be under the command of the duke of Belluno, who will send it instructions to join him at Merida: I let you know this that you may be aware of the march of Lapisse, on your left flank, as far as Abrantes. Such are the last orders I am charged to give you in the name of the emperor: you will have to report to the king and to receive his orders for your ulterior operations. The emperor has unlimited confidence in your talents for the fine expedition that he has charged you with."

ALEXANDER, *Prince of Neufchatel, &c.*

It was further intended, by Napoleon, that when Lisbon fell, marshal Victor should invade Andalusia, upon the same line as Dupont had moved the year before; and like Dupont, he was to have been assisted by a division of the second corps, which was to cross the Guadiana and march on Seville. Meanwhile, the duke of Elchingen, whose corps, reinforced by two regiments of cavalry and by the arrival of stragglers, amounted to near twenty thousand men, was to maintain Galicia, confine the Asturians within their own frontier line, and keep open the communication with the second corps. Thus, nominally eighty thousand, and in reality sixty thousand men, were disposed for the conquest of Lisbon, and in such a manner that forty thousand would, after that had been accomplished, have poured down upon Seville and Cadiz, at a time

* S. MSS.

when neither Portugal nor Andalusia were capable of making any resistance. It remains to shew from what causes this mighty preparation failed.

The gross numbers of the second corps amounted to forty-seven thousand;* but general Bonnet's division remained always at St. Ander, in observation of the eastern Asturian frontier, eight thousand were detached for the service of the general communications, and the remainder had, since the 9th of November, been fighting and marching incessantly among barren and snowy mountains; hence, stragglers were numerous, and twelve thousand men were in hospital. The force, actually under arms, did not exceed twenty-five thousand men, worn down with fatigue, barefooted, and without ammunition. They had outstripped their commissariat, the military chest was not come up, the draft animals were reduced in number, and extenuated by fatigue, the gun-carriages were shaken by continual usage, the artillery parc was still in the rear;† and as the sixth corps had not yet passed Lugo, two divisions of the second corps were required to hold Coruña and Ferrol. Literally to obey the emperor's orders was consequently impossible, wherefore Soult taking quarters at St. Jago di Compostella, proceeded to re-organize his army.

Ammunition was fabricated from the loose powder found in Coruña; shoes were obtained partly by requisition, partly from the Spanish magazines, filled as they were with stores supplied by England; the artillery were soon refitted and the greatest part of the stragglers were rallied. In six days, the marshal thought himself in a condition to obey his orders, and, although his troops were still suffering from fatigue and privation, marched, on the first of February, with nineteen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery; but, to understand his operations, the state of Galicia and the previous movements of Romana must be described.

When the Spanish army, on the 2d of January, crossed the line of sir John Moore's march, it was already in a state of disorganization. Romana, with the cavalry, plunged at once into the deep valleys of the Syl and the Minho, but the artillery and a part of his infantry were overtaken and cut up by Franceschi's cavalry; the remainder wandered in bands from one place to another, or dispersed to seek food and shelter among the villages in the mountains. General Mendizabel, with a small body, halted in the Valdes Orres, and placing guards at the Puente de Bibey, a point of singular strength of defence, he purposed to cover the approaches to Orense on that side; but Romana himself, after wandering for a time, collected two or three thousand men, and took post, on the 15th, at Toabado, a village about twenty miles from Lugo. Meanwhile Ney arrived at that place, having detached some cavalry from Villa Franca to scour the valleys on his left, and also sent Marchand's division by the road of Orense to St. Jago and Coruña. Marchand dispersed Mendizabel's troops on the 17th, and after halting some days at Orense, where he established an hospital, continued his march to St. Jago.

The defeat of Mendizabel and the subsequent movements of Marchand's division completed the dispersion of Romana's army; the greatest part throwing away their arms, returned to their homes, and he himself, with his cavalry, and the few infantry that would follow him, crossed the Minho, passed the mountains, and, descending into the valley of the Tamega, took refuge, on the 21st, at Oimbra, a place on the frontier of Portugal, close to Monterey, where there was a small magazine, collected for the use of sir John Moore's army. In this obscure situation, unheeded by the French, he entered into communication with the Portuguese general Silveira, and with sir John Cradock, demanding

money and arms from the latter; he endeavoured also to reassemble a respectable body of troops, but Blake and other officers deserted him, and these events and the general want of patriotic spirit drew from him the following observation:—"I know not wherein the patriotism, so loudly vaunted, consists; any reverse, "any mishap, prostrates the minds of these people, "and, thinking only of saving their own persons, they "sacrifice their country and compromise their command."

The people of Galicia, poor, scattered, living hardly, and like all mountaineers, very tenacious of the little property they possess, disregarded political events which did not immediately and visibly affect their interests. They were, with the exception of those of the sea-port towns, but slightly moved by the aggression of the French, as long as that aggression did not extend to their valleys, and hence, at first, they treated the English and French armies alike. Sir David Baird's division, in its advance, paid generously for supplies, yet it was regarded with jealousy and defrauded. Soult's and Moore's armies, passing like a whirlwind, were beheld with terror, and the people fled from both. The British and German troops that marched to Vigo being conducted without judgement, were licentious, and as their number was small, the people murdered stragglers, and showed without disguise their natural hatred of strangers. On several occasions, parties sent to collect cars for the conveyance of the sick, had to sustain a skirmish before the object could be obtained, and five officers, misled by a treacherous guide, were scarcely saved from death by the interference of an old man, whose exertions, however, were not successful until one of the officers had been severely wounded in the head. On the other hand, general Marchand discovered so little symptoms of hostility, during his march to Orense, that he left his hospital at that town without a guard, under the joint care of Spanish and French surgeons, and the duties of humanity were faithfully discharged by the former without hindrance from the people.

This quiescence did not last long: the French generals were obliged to subsist their troops, by requisitions extremely onerous to a people whose property chiefly consisted of cattle. The many abuses and excesses which always attend this mode of supplying an army soon created a spirit of hatred that Romana laboured incessantly to increase, and he was successful; for, although a bad general, he possessed intelligence and dexterity suited to the task of exciting a population. Moreover, the monks and friars laboured to the same purpose; and, while Romana denounced death to those who refused to take arms, the clergy menaced eternal perdition;* and all this was necessary, for the authority of the supreme junta was only acknowledged as a matter of necessity—not of liking. Galicia, although apparently calm, was, therefore, ripe for a general insurrection, at the moment when the duke of Dalmatia commenced his march from St. Jago di Compostella.

From that town several roads lead to the Minho; the principal one running by the coast line crosses the Ulla, the Umia, the Vedra, and the Octaven, and passes by Pontevedra and Redondela, to Tuy a dilapidated fortress, situated on the Spanish side of the Minho. The second, crossing the same rivers near to their sources, passes by the Monte de Tenteyros, and, entering the valley of the Avia, follows the course of that river to Ribidavia, a considerable town, situated at the confluence of the Avia with the Minho, having a stone bridge over the former, and a barque ferry on the latter river. The third, turning the sources of the Avia, connects St. Jago with Orense, and from Orense another road passes along the right bank of the Minho, and

* Muster rolls of the French army, MSS.

† S. Journal of Operations of the second corps, MSS.

* Romana's Manifesto.

connects the towns of Ribidavia, Salvatierra, and Tuy, ending at Guardia, a small fortress at the mouth of the Minho.

As the shortest route to Oporto, and the only one convenient for the artillery, was that leading by Redondela and Tuy, and from thence by the coast, the duke of Dalmatia formed the plan of passing the Minho between Salvatierra and Guardia;* wherefore on the 1st of February, Franceschi, followed by the other divisions in succession, took the Pontevedra road, and at Redondela defeated a small body of insurgents, and captured four pieces of cannon, after which Vigo surrendered to one of his detachments, while he himself marched upon Tuy, and took possession of that town and Guardia. During these operations La Houssaye's dragoons, quitting Mellid, had crossed the Monte de Tenteyro, passed through Ribidavia, and taken possession of Salvatierra, on the Minho; and general Soult, the marshal's brother, who had assembled three thousand stragglers and convalescents, between Astorga and Carrion, received orders to enter Portugal by Puebla de Senabria, and thus join the main body.

The rainy season was in full torrent, every stream and river overflowed its banks, the roads were deep, and the difficulty of procuring provisions great. These things, and the delivering over to marshal Ney the administration of Ferrol and Coruña, where the Spanish government and Spanish garrisons were not only retained but paid by the French, delayed the rear of the army so long that it was not until the 15th or 16th that the whole of the divisions were assembled on the Minho, between Salvatierra, Guardia, and Redondela.

The Minho, from Melgaço to the mouth, forms the frontier of Portugal, the banks on both sides being guarded by a number of fortresses, originally of considerable strength, but at this time all in a dilapidated condition. The Spanish fort of Guardia fronted the Portuguese fort of Caminha; Tuy was opposed by Valenza; which was garrisoned, and the works in somewhat a better condition than the rest; Lapella, Moncao, and Melgaço, completed the Portuguese line. But the best defence at this moment was the Minho itself, which, at all times a considerable river, was now a broad and raging flood, and the Portuguese *ordenanzas* and militia who were in arms on the other side had removed all the boats. Nevertheless Soult, after examining the banks with care, decided upon passing at Campo Saucos, a little village where the ground was flatter, more favourable and so close to Caminha that the army, once across, could easily seize that place, and the same day reach Viana on the Lima, from whence to Oporto was only three marches.

To attract the attention of the Portuguese, La Houssaye, who was at Salvatierra, spread his dragoons along the Minho, and attempted to push small parties across that river, above Melgaço; but the bulk of the army was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Campo Saucos, and a detachment seized the small seaport of Bayona, in the rear. A division of infantry, and three hundred French marines released at Coruña and attached to the second corps, were then employed to transport some large fishing boats and some heavy guns from the harbour and fort of Guardia overland to Campo Saucos. This was effected by the help of rollers over more than two miles of rugged and hilly ground; it was a work of infinite labour, but from the 11th to the 15th, the troops toiled unceasingly, and the craft was launched in a small lake at the confluence of the Tamuga river with the Minho.

In the night of the 15th the heavy guns were placed in battery, and three hundred soldiers being embarked, the boats manned by the marines, dropped silently down the Tamuga into the Minho, and endeavoured to reach the Portuguese side of the latter river during the

darkness; yet whether from the violence of the flood, or want of skill in the men, the landing was not effected before day-break, and the *ordenanza* fell with great fury upon the first who got on shore, the foremost being all slain, the others pulled back, and regained their own side with great difficulty. This action was infinitely creditable to the Portuguese, and it had a surprising influence on the issue of the campaign. It was a gallant action, because it might reasonably have been expected that a tumultuous assemblage of half-armed peasants, collected on the instant, would have been dismayed at the sight of many boats filled with soldiers, some pulling across and others landing under the protection of a heavy battery that thundered from the midst of a multitude of troops, who clustered on the heights, or thronged to the edge of the opposite bank in eager expectation. It was an event of leading importance, inasmuch as it baffled an attempt that, being successful, would have ensured the fall of Oporto by the 21st of February, which was precisely the period when general Mackenzie's division being at Cadiz, sir John Cradock's troops were reduced to almost nothing; when the English ministers only waited for an excuse to abandon Portugal; when the people of that country were in the very extremity of disorder; when the Portuguese army was a nullity, and when the regency was evidently preparing to receive the French with submission. It was the period, also, when Soult was expected to be at Lisbon, following the Emperor's orders, and, consequently, Lapisse and Victor could not have avoided to fulfil their part of the plan for the subjugation of Portugal.

The duke of Dalmatia's situation was now, although not one of imminent danger, extremely embarrassing, and more than ordinary quickness and vigour were required to conduct the operations with success. Posted in a narrow, contracted position, he was hemmed in on the left by the Spanish insurgents, who had assembled immediately after La Houssaye passed Orense, and who, being possessed of a very rugged and difficult country, were, moreover, supported by the army of Romana, which was said to be at Orense and Ribidavia. In the French general's front was the Minho, broad, raging, and at the moment impassable, while heavy rains forbade the hope that its waters would decrease. To collect sufficient means for forcing a passage would have required sixteen days, but long before that period, the subsistence for the army would have entirely failed, and the Portuguese, being alarmed, would have greatly augmented their forces on the opposite bank. There remained then only to retrace his steps to St. Jago, or breaking through the Spanish insurgents, to ascend the Minho, and open a way into Portugal by some other route.

Soult's attempt to pass the river had been baffled on the 15th of February, and on the 16th he was in full march towards Ribidavia upon a new line of operations, and this promptitude of decision was supported by an equally prompt execution. La Houssaye, with his dragoons, quitted Salvatierra, and, keeping the edge of the Minho, was galled by the fire of the Portuguese from the opposite bank, and before evening, he twice broke the insurgent bands, and, in revenge for some previous excesses of the peasantry, burnt the villages of Morentan and Cobreira: meanwhile the main body of the army, passing the Tea river, at Salvatierra and Puente d'Arcos, marched, by successive divisions, along the main road from Tuy to Ribidavia.

Between Franquera and Canizar the route was cut by the streams of the Morenta and Noguera rivers, and behind those torrents, eight hundred Gallicians, having barricaded the bridges and repulsed the advanced parties of cavalry, stood upon their defence. The 17th, at daybreak, the leading brigade of Heudelet's division forced the passage, and pursued the Spaniards briskly, but, when within a short distance of Ribidavia, the

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

latter rallied upon eight or ten thousand insurgents, arrayed in order of battle, on a strong hill, covering the approaches to that town. At this sight the advanced guard halted until the remainder of the division and a brigade of cavalry were come up, and then, under the personal direction of Soult, the French assailed and drove the Gallicians, fighting, through the town and across the Avia. The loss of the vanquished was very considerable, the bodies of twenty priests were found amongst the slain, and either from fear or patriotism, every inhabitant had quitted Ribidavia.

The 18th, a brigade of infantry scouring the valley of the Avia, dispersed three or four thousand of the insurgents, who were disposed to make a second stand on that side; a second brigade, pushing on to Barbantes, seized a ferry-boat on the Minho, close to that place, and being joined, the same evening, by the infantry who had scoured the valley of the Avia, and by Franceschi's cavalry, on the 19th entered Orense in time to prevent the bridge over the Minho from being cut; La Houssaye's dragoons then took post at Maside, while the remainder of the horse and Laborde's infantry united at Ribidavia; the artillery were however still between Tuy and Salvatierra, under the protection of Merle's and Mermet's divisions. Thus, in three days, the duke of Dalmatia had, with admirable celerity and vigour, extricated his army from a contracted unfavourable country, strangled a formidable insurrection in its birth, and at the same time opened a fresh line of communication with St. Jago, and an easy passage into Portugal.

The 20th, a regiment being sent across the Minho, by the ferries of Barbantes and Ribidavia, defeated the insurgents of the left bank, advanced to the Arroyo river, and took post on the heights of Merea. The army with the exception of the division guarding the guns was concentrated the same day at Orense; but the efforts of the artillery had been baffled by the difficulties of the road from Tuy to Ribidavia, and this circumstance viewed in conjunction with the precarious state of the communication, a daily increasing sick-list, and the number of small detachments required to protect the rear, seemed to forbid the invasion of Portugal. A man of ordinary genius would have failed. The duke of Dalmatia with ready boldness resolved to throw the greatest part of his artillery and the whole of his other incumbrances into Tuy, as a place of arms, then relinquishing all communication with Galicia, for the moment, to march in one mass directly upon Oporto; from whence, if successful, he proposed to re-open his communication with Tuy, by the line of the coast, recover his artillery and re-establish a regular system of operations.

In pursuance of this resolution, sixteen of the lightest guns and six howitzers, with a proportion of ammunition-waggons, were, with infinite labour, and difficulty, transported to Ribidavia; the remaining thirty-six pieces and a vast parc of carriages, carrying ammunition, and hospital, and commissariat stores, were put into Tuy, where general La Martiniere was left with an establishment of artillery and engineer officers, a garrison of five hundred men fit to carry arms, and nine hundred sick.* All the stragglers, convalescents, and detachments, coming from St. Jago, and the military chest, which was still in the rear, guarded by six hundred infantry, were likewise directed upon Tuy, the gates were shut, and La Martiniere was abandoned to his own resources.

The men in hospital at Ribidavia were now forwarded to Orense, and the marshal's quarters were established at the latter town on the 24th, but other obstacles were to be vanquished before the army could commence the march into Portugal. The gun-carriages

had been so shaken in the transit from Tuy to Ribidavia that three days were required to repair them; it was extremely difficult to obtain provisions, and numerous bands of the peasants were still in arms, nor were they quelled until combats had taken place at Gurzo, on the Monte Blanco, in the Val d'Ornes, and up the valley of Avia, in which the French wasted time, lost men, and expended ammunition that could not be replaced. Soult endeavoured to soften the people's feelings by kindness and soothing proclamations; and as he enforced a strict discipline among his troops, his humane and politic demeanour, joined to the activity of his moveable columns, abated the fierceness of the peasantry. The inhabitants of Ribidavia soon returned to their houses, those of Orense had never been very violent, and now becoming friendly, even lent assistance to procure provisions. It was not, however, an easy task to restrain the soldiers within the bounds of humanity: the frequent combats, the assassination, the torturing of isolated men, and the privations endured, had so exasperated the French troops, that the utmost exertions of their general's authority could not always control their revenge.

While the duke of Dalmatia was thus preparing for a formidable inroad, his adversaries were a prey to the most horrible anarchy. The bishop, always intent to increase his own power, had assembled little short of fifty thousand armed persons in Oporto, and commenced a gigantic line of entrenchment on the hills to the northward of that city. This worse than useless labour so completely occupied all persons, that the defence of the strong country lying between the Duero and the Minho was totally neglected, and when the second corps appeared on the bank of the latter river, the northern provinces were struck with terror; then it was that the people, for the first time, understood the extent of their danger; then it was that the bishop, aroused from his intrigues, became sensible that the French were more terrible enemies than the regency. Once impressed with this truth, he became clamorous for succour; he recalled Sir Robert Wilson from the Agueda, he hurried on the labour of the entrenchments, and he earnestly pressed sir John Cradock for assistance, demanding arms, ammunition, and a reinforcement of British soldiers. Sir Robert Wilson, as I have already related, disregarded his orders; but the British general, although he refused to furnish him with troops, supplied him with arms, and very ample stores of powder, sending artillery and engineer officers to superintend the construction of the defensive works, and to aid in the arrangements for a reasonable system of operations.

The people were, however, become too headstrong and licentious to be controlled, or even advised, and the soldiers being drawn into the vortex of insubordination, universal and hopeless confusion prevailed. Don Bernadim Friere was the legal commander-in-chief of the Entre Minho e Douro, but all the generals claimed equal and independent authority, each over his own force; and this was, perhaps, a matter of self-preservation, for general and traitor were, at that period, almost synonymous; to obey the orders of a superior against the momentary wishes of the multitude was to incur instant death. Nor were there men wanting who found it profitable to inflame the passions of the mob, and direct its blind vengeance against innocent persons adverse to the prelate's faction, which was not without opponents even in Oporto.

Such was the unhappy state of affairs, when the undisciplined gallantry of the peasants, baffling the efforts of the French to cross the Minho at Campo Saucos, obliged Soult to march by Orense. A part of the regular troops were immediately sent forward to the Cavado river, where they were joined by the *ordenanzas* and the militia of the district, but all in a state of fearful insub-

* S. Journal of operations, MSS.

ordination, and there were no arrangements made for the regular distribution of provisions, or of any one necessary supply. Among the troops despatched from Oporto was the second battalion of the Lusitanian legion, nine hundred strong, well armed, well equipped, and commanded by baron Eben, a native of Prussia, who, without any known services to recommend him, had suddenly attained the rank of major in the British service. This man destined to act a conspicuous part in Portuguese tragedy, had been left at Oporto when sir Robert Wilson marched to Almeida; his orders were to follow with the second battalion of the legion, when its clothing and equipment should be completed, but he retained the troops, to push his own fortune under the prelate's auspices.

General Freire having reached the Cavado, was joined by fourteen or fifteen thousand militia and *ordenanzas*; fixing his head-quarters at Braga, he sent detachments to occupy the posts of Salamonde and Ruivaens in his front, and, unfortunately for himself, endeavoured to restrain his troops from wasting their ammunition by wanton firing in the streets and on the roads. This exertion of command was heinously resented; Freire, being willing to uphold the authority of the regency, had been for some time obnoxious to the bishop's faction; already he was pointed to as a suspected person, and the multitude were inimically disposed towards him.

Meanwhile, general Silveira, assuming the command of the *Tras os Montes*, advanced to Chaves, and put himself in communication with the marquis of Romana, who, having remained tranquil at Oimbra and Monterey since the 21st of January, had been joined by his dispersed troops, and was again at the head of nine or ten thousand men. Silveira's force was about four thousand, half regulars, half militia, and he was accompanied by many of the *ordenanzas*; but here, as elsewhere, all were licentious, insubordinate, and disdainful of their general; moreover the national enmity between them and the Spaniards having overcome their sense of a common cause and common danger, the latter were evilly treated, and a deadly feud subsisted between the two armies. The generals, indeed, agreed to act in concert, offensively and defensively, yet neither of them were the least acquainted with the numbers, intention, or even the position of their antagonists: and it is a proof of Romana's unfitness for command that he, having the whole population at his disposal, was yet ignorant of every thing, relating to his enemy that it behoved him to know. The whole of the French force in Galicia, at this period, was about forty-five thousand men, Romana estimated it at twenty-one thousand; the number under Soult was above twenty-four thousand, Romana supposed it to be twelve thousand; and among these he included general Marchand's division of the sixth corps, which he always imagined to be a part of the duke of Dalmatia's army.

The Spanish general was so elated at the spirit of the peasants about Ribidavia, that he anticipated nothing but victory; he knew also that on the Arosa, an estuary, running up towards St. Jago de Compostella, the inhabitants of Villa Garcia had risen, and, being joined by all the neighbouring districts, were preparing to attack Vigo and Tuy; hence, partly from his Spanish temperament, partly from his extreme ignorance of war, he was convinced that the French only thought of making their escape out of Galicia, and that even in that they would be disappointed. To effect their destruction more certainly, he also, as we have seen, pestered sir John Cradock for succours in money and ammunition, and desired that the insurgents on the Arosa might be assisted with a thousand British soldiers.* Cradock anxious to support the cause, although he refused the troops, sent ammunition, and five thou-

sand pounds in money, but before it arrived Romana was beaten, and in flight.

The combined Spanish and Portuguese forces, amounting to sixteen thousand regulars and militia, besides *ordenanzas*, were posted in a straggling unconnected manner along the valley of the Tamega, extending from Monterey, Verim, and Villaza, to near Chaves, a distance of more than fifteen miles. This was the first line of defence for Portugal. Freire and Eben, with fourteen guns and twenty-five thousand men, were at Braga, in second line, their outposts being on the Cavado and at the strong passes of Ruivaens and Venda Nova; but of these twenty-five thousand only six thousand were armed with muskets, and it is to be observed that the militia and troops of the line differed from the armed peasantry only in name, save that their faulty discipline and mutinous disposition rendered them less active and intelligent as skirmishers, without making them fitter for battle. The bishop, with his disorderly and furious rabble, formed the third line, occupying the entrenchments that covered Oporto. Such was the state of affairs, and such were the dispositions made to resist the duke of Dalmatia; but his army, although galled and wearied by continual toil, and, when halting, disturbed and vexed by the multitude of insurrections, was, when in motion, of a power to overthrow and disperse these numerous bands, even as a great ship feeling the wind, breaks through and scatters the gun-boats that have gathered round her in the calm.

CHAPTER II.

Soult enters Portugal—Action at Monterey—Franceschi makes great slaughter of the Spaniards—Portuguese retreat upon Chaves—Romana flies to Puebla Senabria—Portuguese mutiny—Three thousand throw themselves into Chaves—Soult takes that town—Marches upon Braga—Forces the defiles of Ruivaens and Venda Nova—Tumults and disorders in the Portuguese camp at Braga—Murder of general Freire and others—Battle of Braga—Soult marches against Oporto—Disturbed state of that town—Silveira retakes Chaves—The French force the passage of the Ave—The Portuguese murder their general Vallonga—French appear in front of Oporto—Negotiate with the bishop—Violence of the people—General Foy taken—Battle of Oporto—The city stormed with great slaughter.

SECOND INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

THE Entre Minho e Douro and the *Tras os Montes* lying together, form the northern part of Portugal; the extreme breadth of either, when measured from the frontier to the Douro, does not exceed seventy miles.

The river Tamega, running north and south, and discharging itself into the Douro, forms the boundary line between them; but there is, to the west of this river, a succession of rugged mountain ridges, which, under the names of Sierra de Gerez, Sierra de Cabrera, and Sierra de Santa Catalina, form a second barrier, nearly parallel to the Tamega, and across some part of these ridges, an invader coming from the eastward, must pass to arrive at Oporto.

Other Sierras, running also in a parallel direction with the Tamega, cut the *Tras os Montes* in such a manner, that all the considerable rivers flowing north and south tumble into the Douro. But as the western ramifications of the Sierras de Gerez and Cabrera shoot down towards the sea, the rivers of the Entre Douro e Minho discharge their waters into the ocean, and consequently flow at right angles to those of *Tras os Montes*. Hence it follows, that an enemy penetrating to Oporto, from the north, would have to pass the Lima, the Cavado, and the Ave, to reach Oporto; and if, coming from the east, he invaded the *Tras os Montes*, all the rivers and intervening ridges of that province must be crossed, before the Entre Minho e Douro could be reached.

* Cradock's Correspondence, MSS.

The duke of Dalmatia was, however, now in such a position, near the sources of the Lima and the Tamega rivers, that he could choose whether to penetrate by the valley of the first into the Entre Minho e Douro, or by the valley of the second into the Tras os Montes, and there was also a third road, leading between those rivers through Montalegre upon Braga; but this latter route, passing over the Sierra de Gerez, was impracticable for artillery.

The French general had, therefore, to consider—

1. If, following the course of the Lima, he should disperse the insurgents between that river and the Minho, and then recovering his artillery from Tuy, proceed against Oporto by the main road leading along the sea coast.

2. If he should descend the Tamega, take Chaves, and then continuing his route to Villa Real, near the Douro, take the defences of Tras os Montes in reverse; or, turning to the right, cross the Sierra de Cabrera by the pass of Ruivaens, enter Braga, and so go against Oporto.

The first project was irregular, and hazardous, inasmuch as Romana and Silveira could have fallen upon the flank and rear of the French during their march through a difficult country; but as the position of those generals covered Chaves, to attack them was a preliminary measure to either plan, and with this object, Soult moved on the 4th of March. The 5th, his van being at Villa Real and Penaverde, he sent a letter by a flag of truce to Romana in which after exposing all the danger of the latter's situation, he advised him to submit; no answer was returned, nor would the bearer have been suffered to pass the outposts, but that Romana himself was in the rear, for he dreaded that such an occurrence would breed a jealousy of his conduct, and, perhaps, cause his patriotism to be undervalued.*

This failing, three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry marched the next morning against Monterey, while La Houssaye's dragoons, taking the road of Laza, covered the left flank, and pushed parties as far as La Gudina, on the route of Puebla de Senabria. The fourth division of infantry remained at Villa del Rey, to cover the passage of the sick and wounded men from Orense, for the duke of Dalmatia, having no base of operations, transported his hospitals, and other incumbrances, from place to place as the army moved; acting in this respect after the manner of the Roman generals, when invading a barbarous country.

As the French advanced, the Spaniards abandoned their positions in succession, spiked the guns in the dilapidated works of Monterey, and after a slight skirmish at Verim, took the road to Puebla de Senabria; but Franceschi followed close, and overtaking two or three thousand as they were passing a rugged mountain, assailed their rear with a battalion of infantry, and at the same time leading his horsemen round both flanks, headed the column, and obliged it to halt.† The Spaniards, trusting to the rough ground, drew up in one large square to receive the charge. Franceschi had four regiments of cavalry, each regiment settled itself against the face of a square, and then the whole, with loud cries, bore down swiftly upon their opponents; the latter unsteady, irresolute, dismayed, shrunk from the fierce assault, and were instantly trampled down in heaps. Those who escaped the horses' hoofs and the edge of the sword became prisoners, but twelve hundred bodies were stretched lifeless on the field of battle, and Franceschi continued his movements on La Gudina.

Romana was at Semadems, several miles in the rear of Verim, when his vanguard was attacked, and there was nothing to prevent him from falling back to Chaves with his main body, according to a plan before

agreed upon between him and Silveira; but either from fear, or indignation at the treatment his soldiers had received at the hands of the Portuguese, he left Silveira to his fate, and made off with six or seven thousand men towards Bragança; from thence passing by Puebla de Senabria, he regained the valley of the Syl. Meanwhile, two thousand Portuguese infantry, with some guns, issuing from the side of Villaza, cut the French line of march at the moment when Franceschi and Heudelet having passed Monterey, Laborde was approaching that place; a slight combat ensued, the Portuguese lost their guns, and were driven down the valley of the Tamega as far as the village of Outeiro, within their own frontier.* This defeat, and the flight of Romana, had such an effect upon the surrounding districts that the Spanish insurgents returned in crowds to their habitations and delivered up their arms. Some of the clergy, also, changing their opinions, exhorted the people to peace, and the prisoners taken on the 6th, being dissatisfied with Romana's conduct, and moved by their hatred of the Portuguese, entered the French service.

These affairs occupied Soult until the 9th, during which period his outposts were pushed towards Chaves, Montalegre, and La Gudina, but the main body remained at Verim to cover the arrival of the sick at Monterey, while Silveira, thus beaten at Villaza, and deserted by Romana, fell back on the 7th to a strong mountain position, one league behind Chaves, from whence he could command a view of all the French movements as far as Monterey; his ground was advantageous, but his military talents were moderate, his men, always insubordinate, were now mutinous, and many of the officers were disposed to join the French. He wished to abandon Chaves, but his troops resolved to defend it, and three thousand five hundred men actually did throw themselves into that town, in defiance of him; for he was already, according to the custom of the day, pronounced a traitor and declared worthy of that death which he would inevitably have suffered, but that some of his soldiers still continued to respect his orders.

The 10th, the convoy of French sick was close to Monterey, and as Romana's movement was known to be a real flight, and not made with a design to create fresh insurrections in the rear, the French troops were again put in motion towards Chaves;† Merle's division however remained at Verim to protect the hospital, and Franceschi's took the road of La Gudina, as if he had been going towards Salamanca. A report that he had actually entered that town reached Lisbon, and was taken as an indication that Soult would not pass the Portuguese frontier at Chaves, but Franceschi quickly returned, by Osonio and Feces de Abaxa, and being assisted by Heudelet's division, invested Chaves on the left bank of the Tamega, while Laborde, Mermet, La Houssaye, and Lorge, descending the right bank, beat the Portuguese outposts, and getting possession of a fort close under the walls, completed the investment of the town. The place was immediately summoned to surrender, but no answer was returned, and the garrison, like men bereft of their wits and fighting with the air, kept up a continual fire of musketry and artillery until the 12th, when they surrendered on receiving a second summons, more menacing than the first. The 13th the French entered the town, and Silveira retired to Villa Real.

The works of Chaves were in a bad state; few of the fifty guns mounted on the ramparts were fit for service, but there was a stone-bridge, and the town was in many respects more suitable for a place of arms than Monterey; wherefore the sick were brought down from the latter place, and an hospital was established for twelve hundred men, the number now unfit to carry arms. The fighting men were reduced to twenty-one

* Sir J. Cradock's papers, MSS.

† S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

† Ibid.

thousand, and Soult, partly from the difficulty of guarding his prisoners, partly from a desire to abate the hostility of the Portuguese, permitted the militia and *ordenancas* to return to their homes, after taking an oath not to resume their arms; to some of the poorest he also gave money and clothes, and he enrolled, at their own request, the few regular troops taken in Chaves.

This wise and gentle proceeding was much blamed by some of his officers, especially by those who had served under Junot.* They desired that Chaves might be assaulted, and the garrison put to the sword, for they were embued with a personal hatred of the Portuguese, and being averse to serve in the present expedition, endeavoured as it would appear, to thwart their general, yet the prudence of his conduct was immediately visible in the softened feelings of the country people, and the scouting parties being no longer molested spread themselves, some on the side of Bragança and Villa Real, others in the Entre Minho e Douro.† The former reported that there was no enemy in a condition to make head in the *Tras os Montes*, but the latter fell in with the advanced guard of Freire's army at Ruivaens, on the road to Braga.

From Chaves Soult could operate against Oporto, either by the *Tras os Montes* or the *Entre Minho e Douro*, the latter presented the strongest position, but the road was shorter and more practicable for guns, than that by the valley of the Tamega, and the communication with Tuy could be sooner recovered; hence, when the scouts brought intelligence that a Portuguese army was at Braga, the French general decided to penetrate by that line.‡

The road from Chaves to Braga entered a deep and dangerous defile, or rather a succession of defiles, which extended from Venda Nova to Ruivaens, and re-commenced after passing the Cabado river; Freire's advanced guards, composed of *ordenancas*, occupied those places, and he had also a detachment under Eben on the road of Montalegre; he however recalled the latter on the 14th, on the 16th Franceschi forced the defile of Nova; and the remainder of the French army being formed in alternate masses of cavalry and infantry, began to pass the Sierra de Cabrera; meanwhile Lorge's dragoons descending the Tamega, ordered rations for the whole army along the road to Villa Real, and then, suddenly retracing their steps, rejoined the main body.

The 17th, Franceschi, being reinforced with some infantry, won the bridge of Ruivaens, and entered Salamonde; the Portuguese, covered by Eben's detachment, which had arrived at St. Joa de Campo, then fell back on the Pico de Pugalados, close to Braga, and Franceschi took post at Carvalho Este, two leagues in front of that city.

Soult now expecting to reach Braga without further opposition, caused his artillery, guarded by Laborde's division, to enter the pass of Venda Nova; but the *ordenancas*, reinforced by some men from the side of Guimaraens, immediately re-assembled, and clustering on the mountains to the left of the column of march, attacked it with great fierceness and subtlety.

The peasants of the northern provinces of Portugal, unlike the squalid miserable population of Lisbon and Oporto, are robust, handsome, and exceedingly brave; their natural disposition is open and obliging, and they are, when rightly handled as soldiers, docile, intelligent, and hardy. They are, however, vehement in their anger; and being now excited by the exhortations and personal example of their priests, they came rushing down the sides of the hills, and many of them, like men deprived of reason, broke furiously into the French battalions, and were there killed. The others, finding

their efforts unavailing, fled, and were pursued a league up the mountain by some battalions sent out against them; yet they were not abashed, and making a circuit behind the hills, fell upon the rear of the line of march, killed fifty of the stragglers, and plundered the baggage. Thus galled, the French slowly, and with much trouble, passed the long defiles of Venda Nova, Ruivaens, and Salamonde, and gathered by degrees in front of Freire's position.*

That general was no more; and his troops, reeking from the slaughter of their commander, were raging, like savage beasts, at one moment congregating near the prisons to murder some wretch within, at another rushing tumultuously to the outposts, with a design to engage the enemy. The *ordenancas* of the distant districts also came pouring into the camp, dragging with them suspected persons, and adding to the general distraction.†

The unfortunate Freire, unable to establish order in his army, had resolved to retreat, and in pursuance of that design, recalled Eben on the 14th, giving directions to the officers at the different outposts in front of Braga to retire at the approach of the enemy. This, and his endeavour to prevent the waste of ammunition, gave effect to a plan which had been long prepared by the bishop's faction for his destruction. In passing through Braga, he was openly reviled in the streets by some of the *ordenancas*; and as the latter plainly discovered their murderous intention, he left the army; he was however seized on the 17th, at a village behind Braga, and brought back: what followed is thus described by baron Eben, in his official report to sir John Cradock:

"I did not reach Braga until nine o'clock in the morning of the 17th. I found every thing in the greatest disorder; the houses shut, the people flying in all directions, and part of the populace armed with guns and pikes. Passing through the streets, I was greeted with loud *vivas*. Though the people knew me, I could not guess the meaning of this. At the market-place, I was detained by the rapidly increasing populace, who took the reins of my horse, crying out loudly, that they were ready to do any thing to defend the city; requesting me to assist them, and speaking in the lowest terms of their general. I promised them to do all in my power to aid their patriotic zeal; but said that I must first speak to him. Upon this, they suffered me to proceed, accompanied by about a hundred of them: but I had not got far on my way to his quarters, when I saw him on foot, conducted by a great armed multitude, who suffered no one to pass, and on my attempting it, threatened to fire. I was, therefore, obliged to turn my horse, and this the people applauded. Two men had hold of the general's arms, his sword was taken from him, and the people abused him most vehemently. On my way back to the market-place, they wanted to shoot me, taking me for general Freire; but I was saved by a soldier of the legion, who explained the mistake. When I reached the market-place, I found about a thousand men drawn up: I communicated to them my determination to assist them in their laudable endeavours to defend themselves, provided they would first permit me to speak to the general, for whose actions I promised to be answerable as long as I should be with him. I had ordered a house to be got ready for my reception, where the general arrived, accompanied as before; I saluted him with respect, at which they plainly discovered their disapprobation. I repeated my proposal, but they would not listen to it. I perceived the danger of the general, and proposed to take him to my quarters. My adjutant offered him his arm: when I spoke to him, he only replied, 'save me!'

* Noble's Campaign de Galice.

† Journal of Operations, MSS.

‡ Ibid.

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

† Eben's Report, MSS. Sir J. Cradock's Papers.

"At the entrance of my house, I was surrounded by thousands, and heard the loud cry of 'kill! kill!' I now took hold of him, and attempted to force my way into the house, and a gentleman slightly wounded him with the point of his sword, under my arm. He collected all his strength, rushed through them, and hid himself behind the door of the house. The people surrounded me, and forced me from the house. To draw the attention of the people from the general, I ordered the drummers to beat the alarm, and formed the *ordenancas* in ranks; but they kept a constant fire upon my house, where the general still was. As a last attempt to save him, I now proposed that he should be conducted to prison, in order to take a legal trial; this was agreed to, and he was conducted there in safety. I now hoped that I had succeeded, as the people demanded to be led against the enemy, now rapidly advancing, in number about two thousand. I again formed them, and advanced with them; but soon after, I heard the firing again, and was informed that the people had put the general to death with pikes and guns. I was now proclaimed general."

When this murder was perpetrated, the people seemed satisfied, and Eben announcing the approach of a British force from Oporto, sent orders to the outposts to stand fast, as he intended to fight; but another tumult arose, when it was discovered that an officer of Freire's staff, one Villaboas, was in Eben's quarters. Several thousand *ordenancas* instantly gathered about the house, and the unhappy man was haled forth and stabbed to death at the door, the mob all the time shouting and firing volleys in at the windows.* Yet, when their fury was somewhat abated, they obliged their new general to come out and show that he had not been wounded, and expressed great affection for him.

In the course of the night the legion marched in from Pico de Pugalados, and the following morning a reinforcement of six thousand *ordenancas* came up in one mass. Fifty thousand dollars also arrived in the camp from Oporto; for the Portuguese, like the Spaniards, commonly reversed the order of military arrangements, leaving their weapons in store, and bringing their encumbrances to the field of battle. In the evening the corregidor and two officers of rank, together with many persons of a meaner class, were brought to the town as prisoners and put in jail, the armed mob being with difficulty restrained from slaying them on the way thither. In this distracted manner they were proceeding when Franceschi arrived at Carvalho on the 17th, and, surely, if that bold and enterprising soldier could have obtained a glimpse of what was passing, or known the real state of affairs, he would have broke into the midst of them with his cavalry; for, of the twenty-five thousand men composing the whole of the Portuguese force, eighteen thousand were only armed with pikes, the remainder had wasted the greatest part of their ammunition, and the powder in store was not made up in cartridges.† But Braga, situated in a deep hollow, was hidden from him, and the rocky and wooded hills surrounding it were occupied by what appeared a formidable multitude; hence Franceschi, although reinforced by a brigade of infantry, was satisfied by feints and slight skirmishes to alarm his opponents, and to keep them in play until the other divisions of the French army could arrive.

While these events were passing at Braga, Silveira again collected a considerable force of militia and *ordenancas* in the *Tras os Montes*, and captain Arentschild, one of the officers sent by sir John Cradock to aid the bishop, also rallied a number of fugitives at Guimaraens and Amarante. In Oporto, however, the multitude, obeying no command, were more intent upon murder than upon defence.

Eben's posts extended from Falperra, on the route of Guimaraens to the Ponte Porto, on the Cavado river; but his principal force was stationed on a lofty ridge called the Monte Adaufé, which, at the distance of six or seven miles from Braga, crossed the road to Chaves. The left, or western, end, overhanging the river Cavado, covered the detachment guarding the Ponte Porto. The right was wooded and masked by the head of a deep ravine, but beyond this wooded ridge, taking a curved and forward direction, was called the Monte Vallonga, and a second mass of men was posted there, but separated from those on the Monte Adaufé by an interval of two miles, and by the ravine and wood before mentioned. A third body, being pushed still more in advance, crowned an isolated hill, flanking the Chaves road, being intended to take the French in rear when the latter should attack the Monte Adaufé.

Behind the Monte Vallonga, and separated from it by a valley three miles wide, the ridge of Falperra was guarded by detachments from Guimaraens and from Braga.

The road to Braga, leading directly over the centre of the Monte Adaufé, was flanked on the left by a ridge shooting perpendicularly out from that mountain, and ending in a lofty mass of rocks which overhangs Carvalho Esté. But the Portuguese neglected to occupy either these rocks or the connecting ridge, and Franceschi seized the former on the 17th.

The 18th, Soult arrived in person, and, wishing to prevent a battle, released twenty prisoners, and sent them in with a proclamation couched in conciliatory language, and offering a capitulation; the trumpeter who accompanied them was however detained, and the prisoners were immediately slain. The next day Eben brought up all his reserves to the Adaufé, and the Portuguese on the isolated hill in front of Monte Vallonga took possession of Lanhzoa, a village half-way between that hill and the rocky height occupied by Franceschi on the 17th.

Two divisions of French infantry being now up, Soult caused one of them and the cavalry to attack Lanhzoa, from whence the Portuguese were immediately driven, and, being followed closely, lost their own hill also. The other French division took post, part in Carvalho, part on the rocky headland, and six guns were carried to the latter during the night; in this position the French columns were close to the centre of the Portuguese, and could, by a slight movement in advance, separate Eben's wings. The rest of the army was at hand, and a general attack was arranged for the next morning.

BATTLE OF BRAGA.

The 20th, at nine o'clock, the French were in motion: Franceschi and Mermet, leaving a detachment on the hill they had carried the night before, endeavoured to turn the right of the people on the Monte Vallonga.

Laborde, supported by la Houssaye's dragoons, advanced against the centre by the ridge connecting Carvalho with the Monte Adaufé.*

Heudelet, with a part of his division and a squadron of cavalry, attacked Eben's left, with the view of seizing the Ponte Porto.

The Portuguese opened a straggling fire of musketry and artillery in the centre, but after a few rounds, the bursting of a gun created a confusion, from which Laborde's rapidly-advancing masses gave them no time to recover.† By ten o'clock the whole of the centre was flying in disorder down a narrow wooded valley leading from the Adaufé to Braga; the French followed hard, and having discovered one of their men, who had been a prisoner, mutilated in a dreadful man-

* Eben's Report, MS.

† Cradock's Papers, MSS. S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS. † Eben's Report, MS.

ner, and still alive, they gave no quarter. Braga was abandoned, and the victorious infantry passing through, took post on the other side, while the cavalry continued the havoc for some distance on the road to Oporto; yet, so savage was the temper of the fugitives that, in passing through Braga, they stopped to murder the corregidor and other prisoners in the jail, then casting the mangled bodies into the street, continued their flight.* Meanwhile the centre was forced, and Heudelet, breaking over the left of the Monte Adaufe, descended upon Ponte Porto, and after a sharp skirmish, carried that bridge and the village on the other side of the Cavado.

Franceschi and Mermet found considerable difficulty in ascending the rugged sides of the Monte Vallonga, but having, at last, attained the crest, the whole of their enemies fled, and the two generals crossed the valley to gain the road of Guimaraens, and cut off that line of retreat; but they fell in with the three thousand Portuguese posted above Falperra, and these men, seeing the cavalry approach, drew up with their backs to some high rocks, and opened a fire of artillery. Franceschi immediately placed his horsemen on either flank, a brigade of infantry against the front, and, as at Verim, making all charge together, strewed the ground with the dead. Nevertheless, the Portuguese fought valiantly at this point, and Franceschi acknowledged it. The vanquished lost all their artillery and above four thousand men, of which four hundred only were made prisoners. Some of the fugitives crossing the Cavado river, made for the Ponte de Lima, others retired to Oporto, but the greatest number took the road of Guimaraens, during the fight at Falperra. Eben appears, by his own official report, to have been at Braga when the action commenced, and to have fled among the first, for he makes no mention of the fight at Falperra, nor of the skirmish at Ponte Porto, and his narrative bears every mark of inaccuracy.†

Braga was at first abandoned by the inhabitants, they returned however the next day, and when the French outposts were established, general Lorge, crossing the Cavado, entered Bacellos; he was well received by the corregidor, for which the latter was a few days afterwards hanged by the Portuguese general, Botilho, who commanded between the Lima and the Minho. At Braga provisions were found, and a large store of powder, which was immediately made up in cartridges for the use of the French; the gun-carriages and ammunition-waggons, which had been very much damaged, were again repaired, and an hospital was established for eight hundred sick and wounded: hence it may be judged, that the loss sustained in action since the 15th, was not less than six hundred men.

The French general having thus broken through the second Portuguese line of defence could either march directly upon Oporto, or recover his communication with Tuy. He resolved upon the former, 1. because he knew through his spies and by intercepted letters that Tuy, although besieged, was in no distress; that its guns overpowered those of the Portuguese fortress of Valença on the opposite bank of the Minho, and that the garrison made successful sallies. 2. Because information reached him that sixty thousand men, troops of the line, militia, and *ordenanca*, were assembled in the intrenched camp covering Oporto, and his scouts reported also that the Portuguese were in force at Guimaraens, and had broken the bridges along the whole course of the Ave. It was essential to crush these large bodies before they could acquire any formidable consistency; wherefore Soult put his army again in march, leaving Heudelet's division at Braga

to protect his hospitals against Botilho. Meanwhile Silveira struck a great blow, for being reinforced from the side of Beira he remounted the Tamega, invested Chaves on the day of battle at Braga, and the 28th forced the garrison, consisting of one hundred fighting men and twelve hundred sick, to capitulate, after which he took post at Amarante, while Soult, ignorant of the event, continued his march against Oporto in three columns.

The first, composed of Franceschi's and Mermet's divisions, marched by the road of Guimaraens and San Justo, with orders to force the passage of the Upper Ave, and scour the country towards Pombeiro. The second, consisting of Merle's, Laborde's and La Houssaye's divisions, was commanded by Soult in person, and moved upon Barca de Trofa, the third, under general Lorge, quitting Bacellos, made way by the Ponte d'Ave.

The passage of the Ave was fiercely disputed, and the left column was fought with in front of Guimaraens, and at Pombeiro, and again at Puente Negrellos. The last combat was rough, and the French general Jardon was killed. The march of the centre column was arrested at Barca de Trofa, by the cutting of the bridge, but the marshal, observing the numbers of the enemy, ascended the right bank, and forced the passage at San Justo; not however without the help of Franceschi, who came down the opposite side of the river, after the fight at Ponte Negrellos.

When the left and centre had thus crossed, colonel Lallemand was detached with a regiment of dragoons to assist Lorge, who was still held in check at the Ponte Ave; Lallemand was at first beaten back, but, being reinforced with some infantry, finally succeeded, when the Portuguese, enraged at their defeat, brutally murdered their commander, general Vallonga, and dispersed. The whole French army was now in communication on the left bank of the Ave, the way to Oporto was opened, and, on the 27th, the troops were finally concentrated in front of the entrenchments covering that city.

The action of Monterey, the taking of Chaves, and the defeat at Braga, had so damped the bishop's ardour that he was, at one time, inclined to abandon the defence of Oporto; but this idea was relinquished when he considered the multitudes he had drawn together, and that the English army was stronger than it had been at any previous period since Cradock's arrival; Beresford, also, was at the head of a considerable native force behind the Mondego, and, with the hope of their support, he resolved to stand the brunt. He had collected, in the entrenched camp, little short of forty thousand men, and among them were many regular troops, of which two thousand had lately arrived under the command of general Vittoria. This officer had been sent by Beresford to aid Silveira, but when Chaves surrendered, he entered Oporto. The hopes of the people, also, were high, for they could not believe that the French were a match for them; the preceding defeats were attributed, each to its particular case of treason, and the murder of innocent persons followed as an expiation. No man but the bishop durst thwart the slightest caprice of the mob, and he was little disposed to do so, while Raymundo, and others of his stamp, fomented their fury, and directed it to gratify personal enmities. Thus, the defeat of Braga being known in Oporto, caused a tumult on the 22d, in which Louis D'Oliveira, a man of high rank, who had been cast into prison, was, with fourteen other persons, haled forth, and despatched with many stabs; the bodies were then mutilated, and dragged in triumph through the streets.

The entrenchments extending, as I have said, from the Douro to the coast, were complete, and armed with two hundred guns. They consisted of a number of

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

† Sir J. Cradock's Papers, MS.

forts of different sizes, placed on the top of a succession of rounded hills, and where the hills failed, the defences were continued by earthen ramparts, loopholed houses, ditches, and felled trees. Oporto itself is built in a hollow, and a bridge of boats, nearly three hundred yards in length, formed the only communication between the city and the suburb of Villa Nova; this bridge was completely commanded by fifty guns, planted on the bluff and craggy heights that overhung the river above Villa Nova, and overlooked, not only the city, but a great part of the entrenched camp beyond it. Within the lines, tents were pitched for even greater numbers than were assembled, and the people running to arms, manned their works with great noise and tumult, when the French columns, gathering like heavy thunder clouds, settled in front of the camp.

The duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 27th. While at Braga he had written to the bishop, calling on him to calm the popular effervescence; now, beholding the extended works in his front, and reading their weakness even in the multitudes that guarded them, he renewed his call upon the prelate, to spare this great and commercial city the horrors of a storm. A prisoner, employed to carry this summons, would have been killed, but that it was pretended he came with an offer from Soult to surrender his army; and notwithstanding this ingenious device, and that the bishop commenced a negotiation, which was prolonged until evening, the firing from the entrenchments was constant and general during the whole of the 28th.

The parley being finally broken off, Soult made dispositions for a general action on the 29th. To facilitate this, he caused Merle's division to approach the left of the entrenchments in the evening of the 28th, intending thereby to divert attention from the true point of attack; a prodigious fire was immediately opened from the works, but Merle, having pushed close up, got into some hollow roads and enclosures, where he maintained his footing. At another part of the line, however, some of the Portuguese pretending a wish to surrender, general Foy, with a single companion, imprudently approached them, when the latter was killed, and Foy himself made prisoner, and carried into the town. He was mistaken for Loison, and the people called out to kill "*Maneta*," but with great presence of mind he held up his hands, and the crowd, convinced of their error, suffered him to be cast into the jail.

The bishop, having brought affairs to this awful crisis, had not Resolution to brave the danger himself. Leaving generals Lima and Pareiras to command the army, he, with an escort of troops, quitted the city, and, crossing the river, took his station in the Sarea convent, built on the top of the rugged hill which overhung the suburb of Villa Nova, from whence he beheld in safety the horrors of the next day. The bells in Oporto continued to ring all night, and about twelve o'clock a violent thunder storm arising, the sound of the winds was mistaken in the camp for the approach of enemies; at once the whole line blazed with a fire of musketry, the roar of two hundred pieces of artillery was heard above the noise of the tempest, and the Portuguese calling to one another with loud cries, were agitated at once with fury and with terror. The morning, however, broke serenely, and a little before seven o'clock the sound of trumpets and drums, and the glitter of arms, gave notice that the French army was in motion for the attack.

BATTLE AND STORMING OF OPORTO.*

The feint made the evening before against the left, which was the weakest part of the line, had perfectly succeeded, the Portuguese generals placed their prin-

cipal masses on that side; but the duke of Dalmatia was intent upon the strongest points of the works, being resolved to force his way through the town, and seize the bridge during the fight, that he might secure the passage of the river. His army was divided into three columns; of which the first, under Merle, attacked the left of the Portuguese centre; the second, under Franceschi and Laborde, assailed their extreme right; the third, composed of Mermet's division, sustained by a brigade of dragoons, was in the centre. General Lorge was appointed to cut off a body of ordenança, who were posted with some guns, in front of the Portuguese left, but beyond the works on the road of Villa de Conde.

The battle was commenced by the wings; for Mermet's division was withheld, until the enemy's generals, believing the whole of the attack was developed, had weakened their centre to strengthen their flanks. Then the French reserves, rushing violently forwards, broke through the entrenchments, and took the two principal forts, entering by the embrasures, and killing or dispersing all within them. Soult instantly rallied his troops, and sent two battalions to take the Portuguese left wing in the rear, while two other battalions were ordered to march straight into the town, and make for the bridge. The Portuguese army, thus cut in two, was soon beaten on all points. Laborde carried in succession a number of forts, took fifty pieces of artillery, and reaching the edge of the city, halted until Franceschi, who was engaged still more to the left, could join him. By this movement a large body of the Portuguese were driven off from the town, and forced back to the Douro, being followed by a brigade under general Arnaud.

Merle, seeing that the success of the centre was complete, brought up his left flank, carried all the forts to his right in succession, killed a great number of the defenders, and drove the rest towards the sea. These last dividing, fled for refuge, one part to the fort of St. Joa, the other towards the mouth of the Douro, where, maddened by terror, as the French came pouring down upon them, they strove, some to swim across, others to get over in small boats; their general, Lima, called out against this hopeless attempt, but they turned and murdered him, within musket-shot of the approaching enemy, and then, renewing the attempt to cross, nearly the whole perished. The victory was now certain, for Lorge had dispersed the people on the side of Villa de Conde, and general Arnaud hemming in those above the town prevented them from plunging into the river also, as in their desperate mood they were going to do.

Nevertheless the battle continued within Oporto, for the two battalions sent from the centre having burst the barricades at the entrance of the streets, penetrated, fighting, to the bridge, and here all the horrid circumstances of war seemed to be accumulated, and the calamities of an age compressed into one doleful hour. More than four thousand persons, old and young, and of both sexes, were seen pressing forward with wild tumult, some already on the bridge, others striving to gain it, all in a state of phrenzy. The batteries on the opposite bank opened their fire when the French appeared, and at that moment a troop of Portuguese cavalry flying from the fight came down one of the streets, and remorseless in their fears, bore, at full gallop, into the midst of the miserable helpless crowd, trampling a bloody pathway to the river. Suddenly the nearest boats, unable to sustain the increasing weight, sunk and the foremost wretches still tumbling into the river, as they were pressed from behind, perished, until the heaped bodies rising above the surface of the waters, filled all the space left by the sinking of the vessels.

The first of the French that arrived, amazed at this fearful spectacle, forgot the battle, and hastened to

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

save those who still struggled for life—and while some were thus nobly employed, others by the help of planks, getting on to the firmer parts of the bridge, crossed the river and carried the batteries on the heights of Villa Nova. The passage was thus secured, but this terrible destruction did not complete the measure of the city's calamities; two hundred men, who occupied the bishop's palace, fired from the windows and maintained that post until the French, gathering round them in strength, burst the doors, and put all to the sword. Every street and house then rung with the noise of the combatants and the shrieks of distress; for the French soldiers, exasperated by long hardships, and prone like all soldiers to ferocity and violence during an assault, became frantic with fury, when in one of the principal squares, they found several of their comrades who had been made prisoners, fastened upright, and living, but with their eyes burst, their tongues torn out, their other members mutilated and gashed. Those that beheld the sight spared none who fell in their way. It was in vain that Soult strove to stop the slaughter; it was in vain that hundreds of officers and soldiers opposed, at the risk of their lives, the vengeance of their comrades, and by their generous exertions rescued vast numbers that would otherwise have fallen victims to the anger and brutality of the moment. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder, closed not for many hours, and what with those who fell in battle, those who were drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said that ten thousand Portuguese died on that unhappy day.* The loss of the French did not exceed five hundred men.

CHAPTER III.

Operations of the first and fourth corps—General state of the French army—Description of the valley of the Tagus—Inertness of marshal Victor—Albuquerque and Cartoajal dispute—The latter advances in La Mancha—General Sebastiani wins the battle of Ciudad Real—Marshal Victor forces the passage of the Tagus, and drives Cuesta's army from all its positions—French cavalry checked at Miajadas—Victor crosses the Guadiana at Medellín—Albuquerque joins Cuesta's army—Battle of Medellín—Spaniards totally defeated—Victor ordered, by the king, to invade Portugal—Opens a secret communication with some persons in Badajoz—The peasants of Albuera discover the plot, which fails—Operations of general Lapisse—He drives back sir R. Wilson's posts, and makes a slight attempt to take Ciudad Rodrigo—Marches suddenly towards the Tagus, and forces the bridge of Alcantara—Joins Victor at Merida—General insurrection along the Portuguese frontier—The central junta remove Cartoajal from the command, and increase Cuesta's authority, whose army is reinforced—Joseph discontented with Lapisse's movement—Orders Victor to retake the bridge of Alcantara.

THE dire slaughter at Oporto was followed up by a variety of important operations; but before these are treated of, it is essential to narrate the contemporaneous events on the Tagus and the Guadiana, for the war was wide and complicated, and the result depended more upon the general combinations than upon any particular movements.

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST AND FOURTH CORPS.

It has been already related that Marshal Victor, after making a futile attempt to surprise the marquis of Palacios, had retired to his former quarters at Toledo; that the conde de Cartoajal, who succeeded the duke of Infantado, had advanced to Ciudad Real with about fourteen thousand men; that Cuesta having broken the bridge of Almaraz, guarded the line of the Tagus with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry. The 4th corps remained at Talavera and Placentia, but held the bridge of Arzobispo by a

detachment. The remainder of the French army was in Catalonia, at Zaragoza, or on the communication; the reserve of heavy cavalry had been suppressed, and the regiments dispersed among the *corps d'armee*; the whole army, exclusive of the king's guards, was about two hundred and seventy thousand men, with forty thousand horses, shewing a decrease of sixty-five thousand men since the 15th of November.* But this included the imperial guards, the reserve of infantry, and many detachments drafted from the corps—in all forty thousand men, who had been struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, with a view to the war in Germany. The real loss of the French by sword, sickness, and captivity, in the four months succeeding Napoleon's arrival in the Peninsula, was therefore about twenty-five thousand—a vast number, but not incredible, when it is considered that two sieges, twelve pitched battles, and innumerable combats had taken place during that period.

Such was the state of affairs when the duke of Beluno, having received orders to aid Soult in the invasion of Portugal, changed places with the fourth corps. Sebastiani was then opposed to Cartoajal, and Victor stood against Cuesta. The former fixed his headquarters at Toledo, the latter at Talavera de la Reyna, the communication between them being kept up by Montbrun's division of cavalry, while the garrison of Madrid, composed of the king's guards, and Dessolle's division, equally supported both. But to understand the connection between the first, second, and fourth corps, and Lapisse's division, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the nature of the country on both sides of the Tagus.

That river, after passing Toledo, runs through a deep and long valley, walled up on either hand by lofty mountains. Those on the right bank are always capped with snow, and ranging nearly parallel with the course of the stream, divide the valley of the Tagus from Old Castile and the Salamanca country; the highest parts being known by the names of the Sierra de Gredos, Sierra de Bejar, and Sierra de Gata. In these sierras the Alberche, the Tietar, and the Alagon, take their rise, and ploughing the valley in a slanting direction, fall into the Tagus.

The principal mountain on the left bank is called the Sierra de Guadalupe; it extends in a southward direction from the river, dividing the upper part of La Mancha from Spanish Estremadura.

The communications leading from the Salamanca country into the valley of the Tagus are neither many nor good; the principal passes are—

1st. The way of Horcajada, an old Roman road, which, running through Pedrahita and Villa Franca, crosses the Sierra de Gredos at Puerto de Pico, and then descends by Montbeltran to Talavera.

2d. The pass of Arenas, leading nearly parallel to, and a short distance from, the first.

3d. The pass of Tornevecas, leading upon Placentia.

4th. The route of Bejar, which, crossing the Sierra de Bejar at the pass of Baños, descends likewise upon Placentia.

5th. The route of Payo or Gata, which crosses the Sierra de Gata by the pass of Perales, and afterwards dividing, sends one branch to Alcantara, the other to Coria and Placentia. Of these five passes the two last only are, generally speaking, practicable for artillery.

The royal roads, from Toledo and Madrid to Badajoz, unite near Talavera and follow the course of the Tagus by the right bank as far as Naval Moral, but then, turning to the left, cross the river at the bridge of Almaraz. Now, from Toledo, westward, to the bridge of Almaraz, a distance of above fifty miles, the left bank of the Tagus is so crowded by the rugged shoots of the Sierra de Guadalupe, that it may be broadly stated as impassable.

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

* Imperial Muster-rolls, MSS.

sable for an army, and this peculiarity of ground gives the key to the operations on both sides. For Cuesta and Cartoajal, by reason of this impassable Sierra de Guadalupe, had no direct military communication; but Victor and Sebastiani, occupying Toledo and Talavera, could unite on either line of operations by the royal roads above mentioned, or by a secondary road which running near Yébenes crosses the Tagus by a stone bridge near Puebla de Montalvan, half way between Toledo and Talavera.

The rallying point of the French was Madrid, and their parallel lines of defence were the Tagus, the Alberche, and the Guadarama.

The base of Cartoajal's operations was the Sierra de Morena.

Cuesta's first line was the Tagus, and his second the Guadiana, from whence he could retreat by a flank march to Badajos, or by a direct one to the defiles of Monasterio in the Sierra Morena.

The two Spanish armies, if they had been united, would not have furnished more than twenty-six thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, and they had no reserve. The two French corps, united, would have exceeded thirty-five thousand fighting-men, supported by the reserve under the king. The French, therefore, had the advantage of numbers, position, and discipline.

Following the orders of Napoleon, marshal Victor should have been at Merida before the middle of February. In that position he would have confined Cuesta to the Sierra Morena, and with his twelve regiments of cavalry he could easily have kept all the flat country, as far as Badajos, in subjection. That fortress itself had no means of resistance, and, certainly, there was no Spanish force in the field capable of impeding the full execution of the emperor's instructions, which were also reiterated by the king. Nevertheless, the duke of Belluno remained inert at this critical period, and the Spaniards, attributing his inactivity to weakness, endeavoured to provoke the blow so unaccountably withheld; for Cuesta was projecting offensive movements against Victor, and the duke of Albuquerque was extremely anxious to attack Toledo from the side of La Mancha. Cartoajal opposed Albuquerque's plans, but offered him a small force with which to act independently. The duke complained to the junta of Cartoajal's proceedings, and Mr. Frere, whose traces are to be found in every intrigue, and every absurd project broached at this period, having supported Albuquerque's complaints, Cartoajal was directed by the junta to follow the duke's plans; but the latter was himself ordered to join Cuesta, with a detachment of four or five thousand men.

ROUT OF CIUDAD REAL.

Cartoajal, in pursuance of his instructions, marched with twelve thousand men, and twenty guns, towards Toledo; his advanced guard attacked a regiment of Polish lancers, near Consuegra, but the latter retired without loss. Hereupon, Sebastiani, with about ten thousand men, came up against him, and the leading divisions encountering at Yébenes, the Spaniards were pushed back to Ciudad Real, where they halted, leaving guards on the river in front of that town. The French immediately forced the passage, and a tumultuary action ensuing, Cartoajal was totally routed, with the loss of all his guns, a thousand slain, and several thousand prisoners; the vanquished fled by Almagro, and the French cavalry pursued even to the foot of the Sierra Morena. This action, fought on the 27th of March, and commonly called the battle of Ciudad Real, was not followed up with any great profit to the victors. Sebastiani gathered up the spoils, sent his prisoners to the rear, and held his troops concentrated on the upper Guadiana, to await the result of Victor's operations; thus enabling the Spanish fugitives to rally

at Carolina, where they were reinforced by levies from Grenada and Cordova.

While these events were passing in La Mancha Estremadura was also invaded, for the king, having received a despatch from Soult, dated Orense, and giving notice that the second corps would be at Oporto about the 15th of March, had reiterated the Order for Lapisse to move on Abrantes, and for the duke of Belluno to pass the Tagus and drive Cuesta beyond the Guadiana. Marshal Victor, who appears to have been, for some reason unknown, averse to aiding the operations of the second corps at all, remonstrated, and especially urged that the order to Lapisse should be withdrawn, lest his division should arrive too soon, and without support, at Abrantes; but this time the king was firm, and, on the 14th of March, the duke of Belluno, having collected five days' provisions, made the necessary dispositions to pass the Tagus.

The amount of the Spanish force immediately on that river was about sixteen thousand men, and Cuesta had also several detachments and irregular bands in his rear, which may be calculated at eight thousand more.* The duke of Belluno, however, estimated the troops in position before him at thirty thousand, a great error for so experienced a commander to make. On the other hand, Cuesta was as ill informed; for this was the moment when, with his approbation, colonel d'Urban proposed to sir John Cradock, that curiously combined attack against Victor, already noticed, in which the Spaniards were to cross the Tagus, and sir Robert Wilson was to come down upon the Tietar. This, also, was the period that Mr. Frere, apparently ignorant that there were at least twenty-five thousand fighting men in the valley of the Tagus, without reckoning the king's or Sebastiani's troops, proposed, that the twelve thousand British under sir John Cradock, should march from Lisbon to "drive the fourth French corps from Toledo," and "consequently," as he phrased it, "from Madrid." The first movement of marshal Victor awakened Cuesta from these dreams.

The bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo were, as we have seen, held by the French, and their advanced posts were pushed into the valley of the Tagus, as far as the Barca de Bazagona.

The Spanish position extended from Garbin, near the bridge of Arzobispo, to the bridge of Almaraz, the centre being at Meza d'Ibor, a position of surprising strength, running at right angles from the Tagus to the Guadalupe. The head-quarters and reserves were at Deletosa, and a road, cut by the troops, afforded a communication between that place and Meza d'Ibor.

On the right bank of the Tagus there was easy access to the bridges of Talavera, Arzobispo, and Almaraz; but on the left bank no road existed, by which artillery could pass the mountains, except that of Almaraz, which was crossed at the distance of four or five miles from the river by the almost impregnable ridge of Mirabete.

The duke of Belluno's plan was, to pass the Tagus at the bridges of Talavera and Arzobispo, with his infantry and part of his cavalry, and to operate in the Sierra de Guadalupe against the Spanish right; while the artillery and grand parc, protected by the remainder of the cavalry, were to be united opposite Almaraz, having with them a raft bridge to throw across at that point.† This project is scarcely to be reconciled with the estimate made of Cuesta's force; for surely nothing could be more rash than to expose the whole of the guns and field stores of the army, with no other guard than some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, close to a powerful enemy, who possessed a good pontoon train, and who might, consequently, pass the river at pleasure.

* General Semel's Journal of Operations, MS.

† Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MS.

The 15th, Laval's division of German infantry, and Lasalle's cavalry, crossed at Talavera, and, turning to the right, worked a march through the rocky hills; the infantry to Aldea Nueva, on a line somewhat short of the bridge of Arzobispo; the cavalry higher up the mountain towards Estrella. The 16th, when those troops had advanced a few miles to the front, the headquarters, and the other divisions of infantry, passed the bridge of Arzobispo; while the artillery and the parcs, accompanied by a battalion of grenadiers, and the escorting cavalry, moved to Almaraz, with orders to watch, on the 17th and 18th, for the appearance of the army on the heights at the other side, and then to move down to the point before indicated for launching the raft bridge.

Alarmed by these movements, Cuesta hastened in person to Mirabete, and directing general Henestrosa to defend the bridge of Almaraz, with eight thousand men, sent a detachment to reinforce his own right wing, which was posted behind the Ibor, a small river, but at this season running with a full torrent from the Guadalupe to the Tagus.

The 17th, the Spanish advanced guards were driven, with some loss, across the Ibor. They attempted to re-form on the high rocky banks of that river, but being closely followed, retreated to the camp of Meza d'Ibor, the great natural strength of which was increased by some field-works. Their position could only be attacked in front, and this being apparent at the first glance, Laval's division was instantly formed into columns of attack, which pushed rapidly up the mountain, the inequalities of ground covering them in some sort from the effects of the enemy's artillery. As they arrived near the summit, the fire of musketry and grape became murderous, but at this instant the Spaniards, who should have displayed all their vigour, broke and fled to Campillo, leaving behind them baggage, magazines, seven guns, and a thousand prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and wounded. The French had only seventy killed, and five hundred wounded; and while this action was taking place at Meza d'Ibor, Villatte's division, being higher up the Sierra, to the left, overthrew a smaller body of Spaniards, at Frenedoso, making three hundred prisoners, and capturing a large store of arms.

The 18th, at day-break, the duke of Belluno, who had superintended in person the attack at Meza d'Ibor, examined from that high ground all the remaining position of the Spaniards. Cuesta, he observed, was in full retreat to Truxillo, but Henestrosa was still posted in front of Almaraz; wherefore Villatte's division was detached after Cuesta, to Deleytosa, and Laval's Germans were led against Henestrosa, and the latter, aware of his danger and already preparing to retire, was driven hastily over the ridge of Mirabete.

In the course of the night, the raft bridge was thrown across the Tagus; the next day the French dragoons passed to the left bank, the artillery followed, and the cavalry immediately pushed forward to Truxillo, from which town Cuesta had already fallen back to Santa Cruz, leaving Henestrosa to cover the retreat. The 20th, after a slight skirmish, the latter was forced over the Mazarna, and the whole French army, with the exception of a regiment of dragoons (left to guard the raft bridge) was poured along the road to Merida.

The advanced guard, consisting of a regiment of light cavalry, under general Bordesoult, arrived the 21st in front of Miajadas, where the road dividing, sends one branch to Merida, the other to Medellin. A party of Spanish horsemen were posted near the town, they appeared in great alarm, and by their hesitating movements invited a charge; the French incautiously galloped forward, and, in a moment, twelve or fourteen hundred Spanish cavalry, placed in ambush, came up at speed on the flanks. General Lasalle, who from a

distance had observed the movements of both sides, immediately rode forward with a second regiment, and arrived just as Bordesoult had extricated himself from a great peril, by his own valour, but with the loss of seventy killed and a hundred wounded.

After this well-managed combat, Cuesta retired to Medellin without being molested, and Victor spreading his cavalry posts on the different routes to gain intelligence and to collect provisions, established his own quarters at Truxillo, a town of some trade, and advantageously situated for a place of arms.* It had been deserted by the inhabitants and pillaged by the first French troops that entered, but it still offered great resources for the army, and there was an ancient citadel, capable of being rendered defensible, which was immediately armed with the Spanish guns, and provisioned from the magazines taken at Meza d'Ibor. Meanwhile, the flooding of the Tagus and the rocky nature of its bed, injured the raft-bridge near Almaraz, and delayed the passage of the artillery and stores; wherefore directions were given to have a boat-bridge prepared, and a field-fort constructed on the left bank of the Tagus, to be armed with three guns, and garrisoned with a hundred and fifty men to protect the bridge. These arrangements and the establishment of an hospital, for two thousand men, at Truxillo, delayed the first corps until the 24th of March.

The light cavalry reinforced by twelve hundred *volunteers* being posted at Miajadas, had covered all the roads branching from that central point with their scouting parties, and now reported that a few of Cuesta's people had retired to Medellin; that from five to six thousand men were thrown into the Sierra de Guadalupe on the left of the French; that four thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry were behind the river Garganza, in front of Medellin, and that every thing else was over the Guadiana. Thus the line of retreat chosen by Cuesta uncovered Merida, and, consequently, the great road between Badajos and Seville was open to the French. But Victor was not disposed to profit from this, for he was aware that Albuquerque was coming from La Mancha to Cuesta, and believed that he brought nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry; he therefore feared that Cuesta's intention was either to draw him into a difficult country, by making a flank march to join Cartoajal in La Mancha; or by crossing the Guadiana above Naval Villar, where the fords are always practicable, to rejoin his detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe, and so establish a new base of operations on the left flank of the French army. This reasoning was misplaced; neither Cuesta nor his army were capable of such operations; his line of retreat was solely directed by a desire to join Albuquerque, and to save his troops, by taking to a rugged instead of an open country. The duke of Belluno lost the fruits of his previous success, by thus over-rating his adversary's skill; instead of following Cuesta with a resolution to break up the Spanish army, he, after leaving a brigade at Truxillo and Almaraz, to protect the communications, was contented to advance a few leagues on the road to Medellin with his main body; sending his light cavalry to Merida, and pushing on detachments towards Badajos and Seville, while other parties explored the roads leading into the Guadalupe.

The 27th, however, he marched in person to Medellin, at the head of two divisions of infantry, and a brigade of heavy cavalry. Eight hundred Spanish horse posted on the right bank of the Guadiana, retired at his approach, and crossing that river, halted at Don Benito, where they were reinforced by other squadrons, but no infantry were to be discovered. The duke of Belluno then passing the river took post on the road

* Journal of Operations, MSS.

leading to Mingabril and Don Benito, and the situation of the French army in the evening was as follows:

The main body, consisting of two divisions of infantry, and one incomplete brigade of heavy cavalry in position on the road leading from Medellin to Don Benito and Mingabril.

The remainder of the dragoons, under Latour Maubourg, at Zorita, fifteen miles on the left, watching the Spaniards in the Guadalupe.

The light cavalry at Merida, eighteen miles to the right, having patrolled all that day on the roads to Badajos, Seville, and Medellin.

Ruffin's division at Miajadas eighteen miles in the rear.

But in the course of the evening intelligence arrived that Albuquerque was just come up with eight thousand men; that the combined troops, amounting to twenty-eight thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry, were in position on the table land of Don Benito, and that Cuesta, aware of the scattered state of the French army, was preparing to attack the two divisions on their march the next day. Upon this, Victor, notwithstanding the strength of the Spanish army, resolved to fight, and immediately sent orders to Lasalle, to Ruffin, and to Latour Maubourg, to bring their divisions down to Medellin; the latter was also directed to leave a detachment at Miajadas to protect the route of Merida, and a brigade at Zorita, to observe the Spaniards in the Sierra de Guadalupe.

Cuesta's numbers were greatly exaggerated; that general blaming every body but himself, for his failure on the Tagus, had fallen back to Campanarios, rallied all his scattered detachments, and then returned to Villa Nueva de Serena, where he was joined on the 27th by Albuquerque, who brought up, not a great body of infantry and cavalry as supposed, but less than three thousand infantry and a few hundred horse. This reinforcement, added to some battalions drawn from Andalusia, increased Cuesta's army to about twenty-five thousand foot, four thousand horse, and eighteen or twenty pieces of artillery; and with this force, he, fearing for the safety of Badajos, retraced his steps and rushed headlong to destruction.

Medellin, possessing a fine stone-bridge, is situated in a hollow on the left bank of the Guadiana, and just beyond the town is a vast plain, or table land, the edge of which, breaking abruptly down, forms the bed of the river. The Ortigosa, which cuts this plain, is a rapid torrent, rushing perpendicularly on to the Guadiana, and having steep and rugged banks, yet in parts passable for artillery. Two roads branch out from Medellin, the one leading to Mingabril on the right, the other to Don Benito on the left, those places being about five miles apart.

BATTLE OF MEDELLIN.

The French army, with the exception of the troops left to cover the communications and those at Zorita, was concentrated in the town at ten o'clock, and at one, about fourteen thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and forty-two pieces of artillery, went forth to fight. The plain on the side of Don Benito was bounded by a high ridge of land, behind which Cuesta kept the Spanish infantry concealed, showing only his cavalry and some guns in advance. To make him display his lines of infantry the French general sent Lasalle's light cavalry, with a battery of six guns and two battalions of German infantry, towards Don Benito, while Latour Maubourg, with five squadrons of dragoons, eight guns, and two other battalions, keeping close to the Ortigosa, advanced towards a point of the enemy's ridge called the Retamosa. The rest of the army were kept in reserve, the division of Villatte and the remainder of the Germans, being, one-half on the road of Don Benito, the other half on the

road of Mingabril. Ruffin's division was a little way in rear, and a battalion was left to guard the baggage at the bridge of Medellin.

As the French squadron advanced, the artillery on both sides opened, and the Spanish cavalry guards in the plain retired slowly to the higher ground. Lasalle and Latour Maubourg then pressed forward, but just as the latter, who had the shortest distance to traverse, approached the enemy's position, the whole Spanish line of battle was suddenly descried in full march over the edge of the ridge, and stretching from the Ortigosa to within a mile of the Guadiana,—a menacing but glorious apparition. Cuesta, Henestrosa, and the duke del Parque, with the mass of cavalry, were on the left; Francisco Frias, with the main body of infantry, in the centre; Equia and Portazgo on the right, which was prolonged to the Guadiana by some scattered squadrons under Albuquerque, who flanked the march of the host as it descended with a rapid pace into the plain.

Cuesta's plan was now disclosed; his line overlapped the French left, and he was hastening to cut their army off from Medellin, but his order of battle was on a front of three miles, and he had no reserve. The duke of Belluno, seeing this, instantly brought his centre a little forward, and then, reinforcing Latour Maubourg with ten guns and a battalion of grenadiers, and detaching a brigade of infantry as a support, ordered him to fall boldly on the advancing enemy; at the same time Lasalle, who was giving way under the pressure of his antagonist, was directed to retire towards Medellin, always refusing his left.

The Spaniards marched briskly forward into the plain, and a special body of cavalry, with three thousand infantry, running out from their left, met Latour Maubourg in front, while a regiment of hussars fell upon the French columns of grenadiers and guns in his rear. The hussars being received with grape, a pelting fire of musketry, and a charge in flank by some dragoons, were beaten at once; but the Spanish infantry, closely followed by the rest of their own cavalry, came boldly up to Latour Maubourg's horsemen, and with a rough discharge, forced them back in disorder. The French, however, soon rallied, and smashing the Spanish ranks with artillery, and fighting all together, broke in and overthrew their enemies, man and horse. Cuesta was wounded and fell, but, being quickly remounted, escaped.

While this was passing on the French right, Lasalle's cavalry, continually refusing its left, was brought fighting close up to the main body of the French infantry, which was now disposed on a new front, having a reserve behind the centre. Meanwhile Latour Maubourg's division was being re-formed on the ridge from whence the Spaniards had first descended, and the whole face of the battle was changed; for the Spanish left being put to flight, the French right wing overlapped the centre of their antagonist, and the long attenuated line of the latter wavering, disjointed, and disclosing wide chasms, was still advancing without an object.

The duke of Belluno, aware that the decisive moment of the battle had arrived, was on the point of commanding a general attack, when his attention was arrested by the appearance of a column coming down on the rear of his right wing from the side of Mingabril. A brigade from the reserve, with four guns, was immediately sent to keep this body in check, while Lasalle's cavalry, taking ground to its left, unmasked the infantry in the centre, and the latter advancing, poured a heavy fire into the Spanish ranks; Latour Maubourg, sweeping round their left flank, then fell on the rear, and, at the same moment, Lasalle also galloped in upon the dismayed and broken bands. A horrible carnage ensued, for the French soldiers, while their strength would permit, continued to follow and strike, until

three-fifths of the Spanish army wallowed in blood. Six guns and several thousand prisoners were taken; General Frias, deeply wounded, fell into the hands of the victors; and so utter was the discomfiture, that for several days after, Cuesta could not rally a single battalion of infantry, and his cavalry was only saved by the speed of the horses.

Following general Semel  s journal, of which, however, I only possess an unauthenticated copy, the French loss did not exceed three hundred men; a number so utterly disproportionate to that of the vanquished as to be scarcely credible, and if correct, discovering a savage rigour in the pursuit by no means commendable; for it does not appear that any previous cruelties were perpetrated by the Spaniards to irritate the French soldiers. The right to slaughter an enemy in battle can neither be disputed nor limited; but a brave soldier should always have regard to the character of his country, and be sparing of the sword towards beaten men.

The main body of the French army passed the night of the 28th near the field of battle; but Latour Maubourg marched with the dragoons by the left bank of the Guadiana to Merida, leaving a detachment at Torre Mexia to watch the roads of Almendralejo and Villa Franca, and to give notice if the remains of Cuesta's army should attempt to gain Badajos, in which case the dragoons had orders to intercept them at Lobo  . The 29th, Villatte's division advanced as far as Villa Nueva de Serena, and the light cavalry were pushed on to Campanarios; yet, as all the reports agreed that Cuesta, with a few horsemen, had taken refuge in the Sierra Morena, and that the remnants of his army were dispersed and wandering through the fields and along the bye-roads, without any power of reuniting, the duke of Belluno relinquished the pursuit. Having fixed his head-quarters at Merida, and occupied that place and Medell  n with his infantry, he formed with his cavalry a belt extending from Lobo   on the right to Mingabril on the left; but from all this tract of country the people had fled, and even the great towns were deserted. Merida, situated in a richly-cultivated basin, possessed a fine bridge and many magnificent remains of antiquity, Roman and Moorish; amongst others, a castle built on the right bank of the river, close to the bridge, was so perfect that, in eight days, it was rendered capable of resisting any sudden assault; six guns were mounted on the walls, an hospital for a thousand men was established there, and a garrison of three hundred men, with two months' stores and provisions for eight hundred, was put into it.

The king now repeated his orders, that the duke of Belluno should enter Portugal, and that general Lapisse should march upon Abrantes. The former again remonstrated, on the ground that he could not make such a movement and defend his communications with Almaraz, unless the division of Lapisse was permitted to join him by the route of Alcantara. Nevertheless as Badajos, although more capable of defence than it had been in December, when the fourth corps was at Merida, was still far from being secure; and as many of the richer inhabitants, disgusted and fatigued with the violence of the mob government, were more inclined to betray the gates to the French than to risk a siege; Victor, whose battering train (composed of only twelve pieces, badly horsed and provided) was still at Truxillo, opened a secret communication with the malcontents. The parties met at the village of Albuera, and everything was arranged for the surrender, when the peasants giving notice to the junta that some treason was in progress, the latter arrested all the persons supposed to be implicated, and the project was baffled. The duke of Belluno then resigned all further thoughts of Badajos, and contented himself with sending detachments to Alcantara to get intelligence of general Lapisse,

of whose proceedings it is now time to give some account.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LAPISSE.

This general, after taking Zamora in January, occupied Ledesma and Salamanca, where he was joined by general Maupetit's brigade of cavalry; sir Robert Wilson's legion and the feeble garrisons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were the only bodies in his front, and universal terror prevailed; yet he, although at the head of ten thousand men, with a powerful artillery, remained inactive from January to the end of March, and suffered sir Robert, with a few hundred Portuguese, to vex his outposts, to intercept his provisions, to restrain his patrols, and even to disturb his infantry in their quarters. This conduct brought him into contempt, and enabled Wilson to infuse a spirit into the people which they were far from feeling when the enemy first appeared.

Don Carlos d'Espa  a, with a small Spanish force, being after a time placed under sir Robert's command, the latter detached two battalions to occupy the pass of Ba  os, and Lapisse was thus deprived of any direct communication with Victor. In this situation the French general remained without making any vigorous effort, either to clear his front, or to get intelligence of the duke of Dalmatia's march upon Oporto, until the beginning of April, when he advanced towards Bejar; but, finding the passes occupied, turned suddenly to his right, dissipated Wilson's posts on the Ecla, and forced the legion, then commanded by colonel Grant, to take refuge under the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo. He summoned that town to surrender on the 6th, and, after a slight skirmish close to the walls, took a position between the Agueda and Ledesma. This event was followed by a general insurrection, from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara and from Tamames to Bejar; for Lapisse, who had been again ordered by the king to fulfil the emperor's instructions, and advance to Abrantes, instead of obeying, suddenly quitted his positions on the Agueda, and, without regarding his connexion with the second corps, abandoned Leon, and made a rapid march, through the pass of Perales, upon Alcantara, followed closely by sir Robert Wilson, don Carlos d'Espa  a, the two battalions from Bejar, and a multitude of peasants, both Portuguese and Spanish.

At Alcantara, a corps of Spanish insurgents endeavoured to defend the passage of the river, but the French broke through the entrenchments on the bridge, and, with a full encounter carried the town, which they pillaged and then joined the first corps at Merida on the 19th of April. This false movement greatly injured the French cause. From that moment the conquering impulse given by Napoleon was at an end, and his armies, ceasing to act on the offensive, became stationary or retrograded, while the British, Spanish, and Portuguese once more assumed the lead. The duke of Dalmatia, abandoned to his own resources, and in total ignorance of the situation of the corps by which his movements should have been supported, was forced to remain in Oporto; and at the moment when the French combinations were thus paralyzed, the arrival of English reinforcements at Lisbon and the advance of sir John Cradock towards Leiria, gave a sudden and violent impetus both to the Spaniards and Portuguese along the Beira frontier. The insurrection, no longer kept down by the presence of an intermediate French corps, connecting Victor's and Soult's forces, was thus put into full activity, from Alcantara on the Tagus, to Amarante on the Tamega.

During this time Cuesta was gathering another host in the Morena. The simultaneous defeat of the armies in Estremadura and La Mancha had at first produced the greatest dismay in Andalusia; yet the Spaniards, when they found such victories as Ciudad Real and

Medellin only leading to a stagnant inactivity on the part of the French, concluded that extreme weakness was the cause, and that the Austrian war had, or would, oblige Napoleon to abandon his projects against the Peninsula. This idea was general, and upheld the people's spirit and the central junta's authority, which could not otherwise have been maintained after such a succession of follies and disasters.

The misfortunes of the two Spanish generals had been equal; but Cartoajal, having no popular influence, was dismissed, while Cuesta was appointed to command what remained of both armies; and the junta, stimulated for a moment by the imminent danger in which they were placed, drew together all the scattered troops and levies in Andalusia, to reinforce him. To cover Seville, Cuesta took post in the defiles of Monasterio, and was there joined by eight hundred horse and two thousand three hundred infantry, drafted from the garrison of Seville; these were followed by thirteen hundred old troops from Cadiz; and by three thousand five hundred Grenadian levies; and finally, eight thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horsemen, taken from the army of La Mancha, contributed to swell his numbers, until, in the latter end of April, they amounted to twenty-five thousand infantry, and six thousand cavalry. General Venegas, also, being recalled from Valencia, repaired to La Carolina, and proceeded to organize another army of La Mancha. Meanwhile Joseph, justly displeased at the false disposition made of Lapisse's division, directed that Alcantara should be immediately re-occupied. This however, could not be done without an action, which belongs to another combination, and shall be noticed hereafter; it is now proper to return to the operations on the Douro, which were intimately connected with those on the Guadiana.

CHAPTER IV.

The bishop of Oporto flies to Lisbon, and joins the regency—Humanity of marshal Soult—The Anti-Braganza party revives in the north of Portugal—The leaders make proposals to Soult—He encourages them—Error arising out of this proceeding—Effects of Soult's policy—Assassination of colonel Laneth—Execution at Arianá—Distribution of the French troops—Franceschi opposed, on the Vouga, by colonel Trant—Loison falls back behind the Souza—Heudelet marches to the relief of Tuy—The Spaniards, aided by some English frigates, oblige thirteen hundred French to capitulate at Vigo—Heudelet returns to Braga—The insurrection in the Entre Minho e Douro ceases—Silveira menaces Oporto—Laborde reinforces Loison, and drives Silveira over the Tamega—Gallant conduct and death of colonel Patrick at Amarante—Combats at Amarante—French repulsed—Ingenuous device of captain Brochard—The bridge of Amarante carried by storm—Loison advances to the Douro—Is suddenly checked—Observations.

WHEN the bishop of Oporto beheld, from his station at Sarea, the final overthrow of his ambitious schemes in the north of Portugal, he fled to Lisbon. There he reconciled himself to the regency, became a member of that body, was soon after created patriarch, and, as I shall have occasion to shew, used his great influence in the most mischievous manner; discovering, on every occasion, the untamed violence and inherent falseness of his disposition.

The fall of Oporto enabled marshal Soult to establish a solid base of operations, and to commence a regular system of warfare. The immediate fruit of his victory was the capture of immense magazines of powder; of a hundred and ninety-seven pieces of artillery, every gun of which had been used in the action, and of thirty English vessels, wind-bound in the river, loaded with wine and provisions for a month, which fell into his hands. Having repressed the disorders attendant on the battle, he adopted the same concilia-

tory policy which had marked his conduct at Chaves and Braga, and endeavoured to remedy, as far as it was possible, the deplorable results of the soldiers' fury; recovering and restoring a part of the plunder, he caused the inhabitants remaining in the town to be treated with respect, and invited, by proclamation, all those who had fled to return. He demanded no contribution, and restraining with a firm hand the violence of his men, contrived, from the captured public property, to support the army and even to succour the poorest and most distressed of the population.

But his ability in the civil and political administration of the Entre Minho e Douro produced an effect which he was not prepared for. The prince regent's desertion of the country was not forgotten. The national feeling was as adverse to Portugal being a dependency on the Brazils, as it was to the usurpation of the French, and the comparison between Soult's government and the horrible anarchy which preceded it, was all in favour of the former. His victories, and the evident vigour of his character, contrasted with the apparent supineness of the English, promised permanency for the French power, and the party, formerly noticed as being inimical to the house of Braganza, revived. The leaders, thinking this a favourable opportunity to execute their intention, waited upon the duke of Dalmatia, and expressed their desire for a French prince and an independent government. They even intimated their good wishes towards the duke himself, and demanded his concurrence and protection, while, in the name of the people, they declared that the Braganza dynasty was at an end.

Although unauthorized by the emperor to accede to this proposition, Soult was yet unwilling to reject a plan from which he could draw such immediate and important military advantages. Napoleon was not a man to be lightly dealt with on such an occasion, but the marshal, trusting that circumstances would justify him, encouraged the design, appointed men to civil employments and raised a Portuguese legion of five battalions. He acted with so much dexterity that in fifteen days, the cities of Oporto and Braga, and the towns of Bancellos, Viana, Villa de Conde, Pova de Barcim, Feira, and Ovar, sent addresses, containing the expression of their sentiments, and bearing the signatures of thirty thousand persons, as well of the nobles, clergy, and merchants, as of the people. These addresses were burnt when the French retreated from Oporto, but the fact that such a project was in agitation has never been denied; the regency even caused inquest to be made on the matter, and it was then asserted that very few persons were found to be implicated. That many of the signatures were forged by the leaders may readily be believed; but the policy of lessening the importance of the affair is also evident, and the inquisitors, if willing, could not have probed it to the bottom.

This transaction formed the ground-work of a tale, generally credited even by his own officers, that Soult perfidiously aimed at an independent crown. The circumstances were certainly such as might create suspicion; but that the conclusion was false, is shewn, by the mode in which Napoleon treated both the rumour and the subject of it.* Slighting the former, he yet made known to his lieutenant that it had reached his ears, adding "I remember nothing but Austerlitz,"† and at the same time largely increased the duke of Dalmatia's command. On the other hand, the policy of Soult's conduct on this occasion, and the great influence, if not the numbers of the Portuguese malcontents, were abundantly proved by the ameliorated relations between the army and the peasantry.‡ The fierce-

* Rovigo's Memoires.

† Soult distinguished himself in that battle.

‡ S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

ness of the latter subsided; and even the priests abated of their hostility in the Entre Minho e Douro. The French soldiers were no longer assassinated in that province; whereas, previous to this intrigue, that cruel species of warfare had been carried on with infinite activity, and the most malignant passions called forth on both sides.

Among other instances of Portuguese ferocity, and of the truculent violence of the French soldiers, the death of colonel Lameth and the retaliation which followed, may be cited. That young officer, when returning from the marshal's quarters to his own, was waylaid, near the village of Arrifana, and murdered; his body was then stripped, and mutilated in a shocking manner. This assassination, committed within the French lines, and at a time when Soult enforced the strictest discipline, was justifiable neither by the laws of war nor by those of humanity. No general could neglect to punish such a proceeding. The protection due to the army, and even the welfare of the Portuguese within the French jurisdiction, demanded a severe example; for the violence of the troops had hitherto been with difficulty restrained by their commander, and if, at such a moment, he had appeared indifferent to their individual safety, his authority would have been set at naught, and the unmeasured indiscriminating vengeance of an insubordinate army executed.

Impressed with this feeling, and afflicted at the unhappy death of a personal friend, Soult directed general Thomieres to march, with a brigade of infantry, to Arrifana, and punish the criminals. Thomieres was accompanied by a Portuguese civilian, and, after a judicial inquiry, shot five or six persons whose guilt was said to have been proved; but it is certain that the principal actor, a Portuguese major of militia, and some of his accomplices, escaped across the Vouga to colonel Trant, who, disgusted at their conduct, sent them to marshal Beresford. It would also appear, from the statement of a peasant, that Thomieres, or those under him, exceeded Soult's orders; for, in that statement, attested by oath, it is said that twenty-four innocent persons were killed, and that the soldiers, after committing many atrocious excesses, burnt the village.

These details have been related partly because they throw a light upon the direful nature of this contest, but chiefly because the transaction has been adduced by other writers as proof of cruelty in Soult; a charge not to be sustained by the facts of this case, and belied by the general tenor of his conduct, which even his enemies, while they attributed it to an insidious policy, acknowledged, at the time, to be mild and humane. And now, having finished this digression, in which the chronological order of events has been anticipated, I shall resume the narrative of military operations at that part where the disorders attendant on the battle of Oporto having been repressed, a fresh series of combinations were commenced, not less important than those which brought the French army down to the Douro.

The heavy blow struck on the 29th of March was followed up with activity. The boat-bridge was restored during the night; the forts of Mazinho and St. Joa de Foz surrendered; Franceschi's cavalry crossed the Douro, and taking post ten miles in advance on the Coimbra road, pushed patrols as far as the Vouga river. To support this cavalry, general Mermet's division occupied a position somewhat beyond the suburb of Villa Nova; Oporto itself was held by three brigades; the dragoons of Lorge were sent to Villa da Conde, a walled town, situated at the mouth of the Ave; and general Caulaincourt was directed up the Douro to Peñafel, with a brigade of cavalry, having orders to clear the valley of the Tamega. Another brigade of cavalry was posted on the road leading to

Barca de Trofa, to protect the rear of the army, and general Heudelet was directed to forward the hospitals from Braga to Oporto, but to hold his troop in readiness to open the communication with Tuy.

These dispositions being made, Soult had leisure to consider his general position. The flight of the bishop had not much abated the hostility of the people, nor relieved the French from their difficulties; the communication with the Minho was still intercepted; the Tras os Montes was again in a state of insurrection; and Silveira, with a corps of eight thousand men, not only commanded the valley of the Tamega, but had advanced, after retaking Chaves, into the Entre Minho e Douro; posting himself between the Sierra de Catalina and the Douro. Lisbon, the ultimate object of the campaign, was two hundred miles distant, and covered by a British army, whose valour was to be dreaded, and whose numbers were daily increasing. A considerable body of natives were with Trant upon the Vouga, and Beresford's force between the Tagus and the Mondego, its disorderly and weak condition being unknown, appeared formidable at a distance. The day on which the second corps, following the emperor's instructions, should have reached Lisbon was overpassed by six weeks, the line of correspondence with Victor was uncertain, and his co-operation could scarcely be calculated upon. Lapisse's division was yet unfelt as an aiding force, nor was it even known to Soult that he still remained at Salamanca: finally, the three thousand men expected from the Astorga country, under the conduct of the marshal's brother, had not yet been heard of.

On the other hand, the duke of Dalmatia had conquered a large and rich city; he had gained the military command of a very fertile country, from whence the principal supplies of the British army and of Lisbon were derived; he had obtained a secure base of operations and a prominent station in the kingdom; and if the people's fierceness was not yet quelled, they had learned to dread his talents, and to be sensible of their own inferiority in battle. In this state of affairs, judging that the most important objects were to relieve the garrison of Tuy and to obtain intelligence of Lapisse's division, Soult entrusted the first to Heudelet, and the second to Franceschi.

The last-named general had occupied Feira and Oliveira, and spread his posts along the Vouga; but the inhabitants fled to the other side of that river, and the rich valleys beyond were protected by colonel Trant. This officer, well known to the Portuguese as having commanded their troops at Rorica and Vimiero, being at Coimbra when intelligence of the defeat at Braga arrived, had taken the command of all the armed men in that town, among which was a small body of volunteers, students at the university. The general dismay and confusion being greatly increased by the subsequent catastrophe at Oporto, the fugitives from that town and other places, accustomed to violence, and attributing every misfortune to treachery in the generals, flocked to Trant's standard; and he, as a foreigner, was enabled to assume an authority that no native of rank durst either have accepted or refused without imminent danger. He soon advanced with eight hundred men to Sardao and Aveiro, where Eben and general Vittoria joined him, and the conde de Barbacena brought him some cavalry. But as the people regarded these officers with suspicion Trant retained the command, and his force was daily increased by the arrival of *ordenança* and even regular troops, who abandoned Beresford's army to join him.

When Franceschi advanced, Trant sent a detachment by Castanheira to occupy the bridge of the Vouga; but the men, seized with a panic, dispersed, and this was followed by the desertion of many thousand *ordenança*,—a happy circumstance, for the num-

bers that had at first collected behind the Vouga exceeded twelve thousand men, and their extreme violence and insubordination exciting the utmost terror, impeded the measures necessary for defence. Trant, finally, retained about three thousand men, with which imposing upon the French, he preserved a fruitful country from their incursions; he was however greatly distressed for money, because the bishop of Oporto, in his flight, laid hands on all that was at Coimbra and carried it to Lisbon.

Franceschi, although reinforced with a brigade of infantry, contented himself with chasing some insurgents that infested his left flank, while his scouts, sent forward on the side of Viseu, endeavoured to obtain information of Lapisse's division; but that general, as we have seen, was still beyond the Agueda; and while Franceschi was thus employed in front of the French army, Caulaincourt's cavalry on the Tamega was pressed by Silveira. And although Loison marched with a brigade of infantry to his assistance on the 9th of April, Silveira was too strong for both; on the 12th, advancing from Canavezes, obliged Loison, after a slight action, to take post behind the Souza.

Meanwhile, Heudelet was hastening towards Tuy to recover the artillery and dépôts, from which the army had now been separated forty days. He was joined on the 6th of April, at Bancellos, by Lorge, who had taken Villa de Conde and cleared the coast line. The 7th they marched to Ponte de Lima, but the Portuguese resisted the passage vigorously, and it was not forced until the 8th. The 10th the French arrived in front of Valença, on the Minho. This fortress had been maltreated by the fire from Tuy, and the garrison, amounting to two hundred men, having only two days' provisions left, capitulated, on condition of being allowed to retire to their homes, and before the French could take possession, deserted the town. The garrison in Tuy, never having received the slightest intelligence of the army since the separation at Ribidavia, marvelled that the fire from Valença was discontinued, and their surprise was extreme when they beheld the French colours flying in that fort, and observed French videttes on the left bank of the Minho.

La Martinière's garrison, by the arrival of stragglers and a battalion of detachments that followed the army from St. Jago, had been increased to three thousand four hundred men; twelve hundred were in hospital, and two-thirds of the artillery-horses had been eaten in default of other food; the Portuguese had passed the Minho, and, in conjunction with the Spaniards, attacked the place on the 15th of March; yet the French general, by frequent sallies, obliged them to keep up a distant blockade. The 22d of March, the defeat at Braga being known, the Portuguese repassed the Minho, the Spaniards dispersed, and La Martinière immediately sent three hundred men to bring off the garrison of Vigo; it was too late, that place was taken, and the detachment with difficulty regained Tuy.

The peasants on the Arosa Estuary had, as I have before noticed, risen, the 27th of February, while Soult was still at Orense; they were headed, at first, by general Silva and by the count de Mezeda, and, finally, a colonel Barrois, sent by the central junta, took the command. As their numbers were very considerable, Barrois with one part attacked Tuy, and Silva assisted by the Lively and Venus, British frigates on that station, invested Vigo. The garrison of the latter place was at first small, but the paymaster-general of the second corps, instead of proceeding to Tuy, entered Vigo, with the military chest and an escort of eight hundred men, and was blockaded there; nevertheless, after some slight attacks had been repulsed, the French governor negotiated for a capitulation on the 23d of March; distrustful however, of the peasantry, he was still undecided on the 26th, and meanwhile, some of

Romana's stragglers coming from the Val des Orres, collected between Tuy and Vigo; and Pablo Murillo, a regular officer, assembling fifteen hundred retired soldiers, joined the blockading force. His troops acting in concert with captain Mackinley, of the Lively, obliged the garrison to surrender on terms.* The 27th, thirteen hundred men and officers, including three hundred sick, marched out with the honours of war, and, having laid down their arms on the glacis, were embarked for an English port, according to the articles agreed upon. Four hundred and forty-seven horses, sixty-two covered waggons, some stores, and the military chest, containing five thousand pounds, fell into the victor's hands. The Spaniards then renewed their attack on Tuy; the Portuguese once more crossed the Minho, and the siege continued until the 10th of April, when the place was relieved by Heudelet.

The dépôts and the artillery were immediately transported across the river, and directed upon Oporto. The following day general Maucune, with a division of the sixth corps, arrived at Tuy, with the intention of carrying off the garrison, but seeing that the place was relieved, returned. Heudelet, after taking Viana, and the fort of Insoa, at the mouth of the Minho, placed a small garrison in the former, and blowing up the works of Valença, retired to Braga and Bancellos, sending Lorge again to Villa de Conde. The French sick were transported in boats along shore, from the mouth of the Minho to Viana, Villa de Conde, and thence to Oporto, and while these transactions were taking place on the Minho, La Houssaye, with a brigade of dragoons and one of infantry, scoured the country between the Lima and the Cavado, and so protected the rear of Heudelet.

All resistance in the Entre Minho e Douro had now ceased, because the influence of the *Anti-Braganza* party was exerted in favour of the French; but, on the Tras os Montes side, Silveira was advancing, and being joined by Botilho, from the Lima, boasted that he would be in Oporto the 15th. This unexpected boldness was explained by the news of Chaves having fallen, which now, for the first time, reached Soult. He then perceived that while Silveira was in arms, the tranquillity of the Entre Minho e Douro could only be momentary, and therefore directed Laborde with a brigade of infantry, to join Loison and attack the Portuguese general by Amarante, while La Houssaye crossing the Cavado, should push through Guimaraens for the same point.

The 15th, Laborde reached Peñafiel, and Silveira, hearing of La Houssaye's march, retired to Villamea. The 18th, Laborde drove back the Portuguese without difficulty, and their retreat soon became a flight. Silveira himself passed the Tamega at Amarante, and was making for the mountains, without a thought of defending that town, when colonel Patrick, a British officer in the Portuguese service, encouraging his battalion, faced about, and rallying the fugitives, beat back the foremost of the enemy. This becoming act obliged Silveira to return, and while Patrick defended the approaches to the bridge on the right bank with obstinate valour, the former took a position, on the left bank, on the heights overhanging the suburb of Villa Real.

The 19th, La Houssaye arrived, the French renewed their attack on the town, and Patrick again baffled their efforts; but when that gallant man being mortally wounded, was carried across the bridge, the defence slackened, and the Portuguese went over the Tamega: the passage of the river was, however, still to be effected. The bridges of Mondin and Cavez above, and that of Canavezas below Amarante, were destroyed; the Tamega was in full flood, with a deep

* Captain Mackinley's Despatch.

rocky bed; the bridge in front of the French was mined, barred with three rows of pallasades, and commanded by a battery of ten guns; the Portuguese were in position on the heights beyond, and could from thence discern all that passed on the bridge, and reinforce their advanced guard which was posted in the suburb.

PASSAGE OF THE TAMEGA, AT AMARANTE.

Laborde at first endeavoured to work a way over by the flying sap. He reached the barricade the 20th of April, but the Portuguese fire was so deadly that he soon relinquished this method and sought to construct a bridge of tressels half a mile below; which failed, and the efforts against the stone bridge were renewed. The 27th, the centre barricade was burned by captain Brochard, an engineer, who then devised a method of forcing a passage so singularly bold, that all the generals and especially Foy, were opposed to it. Nevertheless it was transmitted to Oporto, and Soult despatched general Hulot to examine its merits on the spot, who approved of it.

It appeared that the Portuguese mine was so constructed that while the muzzle of a loaded musket was in the chamber, a string tied to the trigger passed over the trenches and secured the greatest precision for the explosion. Brochard therefore proceeded in the following manner. In the night of the 2d of May, the French troops were conveniently disposed as near the head of the bridge as the necessity of keeping them hidden would permit; at eight o'clock although the moon shone bright, twenty men were sent a little below the bridge to open an oblique fire against the entrenchments, and this being replied to and the attention of the Portuguese diverted to that side, a sapper, dressed in dark grey, crawled out, pushing with his head a barrel of powder, which was likewise enveloped in grey cloth to deaden the sound, along that side of the bridge which was darkened by the shadow of the parapet; when he had placed his barrel against the entrenchment covering the Portuguese mine, he retired in the same manner. Two others followed in succession, and retired without being discovered, but the fourth, after placing his barrel, rose to run back, and was immediately shot at and wounded. The fire of the Portuguese was then directed on the bridge itself, but as the barrels were not discovered, it soon ceased, and a fifth sapper advancing like the others, attached a sausage seventy yards long to the barrels. At two o'clock in the morning the whole was completed, the French kept very quiet, and the Portuguese remained tranquil and unsuspecting.

Brochard had calculated that the effect of four barrels exploding together would destroy the Portuguese entrenchments, and burn the cord attached to their mine. The event proved that he was right, for a thick fog arising about three o'clock in the morning, the sausage was fired, and the explosion made a large breach. Brochard, with his sappers, instantly jumped on the bridge, threw water into the mine, cut away all obstacles, and, followed by a column of grenadiers, was at the other side before the smoke cleared away. The grenadiers being supported by other troops, not only the suburb, but the camp on the height behind were carried without a check, and the Portuguese dispersing, fled over the mountains. The execution of this bold, ingenious, and successful project, cost only seven or eight men killed; while in the former futile attempts above a hundred and eighty men, besides many engineer and artillery officers, had fallen. It is, however, a singular fact, that there was a practicable ford near the bridge, unguarded, and apparently unknown to both sides.

A short time after the passage of the Tamega, Heudelet, marching from Braga by Guimaraens, entered Amarante; Laborde occupied the position abandoned

by Silveira, and sent detachments up the left bank of the river to Mondin, while Loison pursued the fugitives. The Portuguese, at the bridge of Canavesas, hearing of the action, destroyed the ammunition, and retired across the Douro. Over that river also went the inhabitants of Mezamfrio and Villa Real, when Loison, on the 6th of May, appeared in their vicinity.

This being made known to Soult, he reinforced Loison, and directed him to scour the right bank of the Douro as high as Pezo de Ragoa; to complete the destruction of Silveira's army, and with a view to the reduction of the *Tras os Montes*, to patrol towards Braganza, on which side Bessieres had been asked to co-operate. That marshal was however gone to France, and the reply of his successor Kellerman being intercepted, it appeared that he was unable or unwilling to afford any aid.

Laborde was now recalled to Oporto, with two regiments of infantry, another regiment and a brigade of dragoons were left to guard the communications with Amarante, and meanwhile Loison, meeting with resistance at Pezo de Ragoa, and observing a considerable movement on the opposite bank of the Douro, became alarmed, and fell back to Mezamfrio. The 8th he returned to Amarante, but his march was harassed by the peasantry, with a vigour and boldness that indicated the vicinity of some powerful support, and in truth a new actor had appeared; the whole country was in commotion, and the duke of Dalmatia felt himself suddenly pushed backward by a strong and eager hand.

OBSERVATIONS.—SPANISH OPERATIONS.

1.—The great pervading error of the Spaniards in this campaign was the notion that their armies were capable of taking the lead in offensive movements, and fighting the French in open countries; whereas, to avoid general actions should have been with them a vital principle.

2.—The resolution to fight the French having been unfortunately adopted, the second great error was the attaching equal importance to the lines of operation in La Mancha and Estremadura; the one should have been considered only as an accessory. It is evident that the first rank belonged to La Mancha, because it was in a more open country; because it more immediately threatened Madrid; and because a defeat there endangered Seville more than a defeat in Estremadura would have done. In La Mancha the beaten Spanish army must have fallen back upon Seville, in Estremadura it might have retired upon Badajos. But the latter place being defensible, and to the Spaniards of infinitely less importance than Madrid was to their opponents, the lead in the campaign must always have belonged to the army of La Mancha, which could, at any time, have obliged the French to fight a battle for the capital. The army of Estremadura might, therefore, have been safely reduced to fifteen thousand men, provided the army of La Mancha had been increased to forty or fifty thousand, and it would appear that, with a very little energy, the junta could have provided a larger force. It is true that they would have been beaten just the same, but that is only an argument against fighting great battles, which was, certainly, the worst possible plan for the Spaniards to pursue.

3.—The third great error was the inertness of Valencia and Murcia, or rather their hostility, for they were upon the verge of civil war with the supreme junta. Those provinces, so rich and populous, had been unmolested for eight months; they had suffered nothing from Moncey's irruption, they had received large succours from the English government, and Valencia had written her pretensions to patriotism in the bloody characters of assassination; yet were it not for the force under Llamas, which, after the defeat of Tudela, helped to defend Zaragoza, Valencia and Murcia might have been swallowed up by the ocean without any sensible

effect upon the general cause. Those countries were however admirably situated to serve as a support to Aragon, Catalonia, Andalusia, and La Mancha, and they could, at this time, have paralyzed a large French force, by marching an army to San Clemente. It was the dread of their doing so that made the king restrain Sebastiani from pursuing his victory at Ciudad Real; * and assuredly, the Valencians should have moved; for it is not so much in their numbers as in the variety of their lines of operation that a whole people find their advantage in opposing regular armies. This, the observation of that profound and original writer, general Lloyd, was confirmed by the practice of Napoleon, in Spain.

FRENCH OPERATIONS.

1.—To get possession of Seville and Cadiz was certainly as great an object with Napoleon as to seize Lisbon, but the truth of the maxim quoted above regulated the emperor's proceedings. If Victor had been directed at once upon Andalusia, the Portuguese and Valencians could have carried their lines of operations upon his flanks and rear; if Badajos and Lisbon had been the objects of his march, the Andalusians could have fallen on his left flank and cut his communications. Now all such dangers were avoided by the march of Soult and Lapisse; their direction was not only concentric, but a regular prolongation of the great line of communication with France. Ney protected the rear of one, Bessieres the rear of the other, and those two marshals, also, separated and cut off the Asturias from the rest of Spain; thus, all that was formidable was confined to the south of the Tagus. For the same reason the course of conquest was to have proceeded from Portugal to Andalusia, which would then have been assailed both in front and flank, while the fourth corps held the Valencians in check. By this plan the French would never have lost their central position, nor exposed their grand line of communication to a serious attack.

2.—That this plan, so wisely conceived in its general bearing, should fail, without any of the different corps employed having suffered a defeat, nay, when they were victorious in all quarters, is surprising, but not inexplicable. It is clear that Napoleon's orders were given at a time when he did not expect that a battle would have been fought at Coruña, or that the second corps would have suffered so much from the severity of the weather and the length of the marches; neither did he anticipate the resistance, made by the Portuguese, between the Minho and the Douro. The last error was a consequence of the first, for his plans were calculated upon the supposition that the rapidity of Soult's movements would forestall all defence; yet the delay cannot be charged as a fault to that marshal, his energy was conspicuous.

3.—Napoleon's attention, divided between Austria and Spain, must have been somewhat distracted by the multiplicity of his affairs. He does not seem to have made allowance for the very rugged country through which Soult had to march, at a season when all the rivers and streams were overflowing; and as the combinations of war are continually changing, the delay thus occasioned rendered Lapisse's instructions faulty; for, although it be true, that if the latter had marched by Guarda upon Abrantes while Soult advanced to Lisbon by Coimbra and Victor entered the Alemtejo, Portugal would have been conquered without difficulty; yet the combination was so wide, and the communications so uncertain, that unity of action could not be insured. Soult, weakened by the obstacles he encountered, required reinforcements after the taking of Oporto, and if Lapisse attaching himself to Soult's instead of Victor's incursion, had then marched upon Viseu,

the duke of Dalmatia would have been enabled to win his way without regard to the co-operation in the Alemtejo.

4.—The first error of the French, if the facts are correctly shewn, must therefore be attributed to Napoleon, because he overlooked the probable chances of delay, combined the operations on too wide a scale, and gave Ciudad Rodrigo and Abrantes, instead of Lamego and Viseu, for the direction of Lapisse's march. I say, if the facts are correctly shewn, for it is scarcely discreet to censure Napoleon's military dispositions however erroneous they may appear to have been, and it is certain that, in this case, his errors, if errors they were, although sufficient to embarrass his lieutenants, will not account for their entire failure. Above sixty thousand men were put in motion by him, upon good military principles, for the subjugation of Lisbon; we must therefore search in the particular conduct of the generals for the reason why a *project of Napoleon's, to be executed by sixty thousand French veterans, should have ended as idly and ineffectually as if it had been concocted by the Spanish junta.*

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPARATE OPERATIONS OF LAPISSE, VICTOR, SOULT, ROMANA, SILVEIRA, AND CUESTA.

LAPISSE.

1.—An intercepted letter of general Maupetit, shews the small pains taken by Lapisse to communicate with Soult. He directs that *even so many* as three hundred men should patrol towards Tras os Montes, to obtain information of the second corps, at a time when the object was so important that his whole force should have moved in mass rather than have failed of intelligence.

2.—The manner in which he suffered sir Robert Wilson to gather strength and to insult his outposts was inexcusable. He might have marched straight upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and dispersed every thing in his front; one of those fortresses would probably have fallen, if not both, and from thence a strong detachment pushed towards Lamego, would not only have ascertained the situation of the second corps, but would have greatly aided its progress by threatening Oporto and Braga. It cannot be urged that Salamanca required the presence of a large force, because, in that open country, the people were at the mercy of Bessieres' cavalry, and so sensible were the local junta of this, that both Salamanca and Ledesma refused assistance from Ciudad Rodrigo, when it was offered, and preferred a quiet submission.

3.—When, at last, the king's reiterated orders obliged Lapisse to put his troops in motion, he made a demonstration against Ciudad Rodrigo, so feeble that it scarcely called the garrison to the ramparts, and then as if all chance of success in Portugal was at an end, he broke through the pass of Perales, reached Alcantara and rejoined the first corps, a movement equally at variance with Napoleon's orders and with good military discretion; for the first directed him upon Abrantes, and the second would have carried him upon Viseu. The march to the latter place, while it insured a junction with Soult, would not have prevented an after movement upon Abrantes; the obstacles were by no means so great as those which awaited him on the march to Alcantara, and the great error of abandoning the whole country, between the Tagus and the Douro, to the insurgents, would have been avoided. Here then was one direct cause of failure; yet the error, although great, was not irreparable. If Soult was abandoned to his own resources, he had also obtained a firm and important position in the north, while Victor, reinforced by ten thousand men, was enabled to operate against Lisbon by the Alemtejo, more efficaciously than before; he, however, seems to have been less disposed than Lapisse to execute his instructions.

* Parl. Papers, 1810.

VICTOR.

1.—The inactivity of this marshal, after the rout of Ucles has been already mentioned. It is certain that if the fourth and first corps had been well handled, neither Cuesta nor Cartoajal could have ventured beyond the defiles of the Sierra Morena, much less have bearded the French generals and established a line of defence along the Tagus. Fifty thousand French troops should in two months have done something more than maintain fifty miles of country on one side of Madrid.

2.—The passage of the Tagus was successful, but can hardly be called a skilful operation, unless the duke of Belluno calculated upon the ignorance of his adversary. Before an able general and a moveable army, possessing a pontoon train, it would have scarcely answered to separate the troops in three divisions in an extent of fifty miles, leaving the artillery and parc of ammunition, protected only by some cavalry and one battalion of infantry, within two hours' march of the enemy for three days. If Cuesta had brought up all his detachments, the Meza d'Ibor might have been effectually manned, and ten thousand infantry and all the Spanish cavalry spared, to cross the Tagus at Almaraz on the 17th; in this case Victor's artillery would probably have been captured, and his project certainly baffled.

3.—When the passage of the Tagus was effected, Victor, not only permitted Cuesta to escape, but actually lost all traces of his army; an evident fault, and not to be excused by pleading the impediments arising from the swelling of the river, the necessity of securing the communications, &c. If Cuesta's power was despised before the passage of the river, when his army was whole and his position strong, there could be no reason for such great circumspection after his defeat, a circumspection, too, not supported by skill, as the dispersed state of the French army the evening before the battle of Medellin proves.

4.—That Victor was enabled to fight Cuesta, on the morning of the 28th, with any prospect of success, must be attributed rather to fortune than to talent. It was a fault to permit the Spaniards to retake the offensive after the defeat on the Tagus, nor can the first movement of the duke of Belluno in the action be praised. He should have marched into the plain in a compact order of battle. The danger of sending Lassalle and Latour Maubourg to such a distance from the main body I shall have occasion to show in my observations on Cuesta's operations; the after-movements of the French in this battle were well and rapidly combined and vigorously executed, and the success was proportionate to the ability displayed.

5.—The battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, which utterly destroyed the Spanish armies and laid Seville and Badajos open; those battles, in which blood was spilt like water, produced no result to the victors, for the French generals, as if they had touched a torpedo, never stretched forth their hands a second time. Sebastiani, indeed, wished to penetrate the Sierra Morena, but the king, fearful of the Valencians, restrained him. On the other hand Joseph urged Victor to invade the Alentejo, and the latter would not obey, even when reinforced by Lapisse's division. This last was the great and fatal error of the whole campaign, for nearly all the disposable British and Portuguese troops were thus enabled to move against the duke of Dalmatia, while the duke of Belluno contrived neither to fulfil the instructions of Napoleon, nor the orders of the king, nor yet to perform any useful achievement himself.

He did not assist the invasion of Portugal, he did not maintain Estremadura, he did not take Seville, nor even prevent Cuesta from twice renewing the offensive; yet he remained in an unhealthy situation until he lost

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more men, by sickness, than would have furnished three such battles as Medellin. Two months so unprofitably wasted by a general, at the head of thirty thousand good troops, can scarcely be cited. The duke of Belluno's reputation has been too hardly earned to attribute this inactivity to want of talent. That he was averse to aid the operations of marshal Soult is evident, and, most happily for Portugal, it was so; but, whether this aversion arose from personal jealousy, from indisposition to obey the king, or from a mistaken view of affairs, I have no means of judging.

CUESTA.

1.—Cuesta's peculiar unfitness for the lead of an army has been remarked more than once. It remains to shew that his proceedings, on this occasion, continued to justify those remarks.

To defend a river, on a long line, is generally hopeless, and especially when the defenders have not the means of passing freely, in several places, to the opposite bank. Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Turenne, Napoleon, Wellington, and hundreds of others have shown how the passage of rivers may be won. Eumenes, who prevented Antigonos from passing the Coprates, is, perhaps, the only example of a general baffling the efforts of a skilful and enterprising enemy in such an attempt.

2.—The defence of rivers having always proved fruitless, it follows that no general should calculate upon success, and that he should exert the greatest energy, activity, and vigilance to avoid a heavy disaster; that all his lines of retreat should be kept free and open, and be concentric; and that to bring his magazines and depôts close up to the army, in such a situation, is rashness itself. Now Cuesta was inactive, and, disregarding the maxim which forbids the establishment of magazines in the first line of defence, brought up the whole of his to Deleytosa and Truxillo. His combinations were ill-arranged; he abandoned Mirabete without an effort; his depôts fell into the hands of the enemy; his retreat was confused; and eccentric, inasmuch as part of his army retired into the Guadalupe, while others went to Merida and he himself to Medellin.

3.—The line of retreat upon Medellin and Campanarios, instead of Badajos; being determined by the necessity of uniting with Albuquerque, cannot be blamed; the immediate return to Medellin was bold and worthy of praise but its merit consisted in recovering the offensive immediately after a defeat, wherefore, Cuesta should not have halted at Medellin, thus giving the lead again to the French general; he should have continued to advance, and falling upon the scattered divisions of the French army, endeavoured to beat them in detail, and rally his own detachments in the Sierra de Guadalupe. The error of stopping short at Medellin would have been apparent, if Victor, placing a rear-guard to amuse the Spanish general, had taken the road to Seville by Almendralejos and Zafra.

4.—Cuesta's general design for the battle of Medellin was well imagined; that is, it was right to hide his army behind the ridge, and to defer the attack until the enemy had developed his force and order of battle in the plain; but the execution was on the lowest scale. If, instead of advancing in one long and weak line without a reserve, Cuesta had held the greatest part of his troops in solid columns, and thrust them between Lassalle and Latour Maubourg's divisions, which were pushed out like horns from the main body of the French, those generals would have been cut off, and the battle commenced by dividing the French army into three unconnected masses, while the Spaniards would have been compact, well in hand, and masters of the general movements. Nothing could then have saved Victor, except hard fighting, whereas Cuesta's dispositions rendered it impossible for the

Spaniards to win the battle by courage, or to escape the pursuit by swiftness.

5. It is remarkable that the Spanish general seems never to have thought of putting Truxillo, Guadalupe, Merida, Estrella, or Medellin in a state of defence, although most if not all of those places had some castle or walls capable of resisting a sudden assault. There was time to do it, for Cuesta remained unmolested, on the Tagus, from January to the middle of March, and every additional point of support thus obtained for an undisciplined army would have diminished the advantages derived by the French from their superior facility of movement; the places themselves might have been garrisoned by the citizens and peasantry, and a week's, a day's, nay, even an hour's, delay was of importance to a force like Cuesta's, which, from its inexperience, must have always been liable to confusion.

SOULT.

1. The march of this general in one column, upon Tuy, was made under the impression that resistance would not be offered; otherwise, it is probable that a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry would have been sent from St. Jago or Mellid direct upon Orense, to insure the passage of the Minho; it seems to have been also an error in Ney, arising, probably, from the same cause, not to have kept Marchand's division of the sixth corps at Orense until the second corps had effected an entrance into Portugal.

2. Soult's resolution to place the artillery and stores in Tuy, and march into Portugal, trusting to victory for re-opening the communication, would increase the reputation of any general. Three times before he reached Oporto he was obliged to halt, in order to fabricate cartridges for the infantry, from the powder taken in battle, and his whole progress from Tuy to that city was energetic and able in the extreme.

3. The military proceedings, after the taking of Oporto, do not all bear the same stamp. The administration of the civil affairs appears to have engrossed the marshal's attention, and his absence from the immediate scene of action sensibly affected the operations. Franceschi shewed too much respect for Trant's corps; Loison's movements were timid and slow; even Laborde's genius seems to have been asleep. The importance of crushing Silveira was obvious, and there is nothing more necessary in war than to strike with all the force you can at once; but here Caulaincourt was first sent, being too weak, Loison reinforced him, Laborde reinforced Loison, and all were scarcely sufficient at last to do that which half would have done at first. But the whole of these transactions are obscure. The great delay that took place before the bridge of Amarante, and the hesitation and frequent recurrence for orders to the marshal, indicate want of zeal, or a desire to procrastinate, in opposition to Soult's wishes. Judging from Mr. Noble's history of the campaign, this must be traced to a conspiracy in the French army, which shall be touched upon hereafter.

4. The resistance made by the Portuguese peasantry was infinitely creditable to their courage, but there cannot be a stronger proof of the inefficacy of a like defence, when unsupported by good troops. No country is more favourable to such a warfare than the northern provinces of Portugal; the people were brave, they had the assistance of the organized forces under Romana, Silveira, Eben, and the bishop; yet Soult, in the very worst season of the year, overcoming all resistance, penetrated to Oporto, without an actual loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners of more than two

thousand five hundred men, including the twelve hundred sick, captured at Chaves.

ROMANA.

1. Romana remained at Oimbra and Monterey, unmolested, from the 21st of January to the 6th of March; he had therefore time to reorganise his forces, and he had, in fact, ten thousand regular troops in tolerable order. He knew, on the 11th or 12th, that Soult was preparing to pass the Minho, between Tuy and Guardia. He knew, also, that the people of Ribidavia and Orense were in arms; that those on the Arosa were preparing to rise, and that, consequently, the French must, were it only from want of food, break out of the contracted position they occupied, either by Ribidavia and Orense, or by crossing the Minho, or by retreating to St. Jago. With these guides, the path of the Spanish general was as plain as the writing on the wall; he was at the head of ten thousand regular troops, and two marches would have brought him to Ribidavia; in front of that town he might have occupied a position close on the left flank of the French, rallied all the insurgents about him, and organized a formidable warfare. The French durst not have attempted the passage of the Minho while he was in front of Ribidavia, and if they turned against him, the place was favourable for battle, the retreat open by Orense and Monterey; and the difficulty of bringing up artillery would have hampered the pursuit. On the other hand, if Soult had retreated, that alone would have been tantamount to a victory, and Romana would have been well placed to follow, connecting himself with the English vessels of war upon that coast as he advanced.

2. So far from contemplating operations of this nature, Romana did not even concentrate his force; but keeping it extended, in small parties, along fifteen miles of country, indulged himself in speculations about his enemy's weakness, and the prospect of their retreating altogether from the Peninsula. He was only roused from his reveries, by finding his divisions beaten in detail, and himself forced either to join the Portuguese with whom he was quarrelling, or to break his promises to Silveira and fly by cross roads over the mountain on his right: he adopted the latter, thus proving, that whatever might be his resources for raising an insurrection, he could not direct one, and that he was, although brave and active, totally destitute of military talent. At a later period of the war, the duke of Wellington, after a long and fruitless military discussion, drily observed, that either Romana or himself had mistaken their profession!

SILVEIRA.

1. This Portuguese general's first operations were as ill conducted as Romana's; his posts were too extended, he made no attempt to repair the works of Chaves, none to aid the important insurrection of Ribidavia; but these errors cannot be fairly charged upon him, as his officers were so unruly, that they held a council of war per force, where thirty voted for fighting at Chaves, and twenty-nine against it; the casting voice being given by the voter calling on the troops to follow him. The after-movement, by which Chaves was recaptured, whether devised by Silveira himself, or directed by Marshal Beresford, was bold and skilful; but the advance to Peñafiel, while La Houssaye and Heudelet could from Braga pass by Guimaraens, and cut him off from Amarante, was as rash as his subsequent flight was disgraceful: yet, thanks to the heroic courage of colonel Patrick, Silveira's reputation as a general was established among his countrymen, by the very action which should have ruined him in their estimation.

BOOK VIII.

CHAPTER I.

Anarchy in Portugal—Sir J. Cradock quits the command—Sir A. Wellesley arrives at Lisbon—Happy effect of his presence—Nominated captain-general—His military position described—Resolves to march against Soult—Reaches Coimbra—Conspiracy in the French army—D'Argenton's proceedings—Sir A. Wellesley's situation compared with that of sir J. Cradock.

It will be remembered that the narrative of sir John Cradock's proceedings was discontinued, at the moment when that general, nothing shaken by the importunities of the regency, the representations of marshal Beresford, or the advice of Mr. Frere, resolved to await at Lumiar for the arrival of the promised reinforcements from England. While in this position, he made every exertion to obtain transport for the supplies, remounts for the cavalry, and draught animals for the artillery; but the Portuguese government gave him no assistance, and an attempt to procure horses and mules in Morocco proving unsuccessful, the army was so scantily furnished that, other reasons failing, this alone would have prevented any advance towards the frontier.

The singular inactivity of Victor surprised Cradock, but did not alter his resolution; yet, being continually importuned to advance, he, when assured that five thousand men of the promised reinforcements were actually off the rock of Lisbon, held a council of war on the subject.* All the generals were averse to marching on Oporto, except Beresford, and he admitted that its propriety depended on Victor's movements: meanwhile, that marshal approached Badajoz, Lapisse came down upon the Agueda, and Soult, having stormed Oporto, pushed his advanced posts to the Vouga. A cry of treason was instantly heard throughout Portugal, and both the people and the soldiers evinced a spirit truly alarming. The latter disregarding the authority of Beresford, and menacing their own officers, declared that it was necessary to slay a thousand traitors in Lisbon; and the regiments in Abrantes even abandoned that post, and marched to join Trant upon the Vouga. But, when these disorders were at the worst, and when a vigorous movement of Victor and Lapisse would have produced fatal consequences, general Hill landed with about five thousand men and three hundred artillery horses. Cradock, then, resolved to advance, moved thereto chiefly by the representations of Beresford, who thought such a measure absolutely necessary to restore confidence, to ensure the obedience of the native troops, and to enable him to take measures for the safety of Abrantes.† Thus, about the time that Tuy was relieved by the French, and that Silveira was attacked at Peña-fiel by Laborde, the English army was put in motion, part upon Caldas and Obidos, part upon Rio Mayor; the campaign was, therefore, actually commenced by Cradock, when that general, although his measures had been all approved of by his government, was suddenly and unexpectedly required to surrender his command to sir Arthur Wellesley, and proceed himself to Gibraltar.

It would appear that this arrangement was adopted after a struggle in the cabinet,‡ and, certainly, neither the particular choice nor the general principle of em-

ploying men of talent without regard to seniority can be censured; nevertheless, sir John Cradock was used unworthily. A general of his rank would never have accepted a command on such terms, and it was neither just nor decent to expose him to an unmerited mortification.

Before the arrival of his successor, Cradock had assembled the army at Leiria, and established his magazines at Abrantes, Santarem, and Peniché; but as the admiral fearing the difficult navigation at that season, would not send victuallers to the latter place, the magazines there were but scantily supplied. Meanwhile Lapisse made way by Alcantara to Merida, the re-capture of Chaves became known, and the insurrection in Beira and Tras os Montes took its full spring. Trant's force also increased on the Vouga, and Beresford, who had succeeded in restoring order among the Portuguese battalions, was more than ever urgent for an attack upon Soult; nevertheless Cradock, unprovided with a due proportion of cavalry, unable to procure provisions or forage, and fearful for the safety of Lisbon, refused, and the 24th of April, hearing that his successor had arrived, resigned the command and repaired to Gibraltar.

Sir Arthur Wellesley landed the 22d of April. On the 24th he signified to the British ministers that, affairs being in the condition contemplated by them, it was his intention to assume the command of the army; a circumstance worthy of attention, as indicating that the defence of Portugal was even then considered a secondary object, and of uncertain promise. The deliverance of the Peninsula was never due to the foresight and perseverance of the English ministers, but to the firmness and skill of the British generals, and to the courage of troops whom no dangers could daunt and no hardships dishearten, while they remedied the eternal errors of the cabinet.

The unexpected arrival of a man known only as a victorious commander created the greatest enthusiasm in Portugal. The regency immediately nominated him marshal-general of their troops; the people, always fond of novelty, hailed his presence with enthusiasm; and all those persons, whether Portuguese or British, who had blamed sir John Cradock's prudent caution, now anticipating a change of system, spake largely and confidently of the future operations: in truth, all classes were greatly excited, and an undefined yet powerful sentiment that something great would soon be achieved pervaded the public mind.

Sir Arthur's plans were, however, neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward; like Cradock, he felt the danger of removing far from Lisbon while Victor was on the Alemtejo frontier, and he anxiously weighed his own resources against those at the enemy's disposal. Not that he wavered between offensive and defensive movements; a general of his discernment could not fail to perceive that, if the French were acting upon any concerted plan, the false march of Lapisse to Merida had marred their combinations, by placing a whole nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, whether insurgents, regular troops, or auxiliaries, between the armies of Victor and Soult; and that neither concert nor communication could longer exist between those marshals.

Soult's offensive strength, also, was evidently ex-

* Sir John Cradock's Correspondence, MSS. † Ib.

‡ Lord Loudonderry's Narrative.

hausted; he might establish himself firmly in the provinces beyond the Douro, but he could not, alone, force his way to Lisbon, a distance of two hundred miles, in a season when the waters were full, and through a country tangled with rivers, mountains, and defiles. He could not hope, with twenty-four thousand men, to beat a whole people in arms, assisted by an auxiliary army of as high reputation, and nearly as numerous as his own; and, moreover, there were discontents and conspiracy in his camp, and of this sir Arthur was aware.

Soult alone, then, was no longer formidable to the capital; but that which weakened him increased the offensive power of Victor, who was now at the head of thirty thousand men, and might march straight upon Lisbon, and through an open country, the only barrier being the Tagus, a river fordable in almost all seasons. Such a movement, or even a semblance of it, must perforce draw the British and native armies to that side, and then Soult, coming down to the Mondego, might, from thence, connect his operations with Victor's by the line of the Zezere, or advance at once on Lisbon as occasion offered.

Now, to meet the exigencies of the campaign, the military resources of the English general were,—

- 1.—His central position.
- 2.—The British and German troops, about twenty-six thousand in number; of which the present under arms, including sergeants, amounted to twenty-two thousand, with three thousand seven hundred horses and mules. In the British army corporals and privates only are understood in the present under arms, but in the French army that term includes all military persons. Officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and drummers, combatants and non-combatants, a distinction to be borne in mind when comparing the forces on each side.
- 3.—The Portuguese troops of the line; of which there might be organised and armed about sixteen thousand. Nearly all these troops were already collected, or capable of being collected in a short time, between the Tagus and Mondego; and beyond the latter river, Trant and Silveira commanded separate corps; the one upon the Vouga, the other on the Tamega.
- 4.—The militia and the *ordenancas*, which may be denominated the insurgent force.
- 5.—The fortresses of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, Elvas, Abrantes, Peniché, and Badajos.
- 6.—The English fleet, the Portuguese craft, and the free use of the coast and river navigation for his supplies.
- 7.—The assistance of Cuesta, who had six thousand cavalry and thirty thousand infantry, of which twenty-five thousand were actually about the defiles of Monasterio in front of Victor's posts.

Sir Arthur Wellesley's moral resources were the high courage of his own troops; his personal popularity; the energy of an excited people; a favourable moment; the presentiment of victory, and a mind equal to the occasion.

In a strategic point of view, to fall upon Victor was best, because he was the most dangerous neighbour to Portugal; because his defeat would prove most detrimental to the French, most advantageous to the Spaniards; and because the greatest body of troops could be brought to bear against him. On the other hand, Soult held a rich province, from whence the chief supply of cattle for the army was derived; he was in possession of the second city in the kingdom, where he was forming a French party; the feelings of the regency and the people were greatly troubled by the loss of Oporto, and their desire to regain it was strongly expressed.

To attack Victor, it was indispensable to concert operations with Cuesta; but that general was ill-disposed towards the British, and to insure his co-opera-

tion would have required time, which could be better employed in expelling Soult. For these reasons, sir Arthur Wellesley determined to attack the last-named marshal without delay; intending, if successful, to establish a good system of defence in the northern provinces, and then, in conjunction with Cuesta, to turn his arms against Victor, hoping thus to relieve Galicia more effectually than by following the French into that province.

The security of Lisbon being the pivot of the operations against Soult, time was the principal object to be gained. If Victor came fiercely on, he could not be stopped, but his course might be impeded; his path could not be blocked, but it might be planted with thorns. To effect this, eight or ten thousand Portuguese troops were immediately directed upon Abrantes and Santarem, where two British battalions and two regiments of cavalry just disembarked, also marched and were there joined by three other battalions drafted from the army at Leiria.

A body of two thousand men, composed of a militia regiment, and the Lusitanian legion which remained near Castello Branco after Lapisse had crossed the Tagus, were placed under the command of colonel Mayne, and directed to take post at the bridge of Alcantara, having orders to defend the passage of the river, and, if necessary, to blow up the structure. At the same time, the flying bridges at Villa Velha and Abrantes were removed, the garrison of the latter place was reinforced, and general Mackenzie was appointed to command all the troops, whether Portuguese or British, thus distributed along the right bank of the Tagus. These precautions appeared sufficient, especially as there was a general disposition to believe the French weaker than they really were; Victor could not, by a mere demonstration, shake this line of defence; and if he forced the bridge of Alcantara, and penetrated by the sterile and difficult route formerly followed by Junot, it would bring him, without guns, upon Abrantes; but Abrantes was already capable of a short resistance, and Mackenzie would have had time to line the rugged banks of the Zezere.

If, however, Victor leaving Badajos and Elvas behind him, should pass through the Alemtejo, and cross the Tagus between Abrantes and Lisbon, he was to be feared; but Cuesta had promised to follow closely in the French general's rear, and it was reasonable to suppose that Mackenzie, although he might be unable to prevent the passage of the river, would not suffer himself to be cut off from the capital, where, having the assistance of the fleet, the aid of the citizens, and the chance of reinforcements from England, he might defend himself until the army could return from the Douro. Moreover, Victor was eighteen marches from Lisbon; it was only by accident that he and Soult could act in concert, and the allied army, having a sure and rapid mode of correspondence with Cuesta, was already within four marches of Oporto.

The main body of the allies was now directed upon Coimbra; four of the best Portuguese battalions were incorporated in the British brigades; Beresford retained, under his personal command, about six thousand native troops; Trant remained steadfast on the Vouga; Silveira on the Tamega; and sir Robert Wilson, quitting the command of the legion, was detached, with a small Portuguese force, to Viseu, where, hanging upon Franceschi's left flank, he also communicated with Silveira's corps by the way of Lamego.

The difficulty of bringing up forage and provisions, which had pressed so sorely on sir John Cradock, was now somewhat lessened. The land transport was indeed still scanty, and the admiral, dreading the long shore navigation for large vessels, was without the small craft necessary for victualling the troops by the coast; but the magazines at Caldas were partly filled,

and twenty large country-boats loaded with provisions, the owners being induced by premiums to make the run, had got safely into Peniché and the Mondego. In short, the obstacles to a forward movement, although great, were not insurmountable.

Sir Arthur Wellesley reached Coimbra the 2d of May. His army was concentrated there on the 5th, in number about twenty-five thousand sabres and bayonets; nine thousand were Portuguese, three thousand Germans, the remainder British. The duke of Dalmatia was ignorant that the allies were thus assembled in force upon the Mondego; but many French officers knew it, and were silent, for they were engaged in a plot of a very extraordinary nature, which was probably a part of the conspiracy alluded to in the first volume of this work, as being conducted through the medium of the princess of Tour and Taxis.

The French soldiers were impatient of their toils, their attachment to Napoleon himself was unshaken, but human nature shrinks from perpetual contact with death, and they were tired of war. This feeling induced some officers of high rank, serving in Spain, to form a plan for changing the French government; generally speaking, these men were friendly to Napoleon personally, but they were republicans in their politics, and earnest to reduce the power of the emperor. Their project, founded upon the discontent of the troops in the Peninsula, was to make a truce with the English army, to elect a chief, and march into France with the resolution to abate the pride of Napoleon, or to pull him from his throne. These conspirators at first turned their eyes upon marshal Ney, but finally resolved to choose Gouvion St. Cyr for their leader; yet it was easier to resolve than to execute. Napoleon's ascendancy, supported by the love and admiration of millions, was not to be shaken by the conspiracy of a few discontented men: and, although the hopes of these last were not entirely relinquished until after Massena's retreat from Portugal in 1810, long before that period they discovered that the soldiers, tired as they were of war, were faithful to their great monarch, and would have slain any who openly stirred against him.

The foregoing facts are stated on the authority of a principal mover of the sedition; but many minor plots had cotemporary existence, for this was the spring-time of folly. In the second corps conspirators were numerous, and by their discourses and their slow sullen execution of orders, had continually thwarted the operations of marshal Soult, yet without exciting his suspicions; as he penetrated into Portugal, their counteractions increased, and, by the time he arrived at Oporto, their design was ripe for execution.

In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant, had appeared at marshal Beresford's head-quarters, with proposals from the French malcontents; who desired to have an English officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan, which was to be commenced by seizing their general, and giving him over to the British outposts: a detestable project, for it is not in the field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the overthrow of their country's institutions. It would be idle and impertinent in a foreigner to say how much and how long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government, but there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his general in the field; a compact of honour, which it is singularly base to violate, and so it has in all ages been considered. When the Argyraspides, or silver-shields of the Macedonians, delivered their general, Eumenes, in bonds, to Antigonus, the latter, although he had tempted them to the deed, and scrupled not to slay the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct, and with the approbation of all men destroyed them: yet Antigonus was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood.

An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the Portuguese service reluctantly undertook the duty of meeting these French conspirators, and penetrated, by night, but in uniform, behind the French outposts, by the lake of Aveiro, or Ovar. He had previously arranged that one of the malcontents should meet him on the water, the boats unknowingly passed each other in the dark, and the Englishman returned to Aveiro, where he found John Viana, in company with the French adjutant-major, D'Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana had declared at Thomar; he expressed great respect for Soult, yet dwelt upon the necessity of removing him before an appeal could be made to the soldiers; and he readily agreed to wait, in person, upon Beresford, saying he was himself too strongly supported in the French army to be afraid. Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon, thither D'Argenton followed and having seen him and sir Arthur Wellesley, remained five days in that capital, and then returned to Oporto. While at Lisbon, he, in addition to his former reasons for this conspiracy, stated that Soult wished to make himself king of Portugal; an error into which he and many others naturally fell, from circumstances that I have already noticed.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, D'Argenton appeared again at the English headquarters; this time, however, by the order of sir Arthur, he was conducted through bye-paths, and returned convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that although the allies were in force on the Mondego, many days must elapse before they could be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his absence, he had been denounced by general Lefebvre, who was falsely imagined to be favourable to the conspiracy; being arrested, passports, signed by admiral Berkeley, which this unfortunate man, contrary to Sir A. Wellesley's urgent recommendation, had insisted upon having, completely proved his guilt, and Soult, until that moment, without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned beneath his feet: his firmness, however, did not desert him. He offered D'Argenton pardon, and even reward, if he would disclose the names of the other conspirators and relate truly what he had seen of the English and Portuguese armies; the prisoner, to save his life, readily told all that he knew of the British, but Sir A. Wellesley's foresight had rendered that tale useless, and with respect to his French accomplices D'Argenton was immovable. Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he even defied the marshal's power, and advised him, as the safest course, to adopt the conspirators' sentiments; nor was his boldness fatal to him at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent of the danger, delayed executing him, and he effected his escape during the subsequent operations.

He was not the only person who communicated secretly with the British general; colonel Donadieu and colonel Lafitte were engaged in the conspiracy. The latter is said to have had an interview with sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, and from the first the malcontents were urgent that the movements of the allied forces should be so regulated as to favour their proceedings: sir Arthur Wellesley, however, having little dependence upon intrigue, sternly intimated that his operations could not be regulated by their plots, and hastened his military measures.

Under the impression that Silveira was successfully defending the line of the Tamega, the British general at first resolved to reinforce him by sending Beresford's and Wilson's corps across the Douro at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from Tras os Montes; intending, when their junction was effected, to march with his own army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Douro near that town, by the aid of Beresford's corps, which would then be on the right bank. This

measure, if executed, would, including Trant's, Wilson's, and Silveira's people, have placed a mass of thirty thousand troops, regulars and irregulars, between the *Tras os Montes* and *Soult*, and the latter must have fought a battle under very unfavourable circumstances, or have fallen back on the *Minho*, which he could scarcely have passed at that season while pressed by the pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily abandoned when intelligence arrived that the bridge of *Amarante* was forced, and that *Silveira*, pursued by the enemy, was driven over the *Douro*. The news of this disaster only reached *Coimbra* the 4th of May, and, on the 6th, a part of the army was already in motion to execute a fresh project, adapted to the change of affairs. As this eagerness to fall on *Soult* may appear to justify those who censured sir J. Cradock's caution, it may here be well to shew how far the circumstances were changed.

When *Cradock* refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved in discipline.

Sir John *Cradock* had scarcely any cavalry; four regiments had since been added.

In the middle of April, *Cuesta* was only gathering the wrecks of his forces after *Medellin*; he was now at the head of thirty-five thousand men.

The intentions of the British government had been doubtful, they were no longer so. Sir John *Cradock's* influence had been restricted, the new general came out with enlarged powers, the full confidence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind, always prone to magnify the future, whether for good or bad, combined to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to dictate at once to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals, and the people; to disregard all petty jealousies and intrigues, and to calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was debarred. Sir Arthur *Wellesley*, habituated to the command of armies, was moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and a mind capacious of warlike affairs.

CHAPTER II.

Campaign on the *Douro*—Relative position of the French and English armies—Sir Arthur *Wellesley* marches to the *Vouga*—Sends *Beresford* to the *Douro*—A division under general *Hill* passes the lake of *Over*—Attempt to surprise *Franceschi* fails—Combat of *Grijon*—The French re-cross the *Douro* and destroy the bridge at *Oporto*—Passage of the *Douro*—*Soult* retreats upon *Amarante*—*Beresford* reaches *Amarante*—*Loison* retreats from that town—Sir Arthur marches upon *Braga*—Desperate situation of *Soult*—His energy—He crosses the *Sierra Catalina*—Rejoins *Loison*—Reaches *Carvalho d'Este*—Falls back to *Salamonde*—Daring action of major *Dulong*—The French pass the *Ponte Nova* and the *Salvador*, and retreat by *Montalegre*—*Soult* enters *Orense*—Observations.

CAMPAIGN ON THE DOURO.

AFTER the action of *Amarante*, *Laborde's* troops were recalled to *Oporto*, a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry being left to keep up the communication with *Loison*. General *Botillo*, however, soon reappeared upon the *Lima*, *Lorge's* dragoons were detached to watch him, and meanwhile *Mermet's* division was pushed towards the *Vouga*. The French army was thus extended in detachments from that river to the *Tamega*, occupying two sides of a triangle, its flanks presented to the enemy, the wings separated by the *Douro* and without communication, except by the boat-bridge of *Oporto*. It required three days to unite on the centre, and five days to concentrate on either extremity.

The situation of the allies was very different;—sir Arthur *Wellesley* having assembled the bulk of his troops at *Coimbra*, had the choice of two lines of operation; the one, through *Viseu* and *Lamego*, by which,

in four or five marches, he could turn the French left and cut them off from *Tras os Montes*; the other leading upon *Oporto*, whereby, in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly, and in very superior numbers, upon the enemy's right, with a prospect of crushing it between the *Vouga* and the *Douro*. On the first of these two lines, which were separated by the lofty ridges of the *Sierra de Caramula*, the march could be covered by *Wilson's* corps, at *Viseu*, and by *Silveira's* near *Lamego*. Along the second, the movement could be screened by *Trant's* corps on the *Vouga*.

The duke of *Dalmatia's* dispositions were made in ignorance of sir Arthur *Wellesley's* position, numbers, and intentions. He was not even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible that to advance directly upon *Lisbon* was beyond his own strength, he meditated to cross the *Tamega*, and then, covered by that river and the *Douro*, to follow the great route of *Bragança*, and so enter the *Salamanca* country.* It was in this view that *Loison* had been directed to get possession of *Mezamfrio* and *Pezo de Ragoa*, *Mermet's* advance towards the *Vouga* being only to support *Franceschi's* retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the *Tamega*.

The 9th of May, *D'Argenton* was arrested, the film fell from *Soult's* eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once upon his view. Treason in his camp which he could not probe; a powerful enemy close in his front; the insurgents again active in his rear; the French troops scattered from the *Vouga* to the *Tamega*, from the *Douro* to the *Lima*, and commanded by officers, whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the conspiracy was unknown. Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of *Dalmatia* did not quail at the sight. The general officers assured him of the fidelity of the troops, he ordered *Loison* to keep *Mezamfrio* and *Ragoa*, if he could, but, under any circumstances, to hold *Amarante* fast, and the greatest part of the guns and stores at *Oporto* were directed upon the *Tamega*; the ammunition that could not be removed was destroyed, and *Lorge* was directed to withdraw the garrison of *Viana* and make for *Amarante*; *D'Argenton* was then closely, although vainly, pressed to discover his accomplices, and all the arrangements necessary for a movement upon the *Tras os Montes* were actively followed up. But the war was coming up with a full and swift tide; *Loison*, upon whose vigour the success of the operation depended, was giving way, *Wellesley* was already across the *Vouga*, and *Franceschi* was struggling in his grasp.

The English general had resolved to operate along both the routes before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succour, induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading to *Oporto*. He had one division of cavalry and three of infantry, exclusive of *Beresford's* corps. The first division, composed of two brigades of infantry and twelve guns, was commanded by lieutenant-general *Paget*. The second, of three brigades of infantry and six guns, by lieutenant-general *Sherbrooke*. The third, of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by major-general *Hill*. The cavalry by lieutenant-general *Payne*. The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five hundred infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which six were only three-pounders.

The 6th of May, *Beresford*, with six thousand Portuguese, two British battalions, five companies of riflemen, and a squadron of heavy cavalry, marched upon *Lamego* by the road of *Viseu*.

The 7th, the light cavalry and *Paget's* division advanced towards the *Vouga* by the *Oporto* road, but halted, on the 8th, to give *Beresford* time to reach the

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

Upper Douro, before the attack on the French right should commence. The 9th, they resumed their march for the bridge of Vouga; Hill's division took the Aveiro road, and the whole reached the line of the Vouga river that evening; but Paget's division was not brought up until after dark, and then with caution, to prevent the enemy's guard from seeing the columns, the intent being to surprise Franceschi the next morning.

That general, with all his cavalry, a regiment of Mermet's division, and six guns, occupied a village, eight miles beyond Vouga bridge, called Albergaria Nova; the remainder of Mermet's infantry were at Grijon, one march in the rear, and on the main road to Oporto. Franceschi had that day informed Soult, that the allied forces were collecting on the Mondego and that Trant's posts had closed upon the Vouga; he was, however, far from suspecting that the whole army was upon the last river, although, from the imprudent conversation of an English officer, bearing a flag of truce, he had reason to expect an attack of some kind.

Sir Arthur Wellesley's plan was partly arranged upon the suggestion of the field-officer who had met D'Argenton. He had observed, during his intercourse with the conspirators, that the lake of Ovar was unguarded by the French, although it extended twenty miles behind their outposts, and all the boats were at Aveiro, which was in possession of the allies. On this information it was decided to turn the enemy's right by the lake. Accordingly, general Hill embarked on the evening of the 9th, with one brigade, the other being to follow him as quickly as possible. The fishermen looked on at first with surprise, but, soon comprehending the object, voluntarily rushed in crowds to the boats, and worked with such a will, that the whole flotilla arrived at Ovar precisely at sunrise on the 10th, when the troops immediately disembarked. That day, also, Beresford, having rallied Wilson's corps upon his own, reached Pezo de Ragoa, and he it was, that had repulsed Loison and pursued him to Amarante.

Both flanks of the French army were now turned, and at the same moment sir Arthur, with the main body, fell upon Franceschi, for while the flotilla was navigating the lake of Ovar, the attempt to surprise that general at Albergaria Nova, was in progress. Sherbrooke's division was not yet up; but general Cotton, with the light cavalry, crossing the Vouga, a little after midnight, endeavoured to turn the enemy's left, and get behind him while the head of Paget's division, marching a little later, passed through the defiles of Vouga, directly upon Albergaria. Trant's corps was to make way between Paget's division and the lake of Aveiro.

This enterprise, so well conceived, was baffled by petty events, such as always abound in war. Sir Arthur Wellesley did not perfectly know the ground beyond the Vouga, and late in the evening of the 9th, colonel Trant, having ascertained that an impracticable ravine, extending from the lake to Oliveira de Azemiz, would prevent him from obeying his orders, passed the bridge of Vouga, and carried his own guns beyond the defiles; thinking thus to leave the bridge clear for the British artillery and Richard Stewart's brigade, which had been charged to conduct the British cannon; this task was difficult; several carriages broke down, and Trant's corps took the lead of Paget's column, the march of which was impeded by the broken gun-carriages. Meanwhile the cavalry under Cotton were misled by the guides, and came, in broad daylight, upon Franceschi, who, with his flank resting upon a wood garnished with infantry, boldly offered a battle that Cotton dared not, under such circumstances, accept. Thus, an hour's delay, produced by a few trifling accidents, marred a combination that would have shorn Soult of a third of his infantry and all his light cavalry;

for it is not to be supposed that, when Franceschi's horsemen were cut off, and general Hill at Ovar, Mermet's division could have escaped across the Douro.

When sir Arthur Wellesley came up to Albergaria with Paget's infantry, Franceschi was still in position, skirmishing with Trant's corps, and evidently ignorant of what a force was advancing against him; but being immediately attacked, and his foot dislodged from the wood, he retreated along the road to Oliveira de Azemiz, briskly pursued by the allied infantry. Nevertheless, valiantly extricating himself from this perilous situation, he reached Oliveira without any serious loss, and continuing his march during the night by Feria, joined Mermet next morning at Grijon.

Franceschi, in the course of the 10th, could see the whole of the English army, including the troops with Hill, and it may create surprise that he should pass so near the latter general without being attacked; but Hill was strictly obedient to his orders, which forbade him to act on the enemy's rear; and those orders were wise and prudent, because the principle of operating with small bodies on the flanks and rear of an enemy is vicious. While the number of men on the left of the Douro was unknown, it would have been rash to interpose a single brigade between the advanced guard and the main body of the French; the object of Hill's being sent to Ovar was, 1. that the line of march might be eased, and the enemy's attention distracted; 2. that a division of fresh soldiers might be at hand to follow the pursuit, so as to arrive on the bridge of Oporto pell-mell with the flying enemy; and it was the soldierlike retreat of Franceschi that prevented the last object from being attained.

General Paget's division and the cavalry halted the night of the 10th at Oliveira; Sherbrooke's division passed the Vouga later in the day, and remained in Albergaria; the next morning the pursuit was renewed, and the men, marching strongly, came up with the enemy about eight o'clock in the morning.

COMBAT OF GRIJON.

The French were posted across the road on a range of steep hills, a wood, occupied with infantry, covered their right flank, and their front was protected by a village and broken ground, but their left was ill placed. The British troops came up briskly in one column, the head of which was instantly and sharply engaged. The 16th Portuguese regiment, then quitting the line of march, drove the enemy out of the wood covering his right, and at the same time the Germans, who were in the rear, bringing their left shoulders forward, without any halt or check, turned the other flank of the French: the latter immediately abandoned the position, and, being pressed in the rear by two squadrons of cavalry, lost a few killed and about a hundred prisoners. The heights of Carvalho gave them an opportunity to turn and check the pursuing squadrons, yet, when the British infantry, with an impetuous pace, again drew near, they fell back, and thus fighting and retreating, a blow and a race, wore the day away. During this combat, Hill was to have marched by the coast-road towards Oporto, to intercept the enemy's retreat, but by some error in the transmission of orders, that general, taking the route of Feria, crossed Trant's line of march, and the time thus lost could not be regained.

The British halted at dark. The French passed the Douro in the night, and destroyed the bridge, and all the heavy artillery and baggage still in Oporto were immediately sent off by this road to Amarante. Mermet, without halting, followed the same route as far as Vallonga and Baltar, having orders to secure all the boats and vigilantly to patrol up the right bank of the river, and Loison, his retreat from Pezo de Ragoa being unknown, was again warned to hold the Tamega

as he valued the safety of the army; finally Soult having directed all the craft in the Douro in his front to be secured, and having placed guards at convenient points, resolved to hold Oporto during the 12th, that Lorge's dragoons and the different detachments might have time to concentrate at Amarante.

The duke of Dalmatia's attention was now principally directed to the river in its course *below* the city, for the reports of his cavalry led him to believe that Hill's division had been disembarked at Ovar from the ocean, and he expected that the empty vessels would come round to effect a passage at the mouth of the Douro. Nevertheless, thinking that Loison still held Mesamfrio and Pezo with six thousand men, and knowing that three brigades occupied intermediate posts between Amarante and Oporto, he was satisfied that his retreat was secured, and thought there was no rashness in maintaining his position for another day. But the conspirators were busy. His orders were neglected or only half obeyed, and false reports of their execution made to him.

In this state of affairs the heads of the British columns arrived at Villa Nova, and before eight o'clock in the morning of the 12th, the whole army was concentrated there, yet hidden from Soult by the height upon which the convent of Sarea stood. The Douro rolled between the hostile forces, and the French who had suffered nothing from the previous operations, could in two days take post behind the Tamega, from whence the retreat upon Bragança would be certain; and they might, in passing, defeat Beresford; for that general's force was feeble in numbers, in infancy as to organization, and the utmost sir Arthur expected from it was that, vexing the French line of march, and infesting the road of Villa Real, it would oblige Soult to take the less accessible route of Chaves and retire to Galicia instead of Leon. This however could not happen unless the main body of the allies followed the French closely from Oporto, and as Soult at Salamanca would have been more formidable than ever, the ultimate object of the campaign and the immediate safety of Beresford's corps, alike demanded, that the Douro should be quickly passed. But how force the passage of a river, deep, swift, more than three hundred yards wide, and with ten thousand veterans guarding the opposite bank! Alexander the Great might have turned from it without shame!

The height of Sarea, round which the Douro came with a sharp elbow, prevented any view of the upper river from the town, and the duke of Dalmatia, confident that all above the city was secure, took his station in a house westward of Oporto, whence he could discern the whole course of the lower river to its mouth. Meanwhile, from the summit of Sarea, sir A. Wellesley, with an eagle's glance, searched all the opposite bank and the city and country beyond it. He saw horses and baggage moving on the road to Vallonga, and the dust of columns in retreat, but no large body of troops near the river; the enemy's guards were few and distant from each other; his patrols neither numerous nor vigilant, and an auspicious negligence seemed to pervade his camp. Suddenly a large unfinished building, called the Seminary, caught the English general's eye. This isolated structure, having a short easy access from the river, was surrounded by a high wall, which, extending to the water on either side, enclosed an area sufficient for two battalions in order of battle; the only egress was by an iron gate opening on the Vallonga road, and the building itself commanded every thing in its vicinity, except one mound, which was within cannon-shot, but too pointed to hold a gun. There were no French posts near, and the direct line of passage from the height of Sarea, across the river to the building, being to the right hand, was hidden from the troops in the town. Here, then, with a mar-

vellous hardihood, sir Arthur resolved, if he could find but one boat, to make his way, in the face of a veteran army and a renowned general.

PASSAGE OF THE DOURO.

A poor barber, evading the French patrols, had during the night come over the water in a small skiff. Colonel Waters, a staff officer, a quick daring man, discovered this, and aided by the barber, and by the prior of Amarante, who gallantly offered his services, immediately passed the river, and in half an hour returned unperceived with three large barges. Meanwhile eighteen pieces of artillery were got up to the convent of Sarea, and major-general John Murray was directed, with the German brigade, some squadrons of the 14th dragoons, and two guns, upon the Barca de Avintas, three miles above. He had orders to seek for boats and effect a passage there also if possible, and when Waters returned, some of the English troops were pushed towards Murray in support, while others cautiously approached the brink of the river under Sarea.

It was now ten o'clock; the French were still tranquil and unsuspecting; the British wondering and expectant. Sir Arthur was informed that one boat was brought up to the point of passage. "*Well, let the men cross,*" was his reply, and at this simple order, an officer with twenty-five soldiers of the Bluffs embarked, and in a quarter of an hour silently placed themselves in the midst of the enemy's army.

The Seminary was thus gained, all was quiet in Oporto, and a second boat followed the first; no hostile movement was seen, no sound heard, and a third boat passed higher up the river, but scarcely had the men from this last set foot on shore, when a tumultuous noise arose in the city. The drums beat to arms, shouts arose from all parts, the people were seen vehemently gesticulating and making signals from the houses, confused masses of French troops, hurrying forth from the streets by the higher grounds, threw out swarms of skirmishers that came furiously down against the Seminary. The British army instantly crowded to the bank of the river; Paget's and Hill's divisions collected at the point of passage and Sherbrooke's division where the boat bridge had been cut away from Villa Nova. Paget himself had passed in the third boat, and having mounted the roof of the Seminary was already struck down with a dangerous wound. Hill took his place. The musketry was sharp, voluble, and encreasing as the numbers on both sides accumulated; but the French attack was eager and constant, their fire augmented faster than that of the English, and their artillery also began to play upon the building. The British guns from Sarea commanded indeed the whole enclosure round the Seminary, and swept the left of the wall in such a manner as to confine the French assault to the side of the iron gate; but Murray did not appear, and the struggle was so violent, and the moment so critical, that sir Arthur himself was only prevented from crossing by the earnest representations of those about him, and the just confidence he had in general Hill.

At this period some citizens pushed over to Villa Nova with several great boats, Sherbrooke's people began to cross in large bodies, and at the same moment, a loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from all the windows, gave notice that the enemy had abandoned the lower part of the city: Murray's troops were now seen descending the right bank from Avintas, three battalions were in the Seminary, and Hill, advancing to the enclosure wall, opened a destructive fire upon the French columns, as they passed, in haste and confusion, by the Vallonga road. Five pieces of French artillery came galloping out from the town on the left, but appalled by the terrible line of musketry to be passed, the drivers suddenly pulled up,

and while thus hesitating, a volley from behind stretched most of the artillery-men on the ground; the rest dispersing among the enclosures, left their guns on the road. This volley was given by a part of Sherbrooke's people, who, having forced their way through the streets, thus came upon the rear: in fine, the passage was won, and the allies were in considerable force on the French side of the river. To the left, general Sherbrooke, with the brigade of guards, and the 29th regiment, was in the town, and pressing the rear of the enemy, who were quitting it. In the centre, general Hill, holding the Seminary and the wall of the enclosure, with the Buffs, the 48th, the 66th, the 16th Portuguese, and a battalion of detachments, sent a damaging fire into the masses as they passed him, and his line was prolonged on the right, although with a considerable interval, by general Murray's Germans, and two squadrons of the 14th dragoons. The remainder of the army kept passing the river at different points, and the artillery, from the height of Sarea, still searched the enemy's columns as they hurried along the line of retreat.

If general Murray had then fallen boldly in upon the disordered crowds, their discomfiture would have been complete; but he suffered column after column to pass him, without even a cannon shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river. General Charles Stewart and major Hervey, impatient of this timidity, charged with the two squadrons of dragoons, and riding over the enemy's rear-guard, as it was pushing through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond, unhorsed Laborde and wounded Foy; but on the English side Hervey lost an arm, and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, had to fight their way back with loss. This finished the action, the French continued their retreat, and the British remained on the ground they had gained. The latter lost twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former had about five hundred men killed and wounded, and five pieces of artillery were taken in the fight; a considerable quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns (of which the carriages had been burnt) were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were captured in the hospitals.

Napoleon's veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare that no troops in the world could more readily recover from such a surprise, and before they reached Vallonga their columns were again in order, with a regular rear-guard covering the retreat; a small garrison at the mouth of the Douro which had been cut off, being guided by some friendly Portuguese, also rejoined the army in the night, and Soult, believing that Loison was at Amarante, thought he had happily escaped the danger.

Sir Arthur Wellesley employed the remainder of the 12th, and the next day, in bringing over the rear-guard of the army, the baggage, the stores, and the artillery. Murray's Germans indeed pursued, on the morning of the 13th, but not further than about two leagues on the road of Amarante, and this delay has been blamed as an error in sir Arthur. It is argued that an enemy once surprised should never be allowed to recover, and that Soult should have been followed up, even while a single regiment was left to pursue. The reasons for halting were, first, that a part of the army was still on the left bank of the Douro;—secondly, that the troops had outmarched provisions, baggage, and ammunition, and having passed over above eighty miles of difficult country in four days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, both men and animals required rest; thirdly, that nothing was known of Beresford, whose contemporary operations it is time to relate.

The moment of his arrival on the Douro was marked by the repulse of Loison's division, which immediately fell back, as I have already related, to Mezamfrio,

but followed by the Portuguese patrols only, for Beresford halted on the left bank of the river, because the British regiments were still in the rear. This was on the 10th. Silveira, who was at Villa Real, had orders to feel towards Mezamfrio for the enemy, and the marshal's force was thus, with the assistance of the insurgents, in readiness to turn Soult from the route of Villa Real to Bragança. The 11th Loison continued his retreat, and Beresford finding him so timid, followed and skirmished with his rear-guard; at the same time Silveira advanced from Villa Real. On the 12th, the French outposts in front of Amarante were driven in, and the 13th Loison abandoned that town, and took the route of Guimaraens. These events were unknown to sir Arthur Wellesley on the evening of the 13th, but he heard that Soult, after destroying his artillery and ammunition, near Penafiel, had passed over the mountains towards Braga, and judging this to arise from Beresford's operations on the Tamega, he reinforced Murray with some cavalry, ordering him to proceed by Penafiel, and if Loison still lingered near Amarante, to open a communication with Beresford. The latter was at the same time directed to ascend the Tamega, and intercept the enemy at Chaves.

Meanwhile, the main body of the army marched in two columns upon the Minho, the one by the route of Barca de Trofa and Braga, the other by the Ponte d'Ave and Bacellos; but, on the evening of the 14th, the movements of the enemy about Braga gave certain proofs that not Valença and Tuy, but Chaves or Montalegre, would be the point of his retreat. Hereupon, the left column was drawn off from the Bacellos road and directed upon Braga, and Beresford was instructed to move by Monterey, upon Villa del Rey, if Soult should take the line of Montalegre. The 15th, sir Arthur reached Braga. Murray was at Guimaraens on his right, and Beresford, who had anticipated his orders, was near Chaves, having sent Silveira towards Salamonde, with instructions to occupy the passes of Ruivaens and Melgasso. At this time, however, Soult was fifteen miles in advance of Braga, having, by a surprising effort, extricated himself from one of the most dangerous situations that a general ever escaped from; but to understand this, it is necessary to describe the country through which his retreat was effected.

I have already stated, that the Sierra de Cabreira and the Sierra de Catalina, line the right bank of the Tamega; but, in approaching the Douro, the latter slants off towards Oporto, leaving a rough but practicable slip of land, through which the road leads from Oporto to Amarante: hence, the French in retreating to the latter town had the Douro on their right hand and the Sierra de Catalina on their left, both supposed impassable; and although between Amarante and Braga which is on the other side of the Catalina, a route practicable for artillery runs through Guimaraens, it was necessary to reach Amarante to fall into this road. Soult, therefore, as he advanced along the narrow pass between the mountains and the Douro, rested his hopes of safety entirely upon Loison's holding Amarante; several days, however, had elapsed since that general had communicated with the army, and an aide-de-camp was sent, on the morning of the 12th, to ascertain his exact position. Colonel Tholosé, the officer employed, found Loison at Amarante, but neither his remonstrances, nor the after-coming intelligence, that Oporto was evacuated and the army in full retreat upon the Tamega, could induce that general to remain there; as we have seen, he marched towards Guimaraens on the 13th, abandoning the bridge of Amarante, without a blow, and leaving his commander and two thirds of the army to what must have appeared inevitable destruction.

The news of this unexpected calamity reached Soult at one o'clock on the morning of the 13th, just after

he had passed the rugged banks of the Souza river; the weather was boisterous, the men were fatigued, voices were heard calling for a capitulation, and the whole army was stricken with dismay; then it was that the duke of Dalmatia justified, by his energy, that fortune which had raised him to his high rank in the world. Being, by a Spanish pedlar, informed of a path, that, mounting the right bank of the Souza, led over the Sierra de Catalina to Guimaraens, he, on the instant, silenced the murmurs of the treacherous or fearful in the ranks, destroyed the artillery, abandoned the military chest and baggage, loaded the animals with sick men and musket ammunition, and repassing the Souza, followed his Spanish guide with a hardy resolution. The rain was falling in torrents, and the path was such as might be expected in those wild regions, yet the troops made good their passage over the mountains to Pombeira, and at Guimaraens, happily fell in with Loison. During the night they were joined by Lorge's dragoons from Braga, and thus, almost beyond hope, the whole army was concentrated.

If Soult's energy in command was conspicuous on this occasion, his sagacity and judgement were not less remarkably displayed in what followed. Most generals would have moved by the direct route upon Guimaraens to Braga; but he, with a long reach of mind, calculated from the slackness of pursuit after he passed Vallonga, that the bulk of the English army must be on the road to Braga, and would be there before him; or that, at best, he should be obliged to retreat fighting, and must sacrifice the guns and baggage of Loison's and Lorge's corps in the face of an enemy—a circumstance that might operate fatally on the spirit of his soldiers, and would certainly give opportunities to the malcontents; and already one of the generals (apparently Loison) was recommending a convention like Cintra.* Wherefore, with a firmness worthy of the highest admiration, Soult destroyed all the guns and the greatest part of the baggage and ammunition of Loison's and Lorge's divisions; then, leaving the high road to Braga on his left, once more took to the mountain paths, making for the heights of Carvalho d'Este, where he arrived late in the evening of the 14th, thus gaining a day's march, in point of time. The morning of the 15th he drew up his troops in the position he had occupied two months before, at the battle of Braga, and by this spectacle, where twenty thousand men were collected upon the theatre of a former victory, and disposed so as to produce the greatest effect, he aroused all the sinking pride of the French soldiers. It was a happy reach of generalship, an inspiration of real genius!

He now re-organised his army, taking the command of the rear-guard himself, and giving that of the advanced guard to general Loison. Noble, the French historian of this campaign, says, "*the whole army was astonished*;" as if it were not a stroke of consummate policy, that the rear, which was pursued by the British, should be under the general-in-chief, and that the front, which was to fight its way through the native forces, should have a commander whose very name called up all the revengeful passions of the Portuguese. *Maneta dared not surrender!* and thus the duke of Dalmatia dexterously forced those to act with most zeal who were least inclined to serve him; but in sooth, such was his perilous situation, that all the resources of his mind and all the energy of his character were needed to save the army.

From Carvalho he retired to Salamonde, from whence there were two lines of retreat; the one through Ruivaens and Venda Nova, by which the army had marched when coming from Chaves two months before; the other, shorter, although more impracticable, leading by the Ponte Nova and Ponte Miserella into the road

running from Ruivaens to Montalegre. But the scouts brought intelligence that the bridge of Ruivaens, on the little river of that name, was broken, and defended by twelve hundred Portuguese, with artillery, and that another party had been, since the morning, destroying the Ponte Nova on the Cavado river. The destruction of the first bridge blocked the road to Chaves; the second, if completed, and the passage well defended, would have cut the French off from Montalegre. The night was setting in, the soldiers were harassed, barefooted, and starving; the ammunition was injured by the rain, which had never ceased since the 13th, and which was now increasing in violence, accompanied with storms of wind; the British army would certainly fall upon the rear in the morning; and if the Ponte Nova, where the guard was reported to be weak, could not be secured, the hour of surrender was surely arrived. In this extremity, Soult sent for major Dulong, an officer justly reputed for one of the most daring in the French ranks. Addressing himself to this brave man, he said, "I have chosen you from the whole army to seize the Ponte Nova, which has been cut by the enemy. Select a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen, endeavour to surprise the guards, and secure the passage of the bridge. If you succeed, say so, but send no other report; your silence will suffice." Thus exhorted and favoured by the storm Dulong reached the bridge unperceived of the Portuguese, killed the centinel before any alarm was given, and then, followed by twelve grenadiers, began crawling along a narrow slip of masonry, which was the only part undestroyed. The Cavado river was flooded and roaring in its deep channel, one of the grenadiers fell into the gulf, but the noise of the waters was louder than his cry, and Dulong with the eleven reaching the other side surprised the nearest post; the remainder of his men advanced at the same moment close to the bridge, and some crossing and others mounting the heights, shouting and firing, scared the poor peasantry, who imagined the whole army was upon them; thus the passage was gallantly won.

At four o'clock, the bridge was repaired and the advanced guards of the French commenced crossing; but the column of march was long, the road narrow and rugged, the troops filed over slowly, and beyond the Ponte Nova there was a second obstacle still more formidable. For the pass in which the troops were moving being cut in the side of a mountain, open on the left for several miles, at last came upon a torrent called the Misarella, which, breaking down a deep ravine, or rather gulph, was only to be crossed by a bridge constructed with a single lofty arch, called *Saltador*, or the leaper, and so narrow that only three persons could pass abreast. Fortunately for the French, the *Saltador* was not cut, but entrenched and defended by a few hundred Portuguese peasants, who occupied the rocks on the farther side, and here the good soldier Dulong again saved the army;* for, when a first and second attempt had been repulsed, he carried the entrenchments by a third effort, and, at the same instant, fell deeply wounded. The head of the column then poured over, and it was full time, for the English guns were thundering in the rear, and the Ponte Nova was choked with dead.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, quitting Braga on the morning of the 16th, had come, about four o'clock, upon Soult's rear-guard, which remained at Salamonde to cover the passage of the army over the bridges. The right was strongly protected by a ravine, the left occupied a steep hill, and a stout battle might have been made; but men thus circumstanced, and momentarily expecting an order to retreat, will seldom stand firmly; on this occasion, when some light troops turned the left, and general Sherbrooke, with the guards, mount-

* Noble's Campagne de Galice.

* S. Journal of Operations, MS.

ing the steep hill, attacked the front, the French made but one discharge, and fled in confusion to the Ponte Nova. As this bridge was not on the direct line of retreat, they were for some time unperceived, and gaining ground of their pursuers, formed a rear-guard; yet being at last descried, some guns were brought to bear on them, and then man and horse, crushed together, went over into the gulph, and the bridge, and the rocks, and the defile beyond were strewn with mangled bodies. This was the last calamity inflicted by the sword upon the French army in this retreat; a retreat attended by many horrid as well as glorious events; for the peasants in their fury, with an atrocious cruelty, tortured and mutilated every sick man and straggler that fell into their power, and on the other hand, the soldiers, who held together in their turn, shot the peasants, while the track of the columns might be discovered from afar by the smoke of the burning houses.

The French reached Montalegre on the 17th, being followed only by colonel Waters, with some cavalry, who picked up a few stragglers at Villella. Sir Arthur halted that day at Ruivaens, which seems to have been an error in principle, because there appears no adequate cause for the delay, but on the 18th he renewed the pursuit, and a part of his cavalry passed Montalegre, followed by the guards; the enemy was, however, drawn up behind the Salas in force, and no action took place. Silveira, indeed, had entered Montalegre, from the side of Chaves, before the British came up from Ruivaens; but instead of pursuing, he put his men into quarters; and a Portuguese officer of his division, who was despatched to marshal Beresford with orders to move from Villa Perdices upon Villa del Rey, loitered on the road so long, that all chance of intercepting the French line of march was at an end; for though Beresford, on the 19th, sent colonel Talbot with the 14th dragoons as far as Ginjo, Franceschi turned in force, and obliged that officer to retire, and the pursuit terminated, with the capture of a few stragglers on the Salas.

Soult himself crossed the frontier by Allaritz on the 18th, and on the 19th entered Orense, without guns, stores, ammunition, or baggage; his men were exhausted with fatigue and misery, the greatest part without shoes, many without accoutrements, and in some instances even without muskets. He had quitted Orense seventy-six days before, with about twenty-two thousand men, and three thousand five hundred had afterwards joined him from Tuy. He returned with nineteen thousand five hundred, having lost by the sword and sickness, by assassination and capture, six thousand good soldiers; of which number above three thousand were taken in hospitals,* and about a thousand were killed by the Portuguese, or had died of sickness, previous to the retreat; the remainder were captured, or had perished within the last eight days. He had carried fifty-eight pieces of artillery into Portugal, and he returned without a gun; yet was his reputation as a stout and able soldier no wise diminished.

OBSERVATIONS.

The duke of Dalmatia's arrangements being continually thwarted by the conspirators, his military skill cannot be fairly judged of; nevertheless, the errors of the campaign may, without injustice, be pointed out, leaving to others the task of tracing them to their true sources.

1.—The disposition of the army, on both sides of the Douro and upon such extended lines, when no certain advice of the movements and strength of the English force had been received, was rash. It was, doubtless, right, that to clear the front and to gather information, Franceschi should advance to the Vouga; but he re-

mained too long in the same position, and he should have felt Trant's force more positively. Had the latter officer (whose boldness in maintaining the line of the Vouga was extremely creditable) been beaten, as he easily might have been, the anarchy of the country would have increased; and as Beresford's troops at Thomar wanted but an excuse to disperse, the Portuguese and British preparations must have been greatly retarded.

2.—That Soult, when he had secured, as he thought, all the boats on an unfordable river three hundred yards wide, should think himself safe from an attack for one day, is not wonderful. The improbability that such a barrier could be forced in half an hour might have rendered Fabius careless! yet there were some peculiar circumstances attending the surprise of the French army which indicate great negligence. The commanding officer of one regiment reported, as early as six o'clock, that the English were crossing the river;* the report was certainly premature, because no man passed before ten o'clock, but it reached Soult, and he sent general Quesnel, the governor of Oporto, to verify the fact. Quesnel stated, on his return, and truly, that it was an error, and Soult took no further precaution; the patrols were not increased, no staff-officers appear to have been employed to watch the river, and no signals were established; yet it was but three days since D'Argenton's conspiracy had been discovered, and the extent of it was still unknown. This circumstance alone should have induced the duke of Dalmatia to augment the number of his guards and posts of observation, that the multiplicity of the reports might render it impossible for the malcontents to deceive him. The surprise at Oporto must, therefore, be considered as a fault in the general, which could only be atoned for by the high resolution and commanding energy with which he saved his army in the subsequent retreat.

3.—When general Loison suffered marshal Beresford to drive him from Pezo de Ragoa and Mezamfrio, he committed a grave military error, and when he abandoned Amarante, he relinquished all claim to military reputation, as a simple statement of facts will prove. The evening of the 12th he wrote to Soult that one regiment had easily repulsed the whole of the enemy's forces; yet he, although at the head of six thousand men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, that night and without another shot being fired, abandoned the only passage by which, as far as he knew, the rest of the army could escape from its perilous situation with honour! It was not general Loison's fault if England did not triumph a second time for the capture of a French marshal.

MOVEMENTS OF THE BRITISH GENERAL.

1.—If sir Arthur Wellesley's operations be looked at as a whole, it is impossible to deny his sagacity in planning, his decision and celerity in execution. When he landed at Lisbon, the nation was dismayed by previous defeats, distracted with anarchy, and menaced on two sides by powerful armies, one of which was already in possession of the second city in the kingdom. In twenty-eight days he had restored public confidence; provided a defence against one adversary; and having marched two hundred miles through a rugged country, and forced the passage of a great river—caused his other opponent to flee over the frontier, without artillery or baggage.

2.—Such being the result, it is necessary to show that the success was due, not to the caprice of fortune, but to the talents of the general, that he was quick to see, and active to strike. And first, the secrecy and despatch with which the army was collected on the Vouga belongs entirely to the man; for, there were many obstacles to overcome, and D'Argenton, as the

* Viz. 1800 left in Viana and Braga; 500 including the wounded taken in Oporto; 1300 taken at Chaves, by Silveira.

* Noble's Campagne de Galice.

sequel proved, would, by his disclosures, have ruined sir Arthur's combinations, if the latter had not providently given him a false view of affairs. The subsequent march from the Vouga to the Douro was, in itself, no mean effort; for it must be recollected, that this rapid advance against an eminent commander and a veteran army of above twenty thousand men, was made with a heterogeneous force, of which only sixteen thousand men were approved soldiers, the remainder being totally unformed by discipline, untried in battle, and, only three weeks before, in a state of open mutiny.

3.—The passage of the Douro, at Oporto, would, at first sight, seem a rash undertaking; when examined closely, it proves to be an example of consummate generalship, both in the conception and the execution. The careless watch maintained by the French may, indeed, be called fortunate, because it permitted the English general to get a few men over unperceived; but it was not twenty-five, nor twenty-five hundred, soldiers that could have maintained themselves, if heedlessly cast on the other side. Sir Arthur, when he so coolly said—"let them pass," was prepared to protect them when they had passed. He did not give that order until he knew that Murray had found boats at Avintas, to ferry over a considerable number of troops, and, consequently, that that general, descending the Douro, could cover the right flank of the Seminary, while the guns planted on the heights of Sarea could sweep the left flank, and search all the ground enclosed by the wall round the building. Had only general Murray's troops passed, they would have been compromised; if the whole army had made the attempt at Avintas, its march would have been discovered; but in the double passage all was secured; the men in the Seminary by the guns, by the strength of the building, and by Murray's troops; the latter by the surprise on the town, which drew the enemy's attention away from them. Hence, it was only necessary to throw a few brave men into the Seminary unperceived, and the success was almost certain; because, while that building was maintained, the troops in the act of passing could neither be prevented nor harmed by the enemy. To attain great objects by simple means is the highest effort of genius.

4.—If general Murray had attacked vigorously, the ruin of the French army would have ensued. It was an opportunity that would have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want of military talent and of military hardihood; and how would it have appeared if Loison had not abandoned Amarante? If Soult, effecting his retreat in safety, and reaching Zamora or Salamanca in good order, had turned on Ciudad Rodrigo, he would have found full occupation for Sir Arthur Wellesley in the north; and he would have opened a free communication with the duke of Belluno; the latter must then have marched either against Seville or Lisbon; and thus the boldness and excellent conduct of the English general, producing no adequate results, would have been overlooked, or, perhaps, have formed a subject for the abuse of some ignorant, declamatory writer.

5.—Sir Arthur Wellesley's reasons for halting at Oporto the 13th, have been already noticed, but they require further remarks. Had he followed Soult headlong, there is no doubt that the latter would have been overtaken on the Souza river, and destroyed; but this chance, arising from Loison's wretched movements, was not to be foreseen. He knew nothing of Beresford's situation, but he naturally supposed that, following his instructions, he was about Villa Real; and that, consequently, the French would, from Amarante, either move by Villa Pouca to Chaves, or taking the road to Guimaraens and Braga, make for the Minho; hence, he remained where he could command the main roads

to that river, in order to intercept Soult's retreat and force him to a battle; whereas, if he had once entered the defile formed by the Douro and the Sierra de Catalina, he could only have followed his enemy in one column by a difficult route, a process promising little advantage. Nevertheless, seeing that he detached general Murray by that route at last, it would appear that he should have ordered him to press the enemy closer than he did; but there a political difficulty occurred. The English cabinet, although improvident in its preparations, was very fearful of misfortune, and the general dared not risk the safety of a single brigade, except for a great object, lest a slight disaster should cause the army to be recalled. This circumstance often obliged him to curb his naturally enterprising disposition; and to this burthen of ministerial incapacity, which he bore even to the battle of Salamanca, may be traced that over-caution which has been so often censured as a fault, not only by military writers, but by Napoleon, who, judging from appearances, erroneously supposed it to be a characteristic of the man, and often rebuked his generals for not taking advantage thereof.*

6.—The marches and encounters, from the 14th to the 17th, were excellent on both sides. Like the wheelings and buffeting of two vultures in the air, the generals contended, the one for safety, the other for triumph; but there was evidently a failure in the operations of marshal Beresford. Soult did not reach Salamanca until the evening of the 15th, and his rear-guard was still there on the evening of the 16th. Beresford was in person at Chaves on the 16th, and his troops reached that place early on the morning of the 17th. Soult passed Montalegre on the 18th, but from Chaves to that place is only one march. Again, marshal Beresford was in possession of Amarante on the 13th, and as there was an excellent map of the province in existence, he must have known the importance of Salamanca, which was only thirty-two miles from Amarante, and that there was a road to it through Freixim and Refoyos de Basta, and another through Mondin and Cavez, both shorter than that by Guimaraens and Chaves. It is true that Silveira was directed to occupy Ruivaens and Melgasso; but he either disobeyed or executed his orders too slowly, and Misarella was totally neglected. Major Warre, an officer of the marshal's staff, endeavoured, indeed, to break down the bridges of Ponte Nova and Ruivaens, and it was by his exertions that the peasants surprised at the former, had been collected; but he had only a single dragoon with him, and was without powder to execute this important task. The peasantry, also glad to be rid of the French, were reluctant to stop their retreat, and still more to destroy the bridge of Misarella, which was the key of all the communications, and all the great markets of the Entre Minho e Douro, and therefore sure to be built up again; in which case the people knew well that their labour and time would be called for without payment. It is however undoubted that Soult owed his safety, firstly, to the failure, whatever may have been the cause, in Beresford's general operations, and, secondly, to the particular failure in breaking down the bridges; and it is probable, from what he did do, that major Warre would have effectually destroyed them if he had been supplied with only the commonest means.

Silveira is accused of not moving either in the direction or with the celerity required of him by Beresford, but there seems to have been a misunderstanding between them, and some allowance must be made for the numerous mistakes necessarily arising in the transmission of orders by officers speaking different languages; and for the difficulty of moving troops not accustomed, and perhaps not perfectly willing to act together.

* King Joseph's captured Correspondence, MS.

CHAPTER III.

Romana surprises Villa Franca—Ney advances to Lugo—Romana retreats to the Asturias—Reforms the government there—Ney invades the Asturias by the west—Bonnet and Kellerman enter that province by the east and by the south—General Mahi flies to the valley of the Syl—Romana embarks at Gihon—Ballasteros takes St. Andero—Defeated by Bonnet—Kellerman returns to Valladolid—Ney marches for Coruña—Carrera defeats Maucune at St. Jago Compostella—Mahi blockades Lugo—It is relieved by Soult—Romana rejoins his army and marches to Orense—Lapisse storms the bridge of Alcantara—Cuesta advances to the Guadiana—Lapisse retires—Victor concentrates his army at Torremocha—Effect of the war in Germany upon that of Spain—Sir A. Wellesley encamps at Abrantes—The bridge of Alcantara destroyed—Victor crosses the Tagus at Almaraz—Beresford returns to the north of Portugal—Ney and Soult combine operations—Soult scours the valley of the Syl—Romana cut off from Castile and thrown back upon Orense—Ney advances towards Vigo—Combat of San Payo—Misunderstanding between him and Soult—Ney retreats to Coruña—Soult marches to Zamora—Franceschi falls into the hands of the Capuchino—His melancholy fate—Ney abandons Galicia—View of affairs in Aragon—Battles of Maria and Belchite.

THE duke of Dalmatia halted at Orense the 20th, and on the 21st put his troops in motion upon Lugo, to succour general Fournier, of the 6th corps, who, with three battalions of infantry and a regiment of dragoons, was besieged by twelve or fifteen thousand Spaniards, under the command of general Mahi.* But to explain this it is necessary to resume the account of Romana's operations, after his defeat at Monterey on the 6th of March.

Having reassembled the fugitives at Puebla de Senabria, on the borders of Leon, he repaired his losses by fresh levies, and was soon after joined by three thousand men from Castile, and thus, unknown to Ney, he had, as it were, gained the rear of the sixth corps. Villa Franca del Bierzo was, at this time, only occupied by two weak French battalions, and as their nearest support was at Lugo, Romana resolved to surprise them. Dividing his forces, he sent Mendizabel with one division by the valley of the Syl to take them in rear, and marched himself by the route of Calcabellos; in this manner he surrounded the French, who, after a short skirmish, in which the Spaniards lost about a hundred men, surrendered, and were sent into the Asturias.

Romana then detached a part of his forces to Orense and Ponte Vedra, to assist Morillo and the insurrection in the western parts of Galicia, where, with the aid of the English ships of war, and notwithstanding the shameful neglect of the supreme central junta, the patriots were proceeding vigorously. The moveable columns of the sixth corps daily lost a number of men, some in open battle, and a still greater number by assassinations; these last were however rigorously visited upon the districts where they took place, and thus, in Galicia, as in every other part of Spain, the war hourly assumed a more horrid character. Referring to this period, colonel Barios afterwards told Mr. Frere that to repress the excesses of marshal Ney's troops, he, himself, had, in cold blood, caused seven hundred French prisoners to be drowned in the Minho!† an avowal recorded by Mr. Frere, without animadversion, but which, happily for the cause of humanity, there is good reason to believe was as false as it would, if true, have been detestable.

After the capture of Vigo, the Spanish force on the coast increased rapidly. Barios departed for Seville, Martin Carrera assumed the command of the troops near Orense, and the Conde Noroña of those near Vigo; general Maucune returned to St. Jago from Tuy, and Ney, apprized of the loss at Villa Franca, advanced to Lugo. Romana immediately abandoned Galicia, and entering the Asturias by the pass of Cienfuegos, marched along the line of the Gallician frontier, un-

til he reached Navia de Suarna, where he left Mahi, with the army, to observe Ney, but repaired, himself, to Oviedo, to redress the crying wrongs of the Asturians.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the evil doings of the Asturian junta, which was notoriously corrupt and incapable; Romana, after a short inquiry, dismissed the members in virtue of his supreme authority, and appointed new men; but this act of justice gave great offence to Jovellanos and others. It appeared too close an approximation to Cuesta's manner, in Leon, the year before, and as the central government, always selfish and jealous, abhorred any indication of vigour or probity in a general, Romana was soon afterwards deprived of his command. Meanwhile he was resolutely reforming abuses, when his proceedings were suddenly arrested by an unexpected event.

As soon as Ney understood that the Spanish army was posted on the Gallician side of the Asturian frontier; and that Romana was likely to excite the energy of the Asturian people; he planned a combined movement, to surround and destroy, not only Romana and his army, but also the Asturian troops, which then amounted to about fifteen thousand men, including the partida of Porlier, commonly called the Marquisetto. This force, commanded by general Ballasteros and general Vorster, occupied Infiesta, on the eastern side of Oviedo, and Castropol on the coast. Ney, with the consent of Joseph, arranged that Kellerman, who was at Astorga, with six guns and eight thousand seven hundred men, composed of detachments, drawn together from the different corps, should penetrate the Asturias from the south east by the pass of Pajares; that Bonnet, who always remained at the town of St. Andero, should break in, from the north east, by the coast road; and that the sixth corps should make an irruption by the Concejo de Ibas, a short but difficult route leading directly from Lugo.

When the period for these combined movements was determined, Ney, appointing general Marchand to command in Galicia during his own absence, left three battalions under Maucune at St. Jago, three others in garrison at Coruña under general D'Armagnac, one at Ferrol, and three with a regiment of cavalry under Fournier at Lugo. He then marched himself, with twelve battalions of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, against Mahi, and the latter immediately abandoned his position at Navia de Suarna, and drawing off by his left, without giving notice to Romana, returned to Galicia and again entered the valley of the Syl. Ney, either thinking that the greatest force was near Oviedo, or that it was more important to capture Romana than to disperse Mahi's troops, continued his route by the valley of the Nareca; and with such diligence that he reached Cornellana and Grado, one march from Oviedo, before Romana knew of his approach. The Spanish general, thus surprised, made a feeble and fruitless endeavour to check the French at the bridge of Peñaflor, after which, sending the single regiment he had with him to Infiesta, he embarked on board an English vessel at Gihon, and so escaped.

The 18th, Ney entered Oviedo, where he was joined by Kellerman, and the next day pursued Romana to Gihon; Bonnet, likewise, executed his part, but somewhat later, and thus Vorster, being unmolested by Ney, had time to collect his corps on the coast. Meanwhile Ballasteros, finding that Bonnet had passed between him and Vorster, boldly marched upon St. Andero and retook it, making the garrison and sick men (in all eleven hundred) prisoners: the *Amelia* and *Statira*, British frigates, arrived off the harbour at the same moment, and captured three French corvettes and two luggers, on board of which some staff-officers were endeavouring to escape.

Bonnet, however, followed hard upon Ballasteros,

* S. Journal of Operations, MS. † Parl. Papers, 1810.

and, the 11th of June, routed him so completely that he, also, was forced to save himself on board an English vessel, and the French recovered all the prisoners, and, amongst them, the men taken at Villa Franca, by Romana. But, before this, Ney, uneasy for his posts in Galicia, had returned to Coruña by the coast-road through Castropol, and Kellerman, after several trifling skirmishes with Vorster, had also retired to Valladolid. This expedition proved that Asturia was not calculated for defence, although, with the aid of English ships, it might become extremely troublesome to the French.

While Ney was in Asturia, Carrera, advancing from the side of Orense, appeared in front of St. Jago di Compostella at the moment that colonel D'Esmenard, a staff-officer sent by the marshal to give notice of his return to Coruña, arrived with an escort of dragoons in Maucune's camp. This escort was magnified by the Spaniards into a reinforcement of eight hundred men; but Carrera, who had been joined by Morillo, commanded eight thousand, and, on the 23d, having attacked Maucune, at a place called "*Campo de Estrela*," totally defeated him, with a loss of six hundred men and several guns. The Spaniards did not pursue, and the French retreated in confusion to Coruña. Nor was this the only check suffered by the 6th corps, for Mahi, having united a great body of peasants to his army, drove back Fournier's outposts, and closely invested him in Lugo on the 19th.

Such was the state of affairs in Galicia when Soult arrived at Orense; and as the inhabitants of that town, from whom he got intelligence of these events, rather exaggerated the success of their countrymen, the French marshal immediately sent forward an advanced guard of his stoutest men to relieve Lugo, and followed himself, by the route of Monforte, with as much speed as the exhausted state of his troops would permit.* The 22d, he reached Gutin, and, the same day, his van being descried on the mountains above Lugo, Mahi broke up his camp, and fell back to Mondenedo.

The 23d, Soult entered Lugo, where he heard of the emperor's first successes in Austria, and, with renewed energy, prepared for fresh exertions himself. The 30th, he was joined by Ney, who, uninformed of Mahi's position at Mondenedo, had missed a favourable opportunity of revenging the loss of St. Jago. Meanwhile Romana, disembarking at Ribadeo, joined Mahi at Mondenedo, and immediately marched along the line of the Asturian frontier, until he arrived at the sources of the Neyra; then, crossing the royal road, a little above Lugo, plunged, once more, into the valley of the Syl; and, having gained Orense, the 6th of June, opened a communication with Carrera at St. Jago, and with the insurgents at Vigo. This movement of Romana's was able, energetic, and worthy of every praise.

In pursuance of an order from the emperor, Soult now sent eleven hundred men, composed of dismounted dragoons and skeletons of cavalry regiments, to France; and, having partially restored the artillery and equipments of the second corps, from the arsenals of Coruña and Ferrol, he in concert with the duke of Elchingen, arranged a fresh plan for the destruction of Romana; in the execution it failed, as shall be hereafter noticed, but at present, it is necessary to return to the campaign south of the Tagus.

VICTOR'S OPERATIONS.

After the abortive effort to gain Badajos, the duke of Belluno, in obedience to the king's orders, proceeded to recover Alcantara.† His rear was still within two marches of Merida when the head of his columns, un-

der Lapisse, driving back some cavalry posts, entered the town of Alcantara, and the next day attempted the passage of the bridge. The Portuguese force consisted of two thousand infantry, fifty cavalry, and six guns, and some works of defence were constructed on the right bank of the river, but on the 14th of May, Lapisse, lining the rocks on the left bank, skirmished so sharply that the militia regiment of Idanha gave way. Colonel Mayne then sprung a mine, yet the explosion did little injury to the bridge, and the French made good the passage; the Portuguese, who had suffered considerably, retired to the Puente de Segura, and Lapisse immediately sent patrols towards Castello Branco, Salvatierra, and Idanha Nova.

Intelligence of this attack having reached general Mackenzie, he directed preparations to be made for destroying the boat-bridge at Abrantes, and marched, in person, by Cortiçada to Sobreira Formosa; which movement, aided by a rumour that Soult had retreated from Oporto, afforded an excuse to Victor for again abandoning Alcantara, and resuming his former camp. During his absence, Cuesta, true to the promise he had given, attacked the fort of Merida, but, on the return of the French advanced guard, recrossed the Guadiana, and fell back to Zafra, having first ravaged all the flat country, and obliged the inhabitants to withdraw into the mountains.

Some time before this, king Joseph had received a despatch from the French minister of war, giving notice that reinforcements had sailed from England, and warning him to lose no time in marching against Lisbon, to create a useful diversion in favour of Soult. It might be supposed that the original plan of the emperor would then have been acted upon, and this was the first thought of Joseph himself; but other circumstances created doubt and hesitation in his councils, and, finally, induced him to abandon all thoughts of Portugal. It appears when Napoleon returned to Paris, he imagined that hostilities with Austria, although certain, would not break out so suddenly, but that he should have time to organise a sufficient army in Germany, without drawing his veteran troops from Spain; hence, he still left the imperial guards at Vittoria, and sending the prince of Neufchatel to command the troops on the Danube, he himself remained at Paris, to superintend the preparations for opening the campaign. The Austrians were, however, not inattentive observers of the perfidy which accompanied the invasion of Spain, and, aptly taking the hint, attacked the French outposts and published their own declaration of war at the same moment. Berthier, incapable of acting a principal part, was surprised, and made a succession of false movements that would have been fatal to the French army, if the emperor, journeying day and night, had not arrived at the very hour when his lieutenant was on the point of consummating the ruin of the army. Then, indeed, was seen the supernatural force of Napoleon's genius: in a few hours he changed the aspect of affairs, and in a few days, maugre their immense number, his enemies, baffled and flying in all directions, proclaimed his mastery in an art which, up to that moment, was imperfect; for never, since troops first trod a field of battle, was such a display of military skill made by man. But previous to these successes, so threatening had been the aspect of affairs in Germany, that the imperial guards had been recalled from Vittoria, and hurried to the Danube; the great reserve of infantry was, as we have seen, struck off the rolls of the army in Spain, and the skeletons of the fourth squadrons of every cavalry regiment were ordered to return to their depôts in France; even the fifth corps, under Mortier, then on its way to Valladolid from Zaragoza, was directed to halt, and hold itself in readiness to march for Germany. Thus, while Victor was reluctant to move, while Ney was demanding more

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

† Semel's Journal of Operations, MSS.

troops to preserve Galicia, and while the fate of the second corps was unknown, the whole army was actually diminished by forty thousand men, and fifteen thousand more were paralysed with regard to offensive operations.

These things had rendered Joseph timid. Madrid, it was argued in his councils, was of more consequence than Lisbon; Soult might be already at the latter place; or, if not, he might extricate himself from his difficulties, for the capital of Spain must be covered. In pursuance of this reasoning, Sebastiani was forbidden any forward movement; and the duke of Belluno, whose army was daily wasting with the Guadiana fever, took a position at Torre-Mocha, a central point between Truxillo, Merida, and Alcantara. His cavalry posts watched all the passages over the Guadiana and the Tagus; and his communications with Madrid, between the Tietar and the Tagus, were protected by twelve hundred men, detached for that purpose by the king.*

But one timid measure in war generally produces another. The neighbourhood of the English force at Castel Branco increased the energy of the Spanish insurgents, who infested the valley of the Tagus, and communicated secretly with those of the Sierra de Guadalupe; hence, Victor, alarmed for his bridge at Almaraz, sent a division there the 22d, and, as from that period, until the 10th of June, he remained quiet, his campaign, which had opened so brilliantly, was annulled. He had neither assisted Soult, nor crushed Cuesta, nor taken Badajos, nor Seville; yet he had wasted and lost, by sickness, more men than would have sufficed to reduce both Lisbon and Seville; meanwhile the Spaniards were daily recovering strength and confidence, and sir Arthur Wellesley, after defeating Soult, had full leisure to return to the Tagus, and to combine his future operations with the Spanish armies in the south.

Information that Lapisse had forced the bridge of Alcantara reached the English general on the night of the 17th. That part of the army which was still behind Salamonde received immediate orders to retrace their steps to Oporto; and when the retreat of Soult by Orense was ascertained, the remainder of the troops, including three Portuguese brigades under Beresford, followed the same route. Colonel Trant was appointed military governor of Oporto, and it was thought sufficient to leave Silveira with some regular battalions and militia to defend the northern provinces, for Soult's army was considered a crippled force, which could not for a long time appear again in the field; a conclusion drawn, as we shall see, from false data, and without due allowance being made for the energy of that chief.

As the army proceeded southward, the narrow scope of Lapisse's movements was ascertained; colonel Mayne was directed again to take post at Alcantara, and as a reinforcement of five thousand men had landed at Lisbon, the rapidity of the march slackened. Passing by easy journeys through Coimbra, Thomar, and Punhete, the troops reached Abrantes the 7th of June, and encamped on the left bank of the Tagus, but there was sickness and a great mortality in the ranks.

From the moment of his arrival in Portugal, sir Arthur Wellesley had looked to the defeat of Victor as the principal, and the operation against Soult as the secondary, object of the campaign;† and the English government, acceding to his views, now gave him a discretionary power to enter the nearest province of Spain, if Portugal should not thereby be endangered. In his correspondence with the junta and with Cuesta, he had therefore strongly urged the necessity of avoiding any serious collision with the enemy until the British troops could act in concert with the Spanish

armies, and this advice, approved of by the junta, was attended to by Cuesta, inasmuch that he did not seek a battle; but he exposed his advanced posts, as if in derision of the counsel, and, disdainful of the English general's abilities, expressed his belief that the latter had no desire to act heartily; "because," said he, "the system of the British appears to be never to expose their troops, owing to which, they never gain decisive actions by land."

Cuesta's knowledge of the enemy's strength and positions was always inaccurate, and his judgement false; hence he himself not only never gained any decisive action, but lost every army entrusted to his command. He was now discontented with the movement against Soult; asserting that the French hold of Galicia would only be strengthened thereby, unless that favourite folly of all Spanish generals were adopted, namely, surrounding the enemy, without regarding whether the troops to be surrounded were more or less numerous than the surrounders. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, affirmed that if Soult were first driven over the Minho, a combined attack afterwards made upon Victor would *permanently deliver Galicia*; and this plan being followed, Galicia was abandoned by the French, and they never returned to that province!

When the English army was again free to act, Cuesta was importunate that a joint offensive operation against Victor should be undertaken, yet, obstinately attached to his own opinions, he insisted upon tracing the whole plan of campaign. His views were however so opposed to all sound military principles, that sir Arthur, although anxious to conciliate his humour, could scarcely concede the smallest point, lest a vital catastrophe should follow. Valuable time was thus lost in idle discussions which might have been employed in useful action, seeing that the return of the British army from the Douro had falsified Victor's position at Torremocha. That marshal, as late as the 10th of June, had only one division guarding the bridge of Almaraz, and it was difficult for him to ascertain the movements of sir Arthur Wellesley, covered, as they were, by the Tagus, the insurgents, and Mackenzie's corps of observation: hence, by rapid marches, it was possible for the English general, while Victor was still at Torremocha, to reach the valley of the Tagus, and cutting the first corps off from Madrid, to place it between two fires. This did not escape the penetration of either commander;* but sir Arthur was forced to renounce the attempt, partly because of the sick and harassed condition of his troops, the want of shoes and money, and the difficulty of getting supplies; but chiefly that Cuesta's army was scattered over the open country, between the defiles of Monasterio and the Guadiana, and, as he refused to concentrate or retire, Victor might have marched against and crushed him, and yet found time to meet the British on the Tietar.† Early in June, however, three brigades were directed upon Castello Branco, and the duke of Belluno, immediately taking the alarm, and being also assured, by despatches from Madrid, of Soult's retreat, resolved to recross the Tagus; but, previous to commencing this movement, he resolved to secure his flank, by causing the bridge of Alcantara to be destroyed.

Colonel Mayne, as I have already observed, had been again entrusted with that post, and unfortunately, his first orders to blow up the bridge, if the enemy advanced, were not rescinded, although the return of the army from the north rendered such a proceeding unnecessary. Neither did Mayne keep his instructions secret, and Victor hearing of them, sent a detachment to the bridge with no other view than to induce its destruction. He succeeded. That noble monument of Trajan's genius was ruined! Yet such is the nature

* Semel's Journal of Operations, MS.

† Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

* Semel's Journal of Operations, MS.

† Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

of war that, not long afterwards, both armies found its fall injurious to their interests, and, as a matter of taste and of military advantage, sighed alike over the broken arches of Alcantara.

Having completed this operation, Victor passed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 19th, without being molested by Cuesta, and, removing his boat-bridge, proceeded to take post at Plasencia. Meanwhile Beresford returned to the defence of the northern provinces of Portugal, which Soult was again menacing; for, during the forced inactivity of the British, at Abrantes, the cause of which I shall explain in another place, changes in the relative positions of the hostile armies were taking place; and it is important that these changes should be well understood, because on them the fate of the succeeding campaign hinged.

When Ney and Soult met at Lugo, they, although still on bad terms, agreed, after some discussion, that the first should march from Coruña, by the route of St. Jago and Vigo, against Carrera and the Conde de Noroña; and that the second, entering the valley of the Syl, should attack Romana, and drive him upon Orense, at which place, it was expected, that Ney, after taking or blocking Vigo, would be able to reach him, and thus the whole force of Galicia be crushed at once. Soult was then to menace the *Tras os Montes*, by the side of Bragança, with the view of obliging sir Arthur Wellesley to remain in that province, while the second corps opened a direct communication with Madrid and with the first corps. This being arranged, Ney returned to Coruña; and, on the 1st of June, two divisions of infantry and a brigade of dragoons, of the second corps, marched upon Monforte; they were followed, the next day, by two other divisions of infantry, and, at the same time, Franceschi, who was on the Fereira river, supported by La Houssaye's dragoons, was directed, after scouring the road to St. Jago, to fall down the right bank of the Tamburga, towards Orense.

From the 2d to the 9th, the main body halted at Monforte, to get up stores from Lugo, and to scour the country on the flanks, for Romana, in his passage, had again raised the peasantry of all the valleys. Loison was then sent with a division to the Val des Orres, having orders to feign a movement towards Villa Franca and Puente Ferrada, as if for the purpose of meeting a French column in that direction. The 10th, he passed the Syl, and took post at the Puente de Bibey, and the 12th, Franceschi, reinforced with a division of infantry, arrived at Monte Furada also on the Syl, and, sent a detachment to Laronco, to connect his division with Loison's.* The remainder of the infantry followed this movement, and detachments were sent up the course of the Syl, and towards Dancos, on the road from Villa Franca to Lugo. Loison then forced the passage of the Puente de Bibey, and drove the insurgents to Puebla de Tribes. The French army thus cleared all the valleys opening on the course of the Upper Minho, and Romana was confined to the lower part of that river.

The 13th, Franceschi, ascending the valley of the Bibey, took post at Bollo and the bridge of the Hermitage, and pushed his patrols to Gudina and Monterey on one side; and into the Sierra de Porto on the other, as far as the sources of the Bibey, with a view to ascertain the exact direction which Romana would take to avoid Loison's column; and to prevent the Spanish general from passing the left of the French army, and gaining the Asturias by the route of Puebla de Senabria. These precautions occupied the duke of Dalmatia till the 19th, when, being assured that Romana had fallen back to Monterey, he judged that he would attempt the same march towards Puebla de

Senabria, by which he had escaped after the action in the month of March; the French army was therefore directed up the valley of the Bibey, upon Viana, where there was a bridge, and where many of the mountain roads united. The same day Franceschi fell in with the head of Romana's army, and repulsed it; and the evening of the 20th the whole of the French troops were concentrated near Viana, intending to give battle to the Spaniards the next morning; but the latter retreated precipitately during the night, and many of the men dispersed.

Soult continued his movement by the left until he reached the great road running from Castile to Orense, and from thence, having sent Heudelet's division to Villa Vieja to threaten the *Tras os Montes* frontier, and Mermet's division and Lorge's dragoons towards La Canda to observe the road of Puebla de Senabria, he marched himself, with an advanced guard, to La Gudina, leaving Laborde and La Houssaye in reserve between Gudina and Villa Vieja. These divers movements, through the rugged passes of Galicia, led to a variety of slight skirmishes, the most important of which took place at the Puente de Bibey, a place of such prodigious strength that it is scarcely conceivable how men, with arms, could be brought to abandon such a post.

Romana's situation was now nearly hopeless, but he was saved by a misunderstanding between the French marshals. It appears that Ney, having marched from Coruña, entered St. Jago with about ten thousand men, and Carrera fell back upon Ponte Vedra; the Conde de Noroña joined him there with some fresh troops, and assuming the command, continued the retreat to the Octavem river behind which he took post; placing his main body at the bridge of San Payo, and sending detachments to guard some secondary points. On the 7th of June, the French came up. The Spaniards had thirteen thousand men, two eighteen-pounders, and nine field pieces; of the troops only seven thousand were armed, but the whole of the artillery was in position to defend the passage at San Payo, and the bridge being cut, was overlooked by a battery of two eighteen-pounders. Three thousand men were in reserve at Redondela; and, at Vigo, about sixty stragglers, from sir John Moore's army were landed, and, in conjunction with a detachment of seamen and marines, occupied the forts. Some Spanish gun-boats, one of which was manned by English seamen, under captain Winter, also proceeded up the river to the bridge of San Payo.

During the 7th, a desultory and useless fire took place on both sides, and on the 8th, the French were repulsed in two feeble attempts to force a passage at San Payo and at Soto Mayor, the loss on either side being about a hundred men. These attacks were merely to keep the Spaniards employed until the reports of the officers, sent by Ney to ascertain the situation and projects of Soult's army, were received, but, in the evening of the 8th, those officers returned with information, obtained from the peasants, that the second corps was retreating upon Castile. I have been assured by persons, then on marshal Ney's staff, that he, amazed at these tidings, rashly concluded that Soult, swayed by personal feelings, wished to endanger the sixth corps; hence filled with indignation, he immediately retired to Coruña, while Soult, on the other hand, viewed this retreat as a breach of their engagements, and an underhand policy to oblige him to remain in Galicia. Certain it is that by these ebullitions of temper, both Romana and Noroña were saved; for there was nothing to prevent Ney from sending a column against Orense, while he himself kept in check Noroña, on the Octavem; and, however spirited the conduct of the Spaniards was at San Payo, it would be ridiculous to imagine that ten thousand of the best soldiers of France,

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

led by an officer so quick and resolute as Ney, could have been resisted by an equal number of raw troops and peasants, one-third of whom were without arms. But the history of the quarrel between these marshals is involved in mystery, the clearing of which must be left to those who shall write the memoirs of the men: for the purposes of this history it is sufficient to know that there was ill-blood, and that therein the Gallicians found safety.

Soult, informed of Ney's retreat and of sir Arthur Wellesley's arrival on the Tagus, ceased to pursue Romana, and marched to Zamora, where his sick had been before sent, and where his brother, general Soult, had conducted three or four thousand stragglers and convalescents. Here, also, he requested the king to send the artillery and stores necessary to re-equip the second corps; and here he proposed to give his harassed troops some rest, for they had now been for eight months incessantly marching and fighting, and men and officers were alike dispirited by the privations they had endured, and by the terrible nature of a war in which the most horrid scenes were daily enacted.

To put the king in possession of his views, Soult sent general Franceschi to Madrid; but this celebrated officer, refusing an escort, fell into the hands of the *Capuchino*.* Being transferred to Seville, the central junta, with infamous cruelty, treated him as if he had been a criminal instead of a brave soldier, and confined him in a dungeon at Carthagena. The citizens there, ashamed of their government, endeavoured to effect his escape; but he perished in confinement, at the moment when his liberation was certain. When his young wife, a daughter of count Mathieu Dumas, heard of his fate, she refused all nourishment, and, in a few days, by her death, added one more to the thousand instances of the strength of woman's affections.

The 25th of June, Soult reached Puebla de Senabria.

The 28th, he marched to Mombuey.

The 29th and 30th, he crossed the Esla, by the bridges of San Pelayo and Castro Gonzales.

The 2d of July, he entered Zamora, having previously rejected a proposition of Ney's, that the two corps should jointly maintain Galicia, a rejection which induced the duke of Elchingen to evacuate that province.

To effect this, Ney formed a camp near Betanzos; and, on the 22d of July, withdrew his garrisons from Coruña and Ferrol, having previously destroyed all the stores and arsenals and disabled the land defences. Nevertheless, his influence was still so powerful that captain Hotham, commanding the English squadron, off Coruña, seeing the hostile attitude maintained by the inhabitants, landed his seamen on the 24th, and spiked the guns on the sea-line; and, in like manner, compelled a Spanish garrison, left by Ney in the forts of Ferrol, to surrender on the 26th. The marshal, however, marched, unmolested, by the high road to Astorga, where he arrived on the 30th, having brought off all his own sick and those of the second corps also, who had been left in Lugo. Thus Galicia was finally delivered.

This important event has been erroneously attributed to the exertions of the Spaniards. Those exertions were creditable to the Gallicians, although the most powerful motive of action was to protect their personal property; and when the French withdrew, this same motive led them to repair their losses by resisting the payment of tithes and rents, a compensation by no means relished by the proprietors or the church. But it is certain that their efforts were only secondary causes in themselves, and chiefly supported by the aid of England, whose ships, and arms, and stores were constantly on the coast. How can the operations of the Spaniards be said to have driven the sixth corps from Galicia, when Ney retained every important post in

that province to the last; when single divisions of his army, at two different periods, traversed the country, from Coruña to Tuy, without let or hindrance; and when the Spaniards could not prevent him from overrunning the Asturias without losing his hold of Galicia? It is true, Soult, writing to Joseph, affirmed that the Gallicians would wear out the strongest army; that is, if a wrong system was pursued by the French; but he pointed out the right method of subduing them, namely, in pursuance of Napoleon's views, to fortify some principal central points, from whence the moveable columns could overrun the country; and this, he estimated, would only require fifty thousand pounds and six weeks' labour.* It is plain the real causes of the deliverance were—the quarrels between the marshals, which saved Romana and Noroña from destruction; and the movements of sir Arthur Wellesley on the Tagus; for, in an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph, that marshal expressly assigns the danger hanging over Madrid and the first corps as the reason of his refusing to remain in Galicia. Now, although Soult's views were undoubtedly just, and his march provident, the latter necessarily drew after it the evacuation of Galicia; because, it would have been absurd to keep the sixth corps cooped up in that corner of the Peninsula, deprived of communication, and estranged from the general operations.

The movement of the second corps, after quitting Monforte, being along the edge of the Portuguese frontier, and constantly threatening the northern provinces, drew marshal Beresford, as I have before stated, from the south, and all the regular Portuguese forces capable of taking the field were immediately collected by him round Almeida. The duke del Parque was at Ciudad Rodrigo; and as that part of Romana's force, which had been cut off by Soult's movement upon Gudina, fell back upon Ciudad Rodrigo, not less than twenty-five thousand men, Portuguese and Spaniards, were assembled, or assembling, round those two fortresses.

The change of situation thus brought about in the armies on the great western line of invasion was rendered more important by the events which were simultaneously taking place in other parts, especially in Aragon, where general Blake, whose army had been augmented to more than twenty thousand men, inflated with his success at Alcanitz, had advanced to Ixar and Samper. Suchet, himself, remained close to Zaragoza, but kept a detachment, under general Faber, at Longares and Villa Muel, near the mountains on the side of Daroca. Blake, hoping to cut off this detachment, marched, in person, through Carineña, and sent general Arisaga, with a column, to Botorrita, and the latter captured a convoy of provisions on the Huerba; but Faber retired to Plasencia, on the Xalon.

The 14th of June, the advanced guards skirmished to Botorrita; and Blake endeavouring to surround the enemy, pushed a detachment to Maria, in the plain of Zaragoza.

The excitement produced in that city, and in Aragon generally, by this march, was so great, that Suchet doubted if he should not abandon Zaragoza, and return towards Navarre; for the peasantry had assembled on many points in the mountains around, and it required great vigilance to keep down the spirit of insurrection in the city itself. The importance of that place, however, made him resolve to fight a battle, for which the near approach of Blake, who came on in the full confidence that the French general would retreat, furnished an opportunity which was not neglected.

BATTLE OF MARIA.

The 14th, after some skirmishing, the Spanish army was concentrated at Botorrita.

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

* Intercepted Despatches, Parl. Papers, 1810.

The 15th, Blake slowly and unskilfully formed his troops in order of battle, near the village of Maria, and perpendicular to the Huerba, of which he occupied both banks. Towards two o'clock in the day, he extended his left wing to outflank the right of the French; but Suchet, who had just then been rejoined by Faber, and by a brigade from Tudela, immediately stopped this evolution, by attacking the wing with some cavalry and light troops. The Spaniards then fell back to their line of battle, Blake drew men from his right to reinforce his centre and left, and was immediately engaged in a severe conflict; he repulsed the foremost of the enemy's columns, but so violent a storm arose at the moment, that neither army could see the other, although close together, and the action ceased for a time. Blake's position was so ill chosen, that he was surrounded by ravines, and had only one line of retreat, by the bridge of Maria, which was on the extremity of his right flank.* Suchet, who had observed this error, when the storm cleared off a little, briskly engaged the centre and left of the Spaniards, and forming his cavalry and two regiments of infantry in column, by one vigorous effort broke quite through the Spanish horse, and seized the bridge of Maria. Notwithstanding this, Blake, who was at all times intrepid, collected the infantry of his centre and left wing in a mass, and stood for the victory, but the French troops overthrew his with a great slaughter. A general, twenty-five guns, and many stands of colours were taken, yet few prisoners, for the darkness enabled the dispersed Spaniards to escape by the ravines, and Blake rallied them the next day at Botorrita. The French lost nearly a thousand men, and general Harispé was wounded.

During the action, a French brigade held the position of Monte Torrero, without mixing in the fight, lest the citizens of Zaragoza, being released from their presence, should rise against the garrison; but after the victory, this brigade marched down the Ebro to cut off Blake's retreat; general Laval, who commanded it, did not, however, execute his orders, and the Spanish army retired on the night of the 16th.

The 17th, the rear guard suffered some loss at Torrecilla; and on the 18th, the two armies were again in presence at Belchite. Blake, reinforced by some detachments, was about fourteen thousand strong; but he had lost the greatest part of his artillery, and his men were dispirited. Suchet, on the contrary, having by the success at Maria awed the Aragonese, was able to bring twenty-two battalions and seven squadrons, or about fifteen thousand men, flushed with victory, into action.

BATTLE OF BELCHITE.

The Spaniards were drawn up on a range of hills half enclosing the town;† their right, resting on a hermitage and some buildings, was inaccessible to cavalry; the left was also well covered; and behind the right, a hill with a building on it, overtopping all the position and occupied by a reserve, served as a rallying point, because there was an easy line of communication between it and the left wing.‡ The centre, being on rough ground containing the town of Belchite which had a wall and gates, was also very strong, and the whole position was so compact, that Blake, after completely filling his line, had yet a considerable reserve in hand. His dispositions were made to fight by his centre and right, his left being rather in the nature of an advanced post.

A French battalion commenced the action, by skirmishing with the Spanish centre, but, at the same time, two columns of attack marched, the one against the right, the other against the left. The latter, which was the principal one, preceded by a fire of artillery, soon closed upon the Spanish troops, although Blake's guns

opened heavily from his centre and right. The rapid attack of the French, and the accidental explosion of an ammunition waggon, created a panic, which, commencing on the left, spread to all parts of the line. The Spanish general made a charge of cavalry to retrieve the day, it was however easily repulsed, and the confusion which followed is thus described by himself:—"One regiment fled without firing a shot, it was followed by another, and a third, all flying without having discharged a gun, and, in a few moments, the whole position was abandoned."—"Thus we, the generals and officers, were left alone, without being able to rally a body which could make any opposition; and I had the mortification to see our army dispersed, abandoning all its baggage, and throwing away its arms, and even its clothes, before a single corps of the enemy; nor were we able to avail ourselves of the defence of any strong place, as it was impossible to collect two hundred men to make head against the enemy."

Blake, although a bad general, was a man of real courage: stung to the quick by this disgrace, he reproached his troops with bitterness, demanded an inquiry into his own conduct, and, with a strong and sincere feeling of honour, restored to the junta the estate which had been conferred upon him for the success at Alcanitz.

This battle and the pursuit, in which Suchet took about four thousand prisoners, and all the artillery, ammunition, and baggage of the Spaniards, not only made him master of the operations in Aragon, but also rendered the fifth corps, under Mortier, who were now at Valladolid, completely disposable for offensive operations. Thus, on the 1st of July, there were, exclusive of Kellerman's and Bonnet's divisions, three complete *corps d'armee*, furnishing six thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry, collected between Astorga, Zamora, and Valladolid. The inroad on Portugal had failed, and the loss of Galicia followed, but Napoleon's admirable system of invasion was unbroken; his troops, deprived of his presiding genius, had been stricken severely and shrunk from further aggression; they had been too widely spread for a secure grasp, but the reaction disclosed all the innate strength of his arrangements.

CHAPTER IV.

State of the British army—Embarrassments of Sir Arthur Wellesley—State and numbers of the French armies—State and numbers of the Spanish armies—Some account of the *partidas*, commonly called *guerillas*—Intrigues of Mr. Frere—Conduct of the central junta—Their inhuman treatment of the French prisoners—Corruption and incapacity—State of the Portuguese army—Impolicy of the British government—Expedition of Walcheren—Expedition against Italy.

THE British army remained in the camp of Abrantes until the latter end of June. During this period, Sir Arthur Wellesley, although burning to enter Spain, was kept back by a variety of difficulties. He had been reinforced with five thousand men immediately after his return from the Douro; and, in the preceding operations, the killed and hurt in battle had not exceeded three hundred men, but the deaths by sickness were numerous. Four thousand in hospital, and fifteen hundred employed in escort and dépôt duties, being deducted, the gross amount of the present under arms, as late even as the 25th of June, did not exceed twenty-two thousand men; and these were, at any moment, liable to be seriously diminished, because the ministers, still intent upon Cadiz, had authorized Mr. Frere whenever the junta should consent to the measure, to draw a garrison for that town from Sir Arthur's force. As an army, therefore, it was weak in every thing but spirit; the commissariat was without sufficient means of transport; the soldiers nearly barefooted, and totally

* Suchet's Memoirs. † Ib. ‡ Blake's Despatch.

without pay; the military chest empty, the hospitals full.

The cost, at a low estimation, was about two hundred thousand pounds a month; with the most strenuous exertions, a hundred and sixty thousand pounds only had been procured in the two months of May and June, and of this, thirteen thousand had been obtained as a temporary loan in Oporto. The rate of exchange in Lisbon was high, and notwithstanding the increased value given to the government paper by the successes on the Douro, this rate was daily rising; the Spanish dollar was at five shillings, while Spanish gold sunk so much in value that the commissary-general sent all that he received from England, or could collect in Lisbon, to Cadiz, and other parts, to truck for dollars;* but, in all places of commerce, the exchange was rising against England, a natural consequence of her enormous and increasing issues of paper. Those issues, the extravagant succours given to Spain, together with subsidies to Austria, made it impossible to supply the army in Portugal with specie, otherwise than by raising cash, in every quarter of the globe, on treasury-bills, and at a most enormous loss; an evil great in itself, opening a wide door to fraud and villany, and rendered the war between France and England not so much a glorious contest of arms as a struggle between public credit and military force, in which even victory was sure to be fatal to the former.

The want of money, sickness, Cuesta's impracticable temper, and a variety of minor difficulties, too tedious to mention, kept the army in a state of inactivity until the end of June; but, at that period, the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, and the consequent advance of Cuesta, removed one obstacle to offensive operations, and sir Arthur, having the certainty that eight thousand additional troops were off the rock of Lisbon, then commenced his march into Spain by the northern banks of the Tagus; meaning to unite with Cuesta on the Tietar, and to arrange, if possible, a plan of operations against Madrid.

But, before I embark on the full and broad stream into which the surges and eddies of the complicated warfare that succeeded Napoleon's departure from the Peninsula settled, I must give a general view of the state of affairs, that the reader, comprehending exactly what strength each party brought to the encounter, may judge more truly of the result.

FRENCH POWER.

	Men.	Horses.
The French, having received some reinforcements of conscripts, amounted, in the beginning of July, including the king's guards, to about	275,000	
In hospital	61,000	
Stragglers and prisoners borne on the states	7,000	
Total under arms	207,000	36,000
The military governments, lines of correspondence, garrisons, and detachments, absorbed	32,000	3,000
Present under arms with the corps d'armee	175,000	33,000

The actual strength and situation of each corps d'armee was as follows:—†

Under the King, covering Madrid.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
First corps, in the valley of the Tagus	20,881	4,200
Fourth corps, La Mancha	17,490	3,200
Division of Dessolles, Madrid	6,864	
King's French guards, Madrid, about	4,000	1,500
Total	49,235	8,900

In Old Castile, under Marshal Soult.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Second corps, Zamora, Tora, and Salamanca	17,707	2,883
Fifth corps, Valladolid	16,042	874
Sixth corps, Astorga, and its vicinity	14,913	1,446
Total	48,662	5,203

In Aragon, under General Suchet.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Third corps, Zaragoza, Alcanitz, &c.	15,226	2,004

In Catalonia, under Marshal Augereau.

	Inf. & Art.	Cav.
Seventh corps, Vich, Gerona, and Barcelona	30,593	2,500

In addition to these corps there were twelve hundred men belonging to the battering train; four thousand infantry under Bonnet, at St. Andero; and two thousand two hundred cavalry under Kellerman, in the Valladolid country.

The fortresses and armed places in possession of the French army were—St. Sebastian, Pampeluna, Bilbao, Santona, St. Andero, Burgos, Leon, Astorga, on the northern line;

Jacca, Zaragoza, Guadalaxara, Toledo, Segovia, and Zamora, on the central line;

Figueras, Rosas, and Barcelona, on the southern line.

It needs but a glance at these dispositions and numbers to understand with what a power Napoleon had fastened upon the Peninsula, during his six weeks' campaign. Much had been lost since his departure, but his army still pressed the Spaniards down, and, like a stone cast upon a brood of snakes, was immovable to their writhings. Nevertheless, the situation of Spain, at this epoch, was an ameliorated one compared to that which, four months before, the vehemence of Napoleon's personal warfare had reduced it to. The elements of resistance were again accumulated in masses, and the hope, or rather confidence, of success was again in full vigour; for, it was in the character of this people, while grovelling on the earth, to suppose themselves standing firm; and, when creeping in the gloom of defeat, to imagine they were soaring in the full blaze of victory.

The momentary cessation of offensive operations on the part of the French, instead of being traced to its true sources, the personal jealousies of the marshals, and the king's want of vigour, was, as usual, attributed, first—to fear and weakness, secondly—to the pressure of the Austrian war. It was not considered that the want of unity, checking the course of conquest, would cease when the French army was driven to the defensive; neither was the might of France duly weighed, while the strength of Austria was unduly exalted. The disasters at Ucles, at Almaraz, at Zaragoza, Rosas, Cardadeu, Valls, at Ciudad Real, Medellin, Braga, and Oporto, and in the Asturias, were all forgotten, the French had been repulsed from Portugal, and they had not taken Seville! This, to the Spaniards, was sufficient evidence of their weakness; and, when the French were supposed to be weak, the others, by a curious reasoning process, always came to the conclusion that they were themselves strong. Hence, the fore-boasting at this period was little inferior to what it had been after the battle of Baylen, and the statement of the relative numbers was almost as absurd. The utmost amount of the French force was not calculated higher than a hundred and fifteen, or a hundred and twenty thousand men, of which about fifty thousand were supposed to be on the French side of the Ebro, and the whole only waiting for an excuse to abandon the Peninsula.

SPANISH POWER.

The Spanish armies, on paper, were, as usual, numerous; and the real amount of the regular force was certainly considerable, although very inadequate to the exigencies or the resources of the country. Before the battle of Belchite had broken Blake's strength, there were, organized and under arms, twelve thousand cavalry, and about one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, exclusive of irregular bands and armed peasantry, who were available for particular defensive operations. After that defeat the number of regular forces, capable of taking the field in the south-eastern

* Parl. Papers, 1810.

† Muster-roll of the French Army, MSS

provinces, was not above twenty thousand men, of which about ten thousand, under Coupigny, were watching Barcelona, or, again, rallying under Blake; the remainder were in Valencia, where Caro, Romana's brother, had taken the command.

In the north-western provinces there were about twenty-five thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were in Galicia; some thousands in the Asturias, under Vorster and Ballasteros, and the remainder, under the duke del Parque, who was directed to organize a new army in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo.

In Andalusia, or covering it, there were about seventy thousand men. Of these twenty-three thousand infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry, were assembled in the Morena, near St. Elena and Carolina, under the command of general Venegas; and thirty-eight thousand, including seven thousand cavalry, were in Estremadura, under the orders of Cuesta, who was nominally commander-in-chief of both armies.

The troops, thus separated into three grand divisions, were called the armies of the *right*, the *centre*, the *left*. The fortresses were—Gerona, Hostalrich, Lerida, Mequinez, Tarragona, Tortosa, Valencia, Carthagena, and Alicante, for the army of the right; Cadiz and Badajos for that of the centre; Ciudad Rodrigo, Coruña, and Ferrol, for the army of the left.

The Spanish troops were, however, far from being serviceable in proportion to their numbers; most of them were new levies, and the rest were ill-trained. The generals had lost nothing of their presumption, learnt nothing of war, and their mutual jealousies were as strong as ever. Cuesta still hating the junta, was feared and hated by that body in return, and Venegas was placed at the head of the Carolina army as a counterpoise to him. Romana, also, was obnoxious to the junta, and in return, with more reason, the junta was despised and disliked by him. In Valencia and Murcia generals and juntas appeared alike indifferent to the public welfare, satisfied if the war was kept from their own doors. In Catalonia there never was any unanimity.

Blake, who had abandoned Romana in Galicia, and who was still at enmity with Cuesta, had been, for these very reasons, invested with supreme power in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; and moreover, there were factions and bickerings among the inferior officers in the armies of Venegas and Cuesta. Albuquerque was ambitious of commanding in chief, and Mr. Frere warmly intrigued in his cause, for that gentleman still laboured under the delusion that he was appointed to direct the military instead of conducting the political service in the Peninsula. In April, he had proposed to the junta that a force of five thousand cavalry and some infantry, taken from the armies of Cuesta and Venegas, should, under the command of the duke of Albuquerque, commence offensive operations in La Mancha; this, he said, would, "*if the enemy refused to take notice of it,*" become "a very serious and perhaps a decisive movement;"* and he was so earnest that, without communicating upon the subject with sir Arthur Wellesley, without waiting for the result of the operations against Soult, he pretended to the junta that the co-operation of the English army with Cuesta (that co-operation which it was sir Arthur's most anxious wish to bring about) could only be obtained, as the price of the Spanish government's acceding to his own proposal. The plenipotentiary's greatest efforts were, however, directed to procure the appointment of Albuquerque to the command of an army; but that nobleman was under the orders of Cuesta, who was not willing to part with him, and, moreover, Frere wished to displace Venegas, not that any fault was attributed to the latter, but merely to make way for Albuquerque;

a scheme so indecorous that both the junta and Cuesta peremptorily rejected it.

Mr. Frere did not hesitate to attribute this rejection to a mean jealousy of Albuquerque's high birth and talents;* yet the junta had sufficient reason for their conduct, not only on this occasion, but afterwards, when they refused to give him any independent command. The duke, although a brave and patriotic and even an able soldier, was the dupe of a woman who corresponded with the French; the junta, in the fear of offending him, forbore to punish her, at first, yet, finally, they were obliged to shut her up, and they could not entrust him with a command while her dangerous influence lasted. Hence, Mr. Frere's intrigue failed to serve Albuquerque; and his military project for La Mancha fell to the ground when sir Arthur Wellesley, unable to perceive its advantages, strongly advised the junta, not to weaken but to reinforce Cuesta's army; not to meddle with the French either in La Mancha or Estremadura, but to preserve a strict defensive in all quarters.

The *supreme junta* was itself in fear of the old *junta of Seville*, and the folly and arrogance of the first and its neglect of the public weal furnished ample grounds of attack, as a slight sketch of its administrative proceedings will suffice to prove. The king, after the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real, had, through the medium of don Joachim Sotelo, a Spanish minister in his service, made an attempt to negotiate for the submission of the junta, which was spurned at by the latter and in suitable terms, for dignified sentiments and lofty expressions were never wanting to the Spaniards; yet, taken with their deeds, they were but as a strong wind and shrivelled leaves.

The junta did not fail to make the nation observe their patriotism upon this occasion, and, indeed, took every opportunity to praise their own proceedings; nevertheless, men were not wanting in Spain most anxious not only to check the actual abuses of power, but to lay bare all the ancient oppressions of the country, and recur to first principles, both for present reform and future permanent good government; in short, to make public avowal of the misrule which had led to their misfortunes, and, if possible, to amend it. Knowing that although national independence may co-exist with tyranny, it is necessarily attached to civil and religious freedom,—they desired to assemble the cortes; to give the people an earnest that national independence was worth having, and to convince them that their sufferings and their exertions would lead to a sensible good, instead of a mere choice between an old and a new despotism; this party was powerful enough to have a manifesto, to their purpose, drawn up by the junta, and it would have been published, if the English ministers had not interposed; for, as I have before said, their object was not Spain, but Napoleon.

Mr. Frere vigorously opposed the promulgation of this manifesto, and not ambiguously hinted that the displeasure of England, and the wrath of the partisans of despotism in Spain, would be vented on the junta, if any such approach to real liberty was made.† In his despatches to his cabinet he wrote that, from his knowledge of the members of the junta, he felt assured they would "*shrink from the idea of giving permanent effect to the measures which they held out;*" and this expression he meant in their praise! but still he thought it necessary to check the tendency to freedom in the outset, and it would be injustice not to give his sentiments in his own words; sentiments which were at this time perfectly agreeable to his immediate superior, Mr. Canning, but offering a curious contrast to the political liberality which that politician afterwards thought it his interest to affect.

* Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

† Parliamentary Papers, printed 1810.

* Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

Writing as a Spaniard, Mr. Frere thus addressed don Martin Garay:—

"If we have indeed passed three centuries under an arbitrary government, let us not forget that it is a price which we pay for having conquered and peopled the fairest portion of the globe; that the integrity of this immense power rests solely on these two words, religion and the king. If the old constitution had been lost by the conquest of America, our first object should be to recover it, but in such a manner as not to lose what has cost us so much in the acquisition. From this consideration, it appears to me that we ought to avoid, as *political poison*, any announcement of general principles, the application of which it would be impossible to limit or qualify, even when the negroes and Indians should quote them in favour of themselves. But let us allow that we have made a bad exchange in bartering our ancient national liberty for the glory and extension of the Spanish name. Let us allow that the nation has been deceived for three centuries, and that this error should, at all hazards, be immediately done away. Even though it were so, it does not appear very becoming the character of a well educated person to pass censures upon the conduct of his forefathers, or to complain of what he has lost by their negligence or prodigality; and still less so, if it is done in the face of all the world: and what shall we say of a nation who would do this publicly, and after mature deliberation?"*

The manifesto was suppressed, a new one more consonant to Mr. Frere's notions was published, and a promise to convoke the Cortez given, but without naming any specific time for that event. The junta, who, as Mr. Frere truly stated, were not at all disposed to give any effort to free institutions, now proceeded to prop up their own tottering power by severity: they had, previous to the manifesto, issued a menacing proclamation, in which they endeavoured to confound their political opponents with the spies and tools of the French; and having before established a tribunal of public security, they caused it to publish an edict, in which all men, who endeavoured to raise distrust of the junta, or who tried to overturn the government, by popular commotions, or other means that had, by the junta, been reprobated, were declared guilty of high treason, undeserving the name of Spaniards and sold to Napoleon: their punishment to be death, and confiscation of property. Any person propagating rumours, tending to weaken or soften the hatred of the people against the French, was instantly to be arrested and punished without remission; lastly, rewards were offered for secret information upon these heads.

This decree was not a dead letter. Many persons were seized, imprisoned, and executed, without trial, or knowing their accusers. But the deepest stain upon the Spanish character, at this period, was the treatment experienced by prisoners of war. Thousands, and amongst them part of Dupont's troops, who were only prisoners by a breach of faith, were sent to the Balearic Isles, without any order being taken for their subsistence, and when remonstrated with, the junta cast seven thousand ashore on the little desert rock of Cabrera. At Majorca, numbers had been massacred by the inhabitants, in the most cowardly and brutal manner, but those left on Cabrera suffered miseries that can scarcely be described. The supply of food, always scanty, was often neglected altogether; there was but one spring on the rock, which dried up in summer; clothes were never given to them except by the English seamen, who, compassionating their sufferings, often assisted them, in passing the island. Thus, afflicted with hunger, thirst, and nakedness, they lived like wild beasts while they could live, but perished in such numbers, that less than two thousand remained to tell the tale

of this inhumanity; and surely, it was no slight disgrace that the English government failed to interfere on such an occasion.

But what were the efforts made for the defence of the country by this barbarous junta, which, having been originally assembled to discuss the form of establishing a central government, had, unlawfully, retained their delegated power, and used it so shamefully? There was a Spanish fleet, and a sufficient number of sailors to man it, in Carthagea, and there was another fleet, and abundance of seamen, in Cadiz. Lord Collingwood, and others, pressed the junta, constantly and earnestly, to fit these vessels out, and to make use of them, or at least to place them beyond the reach of the enemy, yet his remonstrances were unheeded; the sailors were rendered mutinous for want of pay, and even of subsistence, and the government would neither fit out ships themselves, nor suffer the English seamen to do it for them. At the period when the marquis of Romana and the insurgents in Galicia were praying for a few stands of arms and five thousand pounds, from sir John Cradock, the junta possessed many millions of money, and their magazines, in Cadiz, were bursting with the continually increasing quantity of stores and arms arriving from England, but which were left to rot as they arrived, while, from every quarter of the country not yet subdued, the demand for these things was incessant.*

The fleet in Cadiz harbour might have been at sea in the beginning of February. In a week it might have been at Vigo, with money and succours of all kinds for the insurgents in Galicia; after which, by skilful operations along the coast from Vigo to St. Sebastian, it might have occupied an enormous French force on that line of country; instead of a fleet, the junta sent colonel Barios, an obscure person, to steal through by-ways, and to take the command of men who were not in want of leaders. In the same manner, the fleet in Carthagea might have been employed on the Catalanian and French coasts; but, far from using their means, which were really enormous, with energy and judgement, the junta carried on the war by encouraging virulent publications against the French, and confined their real exertions to the assembling of the unfortunate peasants in masses, to starve for a while, and then to be cut to pieces by their more experienced opponents.

The system of false reports, also, was persevered in without any relaxation: "*The French were beaten on all points; the marshals were slain or taken; their soldiers were deserting, or flying in terror at the sight of a Spaniard; Joseph had plundered and abandoned Madrid; Zaragoza had not fallen.*" Castro, the envoy to the Portuguese regency, so late as April, anxiously endeavoured to persuade that government and the English general, that Zaragoza had never been subdued, and that the story of its fall was a French falsehood. In June, official letters were written to marshal Beresford, from the neighbourhood of Lugo and dated the very day upon which Soult's army relieved that town, not to give intelligence of the event, but to announce the utter defeat of that marshal, and the capture of Lugo itself; the amount of the killed and wounded, and the prisoners taken, being very exactly stated, and with such an appearance of truth, as to deceive Beresford, notwithstanding his previous experience of the people he had to deal with.

But the proofs of corruption and incapacity in the junta are innumerable, and not confined to the records of events kept by British officers. Romana, a few months later, upon the question of appointing a regency, thus describes their conduct: "*He himself*," he said, "*had doubted if the central junta was a lawful government, and this doubt was general in the provinces through*

* Papers laid before Parliament, 1810.

* Lord Collingwood's Correspondence. Gen. Miller's Memoirs.

which he had passed; yet he had, to preserve the nation from anarchy, not only yielded obedience to it, but he had, likewise, forced the provinces of Galicia, Leon, and Asturias to do the same; because he thought that an illegal government might be useful if it deserved the confidence of the people, and that they respected its authority. The central junta, however, was not thus situated: the people, judging of measures by their effects, complained that the armies were weak, the government without energy; that there were no supplies; that the promised accounts of the public expenditure were withheld; and yet, all the sums drawn from America, all the succours granted by England, the rents of the crown, and the voluntary contributions were expended. The public employments were not given to men of merit and true lovers of their country. Some of the members of the junta rendered their power subservient to their own advantage; others conferred lucrative appointments on their relations and dependents. Ecclesiastical offices had been filled up to enable individuals to seize those rents for themselves which ought to be appropriated for the public service. There was no unity to be found: many of the junta cared only for the interest of their particular province, as if they were not members of the Spanish monarchy; confirming the appointments of the local juntas, without regard to fitness; and even assigning recompenses to men destitute of military knowledge, who had neither seen service nor performed the duties assigned to them."

"The junta, divided into sections, undertook to manage affairs in which they were unversed, and which were altogether foreign to their professions. Horses, taken from their owners under pretence of supplying the armies, were left to die of hunger in the sea-marshes: and, finally, many important branches of administration were in the hands of men, suspected, both from their own conduct and from their having been creatures of that infamous favourite who was the author of the general misery."

It was at this period that the celebrated *Partidas* first commenced the *guerilla*, or petty warfare, which has been so lauded, as if that had been the cause of Napoleon's discomfiture. Those bands were infinitely numerous, because, every robber, that feared a jail, or that could break from one; every smuggler,* whose trade had been interrupted; every friar, disliking the trammels of his convent; and every idler, that wished to avoid the ranks of the regular army, was to be found either as chief or associate in the *partidas*. The French, although harassed by the constant and cruel murders of isolated soldiers, or followers of the army, and sometimes by the loss of convoys, were never thwarted in any great object by these bands; but the necessity of providing subsistence, and attaching his followers to his fortunes, generally obliged the *guerilla* chief to rob his countrymen; and, indeed, one of the principal causes of the sudden growth of this system was the hope of intercepting the public and private plate, which, under a decree of Joseph, was bringing in from all parts to be coined in Madrid; for that monarch was obliged to have recourse to forced loans, and the property of the proscribed nobles and suppressed convents, to maintain even the appearance of a court.

This description will apply to the mass of the *partidas*; yet there were some actuated by nobler motives; by revenge; by a gallant enterprising spirit; or, by an honest ambition, thinking to serve their country better than by joining the regular forces. Among the principal chiefs may be placed, Renovales, and the two Minas, in Navarre and Arragon; Porlier named the *marquisetto*, and Longa, in the Asturias and Biscay; Juan Martin, or *El Enpecinado*, who vexed the neighbourhood of Madrid; Julian Sanchez, in the Gata and Salamanca country; doctor Rovera, Perena, and some others, in Catalonia; Julian Palarea, or *El Medico*, be-

tween the Moreno and Toledo; the curate Merino, *El Principe*, and Saornil, in Castile; the friar Sapia, in Soria, and Juan Abril, near Segovia.

But these men were of very different merit. Renovales, a regular officer, raised the peasantry of the valleys between Pampeluna and Zaragoza, after the fall of the latter city, and was soon subdued. Juan Martin, Rovera, Julian Sanchez, and the student Mina, discovered military talent, and Sanchez was certainly a very bold and honest man; but Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of the student, far outstripped his contemporaries in fame. He shed the blood of his prisoners freely, yet rather from false principle, and under peculiar circumstances, than from any real ferocity, his natural disposition being manly and generous; and, although not possessed of any peculiar military genius, he had a sound judgement, surprising energy, and a constant spirit. By birth a peasant, he despised the higher orders of his own country, and never would suffer any *hidalgo*, or gentleman, to join his band. From 1809, until the end of the war, he maintained himself in the provinces bordering on the Ebro; often defeated, and chased from place to place, he yet gradually increased his forces, until, in 1812, he yet was at the head of more than ten thousand men, whom he paid regularly, and supplied from resources chiefly created by himself; one of which was remarkable:—He established a treaty with the French generals, by which articles, not being warlike stores, coming from France, had safe conduct from his *partida*, on paying a duty, which Mina appropriated to the subsistence of his followers.

That the *guerilla* system could never seriously affect the progress of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops; and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than fifty thousand of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain; and so severely did they press upon the country that it may be assumed as a truth that if the English army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have gained the good will of the nation would have been the extirpating of the *partidas*. Nevertheless, a great and unquestionable advantage was derived by the regular armies, and especially by the British, from the existence of these bands; the French corps could never communicate with each other, nor combine their movements, except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph, an advantage equal to a reinforcement of thirty thousand men.

PORTUGUESE POWER.

The Portuguese military system has been already explained. The ranks of the regular army, and of the militia, were filling; the arms and equipments were supplied by England; and means were taking to give effect to the authority of the *Capitaoes Mor*, or chiefs of districts, under whom the *ordenancas* were to be gathered for the defence of the country. The people having been a second time relieved from an invasion, by the intervention of a British army, were disposed to submit implicitly to the guidance of their deliverers; but the effect of former misgovernment pervaded every branch of administration, political and municipal, and impeded the efforts made to draw forth the military resources of the kingdom; and it is curious that, until the end of the war, such was the reluctance of the people to become soldiers, that, notwithstanding their undoubted hatred of the French, their natural docility, and the visible superiority of the soldiers' condition over that of the peasant or artisan, the recruiting was always difficult; the odious spectacle was constantly

* The bands formed of smugglers were called *Quadrillas*.

exhibited, of men marched in chains, to reinforce armies, which were fighting in what was a popular, and ought to have been a sacred cause.

The actual number of regular troops, armed and organized, was about fifteen thousand, but notwithstanding the courage displayed by those employed in the late operations, marshal Beresford was still doubtful of their military qualities, and reluctant to act separately from the British troops. The most important fortresses in a condition for defence were Elvas, Albuquerque, and Almeida, in the first line: Abrantes and Peniché, in the second; the citadel, and forts of Lisbon, Palmela, and Setuval, in the third. But there were many other walled places, capable, if armed, of standing a siege, and presenting a variety of strong points for the irregular force of the country to assemble upon; and hence, Portugal offered, not only great resources in men, but a base of operations solid in itself; central with respect to the French armies, and enabling the English general to act, without reference to the Spanish government or Spanish commanders; an advantage more justly appreciated at the end of this campaign than at the commencement. Such were the relative situations of the contending hosts in the Peninsula; yet, to take an enlarged view of affairs, it is necessary to look beyond the actual field of battle; for the contest in Spain, no longer isolated, was become an integral part of the great European struggle against France.

Napoleon, after his first successes near Ratisbon, entered Vienna, and attempted to carry the war to the left bank of the Danube; but a severe check, received at the battle of Esling on the 21st of May, so shook his moral ascendancy in Europe, that he deemed it necessary to concentrate all the disposable strength of his empire for one gigantic effort, which should restore the terror of his name. The appearance of inactivity assumed by him, while thus mightily gathering his forces, deceived his enemies; and, as their hopes rose, their boasts became extravagant, more especially in England, where, to express a doubt of his immediate overthrow was regarded as a heinous offence; and where the government, buoyed up with foolish expectations, thought less of supporting a noble and effectual warfare in Portugal than of nourishing and aiding the secondary and rather degrading hostility of conspirators, malcontents, and military adventurers in Germany.

While sir Arthur Wellesley was waiting impatiently on the Tagus for the scanty reinforcements afforded him, two other armies were simultaneously preparing to act against the extremities of the French empire; the one, consisting of about twelve thousand men, drawn from Sicily, was destined to invade Italy, the southern parts of which had been denuded of troops to oppose the Austrians on the Tagliamento.* The other was assembled on the coast of England, where above forty thousand of the finest troops the nation could boast of, and a fleet of power to overthrow all the other navies of the world combined, composed an armament intended to destroy the great marine establishment which the French emperor had so suddenly and so portentously created at Antwerp. So vast an expedition had never before left the British shores, neither any one so meanly conceived, so improvidently arranged, so calamitously conducted; for the marine and land forces, combined, numbered more than eighty thousand fighting men, and those of the bravest, yet the object in view was comparatively insignificant, and even that was not obtained. Delivered over to the leading of a man, whose military incapacity has caused the glorious title of Chatham to be scorned, this ill-fated army, with spirit, and strength, and zeal to have spread the fame of England to the extremities of the earth, perished, without a blow, in the pestilent marshes of Walcheren! And so utterly had party spirit stifled

the feeling of national honour, that men were found in Parliament base enough to reprobate the convention of Cintra, to sneer at sir John Moore's operations, and yet to declare the Walcheren expedition wise, profitable, and even glorious.

The operation against Italy was less unfortunate rather than more ably conducted, and it was equally abortive. What with slow preparations, the voyage, and the taking of the petty islands of Ischia and Procida, thirteen weeks were wasted, although during that period, Murat, conscious of his inability to resist, was only restrained from abandoning Naples by the firmness of his queen, and the energy of Salicetti, the minister of police. We have seen that it was the wish of the ministers to have the troops in Sicily employed in the south of Spain, but, yielding to the representations of sir John Stuart, they permitted him to make this display of military foolery: yet it is not with the bad or good success of these expeditions that this history has to deal, but with that direful ministerial incapacity which suffered two men, notoriously unfitted for war, to waste and dissipate the military strength of England on secondary objects, while a renowned commander, placed at the most important point, was left without an adequate force.

For the first time since the commencement of the peninsular war, sixty thousand Spanish troops, well armed and clothed, were collected in a mass, and in the right place, communicating with a British force; for the first time since Napoleon swayed the destiny of France, the principal army of that country had met with an important check; the great conqueror's fortune seemed to waver, and the moment had arrived when the British government was called to display all its wisdom and energy. The duke of York had performed his duty; he had placed above ninety thousand superb soldiers, all disposable for offensive operations, in the hands of the ministers; but the latter knew not their value, and, instead of concentrating them upon one, scattered them upon many points. Sir Arthur Wellesley might have had above eighty thousand British troops on the frontiers of Portugal, and he was a general capable of wielding them. He was forced to commence a campaign, upon which the fate of the Peninsula, a quick triumph or a long-protracted agony of twelve millions of people depended, with only twenty-two thousand; while sixty thousand fighting men, and ships numerous enough to darken all the coasts of Spain, were waiting, in Sicily and England, for orders which were to doom them, one part to scorn, and the other to an inglorious and miserable fate. Shall the deliverance of the Peninsula, then, be attributed to the firmness and long-sighted policy of ministers who gave these glaring proofs of improvidence, or shall the glory of that great exploit lighten round the head of him who so manfully maintained the fierce struggle, under all the burden of their folly?

CHAPTER V.

Campaign of Talavera—Choice of operations—Sir Arthur Wellesley moves into Spain—Joseph marches against Venegas—Orders Victor to return to Talavera—Cuesta arrives at Almaraz—Sir Arthur reaches Plasencia—Interview with Cuesta—Plan of operations arranged—Sir Arthur, embarrassed by the want of provisions, detaches sir Robert Wilson upon the Vera de Plasencia, passes the Tietar, and unites with Cuesta at Oropesa—Skirmish at Talavera—Bad conduct of the Spanish troops—Victor takes post behind the Alberche—Cuesta's absurdity—Victor retires from the Alberche—Sir Arthur in want of provisions, refuses to pass that river—Intrigues of Mr. Frere—The junta secretly orders Venegas not to execute his part of the operation.

CAMPAIGN OF TALAVERA.

In the foregoing chapters the real state of affairs in the Peninsula has been described; but it appeared

* Adjutant-general's Returns.

with a somewhat different aspect to the English general, because false informations, egregious boasts, and hollow promises, such as had been employed to mislead sir John Moore, were renewed at this period; and the allied nations were influenced by a riotous rather than a reasonable confidence of victory. The English newspapers teemed with letters, describing the enemy's misery and fears; nor was the camp free from these inflated feelings. Marshal Beresford was so credulous of French weakness as publicly to announce to the junta of Badajos that Soult's force, wandering and harassed by continual attacks, was reduced to eight or ten thousand distressed soldiers. Nay, sir Arthur Wellesley himself, swayed by the pertinacity of the tale-makers, the unhesitating assurances of the junta, perhaps, also, a little excited by a sense of his own great talents, was not free from the impression that the hour of complete triumph was come.

The Spanish government and the Spanish generals were importunate for offensive movements, and lavish in their promises of support; and the English general was as eager; for he was at the head of gallant troops, his foot was on the path of victory, and he felt that, if the duke of Belluno was not quickly disabled, the British army, threatened on both flanks, would, as in the case of sir John Cradock, be obliged to remain in some defensive position, near Lisbon, until it became an object of suspicion and hatred to the Spanish and Portuguese people.

There were three lines of offensive operations open:—

1. *To cross the Tagus, join Cuesta's army, and, making Elvas and Badajos the base of movements, attack Victor in front.* This line was circuitous. It permitted the enemy to cover himself by the Tagus, and the operations of the allies would have been cramped by the Sierra de Guadalupe on one side, and the mountains lying between Albuquerque and Alcantara on the other; strong detachments must also have been left to cover the roads to Lisbon, on the right bank of the Tagus. Finally, the communication between the duke of Belluno and Soult being free, Beresford's corps would have been endangered.

2. *To adopt Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo as the base of movements, and to operate in conjunction with Beresford, the duke del Parque, and Romana, by the line of Salamanca, while Cuesta and Venegas occupied the attention of the first and fourth corps on the Tagus.* The objections to this line were, that it separated the British troops from the most efficient and most numerous, and obliged them to act with the weakest and most irregular of the Spanish armies; that it abandoned Cuesta to the ruin which his headstrong humour would certainly provoke; and as the loss of Seville or of Lisbon would inevitably follow, the instructions of the English ministers, (which enjoined the defence of the latter city as paramount to every object, save the military possession of Cadiz,) would have been neglected.

3. *To march upon Plasencia and Almaraz, form a junction with Cuesta, and advance against Madrid, while Venegas operated in the same view, by the line of La Mancha.* The obstacles in the way of this plan were—1. That it exposed Cuesta to be defeated by Victor before the junction; and after the junction, the combinations would still be dependent upon the accuracy of Venegas's movements. 2. That sir Arthur Wellesley's march, with reference to Soult's troops, would be a flank march: an unsafe operation at all times, but, on this occasion, when the troops must move through the long and narrow valley of the Tagus, peculiarly dangerous. Nevertheless, this line was adopted, nor were the reasons in favour of it devoid of force. The number of French immediately protecting Madrid was estimated at fifty thousand; but confidential officers, sent to the head-quarters of Cuesta and

Venegas, had ascertained that their strength was not overstated at thirty-eight thousand, for the first, and twenty-five thousand for the second; all well armed and equipped, and the last certainly the best and most efficient army that the Spaniards had yet brought into the field. Now the English force in Portugal amounted to thirty thousand men exclusive of the sick, twenty-two thousand being under arms on the frontier, and eight thousand at Lisbon: here, then, was a mass of ninety thousand regular troops that could be brought to bear on fifty thousand; besides which there were sir Robert Wilson's legion, about a thousand strong, and the Spanish *partidas* of the Guadalupe and the Sierra de Bejar.

The ridge of mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from Castile and Leon being, as has been already related, impracticable for artillery, except at the passes of Baños and Perales, it was supposed that the twenty thousand men under Beresford and the duke del Parque would be sufficient to block those lines of march, and that Romana, moving by the Tras os Montes, might join the duke del Parque; thus thirty thousand men, supported by two fortresses, would be ready to protect the flank of the British army in its march from Plasencia towards Madrid. But this was a vain calculation, for Romana remained ostentatiously idle at Cornuã, and sir Arthur Wellesley, never having seen the Spanish troops in action, thought too well of them; having had no experience of Spanish promises he trusted them too far, and at the same time, made a false judgment of the force and position of his adversaries. The arrival of the sixth corps at Astorga and of the fifth at Valladolid were unknown to him; the strength of the second corps, and, perhaps, the activity of its chief, were also underrated. Instead of fifteen or twenty thousand harassed French troops, without artillery, there were seventy thousand fighting men behind the mountains!

The 27th of June, the English army, breaking up from the camp of Abrantes, and, being organized in the following manner, marched into Spain:—

Artillery.		
Six brigades,	30 guns,	commanded by maj.-gen. Howorth.
Cavalry.		
Three brigades,	3047 sabres,	commanded by lt.-gen. Payne.
Infantry.		
1st div. of 4 brigades,	6023 bayonets,	com'd by lt.-gen. Sherbrooke.
2d do. 2 do.	3947 do.	do. maj.-gen. Hill.
3d do. 2 do.	3736 do.	do. maj.-gen. Mackenzie
4th do. 2 do.	2957 do.	do. br.-gen. Campbell.
5 divs.	13 brigades.	19710 sabres and bayonets.
—	—	1287 Engineers, artillery, and waggon-train.

Grand total . . . 20997 men, and 30 pieces of artillery.

Besides this force, the 40th regiment, so long detained at Seville by Mr. Frere, had arrived in Lisbon, and the troops on their march from that city, being somewhat less than eight thousand bayonets, were organized in three brigades, commanded by major-general Lightfoot and brigadier-generals Robert and Catlin Craufurd. But the leading brigade, under Robert Craufurd, only quitted Lisbon on the 28th of June.

The army moved by both banks of the Tagus; one column proceeding through Sobreira Formosa, the other by Villa Velha, where a boat-bridge was established. The 1st of July the head-quarters were at Castello Branco, and from thence the troops continued their route, in one column, by Moralejo and Coria; a flanking brigade, under general Donkin, being directed through Ceclaven and Torijoncillos, to explore the country between Zarza Mayor and the Tagus. The 8th, the head-quarters were established at Plasencia. The 10th, the army arrived at that place, and was, soon after, joined by a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry from Lisbon.

At this period Cuesta was at Almaraz, and Victor, of whose intermediate movements it is time to take notice, was at Talavera de la Reyna. When that marshal had retired from Torremocha, the valley of the Tagus was exhausted by the long sojourn of the fourth and fifth corps;* but the valley of Plasencia was extremely fertile, and untouched, and the duke of Belluno, whose troops, weakened by the tertian sickness, required good nourishment, resolved to take post there, keeping a bridge at Bazagona, on the Tietar, by which he could, in two marches, fall upon Cuesta, if he ventured to pass the Tagus at Almaraz; at Plasencia also, he could open a communication with the second and fifth corps, and observe closely the movements of the English army on the frontier of Portugal. The bridge at Bazagona had been finished on the 21st of June, and the French light troops were scouring the country towards Plasencia, when the king, who had already withdrawn a division of infantry and a large part of the cavalry of the first corps to reinforce the fourth, ordered the duke of Belluno to retire instantly to Talavera, leaving rear guards on the Tietar and at Almaraz. This order, which arrived the 22d of June, was the result of that indecision which none but truly great men, or fools, are free from; the first, because they can see their way clearly through the thousand difficulties that encumber and bewilder the mind in war; the last, because they see nothing.

On the present occasion, general Sebastiani had reported that Venegas was reinforced, and ready to penetrate by La Mancha; and the king, swayed by this false information, disturbed by the march of Cuesta, and still more by Blake's advance against Zaragoza (the result of which was then unknown), became so alarmed that he commanded St. Cyr to move into Aragon, repaired himself to Toledo, with his guards and reserve, withdrew the light cavalry and a division of infantry from Victor, obliged that marshal to fall back on Talavera; and even commanded Mortier to bring up the fifth corps from Valladolid to Villa Castin, near Avila, although, following Napoleon's orders, it should have gone to Salamanca.

In the hope of meeting Venegas, Joseph had penetrated as far as the Jabalon river, in La Mancha; and as the Spaniard, fearful of the tempest approaching him, immediately took shelter in the Morena, the king, leaving some posts of the 4th corps at Toledo, restored the light cavalry to the first corps, and, with his guards and reserve, returned to Madrid. But, while he had been pursuing a shadow, Victor was exposed to great danger; for the Jabalon is six long marches from Madrid, and hence, for ten days, the duke of Belluno, with only two divisions of infantry and two thousand cavalry, in all about fourteen thousand men, had remained at Talavera without any support, although sixty thousand men were marching against him from different points.

Victor did not suffer as he might have done, but his numerical weakness was certainly the safety of Cuesta. For that general, having followed the retreat of the first corps from Torremocha, crossed the Tagus, at Almaraz, on the 23d of June, and pushed an advanced guard towards Oropesa. He had thirty-eight thousand men, yet he remained tranquil while (at a distance of only twelve miles) fourteen thousand French made a flank movement that lasted three days; and his careless method of acting, and his unskilful dispositions, were so evident, that the French cavalry, far from fearing, were preparing to punish him, when he suddenly took the alarm, and, withdrawing to Almaraz, occupied himself in finishing his bridges over the Tagus.

The 28th of June, Victor having removed his hospitals and depots from Arzobispo, had taken a position

behind the Alberche, keeping, however, three battalions and the cavalry at Talavera, with advanced posts at Calera and Gamonal; a small detachment, also, watched the course of the Tagus from the mouth of the Alberche to that of the Guadarama, and a moveable column was sent to Escalona, to observe the Vera de Plasencia, and the passes leading upon Avila. In executing this retrograde movement, Victor, having no means of transport, burnt ten out of the fifteen pontoons supporting his bridge over the Tietar, and, for the same reason, he threw a considerable quantity of powder and shot into the river.* His troops had been for four days on quarter rations, and were suffering from sickness and hunger, and as the Tagus was fordable in several places, the danger of his position is evident; the British were, however, still at Abrantes, and Cuesta knew not how to profit by this opportunity before the king returned from La Mancha.

Such was the position of the different armies when the British general arrived at Plasencia. He had seen Soult's letters, found upon general Franceschi, and thus ascertained that the second corps was at Zamora, and from Franceschi himself, who passed as a prisoner, at the same time, he learned the arrival of the fifth corps at Valladolid; but the march of Ney's corps was not suspected, and the tenor of Soult's letters led to the notion that Galicia was to be retained. A letter of Victor's to Joseph, dated the 23d of June, and written in the most desponding language, had been likewise intercepted; and, as Soult's correspondence also gave a strong picture of his difficulties, the general impression, that the French armies were not only weak but utterly dismayed, was rather augmented than lessened by this information. Sir Arthur Wellesley, however, could not but have some distrust, when he knew that two corps were beyond the mountains, on his left, and though far from suspecting the extent of his danger, he took additional precautions to protect that flank, and renewed his instructions to Beresford to watch the enemy's movements, and to look carefully to the defence of the *Puerto Perales*. But the pass of Baños was still to be guarded, and for this purpose sir Arthur applied to Cuesta.†

The Spanish general was at first unwilling to detach any men to that quarter, yet finally agreed that two battalions from his army and two others from the town of Bejar, at the other side of the pass, should unite to defend Baños, and that the duke del Parque should also send a detachment to the pass of Perales. Although these measures appeared sufficient to obviate danger from Soult's corps, weakened as it was supposed to be, they were evidently futile to check the real force under that marshal; and they were rendered absolutely ridiculous by Cuesta, who sent two weak battalions, of three hundred men each, and with only twenty rounds of ammunition per man: and this was only a part of a system which already weighed heavily on the English general.

The 10th, sir Arthur Wellesley had proceeded to Cuesta's head-quarters, near the Col de Mirabete, to confer with him on their future operations. Ever since the affair of Valdez, in 1808, the junta had been sorely afraid of Cuesta, and, suspecting that he was meditating some signal vengeance, they endeavoured to raise up rivals to his power. In this view they had lavished honours and authority upon Blake, and when the defeat at Belchite crushed their hopes in that quarter, they turned their eyes upon Venegas, and increased his forces, taking care to give him the best troops. Still Cuesta's force was formidable, and to reduce it was the object both of Mr. Frere and the junta: the motive of the first being to elevate the duke Albuquer-

* Semel's Journal of Operations First Corps, MSS.

† Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, printed in 1810.

que; the intention of the others being merely to reduce the power of Cuesta.

But whatever might have been the latter's ultimate intention with respect to the junta, it is certain that his natural obstinacy and violence were greatly increased by a knowledge of these proceedings, and that he was ill-disposed towards the English general, as thinking him a party concerned in the intrigues. When, therefore, sir Arthur, at the instigation of Mr. Frere, proposed that a draft of ten thousand Spanish troops should be detached towards Avila and Segovia, Cuesta replied that it must be done by the British, and absolutely refused to furnish more than two battalions of infantry and a few cavalry to strengthen sir Robert Wilson's partizan corps, which was destined to act on the enemy's right.* This determination again baffled Mr. Frere's project of placing the duke of Albuquerque at the head of an independent force, and obliged the supreme junta to fall upon some other expedient for reducing Cuesta's power; however it was fortunate that the old Spaniard resisted the proposal, because the ten thousand men would have gone straight into the midst of the fifth corps, which, in expectation of such a movement, was then at Villa Castin, and, having been rejoined by the detachment of colonel Briche, from Catalonia, was eighteen thousand strong, and supported by Kellerman's division of cavalry at Valladolid.

The discussion between the generals lasted two days; but, with the approbation of the supreme junta, it was finally agreed that the British and Spanish armies, under sir Arthur and Cuesta, should march, on the 18th, against Victor, and that Venegas, advancing, at the same time, through La Mancha, should leave Toledo and Aranjues to his left, and push for Fuente Duenas and Villa Maurique on the Upper Tagus. If this movement should draw Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, to that side, Venegas was to keep him in play while the allied forces defeated Victor. If Sebastiani disregarded it, Venegas was to cross the Tagus and march upon Madrid, from the south-east, while sir Robert Wilson, reinforced by some Spanish battalions, menaced that capital from the opposite quarter.

Previous to entering Spain, sir Arthur had ascertained that the valleys of the Alagon and the Arago and those between Bejar and Ciudad Rodrigo were fertile and capable of nourishing his army, and he had sent commissaries to all these points to purchase mules, and to arrange with the alcaldes of the different districts for the supply of the troops. He had obtained the warmest assurances, from the supreme junta, that every needful article should be forthcoming, and the latter had also sent the intendant-general, don Lonzano de Torres, to the British head-quarters, with full powers to forward all arrangements for the supply of the English soldiers. Relying upon these preparations, sir Arthur had crossed the frontier with few means of transport and without magazines, for Portugal could not furnish what was required, and, moreover, the Portuguese peasants had an insuperable objection to quitting their own country; a matter however apparently of little consequence, because Mr. Frere, writing officially at the time, described the people of Estremadura as viewing "*the war in the light of a crusade, and carrying it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause!*"

From Castello Branco to Plasencia is but seven days' march, yet that short time was sufficient to prove the bad faith of the junta, and the illusion under which Mr. Frere laboured. Neither mules for the transport of ammunition and provisions, nor the promised help of the authorities, nor aid of any kind could be procured; and don Lonzano de Torres, although, to sir Arthur, he freely acknowledged the extent of the evil, the ill-will of the inhabitants, and the shameful conduct of the supreme junta, afterwards, without shame,

asserted that the British troops had always received and consumed double rations, and were in want of nothing: an assertion in which he was supported by don Martin de Garay, the Spanish secretary of state; the whole proceeding being a concerted plan, to afford the junta a pretext for justifying their own and casting a slur upon the English general's conduct, if any disasters should happen.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, seriously alarmed for the subsistence of his army, wrote, upon the 16th, to Mr. Frere and to general O'Donoghue, the chief of Cuesta's staff; representing to both the distress of the troops, and intimating his resolution *not to proceed beyond the Alberche*, unless his wants were immediately supplied; faithful, however, to his agreement with Cuesta, he prepared to put his force in motion for that river. It was known at Plasencia, on the 15th, that Ney had retreated from Coruña; but it was believed, that his corps had been recalled to France, and no change took place in the plan of campaign. It was not suspected that the sixth corps had then been sixteen days at Astorga!

The valley of the Tagus, into which the army was about to plunge, is intersected by several rivers, with rugged banks and deep channels; but their courses being very little out of the parallel of the Tagus, the Alberche is in a manner enclosed by the Tietar. Now, sir Robert Wilson, having a detachment of four thousand Portuguese and Spanish troops, had ascended the right bank of the latter river, and gained possession of the passes of Arenas, which lead upon Avila, and of the pass of San Pedro Bernardo, which leads upon Madrid; in this position he covered the Vera de Plasencia, and threatened Victor's communications with the capital. The French marshal was alarmed, and a movement of the whole army in the same direction would have obliged him to abandon the Lower Alberche;* because, two marches effected beyond Arenas, in the direction of Escalona and Maqueda, would have placed sir Arthur Wellesley between the first corps and Madrid. But, on the other hand, the line of country was too rugged for rapid movements with a large body; and it was necessary first to secure a junction with Cuesta, because Victor, having recovered his third division on the 7th of July, was again at the head of twenty-five thousand men. With such a force he could not be trusted near the Spaniards, and the British general therefore resolved to cross the Tietar, at the Venta de Bazagona, and march by Miajadas upon Oropesa.

The 16th, two companies of the *staff corps*, with a working party of five hundred men, marched from Plasencia to Bazagona, to throw a bridge over the Tietar. The duke of Belluno had wasted many days in dragging up fifteen pontoons from the Tagus, to form his bridge at that place, and when he retired upon Talavera, he destroyed the greatest part of the equipage;† but the English officer employed on this occasion pulled down an old house in the neighbourhood, felled some pine-trees in a wood three miles distant, and, uniting intelligence with labour, contrived, without other aid than a few hatchets and saws, in one day, to throw a solid bridge over the Tietar.

The 18th, the army crossed that river, and taking the route of Miajadas, reached Talayuela.

The 19th, the main body halted at Centinello and Casa de Somas. The advanced posts at Venta de St. Juliens.

The 20th, the troops reached Oropesa; but as their marches had been long, and conducted through a difficult country, they halted the 21st; on which day, Cuesta, who had moved from Almaraz by Naval Moral and Arzobispo, passed Oropesa, and united his whole force at Velada, except a small detachment, which marched along the south bank of the Tagus, to threaten the French by the bridge of Talavera.

* Semel's Journal of Operations, MSS.

† Semel's Journal of the First Corps' Operations, MSS.

* Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

The duke of Belluno, aware of these movements, had supported his posts at Talavera with a division of infantry, which was disposed in successive detachments behind that town, but his situation appeared critical, because the allies, covered by the Alberche, might still gain a march and reach Escalona before him; and from thence either push for Madrid, by the pass of Brunete, or, taking post at Maqueda, cut him off from the capital. His sources of information were however sure, and he contented himself with sending a regiment of hussars to Cazar de Escalona, to watch the Upper Alberche, and to support the moveable column opposed to sir Robert Wilson.

The 21st, the allies being between Oropesa and Velada, Victor recalled all his foraging parties, altered his line of retreat from the Madrid to the Toledo road, removed his parc from St. Ollalla to Cevolla, and concentrated two divisions of infantry behind the Alberche.

The 22d, the allies moved in two columns, to drive the French posts from Talavera, and Cuesta, marching by the high road, came first up with the enemy's rear-guard, near the village of Gamonal; then commenced a display of ignorance, timidity, and absurdity, that has seldom been equalled in war; the past defeats of the Spanish army were rendered quite explicable; the little fruit derived from them by marshal Victor quite inexplicable. General Latour Maubourg, with two thousand dragoons, came boldly on to the table-land of Gamonal, and sustaining a cannonade, not only checked the head of the Spanish leading column, but actually obliged general Zayas, who commanded it, to display his whole line, consisting of fifteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry; nor did the French horsemen give back at all, until the appearance of the red uniforms on their right informed them that it was time to retire. Then, and not till then, Latour Maubourg, supported by some infantry, retreated behind the Alberche, and without loss, although many batteries, and at least six thousand Spanish horse, were close on his rear; the latter could never be induced to make even a partial charge, however favourable the opportunity, and by two o'clock the whole French army was safely concentrated on its position. Ruffin's division on the left touched the Tagus, and protected the bridge over the Alberche, which was more immediately defended by a regiment of infantry and fourteen pieces of artillery. Villatte's and Lapisse's divisions, drawn up in successive lines, on some high ground that overlooked the surrounding country, formed the right; the heavy cavalry were in second line near the bridge, and in this situation Victor rested the 22d and 23d.

It was at all times difficult to obtain accurate information from the Spaniards by gentle means; hence, the French were usually better supplied with intelligence than the British, while the native generals never knew anything about the enemy, until they felt the weight of his blows. Up to this period, sir Arthur's best sources of information had been the intercepted letters of the French; and now, although the latter had been in the same position, and without any change of numbers since the 7th, the inhabitants of Talavera could not, or would not, give any information of their strength or situation; nor could any reasonable calculation be formed of either, until some English officers crossed the Tagus, and, from the mountains on the left bank of that river, saw the French position in reverse. The general outline of an attack was, however, agreed upon for the next morning, but the details were unsettled, and when the English commander came to arrange these with Cuesta, the latter was gone to bed! The British troops were under arms at three o'clock the next morning, Cuesta's staff were, however, not aroused from slumber until seven o'clock, and the old man finally objected to fight that day, alleging, among other absurd reasons, that it was Sunday. There was some-

thing more than absurdity in these proceedings. Victor, who was not ignorant of the weak points of his own position, remained tranquil the 23d, being well assured that no attack would take place, for it is certain that he had a correspondence with some of the Spanish staff, and the secret discussions between sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, at which only one staff officer of each party was present, became known to the enemy in twenty-four hours after; indeed, Cuesta was himself suspected of treachery by many, yet apparently without reason.

In the course of the 23d, the Spanish officer commanding the advanced posts, reported, that the French guns were withdrawn, and that it was evident they meant to retreat; Cuesta then became willing to attack, and proposed, in concert with sir Arthur Wellesley, to examine Victor's position, when, to the surprise of the English commander, the Spaniard arrived in a coach, drawn by six horses, to perform this duty, and as the inequalities of the ground obliged him to descend from his vehicle, he cast himself at the foot of a tree, and in a few moments went to sleep: yet he was always ready to censure and to thwart every proposal of his able coadjutor. This time, however, he consented to fall upon the enemy, and the troops were in motion early in the morning of the 24th; but the duke of Belluno was again duly informed of their intention, and having withdrawn his moveable column from Escalona, and relinquished the road to Madrid, retreated during the night to Torrijos. Thus, the first combination of the allies failed entirely, and each hour the troops of the enemy were accumulating round them; for Venegas, who should have been at Fuente Duenas, high up on the Tagus, had not even passed Danyel; the king was collecting his whole strength in front, between Toledo and Talavera, and Soult was fast gathering his more formidable power behind the mountains of Bejar.

The English general was indeed still ignorant of the danger which threatened him from the Salamanca country, or he would, doubtless, have withdrawn at once to Plasencia, and secured his communications with Lisbon, and with Beresford's troops; and other powerful reasons were not wanting to prevent his further advance. Before he quitted Plasencia he had completed contracts with the *alcaldes*, in the Vera de Plasencia, for two hundred and fifty thousand rations of forage and provisions; this, together with what he had before collected, would have furnished supplies for ten or twelve days, a sufficient time to beat Victor, and carry the army into a fresh country; but, distrustful, as he had reason to be, of the Spaniards, he again gave notice to Cuesta and the junta, that *BEYOND THE ALBERCHE* he would not move, unless his wants were immediately supplied; for, hitherto the rations contracted for had not been delivered, and his representations to the junta and to Cuesta were, by both, equally disregarded; there were no means of transport provided; the troops were already on less than half allowance; absolute famine approached, and when the general demanded food for his soldiers, at the hands of those whose cause he came to defend, he was answered with false excuses, and insulted by false statements. Under any circumstances this would have forced him to halt, but the advance having been made in the exercise of his own discretion, and not the command of his government, there could be no room for hesitation: wherefore, remonstrating warmly, but manfully, with the supreme junta, he announced his resolution to go no farther, nay, even to *withdraw from Spain altogether*.*

It is evident that without these well-founded reasons for pausing, Cuesta's conduct, and the state of his army, offered no solid ground for expecting success by continuing the forward movement; yet the faithless and

* Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

perverse conduct of the supreme junta, although hidden as yet from sir Arthur Wellesley, far exceeded the measure even of Cuesta's obdurate folly. That body, after having agreed to the plan upon which the armies were acting, concluded, in the fulness of their ignorance, that the combined troops in the valley of the Tagus would be sufficient to overthrow Joseph, and, therefore, secretly ordered Venegas not to fulfil his part; arguing to themselves, with a cunning stupidity, that it would be a master-stroke of policy to save him from any chance of a defeat, and hoping thus to preserve a powerful force, under one of their own creatures, to maintain their own power. This was the cause why the army of La Mancha had failed to appear on the Tagus: and thus, the welfare of millions was made the sport of men, who yet were never tired of praising themselves, and have not failed to find admirers elsewhere.

As the Spaniards are perfect masters of the art of saying every thing and doing nothing, sir Arthur's remonstrances drew forth many official statements, plausible replies, and pompous assertions, after their manner, but produced no amelioration of the evils complained of. Mr. Frere, also, thinking it necessary to make some apology for himself, asserted that the evil was deep rooted, and that he had had neither time nor power to arrange any regular plan for the subsistence of the English armies. But all the evils that blighted the Spanish cause were deep seated, and Mr. Frere, who could not arrange a plan for the subsistence of the troops, that indispensable preliminary to military operations, and which was really within his province, thought himself competent to direct all the operations themselves which were in the province of the generals. He had found leisure to meddle in all the intrigues of the day; to aim at making and unmaking Spanish commanders; to insult sir John Moore; to pester sir John Cradock with warlike advice; and to arrange the plan of campaign for sir Arthur Wellesley's army, without that officer's concurrence.

CHAPTER VI.

Cuesta passes the Alberche—Sir Arthur Wellesley sends two English divisions to support him—Soul is appointed to command the second, fifth, and sixth corps—He proposes to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo and threaten Lisbon—He enters Salamanca, and sends general Foy to Madrid to concert the plan of operations—The king quits Madrid—Unites his whole army—Crosses the Guadarama river, and attacks Cuesta—Combat of Alcabon—Spaniards fall back in confusion to the Alberche—Cuesta refuses to pass that river—His dangerous position—The French advance—Cuesta re-crosses the Tietar—Sir Arthur Wellesley draws up the combined forces on the position of Talavera—The king crosses the Tietar—Skirmish at Casa de Salinas—Combat on the evening of the 27th—Panic in the Spanish army—Combat on the morning of the 28th—The king holds a council of war—Jourdan and Victor propose different plans—The king follows that of Victor—Battle of Talavera—The French re-cross the Alberche—General Craufurd arrives in the English camp—His extraordinary march—Observations.

THE English general's resolution to halt at Talavera made little impression upon Cuesta. A French corps had retreated before him, and Madrid, nay, the Pyrenees themselves, instantly rose on the view of the sanguine Spaniard: he was resolved to be the first in the capital, and he pushed forward in pursuit, reckless alike of military discipline and of the friendly warnings of sir Arthur, who vainly admonished him to open his communications as quickly as possible with Venegas, and to beware how he let the enemy know that the British and Spanish armies were separated. In the fulness of his arrogant vanity, Cuesta crossed the Alberche on the 24th, and being unable to ascertain the exact route of the French, pursued them by the road

of Toledo, as far as Cebolla, and by the road of Madrid, as far as El Bravo. On the 25th, still inflated with pride, he caused the troops at Cebolla to move on to Torrijos, and marched himself to St. Ollalla, as if chasing a deer, but the 26th he discovered that he had been hunting a tiger. Meanwhile sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the consequence of this imprudence, had sent general Sherbrooke, with two divisions of British infantry and all the cavalry, across the Alberche, to Cazalegas, where, being centrally situated with respect to Talavera, St. Ollalla, and Escalona, he could support the Spaniards, and, at the same time, hold communication with sir Robert Wilson, who had been at the latter town since the 23d. But a great and signal crisis was at hand, the full importance of which cannot be well understood without an exact knowledge of the situation and proceedings of all the armies involved in this complicated campaign.

The 30th of June, Soult, when at Zamora, had received a despatch from the emperor, dated near Ratisbon, conferring on him the supreme command of the second, fifth, and sixth corps, with orders to concentrate them, and act decisively against the English. "*Wellesley*," said Napoleon, "*will probably advance, by the Tagus, against Madrid: in that case, pass the mountains, fall on his flank and rear, and crush him;*" for, at that distance, and without other information than what his own sagacity supplied, this all-knowing soldier foresaw the leading operations even as soon and as certainly as those who projected them. The duke of Dalmatia immediately imparted these instructions to the king, and, at the same time, made known his own opinions and designs with respect to the probable projects of the allies. He was ignorant of the precise object and exact position of sir Arthur Wellesley, but, judging from the cessation of hostility in the north, that the English were in march with the design of joining Cuesta, and acting by the line of the Tagus, he proposed to concentrate the third corps at Salamanca, besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, and menace Lisbon, which, he justly observed, would bring the English army back to the northern provinces of Portugal; and if, as some supposed, the intention of sir Arthur was to unite, at Bragança, with Romana, and open the campaign to the north of the Douro, the French army would still be in a suitable position to oppose them.

In pursuance of this opinion, Soult ordered Mortier to approach Ciudad Rodrigo, with the double view of preparing for the siege and covering the quarters of refreshment so much needed by the second corps after its fatigues. Ney also was directed to march with the sixth corps, by the left bank of the Esia, to Zamora; but the spirit of discord was strong, and it was at this moment that the king, alarmed by Sebastiani's report, drew the fifth corps to Villa Castin, while Marshal Ney, holding it imprudent to uncover Astorga and Leon, mortified, also, at being placed under the orders of another marshal, refused to move to Zamora. Soult, crossed by these untoward circumstances, sent the division of light cavalry, under his brother, and one of infantry, commanded by Heudelet, from Zamora and Toro to Salamanca, with orders to explore the course of the Tormes, to observe Alba and Ledesma, and especially to scour the roads leading upon Ciudad Rodrigo and Plasencia: these troops relieved a division of dragoons belonging to Kellerman, who was still charged with the general government of the province.

The 10th of July, the march of the British upon Plasencia became known, and it was manifest that sir Arthur had no design to act north of the Douro; wherefore the duke of Dalmatia resolved to advance, with the remainder of the second corps, to Salamanca; and, partly by authority, partly by address, he obliged Ney to put the sixth corps in movement for Zamora, leaving Fournier's dragoons to cover Astorga and Leon. Mean-

while, king Joseph, having returned from his fruitless excursion against Venegas, was at first incredulous of the advance of sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta, but he agreed to Soult's project against Ciudad Rodrigo, and ordered Mortier to return to Valladolid, where that marshal arrived, with his first division, on the 16th of July: his second division, under general Gazan, halted, however, at Medina del Campo and Nava del Rey, on the route from Salamanca to Valladolid, and an advanced guard was sent forward to Alba de Tormes.

The 13th of July, Soult, being assured that the British army was on the eastern frontier of Portugal, and that considerable reinforcements had been disembarked at Lisbon, became certain that sir Arthur meant to operate by the line of the Tagus, and therefore again addressed the king to move him to an immediate siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, promising to have the three corps under his own command in full activity in fifteen days, provided his demands were complied with, the most important being—1. The formation of a battering train; 2. The concentration of an immense number of detachments, which weakened the active corps; 3. A reinforcement of fifteen or twenty thousand conscripts, drawn from France, to enable the old troops, employed on the line of communication, to join the *corps d'armee*. The first corps should, he said, continue to watch the Spanish army of Estremadura, and be prepared either to prevent it from uniting with the English to disturb the siege, or to join the first, second, and sixth corps, and give battle, if that should become necessary.* The siege might thus be pressed vigorously, Ciudad would fall, Almeida would be next invested, and the communications of the English army, with Lisbon, threatened.

The 17th, the king replied, through marshal Jourdan, that he approved of the plan, but had not means to meet several of Soult's demands, and he proposed that the latter should reinforce Kellerman and Bonnet, with ten thousand men, to enable them to seize the Asturias, and thus strengthen the communications with France. This drew from the duke of Dalmatia the following remonstrance:—"Under present circumstances we cannot avoid some sacrifice of territory. Let us prepare, first, by concentrating, on a few points capable of defence and covering the hospitals and depots which may be on the extremity of our general position. This will not be so distressing as it may appear, because the moment we have beaten and dispersed the enemy's masses we shall recover all our ground." Then reiterating his own advice, he concluded thus:—"I conceive it impossible to finish this war by detachments. It is large masses only, the strongest that you can form, that will succeed." It is remarkable that sir Arthur Wellesley, writing at this time, says, "*I conceive that the French are dangerous only when in large masses.*"

Meanwhile, Heudelet's division, having pushed back the advanced guards of the duke del Parque upon Ciudad Rodrigo, ascertained that a great movement of troops was taking place near that city, and that sir Arthur Wellesley, advancing quicker than was expected, had already reached Plasencia; wherefore, on the 18th, Soult directed Mortier to march upon Salamanca with the fifth corps, and, at the same time, reinforced Heudelet's division with Merle's; the latter's place, at Zamora, being supplied by a division of the sixth corps, the remainder of which continued on the Escla, fronting the Tras os Montes. Thus, not less than fifty thousand men were at or close to Salamanca, with their cavalry-posts pointing to the passes of Baños, on the very day that sir Arthur Wellesley crossed the Tietar to effect his junction with Cuesta. Yet, neither through the duke del Parque, nor Beresford, nor the guerillas, nor the peasantry, did intelligence of this formidable fact reach him!

Having put the three corps in motion, Soult despatched general Foy to Madrid, with information of sir Arthur's march, and to arrange the future combinations of the two armies. "*It is probable,*" he said, *that the concentration of my army at Salamanca will oblige the English general to change his plan; but, if he shall already have advanced on the road to Madrid, we should assemble all our forces, both on the Tagus and on this side, fall upon him altogether, and crush him. Thus, his campaign will be finished, and our operations may go on with advantage.* Foy arrived, the 22d, at Madrid; and, a few hours afterwards, intelligence reached the king that the allies were at Talavera, in front of the first corps, and that sir Robert Wilson (whose strength was much exaggerated) was at Escalona. The die was now cast, Joseph directed Soult to march immediately upon Plasencia; then, leaving general Belliard, with only three thousand men, in the Retiro, set out himself, with his guards and reserve, by the road of Mostoles, to join Victor at Talavera. The 23d, being at Naval-Carneiro, he received notice that the first corps would retreat that night to Torrijos, and, in two days, would be behind the Guadarama river; whereupon, turning to the left, Joseph descended the Guadarama to Vargas, and effected his junction with the duke of Belluno on the 25th.

During this time, Sebastiani, who had been watching Venegas near Danyel, deceived that general, and, returning to Toledo by forced marches, left three thousand men there, with the design of obliging him to cross the Tagus, at Aranjues. With the remainder of the fourth corps Sebastiani joined the king, and thus nearly fifty thousand fighting men and ninety pieces of artillery were concentrated, on the morning of the 26th, behind the Guadarama, and within a few miles of Cuesta's advanced guard. But, on the side of the allies, the main body of the Spaniards was at St. Ollalla: Sherbrooke with two divisions and the cavalry, at Casalegas, and the rest of the English in Talavera. So that, while the French were concentrated and in full march to attack, the allies were separated in four nearly equal and unconnected parts, of which three were enclosed, as it were, in a net, between the Alberche and the Tagus! On such an occasion Napoleon would have been swift and deadly.

In retiring upon Toledo, instead of Madrid, the duke of Belluno shewed himself an able commander. Toledo was the strategic pivot upon which every movement turned; it was the central point, by holding which the army of Venegas was separated from the allies on the Alberche. If the latter advanced, Soult's operations rendered every forward step a stride towards ruin; if, leaving Venegas to his fate, they retired, it must be rapidly, or there would be neither wisdom nor safety in the measure. The king knew that Foy would reach Soult the 24th, and as that marshal had already assembled his army about Salamanca, which was only four days' march from Plasencia, he might be in the valley of the Tagus by the 30th; hence, to insure complete success, the royal army needed only to keep the allies in check for four or five days. This was the plan that Soult had recommended, that the king promised to follow, and that marshal Jourdan strenuously supported. The unskilful proceedings of Cuesta and Venegas, the preparation of the allies, the distressed state of the English army, actually on the verge of famine, (a circumstance that could hardly be unknown to Victor,) greatly facilitated the execution of this project, which did not preclude the king from punishing the folly of the Spanish general, whose army, scattered and without order, discipline, or plan, so strongly invited an attack.

I have said that Cuesta was following a tiger: he had some faint perception of his danger on the 25th, and he gave orders to retreat on the 26th; but the

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

French, suddenly passing the Guadarama, at two o'clock in the morning of that day, quickly drove the Spanish cavalry out of Torrijos, and pursued them to Alcabon; where general Zayas had drawn up four thousand infantry, two thousand horsemen, and eight guns, on a plain, and now offered battle.

COMBAT OF ALCABON.

The Spanish right rested on the road of Domingo Perez, and the left on the chapel of the same name. The French cavalry, under Latour Maubourg, advanced in a parallel line against the position and a cannonade commenced; but at that moment, the head of the French infantry appeared in sight, the Spaniards broke, and fled in disorder towards St. Ollalla, followed, at full gallop, by the horsemen, who pressed them so sorely that the panic would, doubtless, have spread through the whole army, but for the courage of Albuquerque, who coming up with a division of three thousand fresh cavalry, held the enemy in play, while Cuesta retreated, in the greatest disorder, towards the Alberche.

After reaching St. Ollalla, the French slackened their efforts; the main body halted there, the advanced guards, save a few cavalry-posts, did not pass El Bravo, and no attempt was made to profit from the unconnected position of the allies—a gross and palpable error; for, either by the sword or dispersion, the Spaniards lost, on that day, not less than four thousand men, and such was their fear and haste that it required but a little more perseverance in the pursuit to cause a general rout. Albuquerque, alone, shewed any front; but his efforts were unavailing, and the disorder continued to increase until general Sherbrooke marching out of Cazalegas, placed his divisions between the scared troops and the enemy. Still the danger was imminent; there was no concert between the commanders, the ground on the left of the Alberche was unfavourable to a retiring party, and, as yet, no position upon which the combined forces could retire had been agreed upon! What, then, would have been the consequence if the whole French army had borne down, compact and strong, into the midst of the disordered masses?

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who, at the first alarm, had hastened to the front, seeing the confusion beyond the Alberche, knew that a battle was at hand, and, being persuaded that in a strong defensive position only could the Spaniards be brought to stand a shock, earnestly endeavoured to persuade Cuesta, while Sherbrooke's people could yet cover the movement, to withdraw to Talavera, where there was ground suited for defence; but Cuesta's uncouth nature again broke forth; his people were beaten, dispirited, fatigued, bewildered, clustering on a narrow slip of low, flat land, between the Alberche, the Tagus, and the heights of Salinas, and the first shot fired by the enemy must have been the signal of defeat; yet it was in vain that sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out those things, and entreated of him to avoid the fall of the rock that trembled over his head; he replied, that his troops would be disheartened by any further retreat, and that he would fight where he stood: in this mood he passed the night.

The 27th, at day-light, the British general renewed his solicitations, at first, fruitlessly, but when the enemy's cavalry came in sight, and Sherbrooke prepared to retire, Cuesta sullenly yielded, yet, turning to his staff with frantic pride, observed that "*He had first made the Englishman go down on his knees.*" Sir Arthur Wellesley, by virtue of his genius, now assumed the direction of both armies. General Mackenzie's division and a brigade of light cavalry were left on the Alberche, to cover the retrograde movement, and the rest of the allied troops was soon in full march for the

position, which was about six miles in the rear. Sir Robert Wilson, who had reached Naval Carneiro on the 25th, and opened a communication with Madrid, and who would certainly have entered that capital but for the approaching battle, was also recalled. He returned, on the 28th, to Escalona, and hung on the enemy's rear, but did not attempt to join the army.

Between the Alberche and the town of Talavera, the country was flat, and covered with olives and cork-trees; but nearly parallel to the Tagus, and at a distance of about two or three miles, a chain of round steep hills bounded the woody plain. Beyond these hills, and separated from them, by a deep and rugged valley, something less than half a mile wide, was the mountain-ridge, which divides the bed of the Alberche from that of the Tietar. Hence, a line drawn perpendicularly from the Tagus would cross the first chain of hills at the distance of two miles, and at two miles and a half would fall on the mountains.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, taking the town of Talavera, which was built close to the river, as his fixed point, placed the right of the Spaniards there, drawing their army up in two lines, with the left resting upon a mound, where a large field-redoubt was constructed, and behind which a brigade of British light cavalry was posted; all this front was covered by a convent, by ditches, mud walls, breast-works, and felled trees. The cavalry was posted behind the infantry; and the rear was supported by a large house in the wood, well placed, in case of defeat, to cover a retreat on to the main roads leading from Talavera to Arzobispo and Oropesa. In this position they could not be attacked seriously, nor their disposition be even seen, and thus, one-half of the line necessary to be occupied by the allies was rendered nearly impregnable, and yet held by the worst troops.

The front of battle was prolonged by the British infantry. Campbell's division, formed in two lines, touched the Spanish left, and Sherbrooke's division stood next to Campbell's, but arranged on one line only, because Mackenzie's division, destined to form the second line, was then near the Alberche. It was intended that Hill's division should close the left of the British, by taking post on the highest hill, in the chain before mentioned, as bounding the flat and woody country; but, from some cause unknown, the summit of this height was not immediately occupied.

The whole line thus displayed was two miles in length, the left resting on the valley between the round hills and the mountain, and the front covered by a water-course, which, commencing about the centre of the line, opened deeply as it passed the left and became a wide chasm in the valley. Part of the British cavalry was with general Mackenzie, part in the plain beyond the left, and part behind the great redoubt, at the junction of the allied troops. The British and Germans under arms that day were somewhat above nineteen thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty guns. The Spaniards, after their previous defeat, could only produce from thirty-three to thirty-four thousand men, but they had seventy guns. The combined army, therefore, offered battle with forty-four thousand infantry, nearly ten thousand cavalry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; the French came on with eighty guns, and, including the king's guards, nearly fifty thousand men, of which seven thousand were cavalry. But what a difference in the quality of the troops! The French were all hardy veterans, while the genuine soldiers of the allied army did not exceed nineteen thousand.

The king passed the night of the 26th at St. Ollalla, but put his troops in motion before day-light, on the 27th. Latour Maubourg, with the cavalry, preceded the column, and the first and fourth corps, the royal guards, and reserve, followed in succession. The appearance of the leading squadrons, near Cazalegas,

hastened, as we have seen, Cuesta's decision, and, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the first corps reached the heights of Salinas, from whence the dust of the allies, as they took up their position, could be perceived; but neither their situation nor disposition could be made out, on account of the forest, which, clothing the country from the Tagus nearly to the foot of the first range of hills, masked all their evolutions. The duke of Belluno, however, being well acquainted with the ground, instantly guessed their true position, and, in pursuance of his advice, the king directed the fourth corps against the left of the allies, the cavalry against the centre, and Victor himself, with the first corps, against the right: the guards and the reserve supported the fourth corps.*

Two good routes, suitable to artillery, led from the Alberche to the position. The one, being the royal road to Talavera, was taken by the fourth corps and the reserve; the other, passing through a place called the *Casa des Salinas*, led directly upon sir Arthur Wellesley's extreme left, and was taken by the first corps: but to reach this Casa, which was situated near the plain in front of the British left wing, it was necessary to ford the Alberche, and to march for a mile or two through the woods. A dust, which was observed to rise near the Casa itself, indicated the presence of troops at that place, and, in fact, general Mackenzie's division, and a brigade of light cavalry, were there posted, the infantry in the forest, the cavalry on the plain: yet no patrols had been sent to the front, and this negligence gave rise to the

COMBAT OF SALINAS.

About three o'clock, Lapisse and Ruffin's division having crossed the Alberche, marched in two columns towards the *Casa de Salinas*, and their light infantry came so suddenly on the British outposts that the latter were surprised, and sir Arthur Wellesley, who was in the *Casa*, nearly fell into the enemy's hands. The French columns followed briskly, and charged so hotly, that the English brigades were separated, and being composed principally of young battalions, got into confusion, one part fired upon another, and the whole were driven into the plain. But, in the midst of this disorder, the forty-fifth, a stubborn old regiment, and some companies of the fifth battalion of the sixtieth, were seen in perfect array, and when sir Arthur rode up to the spot, the fight was restored, and maintained so steadily, that the enemy was checked. The infantry, supported by two brigades of cavalry, then crossed the plain, and regained the left and centre of the position, having lost about four hundred men. General Mackenzie, with one brigade, immediately took post in second line behind the guards; the other was commanded by colonel Donkin, who finding the hill on the left unoccupied, drew up there without orders, and so accidentally completed the position. The cavalry was formed in column behind the left of the line.

Victor, animated by the success of this first operation, brought up Villatte's division, together with all the artillery and light cavalry, to the *Casa de Salinas*, and then, issuing from the forest, rapidly crossed the plain, advancing, with a fine military display, close up to the left of the position, where he seized an isolated hill, directly in front of colonel Donkin's ground, and immediately opened a heavy cannonade upon that officer's brigade. Meanwhile, the fourth corps and the reserve, approaching the right more slowly, and being unable to discover the true situation of Cuesta's troops, sent their light cavalry forward to make that general shew his lines. As the French horsemen rode boldly up to the front, and commenced skirmishing with their pistols, the Spaniards made a general discharge of small arms, and then, as if deprived of all sense, ten

thousand infantry, and all the artillery, breaking their ranks, fled to the rear: the artillery-men carried off their horses, the infantry threw away their arms, the adjutant-general O'Donoghue was amongst the foremost of the fugitives, and even Cuesta himself was in movement towards the rear. The panic spread, and the French would fain have charged home, but sir Arthur Wellesley, who was at hand, immediately flanked the main road with some English squadrons, and the ditches on the other side rendered the country impracticable; the fire of musketry was then renewed by those Spaniards who remained, the enemy lost some men, and finally retreated in disorder.

The greatest part of Cuesta's runaways fled as far as Oropesa, giving out, that the allies were totally defeated and the French army in hot pursuit; thus, the rear became a scene of incredible disorder; the commissaries went off with their animals, the paymasters carried away their money chests, the baggage was scattered, and the alarm spread far and wide; nor is it to be concealed, that some English officers disgraced their uniform on this occasion. Cuesta, however, having recovered from his first alarm, sent many of his cavalry regiments to head the fugitives and drive them back, and a part of the artillery, and some thousands of the infantry were thus recovered during the night; but, in the next day's fight, the Spanish army was less by six thousand men than it should have been, and the great redoubt in the centre was silent for want of guns.

COMBAT ON THE EVENING OF THE 27TH.

The hill on the left of the British army was the key of the whole position. It was steep and rugged on the side towards the French, and it was rendered more inaccessible by the ravine at the bottom, but towards the English side it was of a smoother ascent. Victor, however, observing that the extreme summit was unoccupied and that Donkin's brigade was feeble, conceived the design of seizing it by a sudden assault.* The sun was sinking, and the twilight and the confusion among the Spaniards on the right, appeared so favourable to his project, that, without communicating with the king, he immediately directed Ruffin's division to attack, Villatte to follow in support, and Lapisse to fall on the German legion, so as to create a diversion for Ruffin, but without engaging seriously himself. Although the assault was quick and vigorous, colonel Donkin beat back the enemy in his front, but his force was too weak to defend every part, and many of the French turning his left, mounted to the summit behind him. At this moment, general Hill was ordered to reinforce him, and it was not yet dark, when that officer, while giving orders to the colonel of the 48th regiment, was shot at by some troops from the highest point; thinking they were stragglers from his own ranks, firing at the enemy, he rode up to them, followed by his brigade-major, Fordyce, and in a moment found himself in the midst of the French. Fordyce was killed, and Hill's horse was wounded by a grenadier, who immediately seized the bridle; but the general, spurring the animal hard, broke the man's hold, and galloping down the descent met the 29th regiment, and, without an instant's delay, led them up with such a fierce charge, that the enemy could not sustain the shock.

The summit being thus recovered, the 48th regiment and the first battalion of detachments were immediately brought forward, and, in conjunction with the 29th and colonel Donkin's brigade, presented a formidable front of defence, and in good time; for the troops thus beaten back were only that part of the 9th French regiment, which formed the advance of Ruffin's division; the two other regiments of that division had lost their way in the ravine, and hence the attack had not ceased, but only subsided for a time. Lapisse also was in

* Semel's Journal of Operations, MSS.

* Semel's Journal of Operations, MSS.

motion, and soon after opened his fire against the German legion, and all the battalions of the 9th, being reformed in one mass, again advanced up the face of the hill with redoubled vigour. The fighting then became vehement, and, in the darkness, the opposing flashes of the musketry shewed with what a resolute spirit the struggle was maintained; the combatants were scarcely twenty yards asunder, and for a time the event seemed doubtful; but soon the well known shout of the British soldier was heard, rising above the din of arms, and the enemy's broken troops were driven once more into the ravine below: Lapisse, who had made some impression on the German legion, immediately abandoned his false attack, and the fighting of the 27th ceased. The British lost about eight hundred men, and the French about a thousand on that day.

The bivouac fires now blazed up on both sides, and the French and British soldiers were quiet; but, about twelve o'clock, the Spaniards on the right being alarmed at some horse in their front, opened a prodigious peal of musketry and artillery, which continued for twenty minutes without any object; and during the remainder of the night, the whole line was frequently disturbed by desultory firing from the allied troops, by which several men and officers were unfortunately slain. The duke of Belluno, who had learned, from the prisoners, the exact position of the Spaniards, until then unknown to the French generals, now reported his own failure to the king, and proposed that a second attempt should be made in the morning, at daylight; marshal Jourdan opposed this, as being a partial enterprize, which could not lead to any great result; yet Victor was so earnest for a trial, and, resting his representation on his intimate knowledge of the ground, pressed the matter so home, that he won Joseph's assent, and immediately made dispositions for the attack.

The guns of the first corps, being formed in one mass, on the height corresponding to that on which the English left was posted, were enabled to command the great valley on their own right, to range the summit of the hill in their front, and obliquely to search the whole of the British line to the left, as far as the great redoubt between the allied armies.

Ruffin's division was placed in advance, and Villatte's in rear, of the artillery; but the former kept one regiment close to the ravine.

Lapisse occupied some low table-land, opposite to Sherbrooke's division.

Latour Maubourg's cavalry formed a reserve to Lapisse; and general Beaumont's cavalry formed a reserve to Ruffin.

On the English side, general Hill's division was concentrated; the cavalry was massed behind the left; the parc of artillery and hospitals established under cover of the hill, between the cavalry and Hill's division.

COMBAT ON THE MORNING OF THE 28TH.

About daybreak, Ruffin's troops were drawn up, two regiments abreast, supported by a third, in columns of battalions, and, in this order, went forth against the left of the British; a part moving directly against the front, and a part by the valley on the right, thus embracing two sides of the hill. Their march was rapid and steady, they were followed by Villatte's division, and their assault was preceded by a burst of artillery, that rattled round the height, and swept away the English ranks by whole sections. The sharp chattering of the musketry succeeded, the French guns were then pointed towards the British centre and right, the grenadiers instantly closed upon general Hill's division, and the height sparkled with fire. The inequalities of the ground broke the compact formation of the troops on both sides, and small bodies were seen here and there struggling for the mastery with all the virulence of a single combat; in some places the French grena-

diers were overthrown at once, in others they would not be denied, and reached the summit, but the reserves were always ready to vindicate their ground, and no permanent footing was obtained. Still the conflict was maintained with singular obstinacy; Hill himself was wounded, and his men were falling fast, yet the enemy suffered more, and gave back, step by step at first, and slowly, to cover the retreat of their wounded, but, finally, unable to sustain the increasing fury of the English, and having lost above fifteen hundred men in the space of forty minutes, the whole mass broke away in disorder, and returned to their own position, covered by the renewed play of their powerful artillery.

To this destructive fire no adequate answer could be made, for the English guns were few, and of small calibre, and when sir Arthur Wellesley desired a reinforcement from Cuesta, the latter sent him only two pieces; yet even those were serviceable, and the Spanish gunners fought them gallantly. The principal line of the enemy's retreat was by the great valley, and a favourable opportunity for a charge of horse occurred, but unfortunately the English cavalry, having retired, during the night, for water and forage, were yet too distant to be of service. However, these repeated efforts of the French against the hill, and the appearance of some of their light troops on the mountain, beyond the left, taught the English general that he had committed a fault in not prolonging his flank across the valley, and he hastened to rectify it. For this purpose, he brought up the principal mass of his cavalry behind his left, with the leading squadrons looking into the valley, and having obtained, from Cuesta, general Bassecour's division of infantry, posted it on the mountain itself, in observation of the French light troops. Meanwhile, the duke of Albuquerque, discontented with Cuesta's arrangements, came, with his division, to sir Arthur Wellesley, who placed him behind the British, thus displaying a formidable array of horsemen, six lines in depth.

Immediately after the failure of Ruffin's attack, king Joseph, having in person examined the whole position of the allies, from left to right, demanded of Jourdan and Victor if he should deliver a general battle. The former replied that the great valley and the mountain being unoccupied, on the 27th, sir Arthur Wellesley's attention should have been drawn to the right by a feint on the Spaniards;* that, during the night, the whole army should have been silently placed in column, at the entrance of the great valley, ready, at daybreak, to form a line of battle, to the left, on a new front, and so have attacked the hill from whence Victor had been twice repulsed. Such a movement, he said, would have obliged the allies to change their front also, and, during this operation, they might have been assailed with hopes of success. But this project could not now be executed; the English, aware of their mistake, had secured their left flank, by occupying the valley, and the mountain and their front were alike inattackable. *"Hence, the only prudent line was to take up a position on the Alberche, and await the effect of Soult's operations on the English rear."*

Marshal Victor opposed this counsel; he engaged to carry the hill on the English left, notwithstanding his former failures, provided the fourth corps would attack the right and centre at the same moment; and he finished his argument by declaring that, if such a combination failed, *"It was time to renounce making war."*

The king was embarrassed. His own opinion coincided with Jourdan's; but he feared that Victor would cause the emperor to believe a great opportunity had been lost; and, while thus wavering, a despatch arrived from Soult, by which it appeared that his force could only reach Plasencia between the 2d and 5th

* Letter from Marshal Jourdan, MSS.

of August. Now, a detachment from the army of Venegas had already appeared near Toledo, that general's advanced guard was approaching Aranjuez; and the king was much troubled by the danger thus threatening Madrid, because all the stores, the reserve artillery, and the general hospitals of the whole army in Spain were deposited there; and, moreover, the tolls received at the gates of that town formed almost the only pecuniary resource of his court; so narrowly did Napoleon reduce the expenditure of the war. These considerations overpowered his judgment; adopting the worse and rejecting the better counsel, he resolved to succour the capital, but, before separating the army, determined to try the chance of a battle. Indecision is a cancer in war: Joseph should have adhered to the plan arranged with Soult; the advantages were obvious, the ultimate success sure, and the loss of Madrid was nothing in the scale, because it could only be temporary; but, if the king thought otherwise, he should have decided to fight for it before; that is, he should have drawn the fifth corps to him, prepared his plan, and fallen, with the utmost rapidity, upon Cuesta, the 26th; his advanced guard should have been on the Alberche that evening, and, before 12 o'clock on the 27th, the English army would have been without the aid of a single Spanish soldier. But, after neglecting the most favourable opportunity, when his army was full of ardour, he now, with singular inconsistency, resolved to give battle, when his enemies were completely prepared, strongly posted, and in the pride of success, and when the confidence of his own troops was shaken by the partial action of the morning.

While the French generals were engaged in council, the men on both sides took some rest, and the English wounded were carried to the rear; but the soldiers were suffering from hunger; the regular service of provisions had ceased for several days, and a few ounces of wheat, in the grain, formed the whole subsistence of men who had fought, and who were yet to fight, so hardly. The Spanish camp was full of confusion and distrust. Cuesta inspired terror, but no confidence, and Albuquerque, whether from conviction or instigated by momentary anger, just as the French were coming on to the final attack, sent one of his staff to inform the English commander that Cuesta was betraying him. The aid-de-camp, charged with this message, delivered it to colonel Donkin, and that officer carried it to sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter, seated on the summit of the hill which had been so gallantly contested, was intently watching the movements of the advancing enemy; he listened to this somewhat startling message without so much as turning his head, and then drily answering—“*Very well, you may return to your brigade,*” continued his survey of the French. Donkin retired, filled with admiration of the imperturbable resolution and quick penetration of the man; and, indeed, sir Arthur's conduct was, throughout that day, such as became a general upon whose vigilance and intrepidity the fate of fifty thousand men depended.

BATTLE OF TALAVERA.

The dispositions of the French were soon completed. Ruffin's division, on the extreme right, was destined to cross the valley, and, moving by the foot of the mountain, to turn the British left.

Villatte's orders were to menace the contested height with one brigade, and to guard the valley with another, which, being strengthened by a battalion of grenadiers, connected Ruffin's movement with the main attack.

Lapisse, supported by Latour Maubourg's dragoons, and by the king's reserve, was instructed to pass the ravine in front of the English centre, and to fall, with half his infantry, upon Sherbrooke's division, while the other half, connecting its attack with Villatte's brigade,

mounted the hill, and made a third effort to master that important point.

Milhaud's dragoons were left on the main road, opposite Talavera, to keep the Spaniards in check; but the rest of the heavy cavalry was brought into the centre, behind general Sebastiani, who, with the fourth corps, was to assail the right of the British army. A part of the French light cavalry supported Villatte's brigade in the valley, and a part remained in reserve.

A number of guns were distributed among the divisions, but the principal mass remained on the hill, with the reserve of light cavalry; where, also, the duke of Belluno stationed himself, to direct the movements of the first corps.

From nine o'clock in the morning until mid-day, the field of battle offered no appearance of hostility; the weather was intensely hot, and the troops, on both sides, descended and mingled, without fear or suspicion, to quench their thirst at the little brook which divided the positions; but, at one o'clock in the afternoon, the French soldiers were seen to gather round their eagles, and the rolling of drums was heard along the whole line. Half an hour later, the king's guards, the reserve, and the fourth corps were descried, near the centre of the king's position, marching to join the first corps; and, at two o'clock, the table-land and the height on the French right, even to the valley, were covered with the dark and lowering masses. At this moment some hundreds of English soldiers, employed to carry the wounded to the rear, returned in one body, and were, by the French, supposed to be sir Robert Wilson's corps joining the army; nevertheless, the duke of Belluno, whose arrangements were now completed, gave the signal for battle, and eighty pieces of artillery immediately sent a tempest of bullets before the light troops, who, coming on with the swiftness and violence of a hail-storm, were closely followed by the broad, black columns, in all the majesty of war.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, from the summit of the hill, had a clear view of the whole field of battle; and first he saw the fourth corps rushing forwards, with the usual impetuosity of French soldiers, clearing the intersected ground in their front, and falling upon Campbell's division with infinite fury; but that general, assisted by Mackenzie's brigade, and by two Spanish battalions, withstood their utmost efforts. The English regiments, putting the French skirmishers aside, met the advancing columns with loud shouts, and, breaking in on their front, and lapping their flanks with fire, and giving no respite, pushed them back with a terrible carnage. Ten guns were taken, but as Campbell prudently resolved not to break his line by a pursuit, the French instantly rallied on their supports, and made head for another attack; then the British artillery and musketry played vehemently upon their masses, a Spanish cavalry regiment charged their flank, and they retired in disorder: thus the victory was secured in that quarter.

But, while this was passing on the right, Villatte's division, preceded by the grenadiers, and supported by two regiments of light cavalry, was seen advancing up the great valley against the left, and, beyond Villatte, Ruffin was discovered marching towards the mountain. Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately ordered Anson's brigade of cavalry, composed of the twenty-third light dragoons and the first German hussars, to charge the head of these columns; these regiments, coming on at a canter, and increasing their speed as they advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but, in a few moments, came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at a distance. The French, throwing themselves into squares, opened their fire; and colonel Arentschild, commanding the hussars, an officer whom forty years' experience had made a master in his art, promptly reined up at the brink, exclaiming,

in his broken phrase, "*I will not kill my young mens !*" But in front of the twenty-third, the chasm was more practicable, the English blood hot, and the regiment plunged down without a check; men and horses rolling over each other in dreadful confusion; the survivors still untamed, mounted the opposite bank by two's and three's, and colonel Seymour being severely wounded, major Frederick Ponsonby, a hardy soldier, rallied all who came up, and passing through the midst of Villatte's columns, which poured in a fire from each side, fell with inexpressible violence upon a brigade of French *chasseurs* in the rear. The combat was fierce but short; Victor had perceived the first advance of the English, and detached his Polish lancers, and Westphalian light-horse, to the support of Villatte; and these fresh troops coming up when the twenty-third, already overmatched, could scarcely hold up against the *chasseurs*, entirely broke them. Those who were not killed or taken, made for Bassecour's Spanish division, and so escaped, leaving behind two hundred and seven men and officers, or about half the number that went into action.

During this time the hill, the key of the position, was again attacked, and Lapisse, crossing the ravine, pressed hard upon the English centre; his own artillery, aided by the great battery on his right, opened large gaps in Sherbrooke's ranks, and the French columns came close up to the British line in the resolution to win; but they were received with a general discharge of all arms, and so vigorously encountered, that they gave back in disorder. Under the excitement of the moment, the brigade of English guards, quitting the line, followed up their success with inconsiderate ardour, when the enemy's supporting columns, and their dragoons advanced, the men who had been repulsed turned again, and the heavy French batteries pounded the flank and front of the guards.

Thus maltreated, the latter drew back, and, at the same time, the German legion, being sorely pressed, got into confusion. At this moment, although Hill's and Campbell's divisions, on the extremities of the line, held fast, the centre of the British was absolutely broken, and the fortune of the day seemed to incline in favour of the French, when, suddenly, colonel Donellan with the forty-eighth regiment, was seen advancing through the midst of the disordered masses. At first, it seemed as if this regiment must be carried away by the retiring crowds, but, wheeling back by companies, it let them pass through the intervals, and then, resuming its proud and beautiful line, marched against the right of the pursuing columns, and plied them with such a destructive musketry, and closed upon them with such a firm and regular pace, that the forward movement of the French was checked. The guards and the Germans immediately rallied, a brigade of light cavalry came up from the second line at a trot, the artillery battered the enemy's flanks without intermission, the French wavered, lost their advantage, and the battle was restored.

In all actions there is one critical and decisive moment which will give the victory to the general who knows how to seize it. When the guards first made their rash charge, sir Arthur Wellesley, foreseeing the issue of it, had ordered the forty-eighth down from the hill, although a rough battle was going on there, and, at the same time, he directed Cotton's light cavalry to advance. These dispositions gained the day. The French relaxed their efforts by degrees, the fire of the English grew hotter, and their loud and confident shouts—sure augury of success—were heard along the whole line.

In the hands of a great general, Joseph's guards and the reserve, which were yet entire, might have restored the combat, but all combination was at an end on the French side; the fourth corps, beaten back on the

left with the loss of ten guns, was in confusion; the troops in the great valley on the right, amazed at the furious charge of the twenty-third, and awed by the sight of four distinct lines of cavalry, still in reserve, remained stationary; no impression had been made on the hill; Lapisse was mortally wounded, his division gave way, and the whole army finally retired to the position from whence it had descended to the attack. This retrograde movement was covered by skirmishers and an increasing fire of artillery, and the British, exhausted by toil and want of food, and reduced to less than fourteen thousand sabres and bayonets, could not pursue. The Spanish army was incapable of any evolution, and about six o'clock all hostility ceased, each army holding the position of the morning. But the battle was scarcely over when, the dry grass and shrubs taking fire, a volume of flames passed with inconceivable rapidity across a part of the field, scorching, in its course, both the dead and the wounded.

On the British side, two generals (Mackenzie and Langworth), thirty-one officers of inferior rank, and seven hundred and sixty-seven serjeants and soldiers were killed upon the spot; three generals, a hundred and ninety-two officers, three thousand seven hundred and eighteen serjeants and privates wounded. Nine officers, six hundred and forty-three serjeants and soldiers were missing; thus making a total loss of six thousand two hundred and sixty-eight, in the two days' fighting, of which five thousand four hundred and twenty-two fell on the 28th.

The French suffered more severely; nine hundred and forty-four, including two generals, were killed!* six thousand two hundred and ninety-four wounded, one hundred and fifty-six prisoners, furnished a total of seven thousand three hundred and eighty-nine men and officers, of which four thousand were of Victor's corps, ten guns were taken by general Campbell's division, and seven were left in the woods by the French.†

The Spaniards returned above twelve hundred men, killed and wounded, but the correctness of the report was very much doubted at the time.

The 29th, at day-break, the French army quitted its position, and, before six o'clock, was in order of battle on the heights of Salinas, behind the Alberche. That day, also, general Robert Craufurd reached the English camp, with the forty-third, fifty-second, and ninety-fifth regiments, and immediately took charge of the outposts. These troops, after a march of twenty miles, were in *bivouac* near Malpartida de Plasencia, when the alarm caused by the Spanish fugitives spread to that part. Craufurd, fearing that the army was pressed, allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then, withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the field of battle. As the brigade advanced, crowds of the runaways were met with, and although not all Spaniards, all propagating the vilest falsehoods: "*the army was defeated*,"—"Sir Arthur Wellesley was killed,"—"the French were only a few miles distant;" nay, some, blinded by their fears, affected even to point out the enemy's advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indignant at this shameful scene the troops hastened, rather than slackened, the impetuosity of their pace, and leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body; having in that time, passed over sixty-two English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have spared his sneer about the "delicacy of modern soldiers!"

* Marshal Jourdan, MSS.

† Semel's Journal of Operations of the First Corps, MSS.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The moral courage evinced by sir Arthur Wellesley, when, with such a coadjutor as Cuesta, he accepted battle, was not less remarkable than the judicious disposition which, finally, rendered him master of the field. Yet it is doubtful if he could have maintained his position had the French been well managed, and their strength reserved for the proper moment, instead of being wasted on isolated attacks during the night of the 27th, and the morning of the 28th.

A pitched battle is a great affair. A good general must bring all the moral, as well as the physical, force of his army into play at the same time if he means to win, and all may be too little. Marshal Jourdan's project was conceived in this spirit, and worthy of his reputation; and it is possible, that he might have placed his army, unperceived, on the flank of the English, and then by a sudden and general attack have carried the key of his position, thus commencing his battle well: but sir Arthur Wellesley's resources would not then have been exhausted. He had foreseen such an occurrence, and was prepared, by a change of front, to keep the enemy in check with his left wing and cavalry; while the right, marching upon the position abandoned by the French, should cut the latter off from the Alberche. In this movement the allies would have been reinforced by Wilson's corps, which was near Cazalegas, and the contending armies would then have exchanged lines of operation. The French could, however, have gained nothing, unless they won a complete victory, while the allies would, even though defeated, have ensured their junction with Venegas. Madrid and Toledo would thus have fallen to them, and before Soult could unite with Joseph, a new line of operations, through the fertile country of La Mancha, might have been obtained. But these matters are only speculative.

2. The distribution of the French troops for the great attack cannot be praised. The attempt to turn the English left with a single division was puerile. The allied cavalry was plainly to be seen in the valley; how, then, could a single division hope to develop its attack upon the hill, when five thousand horsemen were hanging upon its flank? and, in fact, the whole of Ruffin's, and the half of Villatte's division, were paralyzed by the charge of a single regiment. To have rendered this movement formidable, the principal part of the French cavalry should have preceded the march of the infantry; but the great error was fighting at all before Soult reached Plasencia.

3. It has been said, that to complete the victory sir Arthur Wellesley should have caused the Spaniards to advance; this would, more probably, have led to a defeat. Neither Cuesta, nor his troops, were capable of an orderly movement. The infantry of the first and the fourth corps were still above twenty thousand strong, and, although a repulsed, by no means a discomfited force; the cavalry, the king's guards, and Dessolle's division, had not been engaged at all, and were alone sufficient to beat the Spaniards; a second panic, such as that of the 27th, would have led to the most deplorable consequences, as those, who know with what facility French soldiers recover from a repulse, will readily acknowledge.

The battle of Talavera was one of hard honest fighting, and the exceeding gallantry of the troops honoured the nations to which they belonged. The English owed much to the general's dispositions and something to fortune. The French owed nothing to their commander; but when it is considered that only the reserve of their infantry were withheld from the great attack on the 28th, and that, consequently, above thirty thousand men were closely and unsuccessfully engaged for three hours with sixteen thousand British, it must be confessed that the latter proved themselves to be truly

formidable soldiers; yet the greatest part were raw men, so lately drafted from the militia regiments that many of them still bore the number of their former regiments on their accoutrements.

CHAPTER VII.

The king goes to Illescas with the fourth corps and reserve—Sir R. Wilson advances to Escalona—Victor retires to Maqueda—Conduct of the Spaniards at Talavera—Cuesta's cruelty—The allied generals hear of Soult's movement upon Banos—Bassecour's division marches towards that point—The pass of Banos forced—Sir A. Wellesley marches against Soult—Proceedings of that marshal—He crosses the Bejar, and arrives at Plasencia with three *corps d'armée*—Cuesta abandons the British hospitals, at Talavera, to the enemy, and retreats upon Oropesa—Dangerous position of the allies—Sir Arthur crosses the Tagus at Arzobispo—The French arrive near that bridge—Cuesta passes the Tagus—Combat of Arzobispo—Soult's plans overruled by the king—Ney defeats sir R. Wilson at Banos, and returns to France.

THE French rested the 29th at Salinas; but, in the night, the king marched with the 4th corps and the reserve to St. Ollalla, from whence he sent a division to relieve Toledo. The 31st, he halted. The 1st of August he marched to Illescas, a central position, from whence he could interpose between Venegas and the capital. The duke of Belluno, with the first corps, remained on the Alberche, having orders to fall upon the rear-guard of the allies, when the latter should be forced to retire, in consequence of Soult's operations. Meantime, sir Robert Wilson, who during the action was near Cazalegas, returned to Escalona, and Victor, displaying an unaccountable dread of this small body, which he supposed to be the precursor of the allied army, immediately retired, first to Maqueda, and then to Santa Cruz del Retamar; he was even proceeding to Mostoles, when a retrograde movement of the allies recalled him to the Alberche.

The British army was so weak, and had suffered so much, that the 29th and 30th were passed, by sir Arthur, in establishing his hospitals at Talavera, and in fruitless endeavours to procure provisions, and the necessary assistance to prevent the wounded men from perishing. Both Cuesta and the inhabitants of Talavera possessed the means, but would not render the slightest aid, nor would they even assist to bury the dead; the corn secreted in Talavera was sufficient to support the army for a month, yet the starving troops were kept in ignorance of it, although the inhabitants, who had fled across the Tagus with their portable effects at the beginning of the battle, had now returned. It is not surprising that, in such circumstances, men should endeavour to save their property, especially provisions; but the apathy with which they beheld, the wounded men dying for want of aid, and those who were sound, sinking from hunger, did in no wise answer Mr. Frere's description of them, as men who "*looked upon the war in the light of a crusade, and carried it on with all the enthusiasm of such a cause.*"

This conduct left an indelible impression on the minds of the English soldiers. From that period to the end of the war their contempt and dislike of the Spaniards were never effaced, and long afterwards, Badajoz and St. Sebastian suffered for the churlish behaviour of the people of Talavera. The principal motive of action with the Spaniards was always personal rancour: hence, those troops who had behaved so ill in action, and the inhabitants, who withheld alike their sympathy and their aid from the English soldiers to whose bravery they owed the existence of their town, were busily engaged after the battle, in beating out the brains of the wounded French as they lay upon the field; and they were only checked by the English soldiers, who, in some instances, fired upon the perpetra-

tors of this horrible iniquity. Cuesta also gave proofs of his ferocious character; he, who had shown himself alike devoid of talent and real patriotism, he whose indolence and ignorance of his profession had banished all order and discipline from his army, and whose stupid pride had all but caused its destruction, now assumed the Roman general, and proceeded to decimate the regiments that had fled in the panic on the 27th. Above fifty men he slew in this manner; and if his cruelty, so contrary to reason and the morals of the age, had not been mitigated by the earnest intercession of sir Arthur Wellesley, more men would have been destroyed in cold blood, by this savage old man, than had fallen in the battle.

Hitherto the allied generals had thought little of the duke of Dalmatia's movements, and their eyes were still fixed on Madrid; but, the 30th, information was received at Talavera, that twelve thousand rations had been ordered, for the 28th, at Fuente Dueña by that marshal, and twenty-four thousand at Los Santos, a town situated between Alba de Tormes and the pass of Baños.* Cuesta, conscious of the defenceless state of the latter post, suggested that sir Robert Wilson should be sent there; but sir Arthur Wellesley wished Wilson to remain at Escalona, to renew his intercourse with Madrid, and proposed that a Spanish corps should go: indeed, he still slighted the idea of danger from that quarter, and hoped that the result of the battle would suffice to check Soult's march. Cuesta rejected this proposal at the moment, and again, on the 31st, when sir Arthur renewed his application; but, on the 1st of August, it was known that Soult had entered Bejar; and, on the 2d, general Bassecour was detached by Cuesta to defend the Puerto de Baños, from which he was absent four long marches, while the enemy had been, on the 31st, within one march.

The day that Bassecour marched, intelligence arrived that Soult had entered Plasencia. Baños had been abandoned to the enemy without a shot; for the battalions from Bejar had dispersed, and those sent by Cuesta had been withdrawn to Almaraz by their general the marquis de la Reyna, who also proclaimed that he would destroy the boat-bridge at that place. This news roused Cuesta; he proposed that half the allied army should march to the rear, and attack Soult; sir Arthur Wellesley however refused to divide the English army, yet offered to go or stay with the whole; and, when the other desired him to choose, he answered that he would go, and Cuesta appeared satisfied.

On the night of the 2d August, letters were received from Wilson, announcing the appearance of the French near Nombella, whither he, unconscious of the effect produced by his presence at Escalona, had retreated with his infantry, sending his artillery to St. Roman, near Talavera. As sir Arthur Wellesley could not suppose that sir Robert Wilson's corps alone would cause the first corps to retire, he naturally concluded that Victor's design was to cross the Alberche at Escalona, crush Wilson, and operate a communication with Soult by the valley of the Tietar. As such a movement, if persisted in, would necessarily dislodge Cuesta from Talavera, sir Arthur, before he commenced his march, obtained the Spanish general's promise that he would collect cars, for the purpose of transporting as many of the English wounded as were in a condition to be moved, from Talavera, to some more suitable place. This promise, like all the others, was shamefully violated, but the British general had not yet learned the full extent of Cuesta's bad faith, and thinking that a few days would suffice to drive back Soult, marched, on the 3d of August, with seventeen thousand men, to Oropesa, intending to unite with Bassecour's division, and to fight Soult, whose force he estimated at fifteen thousand.

Meanwhile, Soult being, by the return of general Foy, on the 24th of July, assured of the king's concurrence in the combined movements to be executed, ordered Laborde, Merle, and La Houssaye to march from Zamora and Toro upon Salamanca and Ledesma, and to scour the banks of the Tormes.* The sixth corps was also directed upon the same place, and, the 25th, Soult repaired to Salamanca in person, intending to unite the three corps there. Hearing, however, of Victor's retrograde movement from the Alberche to the Guadarama, he desired marshal Mortier to march, on the 28th, to Plasencia, by Fuente Roble and Bejar, and he placed La Houssaye's and Lorge's dragoons under his command; the remainder of the second corps and the light cavalry were to follow when the sixth corps should be in motion. This done, Soult wrote to the king, saying, "*My urgent desire is that your majesty may not fight a general battle before you are certain of the concentration of all my forces near Plasencia. The most important results will be obtained if your majesty will abstain from attacking until the moment when a knowledge of my march causes the enemy to retrace his steps, which he must do, or he is lost.*"

The 29th, the fifth corps was at Fuente Roble; but information being received that Beresford, with an army, had reached Almeida on the 27th, the march was covered by strong detachments on the side of Ciudad Rodrigo. The long-expected convoy of artillery and ammunition for the second corps had, however, arrived in Salamanca the 29th; and Ney wrote, from Toro, that he also would be there the 31st.

The 30th, the fifth corps drove the marquis de la Reyna from the pass of Baños, and took post at Aldea Nueva del Camina and Herbas; and the second corps, quitting Salamanca, arrived, the same day, at Siete Carrera.

The 31st, the fifth corps entered Plasencia; the second corps reached Fuente la Casa, Fuente Roble, San Estevan, and Los Santos.

Plasencia was full of convalescents, detachments, and non-combatants, and when the French arrived, about two thousand men, including five hundred of the Lusitanian legion, evacuated the town, taking the road to Moraleja and Zarza Mayor; yet four hundred sick men, following the enemy's accounts, were captured, together with a few stores. During these rapid marches, the French were daily harassed by the Spanish peasantry, the villages were deserted, the cavalry wandered far and near to procure subsistence, and several slight skirmishes and some pillage took place.

The 1st of August, the second corps passed the Col de Baños, and the head of the column entered Plasencia, which was, like other places, deserted by the greatest part of the inhabitants. Vague reports that a battle had been fought between the 26th and 29th was the only intelligence that could be procured of the situation of the allies, and on the second, the advanced guard of the army marched to the Venta de Bazagona, while scouting parties were, at the same time, directed towards Coria, to acquire news of marshal Beresford, who was now said to be moving along the Portuguese frontier.

The 3d of August, the fifth corps and the dragoons, passing the Tietar, reached Toril, the outposts were pushed to Cazatejada and Sierra de Requemedá, but the second corps remained at Plasencia, awaiting the arrival of the sixth corps, the head of which was now at Baños. Hence, on the 3d of August, the king and Sebastiani being at Illescas and Valdemoro, Victor at Maqueda, Cuesta at Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley at Oropesa, and Soult on the Tietar, the narrow valley of the Tagus was crowded in its whole length by the contending troops.

The allies held the centre, being only one day's march

* Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

* S. Journal of Operations 2d corps, MS.

asunder, but their force, when concentrated, was not more than forty-seven thousand men. The French could not unite under three days, but their combined forces exceeded ninety thousand men, of which fifty-three thousand were under Soult. This singular situation was rendered more remarkable by the ignorance in which all parties were as to the strength and movements of their adversaries. Victor and the king, frightened by Wilson's partizan corps of four thousand men, were preparing to unite at Mostoles, while Cuesta, equally alarmed at Victor, was retiring from Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley was supposed, by Joseph, to be at the head of twenty-five thousand British; and the former, calculating on Soult's weakness, was marching, with twenty-three thousand Spanish and English, to engage fifty-three thousand French; while Soult, unable to ascertain the exact situation of either friends or enemies, little suspected that the prey was rushing into his jaws. At this moment the fate of the Peninsula hung by a thread, which could not bear the weight for twenty-four hours, yet fortune so ordained that no irreparable disaster ensued.

At five o'clock in the evening of the 3d, it was known at the English head-quarters that the French were near Naval Moral, and, consequently, between the allies and the bridge of Almaraz.

At six o'clock, letters from Cuesta advised sir Arthur, that the king was again advancing, and that, from intercepted despatches addressed to Soult, it appeared that the latter must be stronger than was supposed; wherefore Cuesta said, that wishing to aid the English, he would quit Talavera that evening: in other words, abandon the British hospitals!

To this unexpected communication sir Arthur replied that the king was still some marches off, and that Venegas should be directed to occupy him on the Upper Tagus; that Soult's strength was exceedingly overrated, and Victor's movements not decided enough to oblige the Spanish army to quit Talavera; wherefore he required that Cuesta should at least wait until the next morning, to cover the evacuation of the English hospitals. But, before this communication reached Cuesta, he was in full march, and, at day-break on the 4th, the Spanish army was descried moving, in several columns, down the valley towards Oropesa; Bassecour's division soon after joined it from Centinello, and, at the same time, the cavalry patrols found the French near Naval Moral.

Sir Arthur Wellesley having, by this time, seen the intercepted letters himself, became convinced that Soult's force was not overrated at thirty thousand; and the duke of Dalmatia, who had also intercepted some English letters, learned that, on the first of August, the allies were still at Talavera, and ill-informed of his march. Thus, the one general perceived his danger and the other his advantage at the same moment.

Mortier was immediately ordered, by the duke of Dalmatia, to take a position with the fifth corps at Cazatejada, to seize the boat-bridge at Almaraz, if it was not destroyed, and to patrol towards Arzobispo; the second corps was, likewise, directed upon the same place, and the head of the 6th entered Plasencia. The further progress of the allies was thus barred in front; the Tagus was on their left; impassable mountains on their right; and it was certain that Cuesta's retreat would immediately bring the king and Victor down upon their rear. The peril of this situation was apparent to every soldier in the British ranks, and produced a general inquietude. No man felt the slightest confidence in the Spaniards, and the recollection of the stern conflict at Talavera, aided by a sense of exhaustion from long abstinence, depressed the spirits of men and officers. The army was, indeed, ready to fight, but all persons felt that it must be for safety, not for glory.

In this trying moment, sir Arthur Wellesley abated nothing of his usual calmness and fortitude. He knew not indeed the full extent of the danger; but, assuming the enemy in his front to be thirty thousand men, and Victor to have twenty-five thousand others in his rear, he judged that to continue the offensive would be rash, because he must fight and beat those two marshals separately within three days, which, with starving and tired troops, inferior in number, was scarcely to be accomplished. To remain where he was, on the defensive, was equally unpromising; because the road from Talavera to Arzobispo led through Calera, in the rear of Oropesa, and thus Victor could intercept the only line of retreat; a battle must then be fought, in an unfavourable position, against the united forces of the enemy, estimated, as we have seen, to be above fifty thousand men. One resource remained: to pass the bridge of Arzobispo immediately, and take up a line of defence behind that river, before the French could seize the Col de Mirabete, and so cut off the road to Truxillo and Merida—a hard alternative; but the long-cherished error relative to Soult's weakness had dried up the springs of success, and left the campaign, like a withered stem, without fruit or foliage.

Cuesta doggedly opposed this project, asserting that Oropesa was a position suitable for a battle, and that he would fight there. Further concession to his humours would have been folly, and sir Arthur sternly declared that he would move forthwith, leaving the Spanish general to do that which should seem meet to him; and, assuredly, this decided conduct saved the Peninsula, for not fifty, but ninety thousand enemies were at hand.

It was now six o'clock in the morning, the baggage and ammunition were already in motion for the bridge of Arzobispo, but the army, which had been reinforced by a troop of horse-artillery, and some convalescents that escaped from Plasencia, remained in position for several hours, to cover the passage of stores and wounded men from Talavera, who had just arrived at Calera in the most pitiable condition. About noon, the road being clear, the columns marched to the bridge, and, at two o'clock, the whole army was in position at the other side, the immediate danger was averted, and the combinations of the enemy were baffled. During the passage, several herds of swine, which, following the custom of the country, had been feeding in the woods, under charge of the swineherds, were fallen in with, and the soldiers, instigated by hunger, broke their ranks, and ran in upon the animals as in a charge, shooting, stabbing, and, like men possessed, cutting off the flesh while the beasts were yet alive; nor can this conduct be much censured under the circumstances of the moment, although it was a severe misfortune to the poor peasants, whose property was thus destroyed.

From Arzobispo, the army moved towards Deleytoza, and general Craufurd's brigade, having six pieces of artillery attached, was directed to gain the bridge of Almaraz by a forced march, lest the enemy, discovering the ford below that place, should cross the river, and seize the Puerto de Mirabete. The roads were exceedingly rugged, and the guns could only be dragged up the Meza d'Ibor by the force of men; nevertheless, Craufurd reached his destination on the evening of the 5th, and the head-quarters were established at Deleytoza, on the 7th, the artillery being at Campillo, the rear-guard occupying the Meza d'Ibor. The sick and wounded were then forwarded to Merida, but the paucity of transport was such, that sir Arthur Wellesley was obliged to unload both ammunition and treasure carts for the conveyance of these unfortunate men. Meanwhile Soult, little thinking that his object was already frustrated, continued his march on the 5th, and Mortier took post at Naval Moral; the advanced

guard entered Puebla de Naciada, and the patroles, scouring the roads to Oropesa and the bridge of Arzobispo, fell in with and were chased by the Spanish cavalry from Arzobispo; for Cuesta would not retire on the 4th, and was in the act of passing the bridge when the French came in view. The movements were now hurried on both sides. Before dark, the Spanish army was across the Tagus, with the exception of a rear-guard, which remained on the right bank that evening, but it was driven across the river, on the morning of the 6th, by the fifth corps, which afterwards took post at Valdeveja and Puebla de Naciada. Ney also reached Naval Moral, and the second corps entered Gordo.

The 7th Mortier examined the Spanish position, and reported that Cuesta, having thrown up entrenchments, and placed twenty guns in battery, to rake the bridge, which was also barricaded, had left two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to hold the post, and withdrawn the rest of his army towards Meza d'Ibor. Hereupon, Soult detached his light cavalry towards Talavera, to communicate with the king, and brought up the second corps to Arzobispo. Meanwhile, the duke of Belluno having, on the 5th, ascertained the retreat of the allies from Talavera, retraced his steps, and entered that town on the 6th; thus the English wounded, left there, fell into his hands, and their treatment was such as might be expected from a gallant and courteous nation; between the British soldiers and the French, there was no rancour, and the generous usages of a civilized and honourable warfare were cherished.

The 7th, Victor crossed the Tagus, at the bridge of Talavera, and pushed his advanced guard to Aldea Nueva de Balbaroya, on the left bank, within a few leagues of the Spanish position, which Soult was preparing to attack in front; for he had observed that, at a certain point, the Spanish horses, when brought to drink, came far into the stream; and, the place being sounded in the night of the 7th, a deep but practicable ford was discovered, about half a mile above the bridge.

The fifth and second corps and a division of the sixth were concentrated, to force this passage, early on the morning of the 8th; but Soult being just then informed of Victor's movement, and perceiving that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, leaving only a rear guard in the works, judged that the allies were retreating; wherefore, without relinquishing the attack at Arzobispo, he immediately sent the division of the sixth corps back to Naval Moral, and, at the same time, transmitted a plan of the ford below Almaraz, directed Ney to cross the Tagus there, seize the Puerto de Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the allies, as they came out from the defiles between Deleytoza and Truxillo. Meanwhile the heat of the day had induced Albuquerque to seek shelter for his horsemen in a wood, near Azutan, a village about five miles from the bridge; and the Spanish infantry, keeping a bad guard, were sleeping or loitering about without care or thought, when Mortier, who was charged with the direction of the attack, taking advantage of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage of the river.

COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO.

The French cavalry, about six thousand in number, were secretly assembled near the ford, and, about two o'clock in the day, general Caulaincourt's brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards, running to their arms, manned the batteries, and opened upon the leading squadrons, but Mortier, with a powerful concentric fire of artillery, immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners; and Caulaincourt, having reached the other side of the river, turned to his right, and, taking the batteries in reverse, cut down the artillery-

men, and dispersed the infantry who attempted to form. The duke of Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, now came down with all his horsemen in one mass, but without order, upon Caulaincourt, and the latter was in imminent danger, when the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed at the ford, another burst the barriers on the bridge itself, and, by this time, the Spanish foot were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque's effort was thus frustrated, a general rout ensued, and five guns and about four hundred prisoners were taken.

Soult's intention being to follow up this success, he directed that the first corps should move, in two columns, upon Guadalupe and Deleytoza, intending to support it with the second and fifth, while the sixth corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass of Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed the ruin of the Spanish army, and forced sir Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous retreat; for so complete was the surprise and so sudden the overthrow that some of the English foragers also fell into the hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta's army was in no condition to have made any resistance, if the pursuit had been continued with vigour, is clear, from the following facts:—

1. When he withdrew his main body from the bridge of Arzobispo to Peralada de Garbin, on the 7th, he left fifteen pieces of artillery by the road-side, without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque placed these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who were, however, ignorant of their situation, until a trumpeter attending an English flag of truce, either treacherously or foolishly, mentioned it in the French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry was sent to fetch them off. 2. The British military agent, placed at the Spanish head-quarters, was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was only by the arrival of the duke of Albuquerque, at Deleytoza, on the evening of the 9th, that sir Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge was lost. He had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to keep the enemy in check; but when he repaired in person to that general's quarter, on the 10th, he found the country covered with fugitives and stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as haughty as ever. All his ammunition and guns (forty pieces) were at the right bank of the Ibor, and, of course, at the foot of the Meza, and within sight and cannon-shot of the enemy, on the right bank of the Tagus; they would have been taken by the first French patroles that approached, but that sir Arthur Wellesley persuaded the Spanish staff-officers to have them dragged up the hill, in the course of the 10th, without Cuesta's knowledge.

In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the Peninsula was again averted by the king, who recalled the first corps to the support of the fourth, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also, was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz, and, by the 11th, the allies had re-established their line of defence. The head-quarters of the British were at Jarai-cejo, and those of the Spaniards at Deleytoza; the former, guarding the fort of Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d'Ibor and Campillo, were on the right. The 12th, Cuesta resigned. General Eguia succeeded to the command, and at first gave hopes of a better co-operation, but the evil was in the character of the people. The position of the allies was, however, compact and central; the reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication to the rear was open, and if defended with courage, the Meza d'Ibor was impregnable; and to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a difficult operation, would, while the Mirabete and Meza d'Ibor were occupied, have been dangerous for the French, as they would be enclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river.

The duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that sir Arthur Wellesley would endeavour to repass the Tagus by Alcantara, and so rejoined Beresford and the five thousand British troops under Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the frontier of Portugal. To prevent this he resolved to march at once upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, threaten both Beresford's and sir Arthur's communication with Lisbon, and, at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but Marshal Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation. He observed that sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for Alcantara; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in a hasty manner; and that the army could not be fed between Coria, Plasencia, and the Tagus; finally, that Salamanca, being again in possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the sixth corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to cover Castile. This reasoning was approved by Joseph, who dreaded the further fatigue and privations that would attend a continuance of the operations during the excessive heats, and in a wasted country; and he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt of a despatch from the emperor, dated Schoenbrunn, the 29th of July, in which any further offensive operations were forbid, until the reinforcements which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him to send should arrive in Spain. The second corps was, consequently, directed to take post at Plasencia; the fifth corps relieved the first at Talavera; and the English wounded being, by Victor, given over to marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous sense of honour, would not permit his own soldiers, although suffering severe privations themselves, to receive rations until the hospitals were first supplied; the sixth corps was directed upon Valladolid, for Joseph was alarmed lest a fresh insurrection, excited and supported by the duke del Parque, should spread over the whole of Leon and Castile.

Ney marched on the 11th; but, to his surprise, found that sir Robert Wilson, with about four thousand men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, was in possession of the pass of Baños. To explain this, it must be observed, that when the British army marched from Talavera, on the 3d, Wilson, being at Nombella, was put in communication with Cuesta. He had sent his artillery to the army on the 3d, and on the 4th, finding that the Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, he fell back with his infantry to Vellada, a few miles north of Talavera. He was then twenty-four miles from Arzobispo, and, as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa until the 5th, a junction with sir Arthur Wellesley might have been effected; but it was impossible to know this at the time, and Wilson, very prudently, crossing the Tietar, made for the mountains, trusting to his activity and local knowledge to escape the enemy. Villatte's division pursued him, on the 5th, to Nombella; a detachment from the garrison of Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas and Monbeltran; and general Foy waited for him in the Vera de Plasencia. Nevertheless, baffling his opponents, he broke through their circle at Viandar, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the Sierra de Lanes, and, getting into the valley of the Tormes, reached Bejar: from thence, thinking to recover his communications with the army, he marched towards Plasencia, by the pass of Baños, and thus, on the morning of the 12th, met with Ney, returning to the Salamanca country.

The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why sir Robert Wilson should have given battle to the sixth corps. His position, although difficult of approach, and strengthened by the piling of large stones in the narrowest parts, was not one in which he could hope to stop a whole army; and, ac-

cordingly, when the French, overcoming the local obstacles, got close upon his left, the fight was at an end; the first charge broke both the legion and the Spanish auxiliaries, and the whole dispersed. Ney continued his march, and, having recovered the line of the Tormes, resigned the command of the sixth corps to general Marchand, and returned to France. But, while these things happened in Estremadura, La Mancha was the theatre of more important operations.

CHAPTER VIII.

Venegas advances to Aranjuez—Skirmishes there—Sebastiani crosses the Tagus at Toledo—Venegas concentrates his army—Battle of Almonacid—Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented by the ill-conduct of the junta—His troops distressed for provisions—He resolves to retire into Portugal—False charge made by Cuesta against the British army refuted—Beresford's proceedings—Mr. Frere superseded by Lord Wellesley—The English army abandons its position at Jaraicejo and marches towards Portugal—Consternation of the junta—Sir A. Wellesley defends his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain—Takes a position within the Portuguese frontier—Sickness in the army.

WHEN the duke of Belluno retired from Salinas to Maqueda, the king, fearing that the allies were moving up the right bank of the Alberche, carried his reserve, in the night of the 3d, to Mostoles; but the fourth corps remained at Illescas, and sent strong patrols to Valdemoro. Wilson, however, retired, as we have seen, from Nombella, on the 4th; and the king, no longer expecting the allies in that quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where he was joined by the fourth corps from Illescas.

The 5th, the duke of Belluno returned to St. Ollalla; and the king marched against general Venegas, who, in pursuance of the secret orders of the junta, before mentioned, had loitered about Daymiel and Templeque until the 27th of July. It was the 29th before Venegas reached Ocaña, his advanced posts being at Aranjuez, his rear-guard at Yepes, and one division, under Lacy, in front of Toledo; the same day, one of the *partidas*, attending the army, surprised a small French post on the other side of the Tagus, and Lacy's division skirmished with the garrison of Toledo.

The 30th, Venegas heard of the battle of Talavera, and at the same time Lacy reported that the head of the enemy's columns were to be seen on the road beyond Toledo. Hereupon, the Spanish commander reinforced Lacy, and gave him Mora as a point of retreat; but, on the 2d of August, being falsely informed by Cuesta that the allied troops would immediately march upon Madrid, Venegas recalled his divisions from Toledo, pretending to concentrate his army at Aranjuez, in order to march also upon the capital; yet he had no intention of doing so, for the junta did not desire to see Cuesta, at the head of sixty thousand men, in that city, and, previous to the battle of Talavera, had not only forbidden him to enter Madrid, but appointed another man governor. This prohibition would, no doubt, have been disregarded by Cuesta, but Venegas was obedient to their secret instructions, and under pretence of danger to his flanks, if he marched on the capital, remained at Aranjuez, where his flank being equally exposed to an enemy coming from Toledo, he yet performed no service to the general cause.

The 3d, he pushed an advanced guard to Puente Largo, and leaving six hundred infantry, and some cavalry, near Toledo, concentrated his army between Aranjuez and Ocaña. In this position he remained until the 5th, when his advanced guard was driven from the Puente Largo, and across the Tagus; his line of posts on that river was then attacked by the French

skirmishers, and, under cover of a heavy cannonade, his position was examined by the enemy's generals: but when the latter found that all the bridges above and below Aranjuez were broken down, they resolved to pass the Tagus at Toledo. With this intent the French army recrossed the Xarama river, and marched in the direction of that city; but Venegas still keeping his posts at Aranjuez, foolishly dispersed his other divisions at Tembleque, Ocaña, and Guardia. He himself was desirous of defending La Mancha; the central junta, with more prudence, wished him to retreat into the Sierra Morena; but Mr. Frere proposed that his army should be divided, one part to enter the Morena, and the other to march by Cuença, upon Aragon, and so to menace the communications with France! The admirable absurdity of this proposal would probably have caused it to be adopted, if Sebastiani's movements had not put an end to the discussion. That general, crossing the Tagus at Toledo, and at a ford higher up, drove the Spanish left, back upon the Guzalate, on the 9th of August; on the 10th, Venegas concentrated his whole army at Almonacid, and, holding a council of war, resolved to attack the French on the 12th; the time was miscalculated, Sebastiani advanced on the 11th, and commenced

THE BATTLE OF ALMONACID.

The army of Venegas, including two thousand five hundred cavalry, was somewhat more than twenty-five thousand strong, with forty pieces of artillery. It was the most efficient Spanish force that had yet taken the field; it was composed of the best regiments in Spain, well armed and clothed, and the generals of divisions were neither incapacitated by age, nor destitute of experience, most of them having been employed in the previous campaign. The village of Almonacid was in the centre of the Spanish position, and, together with some table-land in front of it, was occupied by two divisions of infantry under general Castejon. The left wing, under general Lacy, rested on a hill which covered the main road to Consuegra. The right wing, commanded by general Vigodet, was drawn up on some rising ground covering the road to Tembleque. A reserve, under general Giron, and the greatest part of the artillery, were posted behind the centre, on a rugged hill, crowned by an old castle. The cavalry were placed at the extremity of each wing.

General Dessolles, with the French reserve, was still some hours' march behind, but Sebastiani, after observing the dispositions made by Venegas, resolved to attack him with the fourth corps only. The Polish division immediately marched against the front, Laval's Germans turned the flank of the hill, on which the Spanish left was posted, and two French brigades were directed upon the centre. After a sharp fight, the Spanish left was put to flight; Venegas, however, outflanked the victorious troops with his cavalry, and charging threw them into disorder; but at this moment, the head of Dessolles's column arrived, and enabled Sebastiani's reserves to restore the combat. The Spanish cavalry, shattered by musketry, and by the fire of four pieces of artillery, was, in turn, charged by a French regiment of horse, and broken. Venegas rallied his troops again on the castle-hill, behind the village; but the king came up with the remainder of the reserve, and the attack was renewed. The Poles and Germans continued their march against the left flank of the Spaniards, nine fresh battalions fell upon their centre, and a column of six battalions forced the right; the height and the castle were thus carried at the first effort. Venegas attempted to cover his retreat, by making a stand in the plain behind; but two divisions of dragoons charged his troops before they could reform, and the disorder became irremediable; the Spaniards, throwing away their arms, dispersed in every

direction, and were pursued and slaughtered by the horsemen for several hours.

Following the French account, three thousand of the vanquished were slain, and four thousand taken prisoners; and all the guns, baggage, ammunition, and carriages fell into the hands of the victors, whose loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men. The remnants of the defeated army took shelter in the Sierra Morena; the head-quarters of the fourth corps were then established at Aranjuez, those of the first at Toledo, and the king returned in triumph to the capital.

The Anglo-Spanish army, however, still held its positions at Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and sir Arthur Wellesley was not, at the first, without hopes to maintain himself there, or even to resume offensive operations; for he knew that Ney had returned to Salamanca, and he erroneously believed that Mortier commanded only a part of the first corps, and that the remainder were at Toledo.* On the other hand, his own strength was about seventeen thousand men; Beresford had reached Moraleja, with from twelve to fourteen thousand Portuguese; and between the frontier of Portugal and Lisbon there were at least five thousand British troops, composing the brigades of Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn. If Soult invaded Portugal, the intention of the English general was to have followed him. If the French remained in their present position, he meant to recross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with Beresford's troops, to fall upon their right at Plasencia. For his own front he had no fear; and he was taking measures to restore the broken arch of the Cardinal's bridge over the Tagus, with a view to his operation against Plasencia, when the misconduct of the Spanish government and its generals again obliged him to look solely to the preservation of his own army.

From the 23d of July, when the bad faith of the junta, the apathy of the people in Estremadura, and the wayward folly of Cuesta, had checked the forward movements of the British, the privations of the latter, which had commenced at Plasencia, daily increased. It was in vain that sir Arthur, remonstrating with Cuesta and the junta, had warned them of the consequences; it was in vain that he refused to pass the Alberche until the necessary supplies were secured; his reasonings, his representations, and even the fact of his having halted at Talavera, were alike disregarded by men who, judging from their own habits, concluded that his actions would also be at variance with his professions. If he demanded food for his troops, he was answered by false statements of what had been, and falsar promises of what would be done; the glorious services rendered at Talavera, far from exciting the gratitude or calling forth the activity of the Spanish authorities, seemed only to render them the more perverse. The soldiers in the ranks were weakened by hunger, the sick were dying for want of necessary succours, the commissaries were without the means of transport; and when sir Arthur Wellesley applied for only ninety artillery horses to supply the place of those killed in the action, Cuesta on the very field of battle, and with the steam of the English blood still reeking in his nostrils, refused this request; two days after, he abandoned the wounded men to an enemy that he and his countrymen were hourly describing as the most ferocious and dishonourable of mankind.

The retreat of the allies across the Tagus increased the sufferings of the troops, and the warmth of their general's remonstrances rose in proportion to the ill-treatment they experienced; but the replies, nothing abating in falseness as to fact, now became insulting both to the general and his army: "*The British were not only well but over supplied.*"—"they robbed the peasantry, pillaged the villages, intercepted the Spanish

* Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

convoys, and openly sold the provisions thus shamefully acquired :—"the retreat of the army across the Tagus was unnecessary; Soult ought to have been destroyed; and the English general must have secret motives for his conduct, which he dare not avow :"—and other calumnies of the like nature.

Now, from the 20th of July to the 20th of August, although the Spaniards were generally well fed, the English soldiers had not received ten full rations. Half a pound of wheat in the grain, and, twice a week, a few cunes of flour, with a quarter of a pound of goat's flesh, formed the sole subsistence of men and officers; and this scanty supply was procured with much labour, for the goats were to be caught and killed by the troops; it was, perhaps, upon this additional hardship that the accusation of selling provisions was founded, for, in such cases, it is in all armies the custom that the ofal belongs to the men who slaughter the animals; but the famine in the camp was plainly proved by this very fact; for a goat's ofal sold, at this time, for even three or four dollars, or about double the usual price of the whole animal, and men and officers strove to outbid each other for the wretched food.

It has been said that the British soldiers are less intelligent in providing for themselves, and less able to sustain privations of food than the soldiers of any other nation. This is one of many vulgar errors which have been promulgated respecting them. That they should be constantly victorious, and yet inferior to all other nations in military qualification, does not, at first sight, appear a very logical conclusion; but the truth is, that, with the exception of the Spanish and Portuguese, who are, undoubtedly, more sober, the English soldiers possess all the most valuable military qualities in as high, and many in a much higher degree than any other nation. They are as rapid and as intelligent as the French, as obedient as the German, as enduring as the Russian, and more robust than any; and, with respect to food, this is sure, that no man, of any nation, with less than two pounds of solid food, of some kind, daily, can do his work well for any length of time. A general charge of pillaging is easily made and hard to be disproved, yet it is certain that the Spanish troops themselves did not only pillage, but wantonly devastate the country, and that without any excuse, for, with the exception of the three days succeeding the defeat of Arzobispo, their rations were regular and sufficient. With respect to the interruption of their convoys, by the British soldiers, the reverse was the fact. *The Spanish cavalry intercepted the provisions and forage destined for the English army, and fired upon the foragers, as if they had been enemies.*

Before the middle of August there were, in the six regiments of English cavalry, a thousand men dismounted, and the horses of seven hundred others were unserviceable;* the baggage animals died in greater numbers; the artillery cattle were scarcely able to drag the guns, and one third of the reserve ammunition was given over to the Spaniards, because the ammunition carts were required for the conveyance of sick men, of which the number daily increased. Marshal Beresford experienced the same difficulties in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. The numerous desertions that took place in the Portuguese army, when it became known that the troops were to enter Spain, prevented him from taking the field so soon as he had expected; but, in the last days of July, being prepared to act, he crossed the Portuguese frontier, and, from that moment, the usual vexatious system of the Spaniards commenced. Romana still continued at Coruña; the duke del Parque was full of mighty projects, and indignant that Beresford would not blindly adopt his recommendations. Both generals were ignorant of the real strength of the

French: but the Spaniard was confident, and insisted upon offensive movements, while Beresford, a general by no means of an enterprising disposition when in the sole command of an army, contented himself with taking up a defensive line behind the Agueda. In this he was justified; first, by his instructions, which obliged him to look to the pass of Perales and the defence of the frontier line; secondly, by the state of his army, which was not half organized, and without horsemen or artillery; thirdly, by the conduct of the Spanish authorities.

The Portuguese troops were not only refused provisions, but those which had been collected by sir Arthur Wellesley, and put into the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view to operate in that quarter, were seized by the cabildo, as security for a debt pretended to be due for the supply of sir John Moore's army. The claim itself was of doubtful character, for Cradock had before offered to pay it if the cabildo would produce the voucher for its being due, a preliminary which had not been complied with. There was also an English commissary at Ciudad Rodrigo, empowered to liquidate that and any other just claim upon the British military chest; but the cabildo, like all Spaniards, mistaking violence for energy, preferred this display of petty power to the interests of the common cause. Meanwhile, Soult having passed the Sierra de Gredos, by the Baños, Beresford, moving in a parallel direction, crossed the Sierra de Gata, at Perales; reached Moraleja about the 12th of August, and having rallied the troops and convalescents cut off from Talavera, marched to Salvatierra, where he arrived the 17th, and took post behind the Elga, covering the road to Abrantes.

Such was the state of affairs when the supreme junta offered sir Arthur Wellesley the rank of captain-general, and sent him a present of horses; and when he, accepting the rank, refused the pay as he had before refused that of the Portuguese government, they pressed him to renew offensive operations; but, acting as if they thought the honours conferred upon the general would amply compensate for the sufferings of the troops, the junta made no change in their system. Sir Arthur Wellesley was, however, now convinced that Spain was no longer the place for a British army. He relinquished the notion of further operations in that country, sent his cavalry to the neighbourhood of Cáceres, broke down another arch of the Cardinal's bridge, to prevent the enemy from troubling him, and, through the British ambassador, informed the junta that he would immediately retire into Portugal.

This information created the wildest consternation; for, in their swollen self-sufficiency, the members of the government had hitherto disregarded all warnings upon this subject, and now acting as, in the like case, they had acted, the year before, with sir John Moore, they endeavoured to avert the consequences of their own evil doings by vehement remonstrances and the most absurd statements:—"The French were weak and the moment most propitious for driving them beyond the Pyrenees;" "the uncalled-for retreat of the English would ruin the cause;" and so forth. But they had to deal with a general as firm as sir John Moore; and, in the British ambassador, they no longer found an instrument suited to their purposes. Lord Wellesley, a man with too many weaknesses to be called great, but of an expanded capacity, and a genius at once subtle and imperious, had come out on a special mission,—and Mr. Frere, whose last communication with the junta had been to recommend another military project, was happily displaced; yet, even in his private capacity, he made an effort to have some of the generals superseded; and the junta, with a refined irony, truly Spanish, created him *Marquis of Union*.

At Cadiz, the honours paid to Lord Wellesley were extravagant and unbecoming, and his journey from

* Parliamentary Papers, 1810.

thence to Seville was a scene of triumph, but these outward demonstrations of feeling did not impose upon him beyond the moment, his brother's correspondence and his own penetration soon enabled him to make a just estimate of the junta's pretensions. Disdaining their intrigues, and fully appreciating a general's right to direct the operations of his own army, he seconded sir Arthur's remonstrances with firmness, and wisely taking the latter's statements as a guide and basis for his own views, urged them upon the Spanish government with becoming dignity.

The junta, on their part, always protesting that the welfare of the British army was the principal object of their care, did not fail to prove, very clearly upon paper, that the troops, ever since their entry into Spain, had been amply supplied; and that no measures might be wanting to satisfy the English general, they invested don Lorenzo Calvo, a member of their body, with full powers to draw forth and apply all the resources of the country to the nourishment of both armies. This gentleman's promises and assurances, relative to the supply, were more full and formal than M. de Garay's, and equally false. He declared that provisions and forage, in vast quantities, were actually being delivered into the magazines at Truxillo, when, in fact, there was not even an effort making to collect any. He promised that the British should be served, although the Spanish troops should thereby suffer, and, at the very time of making this promise, he obliged the alcaldes of a distant town to send, into the Spanish camp, provisions which had been already purchased by an English commissary. In fine, lord Wellesley had arrived too late; all the mischief that petulance, folly, bad faith, violence, and ignorance united, could inflict, was already accomplished, and, while he was vainly urging a vile, if not a treacherous government, to provide sustenance for the soldiers, sir Arthur withdrew the latter from a post where the vultures, in their prescience of death, were already congregating.

The 20th, the main body of the British army quitted Jaraicejo, and marched by Truxillo upon Merida. The light brigade, under Crauford, being relieved at Almaraz by the Spaniards, took the road of Cáceres to Valencia de Alcántara; but the pass of Mirabete bore ample testimony to the previous sufferings of the troops. Crauford's brigade, which, only three weeks before, had traversed sixty miles in a single march, were now with difficulty, and after many halts, able to reach the summit of the Mirabete, although, only four miles from their camp; and the side of that mountain was covered with baggage, and the carcasses of many hundred animals that died in the ascent.

When the retreat commenced, the junta, with the malevolence of anger engendered by fear, calumniated the man to whom, only ten days before, they had addressed the most fulsome compliments, and to whose courage and skill they owed their own existence. "*It was not the want of provisions,*" they said, "*but some other motive that caused the English general to retreat.*" This was openly and insultingly stated by Garay, by Eguía, and by Calvo, in their correspondence with lord Wellesley and sir Arthur; and at the same time the junta industriously spread a report that the true reason was their own firm resistance to the ungenerous demands of the English ministers, who had required the cession of Cadiz and the island of Cuba, as the price of further assistance. But the only firmness they had shewn was in resistance to the just demands of their ally. At Talavera, sir Arthur Wellesley had been forced to give over to the Spaniards the artillery taken from the enemy; at Meza d'Ibor, he had sacrificed a part of his ammunition, to obtain conveyance for the wounded men; and to effect the present movement from Jaraicejo, without leaving his sick behind, he was obliged to abandon all his pare of ammunition and

stores; then, however, the Spanish generals, who had refused the slightest aid to convey the sick and wounded men, immediately found ample means to carry off all these stores to their own magazines. In this manner, almost bereft of baggage and ammunition, those soldiers, who had withstood the fiercest efforts of the enemy, were driven, as it were, ignominiously from the country they had protected to their own loss.

The 24th, the head-quarters being at Merida, a despatch from lord Wellesley was received. He painted in strong colours the terror of the junta, the distraction of the people, the universal confusion; and with a natural anxiety to mitigate their distress, he proposed that the British army should, notwithstanding the past, endeavour to cover Andalusia, by taking, in conjunction with the Spanish army, a defensive post behind the Guadiana, in such manner that the left should rest on the frontier of Portugal: to facilitate this he had, he said, presented a plan to the junta for the future supply of provisions, and the vicinity of the frontier and of Seville would, he hoped, obviate any difficulty on that point. But he rested his project entirely upon political grounds, and it is worthy of observation, that he, who for many years had, with despotic power, controlled the movements of immense armies in India, carefully avoided any appearance of meddling with the general's province.

"I am," said he, "fully sensible not only of the *indelicacy*, but of the inutility of attempting to offer to you any opinion of mine in a situation where your own judgement must be your best guide."—"Viewing, however, so nearly, the painful consequences of your immediate retreat into Portugal, I have deemed it to be my duty to submit it to your consideration the possibility of adopting an intermediate plan." Let this proceeding be compared with Mr. Frere's conduct to sir John Moore on a similar occasion.

On the receipt of this despatch, sir Arthur Wellesley halted at Merida for some days, he was able in that country to obtain provisions, and he wished, if possible, to allay the excitement occasioned by his retreat; but he refused to co-operate again with the Spaniards. "Want," he said, "had driven him to separate from them, but their shameful flight at Arzobispo would alone have justified him for doing so. To take up a defensive position behind the Guadiana would be useless, because that river was fordable, and the ground behind it weak. The line of the Tagus, occupied at the moment by Eguía, was so strong, that if the Spaniards could defend any thing they might defend that. His advice then was that they should send the pontoon-bridge to Badajos, and remain on the defensive at Deleytoza and Almaraz. But, it might be asked, he said, was there no chance of renewing the offensive? To what purpose? The French were as numerous, if not more so, than the allies; and, with respect to the Spaniards at least, superior in discipline and every military quality. To advance again was only to play the same losing game as before. Baños and Perales must be guarded, or the bands in Castile would again pour through upon the rear of the allied army; but who was to guard these passes? The British were too few to detach, and the Spaniards could not be trusted; and if they could, Avila and the Guadarama passes remained, by which the enemy could reinforce the army in front,—for there were no Spanish troops in the north of Spain capable of making a diversion."

"But there was a more serious consideration, namely, the constant and shameful misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We, in England," said sir Arthur, "never hear of their defeats and flights, but I have heard Spanish officers telling of nineteen or twenty actions of the description of that at the bridge of Arzobispo, accounts of which, I believe, have never been published." "In the battle of Talavera," he continued,

"in which the Spanish army, with very trifling exception, was not engaged—whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off, when they were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack. When these dastardly soldiers ran away they plunder every thing they meet. In their flight from Talavera they plundered the baggage of the British army, which was, at that moment, bravely engaged in their cause."

For these reasons he would not, he said, again co-operate with the Spaniards; yet, by taking post on the Portuguese frontier, he would hang upon the enemy's flank, and thus, unless the latter came with very great forces, prevent him from crossing the Guadiana. This reasoning was conclusive, but ere it reached Lord Wellesley, the latter found that so far from his plans, relative to the supply, having been adopted, he could not even get an answer from the junta; that miserable body, at one moment shrinking with fear, at the next bursting with folly, now talked of the enemy's being about to retire to the Pyrenees, or even to the interior of France! and assuming the right to dispose of the Portuguese army as well as of their own, inopportunately pressed for an immediate, combined, offensive operation, by the troops of the three nations, to harass the enemy in his retreat! but, at the same time, they ordered Eguia to withdraw from Deleytoza, behind the Guadiana.

The 31st, Eguia reached La Serena, and Venegas having rallied his fugitives in the Morena, and being reinforced from the dépôts in Andalusia, the two armies amounted to about fifty thousand men, of which eight or ten thousand were horse, for, as I have before observed, the Spanish cavalry seldom suffered much. But the tide of popular discontent was now setting full against the central government. The members of the ancient junta of Seville worked incessantly for their overthrow. Romana, Castaños, Cuesta, Albuquerque, all, and they were many, who had suffered dishonour at their hands, were against them; and the local junta of Estremadura insisted that Albuquerque should command in that province. Thus pressed, the supreme junta, considering Venegas as a man devoted to their wishes, resolved to increase his forces. For this purpose they gave Albuquerque the command in Estremadura, yet furnished him with only twelve thousand men, and sent the remainder of Eguia's army to Venegas; at the same time, they made a last effort to engage the British general in their proceedings, offering to place Albuquerque under his orders, provided he would undertake an offensive movement. By these means, they maintained their tottering power, but their plans, being founded upon vile political intrigues, could in no wise alter sir Arthur Wellesley's determination, which was the result of enlarged military views. He refused their offers; and, the 4th of September, his headquarters were established at Badajos. Meanwhile, Romana delivering over his army to the duke del Parque, repaired to Seville; and Venegas again advanced into La Mancha, but at the approach of a very inferior force of the enemy, retired, with all the haste and confusion of a rout, to the Morena. The English troops were then distributed in Badajos, Elvas, Campo Mayor, and other places, on both banks of the Guadiana; the brigades already in Portugal were brought up to the army, and the lost ammunition and equipments were replaced from the magazines at Lisbon, Abrantes, and Santarem; Beresford, leaving some light troops and militia on the frontier, retired to Thomar, and this eventful campaign, of two months, terminated.

The loss of the army was considerable; above three thousand five hundred men had been killed, or had died of sickness, or fallen into the enemy's hands. Fifteen hundred horses had perished from want of food, exclusive of those lost in battle; the spirits of the soldiers were depressed, and a heart-burning hatred of the

Spaniards was engendered by the treatment all had endured. To fill the cup, the pestilent fever of the Guadiana, assailing bodies which fatigue and bad nourishment had already predisposed to disease, made frightful ravages; dysentery, that scourge of armies, raged, and, in a short time, above five thousand men died in the hospitals.

CHAPTER IX.

General observations on the campaign—Comparison between the operations of sir John Moore and sir A. Wellesley.

OBSERVATIONS.

DURING this short, but important campaign, the armies on both sides acted in violation of the maxim which condemns "*double external lines of operation*," but the results vindicated the soundness of the rule. Nothing permanent or great, nothing proportionate to the number of the troops, the vastness of the combinations, or the reputation of the commanders, was achieved; yet, neither sir Arthur Wellesley, nor the duke of Dalmatia, nor marshal Jourdan can be justly censured, seeing that the two last were controlled by the king, and the first by circumstances of a peculiar nature. The French marshals were thwarted by superior authority; and the English general, commanding an auxiliary force, was obliged to regulate his movements, not by his own military views, but by the actual state of the Spaniards' operations, and with reference to the politics and temper of that people.

La Mancha was the true line by which to act against Madrid; but the British army was on the frontier of Portugal, the junta refused Cadiz as a place of arms, and without Cadiz, or some other fortified sea-port, neither prudence, nor his instructions, would permit sir Arthur to hazard a great operation on that side: hence he adopted, not what was most fitting, in a military sense, but what was least objectionable among the few plans that could be concerted at all with the Spanish generals and government. Now, the latter being resolved to act with strong armies, both in Estremadura and La Mancha, the English general had but to remain on a miserable defensive system in Portugal, or to unite with Cuesta in the valley of the Tagus. His territorial line of operations was therefore a matter of necessity, and any fair criticism must be founded on the management of his masses after it was chosen. That he did not greatly err in his conception of the campaign, is to be inferred from the fact, that Napoleon, Soult, Victor, and Jourdan, simultaneously expected him upon the very line he followed. He was thwarted by Cuesta at every step, Venegas failed to aid him, and the fatal error relative to Soult's forces, under which he laboured throughout, vitiated all his operations; yet he shook the intrusive monarch roughly, in the midst of fifty thousand men.

Let the project be judged, not by what did happen, but by what would have happened, if Cuesta had been active, and if Venegas had performed his part loyally. The junction of the British and Spanish forces was made at Naval Moral, on the 22d of July. The duke of Belluno, with twenty-one thousand men, was then in position behind the Alberche, the fourth corps near Madridejos in La Mancha, and Joseph at Madrid, where general Foy had just arrived, to concert Soult's movement upon Plasencia. It is evident that the king and Sebastiani could not reach the scene of action before the 25th or 26th of July, nor could Soult influence the operations before the 1st or 2d of August. If, then, the allied army, being sixty thousand strong, with a hundred pieces of artillery, had attacked Victor on the morning of the 23d, it is to be presumed that the latter would have been beaten, and obliged to retreat, either

upon Madrid or Toledo; but the country immediately in his rear was open, and ten thousand horsemen could have been launched in the pursuit. Sir Robert Wilson, also, would have been on Victor's flank, if, neglecting a junction with the fourth corps, that marshal had taken the road to Madrid; and if that of Toledo, the first and fourth corps would have been separated from the king, who did not reach Vargas until the evening of the 25th, but who would not, in this case, have been able to advance at all beyond Naval Carreiro.

Now, admitting that, by superior discipline and experience, the French troops had effected their retreat on either line without any serious calamity, what would have followed?

1. If Victor joined the king, the latter could only have retired, by Guadalaxara, upon the third corps, or have gone by the Guadarama towards Soult.

2. If Victor joined Sebastiani, the two corps must have retreated to Guadalaxara, and the king would have joined them there, or, as before said, have pushed for the Guadarama to join Soult.

No doubt, that marshal, having so powerful an army, would, in either case, have restored Joseph to his capital, and have cut off sir Arthur's communication with Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Nevertheless, a great moral impression would have been produced by the temporary loss of Madrid, which was, moreover, the general dépôt of all the French armies; and, meanwhile, Venegas, Cuesta, and sir Arthur Wellesley would have been united, and on one line of operations (that of La Mancha), which, under such circumstances, would have forced the junta to consent to the occupation of Cadiz. In this view it must be admitted that the plan was conceived with genius.

Victor's position on the Alberche was, however, strong; he commanded twenty-five thousand veterans; and, as the Spaniards were very incapable in the field, it may be argued that a general movement of the whole army to Escalona, and from thence to Maqueda, would have been preferable to a direct attack at Salinas; because the allies, if thus suddenly placed in the midst of the French corps, might have beaten them in detail, and would certainly have cut the king off from the Guadarama, and forced him back upon the Guadalaxara. But, with Cuesta for a colleague, how could a general undertake an operation requiring celerity and the nicest calculation?

The false dealing of the junta no prudence could guard against; but experience proves that, without extraordinary good fortune, some accident will always happen to mar the combinations of armies acting upon "double external lines." And so it was with respect to Venegas; for that general, with a force of twenty-six thousand men, suffered himself to be held in check for five days by three thousand French, and at the battle of Almonacid shewed, that he knew neither when to advance nor when to retreat.

The patience with which sir Arthur Wellesley bore the foolish insults of Cuesta, and the undaunted firmness with which he sought to protect the Spanish army, require no illustration. When the latter fell back from St. Ollalla on the 26th, it was impossible for the British to retreat with honour; and there is nothing more memorable in the history of this war, nothing more creditable to the personal character of the English chief, than the battle of Talavera, considered as an isolated event. Nevertheless, that contest proved that the allies were unable to attain their object; for, notwithstanding Victor's ill-judged partial attacks on the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, and notwithstanding the final repulse of the French, all the advantages of the movements, as a whole, were with the latter. They were, on the 31st of July, including the garrison of Toledo, still above forty thousand men,

and they maintained their central position, although it was not until the 1st of August that Soult's approach caused any change in the views of the allied generals: and this brings us to the fundamental error of sir Arthur Wellesley's operations.

That so able a commander should engage himself in the narrow valley of the Tagus with twenty thousand British and forty thousand Spanish troops, when fifty thousand French were waiting for him at the further end, and above fifty thousand more were hanging on his flank and rear, shews that the greatest masters of the art may err: but he who wars, walks in a mist through which the keenest eyes cannot always discern the right path. "*Speak to me of a general who has made no mistakes in war,*" said Turenne, "*and you speak of one who has seldom made war.*"

Sir Arthur Wellesley thus excused his error:—"When I entered Spain I had reason to believe that I should be joined by a Spanish army in such a respectable state of discipline and efficiency, as that it had kept in check, during nearly three months after a defeat, a French army, at one time superior, and at no time much inferior."

"I had likewise reason to believe that the French corps, in the north of Spain, were fully employed; and although I had heard of the arrival of marshal Soult at Zamora, on the 29th of June, with a view to equip the remains of his corps, I did not think it possible that three French corps, consisting of thirty-four thousand men, under three marshals, could have been assembled at Salamanca without the knowledge of the Governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, or of the junta of Castile; that these corps could have been moved from their stations in Galicia, the Asturias, and Biscay, without setting free, for general operations, any Spanish troops which had been opposed to them, or without any other inconvenience to the enemy than that of protracting, to a later period, the settlement of his government in those provinces;—and that they could have penetrated into Estremadura, without a shot being fired at them by the troops deemed sufficient to defend the passes by the Spanish generals."

Thus it was, that like the figures in a phantasmagoria, the military preparations of Spain, however menacing in appearance, were invariably found to be vain and illusory. That Sir Arthur Wellesley's error was not fatal is to be attributed to three causes:—

1. The reluctance of marshal Ney to quit Astorga;—2. The march of the fifth corps upon Villa Castin instead of Salamanca;—3. The vehemence with which Victor urged the battle of Talavera: in short, jealousy among the marshals, and the undecided temper of the king.

If Soult had not been thwarted, he would have concentrated the three corps near Salamanca before the 20th, and he would have reached Plasencia before the 28th of July. The allies must then have forced their way into La Mancha, or been crushed; but could they have done the former without another battle? without the loss of all the wounded men? could they have done it at all? The British, including Robert Craufurd's brigade, were seventeen thousand fighting men on the 29th, yet wasted with fatigue and hunger. The Spaniards were above thirty thousand; but in them no trust could be placed for an effort requiring fine discipline and courage of the highest order. The intrusive king was at the head of forty thousand good troops. Venegas, at once ignorant and hampered by the intrigues of the junta, was as nought in the operations, while Soult's step, stealthy when the situation of affairs was obscure, would have been impetuous when a light broke on the field of battle; it is scarcely possible to conceive that the allies could have forced their way in front before that marshal would have fallen on their rear.

FRENCH OPERATIONS.

Joseph was finally successful; yet it may be safely affirmed that, with the exception of uniting his three corps behind the Guadarama, on the evening of the 25th, his proceedings were an almost uninterrupted series of errors. He would not suffer Soult to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo with seventy thousand men, in the end of July. To protect Madrid from the army of Venegas overbalanced, in his mind, the advantages of this bold and grand project, which would inevitably have drawn Sir Arthur Wellesley from the Tagus, and which interrupting all military communication between the northern and southern provinces, and ensuring possession of Castile and Leon, would, by its success, have opened a broad way to Lisbon. Cuesta and Venegas, meanwhile, would have marched against Madrid! Cuesta and Venegas, acting on external lines, and whose united force did not exceed sixty-five thousand men! The king, holding a central position, with fifty thousand French veterans, was alarmed at this prospect, and rejecting Soult's plan, drew Mortier, with the fifth corps, to Villa Castin. Truly, this was to avoid the fruit-tree from fear of a nettle at its stem!

Sir Arthur Wellesley's advance to Talavera was the result of this great error, but he having thus incautiously afforded Soult an opportunity of striking a fatal blow, a fresh combination was concerted. The king, with equal judgment and activity, then united all his own forces near Toledo, separated Venegas from Cuesta, pushed back the latter upon the English army, and obliged both to stand on the defensive, with eyes attentively directed to their front, when the real point of danger was in the rear. This indeed was skilful; but the battle of Talavera which followed was a palpable, an enormous, fault. The allies could neither move forward nor backward, without being infinitely worse situated for success than in that strong position, which seemed marked out by fortune herself for their security. Until the 31st, the operations of Venegas were not even felt, hence, till the 31st, the French position on the Alberche might have been maintained without danger; and, on the first of August, the head of Soult's column was at Plasencia.

Let us suppose that the French had merely made demonstrations on the 28th, and had retired behind the Alberche the 29th, would the allies have dared to attack them in that position? The conduct of the Spaniards, on the evening of the 27th, answers the question; and moreover, Joseph, with an army compact, active, and experienced, could, with ease, have baffled any efforts of the combined forces to bring him to action; he might have covered himself by the Guadarama river and by the Tagus in succession, and the farther he led his opponents from Talavera, without uncovering the line of La Mancha, the more certain the effect of Soult's operation: but here we have another proof that double external lines are essentially vicious.

The combined movement of the French was desirable, from the greatness of the object to be gained, and safe, from the powerful force on each point; and the occasion was so favourable that, notwithstanding the imprudent heat of Victor, the reluctance of Ney, and the unsteady temper of the king, the fate of the allies was, up to the evening of the 3d, heavy in the scale. Nevertheless, as the central position held by the allies, cut the line of correspondence between Joseph and Soult, the king's despatches were intercepted, and the whole operation, even at the last hour, was thus baffled. The first element of success in war is, that every thing should emanate from a single head; and it would have been preferable that the king, drawing the second and fifth corps to him by the pass of the Guadarama, or by that of Avila, should, with the eighty thousand men thus united, have fallen upon the allies in front. Such a combination, although of less brilliant promise than

the one adopted, would have been more sure; and the less a general trusts to fortune the better:—she is capricious!

When one Spanish army was surprised at Arzobispo, another completely beaten at Almonacid, and when Wilson's Portuguese corps was dispersed at Baños, the junta had just completed the measure of their folly by quarrelling with the British which was the only force left that could protect them. The French were, in truth, therefore, the masters of the Peninsula, but they terminated their operations at the very moment when, they should have pursued them with redoubled activity because the general aspect of affairs and the particular circumstances of the campaign were alike favourable. For Napoleon was victorious in Germany; and of the British expeditions against Italy and Holland, the former had scarcely struggled into life,—the latter was already corrupting in death. Hence, Joseph might have been assured that he would receive reinforcements, but that none, of any consequence, could reach his adversaries; and, in the Peninsula, there was nothing to oppose him. Navarre, Biscay, Aragon, and the Castiles were subdued; Gerona closely beleaguered, and the rest of Catalonia, if not quiescent, totally unable to succour that noble city. Valencia was inert; the Asturias still trembling; in Galicia there was nothing but confusion. Remana, commanding fifteen thousand infantry, but neither cavalry nor artillery, was then at Coruña, and dared not quit the mountains. The duke del Parque held Ciudad Rodrigo, but was in no condition to make head against more than a French division. The battle of Almonacid had cleared La Mancha of troops. Estremadura and Andalusia were, as we have seen, weak, distracted, and incapable of solid resistance. There remained only the English and Portuguese armies, the one being at Jaraicejo, the other at Moraleja.

The line of resistance may, therefore, be said to have extended from the Sierra Morena to Coruña—weak from its length; weaker, that the allied corps, being separated by mountains, by rivers, and by vast tracts of country, and having different bases of operation, such as Lisbon, Seville, and Ciudad Rodrigo, could not act in concert, except offensively; and with how little effect in that way the campaign of Talavera had proved. But the French were concentrated in a narrow space, and, having only Madrid to cover, were advantageously situated for offensive or defensive movements. The allied forces were, for the most part, imperfectly organised, and would not, altogether, have amounted to ninety thousand fighting men. The French were above one hundred thousand, dangerous from their discipline and experience, more dangerous that they held a central position, and that their numbers were unknown to their opponents; and, moreover, having, in four days, gained one general and two minor battles, their courage was high and eager.

At this period, by the acknowledgement of the Spaniards themselves, the fate of the country depended entirely upon the British troops, and, doubtless, the latter were soldiers of no ordinary stamp; yet there is a limit to human power, in war as well as in other matters.* Sir Arthur Wellesley was at the head of some seventeen thousand men, of all arms, and about five thousand were between Lisbon and Alcantara: but the whole French army could, in two days, have been concentrated in the valley of the Tagus. Soult, alone, of all the associated generals, appears to have viewed this crisis with the eye of a great commander. Had he been permitted to follow up the attack at Arzobispo, on the 8th of August, what could the seventeen thousand starving British troops, encumbered with the ter-

* See Calvo Garay and Lord Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

ror-stricken Spaniards, have effected against the seventy thousand French that would have stormed their positions on three sides at once? The hardy, enduring English infantry might, indeed, have held their ground in one battle, but could they have fought a second? Would not a movement of the first corps by Guadalupe, would not famine alone, have forced the ten or twelve thousand men remaining (if, indeed, so many were left) to abandon the banks of the Tagus, to abandon, also, their parcels of ammunition and their wounded men, and to retreat towards Portugal? and to retreat also, with little hope, harassed, as they would have been, by six thousand horsemen, for Soult had eighteen regiments of cavalry.

Let it be supposed, however, that the strength of the Meza d'Ibor and the Mirabete had baffled all the enemy's efforts, and that, seeing the allies fixed in those positions, the sixth corps, in pursuance of Soult's second proposal, had crossed the frontier of Portugal: sir Arthur Wellesley, contemplating such an event, affirmed that he meant to follow them in any movement they might make against Lisbon.* There were, however, two ways of following, the one by the south and the other by the north bank of the Tagus. Now, if he designed to cross the Tagus at the Cardinal's bridge, and so, connecting his right with Beresford, to hang on the enemy's rear, it could only have been while he was ignorant of Venegas' defeat, and when he imagined the French to have but thirty thousand men in the valley of the Tagus; but they had above seventy thousand; and, without endangering Madrid, they could have invaded Portugal with, at least, fifty thousand men under arms. If, on the other hand, he designed to move by the south side of the Tagus, the French line of march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was shorter than his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on the 12th, would have been cut off, and thrown back upon Almeida. It is true that marshal Ney alleged the difficulty of feeding the troops in the country about Plasencia and Coria, and the prudence of Soult's project might, in that respect, have been somewhat questionable. But the duke of Elchingen was averse to *any* invasion of Portugal, and, to an unwilling mind, difficulties enlarge beyond their due proportion; moreover, his talents were more remarkable in a battle than in the dispositions for a campaign, and Soult's opinion must, on this occasion, be allowed greater weight; because the Vera de Plasencia and the valleys of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were exceedingly fertile, and had been little injured, and the object was, not to fix a base of operations, but to obtain a momentary subsistence until a richer country could be opened.

Admitting, however, that a march on Lisbon was not feasible at that moment, there could have been no well-founded objection to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The emperor's instructions were indeed pleaded, but those were general, and founded on the past errors of the campaign, which made him doubtful of the future; they were not applicable to the peculiar circumstances of the moment, and would have been disregarded by a general with a tithe of his own genius. Fortunately for Spain, the intrusive king was not a great commander; when he might have entered the temple of victory with banners flying, he stretched himself at the threshold and slept.

The departure of the English army was a remarkable epoch in the Peninsular war. The policy of combining operations with the Spanish armies, and of striking directly at the great masses of the French, had been fairly acted upon, and had failed; and the long cherished delusion, relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency, was at last dissipated. The trans-

actions of the campaign of 1809 form a series of practical comments upon the campaign of 1808. All the objections which had been made to sir John Moore's conduct, being put to the test of experience, proved illusory, while the soundness of that general's views were confirmed in every particular. The leading events of the two campaigns bear a striking resemblance to each other.

Both sir Arthur Wellesley and sir John Moore advanced from Portugal to *aid the Spanish armies*. The first general commanded about twenty thousand, the last about twenty-three thousand men; but there was this difference: that, in 1808, Portugal was so disorganised as to require a British force to keep down anarchy; whereas, in 1809, Portugal formed a good base of operations, and a Portuguese army was acting in co-operation with the British.

Sir John Moore was joined by six thousand men, under Romana, and there was no other Spanish army in existence to aid him.

Sir Arthur Wellesley was joined by thirty-eight thousand Spaniards, under Cuesta, and he calculated upon twenty-six thousand, under Venegas; while from twenty to twenty-five thousand others were acting in Galicia and Leon.

Sir John Moore was urgent to throw himself into the heart of Spain, to aid a people represented as abounding in courage and every other military virtue. Judging of what he could not see by that which was within his view, he doubted the truth of these representations, and thinking that a powerful army, commanded by a man of the greatest military genius, was likely to prove formidable, he was unwilling to commit his own small force in an unequal contest. Nevertheless, feeling that some practicable demonstration of the difficulties to be encountered was required by the temper of the times, he made a movement, too delicate and dangerous to be adopted, unless for a great political as well as military purpose. To relieve the southern provinces, and to convince the English government and the English public that they had taken a false view of affairs, were the objects of his advance to the Carrion river; but, although he carried his army forward with a boldness that marked the consciousness of superior talents, he never lost sight of the danger he was incurring by exposing his flank to the French emperor. To obviate this danger as much as possible, he established a second line of retreat upon Galicia, and he kept a watchful eye upon the cloud gathering at Madrid. Arrived in front of Soult's corps, and being upon the point of attacking him, the expected storm burst, but, by a rapid march to Benevente, Moore saved himself from being taken in flank and rear and destroyed. Benevente was, however, untenable against the forces brought up by Napoleon, and the retreat being continued to Coruña, the army, after a battle, embarked.

It was objected—1. That Moore should have gone to Madrid;—2. That he should have fought at Astorga, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo, instead of at Coruña;—3. That he overrated the strength of the enemy, and undervalued the strength and enthusiasm of the Spaniards; and that, being of a desponding temper, he lost the opportunity of driving the French beyond the Ebro, for, that a battle gained (and it was assumed that a battle must have been gained had he attacked) would have assuredly broken the enemy's power, and called forth all the energies of Spain.

Sir John Moore reasoned that the Spanish enthusiasm was not great, that it evaporated in boasting and promises, which could not be relied upon; that the British army was sent as an auxiliary, not as a principal force, and that the native armies being all dispersed before he could come to their assistance, the enemy was far too strong to contend with single-handed;

wherefore, it was prudent to re-embark, and to choose some other base of operations, to be conducted upon sounder views of the actual state of affairs, or to give up the contest altogether; for that little or no hope of final success could be entertained, unless the councils and dispositions of the Spaniards changed for the better. He died; and the English ministers, adopting the reasoning of his detractors, once more sent an auxiliary army to Spain, although the system still existed which he had denounced as incompatible with success.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, a general of their own choice, and assuredly a better could not have been made, was placed at the head of this army; and, after giving to Soult a heavy blow on the Douro, he also advanced to deliver Spain. Like sir John Moore, he was cramped for the want of money, and, like Sir John Moore, he was pestered with false representations, and a variety of plans, founded upon short-sighted views, and displaying great ignorance of the art of war; but, finally, he adopted, and, as far as the inveterate nature of the people he had to deal with would permit, executed a project, which, like sir John Moore's, had for its object to overpower the French in his front, and, by forcing them to concentrate, relieve the distant provinces; and give full play to the enthusiasm of the Spaniards.

When sir John Moore advanced, there were no Spanish armies to assist him; the French were above three hundred and twenty thousand strong, and of these two hundred and fifty thousand were disposable to move against any point; moreover, they were commanded in person by Napoleon, of whom it has been said by the duke of Wellington, that his presence, alone, was equal to forty thousand good troops.

When sir Arthur Wellesley advanced, the French forces in the Peninsula did not exceed two hundred and sixty thousand men, of which only one hundred thousand could be brought to bear on his operations; and he was assisted by sixty thousand Spaniards, well armed, and tolerably disciplined. His plans were certainly laid with great ability upon the data furnished to him, but he trusted to Spanish promises and to Spanish energy, and he did not fail to repent his credulity. He delivered and gained that battle which sir John Moore had been reproached for not essaying; but it was found that a veteran French army, even of inferior numbers, was not to be destroyed, or even much dispirited, by one defeat; and while this battle was fighting, Soult, with fifty thousand men, came down upon the flank and rear of the English, a movement precisely similar to that which Napoleon had made from Madrid upon the flank and rear of sir John Moore. This last general saved himself by crossing the Esla, in the presence of the French patrols; and in like manner, sir Arthur evaded destruction by crossing the Tagus, within view of the enemy's scouts; so closely timed was the escape of both.

When sir John Moore retreated, the Spanish government, reproaching him, asserted that the French were on the point of ruin, and Romana, even at Astorga, continued to urge offensive operations.

When sir Arthur Wellesley retired from Jaraceijo, the junta in the same manner asserted that the French were upon the point of retreating from Spain, and general Eguía proposed offensive operations.

In explaining his motives, and discussing the treatment he had met with, sir John Moore wrote thus to his own government: "*The British were sent to aid the Spanish armies, but they are not equal to encounter the French, who have at least eighty thousand men, and we have nothing to expect from the Spaniards, who are not to be trusted; they are apathetic, lethargic, quick to promise, backward to act, improvident, insensible to the shame of flying before the enemy, they*

refuse all assistance, and I am obliged to leave ammunition, stores and money, behind. The Spanish armies have shewn no resolution, the people no enthusiasm nor daring spirit, and that which has not been shown hitherto, I know not why it should be expected to be displayed hereafter." Such were his expressions.

When sir Arthur Wellesley had proved the Spaniards, he, also, writing to his government, says:—"We are here worse off than in a hostile country; never was an army so ill used;—the Spaniards have made all sorts of promises;—we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army; on the contrary, we were obliged to lay down our ammunition, to unload the treasure, and to employ the cars in the removal of our sick and wounded. The common dictates of humanity have been disregarded by them; and I have been obliged to leave ammunition, stores, and money behind. *Whatever is to be done must be done by the British army, but that is certainly not capable, singly, to resist a French army of at least seventy thousand men.*"

The last advice given to the government, by sir John Moore, was against sending an auxiliary force to Spain. Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the same spirit, withdrew his troops; and, from that moment, to the end of the struggle, he warred, indeed, for Spain, and in Spain, but never with Spain. "I have fished in many troubled waters, but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again," was his expression, when speaking of this campaign; and he kept his word. That country became, indeed, a field, on which the French and English armies contended for the destiny of Europe; but the defeats or victories, the promises or the performances of the Spaniards scarcely influenced the movements. Spain, being left to her own devices, was beaten in every encounter, foiled in every project, yet made no change in her policy; and while Portugal endeavoured to raise her energy on a level with that of her ally, Spain sought to drag down England to the depth of folly and weakness, in which she herself was plunged. The one would not sacrifice an atom of false pride to obtain the greatest benefits; the other submitted, not with abject dependence, but with a magnanimous humility, to every mortification, rather than be conquered; and the effects of their different modes were such as might be expected. Portugal, although assaulted by an infinitely greater number of enemies, in proportion to her strength, overthrew the oppressors the moment they set foot upon her soil; while in Spain, town after town was taken, army after army dispersed, every battle a defeat, and every defeat sensibly diminished the heat of resistance.

Napoleon once declared that a nation resolved to be free could not be conquered, and the Spaniards re-echoed the sentiment in their manifestos, as if to say it was all that was necessary. But Napoleon contemplated a nation, like the Portuguese, making use of every means of defence, whether derived from themselves or their alliances; not a people puffed with conceit, and lavish of sounding phrases, such as "perishing under the ruins of the last wall," yet beaten with a facility that rendered them the derision of the world; a people unable to guide themselves, yet arrogantly refusing all advice. Such a nation is ripe for destruction, and such a nation was Spain.

The campaign of 1809 finished the third epoch of the war, and it was prolific of instruction. The jealousy of the French marshals, the evils of disunion, the folly of the Spanish government, and the absurdity of the Spanish character, with respect to public affairs, were placed in the strongest light; while the vast combinations, the sanguinary battles, the singular changes of fortune, the result so little suitable to the greatness of the efforts, amply demonstrated the difficulty and the uncertainty of military affairs. It was a campaign replete with interest; a great lesson from which a great

commander profited: sir Arthur Wellesley had now experienced the weakness of his friends and the strength of his enemies, and he felt all the emptiness of public boasting. Foreseeing that if the contest was to be carried on, it must be in Portugal, and that unless he himself could support the cause of the Peninsula, it must fall, his manner of making war changed; his caution increased tenfold, yet, abating nothing of his boldness, he met and baffled the best of the French legions in the fulness of their strength. He was alike unmoved by the

intrigues of the Portuguese regency, and by the undisguised hatred of the Spanish government; and when some of his own generals, and two of them on his personal staff, denouncing his rashness and predicting the ruin of the army, caused the puny energy of the English ministers to quail as the crisis approached, he, with gigantic vigour, pushed aside these impediments, and, steadily holding on his own course, proved himself a sufficient man, whether to uphold or to conquer kingdoms.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

Inactivity of the Asturians and Gallicians—Guerilla system in Navarre and Aragon—The Partidas surround the third corps—Blake abandons Aragon—Suchet's operations against the Partidas—Combat of Tremedal—The advantages of Suchet's position—Troubles at Pampeluna—Suchet ordered by Napoleon to repair there—Observations on the Guerilla system.

WHEN Galicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy's principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly used. Kellerman's division at Valladolid, and Bonet's at San Andero, sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were collaterally, as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts, the war was steadily progressive in favour of the French, yet their career was one of pains and difficulties.

Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre so submissive, that the artillery employed against Zaragoza, was conveyed by the country people, without an escort, from Pampeluna to Tudela. But when the battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the Guerilla system commenced in those parts; and as the chiefs acquired reputation at the moment when Blake was losing credit by defeats, the dispersed soldiers flocked to their standards, hoping thus to cover past disgrace, and to live with a greater license; because the regular armies suffered under the restraints without enjoying the benefits of discipline, while the irregulars purveyed for themselves. Thus, Zaragoza being surrounded by rugged mountains, every range became the mother of a Guerilla brood; nor were the regular partisan corps less numerous than the Partidas.

On the left of the Ebro, the Catalan colonels, Baget, Perena, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo, brought their Migueletes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca and Barbastro. In this position, commanding the sources of the Cinca and operating on both sides of that river, they harassed the communication between Zaragoza and the French out-posts, and maintained an intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon.

On the right of the Ebro, troops, raised in the district of Molina, were united to the corps of Gayan, and that officer, entering the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced guards even to the plain of Zaragoza, and occupied Nuestra Senora del Aguilar; this convent,

situated on the top of a high rock near Carineña, he made his depôt for provisions and ammunition, and surrounded the building with an entrenched camp.

On Gayan's left, general Villa Campa, a man of talent and energy, established himself at Calatayud, with the regular regiments of Soria and La Princesa, and making fresh levies, rapidly formed a large force, with which he cut the direct line between Zaragoza and Madrid.

Beyond Villa Campa's positions the circle of war was continued by other hands, which, descending from the Moncayo mountains, infested the districts of Tarazona and Berja, and intercepted the communications between Tudela and Zaragoza. The younger Mina, called the student, vexed the country between Tudela and Pampeluna; and the inhabitants of the high Pyrenean valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, were also in arms, under Renovalles. This officer, taken at Zaragoza, was, by the French, said to have broken his parole, but he pleaded a previous breach of the capitulation, and having escaped to Lerida passed from thence, with some regular officers, into the valleys, where he surprised several French detachments. His principal post was at the convent of San Juan de la Pena, which is built on a rock, remarkable in Spanish history as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish conquerors; the bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested in the church, and the whole rock was held in veneration by the Aragonese, and supposed to be invulnerable. From this post Saraza, acting under Renovalles, continually menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget, Pedroza, and Father Theobaldo, completed, as it were, the investment of the third corps.

All these bands, amounting to, at least, twenty thousand armed men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men, intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts of the French army. Meanwhile Blake having rallied his fugitives at Tortosa, abandoned Aragon, and proceeding to Tarazona, endeavoured to keep the war alive in Catalonia.

Suchet, in following up his victory at Belchite, had sent detachments as far as Morella, on the borders of Valencia, and pushed his scouting parties close up to Tortosa. Finding the dispersion of Blake's troops complete, he posted Meunier's division on the line of the Guadalupe, with orders to repair the castle of Alcanitz, so as to form a head of cantonnments on the right bank of the Ebro; then crossing that river at Caspe with the rest of the army, he made demonstrations

against Mequinenza, and even menaced Lerida, obliging the governor to draw in his detachments, and close the gates. After this he continued his march by Fraga, recrossed the Cinca, and leaving Habert's division to guard that line, returned himself in the latter end of June to Zaragoza by the road of Mönzon.

Having thus dispersed the regular Spanish forces and given full effect to his victory, the French general sought to fix himself firmly in the positions he had gained. Sensible that arms may win battles, but cannot render conquest permanent, he projected a system of civil administration which might enable him to support his troops, and yet offer some security of property to those inhabitants who remained tranquil. But, as it was impossible for the people to trust to any system, or to avoid danger, while the mountains swarmed with the *Partidas*, Suchet resolved to pursue the latter without relaxation, and to put down all resistance in Aragon before he attempted to enlarge the circle of his conquests; and he knew that while he thus laid a solid base for further operations, he should also form an army capable of executing any enterprise.

Commencing on the side of Jaca, he dislodged the Spaniards from their positions near that castle, in June, and supplied it with ten months' provisions. After this operation, Almunia and Carineña, on the right of the Ebro, were occupied by his detachments, and having suddenly drawn together four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers at the latter point, he surrounded Nuestra Señora del Aguilar, during the night of the 19th, destroyed the entrenched camp, and sent a detachment in pursuit of Gayan. On the same day, Pedrosa was repulsed on the other side of the Ebro, near Barbastro, and general Habert also defeated Perena. The troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed his corps at Uzed, Daroca was occupied by the French, and the vicinity of Calatayud and the mountains of Moncayo were then scoured by detachments from Zaragoza, one of which took possession of the district of Cinco Villas. Meanwhile Jaca was continually menaced by the Spaniards of St. Juan de la Pena, and Saraza, descending from thence by the valley of the Gallego, on the 23d of August, surprised and slew a detachment of seventy men close to Zaragoza. On the 26th, however, five French battalions stormed the sacred rock, and penetrated up the valleys of Anso and Echo in pursuit of Renovallas; nevertheless, that chief, retiring to Roncal, obtained a capitulation for the valley without surrendering himself.

These operations having, in a certain degree, cleared Aragon of the bands on the side of Navarre and Castile, the French general turned against those on the side of Catalonia. Baget, Perena, and Pedrosa, were chased from the Sierra de Guarra, but rallied between the Cinca and the Noguerra, and were there joined by Renovallas, who assumed the chief command; on the 23d of September, however, the whole were routed by general Habert, the men dispersed, and the chiefs took refuge in Lerida and Mequinenza. Suchet then occupied Fraga, Candanos, and Monzon, established a flying bridge on the Cinca, near the latter town, raised some field-works to protect it, and that done, resolved to invade the districts of Venasques and Benevarres, the subjection of which would have secured his left flank, and opened a new line of communication with France. The inhabitants, having notice of his project, assembled in arms, and being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the defeated *Partizans*, menaced a French regiment posted at Graus. Colonel La Peyrolerie, the commandant, marched the 17th of October, by Roda, to meet them, but having reached a certain distance up the valley, was surrounded, yet he broke through in the night, and regained his post. During his absence the peasantry of the vicinity came down to kill his sick men, the townsmen of Graus opposed this barbarity,

and marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct was not rare in Aragonese towns.

While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, the governor of Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candanos to be attacked, and some sharp fighting took place. The French maintained their posts, but the whole circle of their cantonments being still infested by the smaller bands, petty actions were fought at Belchite, and on the side of Molino, at Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina still intercepted the communications with Pampeluna; and Villa Campa, quitting Calatayud, rallied Gayan's troops, and gathered others on the rocky mountain of Tremendal, where a large convent and church once more furnished a citadel for an entrenched camp. Against this place colonel Henriod marched from Daroca, with from fifteen hundred to two thousand men and three pieces of artillery, and driving back some advanced posts from Ojos Negros and Origuella, came in front of the main position at eleven o'clock in the morning of the 25th of November.

COMBAT OF TREMENDAL.

The Spaniards were on a mountain, from the centre of which a tongue of land shooting out, overhung Origuella, and on the upper part of this tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. To the right and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, and Henriod, seeing that Villa Campa was too strongly posted to be beaten by an open attack, skirmished as if he would turn the right of the position by the road of Albaracin. Villa Campa was thus induced to mass his forces on that side, and in the night, the fire of the bivouacs enabled the Spaniards to see that the main body of the French troops and the baggage were retiring, while Henriod, with six chosen companies and two pieces of artillery, coming against the centre, suddenly drove the Spanish outposts into the fortified convent, and opened a fire with his guns, as if to cover the retreat. This cannonade, however, soon ceased, and Villa Campa, satisfied that the French had retired, was thrown completely off his guard; Henriod's six companies then secretly scaled the rocks of the position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards, killed and wounded five hundred, and put the whole army to flight. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made against the valley of Venasque, which being successful, that district was disarmed.

Petty combats still continued to be fought in other parts of Aragon, but the obstinacy of the Spaniards gradually gave way. In December, Suchet, (assisted by general Milhaud, with a moveable column from Madrid,) took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the insurgent junta fled to Valencia, and thus the subjection of Aragon was, in a manner, effected; for the interior was disarmed and quieted, and the *Partidas*, which still hung upon the frontiers, were obliged to recruit and be supplied from other provinces, and acted chiefly on the defensive. The Aragonese were indeed so vexed by the smaller bands, now dwindling into mere banditti, that a smuggler of Barbastro asked leave to raise a Spanish corps, with which he chased and suppressed many of them.

The reinforcements now pouring into Spain enabled the French general to prepare for extended operations. The original Spanish army of Aragon was reduced to about eight thousand men, of which, a part were wandering with Villa Campa, a part were in Tortosa, and the rest about Lerida and Mequinenza; those fortresses were, in fact, the only obstacles to a junction of the third with the seventh corps, and in them the Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge, when closely pressed by the invaders.

The policy of the supreme junta was always to form fresh corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa, keeping in the mountains of Al-

baracin, recruited his ranks, and still infested the western frontier of Aragon: Garcia Navarro, making Tortosa his base of operations, lined the banks of the Algas, and menaced Alcanitz; and Perena, trusting to the neighbourhood of Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the Segre. However, the activity of the French gave little time to effect any considerable organization.

Suchet's positions formed a circle round Zaragoza. Tudela, Jaca, and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned, but his principal forces were on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcanitz, Caspe, Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and Venasque; of these, the first, third, and fourth were places of strength, and, whether his situation be regarded in a political, or a military light, it was become most important. One year had sufficed, not only to reduce the towns and break the armies, but in part to conciliate the feelings of the Aragonese—at that time, confessedly the most energetic portion of the nation—and to place the third corps, with reference to the general operations of the war, in a most formidable position.

1. The fortified castle of Alcanitz formed a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro, and being situated at the entrance of the passes leading into Valencia, furnished a base, from which Suchet could invade that rich province; and by which also, he could place the Catalanian army between two fires, whenever the seventh corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat.

2. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the third corps, while Fraga, with its wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons.

3. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida; and its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all the country between Lerida and Venasques; moreover, a co-operation of the garrison of Monzon, the troops at Barbastro, and those at Benevarres, could always curb Perena.

4. The possession of Venasques permitted Suchet to communicate with the moveable columns, (appointed to guard the French frontier,) while the castle of Jaca rendered the third corps in a manner independent of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca and the Guadalupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected the operations of the third with the seventh corps, and henceforward we shall find these two armies gradually approximating until they formed but one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against the south.

Suchet's projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in Navarre, which, at this period, assumed a serious aspect. The student Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, by hardy and sudden enterprizes, kept the Navarrese in commotion. The duke of Mahon, one of Joseph's Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of Navarre, was at variance with the military authorities, and all the disorders attendant on a divided administration, and a rapacious system, ensued. General D'Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of being in Mina's pay, and his suicide during an investigation seems to confirm the suspicion, but it is certain that the whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, venal, and weak.

To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, the emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the third corps, and that general soon restored order in Pampeluna, and eventually captured Mina himself; yet he was unable to suppress the system of the Partidas. "*Espoz y Mina*" took his nephew's place; and from that time to the end of the war, the communications of the French were troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by

this celebrated man—undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the Partida chiefs. And here it may be observed how weak and inefficient this guerrilla system was to deliver the country, and that, even as an auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by the evils.

It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the greatest injury to the French cause; and it was precisely in those provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain: a fact leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succours may be hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted, men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own exertions. But however this may be, it is certain that the Partidas of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at one time to above thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms, and often commanded by men of undoubted enterprize and courage, never occupied half their own number of French at one time; never absolutely defeated a single division; never prevented any considerable enterprize; never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the operations of a single "corps d'armee."

It is true, that if a whole nation will but persevere in such a system, it must in time destroy the most numerous armies. But no people will thus persevere, the aged, the sick, the timid, the helpless, are all hinderers of the bold and robust. There will, also, be a difficulty to procure arms, for it is not on every occasion that so rich and powerful a people as the English, will be found in alliance with insurrection; and when the invaders follow up their victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case with Suchet and some others of the French generals, the result is certain. The desire of ease natural to mankind, prevails against the suggestions of honour; and although the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke, the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and tranquil. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the violent measures resorted to by the Partida chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters from the French and even from the British formed one-third of their bands.

To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy, but to direct the energy thus aroused, is a gigantic task, and, if misdirected, the result will be more injurious than advantageous. That it was misdirected in Spain was the opinion of many able men of all sides, and to represent it otherwise, is to make history give false lessons to posterity. Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of lord Wellington, but that great man, instead of following the example of the supreme junta, and encouraging independent bands, enforced a military organization upon totally different principles. The people were, indeed, called upon and obliged to resist the enemy, but it was under a regular system, by which all classes were kept in just bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation rendered subservient to the plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently is to confess weakness: it is to say that the government being unequal to the direction of affairs permits anarchy.

The Partida system in Spain, was the offspring of disorder, and disorder in war is weakness accompanied by ills the least of which is sufficient to produce ruin. It is in such a warfare, that habits of unbridled license, of unprincipled violence, and disrespect for the rights of property are quickly contracted, and render men unfit for the duties of citizens; and yet it has with singular inconsistency been cited, as the best and surest mode of resisting an enemy, by politicians, who hold

regular armies in abhorrence, although a high sense of honour, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance, regularity, and decent manners are of the very essence of the latter's discipline.

Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one great man is sufficient to save a nation: but when every person is permitted to make war in the manner most agreeable to himself;—for one that comes forward with patriotic intentions, there will be two to act from personal interest; in short, there will be more robbers than generals. One of the first exploits of Espez y Mina was to slay the commander of a neighbouring band, because, under the mask of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen: * nay, this the most fortunate of all the chiefs, would never suffer any other Partida than his own to be in his district; he also, as I have before related, made a species of commercial treaty with the French, and strove earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the dignity of a regular force. Nor was this manner of considering the guerilla system confined to the one side. The following observations of St. Cyr, a man of acknowledged talents, show that, after considerable experience of this mode of warfare, he also felt that the evil was greater than the benefit.

"Far from casting general blame on the efforts made by the Catalans, I admired them; but, as they often exceeded the bounds of reason, their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times it caused the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without advantage.

"When a country is invaded by an army stronger than that which defends it, it is beyond question that the population should come to the assistance of the troops, and lend them every support; but, without an absolute necessity, the former should not be brought on to the field of battle."—"It is inhuman to place their inexperience in opposition to hardened veterans.

"Instead of *exasperating* the people of Catalonia, the leaders should have endeavoured to *calm* them, and have directed their ardour so as to second the army on great occasions. But they excited them without cessation, led them day after day into fire, fatigued them, harassed them, forced them to abandon their habitations, to embark if they were on the coast, if inland to take to the mountains and perish of misery within sight of their own homes, thus abandoned to the mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The people's ardour was exhausted daily in partial operations, and hence, on great occasions, when they could have been eminently useful, they were not to be had.

"Their good will had been so often abused by the folly of their leaders, that many times their assistance was called for in vain. The peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, began to demand in their turn. They insisted that the soldiers should fight always to the last gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and ill-used them when broken by defeat.

"They had been so excited, so exasperated against the French, that they became habitually ferocious, and their ferocity was often as dangerous to their own party, as to the enemy. The atrocities committed against their own chiefs disgusted the most patriotic, abated their zeal, caused the middle classes to desire peace as the only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. Numbers of distinguished men, even those who had vehemently opposed Joseph at first, began to abandon Ferdinand; and it is certain that, but for the expedition to Russia, that branch of the Bourbons which reigns in Spain, would never have remounted the throne.

"The cruelties exercised upon the French military were as little conformable to the interest of the Spaniards. Those men were but the slaves of their duty,

and of the state; certain of death a little sooner or a little later, they, like the Spaniards, were victims of the same ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted warfare; but the treatment experienced from the Catalans brought out this disposition prematurely; and that unhappy people were themselves the victims of a cruelty, which either of their own will or excited by others, they had exercised upon those troops that fell into their power; and this without any advantage to their cause, while a contrary system would, in a little time, have broken up the seventh corps,—seeing that the latter was composed of foreigners, naturally inclined to desert. But the murders of all wounded, and sick, and helpless men, created such horror, that the desertion, which at first menaced total destruction, ceased entirely."

Such were St. Cyr's opinions; and, assuredly, the struggle in Catalonia, of which it is now the time to resume the relation, was not the least successful in Spain.

CHAPTER II.

Continuation of the operations in Catalonia—St. Cyr sends Lecchi to the Ampurdan; he returns with the intelligence of the Austrian war—Of Verdier's arrival in the Ampurdan, and of Augereau's appointment to the command of the seventh corps—Augereau's inflated proclamation—It is torn down by the Catalonians—He remains sick at Perpignan—St. Cyr continues to command—Refuses to obey Joseph's orders to remove into Aragon—Presses Verdier to commence the siege of Gerona—Reinforces Verdier—Remains himself at Vich—Constancy of the Spaniards—St. Cyr marches from Vich, defeats three Spanish battalions, and captures a convoy—Storms St. Felieu de Quixols—Takes a position to cover Verdier's operations—Siege of Gerona—State of the contending parties—Assault of Monjouic fails—General Fontanes storms Palamos—Wimphen and the Milans make a vain attempt to throw succours into Gerona—Monjouic abandoned.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

THE narrative of the Catalonian affairs was broken off at the moment, when St. Cyr having established his quarters at Vich, received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had been relieved by the squadron of Admiral Comaso.* His whole attention was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening general Reille's preparation for the siege of that place, a second detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded to Ampurdan. During this time Coupigny continued at Taragona, and Blake made his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans and Wimphen, had composed Reding's left wing, were continually skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich, and the Partizans, especially Claros and the doctor Rovira, molested the communications in a more systematic manner than before.

Lecchi returned about the 18th of May, with intelligence that Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that general Verdier had replaced Reille in the Ampurdan, and that marshal Augereau had reached Perpignan in his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the command of the seventh corps. The latter part of this information gave St. Cyr infinite discontent. In his "Journal of Operations," he asserts that his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and his own observations on the occasion are sarcastic and contemptuous of his rival.

Augereau, who having served in Catalonia during the war of the revolution, imagined, that he had then acquired an influence which might be revived on the present occasion, framed a proclamation that vied with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes; but the latter, although turgid, were in unison with the feelings of the people, whereas, Augereau's address, being at utter variance with those feelings, was a pure folly.

* Extract from the Life of Mina.

* See page 152.

This proclamation he sent into Catalonia, escorted by a battalion, but even on the frontier, the Miguelette colonel, Porta, defeated the escort, and tore down the few copies that had been posted. Augereau, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan, and St. Cyr continued to command, but reluctantly, because (as he affirms) the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon's ill-will. The most serious of these affronts was permitting Verdier to correspond directly with the minister of war in France, and the publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr's. For these reasons, the latter says he contented himself with a simple discharge of his duty. But, after the conspiracy in the second corps, Napoleon cannot be justly blamed for coldness towards an officer, who, however free himself from encouraging the malcontents in the French army, was certainly designed for their leader; it is rather to be admired that the emperor discovered so little jealousy. When a man has once raised himself to the highest power, he must inevitably give offence to his former comrades, for, as all honours and rewards, flowing from him, are taken as personal favours, so all checks and slights, or even the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries. Where the sanction of time is wanting to identify the sovereign with the country, the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is patriotism.

While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as we have seen, directed him to march into Aragon, to repel Blake's movement against Suchet.* This order he refused to obey, and with reason; for it would have been a great error to permit Blake's false movement to occupy two "corps d'armée," and so retard the siege of Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia. Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the Spaniard's possession. St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all his operations, was urgent, for many reasons, to commence the siege without delay; but Verdier, who had failed at Zaragoza, was cautious in attacking a town which had twice baffled Duhesme; and when pressed to begin, complained that he could not, after placing garrisons in Rosas and Figueras, bring ten thousand men before Gerona, which, seeing the great extent of the works, were insufficient.

St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that the garrison did not exceed three thousand men, that it could not well be increased, and that expedition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless, considering that a dépôt of provisions, established for the service of the siege at Figueras, and which it was unlikely Napoleon would replenish, must, by delay, be exhausted, as well as the supplies which he had himself collected at Vich, he sent all his own cannoniers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan, and having thus increased the number of troops there to eighteen thousand men, again urged Verdier to be expedite.

These reinforcements marched the 23d of May, and the covering army, diminished to about twelve thousand men under arms, continued to hold the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the Miguelettes often skirmished with the advanced posts, but without skill or profit; and the inhabitants of the town, always remained in the high mountains unsheltered and starving, yet still firm of resolution not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed partly to fear, but more to that susceptibility to grand sentiments, which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Al-

though little remarkable for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by their fortitude; men and women alike, they endure calamity with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly admirable. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and, continually instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigour to execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more than becomes either wise or brave men.

Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly all his corn, resolved to approach Gerona, and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in that district; but, previous to quitting Vich, he sent his sick and wounded men, under a strong escort, to Barcelona, and disposed his reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without loss. The army, loaded with as much grain as the men could carry, then commenced crossing the mountains which separate Vich from the districts of Gerona and Hostalrich. In two days it passed by Folgarolas, San Saturnino, Santa Hillario, and Santa Coloma de Farnes; the head-quarters were fixed at Caldas de Malavella on the 20th, the Fort of St. Felien de Quixols was stormed on the 21st, and the Spanish privateers driven to seek another harbour. The French then occupied a half circle, extending from St. Felien to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola, thus cutting off the communications between Gerona and the districts occupied by Coupigny, Wimphen, the Milans, and Claros.

During the march from Vich, the French defeated three Spanish battalions, and captured a convoy, coming from the side of Martorel, and destined for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners of Blake's army, a curious error, for Blake was, on that very day, being defeated at Belchite, two hundred miles from Santa Coloma. Strictly speaking, there was, at this period, no Catalan army, the few troops that kept the field were acting independently. Coupigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Taragona, where he and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and political intrigues than with military affairs, were thwarting each other. Thus the Spanish and French operations were alike weakened by internal divisions.

Verdier was slow, cautious, and more attentive to the facilities afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within the works; he, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the 6th of May, but it was not till the 4th of June that, reinforced with Lecchi's division, he completed the investment of the place on both sides of the Ter. On the 8th, however, ground was broken; and thus, at the very moment when Blake, with the main body of the army, was advancing against Zaragoza, in other words, seeking to wrest Aragon from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands.

THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA.

When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of the contending parties were as follows:—Eighteen thousand French held the Ampurdan, and invested the place. Of this number about four thousand were in Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier found the first-named place, notwithstanding its great importance, *destitute of a garrison*, when he arrived there from France. A fact consistent with Lord Collingwood's description of the Catalan warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigour attributed to them by others.

St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed, covered the siege with twelve thou-

* See page 209.

sand men, and Duhesme, having about ten thousand, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona.* Forty thousand French were, therefore, disposed between that city and Figueras; while, on the Spanish side, there was no preparation. Blake was still in Aragon; Cou-pigny, with six thousand of the worst troops, was at Taragona; the Milans watched Duhesme; Wimphen, with a few thousand, held the country about the Upper Llobregat; Juan Claros and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olat and Ripol; and, in the higher Catalonia, small bands of Miguelettes were dispersed under different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing their own system of warfare, not only disregarded the generals, as in the time of Reding, but fell upon and robbed the regular troops, whenever a favourable opportunity occurred. The Spanish privateers, dislodged from St. Filieu, now resorted to Palamos-bay, and the English fleet, under lord Collingwood, watched incessantly to prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels, from carrying provisions by the coast.

From Gerona, the governor did not fail to call loudly on the generals, and even on the *Supreme Central Junta*, for succours, but his cry was disregarded, and when the siege commenced, his garrison did not exceed three thousand regular troops, his magazines and hospitals were but scantily provided, and he had no money. Alvarez Mariano was, however, of a lofty spirit, great fortitude, and in no manner daunted.

The works of Gerona, already described, were little changed since the first siege; there, however, as in Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition, patriotism, and military regulations, the moral as well as physical force of the city had been called forth. There, likewise, a sickness, common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the ranks of the besiegers, and there also women were enrolled, under the title of the company of Sta. Barbara, to carry off the wounded, and to wait upon the hospitals, and at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers! To evince his own resolution, the governor forbade the mention of a capitulation under pain of death; but severe punishments were only denounced, not inflicted. Alvarez, master of his actions, and capable of commanding without phrenzy, had recourse to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate his defence was, and full of suffering to the besieged, yet free from the stain of cruelty, and rich in honour.

On the 4th of June the siege was begun, and, on the 12th, one mortar-battery, erected at Casen Rocca on the left of the Ter, and two breaching-batteries, established against Fort Monjouic, being ready to play, the town was summoned in form. The answer was an intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would be fired upon, which was the only proceeding indicative of the barbarian in the conduct of Alvarez.

The 13th the small suburb of Pedreto was taken possession of by the French, and early on the morning of the 14th, the batteries opened against Monjouic, while the town was bombarded from the Casen Rocca. The 17th the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally repulsed with the loss of above a hundred men.

The 19th the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, forming the outworks of Monjouic, being assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel also. The French immediately erected breaching-batteries, four hundred yards from the northern bastion of Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their works, but they made a practicable opening by the 4th of July, and with a strange temerity resolved to give the assault, although the flank fire of the works was not silenced, nor the glacis crown-

ed, nor the covered way or counterscarp injured, and that a half moon, in a perfect state, covered the approaches to the breach. The latter was proved by the engineers, in a false attack, on the night of the 4th, and the resolution to assault was then adopted, yet the storming-force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th; and during these four days as the batteries ceased to play, the Spaniards retrenched, and barricaded the opening.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column, jumping out of the trenches, rapidly cleared the space between them and the fort, descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault with great resolution; but the Spaniards had so strengthened the defences that no impression could be made, and the assailants taken in flank and rear by the fire from the half moon, the covered way, and the eastern bastion, were driven back. Twice they renewed the attempt, but their assault failed, with a loss of a thousand men killed and wounded. The success of the besieged was however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed the garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, situated between Monjouic and the city.

About the period of this assault which was given without St. Cyr's knowledge, the latter finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of Souham's division from Santa Coloma de Farnes, and posted it on the left of the Ter, at Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich were thus reduced to about eight thousand men under arms, although an effort to raise the siege was to be expected; for letters from Alvarez, urgently demanding succours of Blake, had been intercepted, and the latter, after his defeat in Aragon, was, as I have said, collecting men at Taragona.

Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before Blake could reach the scene of action, St. Cyr resolved to take Palamos. To effect this, general Fontaines marched from St. Filieu, on the 5th of July, with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some squadrons of dragoons. Twice he summoned the place, and the bearer being each time treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the attack; but in passing a flat part of the coast near Torre Valenti, they were cannonaded by six gun-boats so sharply, that they could not keep the road until the artillery had obliged the boats to sheer off.

STORMING OF PALAMOS.

This town having a good roadstead, and being only one march from Gerona, was necessarily a place of importance; and the works, although partly ruined, were so far repaired by the Catalans as to be capable of some defence. Twenty guns were mounted, and the town, built on a narrow rocky peninsula, had but one front, the approach to which was over an open plain completely commanded from the left by some very rugged hills, on which a considerable number of Somatenes were assembled, with their line touching upon the walls of the town. Fontanes drove the Somatenes from this position, and a third time, summoned the place to surrender. The bearer was killed, and the Italians immediately stormed the works. The Spaniards flying towards the shore endeavoured to get on board their vessels, but the latter put off to sea, and some of Fontanes' troops having turned the town during the action, intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the sword.

Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and the Milans, arriving near Hostalrich, began to harass Souham's outposts at Santa Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr's attention to that side, while a re-inforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left of his line into the city. The French General was not deceived, but fifteen hundred chosen men, under the

* Imperial Muster Roll, MSS.

command of one Marshal, an Englishman, endeavoured to penetrate secretly through the enemy's posts at Llagostera; they were accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishman also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing general Pino's posts unobserved. Unfortunately a straggler was taken, and St. Cyr being thus informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line of investment would be made in the night and by the road of Casa de Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point, and sent another in pursuit of the succouring column.

As the French general had foreseen, the Spaniards continued their march through the hills at dusk, but being suddenly fired upon by the ambuscade, hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the other troops, and lost a thousand men; the rest dispersing, escaped the enemy, yet were ill used and robbed of their arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Mr. Marshal having offered to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, and thus abandoned his men; but the Spanish general Coupigny affirmed that the men abandoned Marshal, and refused to fight; that Rich ran away before he had seen the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. It is also certain that Marshal's flight was to Gerona, where he afterwards fell fighting gallantly.

This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle had already reduced his garrison to fifteen hundred men, and he was thus debarred the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies as the enemy neared the walls; his resolution was unshaken, but he did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Coupigny, and even denounced his inactivity to the Supreme Junta. That general excused himself on the ground of Blake's absence, the want of provisions, and the danger of carrying the contagious sickness of Taragona into Gerona, and finally adduced colonel Marshal's unfortunate attempt, as a proof that due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had been invested two months, had sustained forty days of open trenches, a bombardment and an assault without any succour, and that during that time, he himself remained at Taragona, instead of being at Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect.

From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Coupigny nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona, until sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have forgotten; that with an open breach, a town, requiring six thousand men to man the works and having but fifteen hundred, might fall at any moment.

After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced his approaches in due form, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the little fort of St. Juan; his operations were, however, retarded by Claros and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French frontier; and to prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade from Souham's division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja.

The 2d of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel, situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort and Monjouic, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted the communication between the latter place and the city. The 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic being crowned, the counterscarp blown in and the flank defences ruined, the ditch was passed, and the half moon in front of the curtain carried by storm, but no lodgement was effected. During this day, Alvarez made an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan, and at the same time, two hundred Span-

iards who had come from the sea-coast with provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking that their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners.

On the 5th the engineers having ascertained that the northern bastion being hollow, the troops would, after storming it, be obliged to descend a scarp of twelve or fourteen feet, changed the line of attack, and commenced new approaches against the eastern bastion. A second practical breach was soon opened, and preparations made for storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after thirty-seven days of open trenches and one assault.

CHAPTER III.

Claros and Rovira attack Bascara and spread dismay along the French frontier—Two Spanish officers pass the Ter and enter Gerona with succours—Alvarez remonstrates with the junta of Catalonia—Bad conduct of the latter—Blake advances to the aid of the city—Pestilence there—Affects the French army—St. Cyr's firmness—Blake's timid operations—O'Donnell fights Souham, but without success—St. Cyr takes a position of battle—Garcia Conde forces the French lines and introduces a convoy into Gerona—Blake retires—Siege resumed—Garcia Conde comes out of the city—Ridiculous error of the French—Conde forces the French lines and escapes—Assault on Gerona fails—Blake advances a second time—Sends another convoy under the command of O'Donnell to the city—O'Donnell with the head of the convoy succeeds, the remainder is cut off—Blake's incapacity—He retires—St. Cyr goes to Perpignan—Augereau takes the command of the siege—O'Donnell breaks through the French lines—Blake advances a third time—Is beaten by Souham—Pino takes Hostalrich—Admiral Martin intercepts a French squadron—Captain Hollowell destroys a convoy in Rosas-bay—Distress in Gerona—Alvarez is seized with delirium, and the city surrenders—Observations.

VERDIER, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and asserted that fifteen days would suffice to take the town, in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding facts. The Spaniards, indignant at his undeserved contempt, redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira, at the head of two thousand five hundred Migueletes, attacked Bascara, a post between Figueras and Gerona, at the moment when a convoy, escorted by a battalion, had arrived there from Belgarde. The commandant of Figueras, uniting some "*gens d'armes*" and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succoured the post on the 6th, but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St. Cyr for three thousand men to protect the frontier. That general refused this ill-timed demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion to censure the system of moveable columns, as more likely to create than to suppress insurrections; as being harassing to the troops; weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the peasantry must always be more moveable than the columns, and better informed of their marches and strength. There is great force in these observations, and if an army is in such bad moral discipline that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times requiring a nice judgement, great talents, and excellent arrangement, was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the seventh

corps. Yet, with good officers and well combined plans, it is difficult to conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting the flanks and rear of an invading army, than that of moveable columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr's objections. The emperor's views, opinions, and actions, will, in defiance of all attempts to lessen them, go down, with a wonderful authority, to posterity.

A few days after the affair of Bascara, eight hundred volunteers, commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cañtera, quitted Olot, made a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening of the 10th, upon the Ter, in front of Angeles. and being baffled in an attempt to pass the river there, descended the left bank in the night, pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a ford near St. Pons, entered Gerona at day-break. This hardy exploit gave fresh courage to the garrison; yet the enemy's approaches hourly advanced, pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish general's outside the town still remained inactive. In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were not wanting to themselves; while defending the half ruined walls of Gerona with inflexible constancy, they failed not to remonstrate against the cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succoured them. The supreme junta of Catalonia, forwarded their complaints to the central junta at Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness of expression.

"The generals of our army," they said, "have formed no efficient plan for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they say that they act in conformity to a plan approved by your Majesty. Can it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to her own feeble resources? If so, her destruction is inevitable; and should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity, when they see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance when this most interesting place can obtain no help from them?—Do you not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is sufficient to freeze the ardour, to desolate the hearts of the most zealous defenders of our just cause? Let this bulwark of our frontier be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures, children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no longer any real existence."

In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree was passed to lend Catalonia every succour, and Blake received orders to make an immediate effort to raise the siege. But how little did the language of the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; but the supreme central junta were only intent upon thwarting and insulting the English general after the battle of Talavera; and this was the moment that the junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic with the pen, were selling, to foreign merchants, the arms supplied by England for the defence of their country!

Towards the end of August, when the French fire had made three breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Taragona with a force of eight or ten thousand regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the mountains to St. Hillario, where he was joined by Wimphen and the Milans. As he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he could direct a body of not less than twenty thousand

men against the circle of investment, and his arrival created considerable alarm among the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged, was also among the besiegers, and the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained many thousand patients, the battalions in the field could scarcely muster a third of their nominal strength. Even the generals were obliged to rise from sick beds to take the command of the brigades; and the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force, was extended along more than thirty miles of mountainous wooded country, intersected by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake's operations.

Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous action should oblige him to raise the long-protracted siege, notwithstanding his fore-boasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St. Cyr's best qualities were developed. A most learned and practised soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution, decided and prompt in council; and, although, apparently wanting in those original and daring views, which mark the man of superior genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, "that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed courage, and Blake's inaction was rather the thing to be dreaded; for, notwithstanding every effort, not more than two days' provisions could be procured, to supply the troops when together, and it would be necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner, that scarcely two thousand would be disposable at any given point. The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would probably act immediately; hence it was necessary to concentrate as many men as possible, in the course of the night and next day, and deliver battle; and there were still ten thousand good troops under arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing corps."

On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous indeed but by no means spirited, was, from frequent defeat, become cautious without being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting that the business of a relieving army is not to protract, but to raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia. He had collected and loaded with flour, about two thousand beasts of burthen, placed them in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under an escort of four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; and Garcia Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man, undertook to conduct them to Gerona, by the flat ground between the Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French attack. To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused colonel Henry O'Donnel to fall upon Sotham's posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of August, supporting this attack with another detachment under general Logoyri. At the same time he directed colonel Landen to collect the Miguelettes and Sematenes on the side of Palamos, and take possession of "*N. S. de los Angeles*," a convent, situated on a high mountain behind Monjuic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to pass.

O'Donnel, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of the position occupied by one of Sotham's battalions at Bruñola, but the latter, with an impetuous charge, again recovered the ground. The Spanish general, being then joined by Logoyri, renewed the skirmish, but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St. Cyr, having transferred his head-quarters to Fornels, was earnestly advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly,

that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side; partly that, being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in detail during their march. He however argued that his opponent must be exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his forces, and broken the covering line at once; wherefore, seeing that such an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own troops, on the Oña, by a flank march close under the beard of his unskilful adversary.

Souham's division, falling back in the night, took post the 1st of September, on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and at eight o'clock, the head of Pino's division entered this line, prolonging it, by the left, in rear of the village of Rieudelot. At twelve o'clock, these two divisions were established in position, and at the distance of four miles in their rear, Vierdier with a strong detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in reserve on the main road to Gerona. Lecchi was sick, and his troops, commanded by Millosewitz, took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the flat ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under Monjouic were guarded. The mortar battery of Casa Rocca was disarmed, and the Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to Sarria, and look to the security of the parc and the trenches.

A thick fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when the weather clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions; for the heads of Blake's columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas. Scarcely had the French general quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, who, under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains, crossed the Ter at Amer, and descended the heights of Bañolas with his convoy. He was now on the flat ground; having two thousand men under Millosewitz, placed, as I have said, at Salt to watch the garrison and the movements of Rovira at Claros, and consequently, with their rear to the advancing convoy.

Verdier's reserve, the nearest support, was six miles distant, and separated from Millosewitz by considerable heights, and the Spanish columns, coming into the plain without meeting a single French post, advanced unperceived close to the main body, and, with one charge, put the whole to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first took the direction of the town, but being fired upon, turned towards the heights of Palau, made for Fornels, and would have gone straight into Blake's camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from viewing that general's positions. Rallying and reinforcing them with a battalion from Pino's division, St. Cyr instantly directed them back again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow Garcia Conde with the reserve. It was too late, the latter had already entered the town, and Alvarez, sallying forth, destroyed the French works near St. Ugenio, and thinking the siege raised, had immediately sent five hundred sick men out of the town, into the convent of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by the French two days before. Verdier, after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his pares, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for when those two Partizans skirmished with the Westphalian troops, the latter retired across the Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars. Thus the place was succoured for a moment, but, as Blake made no further movement, Alvarez was little benefited by the success. The provisions received,

did not amount to more than seven or eight days' consumption, and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour this food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies.

While Millosewitz's troops were flying on the one side of the Ter, the reports of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake's army was victorious, and the French in flight; hence, he refrained from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the garrison, reinforced by Conde's men, might have filled the trenches, razed the batteries, and even retaken Monjouic before Verdier could have come to their support.

St. Cyr having now but one day's provisions left, resolved to seek Blake, and deliver battle; but the Spanish general retired up the mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so contemptible, with reference to the means at Blake's disposal, that Alvarez believed himself betrayed, and, trusting thenceforth only to his own heroism, permitted Conde's troops to go back, or to remain as they pleased; exacting, however, from those who stopped, an oath not to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half, and afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance, a measure which caused some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and citizens were as firm as their chief, and the townsmen freely sharing their own scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in every thing.

Garcia Conde's success must be attributed partly to the negligence of St. Cyr's subordinates; but the extended cantonments, occupied in the evening of the 31st, gave Blake, as the French general himself acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much danger or difficulty. Nor were St. Cyr's dispositions for the next day perfectly combined; it is evident that giving Blake credit for sound views, he was himself so expectant of a great battle that he forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to penetrate to the town; hence it was a fault to leave two thousand men in that place, with their front to the garrison, and their rear to the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to have been at too great a distance from the town; the firing that took place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier's reserve, and the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the fugitives themselves.

St. Cyr says that his generals of division were negligent, and so weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and, when his advice was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he himself was placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted authority. St. Cyr, however, acknowledges that his soldiers answered honestly to every call he made, and he was bound, while he retained the command, to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honour.* In other respects, his prudence and vigilance were such as be seemed his reputation. It was not so with Blake, the

* St. Cyr's Journal of Operations.

whole of his operations proved that he had lost confidence, and was incapable of any great enterprize. He should have come up with a resolution to raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight skirmishes, and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions, and then notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned away, with a cold look, and a donation that mocked its wants.

When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side, for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile, came out at daybreak on the 3d, with fifteen hundred men and the beasts of burthen. He halted for a little time, just beyond the gate, to examine the country in front with his glass, and as every thing appeared favourable, his troops were beginning to move forward, when the noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French forgetting the ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at day-light, and a cry of astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it hastily retreated again into the town.

Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding that the next attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed Mazzuchelli's brigade (the same that had been behind Palau) in the valley of the Oña in such a manner that it could fall upon Conde's rear when the latter should again come forth. He likewise put a battalion on the hills in a position to head the Spanish column, and drive it back either upon Mazzuchelli's brigade, or upon La Bispal, where he also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino's division.

The 4th, one thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and eleven hundred mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed in single files along a by-path, leading to Castellar da Selva. Mazzuchelli saw them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did not fire because Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it was supposed the Spaniards were part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double error, and with great readiness filing off to his left, turned the right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without hurt, although the French in Monjouic observing all that passed, plied their guns against the rear of his column. Being informed by the peasants at Castellar, that troops were also waiting for him at La Bispal, Conde made for Casa de Selva, and general Pino having notice of his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge which crossed the Spanish line of march; these battalions took a wrong direction, the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although their rear was attacked by Pino's personal escort, and that fifty men and some mules were captured, the main body escaped with honour.

There were now four open breaches in Gerona, Mazzuchelli's brigade and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French store of powder failed, ten days elapsed before a fresh supply could be obtained, and Alvarez profited of this cessation, to retrench and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, and obliged the five hundred sick men to return to the town on the 4th; but Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st of August, to seize the convent of *Madonna de los Angeles*, had fortified that building, and introduced small supplies of provisions. This revived, in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable

forts were situated, by which, in conjunction with the post at Madonna de los Angeles, and with the assistance of Blake's army, he hoped to maintain an open communication with the country. But this bold and skillful conception he was unable to effect; because in a sally from the Capuchins on the 6th with eighteen hundred men, he was beaten by a single French regiment, and the same day Mazzuchelli's Italians stormed Madonna de los Angeles, and put the garrison to the sword.

During these events, Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira who were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer, but was repulsed with loss, and the French general Joba was killed. Meanwhile the batteries having recommenced their fire on the 13th, Alvarez made a general sally, by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, Verdier thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes between the generals of the covering and the investing forces were rife; the engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable, those of the former asserted that they were not, and that while the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in ruins, was in possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted.

Either from negligence, or the disputes between St. Cyr and Augereau, above five thousand convalescents capable of duty were retained in a body at Perpignan, and Verdier could not produce so many under arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario. Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm provided Calvary were first taken.

Souham's division was appointed to watch Blake, Pino was directed to make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches were established, and, on the 19th, Verdier's troops, in three columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan to the assault; but the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on the Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and the besiegers were completely repulsed from all the breaches with a loss of six hundred men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice, and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering troops to the assault;* but that general asserted that the men had behaved perfectly well, and calling a council of war, proposed to continue the operations with as much vigour as the nature of the case would permit. His spirit was not however partaken by the council, and the siege was turned into a blockade.

Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th, made as if he would raise the blockade, yet his object was merely to introduce another convoy, and St. Cyr, divining his intention and judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let him penetrate the covering line, and then fall on him before he could reach the town. In this view, Souham's division was placed behind Palau and Pino's division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi's division of the investing troops was directed to meet the Spaniards in front, while the two former came down upon their rear.

Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, then made a circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of St. Sadurni, detached ten thou-

* St. Cyr's Journal of Operations.

sand men, under Wimphen, to protect the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O'Donnel led the advanced guard. At day-break, on the 26th, O'Donnel fell upon the rear of the French troops at Castellar, broke through them, and reached the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the two French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, with a part of Souham's division, came upon the left flank of the convoy, and, pressing it strongly, obliged the greater part to retrograde. Pino's division, then running up from Casa de Selva, attacked the rear-guard under Wimphen, the rout was complete, and Blake made no effort to save the distressed troops. O'Donnel with a thousand men and about two hundred mules got safely into the town, the remainder of the convoy was taken, the Italians gave no quarter, and three thousand of the Spaniards were slain.

After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras, to menace Blake's communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. Filieu de Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings, which were become almost insupportable. Without money, without medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches open. "If," said Alvarez, "the captain-general be unable to make a vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise to our aid, or Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcases and ruins, the memory of which will afflict posterity!"

St. Cyr having repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future supply, found Augereau in a good state of health, and obliged him to assume the command. Then, he says, every thing needful was bestowed with a free hand upon the seventh corps, because he himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found in the state of Napoleon's affairs. Peace had been concluded with Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples had failed, and all the resources of the French government becoming disposable, not only the seventh, but every "corps d'armée" in Spain was reinforced.

Augereau, escorted by the five thousand convalescents from Perpignan, reached the camp before Gerona the 12th of October. In the course of the following night, O'Donnel, issuing from the town on the side of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham's quarters, obliged that general to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a junction with Milans, at Santa Coloma; thus successfully executing as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month, with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such, however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that, notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused.

Blake, on the 29th, took possession once more of the heights of Bruñola, but Souham with an inferior force put him to flight, and this enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of Hostalrich. This place fortified with an old wall and towers, was defended by two thousand men, and supported by the fire of the castle; it was however carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there captured, although Blake, with his army, was only a few miles off. Meanwhile rear-admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, and sixteen large store-ships, having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th, was intercepted by admiral Martin on the 23d, who burnt several of his smaller vessels and drove the rest on shore at different

places, when two of the line of battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and some of the armed vessels took refuge at Rosas, put up boarding nettings, and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity-fort, presented a formidable front, having above twenty guns on board disposed for defence, besides the shore batteries. But on the 31st, captain Hallowell appeared in the bay with a squadron, and the same evening, sending his boats in, destroyed the whole fleet, in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the British seventy men killed and wounded.

The distress of Gerona increased, desertions became frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the governor to capitulate, went over in a body to the enemy. During November, famine and sickness tormented the city, and the French were inactive for want of powder, but on the 6th of December, ammunition having arrived, the suburbs of Marina, that of Girondella, the fort of Calvary, and all the other towers beyond the walls, were carried by the besiegers, and Alvarez, thus confined to the circuit of the walls, was cut off from the Capuchin and Constable forts. He had been ill for some days, but rousing himself for a last effort, made a general sally on the 7th, retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts, and opening a way to the outworks of the Constable, carried off the garrison; the next day, overcome by suffering he became delirious. A council of war then assembled, and after six months of open trenches, Gerona yielded on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, the troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners. Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of Zaragoza.

French and Spanish writers alike, affirm that Augereau treated Alvarez with a rigour and contumely that excited every person's indignation; and that, in violation of the capitulation, the monks were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last accusation admits, however, of dispute; the monks had during the siege, formed themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders; they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform, and being to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said, that to constitute them prisoners, was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a harsh interpretation of the terms.

Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; but so long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard's merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance; yet constancy alone could not have enabled them to defy the regular progress of the engineer; the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity; but the French combinations were not scientific, and this, saving the right of Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the defence.

2. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Montjoui was ill judged and worse executed, says, "The principal approaches should have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there, was easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clefts, and the defences open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the Casen Rocca; but on the side of Montjoui, the approaches, from the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the flying sap, with great loss and difficulty." If, however, the Marcadel had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been covered by the Oña, and Montjoui, and the

forts of the Constable and Capuchin, (regular places complete in themselves,) would have remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed, that a governor, who defended the feeble walls of the town after those out-works fell, would have surrendered all, because a lodgement was made in an isolated quarter. These things are, however, ordinarily doubtful, and certainly, it must always be a great matter with a general, to raise the moral confidence of his own army, and to sink that of his adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive success.

3. The faulty execution of the attack on Montjoui is less doubtful than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of the rules of art already noticed, amply account for failure; and it is to be observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the progress of the siege, that during that month disease invaded the army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted operations, became careless and disinclined to the labours of the trenches.

4. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted than that against Montjoui; and considering these facts, together with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and the maladministration of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost, and so many more kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken at all.

5. The foregoing conclusions in no wise affect the merits of the besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely, they endured unheard-of sufferings with constancy, and their refusal to accept the armistice offered by Augereau, is as noble and affecting an instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed are good and evil principles in man, how dependent upon accidental circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities! Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, was the same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the Barcelona Monjoui, on the insolent summons of Duhesme! At that period, the influence of a base court degraded public feeling, and what was weak in his character came to the surface, but in times more congenial to virtuous sentiments, all the nobility of the man's nature broke forth.

6. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. The number of enemies that came against the latter was rather less than those who came against the former city; the regular garrison of Zaragoza was above thirty thousand, that of Gerona about three thousand. The armed multitude, in the one, amounted to at least twenty-five thousand, in the other, they were less than six thousand. Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza, the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance, above forty thousand persons perished miserably, and the town was taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush for; the fighting was more successful, the actual loss inflicted upon the enemy greater, the suffering within the walls neither wantonly produced nor useless; the period of its resistance doubled that of Zaragoza, and every proceeding tended to raise instead of sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule, more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of generous men.

7. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter having agents in Cata-

lonia, and such a man as lord Collingwood in the Mediterranean, to refer to, were yet so ignorant, or so careless of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by sir John Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia, and landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post, and that place being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater means than the French could have collected in 1809, would not have reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were not more tractable nor more disposed than others to act cordially with their allies; but the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in their possession, and, above all, the long and difficult lines of communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of their convoys, would have rendered the invaders' task most difficult.

8. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy of the Valencians had been characterised by a singular indifference to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The local Junta in that province, not content with asserting their own exclusive authority, imagined that it was possible to maintain Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should be conquered; hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular army of above ten thousand men, more than thirty thousand armed irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthage, the governors of this rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of defence, and carelessly beheld the seventh and third corps gradually establishing, at the distance of a few days' march from Valencia itself, two solid bases for further invasion! But it is now time to revert to the operations of the "*Central Supreme Junta*," that it may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives, and the fortunes of the Spanish people, were sported with by those who had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula.

CHAPTER IV.

Plot at Seville against the Supreme Junta defeated by lord Wellesley—Junta propose a new form of government—Opposed by Romana—Junta announces the convocation of the national Cortez, but endeavour to deceive the people—A Spanish army assembled in the Morena under Eguia—Bassacour sends cavalry to reinforce Del Parque, who concentrates the Spanish army of the left at Ciudad Rodrigo—He is joined by the Gallician divisions—Santociles occupies Astorga—French endeavour to surprise him, but are repulsed—Ballasteros quits the Asturias, and marching by Astorga attempts to storm Zamora—Enters Portugal—Del Parque demands the aid of the Portuguese army—Sir A. Wellesley refuses, giving his reason in detail—Del Parque's operations—Battle of Tamames—Del Parque occupies Salamanca, but hearing that French troops were assembling at Valladolid retires to Bejar.

WHEN sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place; but the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures were secretly taken to seize the members of the Junta, and transport them to Manila. The old Junta of Seville being the chief movers of this sedition, no good could be expected from the

change, otherwise, such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state.

"Spain," said lord Wellesley, "*has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is untrue to herself.*"—"Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain."—"No alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and national infirmity."

This evident discontent of the British ambassador led the conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hopes of assistance; but he being accredited to the existing government, apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The Junta, in great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred; but still averse to sacrificing any power, projected a counter scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading, under licenses, with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation and some peculiarly-heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived.

But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members of the Junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, every member of the existing Junta, in rotation, to have a place; the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; and the council so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, and then to preside in that assembly. Thus under the pretence of resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and the future authority of the Junta were to be confirmed, and even the proposal, in favour of the colonies, was, following the opinion of lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity, and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and government.

This project was foiled by Romana, who, being of the commission, dissented from his colleagues; and it was on this occasion that he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this history, and the bad acts therein specified, although sufficiently heinous, were not the only charges made at this period. It was objected to some amongst the Junta, that having as merchants, contracted for supplying the army, they in their public capacity, raised the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles; and that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult of access, and insolent of demeanour.

Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons, not members of the Junta. This council to be assisted by a fresh chosen Junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general, and to be styled "*The Permanent Deputation of the Realm.*" One of this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which, he thought, could not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in favour of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong in favour of civil liberty, was not well considered. The "*Permanent Deputation,*" being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers and dignity of both being equal, and their

interests opposed, it was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter, having the sole distribution of honours and emoluments, could not fail to conquer, and no Cortes would be assembled.

Some time before this, when the terror caused by sir Arthur Wellesley's retreat from Spain, was fresh, Don Martin de Garay had applied to lord Wellesley for advice, as to the best form of government, and that nobleman also recommended a "*Council of Regency,*" and, like Romana, proposed a second council; but with this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with a list of grievances, "*a Bill of Rights,*" founded on an enlarged conciliatory policy, and having equal regard for the interests of the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of this advice while danger menaced the Junta; but when the arrangement for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the government ceased. It must, however, be acknowledged, that lord Wellesley condemned the existing system, as much for its democratic form as for its inefficiency; the English cabinet never forget, that they were the champions of privilege, nor, that the war was essentially, less for the defence of Spain, than the upholding of the aristocratic system of Europe.

To evade Romana's proposition, the Junta, on the 28th of October, announced that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March following. Having thus, in some measure, met the public wishes, they joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a Regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded Romana's plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, trample on the king's rights, and would never assemble the Cortes; moreover that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which deceived nobody; for, to use the words of lord Wellesley, "*no plan had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction of abuses or relief from exactions, and the administration of justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security of persons and property, and every other great branch of government, were as defective as the military establishments.*"

However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull the public wrath; and the Junta resolved to recommence offensive military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush the enemy, and firmly establish their own popularity and power. They were encouraged by a false, but general impression throughout Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; and in September and October fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and Andalusia, had been incorporated with the remains of Cuesta's old army; the whole forming a body of more than sixty thousand soldiers, of which nearly ten thousand were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for, owing to the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto drawn so little on the population, that the poorer sort never evaded a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English stores and money at Cadiz and Seville, were sufficient for every exigency.

In October Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha; but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile province, made a movement towards him, he regained the Sierra Morena on the 16th, taking post, first at St. Elena, and finally at La Carolina. The first and fourth corps then occu-

pied the whole of La Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the second and fifth corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at Toledo; and the reserve at Madrid. During these movements, Bassecour, who commanded in Estremadura, detached eight hundred horsemen to reinforce the duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his forces behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter end of October, there were sixty thousand men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La Mancha; ten thousand under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura, and about six thousand employed as guards to the Junta and in the service of the dépôts behind the Morena.

In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese frontier to the Tagus, the duke Del Parque, reinforced with the eight hundred cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions of Mendizabel and Carrera, (amounting to thirteen thousand men, completely equipped from English stores, brought out to Coruña in July.) made a movement into the rugged country, about the Sierra de Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same time general Santocildes, marching from Lugo with two thousand men, took possession of Astorga, and menaced the rear of the sixth corps, which after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the Tormes and the Esla.* In this situation, a French detachment attempted to surprise one of the gates of Astorga, on the 9th of October, and, being repulsed, returned to their cantonments. Soon afterwards Ballasteros, having again collected about eight thousand men in the Asturias, armed and equipped them from English stores, and, coming down to Astorga, crossed the Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora. Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and from thence proceeded to join the duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies of Galicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Galicia a general disposition to resist the authority of the central Junta.

Del Parque, eager to act against the sixth corps, had demanded, in September, through Perez Castro, the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army should join him; this being referred to sir Arthur Wellesley, he gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of the military state of affairs at this period.

"The enemy," he said, "were superior to the allies, including those which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but (adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since."

"But, besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate the duke Del Parque's intended operations. He could march a part, or the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing himself upon the duke Del Parque and Beresford, with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult, which was at Plasencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which was near Valladolid,

in which case, even if he, sir Arthur, had the inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them from destruction.

"In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced position, would be liable to a fatal disaster; so likewise would the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate, or the single force in activity would be ruined; but the relative efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the commencement of the argument, forbade a general co-operation with any hopes of solid success; and the only consequence that could follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be forced again to resume those defensive positions, which they ought never to have quitted.

"Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling into the enemy's hands, was resolved not to give the duke Del Parque any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the Portuguese government, not to risk Beresford's army in a situation which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march, in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose these troops to defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the way of preventing the success of an attempt of that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the other corps, which must be put in motion, if Ciudad was to be saved; and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact position which the duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain that, in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford, he could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other probable, or even possible concurrence of circumstances. In fine, that he had long been of opinion that the war must necessarily be defensive on the part of the allies, and that Portugal at least, if not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period, which the enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize, and equip, and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be accomplished, unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were much more important to all parties, than any desultory successful operations against the French troops about Salamanca; but any success was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would immediately collect in numbers sufficient to crush the allies, who must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of men, and, what was worse, time, which would have been more usefully employed in preparing for a great and well combined effort."

This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the Spanish Junta or their general. Castro replied to it, by demanding a positive and definitive answer, as to when the Portuguese army would be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish territories. "*When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have the means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far as any person can engage to carry into execution a military operation.*"

* See page 224.

* Letter from sir A. Wellesley, September 23, 1809. MS.

"When means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food, as was the case when lately in that country." *"When decided answers shall be given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors of Portugal that their excellencies have an army in a state to be sent into Spain."** This was sir Arthur's reply, which ended the negotiation, and the duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself.

To favour the junction of Ballasteros, his first movement was towards Ledesma. General Marchand immediately drew together, at Salamanca, eleven thousand men and fourteen guns, and marched to meet him. Thereupon, the duke, without having effected his junction, fell back to Tamames, taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable strength; where he awaited the enemy, with a thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, of which the Gallicians only could be accounted experienced soldiers.

BATTLE OF TAMAMES.

General Losada commanded the Spanish right, count Belvidere the reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballasteros could arrive, moved rapidly, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th, and immediately fell upon Del Parque's left. The Spanish cavalry fled rather hastily, the French horsemen followed closely, the infantry surprised in the midst of an evolution, were thrown into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and the duke, rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered the guns, and discomfited the French with the loss of an eagle, one cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers, but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to be enclosed by Ballasteros in that disordered state, retreated to Salamanca.

Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st. when, being joined by Ballasteros, he pushed with nearly thirty thousand men for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23d, turned Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to cut off Marchand's retreat, but that general had timely information, and was already at Toro, behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the defeat at Tamames reached Madrid, Dessolle's division was detached through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the sixth corps, and Kellerman was directed to advance from Valladolid, and take the command of the whole.

When the duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back, not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while these events were taking place in Castile, the central Junta having finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha.

CHAPTER V.

Areizaga takes the command of Eguia's army, and is ordered to advance against Madrid—Folly of the supreme junta—Operations in La Mancha—Combat of Dos Barrios—Cavalry

combat of Ocana—Battle of Ocana—Destruction of the Spanish army.

In the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately followed by a confident anticipation of complete success, which continues until the hour of battle, and then when it might be of use, generally abandons them. Now the central Junta having to deceive the people, affirmed that sir Arthur Wellesley had retreated to the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment when the French might have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina headlong against Madrid: nay, such was their pitch of confidence, that forenaming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a provisional system for the future administration of the capital, with a care, that they denied to the army which was to put them in possession.

Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and Albuquerque was distasteful to the Junta; wherefore, casting their eyes upon general Areizaga, they chose him, whose only recommendation was, that, at the petty battle of Alcanitz, Blake had noticed his courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter end of October; and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as the Junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from Madrid.

This movement was to commence early in November, and at first, only Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received instructions to cause a diversion, by marching on Arzobispo and Talavera de la Reyna. The duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of Baños, was to join him there; and thus nearly ninety thousand men were to be put in motion against Madrid, precisely on that plan which sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favour of the French, that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on the defensive, Areizaga's irruption may be regarded as an extreme example of military rashness, and the project of uniting Del Parque's forces with Albuquerque's, at Talavera, was also certain to fail; because, the enemy's masses were already in possession of the point of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque's rear.

Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the Junta spread a report that the British army was to co-operate, and permitted Areizaga to march, under the impression that it was so. Nothing could be more untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley being at this period at Seville, held repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of the Junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did not even officially inform him of Areizaga's march until the 18th of November, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. Yet, on the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance, and with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque's forces. Sir Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that his army would so act; and he assured the Junta that the diversion proposed would have no effect whatever.

* Sir A. Wellesley's Correspondence with Don M. Forgas, October 19, 1809. MSS.

OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.

Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3d of November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with sixty pieces of artillery, and from fifty to sixty thousand men, of which about eight thousand were cavalry. Several British officers and private gentlemen, and the Baron Crossand, an Austrian military agent, attended the head-quarters, which was a scene of gaiety and boasting; for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any military equipment save arms; but the men were young, robust, full of life and confidence, and being without impediments of any kind, made nearly thirty miles each day. They moved however in a straggling manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects.

Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumours of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had returned to France. Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his advice, the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards Talavera, for the false reports had, in some measure, succeeded in deceiving the French as to the approach of the English;* and it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the Junta.

The second corps, commanded by general Heudelet, being withdrawn from Plasencia, was, on the 5th, posted at Oropesa and Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar.

The fifth corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera.

Of the fourth corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence of Dessolle's troops; the other half, under general Liger Belair, was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud's cavalry at Ocaña.

The first corps, about twenty-one thousand strong, and commanded by marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yébenes, a day's march in advance of Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command of Latour Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madridejos, on the road to the Sierra Morena. The whole army, including the French and Spanish guards, was above eighty thousand fighting men, without reckoning Dessolle's division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains.

In the night of the 6th, information reached the king, that six thousand Spanish horsemen, supported by two thousand foot, had come down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and that a second column, likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, had passed the Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon the outposts at Madridejos.† All the prisoners taken in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army was above fifty thousand strong, and the duke of Belluno immediately concentrated the first corps at Yébenes, but kept his cavalry at Mora, by which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra and Madridejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, there were no Spaniards in front of the first corps, yet officers sent towards Ocaña, were chased back by cavalry, hence Soult judged, what was indeed the truth,

that Areizaga continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards Aranjuez, leaving the first corps on his left flank. The division of the fourth corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña, thus concentrating about eight thousand infantry, and fifteen hundred cavalry at that point on the 9th; the same day Victor retired with the first corps to Ajofrin.

On the 10th, Gazan's division of the fifth corps was ordered to march from Talavera to Toledo, and the first corps which had reached the latter town, was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who holding fast at Ocaña, sent six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spaniards continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them towards Ocaña.

COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS.

Areizaga, ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only Sebastiani's cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French thus pressed, drew back behind the infantry which was close at hand, and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons which were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the whole mass of the enemy's cavalry, were beaten, with the loss of two hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga's main body was, however, coming up, Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña, and the next morning took up a position on some heights lining the left banks of the Tagus and covering Aranjuez; the Spaniards entered Dos Barrios, but there their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from the Morena like a stream of lava, and burst into La Mancha with a rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumour to precede them. This swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers, or position, without any plan of action, Areizaga had rushed like a maniac into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still trembling and bewildered.

From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and informed his government of Sebastiani's stubborn resistance, and of the doubts which now for the first time assailed his own mind. It was then the Junta, changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the British army, and commanded the dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced his movement immediately, and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the public, that sir Arthur was also coming on. Wherefore Areizaga, thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first incertitude, made on the 14th a flank march by his right to Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern side; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been concentrated from every quarter, and although to the south of Ocaña, the ground is open and undulating; on the north, the ramifications of the Cuenca mountains, leading down the left bank of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges which stretching strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for Sebastiani to cover that place.

Soult was awake to his adversary's projects, yet could not believe that he would dare such a movement unless certain of support from the British army, and therefore kept the different corps quiet on the eleventh, waiting for Heudelet's report from Oropesa.* In the night it arrived, stating that rumours of a combined Spanish and English army being on the march, were

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

† Ibid.

* S. Journal of Operations, MSS.

rife, but that the scouts could not discover that the allied force was actually within several marches. Soult, now judging, that although the rumours should be true, his central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The first corps was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez; the fifth corps to concentrate at Toledo; the second corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada and Arzobispo, and replacing the fifth corps at Talavera, to be in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally, information being received of the duke Del Parque's retreat from Salamanca to Bejar and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the sixth corps, Dessolle's division was recalled to Madrid.

During the 12th, while the first, second, and fifth corps were in march, general Liger Belair's brigade continued to watch the banks of the Tajuna, and the fourth corps preserved its offensive positions on the height in the front of Aranjuez, having fifteen hundred men in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th the general movement was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the Spaniards in front; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon their left flank, and the king's guards at Madrid formed a reserve for the fourth and first corps. The second corps was at Talavera, and Dessolle's division was in the Guadarama on its return to the capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios, when Areizaga's flank march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new combinations.

In the evening of the 15th, it was known that the Spaniards had made a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry over the Tagus. The duke of Belluno was immediately ordered to carry the first and fourth corps (with the exception of a brigade left in Aranjuez) up the left bank of the Tagus, operating so as to fix Areizaga, and force him to deliver battle; and, with a view of tempting the Spaniard, by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and Aranjuez were broken down.

While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish general commenced a second bridge over the Tagus; and part of his cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured the country, and skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The Partidas also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French garrison to retire from Guadaxara upon Arganda, and occupied the former town on the 12th. But, in the night of the 13th, eight French companies and some troops of light cavalry, by a sudden march, surprised them, killed and wounded two or three hundred men, and took eighty horses and a piece of artillery.

The 16th the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon, and, during this time, the fifth corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at Toledo, marched by Hlescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to the duke of Belluno.

The 17th Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on the approach of the duke of Belluno with the first corps, he stayed the work, and withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus, and on the 18th, (the cavalry of the first corps having reached Villarejo de Salvanes,) he destroyed his bridges, called in his parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la Zarza.

Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish army, and the unsettled plans of the Spanish general, rendered it difficult for the French to fix a field of battle, but now Areizaga's march to St. Cruz had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close togeth-

er, the duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with the first corps, and the king, calling the fourth corps from Bayona, could throw twenty-five or thirty thousand men on Areizaga's rear, by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger could arise from this double line of operations, because a single march would bring both the king and Victor upon Areizaga, and if the latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the fifth corps, then in march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez, and the fourth corps received a like order. The king, himself, quitting Madrid, arrived there on the evening of the 18th, with the Royal French Guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of Dessolle's division which had just arrived; in all about ten thousand men. The same day the duke of Belluno concentrated the first corps at Villarejo de Salvanes, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on the 19th.

A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to repair the broken bridges, near Aranjuez, in two hours; and about one o'clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry of the fourth corps, and the advanced guard of the fifth corps, passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. General Milhaud with the leading squadrons, immediately pursued a small body of Spanish horsemen, and was thus led to the table-land, between Antiguella and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of fifteen hundred cavalry supported by three thousand more in reserve. Having only twelve hundred dragoons, he prepared to retire, but at that moment general Paris arrived with another brigade, and was immediately followed by the light cavalry of the fifth corps; the whole making a reinforcement of about two thousand men. With these troops Sebastiani came in person, and took the command at the instant when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French were advancing to the charge.

CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCAÑA.

The Spaniards came on at a trot, and Sebastiani directed Paris, with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers, to turn and fall upon the right flank of the approaching squadrons, which being executed with great vigour, especially by the Poles, caused considerable confusion, which the Spanish general endeavoured to remedy by closing to the assailed flank. But to effect this he formed his left centre in one vast column, whereupon Sebastiani charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserve, and the enormous mass yielding to the shock, got into confusion, and finally gave way. Many were slain, several hundred wounded, and eighty troopers and above five hundred horses were taken. The loss of the French bore no proportion in men, but general Paris was killed, and several superior officers were wounded.

This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult to believe that the Spanish general, aware of his error, was endeavouring to recover his line of operations. The examination of the prisoners confirmed this opinion, and in the night, information from the duke of Belluno and the reports of officers sent towards Villa Maurique arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear that the Spaniards were on the march, and that a battle could be fought the next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon the king's forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the morning of the 19th at Ocaña, but judging from the cavalry action, that

the French could attack first, drew up his whole army on the same plain, in two lines, a quarter of a mile asunder.

Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which commencing gently half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve, to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies and hollows, whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this ravine the Spanish left was posted, crossing the main road from Aranjuez to Dos Barrios; one flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña. The centre was in front of the town, which was occupied by some infantry as a post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in the direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge *in front* of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with rich olive woods, which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga's dispositions.

Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganising his forces. The whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one regiment left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who was also empowered, if necessary, to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded by general Senarmont. The Royal Guards remained with the king, and marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements.

Before day-break, on the 10th, the monarch marched with the intention of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At Antiguella his troops quitting the high road, turned to their left, gained the table-land of Ocaña, somewhat beyond the centre of the Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga's army in order of battle. The French cavalry instantly forming to the front, covered the advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish out-posts fell back, and were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile front and opened a sharp fire.

About forty-five thousand Spanish infantry, seven thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only twenty-four thousand infantry, five thousand sabres and lances, and fifty guns, including the battery of the Royal Guard. But Areizaga's position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was paralyzed by the ravine; it could neither attack nor be attacked; the centre was scarcely better situated, and the extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horsemen, who were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the attack.

BATTLE OF OCAÑA.

At ten o'clock, Sebastiani's cavalry gaining ground to his left, turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed in front, followed the cavalry, and drove general Zayas from the olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same manner followed Leval in second line, and general Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained in reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two columns; the principal one flanked by the cavalry, directed against and turning the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish centre in check, and each being supported by reserves.

These dispositions were completed at eleven o'clock,
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at which hour, Senarmont, massing thirty pieces of artillery, opened a shattering fire on Areizaga's centre. Six guns, detached to the right, played at the same time across the ravine against the left, and six others swept down the deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops. The Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but discovered no appearance of fear; their cries were loud and strong, their skirmishing fire brisk, and, from the centre of their line, sixteen guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval's and Girard's columns, as the latter were pressing on towards the right. To mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the Spaniards gave back, their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine by a flanking fire of grape, and Senarmont immediately drawing the artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and prolonging his fire to the left, raked Areizaga's right wing in its whole length.

During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing forward, obliged the Spaniards to change their front, by withdrawing the right wing *behind* the shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before said, was in its rear when the action commenced. By this change, the whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form with the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senarmont's artillery tore their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive, and their fire, redoubling, dismounted two French guns; Mortier himself was wounded slightly, Leval severely, the line advanced, and the leading French divisions wavered and gave back.

The moment was critical, and the duke of Treviso lost no time in exhortations to Leval's troops, but, like a great commander, instantly brought up Girard's division through the intervals of the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one regiment in square on the left flank; for he expected that Areizaga's powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge for the victory. Girard's fire soon threw the Spanish first line into disorder, and meanwhile, Dessolles, who had gained ground by an oblique movement, seeing the enemy's right thus shaken, seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other side. The light cavalry of the king's guard, followed by the infantry, then poured through the town, and on the extreme left, Sebastiani, with a rapid charge, cut off six thousand infantry, and obliged them to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little from the cannonade, and had never made an effort to turn the tide of battle, now drew off entirely, and the second line of infantry gave ground as the front fell back upon it in confusion; Areizaga, confounded and bewildered, ordered the left wing, which had scarcely fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself.

For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained, endeavoured to keep the troops together in the plain, and strove to reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios; but Girard and Dessolles' divisions being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion: finally, Sebastiani, after securing his prisoners, came up again like a whirlwind, and charged full in the front with five regiments of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled each man for himself across the plain; but, on the right of the routed multitude, a deep ravine leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an oblique direction, continually contracted the space, and the pursuing cavalry arriving first at Barrios, headed nearly ten thousand

bewildered men, and forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all quarters, and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged to disperse to take prisoners, for, to their credit, no rigorous execution was inflicted, and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms, were desired, in raillery, "to return to their homes, and abandon war as a trade they were unfit for." This fatal battle commenced at eleven o'clock; before two thirty pieces of artillery, a hundred and twenty carriages, twenty-five stand of colours, three generals, six hundred inferior officers, and eighteen thousand privates were taken, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand of the Spaniards contrived to make away towards the mountain of Tarancon, others followed the various routes through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena, and many saved themselves in Valencia and Murcia.

Meanwhile, the first corps, having passed the Tagus by a ford, re-established the bridge at Villa Maurique before ten o'clock in the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed Areizaga's traces; at Villatobas, the light cavalry captured twelve hundred carriages, and a little farther on, took a thousand of the fugitives who were making for Tarancon. The duke of Belluno, being thus apprized of the result of the battle, halted at Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward to La Guardia, where they joined Sebastiani's horsemen, and the whole continuing the pursuit to Lillo, made five hundred more prisoners, together with three hundred horses. This finished the operations of the day, only eighteen hundred cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than fifty thousand men had been ruined. The French lost seventeen hundred men, killed and wounded; the Spaniards five thousand, and before night-fall, all the baggage and military carriages, three thousand animals, forty-five pieces of artillery, thirty thousand muskets, and twenty-six thousand captives were in the hands of the conquerors!*

Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the third day after. On the road, he met general Benaz with a thousand dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle commenced; this body he directed on Madrilejos to cover the retreat of the fugitives, but so strongly did the panic spread that when Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benaz's men fled, without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came from the fight. Even so late as the 24th, only four hundred cavalry, belonging to all regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares; and still fewer at La Carolina.†

CHAPTER VI.

King Joseph's return to Madrid—Del Parque's operations—Battle of Alba de Tormes—Dispersion of the Spanish troops—Their great sufferings and patience—The Supreme Junta treat sir A. Wellesley's counsels with contempt—He breaks up from the Guadiana and moves to the Mondego—Vindication of his conduct for having remained so long on the Guadiana—French remain torpid about Madrid—Observations.

JOSEPH halted at Dos Barrios, the night of the battle, and the next day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division of infantry, upon Madrilejos and Consuegra; the first corps, by St. Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena, the fifth corps, by Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the fourth corps guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments, from Aranjuez to Consuegra. The monarch himself, with his guards and

Dessolles' first brigade, returned on the 20th, to Madrid.

Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La Mancha, but the duke Del Parque still menaced the sixth corps in Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolles' division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the uncertainty with respect to the British movements, obliged the king to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing that, if Del Parque gained upon the sixth corps, he might raise an insurrection in Leon, Gazan's division of the sixth corps was sent, from Toledo, through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand's assistance, and Kellerman was again directed to take the command of the whole.

During these events, the British army remained tranquil about Badajoz; but Albuquerque, following his orders, had reached Peralada de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of being joined by the duke Del Parque. That general, however, who had above thirty thousand men, thought, when Dessolles' division was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the sixth corps, and, therefore, advanced from Bejar towards Alba de Tormes on the 17th, two days before the battle of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected him on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations beyond the Tormes, and, having reached Alba the 21st, sent a division to take possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22d he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry entered Fresno and Carpio. Meanwhile Kellerman, collecting all the troops of his government, and being joined by Marchand, moved upon Medina del Campo, and the 23d, fell with a body of horse upon the Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled at once, but the infantry stood firm, and repulsed the assailants.

The 24th the duke carried his whole army to Fresno, intending to give battle; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Albuquerque having reached him, he commenced a retrograde movement.* Kellerman, without waiting for the arrival of Gazan's division, instantly pursued and his advanced guard of cavalry overtook and charged the Spanish army at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes; being repulsed, the French retired upon their supports, and the duke, seeing that an action was inevitable, brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one division, back to the right bank.

BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.

Scarcely was the line formed, when Kellerman came up with two divisions of dragoons and some artillery, and, without hesitating, sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, and, with the other, charged fiercely in upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of the right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred, those on the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The duke rallied his cavalry on the other side of the river, and brought them back to the fight, but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and under the fire of some French infantry, which arrived just in the dusk. During the night the duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested, but at day-break when a French patrol came up with his rear, his whole army threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellerman having meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was complete.

* S. Journal of Operations. MSS. Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809. MSS.

† Letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 30, 1809. MSS.

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.

After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains behind Tamames, and, in ten or twelve days, again collected about twenty thousand men; they were however without artillery, scarcely any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of the sufferings of those famished soldiers. Many actually died of want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither dispersed nor murmured! Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and feeble in battle, are patient, to the last degree, in suffering.

This result of the duke Del Parque's operation had amply justified sir Arthur Wellesley's advice to the Portuguese regency. In like manner the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the duke of Albuquerque's advance to Arzobispo, had justified that which he gave to the Central Junta. It might therefore be imagined that the latter would have received his after-counsels with deference; but the course of that body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before the rout of Alba de Tormes, sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that ten thousand men, to be taken from the duke Del Parque, should reinforce Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain the strong position of Meza d'Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter.* Meanwhile Del Parque's force, thus reduced one-third, could, he said, be more easily fed, and might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected, and, as he informed them, only delayed to protect Estremadura until the duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement. The only reply of the Junta was an order, directing Albuquerque immediately to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena, behind the Guadiana. Thus abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing his own front in a bad position to an army coming from Almaraz, and his right flank and rear to an army coming from La Mancha.

This foolish and contemptuous proceeding, being followed by Del Parque's defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, sir Arthur at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that twenty thousand Spanish infantry and six thousand mounted cavalry were again collected in La Carolina; and that the troops (eight thousand), who escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuenca, under general Echevarria; and as the numbers reassembled in the Morena were (the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña considered) sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for the moment, there was no reason why the British army should remain in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. Albuquerque's retrograde movement was probably a device of the Junta to oblige sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura, but it only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to engage in serious operations on that side, yet to have retired when that province was actually attacked, would have been disreputable, wherefore, seizing this unhappily favourable moment to quit Badajoz, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of the Mondego, leaving general Hill, with a mixed force of ten thousand men, at Abrantes.

The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed him for stopping so long, but it was his last hold on Spain, and the safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It was not his battle of Talavera, but the position maintained by him on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, saved Andalusia from subjection, and this is easy of demonstration; Joseph having rejected Soult's project against Portugal, dared not invade Andalusia,

by Estremadura, with the English army on his right flank; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La Mancha, without drawing sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive king desired to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried sir Arthur beyond the Morena; nor could the Junta, in that case, have refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their ally. Then the whole force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English army behind the Morena; and, as Areizaga had sixty thousand men, and Albuquerque ten thousand, it is no exaggeration to assume that a hundred thousand could have been organized for defence, and the whole of the troops, in the south of Portugal, would have been available to aid in the protection of Estremadura. Thus, including thirty thousand English, there would have been a mass of at least one hundred thousand soldiers, disposable for active operations, assembled in the Morena.

From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at the former, the allied army could have protected Lisbon as well as Seville, because a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal object of the invaders; but the allied armies, holding the passes of the Morena, their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having rich provinces and large cities behind them, and a free communication with the sea, and abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain.

It was a perception of these advantages that caused sir John Moore to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the northern line for his operations.* Lord Wellesley, also, impressed with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages, would have done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with the Central Junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he would undertake the defence of Andalusia, conditions they would not accede to, but without which, he could not be secured against the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle against reason.† This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English, but political as well as physical resources, and moral considerations weighed in that argument.

For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, during a dangerous crisis of affairs, sir Arthur persisted, at such an enormous sacrifice of men, to hold his position on the Guadiana, yet it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother's wishes than his own judgement, that he remained after Areizaga's army was assembled. Having proved the Junta by experience, he was more clear-sighted, as to their perverseness, than lord Wellesley, who, being in daily intercourse with the members, obliged to listen to their ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of future exertion, clung longer to the notions that Spain could be put in the right path, and that England might war largely in conjunction with the united nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon. He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajoz for ever released the British general from a vexatious dependence on the Spanish government.

Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. Kellerman remained at Salamanca,

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 7, 1809, MSS.

* Sir J. Moore's Correspondence.

† Lord Wellesley's Correspondence, Parl. Papers, 1810.

watching the movements of the duke Del Parque, and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, with a division of the fourth corps, and some cavalry, was detached against Echevarria, but on his arrival at Cuença, finding that the latter had retreated, by Tobaado to Hellin in Murcia, combined his operations with general Suchet, and, as I have before related, assisted to reduce the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, but, as the Spanish regiments of the guard had fought freely against their countrymen, and many of the prisoners, taken at Ocaña, had offered to join the invaders' colours, the king conceived hopes of raising a national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing to serve the French emperor, but not the intrusive king of Spain. Spanish authors assume that none entered the enemy's ranks save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view, and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have reassembled in the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with the loss sustained in the action. However the battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of offensive operations, which the Austrian war, and the reappearance of a British army in the Peninsula had enabled the allies to adopt, in 1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful, the enemy again took the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate in this short campaign, the Junta openly asserted, that it would join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of Areizaga's acting, without such assistance, gave currency to the fiction, and an accredited fiction is, in war, often more useful than the truth; in this, therefore, they are to be commended; but, when deceiving their own general, they permitted Areizaga to act under the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an error, but an enormous crime. Nor was the general much less criminal for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, no understanding with the allied commander, as to their mutual resources and intentions, had taken place.

2. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga's movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly it would be difficult to find its parallel: There is no post so strong, no town so guarded, that, by a fortunate stroke, may not be carried: but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle, unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government! no general is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve the safety of his army, to that he should sacrifice everything but victory; and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory, rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle.

3. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general, having first met with opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, and of the real force in his front, yet this was the only moment in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with fifty thousand infantry and a powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason against moving from

the Morena at all, seeing that the calculated chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could improve accidental advantages.

4. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although intended to turn the French left, and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuña, and Henares, only great rapidity could give a chance of success; yet Areizaga was slow, so late as the 15th, he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions of infantry. Meanwhile the French moving on the inner circle, got between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps, out of the three opposed to him, approached, he recrossed the Tagus and concentrated again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The king by the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, and then Areizaga, who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with Sebastiani when the latter had only eight thousand men, sought a battle on the same ground with the king, who was at the head of thirty thousand, the first corps being also in full march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been on the 9th to the westward at Yébenes and Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle of a hundred and fifty miles, completely round this Spanish general, who pretended to treat his adversaries as if they were blind men.

5. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to await the effect of Albuquerque's and Del Parque's operations. If so, his military ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga's, and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere's former plan for Albuquerque; a plan founded on the supposition, that the rich plains of La Mancha were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or Tarazon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication with Valencia, which would have been exposed to the third corps from Aragon. Yet without examining whether either the Spanish general or army were capable of such a difficult operation, as adopting an accidental line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on the 18th, and on the 16th, the first corps, the fourth, the greatest part of the fifth, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass of more than fifty thousand fighting men, would have taught Areizaga that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact, there were no mountains to hold: between Zarza and the borders of Valencia, the whole country is one vast plain, and on the 18th, there was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French armies, or of retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The former was chosen, Areizaga's army was destroyed, and in the battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, and when the men, undismayed by the defeat of the right, demanded to be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted.

6. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, effectual, and it may seem misplaced, to do ought but commend movements so eminently successful; yet the chances of war are manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points of this short campaign. Areizaga's rush from the mountains was so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries hesitate, and hence perhaps the reason why the first corps, circled round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in front at Zarza, on the 19th, whereas, reinforced with the division of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might

have fallen on the rear and flank from Mora a week before; that this, during the three days Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours march.

7. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the valley of the Tagus, Areizaga did not quit Dos Barrios until the 13th, and he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days therefore, the Spanish general was permitted to lead, and had he been a man of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, from the 9th to the 14th, was a master-piece. It must, however, be acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched fifty thousand men about, like a patrol of cavalry, without the slightest regard to his adversary's positions or his own line of operations.

8. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while they paralyzed the left of the Spaniards; the disparity of numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent. But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her troops! why then was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king, unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military genius of his advising general? or was he distracted by disputes amongst the different commanders? or, did the British army at Badajos alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance.

9. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish projects promised well. Areizaga's army exceeded fifty thousand men, Albuquerque's ten thousand, and thirty thousand were under Del Parque, who, at Tamañes had just overthrown the best troops in the French army. Villa Campa also, and the Partida bands on the side of Cuenca were estimated at ten thousand; in fine, there

were a hundred thousand Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, although much reduced by sickness, had still twenty thousand men fit to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near thirty thousand, making a total of a hundred and fifty thousand allies. Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the sixth corps, a hundred and twenty thousand to attack the seventy thousand French covering Madrid! Why, then, was sir Arthur Wellesley, who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the Junta? "*Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war.*" He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, and he foresaw, to use his own expressions, "*that after one or two battles, and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by others, all would have to retreat again.*"* yet this man, so cautious, so sensible of the enemy's superiority, was laying the foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through the Peninsula. False then are the opinions of those, who, asserting Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame sir John Moore's conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain on sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise and brave man's toil has been the sport of fools!

Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of the Spanish insurrection, after his departure the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were trampled under foot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next book we shall find them every where acting on the defensive, and every where weak.

* Letter to lord Liverpool, MS.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

Joseph prepares to invade Andalusia—Distracted state of affairs in that province—Military position and resources described—Invasion of Andalusia—Passes of the Morena forced by the French—Foolish deceit of the Supreme Junta—Tumult in Seville—Supreme Junta dissolved—Junta of Seville re-assembles, but dispersed immediately after—The French take Jaen—Sebastiani enters Grenada—King Joseph enters Cordoba and afterwards marches against Seville—Albuquerque's march to Cadiz—Seville surrenders—Insurrection at Malaga put down by Sebastiani—Victor invests Cadiz—Faction in that city—Mortier marches against Badajos—The visconde de Gand flies to Ayamonte—Inhospitable conduct of the bishop of Algarve.

NAPOLEON, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past inactivity of the king, and Joseph

prepared to commence the campaign of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque's defeat on one side and Echevaria's on the other had freed his flanks, and while the British army was still at Badajos, he sent the fourth corps towards Valencia, but immediately afterwards re-called it, and also the first corps, which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela. The march of this last corps through La Mancha had been marked by this peculiarity, that, for the first time since the commencement of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives.

Joseph's vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in Navarre, under Renoualles and Mina; partly because lord Wellington, previous to quitting

the Guadiana, had informed the Junta of Badajos, as a matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district, and his confidential letter being published in the town Gazette, and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, made Joseph suspect it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However, the false movements of the first and fourth corps distracted the Spaniards, and emboldened the French partizans, who were very numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. When the troubles in Navarre were quieted by Suchet, and the distribution of the British army in the valley of the Mondego known, Joseph seriously prepared for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose troops were thirteen months in arrears of pay. Napoleon, a rigid stickler for the Roman maxim, that "war should support war," paid only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the military chest.

Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National Cortes had been short-lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the passions of the people, and afforded the old Junta of Seville, the council of Castile, and other enemies of the Central Junta, an opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious, and the general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the approaching crisis. The marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the Junta published a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,—that Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of France,—that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall upon the enemy's rear,—and that a second Baylen might be expected. But, while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent property to Cadiz, and announced that they would transfer their sittings to that town on the 1st of February. Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was issued for a levy of a hundred thousand men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and money belonging to individuals; sums left for pious purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state.

To weaken their adversaries, the Junta offered Romana the command of the army in the Morena and imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The marquis of Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was confined in Pensicola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a dungeon, where it is believed his infamous existence terminated. The celebrated Padre Gil was sent on a mission to Sicily. While on his passage he told an English gentleman, "*They have sent me on this embassy to get rid of my never ceasing remonstrances; and I have submitted to this banishment for fear I might be got rid of in another way!*" Romana refused to serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was appointed to command the troops re-assembled at La Carolina, most of the other generals kept aloof, and in Galicia the Conde de Noronha, resigning his command, issued a manifesto against the Junta. The public hatred increased, and the partizans of Palafox and Montijo, certain that the people would be against the government under any circumstances, only waited for a favourable moment to commence violence. Andalusia generally, and Seville in particular, were but one remove from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached the foot of the Morena with a great and well organized army.

The military preparation of the Junta was in harmony with their political conduct. The decree for

levying a hundred thousand men, issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of government, was followed by an order to distribute a hundred thousand poinards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces at the disposal of the Junta, were still numerous enough, if well directed, to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had twenty-five thousand men in the Morena; Echevaria, with eight thousand, was close by, at Hellin; five or six thousand were spread over Andalusia, and Albuquerque had fifteen thousand behind the Guadiana. The troops at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized. Blake had not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders transmitted almost daily by the Junta, could contrive no reasonable plan of action, until the movements of the enemy enabled him to disregard all instructions. Thus, amidst a whirlpool of passions, intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel, and containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink.

This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and Cordoba in the north, Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. The northern frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but, between those provinces, the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbade all military communication until near the Morena, where, abating somewhat of their surly grandeur, they leave a space through which troops could move from one province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of Andalusia.

Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal road to Seville was practicable for artillery. This road entering the hills, a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful strength, called the Despenas Perros, led by La Carolina and Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another route passed through the Puerto del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little beyond the Despenas Perros, and there were other passes also, but all falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes of the Morena from La Mancha.

To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From thence roads, practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, conducting to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen.

In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads or, rather, paths, penetrated into the kingdoms of Cordoba. One, entering the mountains, by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and it is just beyond these roads that the ridges, separating La Mancha from Estremadura, begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter, by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo.

If entering Estremadura by these passes an army should then invade Andalusia, the Morena must still be passed, and the only military communications between those provinces were by three great roads, namely, one from Medellin and Llerena to Guadalcanal; another from Badajos to Seville, by the defiles of Monasterio and Ronquillo; a third by Xeres de los Caballeros, Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way, through Belalcazar, to Guadalcanal; but all these routes, except that of Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing the mountains led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, a river whose waters, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward, washing the foot of the Morena as

far as the city of Cordoba, then, bending gradually towards the south, flow by Seville, and are finally lost in the Atlantic.

To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen, the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the passes of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was established at La Carolina and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros and Puerto del Rey, which was entrenched, but with so little skill and labour as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection of the enemy. And here it may be well to notice an error relative to the strength of mountain-defiles, common enough even amongst men who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their profession.

From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which the greatest multitudes may be resisted. Now, without stopping to prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight upon equal terms. If this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the whole of the beaten army are obvious. Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest advantages from the strength of mountain-passes. The practice of some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion; nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy's columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills.

Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops, the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; but, as they came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong detachment, before Areizaga could have been safely attacked.

Nor was Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an obstinate defence. Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about a hundred miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean, while the intermediate space between these sierras and the Morena is broken by less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand divisions of country:— 1. The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2. The lower, or open country, about Seville. 3. The coast-tract between the Nevada and Ronda, and the Mediterranean. This last is studded, in its whole length, with sea-port towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places.

No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending, the advantage of

position would be with the invaders. But, to reach the Mediterranean coast, not only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda must be crossed, but most of the minor parallel ridges enclosing the valleys, whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now all those valleys contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Grenada, and Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified, and still retaining their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, nor the lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen, or Cordoba, or both. The difficulty of besieging those places, while a Spanish army was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the mountains, on both flanks and in the rear, were filled with insurgents, and while Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey's sons, acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty man had friends in the province, and, with his accustomed celerity, fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were matured.

But in this, the third year of the war, the Junta were unprovided with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes in the Morena. Those, once forced, Seville was open, and, from that great city, the French could penetrate into all parts and their communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital of the province, and, from its political position, the most important town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon-founderies, and all establishments necessary to a great military power.

INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.

The number of fighting-men destined for this enterprise was about sixty-five thousand. Marshal Soult directed the movements, but the king was disposed to take a more prominent part, in the military arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. To cover Madrid, and to watch the British army, the second corps was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments pushed into the valley of the Tagus; two thousand men, drawn from the reserve, garrisoned the capital; as many were in Toledo, and two battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda and Guadalaxara. Gazan's division was recalled from Castile, Milhaud's from Aragon; the first, fourth, and fifth corps, the king's guards, and the reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed upon Andalusia.

During the early part of January, 1810, the troops, by easy marches, gained the foot of the Morena, and there Milhaud's division, coming by the way of Benillo, rejoined the fourth corps. A variety of menacing demonstrations, being then made along the front of the Spanish line of defence, between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena; on the 18th, the king arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and the whole army was collected in three distinct masses.

In the centre, the artillery, the king's guards, the reserve, and the fifth corps, under marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto del Rey.

On the left, Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, occupied Villa Nueva de los Infantes, and prepared to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and Puerto San Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen.

On the right, the duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo, to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues, with the first corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent patrols through Benalcázar and Hincjosa towards Guadalcanal. By these dispositions, Areizaga's line of defence

in the Morena, and Albuquerque's line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened.

On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles of Esteban, making a number of prisoners; and when the Spaniards rallied behind the Guadalén, one of the tributary torrents of the Guadalquivir, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains of Ubeda, secured the bridges over the Guadalquivir.

In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a shot, and Gazan's division crowning the heights right and left of the Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, which was abandoned. Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, then poured through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field of Baylen; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the foolish pride engendered by that victory, was one of the principal causes of their subsequent losses.

Meanwhile the duke of Belluna pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblanco, and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and Sebastiani's flanking parties communicated also with the fifth corps at Andujar, and thus, in two days, by skilful combinations upon an extent of fifty miles, the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced, and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the interior slopes of the mountains.

In Seville all was anarchy: Palafox and Montijo's partisans were secretly preparing to strike, and the Ancient Junta openly discovered a resolution to resume their former power. The timid, and those who had portable property, endeavoured to remove to Cadiz, but the populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast that above a hundred thousand persons were within the walls, and the streets were crowded with multitudes that, scarcely knowing what to expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence. The Central Junta, fearing alike, the enemy, and their own people, prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, while their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almadén, leading from La Mancha into Estremadura, but that no danger could thence arise; because the duke Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque, and those generals when united being stronger than the enemy would fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena and gain a great victory!

It was on the 20th of January, and at the very moment when the Morena was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was published, and it was not until the day after that the Junta despatched orders for the duke Del Parque (who was then in the mountains beyond Ciudad Rodrigo) to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which such great things were expected! Del Parque received the despatch on the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger of the crisis, had left general Contreras at Medellín with four thousand five hundred men, destined to form a garrison for Badajoz, and marched himself on the 22d, with about nine thousand, towards Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the first corps; he had scarcely commenced his movement, when he learned that Agudo and Almadén were occupied, and that the French patrols were already at Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat upon Seville. In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajoz, and his own artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement, he continued to receive contradictory and absurd orders from the Junta, some of which, he disregarded, and others he could not obey; wherefore, conforming to circumstances, when

the Morena was forced, he descended into the basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquivir a few leagues from that city, at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 24th, and immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy's progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the Central Junta, burst at Seville.

Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the quarters of the city, called out, some for the deposition of the Junta, others for the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and Montijo were released, and the junta of Seville being re-established by acclamation, the Central Junta, committed to their hands the defence of Andalusia, and endeavoured themselves to reach Cadiz, each as he could; yet with the full intention of reuniting and resuming their authority. On the road however, some of them were cast into prison by the people, some were like to be slain at Xerez, and the Junta of Seville had no intention that the Central Junta should ever revive. Saavedra, the President of the former, by judicious measures calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his old army, which was now under the duke Del Parque, made some other popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a formal proposition to the Junta at Badajoz, inviting them to take into consideration the necessity of constituting a Regency, which was readily acceded to. The events of war crowding on, overlaid their schemes. Three days after the flight of the Central Junta, treason and faction being busy amongst the members of the Seville Junta, they also disbanded, some remained in the town, others, amongst them Saavedra, repaired to Cadiz. The tumults were then renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume the command and defend the city, but he evaded this dangerous honour, and proceeded to Badajoz.

Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville elected a military junta, and discovered the same disposition, as the people of other towns in the Peninsula had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza, had then assumed command, they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined city, but there were none so firm, or so ferocious, and finally, a feeling of helplessness producing fear in all, Seville was ready to submit to the invaders.

When the passage of the mountains was completely effected, the French corps again received their artillery, the centre and right wing remained stationary, and a detachment of the first corps, which had approached Cordoba, returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied his troops at Jaén, but Sebastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him upon Alcalá Real, and Jaén surrendered with forty-six guns mounted on the walls. The Spanish general then made one more stand, and being again beaten, all his artillery was captured, and his army dispersed. Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry throwing away their arms, escaped to Gibraltar, while Areizaga himself, with a remnant of horse, flying into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superseded by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani having marched upon Grenada, entered it the 28th of January, and was received with apparent joy, so entirely had the government of the Central Junta extinguished the former enthusiasm of the people.

The capture of Jaén having secured the left flank of the French, the king with the centre and right, moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there also, as at Jaén and Grenada, the invaders were received without any mark of aversion,* and thus the upper country was conquered.

* Dupont's Proceedings at Cordoba, as related in my first volume, have been commented upon in a recent publication, entitled "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns*."

Upon the authority of general Foy, the author asserts that

But the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before that city; hence, judging that no serious opposition would be made in Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada, and seize the Grenadan coast, an operation that would enable him with greater facility to act against Valencia. To ensure the success of the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cordoba to Suchet, urging him to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful detachment from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of Valencia.*

Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba and Jaen, and the first and fifth corps, followed by the king's guards, proceeded without delay towards Ecija, where it will be remembered, Albuquerque's cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. As the French approached, the duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could retreat either to Seville, or Cadiz, the way to the latter being through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this road the cavalry of the first corps was pushed on the 27th. Albuquerque despairing for Seville, resolved to make for Cadiz, and lest the enemy should reach Utrera before him, gained that town with great expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija and Xeres, by long marches, journeying day and night, reached Cadiz on the 3d of February. Some French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his rear at Utrera, but he was not pursued further, save by scouting parties; for the king had altered the original plan of operations, and ordered the first corps which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change its direction and march by Carmona against Seville, and the 30th, the advanced guard came on that city.

Some entrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence, the mob still governing, fired upon the bearer of the first French summons, and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight, and besides the popu-

lace, there were about seven thousand troops, composed partly of fugitives from the Morena, partly of the original garrison of the town. Nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on the 31st, with all its stores, founderies, and arsenals complete, and on the 1st of February the king entered in triumph. The lower country was thus conquered, and there remained only Cadiz, and the coast tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to subdue.

The first corps was immediately sent against Cadiz, the fifth against Estremadura; and Sebastiani, having placed fifteen hundred men in the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops, a Swiss battalion, composed of those who had abandoned the French service in the battle of Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the people having imprisoned the members of the local Junta, were headed by a Capuchin friar, who resolved to fight the French, and collected a vast multitude armed in all manners above Antequera and Alhama, where the road from Grenada enters the hills.

As this insurrection was spreading, not only in the mountains, but through the plains of Grenada, Sebastiani resolved to fall on at once, lest the Grenadians having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia on the other, and in their own country, many sea-ports and fortified towns, should organize a regular system of resistance. Wherefore, after a slight skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills, driving the insurgents upon Malaga, near which place they rallied, and an engagement, with the advanced guard of the French, under general Milhaud, taking place, about five hundred Spaniards fell, and the conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished took refuge on board some English ships of war, the rest submitted, and more than a hundred pieces of heavy, and about twenty pieces of field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British merchandize, became the spoil of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and thus the insurrection was quelled, for in every other part, both troops and peasantry, were terrified and submissive to the last degree.*

Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such diligence, as to reach Chiclana on the 4th, and it is generally supposed, that he might have rendered himself master of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz, and the Isla were in no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of Sir George Smith's negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle; but Albuquerque's troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed, and in every way inefficient; the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the authorities, as usual, occupied with intrigues and private interests. In this state, eight thousand Spanish soldiers could scarcely have defended a line of ten miles against twenty-five thousand French, if a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the canal.

Venegas was governor of Cadiz, but when it was known that the Central Junta had been deposed at Seville, a Municipal Junta, chiefly composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would not suffer the fugitive members of the Central Junta to assume any authority; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were obliged to submit, but, by the advice of Jovellanos, they appointed a Regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves. Although the Municipal Junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, at first, the judi-

Cordoba was sacked, calls it "a gratuitous atrocity," and "an inhuman butchery," and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, that, *capacity and cruelty are rarely united; that Dupont was a fool, and that Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon, but that he must have "dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal scorn and haired."*

Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author of "the Annals," as the era of good government in France.

I rejected Foy's authority, 1st, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont. Secondly, because he was not an eye-witness, and his relation at variance with the "official journal of Dupont's operations;" was also contradicted by the testimony of a British general of known talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event.

"Some time after the victory, order was restored, pillage was forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police."—Journal of Operations.

* Cordoba was not pillaged, being one of the few places where the French were well received.—Letters from a British general to colonel Napier.

On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the "Annals," after contrasting my account with Foy's, thus proceeds, "It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by colonel Napier without any quotation of authority."

A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, six months previous to the publication of the *Annals*, colonel Napier, hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the author of that work, because there was no quotation of authority, transmitted through a mutual friend, an assurance that he had authority for every statement, and that he would willingly furnish the author with any or all of them: no notice was taken of this offer.

* Suchet's Memoirs.

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* General Campbell's Correspondence from Gibraltar. MSS.

cious intervention of Mr. Bartholomew Frere induced them to acquiesce; and on the 29th of January, the bishop of Orense, general Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were appointed Regents, until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain.

The council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the fall of Seville, now charged the deposed Junta, and truly, with usurpation—the public voice added peculation and other crimes; and the Regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their papers, sequestered their effects, threw some of the members into prison, and banished others to the provinces: thus completely extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly some of unsullied honour and fine talents, ready and eloquent of speech, and dexterous in argument; but it is not in Spain only, that men possessing all the “grace and ornament” of words, have proved to be mean and contemptible statesmen.

Albuquerque, elected president of the Municipal Junta, and commander of the forces, endeavoured to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist a sudden attack, and the French, deceived as to its real strength, after an ineffectual summons, proceeded to gird the whole bay with works. Meanwhile, Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the fifth corps at Seville, pursued a body of four thousand men, that, under the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town towards the Morena; they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet were like to be destroyed, because the bishop of Algarve, from national jealousy, would not suffer them to pass the Portuguese frontier.* Mortier, however, disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena, by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos, summoned it the 12th of February, but Contreras' detachment had arrived there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, finding, contrary to his expectation, that the place was in a state of defence, retired to Merida.

This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch of the war; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in possession of Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Badajoz, Olivenza, and Albuquerque in the other province. Yet, great as were the results of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained, and the capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula.

From Andujar to Seville is only a hundred miles, yet the French took ten days to traverse that space; a tardiness for which there appears no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations and seeming cordiality with which the towns, and even villages, greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her gates at once; and thinking that the possession of that town, would produce the greatest moral effect, in Andalusia, and all over Spain, changed the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched thither in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville, was however transferred, along with the government, to Cadiz, and Joseph was deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had entered Cordoba. When he discovered his error there was still time to repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque, but fearing to leave a city with a hundred thousand people in a state of excitement upon his flank, he resolved to reduce Seville, and met indeed with no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition, as left him only the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation. The first his hu-

manity forbade; the latter cost him time, which was worth his crown, for Albuquerque's proceedings were only secondary: the ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety of Cadiz.

The march by which the Spanish duke secured the Isla de Leon, is only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his movements although judicious, were more the result of necessity than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia would be invaded; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed of the enemy's movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his after-march upon Guadalcanal, was the forced result of his position; he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos.

From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23d, and he might have thrown himself into that town; yet the prudence of taking such a decided part, was dependent upon the state of public sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque, indeed, imagined that the French were already in possession of the place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later; yet they could easily have entered it on the 24th, and as he believed that they had done so, it is apparent that he had no confidence in the people's disposition; in this view, his determination to cross the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered Seville a lost city; and when the French approached, we find him marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, yet he was again late in deciding, for the enemy's cavalry, moving by the shorter road to Utrera, overtook his rear-guard; and the infantry would assuredly have entered the Island of Leon with him, if the king had not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city therefore saved Albuquerque, and he, in return, saved Cadiz.

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Navarre, Aragon, and Valencia—Pursuit of the student Mina—Suchet's preparations—His incursion against Valencia—Returns to Aragon—Difficulty of the war in Catalonia—Operations of the seventh corps—French detachments surprised at Mollet and San Perpetua—Augereau enters Barcelona—Sends Duhesme to France—Returns to Gerona—O'Donnell rallies the Spanish army near Centellas—Combat of Vich—Spaniards make vain efforts to raise the blockade of Hostalrich—Augereau again advances to Barcelona—Sends two divisions to Reus—Occupies Manreza and Villa Franca—French troops defeated at Villa Franca and Esparaguera—Swartz abandons Manreza—Is defeated at Savadel—Colonel Villatte communicates with the third corps by Falcet—Severolli retreats from Reus to Villa Franca—Is harassed on the march—Augereau's unskilful conduct—Hostalrich falls—Gallant exploit of the governor, Julian Estrada—Cruelty of Augereau.

LORD WELLINGTON's plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia. But before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now meditating, it is necessary, once more to revert to the operations in the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy the unity of narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject.

OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA.

Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to Pampeluna, having previously directed an active pursuit of the student Mina, who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sangüessa. General Harispe, with some battalions,

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence. MSS.

marched straight against him from Zaragoza, while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the valleys of Ainsa and Mediano, cut him off from the Cinca river.

Harispe quickly reached Sanguessa, but the column from Pampeluna being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line of communication;* the garrison, however, made a strong resistance, and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division, under Loison, was at Logroño, wherefore Harispe having, in concert with that general and with the garrison of Pampeluna, occupied Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puente de Reyna, and all the passages of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of moveable columns, that continually pursued Mina, until chased into the higher parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic simplicity, truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.

But that general, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials, for a methodical war of invasion, beyond the frontiers of Aragon, and when general Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops intended to form an eighth corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, although some petty actions had taken place, his general arrangements were not disturbed, and the emperor having promised to increase the third corps to thirty thousand men, with the intention of directing it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, and other events in Catalonia having, however, baffled Napoleon's calculations, this first destination of the third corps was changed. Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortosa or Lerida; the eighth corps, then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear; the seventh corps to advance to the Lower Ebro and support the siege. But neither was this arrangement definitive; fresh orders sent the eighth corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph's letter from Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain.

A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, and constituting Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the king's orders, civil or military. This decree, together with a renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had, however, been intercepted, and the French general, doubtful of Napoleon's real views, undertook the enterprise against Valencia; but wishing first to intimidate the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached Laval against Villa Campa, who was defeated on the side of Cuenca, and his troops dispersed.

Suchet then fortified a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base of operations, and drew together at that place twelve battalions of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light cavalry, and some field artillery, and, at the same time, caused six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at Alcanitz, under general Habert. The remainder of the third corps was distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcanitz, Monzon, Venasque, Jaca, Tudela, and other towns, were placed in a state of defence, and four thousand men, newly arrived from France, were

pushed to Daroca, to link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements occupied the whole of February, and, on the 1st of March, a duplicate of the order, directing Suchet to commence the siege of Lerida, reached Terruel, yet as Habert's column having marched on the 27th, by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of Valencia, the operation went on.

INCURSION TO VALENCIA.

The first day, brought Suchet's column, in presence of the Valencian army, for Ventura Caro, captain-general of the province, was in march to attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced guard of five or six thousand regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a deep ravine so suddenly sunk, as not to be perceived until close upon it. The village and castle of Alventosa, situated somewhat in advance of the Spaniard's centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, and their left on the village of Manzanera, where the ground was rather more practicable.

Suchet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia, while Habert's column was turning his right, sent a division before daylight, on the 2d, to turn the left of the position, and cut off the retreat; nevertheless, although the French, after a skirmish, crossed the ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro fell back to the city of Valencia. Suchet then entered Segorbe, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a small corps at Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea coast. The country between their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after passing Saguntum, the columns united in the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of Spain.

Suchet arrived before the city on the 5th of March, and seized the suburb Seranos, and the harbour called the Grao. His spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a baron Pozzo Blanco, publicly executed, and the archbishop and many others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. Five days the French general remained before the city, vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his rear. Combats had already taken place at Liria and Castellon de la Plana, and general Villa Campa, who had re-assembled his dispersed troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between Terruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of a hundred men left at Alventosa, and, having invested the post at Terruel, on the 7th, by a bold and ready witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The 12th, however, the head of Suchet's column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza. During his absence, Perena had invested Monzon, and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida entered the latter town, and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments. Mina, also, was again become formidable, and, although several columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable, that they would have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, but for an accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner.

Suchet's failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the

* Suchet's Memoirs.

French than would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; and as it seemed to balance the misfortunes of Andalusia, it was hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. The principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenza, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded; and although Suchet laboured, and successfully, to show that he was drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon's avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at certain conjunctures any progress could be made, and one of the most favourable of those conjunctures, was lost, for want of the co-operation of the third corps; but to understand this, the military topography of Catalonia must be well considered.

That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic shores; for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from the central parts of Spain, are but continuations of those shoots. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia, and the hills, thus broken by the river, push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Taragona from Tortosa, and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of Catalonia, which contains Rosas, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, Manresa, Taragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military features of this region have been before described.* The western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and rugged valleys, each, the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenza, Cervera, and, near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortosa, which, however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia.

Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most part impracticable for artillery, and those practicable, leading upon walled towns at both sides of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, Cardona, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to the same city. Between Lerida and Taragona, stands Mombianch, and between Taragona, and Tortosa, the Fort St. Felipe blocks the Col de Balaguer. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller fortresses, or castles, such as Urgel, Berga, and Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes, of the higher valleys, took refuge from the moveable columns, and from whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied, to harass the flanks and rear of both the French corps.

In the eastern region, the line of operations for the seventh corps, was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front, and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Taragona, could advance or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the defence of Catalonia was conducted.

Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing by the mountains, or by sea from Taragona, harassed the French flanks, and when

defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, or Cervera, and finally to Taragona. From this last, the generals communicated with Tortosa, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even Sicily, and drew succours of all kinds from those places, and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the French communications; and it was only during the brief period of lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the seventh corps could chase those mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short incursions towards Taragona, because the Miguelettes from the higher valleys, and detachments from the army at Taragona, again passing by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the communication, and thus obliged the French to retire, because the country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long.

But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea, it was indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in advance, retiring again when the object was effected; this being often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary absence of the army. Thus during the siege of Gerona, Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. When the place fell, he retired again to Taragona, and Augereau took the occasion to attack the Miguelettes, and Somatenes, in the high valleys; but in the midst of this operation admiral Baudin's squadron, was intercepted by admiral Martin, and the insatiable craving of Barcelona, obliged Augereau to reassemble his army and conduct a convoy there by land; yet he was obliged to return immediately, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were again defeated, and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of co-operating with the third corps, which, he supposed, would, following the Emperor's design, be before Lerida or Tortosa. But at this time, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and Henry O'Donnel who had succeeded Blake in the command, recommenced the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida. Thus, like unruly horses in a chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other's movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above.

OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.

Gerona having fallen, general Souham with a division, scoured the high valleys, beat the Miguelettes of Clares and Rovira, at Besalu, Olot, Ribas, and Campredon, and at Ripoll destroyed a manufactory for arms. Being afterwards reinforced with Pino's division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu, and although the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, the French forced the passage, and took possession of Vich. Meanwhile Blake having been called to Andalusia, the Provincial Junta of Catalonia rejecting the duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give the command to Henry O'Donnel, whose courage during the siege of Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains of Blake's army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham's advanced guard, pursued, and at Tona captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights of Sespina, charged with a shock, that sent them headlong down again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the next day offered battle,

* Book I. Chap. VI.

but O'Donnel continued his retreat, and the French general returned to Vich.

During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardedieu; having previously ordered Duhesme, to post three battalions and five squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction, of the roads of Cardedieu and Manresa, to watch O'Donnel. Colonel Guery, commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, taking no military precautions, wherefore O'Donnel who had been joined by Campo Verde, sent him to fall upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel, surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa Perpetua and Mollet; those at Granollers, threw themselves into a large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach of Augereau they were relieved. The marshal finding the streets of Mollet strewn with French carcasses, ordered up the division of Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona; and when there, affecting to be convinced how oppressive Duhesme's conduct had been, sent him to France in disgrace. After this act of justice or of personal malice, for it has been called both names, Augereau, unable to procure provisions without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, resumed his former position at Gerona, and Souham returned to Vich.

All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat of Augereau, and the success of Campo Verde's enterprise, produced extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken, were marched from town to town, the action everywhere exaggerated, the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced with vigour, and the execution entrusted to the Baron d'Erolles, a native of Talaru, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, was thus reinforced, the confidence of the people increased hourly, and a Local Junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organise the Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succours from the sea. The Partisans, also reassembling their dispersed bands in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and accommodated the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich.

O'Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the Migueletes from the Lerida side, to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more than twelve thousand fighting-men, with which he took post at Moya, in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with enemies, and, having but five thousand men of all arms to oppose to them, demanded reinforcements, but Augereau paid little attention to him, and O'Donnel, descending the mountain of Centellas, on the 20th, entered the plains in three columns. The French general had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the Spaniards.

COMBAT OF VICH.

Rovira commenced the action, by driving the enemy's posts, on the side of Roda, back upon the town; O'Donnel, then, coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right, intending to outflank Souham's left. The latter general, leaving a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the first charge, were driven back in confusion. The Spanish foot then fell

in on the French centre, but failed to make any serious impression, wherefore O'Donnel, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves all engaged, and himself severely wounded in the head. O'Donnel, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led the whole mass once more against the left. At this critical period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was afterwards driven away from the rear, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded twelve hundred of the enemy.

O'Donnel's advance, had been the signal, for all the irregular bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they were, however, with the exception of a slight succour thrown into Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the moveable columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the Junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country about Cervera, and O'Donnel, quitting the Upper Llobregat, retired by Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the army of Taragona, leaving only an advanced guard at Roda.

It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish general, that the emperor directed the seventh corps upon the Lower Ebro, to support Suchet's operations against Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and two thousand men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered his brother and general Mazzucchelli (the one commanding Souham's, and the other Pino's division) to march upon Manresa, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent movements.

General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manresa, the 16th of March, and there joined Mazzucchelli; the inhabitants had abandoned the place, and general Swartz was sent with a brigade, from Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their movement, by Montserrat upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards Taragona. The French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left a thousand men in Villa Franca, and, after scouring the country on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Tarragona was placed between them and the troops at Villa Franca.

O'Donnel, whose energy and military talents, were superior to his predecessors, saw, and instantly profited from this false position. By his orders, general Juan Caro marched, with six thousand men, against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores, but, being wounded himself, resigned the command to general Gasca, after the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manresa, then detached columns, both by Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz, and the first reached its destinations, but the other, twelve hundred strong, was intercepted by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3d of April. Campo Verde immediately came down from the side of Cervera, took the chief command, and proceeded against Manresa, by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch, and Rovira, hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and the

Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. Swartz thus menaced evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the Spaniards, by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel, was followed closely by Rovira and Milans, and so pressed, on the 5th of April, that with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage, he reached Barcelona.

These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched, by sea, with orders to recal them to Barcelona. Meanwhile count Severoli, who had taken the command of them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose his rear to an attack from Taragona, and perhaps fail of meeting the third corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on the defensive at Reus, he detached colonel Villatte, at the head of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Falcet, to open a communication with the third corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the Lower Ebro. Villatte having accomplished his object, returned with great celerity, fighting his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles in his rear, and regaining Reus just as Severoli, having received the order of recal, was commencing his march for Barcelona.

In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such confusion, that from Taragona, O'Donnel perceived the disorder, and sending a detachment, under colonel Orry, to harass the French, followed himself with the rest of his army.* Nevertheless, Severoli's rear guard covered the retreat successfully, until a position was attained near Villa Franca, where Orry, pressing on too closely, was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their main body. When these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more than three thousand men, by a series of most unskilful movements; the situation in which he had voluntarily placed himself, was precisely such as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose.

Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains, to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa, were beyond those defiles, and several days march from each other. Rovira and Milans being about San Cugat, cut the communication between Manresa and Barcelona; O'Donnel at Taragona, was nearer to the defiles of Cristina, than the French divisions at Reus; and his own communication with Campo Verde was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Queralt; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and Igualada. Augereau indeed, had placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only rendered his situation worse; for what could six hundred men effect in a mountainous country, against three considerable bodies of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion, at Villa Franca, was put to the sword, Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a timely flight, and the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their retreat. O'Donnel, who, one month before, had retired from the battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only five thousand French, now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, although at the head of more than twenty thousand men, to abandon Lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona with disgrace; a surprising change, yet one in which fortune had no share.

Augereau's talents for handling small corps in a battle, have been recorded by a master hand.† There is a vast difference between that and conducting a campaign. But the truth is, that Catalonia had, like Ara-

gon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting the state of a viceroy, when he should have been at the head of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, indefatigable, and eager; he merited the success he obtained, and, with better and more experienced troops, that success would have been infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken place, O'Donnel, distracted by a double attack, would have remained at Taragona, and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at Mollet, Villa Franca, and Esparaguera, would have taken place.

Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations, sent M'Donald, duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau; meantime, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli the command.

FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.

This citadel had been invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, armed with forty guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, it was nearly impregnable, and the French at first endeavoured to reduce it by a simple blockade, but towards the middle of February, they commenced the erection of mortar batteries. Severoli also pressed the place more vigorously than before, and although O'Donnel, collecting convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops to be attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, every attempt to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity and honourable terms were offered, but the governor, Julian Estrada, rejected them, and prepared to break through the enemy's line; an exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne's days, and, as Napoleon has shewn by numerous examples, generally successful.*

O'Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, being aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to favour the enterprise; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving his sick behind, came forth with about fourteen hundred men. He first made as if for St. Celoni, afterwards turning to his right, he broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich; but the French closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so closely, that Estrada himself was wounded, and taken, together with about three hundred men, many were killed, the rest dispersed in the mountains, and eight hundred reached Vich in safety; this courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, after two years of field operations, many battles, and four sieges.

Two small islands, called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized. This event which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from port to port with provisions, or despatches, finished Augereau's career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr's. The latter, victorious in the field, was humane afterwards; but Augereau, endeavouring to frighten those people into submission, whom he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, which cruelty produced precisely the effect that might be expected.† The Catalans more animated by their successes, than daunted by this barbarous severity, became

* Vacani Istoria Militare degl' Italiani in Spagna.

† Napoleon's Memoirs.

* Napoleon's Memoirs.

† Victoires et Conquetes des Francaises

incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus all human feeling lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with crimes.

CHAPTER III.

Suchet marches against Lerida—Description of that fortress—Suchet marches to Tarega—O'Donnell advances from Taragona—Suchet returns to Balaguer—Combat of Margalef—Siege of Lerida—the city stormed—Suchet drives the inhabitants into the citadel and thus forces it to surrender.

WHILE Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from France, had raised his fighting men to about twenty-three thousand, and of these, he drew out thirteen thousand to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder, were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, and to hold in check the Partisans, principally in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa however, with from three to four thousand men, still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the mountains of Albaracin.

Two lines of operation were open to Suchet, the one, short and direct, by the high road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to Lerida; the other circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, because the Spaniards, when they took Fraga, destroyed the bridge over the Cinca. Moreover, the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, was close on the right flank, and might seriously incommode the communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although longer, was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions.

Monzon was already a considerable military establishment, the battering train consisting of forty pieces, with seven hundred rounds of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, and placed under the guard of Habert's division, which occupied the line of the Cinca. Leval leaving general Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division. Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcanitz, and was there joined by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point, from Terruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by detachments.

The right bank of that river, being guarded by Leval's division, and the country on the left bank, secured by a number of fortified posts, there remained two divisions of infantry, and about nine hundred cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish side, Campo Verde was with O'Donnell at Manreza, Garcia Novaro was at Taragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to cover Tortosa; Perenna with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the Upper Segre.

Suchet were the relative situations of both parties, when general Musnier quitting Alcanitz towards the end of March, crossed the Guadalupe, drove Novaro's detachments within the walls of Tortosa, and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that river at Mora and at Flix, communicated, as I have before related, with colonel Villatte of the seventh corps. While this was passing on the Ebro, general Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns, one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed the Segre at Camarasa. Perenna, fearing to be attacked on both sides of that river, and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the left bank, and

using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, at its confluence with the Segre.

Suchet himself having repaired to Monzon the 10th of April, placed a detachment at Candanos to cover his establishments from the garrison of Mequinenza, and the 13th advanced with a brigade of infantry, and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; meanwhile Habert, descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of the Noguerra, and obliged Perenna to retire within the place. The same day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed, the operations of the seventh and third corps were connected. Suchet's line of operations from Aragon, was short, direct, and easy to supply, because the produce of that province was greater than the consumption. Augereau's line was long and unsafe, and the produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption.

Lerida contained about eighteen thousand inhabitants. Situated upon the high road from Zaragoza to Barcelona, and about sixty-five miles from each, it possessed a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a short distance from the Ebro, and the Cinca rivers; its strategic importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner commanded the plain of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. The regular governor was named Gonzalez, but Garcia Conde had been appointed chief commandant, to appease his discontent at O'Donnell's elevation; and the troops he brought with him had increased the garrison to nine thousand regulars, besides the armed inhabitants.

The river Segre covered the town on the south east, and the head of the bridge was protected on the left bank, by a rampart and ditch enclosing a square stone building. The body of the place on the north side, was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way, but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on the east, was joined to a rocky hill more than two hundred and fifty feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, which was an assemblage of huge solid edifices, clustered about a castle of great height, and surrounded by an irregular work flanked by good bastions with ramparts from forty to fifty feet high.

The descent from the citadel into the town, was gentle, and the works were there strengthened by ditches; on the other parts, the walls could be seen to their base; yet the great height of the rock rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river, the town was squeezed out, about two or three hundred yards, and the salient part was secured by an entrenchment, and by two bastions called the Carmen and the Magdalen.

To the westward of the town, at the distance of seven or eight hundred yards, the hill, on which Afranius and Petreius encamped to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort Garden, which was again covered by a large horn-work with ditches above twenty feet deep; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando, secured the whole of the flat summit. All the works of Lerida were in good condition, and armed with more than one hundred pieces of artillery, the magazines were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local Junta also had been formed to excite public feeling, and two officers of artillery had already been murdered and their heads nailed to the gates of the town.

The siege was to be a joint operation by the third and seventh corps, but the information derived from colonel Villatte, and the appearance of Spanish Partisans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to suspect that the seventh corps had already retired, and that the further

would rest on him alone, wherefore he still kept his battering train at Monzon, intending to wait until O'Donnel's plans should be clearly indicated, before he commenced the siege. Meanwhile, he established a communication across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one league above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared materials for the construction of batteries. Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and Balaguer, the remainder were thus distributed. On the left bank of the Segre, at Alcoletege, four thousand men, including the cavalry, which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers and one of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation; Harispe, with three battalions, invested the bridge-head of Lerida. By this disposition, the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from the sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by patrols.

Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer, pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French general detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information; for there were rumours, that O'Donnel was collecting troops at Momblanch, that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the Somatenes of the high valleys were in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet anxious to ascertain the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with three hundred hussars on the 19th of April, and carried the corps of observation to Balaguer. The governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make a sally, but was repulsed. and the 21st, the French general, to strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa, above that town, to be broken, and then advanced as far as Tarrega, forty miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he was still uncertain of Augereau's movements, and like every other general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune, he ascertained that O'Donnel, with two divisions, was at Momblanch, ready to descend the mountains and succour Lerida; wherefore returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier to resume his former position at Alcoletege.

This rapidity was well-timed, for O'Donnel had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with eight thousand chosen infantry, and six hundred cavalry, and was encamped at Vinaxa, about twenty-five miles from Lerida, on the 22d. when a note from Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being drawn off, the investing force was weak, reached him. Being willing to seize the favourable moment, he immediately pushed forward, reached Juneda, fourteen miles from Lerida, by ten o'clock in the morning of the 23d, and, after a halt of two hours, resumed his march with the cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow more leisurely.

COMBAT OF MARGALEF.

Four miles from Juneda, stood the ruined village of Margalef, and from thence to Lerida was an open country, on which O'Donnel could perceive no covering force; hence, trusting implicitly to Conde's information (already falsified by Suchet's activity), the Spanish general descended the hills, and crossed the plain in three columns, one following the high road and the other two marching on the right and left. The centre outstripping the flankers, soon beat back the advanced posts of Harispe; but that general, charged

with his three hundred hussars, upon the centre Spanish column, so suddenly, that it was thrown into confusion, and fled towards Margalef, to which place, the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, but as the French infantry stood firm, the besieged, seeing the rout of O'Donnel's people, returned to the town.

Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed the real state of affairs, and marched at once with his infantry and four hundred cuirassiers from Alcoletege across the plain towards Margalef, hoping to cut off the Spaniards' retreat. O'Donnel who had rallied his troops, was already in line of battle, having the artillery on the right and the cavalry on the left, but his second division was still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of light artillery, came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and the Spanish cavalry rode forward, when the French cuirassiers, commanded by general Boussard, charged hotly, and forced them back on the line of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, and Boussard, observing the confusion, came with a rude shock upon the flank of the infantry. The Walloon guards made a vain effort to form square, but the confusion was extreme, and finally nearly all the Spanish infantry threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the advanced guard of the second Spanish division; yet the main body of the latter checked their fury, and O'Donnel retreated in good order, and without further loss to the defile of Momblanch. This action, although not discreditable to O'Donnel, was very unfortunate. The plain was strewn with carcasses; three Spanish guns, one general, eight colonels, and above five thousand men were captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of the defeat.

Suchet wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the besieged, attempted the night after the battle, to storm the redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando, and as the Spaniards, only fifty in number and unprovided with hand grenades, could not drive them away, a parley ensued, when it was agreed that the French should retire without being molested. Thus the Pilar was also saved, for being commanded by San Fernando, it was necessarily evacuated. Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to count the dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the prisoners; but Garcia Conde replied, "*that Lerida had never looked for external succour in her defences.*"

SIEGE OF LERIDA.

The absolute retreat of Augereau, was now fully ascertained, yet the victory of Margalef, and the apathy of the Valencians, encouraged Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to France by the way of Jaca, the battering train was brought up from Monzon, and all the other necessary preparations being completed, the Spanish out-posts were driven within the walls between the 26th and 27th. The following night, under the direction of general Haxo, ground was broken three hundred yards from the bastions of the Carmen and Magdalen; the Spaniards threw some fire-balls, and opened a few guns, without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke, the besiegers were well covered in the trenches.

In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed. Breaching and counter batteries were commenced, six sixteen-pounders were destined to batter

the left face of the Carmen, four long twelve-pounders, to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, and four mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather was rainy and the labour heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly, and on the 2d of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and two sixteen-pounders was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the Spanish musqueteers, incommoded the trenches from the left bank of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of investment on that side.

In the evening of the 4th, six hundred Spaniards, sallying from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the trenches, while another body, coming from the Magdalen, menaced the right of the French works. The French guards held the latter in check and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town; but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve as a place of arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken, down to the river; and as the light troops still continued to ply the trenches from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, close to the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six Spanish field-pieces, posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of the main attack was also extended on the right, embracing a part of the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at this extremity.

All the French batteries opened at day-break on the 7th, the mortars played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and three hundred men, stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the right of the parallels, took the two mortars, and penetrated as far as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by the French reserves, but they suffered from the Spanish guns in the pursuit, and in the night a violent storm, with rain, damaged the batteries and overflowed the trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the besiegers laboured at their works, and opened a second parallel one hundred and fifty yards in advance of the first, with the intention of forming fresh batteries; that being closer under the citadel-rock, would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a larger size, were also mounted; three new batteries were constructed, and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoners.

On the 12th the fire recommenced from eight batteries, containing fifteen guns and nineteen mortars. The besieged replied at first sharply, but in a little time stammered in their answers, the French artillery took the ascendent, the walls of the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in the Carmen, and one in the Magdalen, appeared practicable, and after dark, some Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, brought intelligence, that the streets of the town behind the breaches, were retrenched and defended by batteries.

Suchet's hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high. He had from the first supposed, that the vehemence of the citizens, and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige the governor to fight the town to the last, instead of reserving his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed mobs, easily excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected to carry the breaches briskly, and with one sweep, to force all the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they would hamper, if not entirely mar, the defence of that formidable fortress; but he resolved first to carry the forts of San Fernando and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, flying from the assault of the breaches, should take refuge on that side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other

necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius that night; one marched against the redoubts, and the others were ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden, fell in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort Garden, but meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted desperately, and that redoubt was not taken until two-thirds of the defendants were put to the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of a hundred men.

During this operation the great batteries played into the citadel only, but, at day-break, renewed their fire on the breaches; steps were also cut in the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the troops to the assault; and all the materials, necessary to effect a solid lodgement on the walls, were conveyed into the trenches. These arrangements being completed at seven o'clock in the evening of the 13th, the signal was made, and four storming parties jumped out of the trenches; two made for the Carmen, one against the Magdalen, and one moved close by the river, and the Spaniards being at this moment preparing a sally to retake the horn-work of Fort Garden, did so little expect this assault, that they suffered the French to mount the breaches without opposition; but then rallying, found such a fire of musquetry and artillery upon the heads of the principal columns, that the latter staggered and would have yielded if Habert had not revived their courage, and led them into the town, at the very moment that the troops on the right and left having also forced their way, turned all the retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river, general Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve, followed close upon the steps of the storming-parties; the Spaniards were thus overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat into the citadel.

It was now that the French general put his design into execution.* Harispe's brigade passing the bridge, made for the gate of St. Anthony, looking towards Fort Garden, and thus cut off all egress from the town; this done, the French columns advanced from every side, in a concentric direction, upon the citadel, and, with shouts, and stabs, and musquetry, drove men, women, and children before them, while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then flying up the ascent, the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded on the summit of the rock; but, all that night, the French shells fell amongst the hapless multitude, and, at daylight, the fire was redoubled, and the carnage swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the cries and sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag. At twelve o'clock, the horrible scene terminated. The capitulation that followed was honourable in terms to the besieged, but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with its immense stores and near eight thousand prisoners, for the whole loss of the garrison had been only twelve hundred men.

Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced, by a proceeding, politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilized warfare. For, though a town, taken by assault, be considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant the driving of unarmed helpless people, into a situation, where they must perish from the fire of the enemy, unless the governor fail in his duty. Suchet justifies it, on the ground, that he thus spared a great effusion of

* Suchet's Memoirs.

blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted siege, and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers' blood at the expense of women's and children's, and, had Garcia Conde's nature been stern, he, too, might have pleaded expediency, and the victory would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing mothers.

CHAPTER IV.

Reflections on that act—Lazan enters Alcanitz, but is driven out by the French—Colonel Petit taken with a convoy by Villa Campa, and assassinated after the action—Siege of Mequinenza—Fall of that place—Morella taken—Suchet prepares to enter Catalonia—Strength and resources of that province.

WHEN Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no foundation for the charge; the cause stated by Suchet was sufficient for the effect; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls, on the side of the attack, could not be expected, and scarcely did, offer an impediment to the French general; hence the citadel should have been the better prepared, and, as the besiegers' force, the corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in number, it might have baffled Suchet's utmost efforts. Engineers require that the relative strength of besiegers and besieged, should not be less than four to one; yet here the French invested a force equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in the midst of succouring armies; for Lerida had communications, 1. With the armed population of the high valleys; 2. With O'Donnel's corps of fourteen thousand; 3. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was posted with four thousand men; 4. With Tortosa, where the marquis of Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from five to six thousand; 5. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable army of fifteen thousand regular and more than thirty thousand irregular soldiers.

It is evident that, if all these forces had been directed with skill and concert upon Lerida, not only the siege would have been raised, but the very safety of the third corps endangered; and it was to obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the seventh corps to take such a position on the Lower Ebro as would keep both O'Donnel and the Valencians in check. Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do this; and St. Cyr asserts that the seventh corps could never safely venture to pass the mountains, and enter the valley of the Ebro. On the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon's instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat similar circumstances, blockaded Taragona for a month; Augereau, who had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet spared six thousand men to pass the mountains, Suchet would then have been tranquil with respect to O'Donnel, would have had a covering-army to protect the siege, and the succours, fed from the resources of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia.

Augereau has been justified, on the ground, that the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The danger of this could not have escaped the emperor, yet his military judgement, unerring in principle, was often false in application, because, men measure difficulties by the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon's standard only suited the heroic proportions. One thing is, however, certain, that Catalonia presented the most extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military organization of the Miguelettes and Somatenes,—the well-arranged system of fortresses,—the ruggedness and sterility of the country,—the ingenuity and readi-

ness of a manufacturing population thrown out of work, and, finally, the aid of an English fleet, combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. Nevertheless, the French made progress, each step planted slowly indeed and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making another.

Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona; and, by the capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines, stores of powder, ten thousand muskets, the command of several dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in the midst of the Catalonian strong-holds; and he had taken or killed fifteen thousand Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the prelude to greater struggles. The Miguelettes supplied O'Donnel with abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Taragona, San Felipe Belaguer, and Tortosa, the link of connexion between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and, during every great operation, the Partisans, being unmolested, recovered strength. Thus during the siege of Lerida, the marquis of Lazan entered the town of Alcanitz with five thousand men, and would have carried the castle, but that general Laval despatched two thousand men, from Zaragoza, to its succour, when the Spaniards after a skirmish in the streets, retired; and, while this was passing at Alcanitz, Villa Campa intercepted four hundred men conducting a convoy of provisions from Calatayud to Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the commander, being attacked in the defile of Frasno, was forced to abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, to fight his way for ten miles, until his detachment, reduced to one hundred and eighty wounded men, passed the Xalon river, and, at the village of Arandiza, finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band were taken or killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, and sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death, but at the same time, suffered the troops to burn alive an old man, the Alcade of Frasno, who was taken among the French.

This action happened the day Lerida fell, and the next day, Chlopiski, following Villa Campa's march from Daroca, reached Frasno, but the Spaniards were no longer there; Chlopiski, then dividing his forces, pursued them, by the routes Calatayud and Xarava, to Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and so pressed the Spanish general, that his troops disbanded, and several hundred retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack, made from the side of Navarre, on the garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed.

These petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the Spaniards, proved also the stability of Suchet's power in Aragon. His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the nature of this unjust war would permit; and, however questionable the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided measures, for the retreat of the seventh corps set free not only O'Donnel's army, but Campo Verde's and all the irregular bands. The Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force, on the Upper Segre, the very day of the assault; eight hundred Miguelettes attacked Venasque three days after: and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera, by Aramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana, above Talarn and Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled.

Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida; the Miguelettes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at Tremp; and general Habert,

marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo Verde from Cervera, and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. If the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O'Donnel, less hasty, had combined his march, at a later period, with these Somatenes and with Campo Verde, the third corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster; whereas, now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza. This place situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The French general could not advance in force against Tortosa, nor avail himself of the water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall; and such was his activity that one detachment, sent the day after the assault of Lerida, by the left bank of the Segre, was already before the place; and Musnier's division, descending the right bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the investment on the 20th of May.

Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra de Alcubierre filled the space between the two rivers, and narrowing as they closed, ended in a craggy rock, seven hundred feet high and overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water. This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, which being inaccessible on two sides from the steepness, and covered, on a third, by the town, could only be assailed, on the fourth, along a high neck of land, three hundred yards wide, that joined the rock to the parent hills: and the rampart on that side, was bastioned, lined with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way with palisades. No guns could be brought against the castle, until the country people, employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente, over the hills, and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June, and meanwhile the brigade, which had defeated Lazan at Alcanitz, arrived on the right bank of the Ebro, and completed the investment. The 30th of May, general Regniet, coming from France, with a reinforcement of engineer-officers, and several companies of sappers and miners, also reached the camp, when, taking the direction of the works, he contracted the circle of investment, and commenced active operations.

SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.

The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st; and, the 2d of June, the French artillery, consisting of eighteen pieces, of which six were twenty-four pounders, being brought over the hills, the advanced posts of the Spaniards were driven into the castle. During the night, ground was broken two hundred yards from the place, under a destructive fire of grape, and while this was passing on the height, approaches were made against the town, in the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also entrenched, close to the water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation, but of eleven boats freighted with inhabitants and their property, nine effected their escape.

In the night of the 3d the parallels on the rock were perfected, the breaching-batteries were commenced, and parapets of sand-bags were raised, from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the castle with musketry; the works against the town were also advanced, but in both places, the nature of the ground greatly impeded the operations. The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, were opened chiefly by blasting; those below were in a space too

narrow for batteries, and, moreover, searched by a plunging fire, both from the castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the town wall. The troops on the right bank of the Ebro, however, opened their musketry with such effect on the wall, that the garrison could not stop, and both the wall and tower were then escalated without difficulty, the Spaniards all retiring to the castle. The French placed a battalion in the houses, and put those next the rock in a state of defence; and although the garrison of the castle rolled down large stones from above, they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy.

The 6th the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were completed; and, in the night, forty grenadiers carried by storm a small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th, Suchet, who had been at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp and, on the 8th, sixteen pieces of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The Spaniards answered with such vigour, that three French guns were dismounted, yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and at nine o'clock in the morning, the place was nearly silenced, and the rampart broken in two places. The Spaniards endeavoured to keep up the defence with musketry, while they mounted fresh guns, but the interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment, that, at ten o'clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men became prisoners of war; forty-five guns, and large stores of powder and of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were found in the magazines.

Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, general Mont-Marie, commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched, against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, had left that important fort, commanding one of the principal entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. When it was lost, general O'Donouj, with a division of the Valencian army, advanced to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works were then repaired, and Morella became a strong and important place of arms.

By these rapid and successful operations Suchet secured, 1. A fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and Valencia; 2. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance to those provinces; 3. The command of several fertile tracts of country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4. The co-operation of the seventh corps, which, by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage beyond the Llobregat. But, to effect the complete subjugation of Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its communications by land with Valencia, and to destroy O'Donnel's base. The first could only be effected, by taking Tortosa, the second by capturing Taragona. Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by the third, and the other by the seventh corps, were ordered by the emperor.

Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles arose: the difficulty of obtaining provisions, in the eastern region of Catalonia, was increased by O'Donnel's measures, and that general, still commanding above twenty thousand men, was neither daunted by past defeats, nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His harsh manners and stern sway, rendered him hateful to the people; but he was watchful to confirm the courage, and excite the enthusiasm of his troops by conferring rewards and honours on the field of battle, and, being of singular intrepidity himself, his exhortations had more effect. Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good officers, and the full strength and importance of every position and town were, by dint of experience, becoming known. With these helps O'Donnel long prevented

ed the siege of Tortosa, and found full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year. Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified places fell one after another, each serving, by its fall, to strengthen the hold of the French, in the same proportion that it had before impeded their progress.

The foundations of military power were, however, deeply cast in Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards, and ten thousand British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to land on the rear of the French, or to join the Catalans in an action, could at any period of 1809 and 1810, have paralyzed the operations of the seventh corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortosa, Taragona, and even Lerida. While those places were in the hands of the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily were reducing the Ionian islands or loitering on the coast of Italy; but when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people were worn out with suffering, a British army which could have been beneficially employed elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern coast of Spain. Notwithstanding the many years of hostility with France, the English ministers were still ignorant of every military principle; and yet too arrogant to ask advice of professional men; for it was not until after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory of Salamanca shewed the giant in his full proportions, that even Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgement, although he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole responsibility of failure would rest on his head.

CHAPTER V.

Operations in Andalusia—Blockade of Cadiz—Desertions in that city—Regency formed—Albuquerque sent to England—Dies there—Regency consent to admit British troops—General Colin Campbell obtains leave to put a garrison in Ceuta, and to destroy the Spanish lines at San Roque—General William Stewart arrives at Cadiz—Seizes Matagorda—Tempest destroys many vessels—Mr. Henry Wellesley and general Graham arrive at Cadiz—Apathy of the Spaniards—Gallant defence of Matagorda—Heroic conduct of a sergeant's wife—General Campbell sends a detachment to occupy Tarifa—French prisoners cut the cables of the prison-hulks, and drift during a tempest—General Lacey's expedition to the Ronda—His bad conduct—Returns to Cadiz—Reflections on the state of affairs.

SUCHET's preparations equally menaced Valencia, and Catalonia, and the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side of Grenada, and made excursions against the fourth corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the course of the history leads me back to Catalonia, those of the Murcian army belong to the

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

During the month of February, the first corps was before Cadiz, the fourth in Grenada, Dessolles' division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda, and the fifth corps (with the exception of six battalions and some horse left at Seville) in Estremadura. The king, accompanied by marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry, to different points, and received from all the great towns assurances of their adhesion

to his cause. But as the necessities of the army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, both of money and provisions, moveable columns were employed to collect them, especially for the fourth corps, and with so little attention to discipline as soon to verify the observations of St. Cyr, that they were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. The people exasperated by disorders, and violence, and at the same time excited by the agents of their own and the British government, suddenly rose in arms, and Andalusia, like other parts of Spain, became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare.*

The Grenadans of the Alpujarras, were the first to resist, and this insurrection spreading on the one hand through the Sierra de Ronda, and on the other, towards Murcia, received succours from Gibraltar, and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry under the command of Blake. The communication between the first and fourth corps across the Sierra de Ronda, was maintained by a division of the former, posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars of the latter quartered in the town of Ronda. From the latter place, the insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the other extremity Blake marching from Almeira, took Ardra and Motril, and at the same time the mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba interrupted Dessolles' communications with La Mancha.

These movements took place in the beginning of March, and the king and Soult being then in the city of Grenada, sent one column across the mountain by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril, while a second moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeria, cut off his retreat. This obliged the Murcians to disperse, and at the same time, Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; and the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, marched to restore the communications with the first corps. Being joined by the detachment beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st of March; but during their absence the people from the Alpuxaras entered Malaga, killed some of the inhabitants as favourers of the enemy, and would have done more, but that another column from Grenada came down on them, and the insurrection was thus strangled in its birth. It had, however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening a character, that the fifth corps was recalled from Estremadura, and all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison, and a part of the second corps, were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha, the capital itself being left in charge of some Spanish battalions in the invader's service.† The king who feared the Valencian and Murcian armies would invade La Mancha, repaired thither, and after a time returned to Madrid. The duke of Dalmatia then remained chief commander of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a system of administration so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal, and supported by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold, but this will be better shewn hereafter; at present, it is more convenient to notice

THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

Marshal Victor having declined an assault on the Isla, spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of contravallation on an extent of not less than twenty-five miles. The towns, the islands, castles, harbours, and rivers, he thus enclosed are too numerous, and in their relative bearings, too intricate for minute description; yet, looking as it were from

* King Joseph's Correspondence, captured at Victoria, MSS.

† Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MSS.

the French camps, I shall endeavour to point out the leading features.

The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or entrenched positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, having its left on the sea-coast near the Torre Bermeja, was from thence carried across the Almanza, and the Chiclana rivers, to the Zuraque; on a line of eight miles, traced along a range of thickly wooded hills, and bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad. This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the above-mentioned rivers, and by a number of navigable water-courses or creeks, was also cut in its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea. The Santi Petri, nine miles long, from two to three hundred yards wide, and of depth to float a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the marsh and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the bridge of Zuaro, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the Caraccas, or Royal Arsenal, situated on an island just in the harbour mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh inattackable, save by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and served as an advanced post. On the left hand the castle of Santi Petri, also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel.

Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in form a triangle, the base of which rested on that channel, the right side on the harbour, the left on the open sea, and the apex pointing towards Cadiz. All this island was a salt-marsh, except one high and strong ridge in the centre, about four miles long, upon which the large town of La Isla stands, and which being within cannon shot of the Santi Petri, offered the second line of defence.

From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low and narrow isthmus about five miles long, connected the island with the rocks upon which Cadiz stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, a cut called the Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered a third line of defence. The fourth and final line, was the land front of the city itself, regularly and completely fortified.

On the Chiclana side therefore, the hostile forces were only separated by the marsh; and although the Spaniards commanded the Santi Petri, the French having their chief depots in the town of Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might force the passage of the channel; because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and Almanza creeks, were navigable above the lines of contravallation. The thick woods behind, afforded the means of constructing an armed flotilla; and such was the nature of the ground bordering the Santi Petri itself, on both sides, that off the high road, it could only be approached by water, or by narrow footpaths, leading between the salt-pans of the marsh.

The central French or Puerto Real division, extending from the Zuraque on the left, to the San Pedro a navigable branch of the Guadalete on the right, measured about seven miles. From the Zuraque to the town of Puerto Real, the line was traced along a ridge skirting the marsh, so as to form with the position of Chiclana a half circle. Puerto Real itself was entrenched, but a tongue of land four miles long projected from thence perpendicularly on to the narrow isthmus of Cadiz. This tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or canal of Trocadero, separated the inner from the outward harbour, and at its extreme points stood the village of Trocadero, and the fort of Matagorda, opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz a powerful battery called the Puntales. From Matagorda to the city was above four thousand yards, but across the channel to Puntales was only twelve

hundred; it was therefore the nearest point to Cadiz and to the isthmus, and was infinitely the most important post of offence. From thence the French could search the upper harbour with their fire and throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, while their flotilla safely moored in the Trocadero creek, could make a descent upon the isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works between it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned Matagorda.

The third or Santa Maria division of blockade, followed the sweep of the bay, and reckoning from the San Pedro, on the left, to the castle of Santa Catalina the extreme point of the outer harbour, on the right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the mouth of the Guadalete in the centre of this line, was entrenched and the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged.

Besides these lines of blockade which were connected by a covered way, concealed by thick woods, and, when finished, armed with three hundred guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz, was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead, the second commanded the mouth of the Guadalquivir. Behind the line of blockade, Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, took post at Medina Sidonia, his left being upon the Upper Guadalete, and his advanced posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the position of the first corps. I shall now relate the progress of events within the blockaded city.

The fall of the Central Junta, the appointment of the regency and the proclamation for convoking the national Cortes have been already touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, commander in chief, and president of the Junta, appeared to have unlimited power, but in reality, possessed no authority, except over his own soldiers, and did not meddle with administration. The regency appointed provisionally and composed of men without personal energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the Junta of Cadiz; and that imperious body without honour, talents, or patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile privately trafficked with the public stores.*

Albuquerque's troops were in a deplorable state; the whole had been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms, accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes.† When he demanded supplies, the Junta declared that they could not furnish them; but the duke affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the Regency, and the latter, anxious to render the Junta odious, yet fearing openly to attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The Junta replied by an exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous in reasoning; for although they had elected the duke president of their own body, they accused him amongst other things, with retreating from Carmona too quickly; and they finished with a menacing intimation, that, supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to a crisis, both Albuquerque and the Regency gave way, and the former being sent ambassador to England, it was thought he meant to go to South America, but he died in London, some months after, of a phrenzy brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion at the unworthy treatment he received. He was judged to be a brave and generous man, but weak and hasty, and easy to be duped.

The misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions, the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit

* Albuquerque's Manifesto.

† Private Correspondence of Officers from Cadiz, 1810, MSS

of the Junta, the apathy of the people, the feebleness of the Regency, the scarcity of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many favourers, and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy; and this state of affairs would have led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish store-houses, and if the Regency had not consented to receive British troops into the city. Their entrance saved it, and at the same time, general Colin Campbell (who had succeeded sir John Cradock as governor of Gibraltar) performed a great service to his country, for, by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of San Roque, and the forts round the harbour of Algeiras should be demolished. Both measures were very essential to the present and permanent interests of England, and the last especially so, because it cleared the neighbourhood of the fortress, and gave it a secure harbour. Gibraltar, at this time, contained a mixed and disaffected population of more than twelve thousand persons, and merchandize to the value of two millions sterling, which could have been easily destroyed by bombardment. Ceuta, which was chiefly garrisoned by condemned troops, and filled with galley-slaves, and its works miserably neglected, had only six days' provisions, was at the mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the streights; and the possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways, especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries were exceedingly active.

General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz, on the 11th of February, with two thousand men, a thousand more joined him from Gibraltar, and the whole were received with an enthusiasm, that proved sir George Smith's perception to have been just, and that Mr. Frere's unskilful management of the Central Junta, had alone prevented a similar measure the year before. The 17th a Portuguese regiment, thirteen hundred strong, was also admitted into the city, Spanish troops came in daily in small bodies; two ships of war, the *Euthalion* and *Undaunted*, arrived from Mexico with six millions of dollars; and another British battalion, a detachment of artillery, and more native troops having joined the garrison, the whole force assembled behind the *Santi Petri*, was not less than four thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fourteen thousand Spaniards.† Yet there was little of enthusiasm amongst the latter; and in all this time, not a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, or had volunteered, either to labour or to fight. The ships recovered at Ferrol, had been transferred to Cadiz, so there were in the bay, twenty-three men of war, of which four of the line, and three frigates were British; and thus, money, troops, and a fleet, in fine, all things necessary to render Cadiz formidable, were collected, yet to little purpose, because procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and a thousand absurdities, were the invariable attendants of Spanish armies and governments.

General Stewart's first measure, was to recover Matagorda, the error of abandoning which was to be attributed as much to admiral Purvis as to the Spaniards. In the night of the 22d, a detachment consisting of fifty seamen and marines, twenty-five artillery-men, and sixty-seven of the ninety-fourth regiment, the whole under the command of captain M'Lean, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking possession of the dismantled fort, before morning effected a solid lodgement, and although the French cannonaded the work with field-artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported by the fire of Puntales, was immovable.

The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh meat; and from the 7th

to the 10th of March, a continued tempest, beating up on the coast, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail of the line, and a frigate and from thirty to forty merchantmen, on shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary's. One ship of the line was taken, the others burnt and part of the crews brought off by boats from the fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of the fourth English regiment fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an immense booty.

Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary, arrived, and on the 24th of that month, general Graham coming from England assumed the chief command of the British, and immediately caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence, was quite inadequate, and that to secure it against the utmost efforts of the enemy, twenty thousand soldiers, and a system of redoubts, and batteries, requiring the labour of four thousand men for three months, were absolutely necessary. Now, the Spaniards had only worked beyond the *Santi Petri*, and that without judgement; their batteries in the marsh were ill placed, their entrenchments on the tongue of land at the sea mouth of that channel, were of contemptible strength, and the Caracacs which they had armed with one hundred and fifty guns, being full of dry timber could be easily burned by carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected, and while they had abandoned the important posts of Matagorda, and the Trocadero, they had pushed their advanced batteries, to the junction of the Chiclana road with the Royal-causeway, in the marsh; that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and consequently exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by water and land.

It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans, and offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent to pull down a house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination paralysed their allies, and would have lost the place, had the French been prepared to press it vigorously. They were indifferent to the progress of the enemy, and to use general Graham's expression, they wished the English would drive away the French, *that they might go and eat strawberries at Chiclana*. Nor were the British works (when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed) well and rapidly completed, for the Junta furnished bad materials, there was a paucity of engineer-officers, and, from the habitual negligence of the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores, nor implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from the private journals of commanders of British expeditions, during the war with France, would show an incredible carelessness of preparation on the part of the different cabinets. The generals were always expected to "make bricks without straw," and thus the laurels of the British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, was due, more to his perseverance and unconquerable energy before the descent, than to his daring operations afterwards.

Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the 31st, and both sides continued to labour, but the allies slowly and without harmony, and, the supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased; many persons were forced to quit Cadiz, two thousand men were sent to Ayamonte to collect provisions on the Guadiana; and notwithstanding this, so strange a people were the Junta, that they deceived Mr. Wellesley by assurances that the magazines were full, and thus induced him to suffer them to send wheat and flour away from the city, which was actually done, at the very time they were thus pressed by want!*

But now Matagorda, which, though frequently can-

* General Campbell's Correspondence. MSS.

† Official Abstract of Operations at Cadiz. 1810. MSS.

* General Graham's Correspondence. MSS.

nonaded, had been held fifty-five days, impeded the completion of the enemy's works at the Trocadero point. This small fort, of a square form, with one angle projecting towards the land, without a ditch, and without bomb-proofs sufficient for the garrison, was little calculated for resistance; and, as it could only bring seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an armed flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate in the defence. The French had however raised great batteries behind some houses on the Trocadero, and, as daylight broke, on the 21st of April, a hissing shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, and in the midst of the flotilla, obliged them to cut their cables and take shelter under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of forty-eight guns and mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, the enemy shot quick and close, a staff, bearing the Spanish flag, was broken six times in an hour, and the colours were at last fastened to the angle of the work itself, while the men, especially the sailors besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours this tempest lasted, and sixty-four men out of one hundred and forty were down, when general Graham, finding a diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. The bastion was then blown up, under the direction of major Lefebvre, an engineer of great promise, but he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned. Here I must record an action of which it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A sergeant's wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and, although a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered it, and fulfilled her mission.*

After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished at Cadiz; but Sebastiani's cavalry infested the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and he himself entered the capital of Murcia, on the 23d, when Blake retired upon Alicante and Carthagena. Meanwhile the French covered Matagorda point with batteries; but they were pressed for provisions, and general Campbell, throwing a detachment into Tarifa, drove their foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with cattle.† The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, yet by their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with four hundred foot and some cavalry, and although the former were repulsed, the horse foraged the country, and drove off several herds of cattle during the action. General Campbell then increased the detachment to five hundred men, with some guns, and placed the whole under the command of major Brown of the 28th.

In May the French prisoners, cutting the cables of two hulks, drifted in a heavy gale to the French side of the bay; and the boats sent against them being beat off, by throwing cold shot from the decks, above fifteen hundred men saved themselves in despite of the fire from the boats of the allied fleet, and from the batteries, which was continued after the vessels had grounded; although the miserable creatures, thus struggling for life, had been treated with horrible cruelty, and, being all of Dupont's or Vedel's corps, were prisoners only by a dishonourable breach of faith! Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder was daily increasing. The Regency

having recalled Cuesta to their military councils, he published an attack on the deposed Central Junta, and was answered so as to convince the world, that the course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English general was hampered by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops were daily getting more inefficient from neglect, when the departure of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla, and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the Municipal Junta consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla.

English reinforcements continued to arrive, and four thousand Spaniards, from Murcia, joined the garrison, or rather army, now within the lines; yet such was the state of the troops, and the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy's works. It was, however, necessary to do something; and, after some ill judged plans of the Regency had been rejected by Graham, general Lacy was embarked, with three thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry, to aid the armed peasants, or Seranos, of the Ronda.* These people had been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed by captain Cowley and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers, sent from Gibraltar. General Campbell also offered to reinforce Lacy, from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga, where there were twenty thousand males fit to carry arms, and the French were only two thousand, and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle, containing but twelve guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only supplied by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this enterprise, and demanded that eight hundred men, from Gibraltar, should make a diversion to the eastward, while he, landing at Algeiras, moved on Ronda, this being assented to, the English armament sailed under the command of general Boves.

Lacy made good his movement upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having fortified it, were too strong at that point, or, rather, Lacy, a man of no enterprise, durst not act, and, when he was joined by many thousand mountaineers, he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, alarmed by these operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia, and by an insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, and general Rey, marching from Seville, against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July. Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little use made of the naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength in the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish soldiers, at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, 30,000, the British in Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, forming a total of more than fifty thousand effective troops, aided by a great navy, and favourably placed for harassing that immense, and, with the exception of the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted French line of operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz; for, even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under Murat, in Calabria, and from fifteen to twenty thousand French around Cadiz, were allowed to paralyze this mighty power.

It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, and favourable localities, are all required, in the combined operations of a fleet and army, and troops disembarking, also require time to equip for service. But

* An interesting account of this noble-minded woman, is to be found in a small volume, entitled, "*Sketches of a Soldier's Life, in Ireland*," by the author of "*The Eventful Life of a Soldier*." This last work was erroneously designated, in the former part of this work, as "*The Life of a Sergeant*."

† General Campbell's Correspondence. MSS.

* General Graham's Despatches. MSS.

Minorca offered a central station, and a place of arms for the army, and a spacious port for the fleet; the coast of Catalonia and Valencia is so pacific and safe, that seldom or never does a gale blow on shore; the operations would always have been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities, and Lord Collingwood was fitted, by his talents, discretion, zeal, experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to direct such a floating armament. What coast-siege, undertaken by the seventh or third corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, if the garrison had been suddenly augmented with fifteen or twenty thousand men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the operations of a siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas, the slight expeditions of this period, were generally disconcerted by the presence of a few French companies.

In July the British force, in Cadiz, was increased to eight thousand five hundred men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de Barrameda, made no attacks, and his works have been much censured, as ostentatiously extended, and leading to nothing. This is however a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade the Isla, and, as the true point for offensive operations, was at the Trocadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria, were necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive the citizens of good water, which in ordinary times, was fetched from Puerto Maria, and finally to enable the flotilla, constructing at San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, as experience proved, almost repaid the labour, and it is to be considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not with a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded troops, but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other parts of the Peninsula first impeded, and finally frustrated this intention, yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or ostentatious.

Neither was it a slight political advantage, that the duke of Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper's government, while the National Cortes, and the Regency, were cooped up in a narrow corner of the province. Moreover, the preparations at Matagorda constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was necessarily kept there, for the English generals were well assured, that otherwise, some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the French works, no mischief could have been apprehended, and Graham's division, consisting of excellent soldiers, would have been set free, instead of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in the number of the French troops at the blockade; for the latter aided indirectly, and at times directly, in securing the submission of Andalusia, and if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as there was an army in the Isla.

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the operations in Andalusia—Description of the Spanish and Portuguese lines of position south of the Tagus—Situation of the armies in Estremadura—Complex operations in that province—Soult's policy.

WHILE the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville was guarded by a few thousand men of the fifth corps, left by Mortier when he advanced against Badajos; and even from this small body six hundred infantry, under general Remond, and two hundred cavalry, were sent to attack the viscount De Gand, who was still at Aya-

monte, vainly demanding a refuge in Portugal. The latter had four thousand troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left through Gibralfaro into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Cerrado de Niebla, and the French immediately occupied Moguer and Huelva, towns situated at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had hitherto drawn supplies. Meanwhile the viscount returning to Ayamonte, sailed with his troops to Cadiz, and was replaced by general Copons, who came with two thousand men to gather provisions on the lower Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts.

On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered Grenada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia; a great part of that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was ravaged and laid waste.

In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles reduced the struggle to a trifling Guerilla warfare; but it was different in La Mancha, where the Partidas became so numerous and the war so onerous, that one of Joseph's ministers writing to a friend, described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands. It remains to speak of Estremadura which was become the scene of various complicated movements and combats, producing no great results, indeed, but important as being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal.

The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier south of the Tagus, may be divided into three parts.

1. From the Tagus to Badajos on the Guadiana.
2. From Badajos to the Morena.
3. From the Morena to the sea.

Each of these divisions is about sixty miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick woods, a double chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish; Montalvao, Castello de Vide, Marvao, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, the principal Portuguese places. The three first on either side are in the mountains, the others in the open country, which spreads from the Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point, from whence roads lead to all the above-named fortresses.

From Badajos to the Morena, forms the second division of the country, it is rugged and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese side, Jaramenha, Mourao and Moura; on the Spanish, Olivenza (formerly Portuguese), Xeres de los Caballeros, and Aroche.

From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, contained the fortresses of San Lucar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte. The Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin, and, although the greater number of these places were dismantled, the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza.

When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th of February, Romana was near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided, that a fortnight's blockade would have reduced it;* but the French general, who had only brought up eight thousand infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his cavalry was surprised at Valverde, and the commander Beauregard slain. Romana then returned to Badajos the 20th; and the 27th, Mortier leaving some troops in

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence. MSS.

Zafra, marched to Merida, to connect himself with the second corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on the Guadiana.

It will be remembered that this corps, commanded by general Mermet, occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the invasion of Andalusia, and communicating with the sixth corps through the pass of Baños, formed an intermediate reserve between Mortier and Kellerman. The latter was at Bejar, and Miranda de Castanar, watching the duke Del Parque, in the early part of January, but withdrew to Salamanca, when the British army arrived in the valley of the Mondego. The duke Del Parque then left Martin Carrera with a weak division in the Sierra de Gata, marched, with thirteen thousand men, through the pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque and his left on the Guadiana.

When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placentia, knew of this movement, he first detached three thousand men across the Tagus, by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult's brother, with four thousand men from Talavera, crossed the bridge of Arzobispo, advanced by Caceres, surprised some Spanish troops at Villa del Rey and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close to Badajos. The remainder of the second corps arrived at Caceres by degrees; general Reynier took the command, and, as I have said, was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at Merida, and prepared gabions and fascines as if to besiege Badajos.

These demonstrations attracted the notice of general Hill, who advanced with ten thousand men from Abrantes to Portalegre; and then Romana, finding himself, by the junction of the duke Del Parque's army, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, resolved to act against the communications of the French. His first division, commanded by Charles O'Donnel, brother to the Catalan general, occupied Albuquerque. The second, under Mendizabel, was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of five thousand Asturians, was sent, under Ballasteros, to Olivenza, and the fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier's communication with Seville.

Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros the 1st of March, but a detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballasteros with the fourth at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras' movements, repaired to Zafra, leaving the second corps at Merida. The 10th, Romana advanced again towards Albuquerque, and having pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by general Foy. The 14th O'Donnel endeavoured to surprise Foy in return, but the latter, with very inferior numbers, fought his way through the Puerto de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres.

At this period the insurrections in Grenada, the movements of the Murcian army, and the general excitement of Valencia, in consequence of Suchet's retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier for the defence of Andalusia; wherefore the latter, after holding a council of war with Reynier, destroyed the works at Merida, on the 19th, and retired to Seville, leaving Gazan's division at Monasterio. Reynier having sent his stores to Truxillo drove the Spaniards out of Caceres the 20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards took post at Torremocha, and O'Donnel returned to Caceres.

There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1. The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra Los Santos, Monasterio, and

Ronquillo. 2. A shorter, but more difficult, road, which, running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel routes, have no cross communications in the Morena, but on the Estremaduran side, a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to Zafra, and on the Andalusian side, there is one from Araceña to Ronquillo. Now when Mortier retired, Ballasteros marched from Olivenza to Xeres de los Cavalleros, and being joined by Contreras, their united corps, amounting to ten thousand men, gained the Royal Causeway by Zafra, and, on the evening of the 29th, coming up with Gazan, fought an undecided action; the next day it was renewed, and the Spaniards having the worst, Ballasteros retired to Araceña and Contreras to the high mountains above Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballasteros marched to Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but Girard drove him back again to Araceña, yet again entering the Condado de Neibla, he established himself at Zalamea de Real on the Tinto river.

Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize Merida, and cut the communication of the fifth corps with Reynier; but that general, marching with eight thousand men from Torremocha, passed through to Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, and pushed troops the 2d of April, into the Morena, intending to take Contreras in rear, while Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened, but that O'Donnel, immediately threatened Merida, and so drew Reynier back. Nevertheless, Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, and so completely defeated, that he regained Zafra in the night of the 14th, with only two thousand men; Ballasteros also, assailed by a detachment from Seville, retired to Araceña.

The 20th, Reynier marched to Montijo, and O'Donnel retired from Caceres, but his rear guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would have been lost, if Mendizabel, and Hill also, had not come to his aid, whereupon Reynier declining a general action, retired to Merida. The insurrection in the Alpuxaras was now quelled, the Valencians remained inactive, Joseph re-entered Madrid, Soult assumed the government of Andalusia, and Mortier returned to Estremadura. On the Spanish side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his successor, advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier's rear; Ballasteros remained at Aroche; Hill returned to Portalegre, and Romana encamped, with fourteen thousand men, near Badajos, where a Spanish plot was formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, but the villain who was to have executed the atrocious deed escaped.*

Notwithstanding Romana's presence, Reynier and the younger Soult, passed the Guadiana below Badajos, with only four hundred cavalry, and closely examined the works of that fortress, in despite of the whole Spanish army; at the same time, Mortier's advanced guards arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of four thousand men joined the second corps from Toledo; however the want of provisions would not permit the French to remain concentrated, and Mortier returned to the Morena, to watch Imas. The 14th of May, a French detachment again came close up to Badajos, then took the road to Olivenza, and would have cut off Ballasteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to Elvas, arrested its movement. Meanwhile, Ballasteros again menaced Seville, and was again driven back upon Aroche, with a loss of three hundred men.

To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the frontier of Portugal, by the Lower Guadiana: sometimes appearing at Gibrleon, and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the possession of which would have lamed Ballasteros' movements,

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence. MSS.

yet the advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted, at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the first corps; and O'Donnell having made an attempt, during Reynier's absence, to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, and regained Albuquerque with great difficulty. It would be perplexing, to trace farther and in detail all the movements, on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, yet two circumstances there were, of historical importance. In the beginning of July, Lacy being in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballasteros near Aróche, and Copons in the Condado Neibla, the French marched against Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph's service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one of inhospitality, the other of robbery and violence, would, but for the mediation of the British authorities, have commenced a regular war, and their mutual jealousy and hatred was extended to the governments on both sides.

Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save, when Romana was hardly pressed, but the latter's demands for aid were continual, and most of his projects were ill judged, and contrary to lord Wellington's advice. On the 26th of June however, Reynier passing the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo Mayor, and then turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known also that his corps belonged to the army assembling in Castile for the invasion of Portugal, that he had collected mules and other means of transport in Estremadura; and the spies asserted, that he was going to cross the Tagus. Hill, therefore, gathered his divisions well in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of Beira. The march of the second corps was, however, postponed, and the after operations belonging to greater combinations, will be treated of in another place.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Although, apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana as far as Badajos, is separated from the valley of the Tagus, by a range of heights, connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque; and the country between those hills and the Tagus, contained fertile valleys, and considerable towns, such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres. To profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier, whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as Caceres, but beyond that town, the Salor presented a barrier, from behind which the Spaniards, supported by the fort of Albuquerque, could observe whether the incursion was made in force, and act accordingly; hence O'Donnell's frequent advances and retreats.

2. Reynier could not operate seriously, unless in unison with the fifth corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana, and Merida, on account of its stone-bridge, was the key of his movements. But Mortier's base of operations being in Andalusia, his front was spread from Zafra to Merida, to cover his line of retreat, and to draw provisions from about Lereña; now the road of Xeres de los Caballeros was always open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances of Ballasteros and Contreras, were to harass Mortier's line of communication. Wherefore the clue of affairs was this; Romana, holding Badajos, and being supported by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French, and the Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every part of his lines of operation; but, as his projects were generally vague and injudicious, lord Wellington forbade Hill to assist, except for definite and approved objects.

3. To stop Romana's movements, Mortier had only to unite the 2d and 5th corps and give battle, or, if that

was refused, to besiege Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this he ardently desired. Soult, however, would not permit him to undertake any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden insurrections and descents from Cadiz; and to say that either marshal was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed. Mortier and Reynier united, could have furnished twenty thousand infantry, fifty guns, and more than three thousand cavalry, all excellent troops. Romana having garrisoned Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, could not bring more than fifteen thousand men into line, and must have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, and lord Wellington must then have detached largely from the north; the king and Soult could have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate consequences are not to be assumed.

On the other hand, Soult, judging, that ere future conquests were attempted, the great province of Andalusia should be rendered a strong hold, and independent of extraneous events, bent all his attention to that object. An exact and economical arrangement provided for the current consumption of his troops, and vast reserve magazines were filled without overwhelming the people. The native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of police and supply, acted zealously, yet without any imputation upon their patriotism; for those who see and feel the miseries, flowing from disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a general labouring to preserve regularity. All this could not be the work of a day, and meanwhile the marshals under Soult's orders, being employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire controul of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations, because, thus only could they be distinguished. But the duke of Dalmatia, while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain, by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia, was also well assured, that, in fixing a solid foundation for future military operations, he should obtain reputation as an able administrator and pacificator of a conquered country.

4. Soult's views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals, than with the wishes of the king, whose poverty forced him to grasp at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who having led the army, in person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. He who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult, guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the king's demands, and thus excited the monarch's hatred to an incredible degree; nevertheless, the duke of Dalmatia never lost the emperor's confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually tranquillized; the military resources of the country drawn forth, and considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully employed, to repress the efforts of the Partisan chiefs. The arsenal of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of Lead at Lenares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered for the supply of the foundries, and every provision for the use of a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out, a commerce was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada; and finally, a secret, but considerable, traffic carried on with Lisbon itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult.* Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain.

5. Both marshals appear to have entertained sound

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence, MSS.

views, and the advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of twenty-five thousand men in Estremadura, during the months of June and July, would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him directing Suchet, in July, to co-operate with fifteen thousand men in Massena's invasion, whenever Tortoza should fall. The application of this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative advances; and whether Napoleon's recent marriage with the Austrian princess drew him away from business, or that, absorbed by the other many and great interests of his empire, he neglected Spanish affairs; or whether deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes, he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason, why the king, whose army was increased to twenty thousand men before the end of June, made no movement to favour the attack on Portugal. It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause, than the inevitable errors, that mar all great military combinations not directed by a single hand.

CHAPTER VII.

Situation of the armies north of the Tagus—Operations in Old Castile and the Asturias—Ney menaces Ciudad Rodrigo—Loison repulsed from Astorga—Kellerman chases Carrera from the Gata mountains—Obscurity of the French projects—Siege of Astorga—Mahi driven into Galicia—Spaniards defeated at Mombouey—Ney concentrates the sixth corps at Salamanca—The ninth corps and the imperial guards enter Spain—Massena assumes the command of the army of Portugal and of the northern provinces—Ney commences the first siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Julian Sanchez breaks out of the town—Massena arrives and alters the plan of attack—Daring action of three French soldiers—Place surrenders—Andreas Herrasti—His fine conduct—Reflections upon the Spanish character.

THE operations, south of the Tagus, having been described, those which occurred, north of that river, shall now be traced; for previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French stretched in one great line across the Peninsula, from Cadiz to Gihon, and eagerly discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies.

It will be remembered, that the duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera in the Gata mountains, to interrupt the communication, between the Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also, issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and beyond the Douro, the Gallician army, under Garcia (in number about ten thousand), occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa Franca, and Astorga, menacing the right flank, and rear, of the sixth corps. Mahi was organising a second army at Lugo, and in the Asturias, the captain-general D'Arco commanded seven thousand men, three thousand of which were posted at Cornelana, under general Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence, six hundred miles long, was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance, save at Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese troops were lying.

On the other hand, the French, holding the interior line, kept their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by moveable columns, and thus menaced all the important points without scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France, continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where Ney had resumed the command, being supported by Kellerman with the force of his govern-

ment, and by an eighth corps under the duke of Abrantes.

The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a general movement of all the French in Spain; and while Victor and Mortier, menaced Cadiz and Badajoz, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonet, entering the Asturias, threatened Galicia by the Conceja d'Ibas. At the same time, Loison, with eight thousand fresh men, occupied Leon and Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of the eighth corps passed Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Galicia by Puebla de Senabria, and on the 15th of February, his cavalry cut to pieces five hundred Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched against Astorga, and, at the same time, Bonet destroyed Ponte's force at Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. These movements alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, menaced at once by Bonet and by Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of his army into the former, and carried the remainder to Villa Franca, to support Mahi.

Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and Loison, although supported by the men from Leon, who advanced to Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the eight corps at Benevente, intending to besiege Astorga in form; but he was suddenly called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise in the capital during the king's absence. Mahi and Garcia being apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge of the mountains, thinking to relieve the Asturias by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon; but as Loison still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object, and, after drawing off five thousand men from Astorga, retired to Villa Franca.

Bonet did not pass Nava de Suarna, and when general Arco had rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia, leaving Mahi to command in Galicia, marched himself with the remnant of the old army of the left, to join Romana at Badajoz. Meanwhile Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and Ney's force chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. It is unnecessary to trace all these movements, because the French, while preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false reports, and making demonstrations in various directions to mislead the allies, and to cover their own projects.

Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion of Portugal by the northern line, was not finally arranged until a later period; yet it seems probable, that while Bonet drew the attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the duke of Abrantes designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria; not as Loison announced, for the invasion of Galicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the second corps to the aid of the sixth, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo. Whatever designs might have been contemplated, they were frustrated, partly by the insurrection in Grenada, and the failure of Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals, for here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally; and every where it was plainly seen that the French corps d'armée, however formidable in themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, act cordially in the general system.

When the commotions in the south subsided, Junot returned to Old Castile; Loison joined the sixth corps on the Tormes; Kellerman retired to Valladolid; detachments, placed on the Douro, maintained the communications between Ney and Junot; and the latter, having drawn a reinforcement from Bonet, invested Astorga with ten thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry,

eighteen field-guns, six twenty-four pounders, and two mortars. His covering divisions were placed, one at Benevente, to watch the road of Mombuey, one near Puebla de Senabria, and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi immediately concentrated the Gallician army at Villa Franca and Fonceabadon, and detached fifteen hundred men, under Echevarria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the flank and rear of the investing army; yet his force was weak, the Gallician authorities had frequently assured lord Wellington that it amounted to twenty thousand well-organized troops; it now appeared that only eight thousand were in the field, and those ill provided, and prone to desertion.*

SIEGE OF ASTORGA.

Santocildes, the governor, was an officer of courage; his garrison consisted of two thousand five hundred infantry, besides cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been strengthened by fresh works; but there was little ammunition, scarcely twenty days' rations, and nothing outside the walls, capable of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain, and had three suburbs; Puerto de Hierro to the north, St. Andreas to the east, and Retebia to the west. On the two last Junot made false attacks, and conducted his real approaches, against the front between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia.

The place was invested the 22d, and Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies were repulsed, and the trenches opened, before the end of the month. A breach was then commenced, but the battering-guns soon became unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. Nevertheless, the town suffered from shells, the wall was broken on the 20th of April, an assault was ordered, and although a previous attack on Retebia had failed, Santocildes was so distressed for ammunition, that he offered to capitulate.

Junot refused the terms demanded, and, at five o'clock in the evening of the 21st, some picked troops ran up to the breach, which was well retrenched and stockaded, and defended with great obstinacy, while the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The storming-party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay on the summit of the breach; and being plied on both flanks, and in front, with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the musketry from Retebia, it would have been totally destroyed, but for the scarcity of ammunition, which paralyzed the Spanish defence. Three hundred French are said to have fallen on the breach itself, but the remainder finally effected a lodgement in the ruins. During the night, a second attack on Retebia proving successful, a communication was opened from the parallels to the lodgement, and strong working-parties were sent forward, who cut through the stockade into the town, when the governor surrendered.

Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains, as if he would have succoured the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bembibre, where his rear was overtaken and defeated by general Clausel on the 24th. He then fell back to Lugo, and recalled his detachment from Mombuey; but the French from Benevente were already in that quarter, and, on the 25th, totally defeated Echevarria at Castro Contrijo. Meanwhile, Junot placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored Bonet his division. That general, who had retired to Santander during the siege, then re-occupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, and once more menaced Galicia by the road of Concija, and by that of Sales; several slight actions ensued; the French penetrated no farther, and the Junta of Galicia reinforced the Asturians with three thousand men.

During the siege of Astorga, the sixth corps was

concentrated at Salamanca; a strong detachment of Kellerman's troops seized the pass of Baños; and Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were commencing, and the line of communication with France, was encumbered with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering-train, collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, arrived at Salamanca, general Martineau, with ten thousand men for the eighth corps, reached Valladolid; general Drouet passed the Pyrenees with a ninth corps, composed of the fourth battalions of regiments already in Spain; and these were followed by seventeen thousand of the imperial guards, whose presence gave force to the rumour, that the emperor himself was coming to take the chief command.

Fortunately for the allies, this report, although rife amongst all parties, and credited both by Joseph's ministers, and the French ambassador at Madrid, proved groundless; a leader for the projected operations was still to be named. I have been informed that marshal Ney resumed the command of the sixth corps, under the impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal; that the intrigues of marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, frustrated his hopes; that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in person to the Peninsula; that his marriage, and some important political affairs, diverted him from that object, and that Massena, prince of Esling, was finally chosen; partly for his great name in arms, partly that he was of higher rank than the other marshals, and a stranger to all the jealousies and disputes in the Peninsula. His arrival was known in May amongst the allies, and lord Wellington had no longer to dread the formidable presence of the French emperor.

That Massena's base of operations might not be exposed to the interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military governments of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and St. Andero were placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the troops, he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the king, and it would seem that some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed in the French councils; because in the imperial muster-rolls, the head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that army, yet during the month of April only; a circumstance strongly indicating Napoleon's intention to assume the command himself. The northern line was, however, definitively adopted, and, while the prince of Esling was still in the capital, the eighth corps passed the Tormes, and Ney commenced the

FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

The conduct of the governor of this fortress had in the beginning of the year appeared so suspicious, that lord Wellington demanded his removal.* Don Andreas Herrasti, the actual governor, was a veteran of fifty years' service, whose silver hairs, dignified countenance, and courteous manners excited respect; and whose courage, talents, and honour were worthy of his venerable appearance. His garrison amounted to six thousand fighting men, besides the citizens; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and stores of all kinds. The works were, however, weak, consisting of an old rampart, nearly circular, about thirty feet in height, and without other flanks than a few projections containing some light guns: a second wall, about twelve feet high, called a "*fausse braie*," with a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first, yet was placed so low on the hill, as scarcely to offer any

* Mr. Stuart's Correspondence. MSS.

* Lord Wellington's Correspondence. MSS.

cover to the upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs, even for the magazine, and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church, which he secured as he might.

Beyond the walls, and totally severed from the town, the suburb of Francisco, defended by an earthen entrenchment, and strengthened by two large convents, formed an outwork to the north-east of the place. The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west; and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only a hundred and fifty yards from the body of the place. There was also a Greater Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of six hundred yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts, and saw into the bottom of the ditch.

The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, although wooded, was easy for troops; especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the castle-gate. The Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia, and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods; and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet deep, and overhung with huge desolate rocks.

During February and March, the French departed as lightly as they had advanced against Ciudad Rodrigo; but, on the 25th of April, a camp was pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city; and, in a few days, a second, and then a third, arose: and these portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when fifty thousand fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress.

This multitude, composed of the sixth and eighth corps, and a reserve of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The sixth corps invested the place, the eighth occupied San Felices Grande, and other points, the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river, but the battering train with a great escort was still two days' march in the rear, for the rains inundating the flat country between the Agueda and the Tormes, rendered the roads impassable. The bridges were established on the 2d and 7th of June, the one above, the other below the town, and on the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater Teson. The 22nd, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Agueda, which had hitherto been but slightly watched. That night Julian Sanchez, with two hundred horsemen, passed silently out of the castle-gate, and crossing the river, fell upon the nearest French posts, pierced their line in a moment, and reached the English light division, then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This event induced Ney to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against general Crawford the 25th, on which day, also, the French batteries opened.

Ney's plan was to breach the body of the place, without attending to the Spanish fire, and salvos, from forty-six guns, constantly directed on one point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; nevertheless the besieged, who could bring twenty-four guns to bear on the Teson, shot so well that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches, and killed above a hundred of the assailants. On the 27th the prince of Esling arriving in the camp, summoned the governor to surrender, and Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so good a soldier. The fire was then resumed until the first of July, when Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the engineers to raise counter-batteries, to push their parallels to the Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow

in the counterscarp, and pass the ditch in form.* Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the new works, the convent of Santa Cruz, on the right flank, was carried after a fierce resistance; and, on the left, the suburb was attacked, taken, and retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained masters of every thing beyond the walls.

During the cessation of fire, consequent upon the change in the French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the breach, and strengthened his flank defences. On the 9th of July, the besieger's batteries, being established on the Lesser Teson, reopened with a terrible effect. In twenty-four hours, the fire of the Spanish guns was nearly silenced, part of the town was in flames, a reserve magazine exploded on the walls, the counterscarp was blown in by a mine, on an extent of thirty-six feet, the ditch was filled by the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. Three French soldiers, of heroic courage, then rushed out of the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having thus, in broad daylight, proved the state of affairs, discharged their muskets, and, with matchless fortune, retired unhurt to their comrades.

The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the signal, and a few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of the city, when the white flag suddenly waved on the rampart, and the venerable governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying, by his gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He had stricken manfully, while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonour to his silver hairs, that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to massacre and devastation.

Six months had now elapsed, since the French resuming the plan of conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of sir Arthur Wellesley had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle they had gained, fortress after fortress, they had taken, and sent the Spanish forces, broken and scattered, to seek for refuge in the most obscure parts: solid resistance there was none, and the only hope of deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British general. How he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related in the foregoing chapters, were contemporaneous, and that he has been led, as it were, round the margin of a lake, whose turbulent waters spread on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many of the circumstances must appear, yet, as a whole, they form what has been called the Spanish military policy; and without accurate notions on that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the man who, like Milton's phantom, paved a broad way through their chaotic warfare.

I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and most unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance; but it is the province of history to record, foolish as well as glorious deeds, that posterity may profit from all, and neither will I mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of my country's arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people. In their constancy, in the unexampled patience, with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by a ruthless enemy, and by their own sordid governments, the Spaniards were truly noble: but shall I say that they were victorious in their battles, or faithful in their compacts; that they treated their prisoners with hu-

* Intercepted French Correspondence, MSS.

manity; that their Juntas were honest or wise; their generals skilful; their soldiers firm? I speak but the bare truth, when I assert, that they were incapable of defending their own cause! Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact; and to assume that an insurrection so conducted did, or could possibly baffle the prodigious power of Napoleon is an illusion. Spain baffle him! Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the opportunity; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans; the English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force, never matched; with a general equal to any

emergency; fought as if for their own existence. The Austrians brought four hundred thousand good troops to arrest the conqueror's progress; the snows of Russia destroyed three hundred thousand of his best soldiers; and finally, when he had lost half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from him, by tearing France along with it. What weakness, then, what incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies, and her never-ending defeats as a proof that a people fighting for independence must be victorious. She was invaded, because she adhered to the great European aristocracy; she was delivered, because England enabled that aristocracy to triumph, for a moment, over the principles of the French revolution.

BOOK XI.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington's policy—Change of administration in England—Duel between lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning—Lord Wellesley joins the new ministry—Debates in Parliament—Factional violence on both sides—Lord Wellington's sagacity and firmness vindicated—His views for the defence of Portugal—Ministers accede to his demands—Grandeur of Napoleon's designs against the Peninsula—Lord Wellington enters into fresh explanation with the English Ministers—Discusses the state of the war—Similarity of his views with those of sir John Moore—His reasons for not advancing into Spain explained and vindicated.

THE defence of Portugal, was not the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor was lord Wellington moved thereto, by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and deliberately, formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then to the period, when, by retreating upon Badajoz, he divorced his operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his military and political proceedings up to the moment, when, confident in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project, unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men, who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, laboured to thwart his measures and to ruin his designs.

After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly to negotiate with the Central Junta, upon matters touching the war, but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley's departure was caused by the state of politics in England, where a change in the administration was about to take place; a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected, because the ineptitude of the government, was, in private, acknowledged by many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition, was only the signal, for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues, which had rendered the Cabinet of St. James's the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly denounced lord Castlereagh to his colleagues, as a man incapable of conducting the public

affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him.* Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his abilities, to plan, and conduct the fitting out, of the most powerful armament that ever quitted England.† When it became evident that loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition, Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue thus becoming known to lord Castlereagh, was by him characterised as "*a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private.*" This was followed by a duel! and by the dissolution of the administration. Mr. Perceval and lord Liverpool being then empowered to form another Cabinet, after a fruitless negotiation with lord Grey, and lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered the department of foreign affairs to lord Wellesley.

Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which were afterwards so gloriously realized; but which could never have been undertaken with confidence by that general, unless secure of some powerful friend in the administration, imbued with the same sentiments, bound by common interest, and resolute, to support him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise, and commendable, in lord Wellesley, to sacrifice something of his own personal pretensions, to be enabled to forward projects, promising so much glory to the country and his own family, and the first proceedings in parliament justified his policy.

Previous to the change in the Cabinet, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been created baron Douro, and viscount Wellington; but those honours, although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the opposition members, who with few exceptions, assailed the general, personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash; his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment.‡ Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Galli-

* Lord Castlereagh's statement. † Mr. Canning's statement.
‡ See Parliamentary Debates.

cia and Estremadura, and obliged one hundred thousand French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid!

Lord Grey opposing his own crude military notions, to the practised skill of sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter's dispositions at Talavera; others denied that he was successful in that action: and some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army! That battle, so sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect to the commander as not warranting admission to a peerage always open to venal orators; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgement, they would have cast away as a thing of no worth!

This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side: there was a ministerial person, at this time, who in his dread of the opposition, wrote to lord Wellington complaining of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a public sensation: *any thing provided blood were spilt!* A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the general's abhorrence of this detestable policy. When such passions were abroad, it is evident that lord Wellesley's accession to the government, was essential to the success of lord Wellington's projects.

Those projects delivered the Peninsula and changed the fate of Europe, and every step made towards their accomplishment merits attention, as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject, as that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and to the strenuous support he received from the Cabinet at home. Now it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune in war, or that the duke of Wellington has always been one of her peculiar favourites; but I will make it clearly appear, that if he met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon solid grounds; that the Cabinet did not so much support him as it was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be adduced.

Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the ministers were yet unchanged, Lord Castlereagh, brought by continual reverses, to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded lord Wellington's opinion upon the expediency, the chance of success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached the general on the 14th of September, 1809; but the subject required many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; and at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal, was necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocana, that lord Wellington replied to lord Liverpool, who, during the interval, had succeeded lord Castlereagh in the war department.

Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, he observed, that unless the Spanish armies met with some great disaster, the former *could not then make an attack upon Portugal*; yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that moment in the latter might defend it.* "But the peace in Germany," he said, "might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, when the means of invading Portugal would be increased; not only in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in proportion to the effect which such a

display of additional strength would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in that case, *until Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive*, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, *provided England employed her armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military service was organised to the full extent of which it was capable*. But the number of British forces employed should not be less than thirty thousand effective men, although the Portuguese regular force, actually enrolled, consisted of thirty-nine thousand infantry, three thousand artillery, and three thousand cavalry; and the militia amounted to forty-five thousand, exclusive of the *ordenanças*."

The next point of consideration was the probable expense. "The actual yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of transport-vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence the most important consideration was the expense of renovating, and supporting the Portuguese military and civil services. The British government had already subsidised the Portuguese Regency, at the rate of six hundred thousand pounds yearly, being the expense of twenty thousand men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place at the service of the English commander-in-chief.

"But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars, which, after a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese army from disbanding from want of food.

"It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the Regency, and yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished the country, that it was impossible to raise the revenue or to obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade from the mother-country to Great Britain. This transfer, so profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and, therefore, justice as well as policy required that England should afford pecuniary assistance to the Regency.

"Without it, nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The officers of that army had, for many years, done no duty, partly that their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they had continued in the same garrisons, and lived with their families; and, to these advantages, added others arising from abuses in the service. Now the severe but necessary discipline introduced by marshal Beresford, had placed the Portuguese officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the necessities of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom, or against whom, they were to fight.

* Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool. Badajoz, 14th Nov. 1809. MSS.

"If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to grant a subsidy of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds yearly, to enable the Regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before-mentioned, should be added a further subsidy of three hundred thousand pounds, to supply the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English cabinet preferred it, they might take ten thousand more Portuguese troops into pay, which could be done at an expense of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds. With such assistance, the difficulties of the moment might be overcome; but, without it, he, lord Wellington, felt assured, that the whole financial and military system of the Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense, hitherto incurred, would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide.

"There remained two other points to consider—the re-embarkation of the British army, in the event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry and artillery; those could not be carried off, if the embarkation took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances, the expense of horse-transport would be more than the worth of the animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although I," he said, "*consider the Portuguese government and army as the principals in the contest for their own independence, and that their success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British officers and troops; I have no hope of either, if his Majesty should now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without a contest; and other consequences will follow, affecting the state of the war, not only in Portugal but Spain. If, therefore, it should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually, the British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than continue by their means, the contest in this country.*"

Peniche and Setúbal offered secure points of embarkation in the event of failure, but neither were likely to come within the scope of the operations, and lord Wellington's opinion as to the facility of carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon admiral Berkeley's assurances that the embarkation would not take longer than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all the ground above Passo d'Arcos, which, from the circumstance of its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian's for an embarkation. But the admiral's views, as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the Tagus, for the purpose of an embarkation, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank.

Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which, from the recent loss sustained on the Walcheren expedition, they truly observed, would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of England, the ministers assented to lord Wellington's proposals; they undertook to pay ten thousand additional Portuguese troops, and to advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; and being now pledged to an

annual subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice required that the Portuguese Regency, under pain of the subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of complete efficiency.

Thus supported, lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending contest. His troops, removed from the Guadiana, took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal. He expected a reinforcement of five thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry from England, smaller detachments had already reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the Guadiana was numerically thirty thousand strong; but those actually under arms scarcely amounted to twenty thousand, for nine thousand were in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the effects of past illness.

The 20th of January, the head-quarters, and the artillery park, were established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry was quartered, by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico, and Santarem. General Hill was left with five thousand British, and a like number of Portuguese, at Abrantes; and the remainder of the infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was distributed along the valley of the Mondego.

The plans of the English general were, at first, grounded upon the supposition, that the French would follow the right or northern line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations, against the Peninsula, that is, *attack Portugal from the side of Old Castile, rather than Andalusia from the side of La Mancha*. In this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon, his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms. Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment Seville was opening her gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh instructions, reiterating the question, *whether Portugal should be defended at all*; but at the same time transmitting one of those clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the ministers' information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; statements, in which, showing the bearings of past and present events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes, which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness.

"The enemy," he said, "aimed at conquering the south; he would no doubt obtain Seville with all its resources; and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however, be lost and the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans would continue; Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist within its walls, but it would be without authority, because the French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs left Portugal untouched; yet it was chiefly to that country he wished to draw the ministers' attention.

"They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of ninety thousand men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the armed population and of the British army. Much had been

done within the last nine months, for the enrolment, organization, and equipment of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very insufficient means, before the fifty thousand men, composing the militia, could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by military experience.

"When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to that pass, *that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burthen rather than an advantage to the French government.* Thence arose this question, 'Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal, afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to the allies?'

"It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars every thing that discipline could effect had been done, and they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually determined to do every thing for the cause. Still they were not to be certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced in military affairs.*"

Under these circumstances, and *adverting to the approaching subjection of Spain*, he demanded to know whether "the enemy, bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could be found. But under any circumstances, (he said) the British army could always be embarked in despite of the enemy."

Such being the view taken of this important subject by lord Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in disparagement of sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal could not be defended, whereas lord Wellington did defend that country.† The former general, premising that he was not prepared to answer a question of such magnitude, observed, that the frontier being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a superior force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, and Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, &c., which could only be made at Lisbon. That the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could alone defend the *Tras os Montes*. That, if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal, "because the latter was without a military force," and if it were otherwise, from the experience of Rorica and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on their troops. This opinion, hastily given, had reference only to the *state of affairs existing at that moment*, being expressly founded, on the miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military, Spain also being supposed conquered.

Now lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the termination of the anarchy, which

prevailed during sir John Cradock's time; after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force reorganized, and her regular troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon fifty thousand men, the campaign in the Peninsula at least fifty thousand more; in fine, after mature consideration, and when Spain was still fighting; when Andalusia, Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Galicia, and the Asturias, were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, most important posts with reference to this question, were still in possession of the Spaniards, and prepared for defence; lord Wellington, I say, came to the conclusion, that Portugal might be defended against the army then in the Peninsula, provided an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation.* And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that, although success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the Portuguese, their army could not even then be implicitly trusted.† Lisbon, also, he considered as the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as temporary posts.

But, in all things concerning this war, there was between those generals, a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan of action.

"The French," said sir John Moore, "will find the Spaniards troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little more than a march to subdue the country."‡

"The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be," said lord Wellington, "the probable consequence of any action in which either imprudence, necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans will probably continue."§

And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending on the unguarded front of Andalusia, lord Wellington, on the first indication of Joseph's march, designed to make a movement similar in principle to that executed by sir John Moore on a like occasion; that is, by an irruption into Castile, to threaten the enemy's rear, in such sort that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer his forces in Castile to be beaten. Nor was he at first deterred from this project, by the knowledge, that fresh troops were entering Spain. The Junta, indeed, assured him that only eight thousand men had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it, and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers then, and since, have accused him of looking on with indifference, if not with satisfaction, at the ruin of the Central Junta's operation, as if it only depended upon him to render them successful.

Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already explained. He abandoned his own,—

1. Because the five thousand men promised from England had not arrived, and his hospitals being full, he could not, including Hill's division, bring more than twenty thousand British soldiers into the field. Hill's division, however, could not be moved without leaving the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,—a danger, which success in Castile, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, would only increase.

* Letter to lord Liverpool, Nov. 14, 1809. MSS.

† Ibid. Jan. 31, 1810. MSS.

‡ Mr. James Moore's Narrative.

§ Letter to lord Liverpool, Jan. 31, 1810. MSS

* Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, 31st Jan., 1810. MSS.

† Mr. James Moore's Narrative.

2. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before-mentioned.* To bring them into line, was to risk a total disorganization, destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other hand, the French in Castile, consisting of the sixth corps and the troops of Kellerman's government, lord Wellington knew to be at least thirty thousand strong, of which twenty thousand were in one mass; and, although the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, from Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning was sound shall now be shewn.

Mortier's march from Seville would not have terminated at Badajos, if the British force at Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre, had been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia, was only part of a general system throughout Spain; and when the king placed himself at the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellerman marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar, with the sixth corps, and thus secured the defiles leading into the valley of the Tagus; at the same time, the second corps coming down that valley, communicated with the sixth by the pass of Banos, and with the fifth by Seradillo and Cáceres. Hence, without losing hold of Andalusia, three *corps d'armée*, namely, the sixth, second, and fifth, amounting to fifty thousand men, could, on an emergency, be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of lord Wellington's. Nor was this the whole of the French combinations; in rear of all these forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with fresh armies, and not eight thousand, as the Central Junta asserted, but one hundred thousand men, rendered disposable by the peace with Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to cross, the western Pyrenees.†

Of these, the first detachments reinforced the divisions in the field, but the succeeding troops formed an eighth and ninth corps, and the former, under the command of the duke of Abrantes, advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the plains of Valladolid, and would, in conjunction with Kellerman, have overwhelmed the British army, but for that sagacity, which the French with derisive but natural anger, and the Spaniards, with ingratitude, have termed, "*The selfish caution of the English system.*"

Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a machine, as a British army, with all its national reputation to support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, dispersed in an hour, reassembled again without difficulty, and incapable of attaining, and, consequently, incapable of losing, any military reputation.

CHAPTER II.

Greatness of Lord Wellington's plans—Situation of the belligerents described—State of the French—Character of Joseph—Of his Ministers—Disputes with the Marshals—Napoleon's policy—Military governments—Almenara sent to Paris—Curious deception executed by the marquis of Romana, Mr. Stuart, and the historian Cabanes—Prodigious force of the French army—State of Spain—Inertness of Galicia—Secret plan of the Regency for encouraging the Guerrillas—Operations of those bands—Injustice and absurdity of the Regency, with respect to South America—England—State of parties—Factional injustice on both sides—Difficulty of raising money—Bullion Committee—Wm. Cobbett—Lord King—Mr. Vansittart—Extravagance of the Ministers—State of Portugal—Parties in that country—Intrigues of the Patriarch and the Souza's—Mr. Stuart is appointed Plenipo-

tentary—His firmness—Princess Carlotta claims the Regency of the whole Peninsula, and the succession to the throne of Spain.

THE greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the idea of offensive operations, lord Wellington turned his whole attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its defence; yet, the majority yielded to the influence of his brother, rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and threw the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general. The deep designs, the vast combinations, the mighty efforts by which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to comprehend, the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion. Failure was every where anticipated, and there were but few who even thought him serious in his undertaking.

But having now brought the story of the war down to that period, when England, setting Portugal and Spain as it were aside, undertook the contest with France, it will be well to take a survey of the respective conditions and plans of the belligerents; and to show how great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock.

State of the French.—France victorious, and in a state of the highest prosperity, could with ease, furnish the number of men, required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many years. The utmost strength of the Spaniards had been proved, and it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies, disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years, yet no effectual resistance made, and as in the war of succession, the people would gradually have accommodated themselves to the change of dynasty; especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully demonstrated by an effort to effect his release. For when baron Kollí, the agent employed on this occasion, was detected, and his place supplied by one of the French police, to ascertain the intentions of the captive king, the latter, *influenced by personal fears alone*, not only refused to make the attempt, but dishonourably denounced Kollí to the French government. The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious, and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be equal to the task. Yet in war, there are always circumstances, which, though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the most important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive king.

Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards never accused him of any thing worse than being too convivial; but it is evident that he was unequal to his task and mistook his true situation, when, resisting Napoleon's policy, he claimed the treatment of an independent king. He should have known that he was a tool, and in Spain, could only be a tool of the emperor's. To have refused a crown, like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept, and then to resist the hand that conferred it, was a folly that, without ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in Napoleon's path. Joseph's object was to create a Spanish party for himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell

* Lord Wellington's Correspondence. MSS.

† Rolls of the French army.

from the hands of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen submission, much less attachment, from a nation so abused; neither was it possible to recast public feeling, until the people had passed through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his throne.

Now Joseph's Spanish ministers, were men who joined him upon principle, and who, far from shewing a renegade zeal in favour of the French, were as ardently attached to their own country, as any of those who shouted for Ferdinand VII.; and whenever Spanish interests clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies, they as well as the king invariably supported the former; and so strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended to fall on the emperor's troops. Thus civil contention weakened the military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command in person, or to adopt a policy which however defective, will perhaps be found to have been the best adapted to the actual state of affairs.

He suffered, or as some, eager to lower a great man's genius to their own level, have asserted, he fomented disputes between the marshals and the king; but the true question is, could he prevent those disputes? A wise policy, does not consist in pushing any one point to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in regulating and balancing opposing interests, in such a manner, that the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole. To arrive at a sound judgement of Napoleon's measures, therefore, it would be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political position, and there are not sufficient materials yet before the world, to do this correctly; yet we may be certain, that his situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy, required extraordinary management. It must always be remembered, that, he was not merely a conqueror; he was also the founder, of a political structure too much exposed to storms from without, to bear any tampering with its internal supports. If money be the sinew of war, it is also the vital stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon's policy, than the care with which he handled financial matters, avoiding as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public credit, so fatuously cherished in England. He could not, without hurting France, transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the only resource left was to make "*the war maintain the war.*" Now Joseph's desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, were opposed to this system; nor were the proceeds of the contributions always applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy; yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been impolitic in the highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate course, and formed what were called "*particular military governments,*" such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia, in which the marshal, or general, named governor, possessed both the civil and military power; in short, he created viceroys as he had threatened to do when at Madrid, and, though many disadvantages attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon's measures.

The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party; that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to the provinces beyond the Ebro;

and, indeed, the annexing those parts to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the emperor. On the other hand, experience proved, that Joseph was not a general equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits, that, at this period, the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the Guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies, and introduced a horrible license, while the military movements were feebly pushed.* Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to make the success of each "*corps d'armee,*" and the reputation of its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it was fighting. And, although some of the governors, had neither the sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation, others, such as Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly not have been attained under the supreme government of the king, because he knew little of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy, obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain.

I am aware that the first-named generals, especially Soult, were included by Joseph amongst those who, by oppressing the people, extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result of personal enmity, and facts, derived from less interested quarters, as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer reach in their policy than the king could understand.

There is yet another view in which the matter may be considered. Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to the small states of that country, might be broken, and the whole rendered amenable and ready to assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the military governments of Spain. The marshal's sway, however wisely adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and violence, was, of necessity, onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful government of the king, who would then have been regarded as a deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war, only, could introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the constitution of Bayonne.

Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing this system, were injurious to the French cause.† Fresh contributions were exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of succours from France; and, to avoid these, men, who would otherwise have submitted tranquilly, fled from the military governments. The Partidas also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies although regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as major-general for the king, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands in Andalusia, as assassins, and beyond the pale of military law, the Regency answered, by a retaliatory declaration; and both parties had strong grounds for what they did. The Junta, because the defence of the country now rested chiefly on the Partidas. Joseph, because the latter, while claiming the usages of war, did not act upon them, and were, by the

* Mémoires de St. Hélène.

† King Joseph's Correspondence. MSS.

Junta, encouraged in assassination. Mina, and, indeed, all the chiefs, put their prisoners to death whenever it became inconvenient to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his hope of being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he might destroy the mother and the infant together!* And such things were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring in argument were, however, overcome in practice; the question of the treatment of the prisoners was generally decided by granting no quarter on either side.

Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, sent the marquis of Almenara to Paris, to remonstrate with his brother, and to complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals, especially Ney and Kellerman; and he denounced one act of the latter, which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety; namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas, by which infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited, without obtaining the slightest benefit, political or military. Another object of Almenara's mission was to ascertain if there was really any intention of seizing the provinces beyond the Ebro; and this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, and he, in concert with Romana, and Cabanes the Spanish historian, simulating the style and manner of Napoleon's state-papers, composed a counterfeited "*senatus consultum*" and decree for annexing the provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and transmitted them to Joseph, whose discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. Meanwhile, his distress for money was so extreme, that his ministers were at times actually destitute of food.

These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable; for, reckoning the king's French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less than *three hundred and seventy thousand men, and eighty thousand horses*. Of these, forty-eight thousand men were in hospital, four thousand prisoners, and twenty-nine thousand detached; leaving nearly two hundred and eighty thousand fighting men actually under arms, ready either for battle or siege: and moreover, a fresh reserve, eighteen thousand strong, was in march to enter Spain. In May, this prodigious force had been re-organized; and in July was thus distributed:—

Governments or Armies in the 2d Line.

		Total Strength.
1. Catalonia . . .	Seventh corps . . . Duke of Tarento	55,647
2. Aragon . . .	Third corps . . . Gen. Suchet	33,007
3. Navarre . . .	Detachments and	21,887
	division of the Imperial Guards . . .	
4. Biscay . . .	Detachments . . . Gen. Caffarelli	6,570
5. Old Castile, comprising Burgos, Aranda, and Soria	Divisions of the Imperial Guards and	10,303
	Cavalry . . .	
6. Valladolid, &c.	Detachments . . . Gen. Kellerman	6,474
7. Asturias . . .	One division . . . Gen. Bonet	9,898
Total for the governments . . .		143,786

Armies in the 1st Line.

Army of the South, composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, under the command of Soult . . .	72,769
Army of the Centre, composed of the Royal Guards, two divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the personal command of the king . . .	24,167
Army of Portugal, composed of a reserve of cavalry and the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massey . . .	86,596
The ninth corps, commanded by general Drouot, distributed, by divisions, along the great line of communication from Victoria to Valladolid . . .	23,815
A division under general Serras, employed as a moveable column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal . . .	10,605
	218,272

Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines, namely, the third and seventh corps on the left; the army of the south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the interior circle was still held by the French, and their lines of communication were crowded with troops.

State of Spain.—On the right, the armies of Valencia and Catalonia, were opposed to the third and seventh corps; and their utmost efforts could only retard, not prevent the sieges of Taragona and Tortosa. In the centre, the Murcian troops and those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance of the British force under general Graham. On the left, Romana, supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partizan warfare from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, but looked to Hill for safety, and to Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Galicia and Asturia, did not exceed fifteen thousand men; and Mahi declared his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonet advanced beyond the frontiers. Indeed, the Galicians were so backward to join the armies, that, at a later period, Contreras was used to send through the country moveable columns, attended by an executioner, to oblige the villages to furnish their quota of men.* Yet, with all this severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England, Galicia never was of any signal service to the British operations.

But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the Partidas suddenly and surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many persons joined these bands, as a refuge from starvation; others from a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French columns: and, finally, the Regency, desirous of pushing the system to its utmost extent, established secret Guerilla Juntas, in each province, enjoining them, diligently to collect stores and provisions in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline and payment of the Partidas, and particular tracts were charged with the supplies, each according to its means.† Lastly, every province was divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force; and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act in mass.

The first burst of these bands, occasioned the French considerable loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was a second insurrection of the whole country. The Murcians, in concert with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of Andalusia. Franquisetto and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad Real and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, Temprano, and Juan Abril, keeping the circuit of the Carpentino mountains, from the Somosierra to Avila, and descending sometimes on the side of New, sometimes on the side of Old Castile, sometimes in Estremadura, carried off small French posts even close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the very gates of that town. On the other side of Madrid, Duran with two thousand men, and the Empecinado, with twelve hundred cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadaluara, as far as Cuenca, and ventured sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of more than two thousand men, harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Victoria, and the chain of communication, between these great bands and the Empecinado, was maintained by Amor, Merino, and the Friar Sapia;

* Suchet's Memoirs.

* Memoirs of Contreras, published by himself.

† Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

the two first acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria. In the Asturias, Escadron, continually hanging upon the flanks and rear of Bonet, between St. Andero and Oviedo, acted in concert with Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders of Galicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence, and slew numbers of the Guerillas, many of whom were robbers that, under pretence of acting against the enemy, merely harassed their own countrymen; few were really formidable, though all were vexatious. Enough has been said upon this point.

But, while reduced to this irregular warfare, for preventing the entire submission of Old Spain, the Regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and provoking civil war, as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence of Spain was, with them, of subordinate interest to the continuance of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops, were withdrawn from the Peninsula, to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency, of expecting Napoleon's innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their own doors, by Guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few divisions to crush whole nations, acting in the same manner, at three thousand miles distance. Such being the state of French and Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula.

England.—The contentions of party were vehement, and the ministers' policy resolved itself into three principal points: 1. The fostering the public inclination for the war; 2. The furnishing money for the expenses; 3. The recruiting of the armies. The last was provided for by an act passed in the early part of 1809, which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this was found to furnish about twenty-four thousand men in the year; but the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition in parliament, was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers, were, indeed, justly attacked, but when particulars, touching the contest in Portugal, were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy of Beresford's report of the numbers and efficiency of the native forces, was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful resistance assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused, one of the smallest difficulties encountered by the English general.

On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or wherefore; and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never attacked, and victories gained, where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was expected, his numbers were contemptible, if a victory was gained, his host was countless. Members of parliament related

stories of the enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing that consummate art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit, and to stifle reason, was neglected.

But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The country, inundated with bank-notes, was destitute of gold. Napoleon's continental system burdened commerce, the exchanges were continually rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are the inevitable result of a factitious currency, were too perceptible to be longer disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed to investigate the matter, made early in the session of 1810, a report in which the evils of the existing system, and the causes of the depreciation were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not perceive, or at least did not touch upon the injustice, and the ruin, attending a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly, and subsequent experience has confirmed his views.* The government at first endeavoured to stave off the bullion question; but finding that they must either abandon the prosecution of the war in the Peninsula, or deny the facts adduced by the committee, adopted the latter. On the motion of Mr. Vansittart, the house voted in substance that a pound note and a shilling were equal in value to a golden guinea of full weight, although light guineas were then openly sold at twenty-eight shillings each. Lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants, whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, exposed all the fraud and the hollowness of the minister's system; and the vote of the Commons, although well calculated to convince the minister's opponents, that no proposition could be too base, or absurd, to meet with support in the existing parliament, did not remove the difficulties of raising money; hence no resource remained, but that of the desperate spendthrift, who never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the war, had, however, given England a monopoly of the world's commerce by sea, and the ministers affirming, that the country was in a state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first bullet might have extinguished for ever.

State of Portugal.—In this country, three parties were apparent. That of the people ready to peril body and goods for independence. That of the *fidalgos*, who thought to profit from the nation's energy without any diminution of ancient abuses. That of the *disaffected*, who desired the success of the French; some as thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere baseness of nature. This party, looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed. Those noblemen, in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot's time, under the authority of the prince regent's edict to that effect; Freire more honourable than his companions, refused to bear arms against his country; the two others had no scruples, and Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in the military archives at Paris.

The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army; but the *fidalgos*, or cast of nobles, working in unison with, and supported by the Regency, were a powerful body, and their political proceedings after the departure of sir John Cradock,

* Paper against Gold.

demand notice. The patriarch, formerly bishop of Oporto, the marquis de Olhao Conteiro Mor, and the marquis of Das Minas, these composed the regency, and they and every other member of the government, were jealous of each other, exceedingly afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and with the exception of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses. As the military organization carried on by Beresford, was only a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was necessarily hateful to the regency, and to the fidalgos, who profited by its degeneracy. The opposition of these people joined to unavoidable difficulties in finance, and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to organize the militia, and ordenança nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, the energy of lord Wellington and of Beresford and the comparatively zealous proceedings of Forjas proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither few nor inactive, gathered. As the times obliged the government, to permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon, it naturally followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded, and those opinions being repeated in the British parliament, were printed in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colours of misrepresentation, at the moment when the safety of the country depended upon the devoted submission of the people.

After Das Minas' resignation, Mr. Stuart and three Portuguese, namely, Antonio, called Principal Souza, the Conde de Redondo, and doctor Nogueira, were added to the regency by an intrigue which shall be hereafter noticed. The last was a man of honesty, talent, and discretion, but Souza daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost disorder. Seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the British generals, he was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence amongst the people was still very considerable. An exceedingly powerful cabal, was thus formed, whose object was to obtain the supreme direction of the civil and military affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde Linhares, head of the Souza family, was prime minister in the Brazils; the Principal was in the regency at Lisbon; the chevalier Souza was envoy at the British Court, and a fourth of the family, Don Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish regency; playing into each others' hands, and guided by the subtle Principal, they concocted very dangerous intrigues, and their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janeiro. Lord Wellesley's energetic interference reduced the latter, indeed, to a reasonable disposition, yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they durst not attempt by force, they sought to attain by artifice.

In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers had, fortunately for the cause, been replaced as envoy, by Mr. Charles Stuart, and this gentleman well experienced in the affairs of the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political agents with the generals, immediately applied his masculine understanding, and resolute temper, to forward the views of Lord Wellington. It is undoubted that the dangerous political crisis which followed his arrival, could not have been sustained, if a diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the plans of the commander had been employed.

To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in Portugal, but with the fidalgos, it was a question of interest more than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great body of which, perceiving at once that they must stand or fall with the English army heartily aided the cause, the fidalgos clung rather to the regency. Now the caballers in that body, who were the same people that had opposed sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only to beat the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces (of which they themselves were the lords) in the administration of the country, and would therefore consent to no operations militating against this design. Moreover the natural indolence of the people being fostered by the negligence and fears of the regency rendered it most difficult to obtain the execution of any work or the fulfilment of any agreement in which the Portuguese government or the civil authorities were concerned.

Another spring of political action, was the hatred and jealousy of Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties during the military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous effect upon the people, in their intercourse with the British. For when the Spaniards shewed a distrust of their allies, the Portuguese were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they had no feeling in common with their neighbours. Yet notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the princess Carlotta, wife to the Prince Regent, and sister to Ferdinand, claimed not only the succession to the throne of Spain in the event of her brother's death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the whole Peninsula as hereditary Regent; and to persuade the Spanish tribunals to acknowledge her claims, was the object of Pedro Souza's mission to Cadiz.

Although the council of Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish Regency, readily recognized Carlotta's pretensions in virtue of the decision of the secret Cortes of 1789 which abolished the Salique law of Philip the Fifth, the regents would pay no attention to them; yet Souza, renewing his intrigues when the Cortes assembled, by corruption obtained from the majority of the members a secret acknowledgement of the princess's claim. His further progress was, however, promptly arrested by lord Wellington, who foresaw that his success would affect, not only the military operations in Portugal, by placing them under the control of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards, if power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one family. Moreover, although at first he thought it might prove beneficial in the event of the Peninsula being conquered, he soon judged it a scheme, concocted at Rio Janeiro, to embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from the British Cabinet, and it was proposed that the princess should reside at Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of the plan, she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain that arrogance, deceit, negligence in business, and personal intrigues, were common to the Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the same fatal effects in the one as in the other country, will be shewn in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER III.

Lord Wellington's scheme for the defence of Portugal—Vastness of his designs—Number of his troops—Description of the country—Plan of defence analysed—Difficulty of supplying the army—Resources of the belligerents compared—Character of the British soldier.

WHEN lord Wellington required thirty thousand British troops to defend Portugal, he considered the

number that could be fed and managed with such an inexperienced staff and civil administration as that of the English army, rather than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was, that he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet knowing, from his experience in Spain, how passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free promises of their governors, and insisted that his own authority as *marshal-general of Portugal* should be independent of the local government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or "*ordenanças*;" for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by extraordinary means.

Armed with this power, and with the influence derived from the money supplied by England, he first called upon the Regency, to revive and enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men were to be enrolled, and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, to remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on whatever line the invaders should penetrate: and that this might be deliberately and effectually performed, he designed at the head of all the allied regular forces, to front the enemy, in such sort, that, without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet be obliged to keep constantly in a mass; while the whole population, converted into soldiers, and closing on the rear and flanks, should cut off all resources, save those carried in the midst of the troops.

But it was evident, that if the French could find, or carry supplies, sufficient to maintain themselves until the British commander, forced back upon the sea, should embark, or giving battle be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit without further struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary to find a position, covering Lisbon, where the allied forces could neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers, nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, furnished this key-stone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of all the positions, had been made under the directions of sir Charles Stuart in 1799, and, together with the French colonel Vincent's minutes, shewing how they covered Lisbon, were in lord Wellington's possession. From these documents the original notion of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are said to have been derived; but the above-named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be made by an army in movement, before an equal or a greater force. It was lord Wellington, who first conceived the design, of turning those vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula.

Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; at present it must suffice to observe, that intrenchments, inundations, and redoubts secured more than five hundred square miles of mountainous country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the most gigantic part of the English general's undertaking. He was a foreigner, ill supported by his own government, and holding power under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure, and he was vehemently opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility of that country; yet, in this apparently weak position, he undertook at one and the same time, to overcome the abuses engendered by centuries

of misgovernment, and to oblige a whole people, sunk in sloth, to arise in arms, to devastate their own lands, and to follow him to battle against the most formidable power of modern times.

Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the Regency, and of the *fidalgos*, the ancient military laws were revived; and so effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross number of more than four hundred and thirty thousand men in arms, of which about fifty thousand were regular troops, fifty-five thousand militia, and the remainder "*ordenanças*;" but this multitude was necessarily subject to many deductions. The "*capitans mor*," or chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty, the *fidalgos* evaded service by the connivance of the government, and the total number of "*ordenanças*" really assembled, fell far short of the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the militia, only thirty-two thousand of which had muskets and bayonets; and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived at absence under false pretences, to such an extent, that scarcely twenty-six thousand men ever remained with their colours. Of the regular troops the whole were in good condition; thirty thousand being in the pay of England, were completely equipped, clothed, disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers; but, deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual number under arms did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry, and three thousand artillery. Thus the disposable native force was about fifty-six thousand men, one-half of which were militia.

At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula, exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded thirty-eight thousand men of all arms, of which six thousand were in hospital or detached, and above seven thousand were in Cadiz. The latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly thirty thousand men, while the army on whose exertions the fate of the Peninsula rested, was reduced to twenty-five thousand British, such was the policy of the English cabinet; for this was the ministers' and not the general's arrangement. The *ordenanças* being set aside, the actual force at the disposition of lord Wellington, cannot be estimated higher than eighty thousand men, and the frontier to defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, four hundred miles long. The great military features, and the arrangements made to take advantage of them in conformity with the general plan of defence, shall now be described.

The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to invasion:—

1. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes, extending from the mouth of the Minho, to Miranda on the Douro.
2. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes following the course of the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo.
3. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminal on the Tagus.
4. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers stretching in one line from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana.

But these divisions may be simplified with respect to the military aspect of the country; for Lisbon taken as the centre, and the distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass to Rosaminal will trace the frontier of Beira; and the space lying between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of the whole; but each had a separate system for itself, based on the one general principle, that the country should be wasted, and the best

troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action, while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the invaders.

The northern and southern provinces have been already described, Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line, except one or both of those provinces be first subdued; but from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminhal, that is from the Douro to the Tagus, the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of the enemy.

An invading army then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria, or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications could be maintained, directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of Perales, or circuitously, by Placentia and the pass of Baños; and the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps could either advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way at one point only. In this situation, the frontier of Beira between the Douro and the Tagus, would offer them an opening of ninety miles against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space; the summit is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers cleaving deeply, amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following directions:—

From Ciudad Rodrigo.—1. By the valley of the Douro.—2. By the valley of the Mondego.—3. By the valley of the Zezere.

From Coria.—1. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus; and, 2. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa.

To advance by the valley of the Douro, would be a flank movement through an extremely difficult country, and would belong rather to an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement could be prosecuted against Lisbon.

To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for artillery; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land offers a position where a large army (for a small one it is dangerous) could seal the passage on either side of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella.

On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the passages of the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the positions if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite impracticable for artillery of any calibre.

Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending army must occupy all the positions on this line of

ninety miles, while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier consists in this, *the Tagus along its whole course is, from June till December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the lines.* A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at any place below Abrantes would, therefore, render all the frontier positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons *the frontier of Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers.*

Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of the French corps, led lord Wellington to expect, that the principal attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco upon Abrantes, and, under this impression, he made the following dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniche, Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia.

General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British colonels, Trant, Miller, and J. Wilson, under his orders, occupied the provinces beyond the Douro, with twenty-one regiments of militia, including the garrison of Valença, on the Minho.

The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. There remained in reserve, twelve regiments of the fifty composing the whole militia force, and these were distributed in Estremadura on both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida, Elvas and Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes.

The British, organised in five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, were distributed as follows:—

1st Division	General Spencer, about 6000	Men.	Viseu.
2d Division, including the 13th Dragoons }	General Hill, " 5000	"	Abrantes and Portalegre.
3d Division	General Picton, " 3000	"	Celerico.
4th Division	General Cole, " 4000	"	Guarda.
Light Division	Robert Crawford, " 2400	"	Pinhel.
The Cavalry	General Cotton, " 3000	"	Valley of Mon- dego.
Total 23,400 under arms.			

Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and ordananza, and the whole of the regular force was in the centre. The Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, formed a body of thirty-eight thousand men, the greater part of which could, in two marches, be united either at Guarda or between that position and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could, in as short a period, unite by the boat-bridge of Abrantes, and thus thirty-two thousand men would be concentrated on that line. If the enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from Coria, or by a flank movement of the second corps from Estremadura, across the Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by moving over the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco, while Hill could reach that place much quicker than general Reynier, in consequence of an arrangement which merits particular attention.

It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult mountains, and to have repaired the roads between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than to the allies, as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But lord Wellington, after throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line of communication by the left bank of the Tagus, through Niza, to the pass of Vilha Velha, where, by a flying bridge, the river was re-crossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now the pass of Vilha Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and the distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco being nearly the same by Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was yet much accelerated, for the road near Vilha Velha being reconstructed by the engineers, was excellent.

Thus all the obstacles to an enemy's march by the north bank were preserved. The line by Vilha Velha, enabled Hill to pass from Portalegre, or Abrantes, to Castello Branco by a flank movement in less time than Reynier; and also provided a lateral communication for the whole army, which we shall hereafter find of vital importance in the combinations of the English general; supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales which otherwise would have been adopted. The French, also, in default of a direct line of communication between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños, and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.

Notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration, the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier, because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo, before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a battle lost there, would, in the dry season, decide the fate of Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south, would have been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy; but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the very basis of lord Wellington's defence, and all his dispositions were made to oblige the French to move *in masses*, and to *gain time himself*; time to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines, time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenança: above all things, time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his combinations will show, that they were well adapted to effect these objects.

1. The enemy dared not advance, except with *concentrated masses*, because, on the weakest line of resistance, he was sure to encounter above twenty thousand men.

2. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana's troops and even forced back Hill's, the latter passing the Tagus at Abrantes, and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without first besieging Badajoz or Elvas to form a place of arms.

3. A principal attack on the central line could not be made without sufficient notice being given by the collection of magazines at Coria, and by the passage of the Elga and Ponçul, Beresford and Hill could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. But an invasion on this line, save by a light corps in connexion with other attacks, was not to be expected; for, although the

enemy should force the Sobreira, and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter, in default of heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river, with rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on his left, the mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and the troops from Guarda and the valley of the Mondego would have time to fall back.

4. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida, to the valley of the Mondego, the road from Belmonte towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken and obstructed, and that from Thomar by Espinal to the Ponte de Murcella was repaired and widened; thus the inner and shorter line was rendered easy for the allies, while the outward and longer line was rendered difficult for the enemy, and to secure quick reports telegraphs were established from Lisbon to Elvas, to Abrantes and to Almeida.

The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about thirty miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel, run, in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and Sierra de Estrella, into the Douro, all having this peculiarity, that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen into profound and gloomy chasms; and there are few bridges. But the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open. If the French adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca, and by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, where they would have to choose between the right and the left bank. In the latter case, they must march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains, until they reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego, behind which they would find the allied army in a position of surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter noticed; but, in either case, the allied forces, having *interior lines of communication*, could, as long as the Belmonte road was sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva, or in front of Coimbra. Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that danger was most to be apprehended, and it behoved general Hill to watch vigilantly and act decisively in opposition to general Reynier. For the latter having necessarily the lead in the movements, might, by skilful evolutions and rapid marches, either join the sixth and eighth corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the allied divisions on the Mondego; or drawing him across the Tagus, furnish an opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the southern bank of that river.

In these dispositions the English general had regard only to the enemy's actual situation, and expecting the invasion to be in summer, but in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full, and the roads deteriorated, the defence would have been different; fewer troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus and the Zezere, the Sobreira Formosa would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the allied troops could be collected about Guarda and a more stubborn resistance made on the northern line.

Every probable movement being thus previously well considered, lord Wellington trusted that his own military quickness, and the valour of the British soldiers, could baffle any unforeseen strokes during the retreat, and once within the Lines, (the Portuguese people and the government doing their part) he looked confidently to the final result. He judged that in a

wasted country, and with thirty regiments of militia, in the mountains on the flank and rear of the enemy, the latter could not long remain before the Lines, and his retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were however many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest with eighty thousand French veterans having a competent general at their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a third line of entrenchments was prepared, and twenty-four thousand tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the British forces; measures were also taken to procure a like quantity for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens as might wish to emigrate. It only remained to feed the army.*

In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies; there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country, but it was unevenly distributed, difficult to get at, and the people are of a nature to render it impossible to depend upon contracts even where they are friendly; some places were exhausted, others overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, and in this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; their convoys could pass unmolested, whereas the French always required strong guards first to collect food and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal there was however a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the people; after a time scarcely any food for man or beast, (some cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted,) was to be obtained in that country: nay, the whole nation was at last in a manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable war, and yet it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle against famine, even near the sea; but at a distance from that nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use; hence the only resource, for the conveyance of stores, was water-carriage, to a certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen.

Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus; Figueras and Raiva de Pena Cova, on the Mondego, and, finally, Oporto and Lamego, on the Douro, were the principal depôts formed by Lord Wellington, and his magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celerico, Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points four hundred miserable bullock cars and about twelve thousand hired mules, organized in brigades of sixty each, conveyed the necessary warlike stores and provisions to the armies; when additional succours could be obtained, it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount of transport, and all his magazines in advance of Lisbon were so limited and arranged that he could easily carry them off or destroy them before the enemy.

With such means and with such preparations was the defence of Portugal undertaken, and it must be evident to the most superficial observer, that amidst so many difficulties, and with such a number of intricate combinations, lord Wellington's situation was not one in which a general could sleep; and that, due allowance being made for fortune, it is puerile to attribute the success to aught but his talents and steel-hardened resolution.

In the foregoing exposition of the political and mili-

tary force of the powers brought into hostile contact, I have only touched, and lightly, upon the points of most importance, designing no more than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts of each. The unfavourable circumstances for France would appear to be the absence of the emperor—the erroneous views of the king,—the rivalry of the marshals,—the impediments to correspondence,—the necessity of frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,—the iniquity of the cause, and the disgust of the French officers, who for the most part, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could not patiently endure a service, replete with personal dangers over and above the ordinary mishaps of war, and promising little ultimate reward.

For the English, the quicksands were—the memory of former failures on the continent,—the financial drain,—a powerful and eloquent opposition, pressing a cabinet, so timid and selfish that the general dared not risk a single brigade, lest an accident should lead to a panic amongst the ministers which all lord Wellesley's vigour would be unable to stem, the intrigues of the Souza party, and the necessity of persuading the Portuguese to devastate their country for the sake of defending a *European cause*. Finally, the babbling of the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew the most certain information of the strength and situation of the army. On the other side, France had possession of nearly all the fortified towns of the Peninsula, and, while her enormous army threatened to crush every opponent, she offered a constitution, and recalled to the recollection of the people that it was but a change of one French dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the educated classes did not shrink less from the British government's known hostility to all free institutions. What, then remained for England to calculate upon? The extreme hatred of the people to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the armies, the chances of another continental war,—the complete dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,—the recruiting through the militia, which was, in fact, a conscription with two links in the chain instead of one; lastly, the ardour of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of Europe, and to raise a rival to the French emperor. And here, as general Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of the British soldiers, I will set down what many years' experience gives me the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams.

That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe; and notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat with incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and his movements free; the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, indeed possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril.

It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle, is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but the British soldier conquered under the cold

* Lord Wellington's Correspondence. MSS.

shade of aristocracy; no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen, his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore! Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, overthrow, with incredible energy, every opponent, and at all times prove that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him!

The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial writers of different nations have given the first place amongst the European infantry, to the British; but in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world.

CHAPTER IV.

Character of Miguel Alava—Portuguese government demand more English troops—Lord Wellington refuses, and reproaches the Regency—The factious conduct of the latter—Character of the light division—General Crawford passes the Coa—His activity and skilful arrangements—Is joined by Carrera—Skirmish at Barba del Puerco—Carrera invites Ney to desert—Romana arrives at head-quarters—Lord Wellington refuses to succour Ciudad Rodrigo—His decision vindicated—Crawford's ability and obstinacy—He maintains his position—Skirmish at Alameda—Captain Kraukenberg's gallantry—Skirmish at Villa de Puerco—Colonel Talbot killed—Gallantry of the French captain Guache—Combat of the Coa—Comparison between general Picton and general Crawford.

In resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted in actual concert, with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava, that brave, generous, and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connexion was kept up. Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military correspondent of the Junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity of zealously seconding the English general. But in the manner of doing it, he never forgot the dignity of his own country, and, as he was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always honourable to himself and advantageous to both nations.

It will be remembered that in February, Ney threatened Ciudad Rodrigo at the same time that Mortier menaced Badajos and that Hill advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre. Lord Wellington immediately reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent the light division across the Coa, to observe the enemy's proceedings. The Portuguese Regency were alarmed, and demanded more British troops; but lord Wellington replied that the numbers already fixed would be as great as he could feed, and he took that occasion to point out, that the measures agreed upon, with respect to the native forces, were neither executed with vigour nor impartiality; and that the carriages and other assistance, required for the support of the British soldiers then in the country were not supplied. These matters he urgently advised them to amend before they asked for more troops; and, at the same time, as the Regency in the hope of rendering him unpopular with the natives, intimated a wish that he should take the punishment of the offenders into his own hands, he informed them that, although he advised the adoption of severe measures, he would not be made the despotic punisher of the people, while the actual laws were sufficient for the purpose.

When Ney first appeared before Ciudad Rodrigo, and the second corps under Mermet was at Placentia, Lord Wellington was considerably embarrassed; the French might have passed from Placentia across the Tagus and pushed between Hill and the army in Beira, or even between the latter and Lisbon, seeing that the Portuguese government had with their usual apathy neglected the works projected for opening the road from Thomar to Espinal; and thus, instead of being within three or four marches of the Tagus, Lord Wellington was nine marches distant. He was, therefore, forced to keep a keen watch upon the motions of the second corps, and to have his own troops in hand to withdraw from the frontier, lest the French should suddenly cross the Tagus, for the want of good information was now and for a long time after severely felt. This was in February; but when Del Parque's movement from Gata to Badajos occupied the attention of Mermet,* and that Junot commenced the siege of Astorga, the repairs of the road to Espinal being also in a forward state, his situation was different: the Portuguese army was brought up to Cea and Viseu, and the militia in the northern provinces were ordered to concentrate at Braga to guard the *Tras os Montes*.

Ciudad Rodrigo being soon after seriously menaced, Lord Wellington sent a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte, and transferred his own quarters to Celerico; for he contemplated a sudden incursion into Castile with his whole army, intending to strike at the French magazines in Salamanca. But when he considered the force they had in his front, which could be also reinforced by Kellerman's and Junot's corps, and would therefore be strong enough to defend the Tormes, he relinquished this project, and confined his views to the succour of Ciudad Rodrigo, if occasion should offer, without detriment to the general plan of defending Portugal in the lines. The conduct of both the British and the Portuguese governments cramped his exertions. The resources of the country were not brought forward, and the English general could scarcely maintain his actual position, much less advance; yet the Regency treated his remonstrances lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish Central Junta during the campaign of Talavera.

Indignant at their conduct, he told them that "their proceedings were evasive and frivolous; that the army could neither move forward nor remain without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public or private interests; that the resources were in the country, could be drawn forth, and must be so if the assistance of England was desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and, to be effectual, must begin with the higher classes." Then, issuing a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and the omission of both magistrates and people, and by this vigorous interference procured some immediate relief for his troops.

Meanwhile general Crawford had commenced a series of remarkable operations with the light division. His three regiments of infantry were singularly fitted for any difficult service; they had been for several years under sir John Moore, and, being carefully disciplined in the peculiar school of that great man, came to the field with such a knowledge of arms, that, in six years of real warfare, no weakness could be detected in their system.

As the enemy's posts on the Agueda rendered it impossible for the light division to remain, without cavalry, beyond the Coa, unless some support was at hand, nearer than Guarda or Celerico; Crawford proposed that, while he advanced to the Agueda, Cole, with the fourth division, should take up the line of the

* See page 273.

Coa. But that general would not quit his own position at Guarda; and lord Wellington approving, and yet desirous to secure the line of the Coa with a view to succour Ciudad Rodrigo, brought up the third division to Pinhel; and then reinforcing Crawford with the first German hussars, (four hundred excellent and experienced soldiers,) and with a superb troop of horse-artillery, commanded by captain Ross, gave him the command of all the outposts, and ordered Picton and Cole to support him, if called upon.

In the middle of March, Crawford lined the bank of the Agueda with his hussars, from Escalhon on the left, to Navas Frias on the right, a distance of twenty-five miles, following the course of the river. The infantry were disposed in small parties in the villages between Almeida and the Lower Agueda; the artillery was at Fort Concepcion, and two battalions of Portuguese caçadores which soon afterwards arrived, were placed in reserve, making a total of four thousand men, and six guns.

The French at this period were extended in divisions from San Felices to Ledesma and Salamanca, but as they did not occupy the pass of Perales, Carrera's Spanish division being at Coria, was in communication with Crawford, whose line, although extended, was very advantageous. For from Navas Frias to the Douro, the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy rain, and only four bridges crossed it on that whole extent, namely, one at Navas Frias; one at Villar, about a league below the first; one at Ciudad Rodrigo; and one at San Felices, called the bridge of Barba del Puerco. While therefore, the hussars kept a good watch at the two first bridges which were distant, the troops could always concentrate under Almeida before the enemy could reach them from that side; and on the side of Barba del Puerco, the ravine was so profound that a few companies of the ninety-fifth were considered capable of opposing any numbers. This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was swollen; but that river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without apparent reason. When it was fordable, Crawford always withdrew his outposts, and concentrated his division, and his situation demanded a quickness and intelligence in the troops, the like of which has seldom been known. Seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under arms in the middle of the night, and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear. And this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times and certain.

The 19th, general Ferey, a bold officer, desiring either to create a fear of French enterprise at the commencement of the campaign, or thinking to surprise the division, collected six hundred grenadiers close to the bridge of San Felices; and, just as the moon, rising behind him, cast long shadows from the rocks, and rendered the bottom of the chasm dark, he silently passed the bridge, and, with incredible speed, ascending the opposite side, bayoneted the sentries, and fell upon the piquet so fiercely, that friends and enemies went fighting into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, and so great the confusion, that the British companies could not form, but each soldier encountering the nearest enemy, fought hand to hand, and their colonel Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight, urged the contest with such vigour that, in a quarter of an hour, the French column was borne back, and pushed over the edge of the descent.

This skirmish proved, that, while the Agueda was swollen, the enemy could gain nothing by slight ope-

rations; but it was difficult to keep in advance of the Coa, because the want of money had reduced the whole army to straits, and Crawford, notwithstanding his prodigious activity, was unable to feed his division, wherefore giving the reins to his fiery temper, he seized some church-plate, with a view to the purchasing of corn. For this rash act he was rebuked, and such redress granted that no mischief followed, and fortunately the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring supplies, as it convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned.

When the sixth corps again approached Ciudad Rodrigo in the latter end of April, lord Wellington, as I have before said, moved his head-quarters to Celerico, and Carrera took post at St. Martin Trebeja, occupying the pass of Perales; but being there menaced by Kellerman's troops, he came down, in May, from the hills to Ituro on the Azava river, and connected his left with the light division, which was then posted at Gallegos Espeja and Barba del Puerco. Crawford and he then agreed that, if attacked, the British should concentrate in the wood behind Espeja, and if unable to maintain themselves there, should unite with the Spaniards at Nava d'Aver, and finally retire to Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there was a sure retreat to Guarda.

It was at this period that Massena's arrival in Spain became known to the allies; the deserters, for the first time, ceased to speak of the emperor's commanding in person, and all agreed that serious operations would soon commence. No good information could be obtained; but, as the river continued unfordable, Crawford maintained his position, until the end of May, when certain advice of the march of the French battering-train was received through Andreas Herrasti: and the 1st of June, Ney, descending upon Ciudad Rodrigo, threw a bridge on trestles, over the Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles above, and, a few days afterwards, a second at Carboneras, four miles below the fortress. This concentration of the French troops relieved the northern provinces of Portugal from danger, sixteen regiments of militia were immediately brought down from Braganza to the Lower Douro, provisions came by water to Lamego, the army was enabled to subsist, and the military horizon began to clear.

The 8th, four thousand French cavalry having crossed the Agueda, Crawford concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja, and the Spaniards occupied the wood behind the last-named village, and it was at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, and when the eye could scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate front, that Martin Carrera thought fit to invite marshal Ney to desert!

Nothing could be more critical than Crawford's position. From the Agueda to the Coa the whole country, although studded with woods and scooped into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and there were at least six thousand horsemen and fifty guns within an hour's march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick woods rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close upon the village, while wide plains behind, almost precluded hope, in a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery. The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered indeed some security to his left; because the channel of the former river there became a chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge of Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, the bank on the enemy's side was highest, and, to obtain a good prospect, it was necessary to keep posts beyond the Azava; moreover the bridge of Marialva could be turned by a ford, below the confluence of the streams.

The 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but, as the enemy occupied himself with the raising of redoubts, to secure his bridge at Carboneras, and with other preparations for the siege of Rodrigo, Crawford, trusting to his own admirable arrangements, and to the surprising discipline of his troops, still maintained his dangerous position. He thus encouraged the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and protected the villages in the plain between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy's foraging parties.

On the 18th, the eighth corps was seen to take post at San Felices, and other points, and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to the Douro, were occupied by the French army. The 23d, Julian Sanchez, breaking out of Ciudad, came into Gallegos. The 25th, the French batteries opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed upon the Azava, and Crawford withdrew his outposts to the left bank. The 26th, it was known that Herrasti had lost one hundred and fifty killed, and five hundred wounded; and, the 29th a Spaniard, passing the French posts, brought Carrera a note, containing these words: "*O venir luego! luego! luego! a secorrer esta plaza.*" ("Oh! come, now! now! now! to the succour of this place.") On the 1st of July the gallant old man repeated his "*Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo vez.*"

Meanwhile, lord Wellington, still hoping that the enemy by detaching troops, would furnish an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, reinforced Crawford with the 14th and 16th light dragoons, and transferred his own quarters to Alverca, a village half-way between Almeida and Celeroico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack, and Romana, quitting Badajoz, came to propose a combined movement for carrying off the garrison. This was a trying moment! The English general had come from the Guadiana with the avowed purpose of securing Rodrigo; he had, in a manner, pledged himself to make it a point in his own operations; his army was close at hand, the garrison brave and distressed, the governor honourably fulfilling his part. To permit such a place to fall without a stroke struck, would be a grievous disaster, and a more grievous dishonour to the British arms; the troops desired the enterprise; the Spaniards demanded it, as a proof of good faith; the Portuguese to keep the war away from their own country: finally, policy seemed to call for this effort, lest the world might deem the promised defence of Portugal a heartless and a hollow boast. Nevertheless, Romana returned without his object. Lord Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade, and thus proved himself a truly great commander, and of a steadfast mind.

It was not a single campaign but a terrible war that he had undertaken. If he lost but five thousand men, his own government would abandon the contest; if he lost fifteen, he must abandon it himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed fifty-six thousand men, of these, twelve thousand were with Hill, and one-half of the remainder were untried and raw. But this included all, even to the Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. All could not, however, be brought into line, because Reynier, acting in concert with Massena, had, at this period, collected boats, and made demonstrations to pass the Tagus and move upon Coria; French troops were also crossing the Morena, in march towards Estremadura, which obliged lord Wellington to detach eight thousand Portuguese to Thomar, as a reserve; and these and Hill's corps being deducted, not quite twenty-five thousand men were available to carry off the garrison in the face of sixty thousand French veterans. This enterprise would also have taken the army two marches from Guarda, and Coria was scarcely more distant from that place: hence, a division must have been left

at Guarda, lest Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first.

Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes of using them. 1. In an open advance and battle. 2. In a secret movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have assembled in the night upon the Azava, and filed over the single bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, with a view of capturing the battering train, by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without dwelling on the fact that Massena's information was so good that he knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana's visit, such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved, even in the early part of the siege, and, certainly, not towards the end, when the enemy were on the Azava.

An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing over a plain, in the face of nearly three times its own numbers, must have exposed its flanks to the enemy's bridges on the Agueda, because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of the river, and the French were on the convex side. What hope then for twenty thousand mixed soldiers cooped up between two rivers, when eight thousand cavalry and eighty guns should come pouring over the bridges on their flanks, and fifty thousand infantry would have followed to the attack?—What would even a momentary success have availed? Five thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would have ill supplied the ten or twelve thousand good troops lost in the battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual state of affairs in that country? The militia deserting in crowds to the harvest, the Regency in full opposition to the general, the measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and advanced to retrieve his honour, and who was to have withstood him?

Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general, that he was afraid!—that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared to carry him away—that he was a man, who, insensible to military honour, permitted his ally's towns to fall without risking a shot to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety failed, lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. "If thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!"

Ciudad Rodrigo left to its fate, held out yet a little longer, and meanwhile the enemy pushed infantry on to the Azava; Carrera retired to the Dos Casas river; and Crawford, reinforced with the sixteenth and fourteenth light dragoons, placed his cavalry at Gallegos, and concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear, from whence he could fall back, either to the bridge of Almeida by San Pedro, or to the bridge of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa. Obstinate however not to relinquish a foot of ground that he could keep either by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks on the rising grounds, in the evening of the 2d of July, and then sending some horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the ranks of infantry in succession, and slowly, within sight of the enemy, hoping that the latter would imagine the whole army was come up to succour Ciudad Rodrigo. He thus gained two days, but on the 4th of July, a strong body of the enemy assembled at Marialva, and a squadron of horse, crossing the ford below the bridge, pushed at full speed towards Gallegos driving back the picquets; the enemy then passed the river, and the British retired skirmishing upon Alame-

da, leaving two guns, a troop of the 16th and a troop of German hussars to cover the movement. This rear guard was scarcely drawn up on a hill half-cannon shot from a streamlet with marshy banks, which crossed the road to Alameda, when a column of French horsemen was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing its front as it approached the bridge, but resolute to pass, and preserving the most perfect order, notwithstanding some well-directed shots from the guns. Captain Krauchenberg, of the hussars, proposed to charge those who first came over, but the English officer did not conceive his orders warranted it, and the gallant German riding full speed against the head of the advancing columns with his single troop, killed the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole back. Meanwhile the enemy crossed the stream at other points, and a squadron coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a volley from the third *caçadores*.

This skirmish not being followed up by the enemy, Crawford took a fresh post with his infantry and guns in a wood near Fort Concepcion; his cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera's divisions, were disposed higher up on the *Duas Casas*, and the French withdrew behind the *Azava*, leaving only a piquet at *Gallegos*. Their marauding parties however entered the villages of *Barquillo* and *Villa de Puerco* for three nights successively, and Crawford, thinking to cut them off, formed two ambuscades, one near *Villa de Puerco* with six squadrons, another of three squadrons near *Barquillo*; he also placed his artillery, five companies of the ninety-fifth and the third *caçadores* in reserve, for the enemy were again in force at *Gallegos* and even in advance of it.

A little after day-break, on the 11th, two French parties were observed, the one of infantry near *Villa de Puerco*, the other of cavalry at *Barquillo*, and the open country on the right, would have enabled the six squadrons to get between the infantry in *Villa de Puerco* and their point of retreat; but this was circuitous, and Crawford preferred pushing straight through a stone enclosure as the shortest road. The enclosure proved difficult, the squadrons were separated, and the French, two hundred strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather steep rise of land, yet so far from the edge, as not to be seen until the ascent was gained. The two squadrons which first arrived, galloped in upon them, and the charge was rough and pushed home, but failed; the troopers received the fire of the square in front and on both sides, and in passing saw and heard the French captain, *Guache*, and his sergeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully. Scarcely was this charge over, when the enemy's cavalry came out of *Barquillos*, and the two British squadrons having re-formed, rode against it, and made twenty-nine men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile colonel *Talbot* mounting the hill with four squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, bore gallantly in upon captain *Guache*; but the latter again opened such a fire, that *Talbot* himself and fourteen men went down close to the bayonets, and the stout Frenchman made good his retreat.—Crawford then returned to the camp, having had thirty two troopers, besides the colonel, killed or wounded in this unfortunate affair.

That day *Ciudad Rodrigo* surrendered, and the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light division, and marching by the pass of *Perales*, rejoined *Romana*; Crawford then assumed a fresh position, a mile and a half from *Almeida*, and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Lord Wellington replied that he would give him two divisions, if he could hold his ground, but that he could not do so, and knowing the temper of the man, he repeated his former orders *not to fight beyond the Coa*.

On the 21st, the enemy's cavalry again advanced, *Fort Concepcion* was blown up, and *Crawford* fell back to *Almeida*, apparently disposed to cross the *Coa*, but nothing was further from his thoughts. Braving the whole French army, he had kept with a weak division for three months, within two hours' march of sixty thousand men, appropriating the resources of the plains entirely to himself; and this exploit, only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish thirst of distinction. Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the *Coa* was a matter of sufferance, not real strength, with head-strong ambition, he resolved, in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, to fight on the right bank.

The British force under arms now consisted of four thousand infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and six guns, and his position one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards the *Coa*. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front; his right was on some broken ground, and his left resting on an unfinished tower, eight hundred yards from *Almeida*, was defended by the guns of that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine forming the channel of the *Coa*, and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in the bottom of the chasm.

COMBAT OF THE COA.

A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched with rain, were under arms before day-light, expecting to retire, when a few pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy's approach; and as the morning cleared, twenty-four thousand French infantry, five thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery were observed in march beyond the *Turones*. The British line was immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine; but meanwhile *Ney*, who had observed *Crawford's* false disposition; came down with the stoop of an eagle. Four thousand horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain, the allied cavalry gave back, and *Loison's* division coming up at a charging pace, made towards the centre and left of the position.

While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes were made on the English side; part of the troops were advanced, others drawn back, and the forty-third regiment most unaccountably placed within an enclosure of solid masonry, at least ten feet high, situated on the left of the road, about half-musket shot down the ravine and having but one narrow outlet. While thus imprisoned, the firing in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, and the *caçadores* successively passed by in retreat, and the sharp clang of the ninety-fifth rifle was heard along the edge of the plain above. A few moments later, and the forty-third would have been surrounded, if here, as in every other part of this field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion officers had not remedied the faults of the general. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful effort burst the enclosure, and the regiment, re-formed in column of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen. There was no room to array the line, no time for any thing but battle, every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and joining as he could with the ninety-fifth or fifty-second, the whole presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no regular command, yet each confident in the courage and discipline of those on his right and left; and all regulating their movements by a common discretion and keeping together with surprising vigour.

It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers. It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence the troops follow, and

with what a storm of fire they waste a field of battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns ranged along the summit, played hotly with grape, and their hussars, galloping over the glacis of Almeida, poured down the road, sabring every thing in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow this movement with the whole of the French cavalry, and so cut off the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge him on; and, indeed, so mixed were friends and enemies at the moment, that only a few guns of the fortress durst open, and no courage could have availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an independent command, and as the attack was made without Massena's knowledge, he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from their perilous situation. Falling back slowly, and yet stopping and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way through a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in despite of their enemies, who were so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks.

As the retreating troops approached the river, they came upon a more open space; but the left wing being harder pressed, and having the shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded and some of the right wing distant. Major M'Leod of the forty-third, seeing this, rallied four companies on a hill just in front of the passage, and was immediately joined by a party of the ninety-fifth; and at the same time, two other companies were posted by brigade-major Rowan, on another hill flanking the road. These posts were maintained until the enemy, gathering in great numbers, made a second burst, when the companies fell back; but at that moment the right wing of the fifty-second was seen marching towards the bridge, which was still crowded with the passing troops. M'Leod, a very young man, but with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse round, called to the troops to follow, and, taking off his cap, rode with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the distinguished action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs, and the enemy's skirmishers, astonished at this unexpected movement, stopped short. Before they could recover from their surprise, the fifty-second crossed the river, and M'Leod, following at full speed, also gained the other side without a disaster.

As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted themselves in loose order on the side of the mountain. The artillery drew up on the summit and the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads to the right, because two miles higher up the stream there were fords, and beyond them the bridge of Castello Bom; and it was to be apprehended that, while the sixth corps was in front, the reserves, and a division of the eighth corps, then on the Agueda, might pass at those places and get between the division and Celerico. The river was however, rising fast from the rains, and it was impossible to retreat farther.

The French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, opened a biting fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm, and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and thickly, his columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragon was seen to try the depth of the stream above,

but two shots from the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcasses, floating between the hostile bands, showed that the river was impassable. The monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard. The next instant, the head of a noble column darkened the long narrow bridge, a drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform, leaped forward together, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the ravine at first deceived the English soldiers' aim, and two-thirds of the passage was won, ere a shot had brought down an enemy; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading French section fell as one man! Still the gallant column pressed forward, but no foot could pass that terrible line; the killed and wounded rolled together, until the heap rose nearly even with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than gave back.

The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently answered, and, in half an hour, a second column more numerous than the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude was again torn, shattered, dispersed and slain; ten or twelve men only succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was then renewed, and a French surgeon coming down to the very foot of the bridge, merely waved his handkerchief and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was this touching appeal unheeded, every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. The impossibility of forcing the passage was, however, become too apparent, and this last effort, made with feebleness and less energy, failed almost as soon as it commenced.

Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued. By the French as a point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed the bridge. By the English, from ignorance of their object. One of the enemy's guns was dismantled, a powder-magazine blew up, and many continued to fall on both sides until about four o'clock, when a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire, the men amongst the rocks returned, unmolested, to their own party, the fight ceased, and Crawford retired behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, two hundred and seventy-two British, including twenty-eight officers, were killed, wounded, or taken, and it was at first supposed that lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the fifty-second, which had been posted in the unfinished tower, were also captured; but that officer kept close until the evening, and then, with great intelligence, passed all the enemy's posts, and crossing the Coa at a ford, rejoined his regiment.

In this action the French lost above a thousand men, the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to behold; but Massena claimed to have taken two pieces of artillery, and it was true, for the guns intended to arm the unfinished tower, near Almeida, were lying dismantled at the foot of the building. They, however, belonged to the garrison of Almeida, not to the light division. That they were not mounted and the tower garrisoned, was certainly a great negligence; the enemy's cavalry could not otherwise have fallen so dangerously on the left of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida would have been retarded. In other respects, the governor, severely censured by Crawford, at the time, for not opening his fire sooner and more vigorously, was unblameable; the whole affair had been so mismanaged by the general himself, that friends and enemies were mingled together from the first, and the shots from the fortress would have killed both.

During the fight, general Picton came up alone from Pinhel, Crawford desired the support of the third division, it was refused, and excited by some previous

disputes, the generals separated after a sharp altercation. Picton was decidedly wrong, because Crawford's situation was one of extreme danger; he could not retire, and Massena might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello Bom, upon the right flank of the division, and destroyed it between the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawford were, however, not formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere demeanour of the first, promised little sympathy with the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements, and fiery temper of the second; nor, did they often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command; both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from inferiors; and they were alike ambitious and craving of glory. They both possessed decided military talents, were enterprising and intrepid, yet neither were remarkable for skill in handling troops under fire. This, also, they had in common, that both, after distinguished services, perished in arms, fighting gallantly, and being celebrated as generals of division while living, have, since their death, been injudiciously spoken of, as rivalling their great leader in war.

That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable, and Crawford more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate command, and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed; but to compare either to the duke of Wellington displays ignorance of the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended the profound military and political combinations he was then conducting, the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa, and the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support.

CHAPTER V.

Slight operations in Galicia, Castile, the Asturias, Estremadura, and Andalusia—Reynier passes the Tagus—Hill makes a parallel movement—Romana spreads his troops over Estremadura—Lord Wellington assembles a reserve at Thomar—Critical situation of Silveira—Captures a Swiss battalion at Puebla de Senabria—Romana's troops defeated at Benvenida—Lasey and captain Cockburne land troops at Moguer, but are forced to reimbarc—Lord Wellington's plan—How thwarted—Siege of Almeida—Allies advance to Freixadas—The magazine of Almeida explodes—Treachery of Bareiros—Town surrenders—The allies withdraw behind the Mondego—Fort of Albuquerque ruined by an explosion—Reynier marches on Sabugal, but returns to Zarza Mayor—Napoleon directs Massena to advance—Description of the country—Erroneous notions of lord Wellington's views entertained by both armies.

DURING the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, an expedition sailing from Coruña, under Porlier, seized Santona, and dismantled that and other points on the coast. At the same time Mahi, coming down from the Gallician mountains, menaced Astorga, and a detachment of his army under Tobaado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria, acting in concert with Silveira. Mahi's movements could not be well opposed by either Kellerman or Serras, during the siege, because the former had a strong detachment in Baños, and the troops of the latter were spread over too great an extent of ground; but, when the place fell, the eighth corps, being detached beyond the Tormes, to gather provisions, enabled Serras to act against the Gallicians. The latter were then driven into the mountains, and Tobaado Gil, removing his stores from Puebla Senabria, drew closer to Silveira, in expectation of an attack; but Serras, only placing a Swiss battalion and sixty dragoons at Puebla, fell back

to Zamora, and the eighth corps reoccupied the country between the Tormes and the Agueda.

Meanwhile Bonnet defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered Castropol, on the frontier of Galicia, but returned to Oviedo, on hearing of the expedition to Santona. The Spaniards then re-embarked for Coruña, the project of a larger armament, to be directed against Santander itself, was adopted, and Mahi affirmed that, if more arms and ammunition were sent to him from England, he would clear the plains of Leon, as far as the Esla river. His demands were complied with; sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend the naval expeditions against the coast of the Asturias and Biscay, and a serious interruption of the French communications was planned, but never realized.

General Reynier now passed the Tagus with the second corps, but it appears that this movement should have been executed in June, for boats were collected at Barca de Alconete, in the middle of that month; and the French only waited for a detachment from Andalusia, when Mendizabel, taking the road of Zafra, attacked that detachment, at Los Santos, on the 23d, and Reynier immediately moved to its succour, with one division of infantry and all his cavalry. At this period the insurrection caused by Lasey's expedition to the Ronda, had drawn all the troops of the fifth corps from Seville to that side, the duke of Aremberg and general Remond had fallen back behind the river Tinto, and Copons had advanced to collect provisions on the Odiel. In this threatening state of affairs, instead of returning to Merida, Reynier endeavoured to surprise Imas, at Xeres de los Caballeros, and failing in that, pushed across the Morena against Ballasteros, and the latter being at Campo Frio, beyond Aracena, and, ignorant that Imas had retreated, could only save himself by a hasty flight across the frontier of Portugal. Meanwhile, Lasey being beaten in the Ronda, the fifth corps retired to Seville, D'Aremberg and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer, and Reynier, going back to Merida, resumed his design of passing the Tagus. His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards had neglected this opportunity of destroying them; but, as it was necessary to cover the operations both from Hill's division which was concentrated at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops behind the Elga river, a strong rear guard was placed on the Salor to watch the former, and the French division at Baños advanced to Coria to awe the latter. Reynier then quitting Merida the 10th of July, marched, by Truxillo and Caceres, upon Alconete and Almaraz, and effected the passage, his rear guard following on the 16th. This cautious operation saved him from an attack meditated by Hill, who had received orders to unite with Romana, and drive the second corps back, with a view to gather the harvest for the victualling of Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. The passage of the Tagus being thus effected by the French, general Hill made a parallel movement, which, on his part, only required thirty-six hours; and meanwhile, lord Wellington assembled a reserve at Thomar, under the command of general Leith, consisting of eight thousand Portuguese and two thousand British infantry, just arrived from England.

Reynier having reached Coria, detached a force, by Perales, upon Sabugal, but recalled it when he found that Hill, having crossed the Tagus by Vilha Velha, was at Castello Branco on the 21st. The two generals then faced each other. Hill, joined by a strong body of Portuguese cavalry, under general Fane, encamped, with sixteen thousand men and eighteen guns, at Sarzedas, just in front of the Sobreira Formosa; his advanced guard was in Castello Branco, his horsemen on the line of the Poncul; and a Brigade of Portuguese infantry was posted at Fundao, to keep up the communication with Guarda, and to cover the Estrada

Nova. Behind Hill, Leith occupied the line of the Zezere, and thus twenty-six thousand men, besides the militia, were in observation between the Estrella and the Tagus.

Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of Salvatierra, but being repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry, divided his forces between Penamacor and Zarza Mayor; he also established a post of one hundred and fifty men on the left bank of the Tagus, near the mouth of the Rio del Monte; and, by continual movements, rendered it doubtful, whether he meant to repossess the Tagus, or to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join Massena. Meanwhile, Ballasteros returned to Aracena; Imas to Xeres de los Caballeros; O'Donnell entered Truxillo, and Carlos d'Espana cut off the French post on the Rio del Monte. Romana was, however, soon obliged to concentrate his troops again, for Mortier was on the Guadalquivir, with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the situation of the armies in the beginning of August; but Massena, when assured that Reynier had crossed the Tagus, directed the sixth corps and the cavalry upon Almeida, which led, as we have seen, to the combat on the Coa, during which, Loison, imagining the governor to be a native, pressed him to desert the cause of the English: "*that vile people, whose object was to enslave the Portuguese.*"

Lord Wellington's situation was now critical. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished the French with a place of arms: they might disregard Almeida, and their tardy investment of it, viewed in conjunction with the great magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of so doing. Massena's dispositions were such as rendered his true designs difficult to be discovered. The sixth corps and the reserve cavalry were, indeed, around Almeida, but, by telegraphic intercourse with the garrison, it was known that the investment was not real, and the heads of the columns pointed towards Celerico. Loison's advanced guard was in Pinhel the day after Crawford's action; the second corps, divided between Zarza Mayor and Penamacor, and with boats, near Alcantara, on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river and the line of the Zezere; and it was as likely that Massena would join Reynier as that Reynier would join Massena. It was known by an intercepted letter, that Napoleon had ordered Reynier to invade by the line of Abrantes while the 5th corps entered the Alemtejo, and Massena acted by the valley of the Mondego; but as Reynier was by the same letter placed under Massena's command and that the 5th corps was not then in a condition to move against the Alemtejo, no certain notion of the enemy's intention could be formed. The eighth corps and the division of Serras and Kellerman being between the Tormes and the Escla, might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while the sixth and second corps should hold the allies in check, and this was undoubtedly the surest course; because the taking of Oporto would have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror, dispersed the northern militia, opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English general must then have retired before the second and sixth corps, unless he attacked Ney: an unpromising measure, because of the enemy's strength in horse: in fine although Massena was dilatory, he had one hundred and sixteen thousand men and the initial operations in his power, and lord Wellington was obliged to wait upon his movements.

The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward, yet to retire at once would have seemed timid; hence lord Wellington remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although the enemy's posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. The 28th, the British cavalry advanced to Frexadas, and the in-

fantry withdrew behind the Mondego, except the fourth division, which remained at Guarda. The light division occupied Celerico; the other divisions were posted at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the Portuguese troops were a day's march behind. The sick and wounded men were transferred daily to the rear, and the line of retreat kept free from encumbrance. The enemy then made a demonstration towards St. Joa de Pesquera, and defeated some militia at Fosboa, on the Douro, but finally retired across the Coa, and, after a few skirmishes with the garrison on the 3rd of August, left the communication with Almeida again free. At the same time, a detachment of Reynier's horse was encountered at Atalaya, near Fundao, and beaten by the Portuguese cavalry and ordenança, with a loss of fifty killed or taken, after which the French withdrew from Penamacor.

On the side of Galicia, Kellerman advanced from Benevente to Castro Contrijo, and detachments from Serras's division penetrated towards Monterey, ordering provisions for ten thousand men on the road to Braganza. Silveira then marched on Senabria, defeated a few of the enemy's cavalry there on the sixth; invested the Swiss on the 7th; and, on the 10th, obliged them to capitulate at the moment when Serras, who had foolishly left them there and neglected to succour them in time, was tardily coming to their relief. Five hundred men and an eagle were taken, and Silveira, who did not lose a man, thought of giving battle to Serras, but Beresford alarmed at such rashness sent him imperative orders to retreat; an operation he performed by abandoning his rear guard, which was under the command of colonel J. Wilson, and which, being closely pressed, was saved by that officer under circumstances of such difficulty that he received the public thanks of the marshal.

This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in Estremadura. The Spanish generals, never much disposed to respect lord Wellington's counsels, were now less so than before, from the discontent engendered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles; had procured permission that Campo Mayor should be given to him as a place of arms, with leave to retire into Portugal when overmatched by the enemy; and he had shewn him that Hill's departure greatly augmented the necessity of caution. Nevertheless, Romana joined Ballasteros, and, as their united force amounted to eighteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry beside Partidas, the English general immediately foresaw that they would offer battle, be defeated, and lay open the whole frontier of the Alemtejo; he, therefore, directed Hill to send Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry to their assistance.

Madden reached Campo Mayor the 14th, but Romana's advanced guard under Mendizabel had been defeated on the 11th at Benvenida, and having lost six hundred men, was going to lay down its arms, when fortunately Carrera arrived with the Spanish cavalry and disengaged it; the whole then retreated across the Morena to Monte Molin and Fregenal, but the French pursued and slew or took four hundred more.* The following day Mortier entered Zafra, and Romana retired to Almendralejos. The enemy did not, however, press this advantage, because Lascy with three thousand men from Cadiz conveyed by Captain Cockburn of the British navy, had landed near Moguer and driven the duke of Aremberg towards Seville, while Copons drove Remond upon Zalamea; and although the French soon rallied and obliged Lascy to re-embark, Mortier was withdrawn towards the Morena, and Romana again advanced to Zafra. This affair at Moguer was very contemptible, but the tumid nature of Cock-

* Captain Carrol's dispatches.

burn's despatches on the occasion obtained for it a momentary celebrity.

It would appear that Massena had been waiting for Mortier's movements to develop his own plans, for on the day that the latter entered Zafra, the sixth corps formally invested Almeida, and lord Wellington immediately bringing up the Portuguese, recrossed the Mondego; the British being at Pinhel, Frexadas, and Guarda, and the Portuguese at Celerico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso. In this situation, expecting a vigorous defence from Almeida, he had good hopes to delay the enemy for six weeks or two months, when the rains setting in would give him additional advantages in the defence of the country. He had intended to keep the light division on the Cabeça Negro overhanging the bridge of the Coa, and thus secure a communication with the garrison, or force the French to invest the place with their whole army. Crawford's rashness marred this plan, and he himself was so dispirited by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief did not think it prudent to renew the project. Yet Massena's tardiness and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led lord Wellington to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly forcing the bridge and the fords and taking the French battering train, or at least bringing off the garrison; but while revolving this great stroke in his mind, an unexpected and terrible disaster broke his measures.

SIEGE OF ALMEIDA.

This fortress, although regularly constructed with six bastions, ravelins, an excellent ditch, and covered way, was extremely defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some near ground, on the side of the attack, the bottom of the ditch might be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of the town, contained three bomb proofs, the doors of which were not secure; and with the exception of some damp casements in one bastion, there was no other magazine for the powder. Colonel Cox was governor, and his garrison composed of one regular and two militia regiments, a body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about four thousand men.*

On the 18th, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack, and in the morning of the 26th (the second parallel being commenced) sixty-five pieces of artillery mounted in ten batteries opened at once. Many houses were soon in flames and the garrison was unable to extinguish them; the counter fire was, however, briskly maintained, and little military damage was sustained. Towards evening the cannonade slackened on both sides; but just after dark the ground suddenly trembled, the castle bursting into a thousand pieces, gave vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin! Treason or accident had caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. The ramparts were breached, the greatest part of the guns thrown into the ditch, five hundred people were struck dead on the instant, and only six houses left standing; the stones thrown out hurt forty of the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing that the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, the governor beat to arms, and, running to the walls, with the help of an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained; but the French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the 27th, two officers appeared at the gates, with a letter from Massena, offering terms.

Cox, sensible that further resistance was impossible, still hoped that the army would make a movement to relieve him, if he could impose upon the enemy for two or three days; and he was in act of refusing the prince of Esling's offer, when a mutiny, headed openly by the lieutenant-governor, one Bernardo Costa, and secretly by José Bareiros, the chief of artillery, who had been for some time in secret correspondence with the French, obliged him to yield. The remainder of the native officers disturbed by fear, or swayed by the influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose their dishonourable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution to hoist the white flag. The governor seeing no remedy by force, endeavoured to procrastinate, and, being ignorant of Bareiros' treason, sent him to the enemy with counter propositions. Bareiros immediately informed Massena of the true state of garrison, and never returned; and the final result was a surrender upon agreement that the militia should retire to their homes, and the regulars remain prisoners of war.

While the treaty was pending and even after the signature of the articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place. This act, unjustifiable, and strange because Massena's aide-de-camp, colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing commenced, was excused, on the ground of an error in the transmission of orders; it, however, lasted during the whole night, and Cox also asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect to the militia were violated.* Pelet indignantly denies this, affirming that when the garrison still amounting to three thousand men perceived the Marquis d'Alorna amongst the French generals, the greatest part immediately demanded service, and formed a brigade under general Pamplona,† and the truth of this account is confirmed by two facts; namely, that the arganil militia were sent in by Massena the next day, and the 24th Portuguese regiment did certainly take service with the enemy in a body.‡ Yet, so easily are men's minds moved by present circumstances, that the greater number deserted again, when they afterwards saw the allied armies.

Bareiros, having joined the enemy, escaped punishment, but De Costa, being tried, was afterwards shot as a traitor, by the orders of marshal Beresford. His cowardice and mutiny merited this chastisement, yet the evidence on which he was condemned was an explanatory letter, written to lord Liverpool by Cox, while a prisoner at Verdun.

The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple, and cessation of fire, proclaimed the misfortune of Almeida in the allied camp, but the surrender was first ascertained by lord Wellington on the 29th, when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the glacis of the place. The army then withdrew to its former position behind the Mondego; and while these things were passing on the Coa, the powder magazine in Albuquerque, being struck with lightning, also exploded and killed four hundred men. Reynier, after several demonstrations towards Castello Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse, now suddenly reached Sabugal the 1st of September; and as the British piquets on the Pinhel were attacked the following day by the horsemen of the sixth corps, the enemy's plans seemed to be ripe for execution. Lord Wellington therefore transferred his quarters to Govea, withdrew his infantry behind Celerico, and fixed his cavalry at that place with posts of observation at Guarda and at Trancoso. Reynier, however, suddenly returned to Zarza Mayor, and, throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, again involved the French projects in obscurity.

* Justification of Colonel W. Cox.

† Note by Gen. Pelet. *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*.

‡ Mr. Stuart's Correspondence. MSS.

* Colonel Cox's Narrative.

Massena experienced considerable difficulty in feeding his forces, and he seemed at first, either disinclined to commence the invasion or undecided as to the mode. Two months had elapsed since the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida had only resisted for ten days, the French army was still behind the Coa, and it would seem, by a second intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon, in September, that he expected further inaction: "Lord Wellington," he observed to Massena, "has only eighteen thousand men, Hill has only six thousand; and it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty-five thousand English can balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly on after having *well observed where the blow may be given*. You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations. The emperor is too distant, and the positions of the enemy change too often, to direct how you should attack; but it is certain that the utmost force the English can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be twenty-eight thousand men." This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but Napoleon was ignorant how strongly lord Wellington was thrusting Portugal forward in the press.

Massena had commenced the invasion before these instructions reached him; and to understand his operations it is essential to have a clear idea of the country in which they were conducted. The advanced positions of the allies extended from Almeida over the Sierra de Estrella, by Guarda to Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco; no enemy could penetrate that line unless by force, and a serious attack on any one point was to be the signal for a gradual retreat of the whole, in concentric directions towards the Lines. But, if Guarda were evacuated, the enemy while menacing Celerico, could move either by Belmonte or Covilhao and separate general Hill from lord Wellington, the distance between those generals being twice as great as the enemy's perpendicular line of march would be. To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao was broken up, a Portuguese brigade was placed in Fundao, and general Leith's corps was stationed at Thomar, between two entrenched positions, which formed the second temporary line of resistance. The first of those positions was behind the Zezere, extending from the Barca de Codies to the confluence of that river with the Tagus. The second behind the Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from the Estrella and falling into the Mondego some miles above Coimbra. Both were strong, the rivers deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra de Murcella closely hugs the left bank of the Alva.

During the spring and summer the Portuguese militia, now forming the second line on the Zezere under Leith, had been kept in winter quarters, although with danger to the defence of the country; but the destitute state, with respect to money, in which the English ministers kept lord Wellington, prevented him from being able to bring these troops into the field until the last moment.

Hill's line of retreat from Sarzedas to the Zezere, has been already noticed, and from that river to the Alva, there was a military road constructed through the mountains to Espinhal. But the country from Celerico to the Murcella, a distance of about sixty miles, is one long defile, lying between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego; and the ridge upon which Celerico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella, and encircled by a sweep of the Mondego, closes this defile in front. In like manner the Sierra Murcella, covered by the Alva river, closes it in the rear, and the intermediate parts are but a succession of smaller streams

and lower ridges. The principal road was repaired and joined to the road of Espinhal, and a branch was also carried across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus an internal communication was established for the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between Celerico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable; because, from Guarda and Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, towns in rear of Celerico; and the enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra.

Lord Wellington keeping the head of his army one march behind Celerico, in observation of the routes over the Estrella, and his rear close to the Alva, was master of this line of retreat; and as the Mondego was fordable in summer and bridged at several points, he could pass it by a flank movement in a few hours. Now the right bank was also one great defile, lying between the river and the Sierra de Alcoba or Caramulla. This mountain stretching with some breaks from the Douro to Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego from the coast line; and in approaching Coimbra it sends out a lofty transverse shoot, called the Sierra de Busaco, exactly in a line with the Sierra de Murcella, and barring the way on the right bank of the Mondego in the same manner that the latter Sierra bars it on the left bank. Moreover this route to Coimbra was the worst in Portugal, and crossed by several deep tributaries of the Mondego, the most considerable of which were the Criz and Dao. The Vouga, however, opened a passage through the Alcoba near Viseu, and that way the French could gain the great road from Oporto, and so continue their movement upon Coimbra.

Such being the ground on both sides of the Mondego, the weakest point was obviously towards the Estrella, and lord Wellington kept the mass of his forces there. Massena was ill-acquainted with the military features, and absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras; indeed, so secretly and circumspectly had those works been carried on, that only vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English army. Nay, the Portuguese government and the British envoy, although aware defensive works were constructing, knew not their nature, and imagined, until the last moment, that the entrenchments immediately round Lisbon were the lines! Many British officers laughed at the notion of remaining in Portugal, and the major part supposed the campaign on the frontier to be only a decent cloak to cover the shame of an embarkation. In England the opposition asserted that lord Wellington would embark; the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army universally believed it; and the British ministers seem to have entertained the same opinion, for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally from lord Liverpool, were unknown to lord Wellington, and commenced thus:—"As it is probable that the army will embark in September."

CHAPTER VI.

Third Invasion of Portugal—Napoleon's prudence in military affairs vindicated—Massena concentrates his corps—Occupies Guarda—Passes the Mondego—Marches on Viseu—Lord Wellington falls back—Secures Coimbra, passes to the right bank of the Mondego, and is joined by the reserve from Thomar—General Hill anticipates his orders, and by a forced march reaches the Alva—The allied army is thus interposed between the French and Coimbra—Daring action of colonel Trant—Contemporaneous events in Estremadura, and the Condado de Niebla—Romana defeated—Gallantry of the Portuguese cavalry under general Madden—Dangerous crisis

of affairs—Violence of the Souza faction—An indiscreet letter from an English officer, creates great confusion at Oporto—Lord Wellington rebukes the Portuguese Regency—He is forced to alter his plans, and resolves to offer battle—Chooses the position of Busaco.

THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

MASSENA's command extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos; and the number of his troops present under arms exceeded one hundred and ten thousand men. From these however must be deducted thirteen thousand in the Asturias and province of Santander, four thousand in the government of Valladolid, eight thousand under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly, the reserve of Bayonne under general Drouet, nineteen thousand strong, which, organized as a ninth corps entered Spain in August, and was replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve under general Caffarelli. Thus, the active army of invasion did not much exceed seventy thousand; and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is borne on the strength of a French army, not more than fifty-five thousand infantry and about eight thousand horsemen were with the eagles. The ninth corps had, however, orders to follow the traces of the prince of Esling, and the void thus left at Burgos and Valladolid was supplied by sixteen thousand of the young guard.

This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat. No man ever made bolder marches, but no man ever secured his base with more care. Here, he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication had been strengthened with three additional fortresses,—namely, Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while he employed sixty-five thousand men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept more than eighty thousand in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of the army destined to make what is technically termed "a point" upon Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his hold of Spain.

Massena's instructions were to convert Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. But either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult's army from Andalusia, he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot's march in 1807, warned him off the Sobreira mountains, his views were confined to the three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and Viseu.

The strength of the positions about the Alva was known to him, as were also the measures taken to impede a descent from Covilhao to Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the French camp, with a singular ignorance, asserted that the road by Viseu and Coimbra was easy, and that no important position covered the latter town.* The French general thus deceived resolved suddenly to assemble all his forces, distribute thirteen days' bread to the soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right bank of the Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before general Hill could join lord Wellington.

In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier's at Guarda, Ney's, and the heavy cavalry, at Maçal da Chao, and Junot's at Pinhel. By this disposition all three roads were alike menaced, and the allies being kept in suspense as to the ultimate object, Massena hoped to gain one march; a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not more than a hundred miles, whereas Hill's distance from that town was

longer. To cover the real object with more care, and to keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused Guarda to be seized on the 12th, by a detachment, which withdrew again immediately, as if it were only a continuation of the former feints; and meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly destroyed the boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched towards Sabugal.

On the 13th the allies re-established their post at Guarda; on the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the enemy, and retired up the side of the Estrella; at the same time the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced back in the centre, and the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious progress; and having ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the troops in Guarda were of Reynier's corps, despatched his final orders for Hill and Leith to concentrate on the Alva.

On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering the Mondego, and being there joined by the sixth corps and Montbrun's horsemen, the whole passed the river, and, pushing through Celerico, drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço; but there the first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near Cortiço, the road branched off to the bridge of Fornos and to Gouvea, and a French brigade took the latter to cover the march of the main body which made for Fornos. This feint was however closely watched, for there is a custom, peculiar to the British army, of sending mounted officers, singly to observe the enemy's motions; and such is their habit, they will penetrate through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days, on the skirts of his columns, until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the true direction of his march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring officers, being close on the left of Reynier's troops during this day, reported their movements, and in the evening, leading some of the German cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners and the baggage of a general.

As the French movements were now decided, lord Wellington directed the first, third, and fourth divisions upon the Alva; withdrew his heavy cavalry from the front; and placed the light division at St. Romao, in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred, that night, to Cea.

The 17th, the whole of the second and sixth corps were observed to pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard approached Mongualde. But the eighth corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, for ten thousand militia of the northern provinces, forming the brigades of Trant, T. Wilson, and Miller, had been collected upon the Douro to harass the enemy's right flank and rear; and Trant, with about three thousand, was already at Moimenta de Beira, in the defiles leading through the hills to Lamego. The country between the Coa and Coimbra, on both sides of the Mondego, had been before laid waste, the mills were destroyed, the ordenança were in arms, and the helpless population hidden amongst the highest mountains.

On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of Viseu. Pack's Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at Foadao, and took post beyond the Criz; and general Pakenham, with a brigade of the first division, entered Coimbra, to protect it from the enemy's scouting parties. On the 19th, captain Somers Cocks, a very gallant and zealous officer, commanding the cavalry post which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained that neither sick men nor stores were left

* Note by General Pelet. Vide *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*, vol. xi.

behind: hence it was evident that Massena, relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, artillery, parcels, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass, upon the worst road in Portugal.

The allies were now in motion to cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the enemy was again on the left bank, arrested the general movement. The next day, the truth being known, the third, fourth and light divisions, and the British cavalry passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places; the light division moved to Mortagao in support of Pack; the third and fourth entered the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and Mortagao, and the horsemen occupied a plain between the light division and Pack's brigade. But the eighth corps pointed towards the valley of the Vouga, and it was still doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main road from Oporto to Coimbra; general Spencer, with the first division, therefore, marched upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join him by a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. Meanwhile Leith arrived on the Alva, and general Hill was only one march behind; for having discovered Reynier's movements on the 12th, and at the same time, getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus had been destroyed; he with a ready decision, anticipating lord Wellington's orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and putting his troops in motion that evening, reached Espinal on the 20th. There he was joined by general Lecor, who, with equal vigour and judgement, had brought the Portuguese brigade, by long marches, from Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry in observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps of the allied army were united on the same day that the main body of the enemy entered Viseu; and although the French horsemen were on the Criz, the bridges had been destroyed by Pack; and the project of surprising Coimbra was baffled.

Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from day to day for his artillery, and it was still twenty miles from Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, formed the hardy project of destroying it. Quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with a squadron of cavalry, two thousand militia, and five guns, on the 20th, he surprised a patrol of ten men, from whom he learnt that the convoy was at hand, and that Monbrun's cavalry was close in the rear. Nevertheless, as the defiles were narrow, he charged the head of the escort, and took a hundred prisoners and some baggage. The convoy then fell back, and Trant followed, the ways being so narrow that Monbrun could never come up to the front. At this time a resolute attack would have thrown the French into utter confusion, but the militia were unmanageable; and the enemy, having at last rallied a few men, and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of twelve troopers, the whole got into disorder, wherefore Trant, seeing nothing more was to be effected, returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence marched to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and quality of their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally reach Viseu until the 23d, by which, Massena lost two most important days.

While these events were passing in the valley of Mondego, a small expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in collecting provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly obliged to reembark, and Copons was defeated by general Remond, with the loss of three hundred men on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the French posts near Monasterio, pushing his cavalry towards Seville, whereupon Soult sent the fifth corps against him, and he retired, but was beaten at Fuente de Canto on the same day that Copons had been defeated on the Tinto. The

pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre; and the whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden's Portuguese cavalry came up, and charging the pursuers with signal gallantry, overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered Zafra, and Romana retreated, by Almendralejo and Merida, to Montijo, on the 18th, throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions into Badajos. Being, however, sensible that the latter place was in no condition to resist a serious attack, he directed the Junta to repair to Valencia d'Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas.

Lord Wellington's anticipations were thus realized and the Alemtejo laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this moment near Carthage in pursuit of the Murcian army: a fresh insurrection had broken out in the mountains of Grenada, and the castles of Motril and Almunecar were taken. Copons also advanced to the Tinto, and all these calls upon Soult taking place at one time, he was unable to bring quite twelve thousand men to Zafra, a number inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo; because several British regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from England, had reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve for the allies, of more than five thousand good troops. Wherefore the French returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis glided gently away. To understand its importance, it is necessary to shew how increasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original plan of the English general.

The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been checked, but the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings. Falsely asserting, that the provisions of that fortress had been carried away by the English commissaries, and as falsely pretending that lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party hypocritically assumed, that his expressions of sorrow for its fall were indications of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the public despondency. They vehemently insisted, also, on a defence of the frontier, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, endeavoured to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction on to the staff of marshal Beresford, that they might the more readily embarrass the operations;* and even proposed to have the fleet and transports sent away from the Tagus! Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there wanting either accident or indiscretion to increase the growing confusion. When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing to a friend at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted, that Massena was advancing in front with a hundred thousand French; and that eighty thousand more were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being made public, created such a panic amongst the English merchants, that one and all they applied for ships to carry their families and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the commotion. To dry this source of mischief, lord Wellington issued proclamations; and in the orders of the day, declared that he would not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any repetition of such hurtful conduct.

* Mr. Stuart's Papers. MSS.

To the regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and severe manner; he reproved them for the false colouring given to his communications; and informed them that he would never "*permit public clamour and panic to induce him to change, in the smallest degree, a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the only one likely to produce a good end.*" This remonstrance only increased the virulence of his opponents; and such was their conduct, that, before lord Wellington reached Busaco, he was obliged to tell them "*their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his own government to withdraw the British army.*"

Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful, that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the Lines, still contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing winter; and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to attempt a removal of their property.

Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated. But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of moral strength he was enabled to call forth; and he would have had to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent commander, his rear guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to save them from famine; but where the violent and powerful faction in the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding, and inflame the people's minds: and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion to shew, panic-stricken by the desponding letters of some general officers about the commander in chief! It was evidently necessary to fight, although Massena had seventy thousand veterans, and lord Wellington could only bring about fifty thousand men into line, more than half of which were untried soldiers.

The consequences of such a battle were not however to be estimated by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain every thing by a victory; but if defeated, his powerful cavalry and the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent it from being very injurious; or a serious check might induce him to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general's resources could not be much improved; and it was very doubtful if either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense.

Such was the state of affairs, when the allies passed to the right bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon their general. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the first division, under Spencer, was held at Milheada in observation of the great road from Oporto; the light division at Mortagao watching the road from Viseu; and the remainder of the army was in reserve ready to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, lord Wellington recalled the first division, and fixed upon the Sierra de Busaco for his position of battle.

This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts to the right on the Mondego, and on the left is con-

nected with the Sierra de Caramula by a hilly rugged country, impervious to the march of an army. A road along the crest of Busaco afforded an easy communication; and at Pena Cova, just behind the right hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the Murecella ridge, behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for defence. The artillery of the allies fixed on certain points, could play along the front freely, and there was some ground on the summit suitable for a small body of cavalry. But neither guns nor horsemen of the enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was also unfavourable to an attacking army.

After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march, in a wide order of battle, to Mortagao, but then a succession of ascending ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last by a chasm, so profound, that the naked eye could hardly distinguish the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that twelve-pounders could range to the salient points on the opposite side. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco; one by a large convent on the right hand of the highest point of the ridge; a second on the left hand of this culminating point, by a village called St. Antonio de Cantara; and a third, which was a branch from the second, followed the Mondego to Pena Cova.

When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed their fears that Massena would not assail it. "*But, if he does, I shall beat him,*" was the reply of the English general. He was well assured that the prince would attack; for his advanced guard was already over the Criz, the second and sixth corps were in mass on the other side of that river; and it was improbable that so celebrated a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position, make a retrograde movement, change all his dispositions, and adopt a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only anxious for a battle, and, being still under the influence of Alorna's and Pamplona's false reports, as to the nature of the country in his front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him.

CHAPTER VII.

General Pack destroys the bridges on the Criz and Dao—Remarkable panic in the light division—The second and sixth corps arrive in front of Busaco—Ney and Regnier desire to attack, but Massena delays—The eighth corps and the cavalry arrive—Battle of Busaco—Massena turns the right of the allies—Lord Wellington falls back, and orders the northern militia to close on the French rear—Cavalry skirmish on the Mondego—Coimbra evacuated, dreadful scene there—Disorders in the army—Lord Wellington's firmness contrasted with Massena's indolence—Observations.

GENERAL PACK, on the 22d, destroyed the bridges over the Criz, and fell back upon the light division; but, the 23d, the enemy re-established the communications, passed the river, and obliged the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the hills behind Mortagao. Three squadrons of light and one regiment of heavy cavalry were retained there by lord Wellington; but the rest he sent over the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, whence he recalled Spencer, and at the same time caused the third and fourth divisions to take their ground on the position, the former

at St. Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. The light division falling back only a league, then encamped in a pine wood, where happened one of those extraordinary panics that, in ancient times, were attributed to the influence of a hostile god. No enemy was near, no alarm was given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a phrenzy, started from sleep and dispersed in every direction: nor was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror, until some persons called out that the enemy's cavalry were amongst them, when the soldiers mechanically run together in masses, and the illusion was instantly dissipated.

The 24th, the enemy skirmished with the picquets in front of Mortagao, the light division, retiring four miles, occupied very strong ground, and, in the evening, some of the enemy's cavalry approaching too close, were charged by a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons, and overthrown, with the loss of twenty or thirty men.

Early on the 25th, Crawford moved down from his strong post to the front, and appeared somewhat disposed to renew the scene at the Coa. The enemy's cavalry were gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry columns were plainly descried on the tableland above Mortagao, coming on abreast, and with a most impetuous pace, while heavy clouds of dust, rising and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, showed that the whole French army had passed the Criz, and was in full march to attack. The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging pistol-shots, when lord Wellington, arriving, ordered the division to retire, and, taking the personal direction, covered the retreat with the fifty-second and ninety-fifth, the cavalry, and Ross's troop of horse-artillery. Nor was there a moment to lose, for the enemy, with incredible rapidity, brought up both infantry and guns, and fell on so briskly, that all the skill of the general and the readiness of the excellent troops composing the rear guard, could scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful movements, a sharp cannonade, and an hour's march, brought every thing back, in good order, to the great position; but, almost at the same moment, the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of the sixth corps, the French batteries opened as the English troops mounted the steep ascent on which the convent was situated, and Reynier, taking the left hand route, along which a Portuguese battalion had retired, also arrived at St. Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third division. Before three o'clock, forty thousand French infantry were embattled on the two points, and the sharp musketry of the skirmishers arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath.

Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived in an instant that the position, a crested not a table mountain, could not hide any strong reserve, that it was scarcely half occupied, and that great part of the allied troops were moving from one place to another, with that sort of confusion which generally attends the first taking up of unknown ground. He therefore desired to make an early and powerful attack; but the prince of Esling was at Mortagao, ten miles in the rear, and an aide-de-camp, despatched to inform him of the state of affairs, after attending two hours for an audience, was (as I have been informed) told, that everything must await Massena's arrival. Thus a most favourable opportunity was lost; for the first division of the allies, although close at hand, was not upon the ridge, Leith's troops, now called the fifth division, were in the act of passing the Mondego, and Hill was still behind the Alva. Scarcely twenty-five thousand men were actually in line, and there were great intervals between the divisions.

Reynier coincided with Ney, and they wrote in con-

cert to Massena, on the 26th, intimating their joint desire to attack. The prince of Esling, however, did not reach the field until twelve o'clock. He brought with him the eighth corps, with which, and the cavalry, he formed a reserve connecting the sixth and second corps, and then sending out his skirmishers along the whole front, proceeded carefully to examine the position from left to right.

But the situation of the allies was now greatly changed. Hill's corps, having crossed the Mondego, was posted athwart the road leading over the Sierra to Pena Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line of defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve; Picton with the third division, supported by Champlémond's Portuguese brigade, was next to Leith; and Spencer, with the first division, occupied the highest part of the ridge, being between Picton and the convent. The fourth division closed the extreme left, covering a path leading to Milheada, where the cavalry held the flat country, one heavy regiment only being kept in reserve on the summit of the Sierra. Pack's brigade and some other Portuguese troops formed a sort of advanced guard to the first division, being posted half way down the mountain. On their left, the light division, supported by a German brigade, occupied a tongue of land jutting out nearly half a mile in front of, and lower than the convent, the space between being scooped like the hollow of a wave before it breaks. Along the whole of the front, skirmishers were thrown out on the mountain side, and about fifty pieces of artillery were disposed upon the salient points.

Ney was averse to attack after the delay which had taken place, but Massena resolved to attempt carrying the position. Reynier thought that he had only to deal with a rear-guard of the allies; and the prince, whether partaking of this error, or confident in the valour of his army, directed the second and sixth corps to fall on the next day, each to its own front, while the eighth corps, the cavalry, and the artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack, the light troops, dropping, by twos and threes, into the lowest part of the valley, endeavoured, in the evening, to steal up the wooded dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen close to the picquets of the light division. Some companies of rifle corps and caçadores checked this proceeding, but similar attempts made with more or less success at different points of the position, seemed to indicate a night attack, and excited all the vigilance of the troops. Yet, were it otherwise, none but veterans, tired of war, could have slept, for the weather was calm and fine, and the dark mountain masses, rising on either side, were crowned with innumerable fires, around which more than a hundred thousand brave men were gathered.

BATTLE OF BUSACO.

Before day-break on the 27th, the French formed five columns of attack; three under Ney, opposite to the convent, and two under Reynier, at St. Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three miles asunder. Reynier's troops had comparatively easier ground before them, and were in the midst of the picquets and skirmishers of the third division almost as soon as they could be perceived to be in movement. The allies resisted vigorously, and six guns played along the ascent with grape, but in less than half an hour the French were close upon the summit; so swiftly and with such astonishing power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrowing every thing that opposed their progress. The right of the third division was forced back; the eighth Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces, and the hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just between the third and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions immediately established themselves

amongst the crowning rocks, and a confused mass wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit of the sierra; but at that moment lord Wellington caused two guns to open with grape upon their flank, a heavy musketry was still poured into their front, and in a little time, the forty-fifth and the eighty-eighth regiments charged so furiously that even fresh men could not have withstood them. The French, quite spent with their previous efforts, only opened a straggling fire, and both parties, mingling together, went down the mountain side with a mighty clamour and confusion. The dead and dying strewed the way even to the bottom of the valley.

Meanwhile the French who first gained the crest had re-formed their ranks with the right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse side of the Sierra; thus the position was in fact gained, if any reserve had been at hand, for the greatest part of the third division, British and Portuguese, were fully engaged, and a misty cloud capped the summit, so that the enemy, thus ensconced amongst the rocks, could not be seen, except by general Leith. That officer had put his first brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he perceived the vigorous impression made on the third division, and he was now coming on rapidly; but he had two miles of rugged ground to pass in a narrow column before he could mingle in the fight. Keeping the royals in reserve, he directed the thirty-eighth to turn the right of the French, and as the precipice prevented this, colonel Cameron, of the ninth, who had been informed by a staff-officer of the critical state of affairs, formed his regiment in line under a violent fire, and, without returning a single shot, ran in upon and drove the grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying them with a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached; and yet with excellent discipline refraining from pursuit, lest the crest of the position should be again lost, for the mountain was so rugged that it was impossible to judge clearly of the general state of the action. The victory was, however, secure. Hill's corps edged in towards the scene of action; Leith's second brigade joined the first, and a great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight.

Ney's attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the valley could be discerned. The ascent was steeper and more difficult than where Reynier had attacked, and Crawford in a happy mood of command, had made masterly dispositions. The table-land between him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the forty-third and fifty-second regiments, drawn up in line; and a quarter of a mile behind them, but on higher ground and close to the convent, a brigade of German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance on this part of the position. In front of the two British regiments, some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures, in which the guns of the division were placed, and the whole face of the hill was planted with the skirmishers of the rifle corps and of the two Portuguese cacadore battalions.

While it was yet dark, a straggling musketry was heard in the deep hollows separating the armies, and when the light broke, three divisions of the sixth corps were observed entering the woods below and throwing forward a profusion of skirmishers; soon afterwards Marchand's division emerging from the hollow, took the main road, as if to turn the right of the light division, Loison's made straight up the face of the mountain in front, and the third remained in reserve.

General Simon's brigade, which led Loison's attack, ascended with a wonderful alacrity, and though the

light troops plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the first to the last section, its order was never disturbed, nor its speed in the least abated. Ross's guns were worked with incredible quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round, and the enemy's shot came singing up in a sharper key, until the skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of the ascent, the artillery suddenly drew back, and the victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the summit. Crawford, who standing alone on one of the rocks, had been intently watching the progress of this attack, then turned, and in a quick shrill tone desired the two regiments in reserve to charge! the next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and eighteen hundred British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. Yet so truly brave and hardy were the leaders of the enemy, that each man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark! They could do no more! The head of their column was violently overturned and driven upon the rear, both flanks were lapped over by the English wings, and three terrible discharges at five yards' distance completed the rout. In a few minutes a long trail of carcasses and broken arms indicated the line of retreat. The main body of the British stood fast; but several companies followed the pursuit down the mountain, until Ney moving forward his reserve, and opening his guns from the opposite height killed some men, and thus warned the rest to recover their own ground. The German brigade then spread over the hill, and the light division resumed its original position.

Loison shewed no disposition to renew the attack, but Marchand's people, who had followed the main road, broke into several masses, gained a pine wood half-way up the mountain, and sent a cloud of their skirmishers against the highest part, at the very moment that Simon was defeated. Such, however, was the difficulty of ascending, that the Portuguese troops alone held the enemy in check, and half a mile higher up, Spencer shewed a line of the royal guards, which forbade any hope of success. From the salient point of land occupied by the light division, Crawford's artillery also took the main body of the French in the wood, in flank; and Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous fire for an hour, relinquished the attack. The desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before two o'clock Crawford having assented to a momentary truce, parties of both armies were mixed amicably together searching for the wounded men.

Towards evening, however, a French company having, with signal audacity, seized a village within half-musket shot of the light division, refused to retire, which so incensed Crawford that, turning twelve guns on the village, he overwhelmed it with bullets for half an hour. After paying the French captain this distinguished honour, the English general recovering his temper, sent a company of the forty-third down, which cleared the village in a few minutes. Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day. A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen years of age, and very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain and driving an ass, loaded with all her property, through the midst of the French army. She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation, and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops, for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her.

In this battle of Busaco, the French after astonishing efforts of valour, were repulsed, in the manner to be expected from the strength of the ground, and the goodness of the soldiers opposed to them; and their loss, although prodigiously exaggerated at the time, was great. General Grain-d'orge and about eight hundred men were slain; generals Foy and Merle wounded; general Simon was made prisoner. The whole loss sustained may be estimated at four thousand five hundred men, while that of the allies did not exceed thirteen hundred, because the musketry and artillery of the latter were brought into full activity, whereas the French sought to gain the day by resolution and audacity rather than by fire.

Massena now judged the position of Busaco impregnable, and to turn it by the Mondego impossible, as the allies could pass that river quicker than himself; but a peasant informed him of the road leading from Mortagao over the Caramula to Boyalva, and he resolved to turn Lord Wellington's left. To cover this movement the skirmishing was renewed with such vigour on the 28th, that a general battle was for some time expected. Yet an ostentatious display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the throwing up of entrenchments on the hill covering the roads to Mortagao plainly indicated some other design. Howbeit, it was not until evening when the enemy's masses in front being sensibly diminished, and his cavalry deserted winding over the distant mountains, that the project became quite apparent. Hill then crossed the Mondego, and retired by Espinal upon Thomar, while the centre and left of the army defiled in the night by the other roads upon Milheada. In this manner Busaco was evacuated before the 29th; the guns followed the convent road, and the light division furnished the rear-guard until they passed Fornos, where the open country enabled the cavalry to relieve them.

Massena's scouts reached Boyalva in the evening of the 28th, and it has been erroneously asserted, that Trant's absence from Sardao alone enabled the French general to execute his design. Trant was however at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva, before one o'clock on the 28th; but having, through a mistake of Baccellar's, marched from Lamego, by the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct road through San Pedro do Sul, he lost men from fatigue and desertion, and could bring only fifteen hundred militia into line. Hence his absence or presence could have produced no effect whatever, even though he had as Lord Wellington intended, been at Boyalva itself. Accordingly, the French cavalry, pushing between him and the British horse, on the 29th cut off one of his patrols, and the next morning drove him, with the loss of twenty men, behind the Vouga.

When Massena's main body had cleared the defiles of Boyalva, it marched upon Coimbra, and the allies, crossing the Mondego at that city, commenced the passage of the defiles leading upon Condeixa and Pombal. The commissariat stores, which had been previously removed from Raiva de Pena Cova to Figueiras, were then embarked at Peniché; the light division and the cavalry remained on the right bank of the Mondego; and Baccellar was directed to bring down all the militia of the northern provinces upon the Vouga. The foolish policy of the native government now became evident, notwithstanding the proclamations, and the urgent, and even menacing remonstrances of the English general, the Portuguese Regency had not wasted the country behind the Mondego. During the few days that the enemy was stopped at Busaco, only the richest inhabitants had quitted Coimbra, when the allied army retreated, that city was still populous; and when the approach of the enemy left no choice but to fly or to risk the punishment of death and infamy announced in the proclamation, so direful a scene of

distress ensued that the most hardened of men could not behold it without emotion. Mothers, with children of all ages, the old, the sick, the bedridden, and even lunatics, went or were carried forth, the most part, with little hope and less help, to journey for days in company with contending armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine, and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have perished in the most deplorable manner. And, notwithstanding all this misery, the object was not gained: the people fled, but the provisions were left, and the mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined.

On the first of October, the outposts were attacked, and driven from the hills bounding the plain of Coimbra to the north. The French, on entering this plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade, and the British cavalry was drawn up in line, but with no serious intention of fighting; and was soon after withdrawn across the Mondego, yet somewhat unskilfully, for the French following briskly, cut down some men even in the middle of the river, and were only prevented from forcing the passage by a strong skirmish, in which fifty or sixty men fell.

This scrambling affair obliged the light division to march hastily through the city, to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at the end of the bridge; all the inhabitants who had not before quitted the place then rushed out, each with what could be caught up in the hand, and driving before them a number of animals loaded with sick people or children. At the entrance to the bridge, the press was so great that the troops halted for a few moments, just under the prison; the jailor had fled with the keys; the prisoners, crowding to the windows, were endeavouring to tear down the bars with their hands, and even with their teeth, and bellowing in the most frantic manner, while the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, and the pistol shots of the cavalry engaged at the ford below, were distinctly heard.

Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawford's staff, burst the prison-doors, and released the wretched inmates, and the troops forced their way over the bridge; but at the other end, the up-hill road, passing between high rocks, was so crowded that no effort, even of the artillery, could make way. A troop of French dragoons crossed a ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased the confusion; and a single regiment of foot would have sufficed to destroy the division, wedged in, as it was, in a hollow way, and totally incapable of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either side. At last, some of the infantry opened a passage to the right, and, by great exertions, the road was cleared for the guns; but it was not until after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, although the distance was less than eight miles. Head-quarters were that night at Redinha, and the next day at Leiria.

Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather fine, and provisions abundant, nevertheless, the usual disorders of a retreat had already commenced. In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching tools were scattered in the streets; at Leiria, the magazines were plundered by the troops and camp-followers; at Condeixa, a magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed, or abandoned to the enemy: and, while the streets were flowing, ankle deep, with rum, the light division and Pack's Portuguese brigade, at the distance of a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their own bullocks, and received only half rations of liquor!

Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder with a strong hand. Three men, taken in the fact at Leiria, were hanged on the spot, and some regiments, whose discipline was more tainted than others, were forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, aided by the fine weather and the enemy's inactivity,

restored order amongst the allies, while Massena's conduct, the reverse of the English general's, introduced the confusion of a retreat in the pursuing army. In Coimbra, the French general permitted such waste that in a few days, resources were dissipated which under good arrangements, would have supplied his troops for two months; and, during this licentious delay the advantage gained by his dangerous flank march to Boyalva was lost.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. "*Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to strike.*" This simple, but profound expression in Napoleon's letter of service, forms the test by which the prince of Esling's operations should be judged.

2. The design of turning the strong ground behind Celerico, by the route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French general did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, until the tenth day after passing the Pinhel. This was not a "*a vigorous attack.*"

3. Massena should have brought the allies to action in a forward position; and he might have done so either when Almeida fell, or before that event, because the complement of mules for the service of the army not being then full, the commissariat was dependent upon the country carts, and when the first retrograde movement took place from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, producing infinite confusion in the rear. The commissary-general Kennedy contrived, indeed, to procure fifteen hundred additional mules; but, intermediately, a brisk advance of the enemy would have forced the English general to fight, or retire more hastily than would have besmeared his reputation, or suited his political position.

4. If the prince of Esling had not been misled by Alorna and Pamplona, and the more readily that the estates of the latter were situated about Coimbra, he would have judged that the line his adversary had studied for eight months, and now so carefully and jealously guarded, was more likely to afford advantages, than the circuitous route by Viseu, which was comparatively neglected. The French general, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but having the stronger and more moveable army, should have followed closely.

A rapid pursuit, through Celerico, would have brought the French army on to the Alva before Hill or even Leith could have joined lord Wellington. The latter must then have fought with half his own army, or he must have retreated to the Lines. If he offered battle with so few troops, his position could be turned either by the right or left; on the left, by the slopes of the Estrella; on the right by crossing the Mondego, for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before Hill and Leith arrived. Now, the road by Viseu being the longest and least practicable, demanded great diligence to compensate for the difficulties of the way; and to gain Coimbra and force the allies to a battle before Hill arrived, were objects more readily to be attained by the left bank of the Mondego. The point where to strike was therefore not "*well considered,*" and it is clear that Massena did not rightly estimate the greatness of his enterprise.

5. When the rocks of Busaco glittering with bayonets first rose on the prince of Esling's view, two fresh questions were to be solved. Was he to attack or to turn that formidable post? Or, availing himself of his numerical strength and central situation, was he to keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until better combinations could be made? The last question has been already discussed; but, contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon Busaco appears to me faulty in the execution rather than in the conception; and the march by which that position was

finally turned, a violation of the soundest principles of war. In a purely military view, the English general may be censured for not punishing his adversary's rashness.

With respect to the attack, sixty five thousand French veterans had no reason to believe that fifty thousand mixed and inexperienced troops, distributed on a mountain more than eight miles long, were impregnablely posted. It would have been no overweening presumption in the French general to expect, that three corps well disposed, supported by a numerous artillery, and led on the first day, (as Ney desired,) might carry some part of the position, and it is an error, also, to suppose that guns could not have been used: the light division were constantly within range, and thirty pieces of artillery employed on that point would have wonderfully aided the attack by the sixth corps. But when a general in chief remains ten miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle in a position, makes his attacks without connection, and without artillery, and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible even with the valiant soldiers Massena commanded.

6. "*An army should always be in condition to fight.*" "*A general should never abandon one line of communication without establishing another.*"

"*Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious.*"

These maxims of Napoleon, the greatest of all generals, have been illustrated by many examples; Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, Salamanca, attest their value. Now, Massena violated all three, by his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances, or desperate crisis of affairs should be shewn, to warrant such a departure from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another art says, "*genius begins where rules end.*" But here genius was dormant, and rules disregarded. Massena was not driven to a desperate game. The conquest of Oporto was open to him, so was a march by Viseu upon the Vouga, which, though demanding time, was safe; in going by Boyalva, he threw his whole army into a single and narrow defile, within ten miles of an enemy in position; and that also (as I have been informed by an officer of marshal Ney's staff) with much disorder: the baggage and commissariat, the wounded and sick, the artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mixed together: discord raging amongst the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers, and in the night season when every difficulty is doubled. His "*army was not, then, in a condition to fight.*" He was making "*a flank march within reach of an enemy in position,*" and he was "*abandoning his line of communication without having established another.*"

7. Lord Wellington was within four hours march of either end of the defile, through which the French army was moving. He might have sent the first division and the cavalry (forming with Portuguese regular troops, and Trant's militia, a mass of twelve or fourteen thousand men) to Sardao, to head the French in the defile; while the second, third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Mortagao, assailed their rear. That he did not do so, is to be attributed to his political position. His mixed and inexperienced army was not easily handled; war is full of mischances, and the loss of a single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was more critically dangerous than such an attack would have been, and in a military view the battle of Busaco should not have been fought: it was extraneous to his original plan, it was forced upon him by events, and was in fine a political battle.

8. Massena's march, being unopposed, was successful. The allied army could not cope with him in the

open country between Busaco and the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field; hence lord Wellington, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra and Espinhal roads. But the prince of Esling was at Avelas de Cima and Milheada on the 30th; the allied cavalry and the right division being still on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in many places below Coimbra. Had the French general, directing his march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords, and pushed rapidly on to Leiria, by the route sir Arthur Wellesley followed, in 1808, against Junot, the communication with Lisbon would have been cut: terror and confusion would then have raged in the capital, the patriarch's faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must have been risked before the Lines could be reached.

9. When the allies had gained Leiria, and secured their line of retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in the French general's hands. If he had established a fresh base at Coimbra; employed the ninth corps to seize Oporto; secured his line of communication with that city and with Almeida by fortified posts; and afterwards, extending his position by the left, attacked Abrantes, and given his hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south, not only would the campaign have been so far a successful one, but in no other manner could he have so effectually frustrated his adversary's political and military projects. Lord Wellington dreaded such a proceeding, and hailed the renewed advance of the French army, which like the rising of a heavy cloud discovered a clear horizon beneath.

Even at Coimbra, the prince was unacquainted with the existence of the Lines, and believed that, beyond Santarem, the country was open for the usage of all arms. It is strange that, when Junot, Loison, Foy, and many other officers, who had served in Portugal, were present, better information was not obtained; but every part of this campaign illustrated Massena's character, as drawn by Napoleon:—"Brave, decided, and intrepid; dull in conversation, but in danger acquiring clearness and force of thought; ambitious, filled with self-love, neglectful of discipline, regardless of good administration, and, consequently disliked by the troops; his dispositions for battle bad, but his temper pertinacious to the last degree; he was never discouraged!"

10. It appears that the French reached Coimbra at the moment when the fourteen days' bread, carried by the soldiers, was exhausted, and it is worthy of consideration that French soldiers are accustomed to carry so much bread. Other nations, especially the English, would not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient Romans, and it ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires a long previous discipline and well-confirmed military habits; but, without it, men are only half efficient, especially for offensive warfare. The secret of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted, by previous habits, for military service, instead of being stretched as it were upon the bed of Procrustes, by a discipline which has no resource but fear.

CHAPTER VIII.

Massena resumes his march—The militia close upon his rear—Cavalry skirmish near Leiria—Allies retreat upon the lines—Colonel Trant surprises Coimbra—The French army continues its march—Cavalry skirmish at Rio Mayor—General Crawford is surprised at Alemquer, and retreats by the wrong road—Dangerous results of this error—Description of the lines of Torres Vedras—Massena arrives in front of them—Romana reinforces lord Wellington with two Spanish divisions—Remarkable works executed by the light division at Aruda—The French skirmish at Sobral—General Harvey

wounded—General St. Croix killed—Massena takes a permanent position in front of the Lines—He is harassed on the rear and flanks by the British cavalry and the Portuguese militia.

From the 1st until the 3d, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard, (in all about four thousand seven hundred men,) at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach the Lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and Wilson, with nearly ten thousand militia, closed upon his rear, occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off all communication with Almeida.

On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English picquets from Pombal, and, the next morning pushed so suddenly upon Leiria, as to create some confusion. The road was however crossed at right angles, by a succession of parallel ravines, and captain Somers Cocks taking advantage of one, charged the head of the enemy, and checked him until general Anson's brigade of cavalry, and captain Bull's troop of artillery, arrived to his support. The French then, forming three columns, endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre, while the others turned the flanks. The ravines were difficult to pass; Bull's artillery played well into the principal body, and Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number. The British lost three officers and about fifty men, the enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many miles of ground, although he had thirty-six squadrons opposed to ten. During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the right by Thomar and Santarem; the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor: the left by Alco-baça and Obidos, and at the same time a native force, under colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniche. Massena followed, in one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as daring and hardy as any performed by a Partizan officer during the war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion to its base.

SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.

Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to unite with Miller and J. Wilson, the latter having made a forced march for that purpose, but they were still distant, his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, and he resolved to attack the French in that city without waiting for assistance. Having surprised a small post at Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated at different points into the principal parts of the town, the enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance, and the convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion; thus, on the third day after the prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, and nearly five thousand prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst which there was a company of the marines of the imperial guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication, and picked up above three hundred more prisoners, while Trant conducted his to Oporto.

During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence on the prisoners, and the Abbe du Pradt and other French writers have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his uniform by encouraging this conduct, whereas, his exertions re-

pressed it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient refutation, the falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands.

This disaster made no change in Massena's dispositions. He continued his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry piquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded the brigade, took no heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have taken the battery of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion ensued, but the royals and the sixteenth drove the French out of the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, and, finally, the British retreated.

Meanwhile the allied army was entering the Lines. The first, fourth, and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill's corps on the right by Alhandra. The light division and Pack's brigade should also have entered by Aruda. But Crawford, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still there, at three o'clock, p. m. on the 10th; and the weather being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of marching was given by the general. He knew that all the cavalry had already filed into the lines, yet he posted no guards, sent no patrols forward, and took no precaution against a surprise, although the town situated in a deep ravine was peculiarly exposed to such a disaster.

Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched the height in front, and, about four o'clock, observed some French dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was instantly given, and the regiments got under arms; but the principal post of assembly had been marked on an open space, very much exposed to an enemy's guns, and from whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the mountain behind. The numbers of French increased every moment, they endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up, and although this feint was easily seen through the general desired the regiments to break and reform on the other side of the archway, out of gun range. In a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops, a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the first confusion had abated.

Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy's infantry descending the heights, endeavoured some to turn the town on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets in pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear skirmishing, and night falling, Crawford commenced a retreat. The weather was, however, so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; yet so uncertain is every thing in war, that this affair had like to have produced the most terrible results in another quarter.

The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafes, followed the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the dark to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of the Lines to gain Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. In this state, the cavalry patrols from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was cut off; a report confirmed in some measure by the unguarded state of Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy's

scouts on that side. This information alarmed general Hill for the safety of the second line, and the more so that the weakest part was in the vicinity of Aruda; he therefore made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the Lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, was quite disorganised of troops. The true state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained Alhandra before day-light on the 11th.

During this time the second and the eighth corps passed Alemquer, the former marching upon Villa Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier's movements on the French left were languid, he did not discover the unguarded state of Alhandra, and his piquets did not enter Villa Franca until late the next day. But on the right general Clausel, one of the most distinguished officers in the French army, coming upon Sobral, in the dusk, with the head of the eighth corps dislodged the troops of the first division, occupied the ridge on which the town is built, and in the night threw up some entrenchments close under the centre of the allies' position.

It is however time to give a more detailed description of those celebrated works, improperly called

THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

It has been already said, that they consisted of three distinct ranges of defence.*

The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the hills, twenty-nine miles long.

The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. Lorenza, being twenty-four miles in length.

The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from Passo d'Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of three thousand yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather; within this second camp, Fort St. Julian's (whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to enable a rear-guard to protect both itself and the army.

The nearest part of the second line was twenty-four miles from these works at Passo d'Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two long marches distant; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the embarkation.

Of these stupendous Lines, the second, whether regarded for its strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal; the others were only appendages, the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the summer season on the frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labour and from the fall of rain, that lord Wellington resolved to abide his opponent's charge there.

The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into five parts or positions, shall be described in succession from right to left.

1. *From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix.* This distance, of about five miles, was a con-

* Memoranda of the lines, &c., by Col. J. T. Jones, Royal Engineers, printed for private circulation.

tinuous and lofty ridge, defended by thirteen redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible by a scarp fifteen to twenty feet high, executed along the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese divisions under general Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla of gun boats, manned by British seamen.

2. *From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pe de Monte.* This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here, and the defence of the ground was entrusted to general Crawford and the light division.

3. *The Monte Agraça.* This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent country in such a manner, that from its summit the whole of the first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated from the Aruda position, by a deep ravine which led to nothing; the left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira; the centre overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned by an immense redoubt, mounting twenty-five guns, and having three smaller works, containing nineteen guns, clustered around it. The garrisons, amounting to two thousand men, were supplied by Pack's brigade; and on the reverse of the position, which might be about four miles in length, the fifth division, under general Leith, was posted in reserve.

4. *From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras.* This position, seven miles long, was at first without works; because it was only when the rains had set in, that the resolution to defend the first line permanently, was adopted. But the ground being rough and well defined, the valley in front, deep, and watered by the Zizandre, now become a considerable river, it presented a fine field of battle for a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted, under the immediate command of lord Wellington himself, whose head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, near the Secorra, a rock, on which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the Lines.

5. *From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre.* The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting forty guns; secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the sea a range of moderate heights were crowned with small forts; but the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the foot of the hills, ran along the whole front; that is, from Torres Vedras, by Ruia Sobral and Aruda, to Alhandra. This was the nature of the first line of defence; the second was still more formidable.

1. *From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra.* In this distance of seven miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially scarp'd, and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a road leading from Ereceira to Cintra.

2. *On the right of the above line the Tapada, or royal park of Mafra.* Here there was some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of fourteen redoubts, constructed with great labour and care, well considered with respect to the natural disposition of

the ground, and, in some degree, connected with the secondary post spoken of above: in front, the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself.

3. *From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas.* In this space of ten or twelve miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça, or head of which is in the centre of, and overtopping all the other, mountain masses. A road, conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights, parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position, which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting road in front; and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, on the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte Chique, on the right, must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter consisted of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in advance of the Cabeça, and completely commanding all the approaches, and both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its immediate flanks were considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas, being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad mule road that led over them.

4. *From Bucellas to the low ground about the Tagus.* The pass of Bucellas was difficult, and strongly defended by redoubts on each side. A ridge, or rather a collection of impassable rocks, called the Sierra de Serves, stretched to the right for two miles without a break, and then died away by gradual slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts, water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts with the heights of Alhandra; but it was the weakest part of the whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.

There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the first line of defence, namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the second line, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favourable fighting positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army. Those were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the first line would not have been injurious, save in reputation, because the retreat was secure upon the second and stronger line; and the guns of the first were all of inferior calibre, mounted on common truck carriages, and consequently immoveable and useless to the enemy.

The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works. The movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre of the first line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting direction, so close up to the heights of Torres Vedras that the narrow pass of Ruia alone separated them. As this pass was commanded by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not transfer his army to either without danger; because the sierra, although not impassable, was difficult; and the movement, which would require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked

from the Monte Agraça, whence, in a few hours, the allied forces could pour down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while in march. And this could be done with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by the engineers to all important points of the Lines, and a system of signals was established, by which orders were transmitted from the centre to the extremities in a few minutes.

Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting the *Lines*; too little for the professional reader, too much, perhaps, for a general history. But I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works, more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours; partly that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British engineers who constructed them, and partly to show that lord Wellington's measures of defence were not, as some French military writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position.

To occupy fifty miles of fortification, to man one hundred and fifty forts, and to work six hundred pieces of artillery, required a number of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, and the militia and ordnance of Estremadura furnished, altogether, a powerful reserve. The native artillery and the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, and most of those on the first line. The British marines occupied the third line; the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and aided, in various ways, the operation in the field. The recruits from the depôts, and all the men on furlough, being called in, rendered the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British army, reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire to see in a dangerous crisis.

It was, however, necessary not only to have strength, but the appearance of strength; and lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana that, without much attention to the wishes of his own government, the latter joined the allies with two divisions. Yet the English general did not act thus, until he was assured that Massena's force was insufficient to drive the British from Lisbon. He felt that it would have been dishonest to draw Romana's troops into a corner, where they could not (from want of shipping) have escaped in the event of failure. The first division of Spaniards, led by Romana himself, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega the 19th, and the 24th was posted at Enxara de los Cavalleros, just behind the Monte Agraça; the other followed in a few days; and thus before the end of October, not less than one hundred and thirty thousand fighting men received rations within the Lines; more than seventy thousand being regular troops, completely disposable and unfettered by the works.

Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of the Spanish army, reinforced by Madden's Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra. Ballasteros, at the same time moved upon Aracena; and Mortier, ignorant of Romana's absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th, to be near Soult who was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined, with the dispositions of the English general, to widen the distance, and to diversify the objects of the French armies, at the moment when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most important point.

Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works, the existence of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights of Alhandra he judged inattackable; but the valleys of

Calandrix and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn Hill's position, and come at once upon the weakest part of the second line; yet the abattis and redoubts erected, and hourly strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there; the nature of the ground about Aruda also was such that he could not ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division, to oblige Crawford to shew his force.

That general, by making the town of Aruda an advanced post, had rendered it impossible to discover his true situation without a serious affair; and, in an incredible short space of time, the division with prodigious labour, had secured the position in a manner really worthy of admiration. For across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, sixteen feet thick and forty feet high, was raised; and across the great valley of Aruda, a double line of abattis was drawn; not composed, as is usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chestnuts, dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged, by main force, for several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed, so that no human strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances, to defend this line of trees, were then cast up; and along the summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in thickness, with banquettes, were built; so that a good defence could easily have been made against the attacks of twenty thousand men.

The next points that drew Massena's attention were the Monte Agraça and the vale of the Upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period at which lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first line, no out-works had been constructed; neither the valley of Zibreira, nor the hills above Runa, had been fortified. Here it was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position of the allies was still very formidable; the flanks and rear were protected by great forts, and not only was a powerful mass of troops permanently posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill's corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very short time, have come into action.

Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras forbid any flank movement by the French general; and it only remained for him to dispose his troops in such a manner between Villa Franca and Sobral that, while the heads of the columns menaced the weakest points of the Lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the whole army at any part between the Tagus and the Baragueda ridge. The second corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended its right along some open ground as far as Aruda; and being covered, at that point, by a force of cavalry, was connected with the eighth corps, the head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, occupying the lower ridges of the Baragueda, and lining the banks of the Zizandre as far as Duas Portas on the road to Runa: the outposts of each army being there nearly in contact.

Massena did not bring the sixth corps beyond Otta, and his dispositions were not made without several skirmishes, especially near Sobral, on the morning of the 14th, where, attempting to dislodge the seventy-first regiment from a field-work, his troops were repulsed, pursued, and driven from their own retrenchments, which were held until evening; and only evacuated because the whole of the eighth corps was advancing for the purpose of permanently establishing its position. The loss of the allies in these petty affairs amounted to one hundred and fifty, of which, the greatest part fell at Sobral; that of the enemy was estimated higher. The English general Harvey was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats

killed the French general St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and promise.

The war was now reduced to a species of blockade. Massena's object was to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; lord Wellington's to starve the French before succour could arrive. The former spread his moveable columns in the rear to seek for provisions, and commenced forming magazines at Santarem, where his principal depôt was established; but the latter drew down all the militia and ordenança of the north on Massena's rear, putting them in communication with the garrison of Peniché on one side, and on the other with the militia of Lower Beira. Carlos d'Espana also, crossing the Tagus acted between Castello Branco and Abrantes. Thus the French were completely enclosed without any weakening of the regular army.

To aid the communication between Peniché and the militia of the North, Obidos surrounded by old walls had been put in a state of defence; but the Portuguese government having neglected to furnish it with provisions, it had been evacuated. Nevertheless, major Fenwick again occupied it temporarily with three hundred militia, and being supported by a Spanish battalion and by a strong detachment of British cavalry posted at Ramahal, hemmed in the French on that side; and a moveable column, under colonel Waters, issuing from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the enemy's marauding detachments, capturing many prisoners, and part of a considerable convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable quantities.

Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces remained quiet, although Massena's right was greatly exposed. Lord Wellington had four British divisions and Romana's corps, forming a mass of twenty-five thousand men, close round Sobral; and, by directing the greatest part of his cavalry and the six battalions at Bucellas, upon Aruda, he could have assembled from eight to ten thousand men there also; these last advancing a short distance into the plain, could, in conjunction with Hill, have kept the second corps in check, while the twenty-five thousand, pouring down at daylight from the Monte Agraga, from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, could have enveloped and crushed the head of the eighth corps long before the sixth could have reached the scene of action. But war is a curious and complicated web! and while the purely military part was thus happily situated and strong, the political part was one of weakness and alarm. Scarcely could the English general maintain a defensive attitude, struggling as he was against the intrigues and follies of men who have, nevertheless, been praised for their "earnest and manly co-operation."*

CHAPTER IX.

State of Lisbon—Embargo on the vessels in the river—Factionary conduct of the Patriarch—The desponding letters from the army—Base policy of ministers—Alarm of lord Liverpool—Lord Wellington displays the greatest firmness, vigour, and dignity, of mind—He rebukes the Portuguese Regency, and exposes the duplicity and presumption of the Patriarch's faction—Violence of this faction—Curious revelation made by baron Eben and the editor of the *Braziliense*—Lord Wellesley awes the Court of Rio Janeiro—Strengthens the authority of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart—The French seize the islands in the river—Foolish conduct of the governor of Setúbal—General Fane sent to the left bank of the Tagus—Lord Wellington's embarrassments become more serious—The heights of Almada fortified—Violent altercation of the Regency upon this subject—The Patriarch insults Mr. Stuart and nearly ruins the common cause.

THE presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed the finances, and the Regency applied to England for an additional subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself to direct the house of Sampaio to furnish provisions to the troops on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, forty thousand of whom arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, destitute and starving.* Corn, to be purchased at any price, was sought for in all countries; from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and one thousand tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade with Spain through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up the Tagus to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock, from the islands and from the left bank; and post-vessels were established along the coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war; a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally, to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid upon the port of Lisbon; it was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an imperious necessity ruled.

All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his faction; and that nothing might be wanting to shew how entirely the fate of the Peninsula depended, in that hour, upon lord Wellington's firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been increasing as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. Their private letters contained hints at variance with their public despatches. They evidently wished their general to abandon the country, but threw the responsibility upon him; they were unable to comprehend his genius; they thought him rash, and were themselves unequal to the crisis. They had not the manliness either to resign the contest or to carry it on with vigour, and cast their base policy with a view only to their own escape in case of failure. During the retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy to the eyes of some officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their feelings; the letters of general Spencer and general Charles Stewart appeared so desponding to lord Liverpool, that he transmitted them to Lord Wellington, and by earnestly demanding an opinion upon their contents, showed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind.

Thus beset on every side, the English general rose like a giant. Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these letters, he took a calm historical review of the circumstances which had induced him to defend Portugal, and which he had before explained to the very minister he was addressing; then shewing that, up to that period his opinions had been in every instance justified by the results, he assumed that it was reasonable to confide in his judgement for the future. Having thus vindicated his prudence and foresight, he traced out the probable course of coming events, discussing both his own and the enemy's designs, and that with such sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other records of lord Wellington's genius to be lost, it would alone suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity.

Having with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he, with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them plainly that

* See Annals of the Peninsular War, Vol. II. p. 331.

* Mr. Stuart's Papers. MSS.

they were unfaithful servants of their country and their prince; and threatened to *withdraw the British army altogether*, if the practices of which he complained were not amended.

"The king of England and the prince regent of Portugal had," he said, "entrusted him with the conduct of the military operations, and he would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he would not alter his plans to meet the *senseless suggestions of the Regency*. Let the latter look to their own duties! Let them provide food for the army and the people, and keep the capital tranquil." "With principal Souza," he said, "it was not possible to act, and, if that person continued in power, the country would be lost. Either the principal or himself must quit their employments; if himself, he would take care that the world should know the reasons; meanwhile he would address the prince upon the conduct of the Regency."

"He had hoped," he resumed in another letter, "that the Portuguese government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of endeavouring to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure the tranquillity of that capital. But, like other weak individuals, they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to provide food for their own troops while employed in the Lines, and to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and their families who were obnoxious to the enemy." "I have," he said, "little doubt of final success, but *I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain, even with the best arrangements.*"

These reproaches were neither too severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the Regency, was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to shew the justice of lord Wellington's complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of those intrigues which have been before touched upon. Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed, that the struggle could be maintained on the frontier, and when they should have been removing the people and the provisions from the line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military operations which were quite impracticable. When convinced of their error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country upon the general, although they knew that he was ignorant even of the names and places of abode of those officers and magistrates who were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at headquarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders.

When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves, but made the execution referable to the general, without his knowledge, and well knowing that he had no means of communicating with the country people, and this at the very moment of the enemy's advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, had alone enabled the orders, even to reach the persons to whom they were addressed. But it was the object of the Regency, by nourishing and soothing the national indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, however, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from the odium; he avowed, in his proclamations, that he was the author of the plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the Regency should shelter themselves under his name, but he was not willing to lose the fruit of his responsibility, nor content that those whose courage did shrink from the trial, "should seek popu-

larity with the populace at the expense of the best interests of the country."

After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English government convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be taken of Portugal, permitted their envoy, Mr. Stuart, to have a seat in the Regency, and influenced by lord Wellington, insisted that the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead of the native authorities. Lord Wellesley also gave assurances that if the army was forced to quit Lisbon, the Portuguese troops should be carried to Oporto, and the war recommenced in that quarter; but Mr. Stuart very prudently reserved this information until the necessity should arrive, well knowing that the Patriarch and Souza, who had already proposed to go there themselves, would eagerly seize the occasion to urge the evacuation of Lisbon. The 2d of October, Mr. Stuart took his seat, and together with doctor Noguera, the Conde de Redondo, and the marquis Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse to the Souzas' faction, and the two latter moderate in their conduct) proceeded to control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and principal Souza. It was full time, for both were formally protesting against the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every measure proposed by lord Wellington.

They were deeply offended by the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was incorporated with the regular forces; they had openly declared that the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers; and that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, not a native, whether soldier or citizen, should go with it. When the allies, notwithstanding this, fell back to the Lines, Souza proposed that the Regency should fly to the Algarves, which being indignantly protested against by Mr. Stuart, Souza threatened to quit the government. The dispute was then referred to lord Wellington, and, on the 6th of October, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract has been given above. When the army approached the lines Souza proposed that the Portuguese troops should remain outside while the British took shelter within! a notion so preposterous as almost to justify marshal Beresford's observation that he knew not whether the proposer were more fool, rogue, or madman.

The restless Principal however pursued his designs with activity, and, in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established a regular and systematic opposition to lord Wellington's plans of defence. Factious in council, they were also clamorous out of doors, where many echoed their sentiments, from anger at some wanton ravages, that in despite of the general's utmost efforts, had marked the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly; and Antonio Souza getting the superintendence of the succours for the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies being echoed by the numerous friends and partisans of the caballers, and by the fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible, there wanted but slight encouragement from the Brazils, to form a national party, and openly attack the conduct of the war.

To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro, to excite the prince regent against lord Wellington; and the Patriarch himself wrote to the prince of Wales and to the duke of Sussex, thinking to incense them also against the English

general. But the extent and nature of the intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made at the time by baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper, called the *Braziliense*.

Those persons abandoning the faction, asserted that the Patriarch, the Souzas, and (while he remained in Portugal) the ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. Villiers, were personally opposed to lord Wellington, marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and were then seeking to remove them from their situations, and to get the duke of Brunswick appointed generalissimo in place of Beresford. This part of the project was very naturally aided by the Princess of Wales; and the caballers in London had also sounded the Duke of Sussex, but he repulsed them at the outset. Part of their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in London as the "*Braziliense*" was in Lisbon; and in their correspondence they designated lord Wellington by the name of *Alberoni*, lord Wellesley *Lama*, Beresford *Ferugem*, Mr. Stuart *Labre*, the Patriarch *Saxe*, Antonio Souza *Lamberti*, colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, the under-secretaries of state, *Thin* and *Bythin*, sir Robert Wilson *De Camp*, lord Liverpool *Husband*, Mr. Villiers *Fatut*, Mr. Casamajor *Parvenu*, and so on of many others. After Mr. Villiers' departure the intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a different plan; for, overborne by Mr. Stuart's vigour in the council, they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and transmit, that which suited their purpose, to the Conde de Linhares and the chevalier Souza; who undertook to represent the information so received, after their own fashion, to the cabinets of St. James' and Rio Janeiro.

Mr. Stuart having thus obtained their secret, was resolute to suppress their intrigues; but first endeavoured to put them from their mischievous designs, by the very humorous expedient of writing a letter to Domingo Souza, in his own cypher, warning him and his coadjutors not to proceed, as their party was insecure, while Mr. Stuart, lord Wellington, Beresford, and Forjas being united and resolved to crush all opposition, might be made friends but would prove dangerous enemies! This had apparently some effect at first, but Principal Souza would not take any hint, and the violent temper of the Patriarch soon broke forth again. He made open display of his hostility to the English general; and it is worthy of observation, that, while thus thwarting every measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom they denominated well-wishers to the French, provided they were not of the Fidalgo faction. By a decree of the prince regent's, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations in cases of disaffection, were permitted, the informer's name to be kept secret; and in September 1810, this infamous system, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon, and many persons suddenly sent to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons. Some might have been guilty; and the government pretended that a traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a London house, which they indicated; but it does not appear that a direct crime was brought home to any, and it is certain that many innocent persons were oppressed.

All these things shewing that vigorous measures were necessary to prevent the ruin of the general cause, lord Wellesley dealt so with the Brazilian court, that every intrigue there was soon crushed, lord Wellington's power in Portugal was confirmed, and his proceedings approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain Antonio Souza and even to remove lord Strangford, the British envoy at Rio Janeiro, who had been the contriver of the

obnoxious change in the members of the Regency, and whose proceedings generally were in unison with the malcontents and mischievously opposed to lord Wellington's and Mr. Stuart's policy in Portugal. The subsidies were placed under lord Wellington's and Mr. Stuart's control, and admiral Berkeley was appointed to a seat in the Regency; in fine, Portugal was reduced to the condition of a vassal state; a policy which could never have been attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been willing to acquiesce. But firm in their attachment to independence and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this temporary assumption of command; and fully justified the sagacity of the man who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other.

Although so strongly armed, lord Wellington removed no person, but with equal prudence and moderation reserved the exercise of this great authority until further provocation should render it absolutely necessary. This remedy for the disorders above related was however not perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal, of which notice shall be taken hereafter.

From the strength of the Lines, it was plain that offensive operations were more to be dreaded on the left, than on the right bank of the Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more easily subsist, more effectually operate to the injury of Lisbon, and more securely retreat upon his own resources. Lord Wellington had therefore repeatedly urged the Regency to oblige the inhabitants to carry off their herds and grain from that side, and from the numerous islands in the river, and above all things to destroy or remove every boat. To effect this a commission had been appointed; but so many delays and obstacles were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy was close upon the river, both banks being still stocked with cattle and corn, and what was worse, forty large boats being on the right side. This enabled the French to seize the islands especially Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions; and while the Regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of Palmella, St. Felipe de Setuval, and Abrantes with empty magazines.

Lord Wellington thinking that the ordenança on the left bank, of whom five hundred were, contrary to his wishes, armed with English muskets and furnished with two pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel any plundering parties attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the Lines: he wanted numbers there, and he also judged that the ordenança would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their allies. Meanwhile Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the Tagus, and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the governor of Setuval adopted the idea, and suddenly advanced with his garrison to Salvatierra on the river side.

This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy's attention, and lord Wellington fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and consternation reigned in the Alemtejo; the supply of grain coming from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send general Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill spared from the Lines, to that side.

Fane immediately destroyed all the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions and patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zezere, kept a strict watch upon the enemy's movements.

Other embarrassments were however continually arising. The number of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious inconvenience; for the Admiralty, pretending to be alarmed at a fever generated by the infamous treatment the prisoners received at the hands of the Portuguese government, refused permission to have them transported to England, in vessels of war, and other ships could not be had. Thus the rights of humanity, and the good of the service, were alike disregarded, for had there been real danger, lord Wellington would not have continually urged the measure. About this time also admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before, stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada, he could not injure the fleet in the river, admitted that he was in error; and the engineers were directed to construct secondary lines on that side.

Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the Regency, was the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been relieved from the British magazines. Ten thousand soldiers of the line deserted between April and December, and of the militia two thirds were absent from their colours; for, as no remonstrance could induce the Regency to put the laws in force against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British stores within the Lines, the desertion was alarmingly great.

Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the Regency, lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the Prince Regent, and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch, whose influence was, from various causes, very great, took occasion to declare that "he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the people which were evidently for no other purpose than to *nourish the war in the heart of the kingdom.*"

But it was his and his coadjutors' criminal conduct that really nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in time, ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena could not then have remained a week before the Lines, and his retreat would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures previously agreed to by the Regency had been duly executed. Whereas now, the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Collegao, and Santarem was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained, the mills, but little injured, were quickly repaired, and lord Wellington had the deep mortification to find, that his well considered design was frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe that the prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him. "*It is heart-breaking,*" was the bitter reflection of the British general, "*to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly.*"

CHAPTER X.

Massena's pertinacity—He collects boats on the Tagus, and establishes a dépôt at Santarem—Sends general Foy to Paris—Casts a bridge over the Zezere—Abandons his position in front of the Lines—Is followed by lord Wellington—Exploit of serjeant Baxter—Massena assumes the position of Santarem—Lord Wellington sends general Hill across the Tagus—Prepares to attack the French—Abandons this design, and assumes a permanent position—Policy of the hostile generals exposed—General Gardanne arrives at Cardigos with a convoy, but retreats again—The French marauders spread to the Mondego—Lord Wellington demands reinforcements—Beresford takes the command on the left of the Tagus—Operations of the militia in Beira—General Drouet enters Portugal with the ninth corps—Joins Massena at Espinal—Occupies Leiria—Claparede defeats Silveira and takes Lamego—Returns to the Mondego—Seizes Guarda and Covilhao—Foy returns from France—The duke of Abrantes wounded in a skirmish at Rio Mayor—General Pamplona organizes a secret communication with Lisbon—Observations.

THE increasing strength of the works, and the report of British deserters (unhappily very numerous at this period,) soon convinced Massena that it was impracticable to force the Lines without great reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with an obstinate pertinacity, only to be appreciated by those who have long made war, the French general maintained his forward position, until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert; and then, reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp in which to make head against the allies, while his foragers searched more distant countries for food.

Early in October artillery officers had been directed to collect boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere. Montbrun's cavalry, stretching along the right bank of the former, gathered provisions, and stored them at Santarem; and both there and at Barquina (a creek in the Tagus, below the mouth of the Zezere,) rafts were formed and boats constructed with wheels, to move from one place to another, but, from the extreme paucity of materials and tools, the progress was necessarily slow. Meanwhile, Fane, reinforced by some infantry, watched them closely from the left bank; Carlos d'España came down from Castello Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the side of Ourem, and Wilson's Portuguese militia so infested the country from Espinal to the Zezere, that Loison's division was detached upon Thomar to hold him in check.

Towards the end of October, however, all the hospitals, stores, and other incumbrances of the French army were removed to Santarem; and, on the 31st, two thousand men forded the Zezere above Punhete to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body, four hundred infantry and two hundred dragoons, under general Foy, moved against Abrantes, and, after skirmishing with the garrison, made towards Sobreira Formosa, when the allies' bridge at Villa Velha was foolishly burnt; but Foy, with a smaller escort, immediately pushed for Pena Macor, and the 8th had gained Ciudad Rodrigo, on his way to France, having undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon; a task which he performed with singular rapidity, courage, and address. The remainder of his escort retiring down the Zezere, were attacked by Wilson, and suffered some loss.

The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, the 6th of November, but the enemy having entrenched the height over Punhete, restored it, and cast a second at Martinchel, higher up the river. Massena then commenced his retrograde march, but with great caution, because his position was overlooked from the

Monte Agraça, and the defile of Alemquer being in the rear of the eighth corps, it was an operation of some danger to withdraw from before the Lines. To cover the movement from the knowledge of the Partizans in the rear, Montbrun's cavalry marched upon Leiria, and his detachments scoured the roads to Pombal, on the one side, and towards the Zezere, on the other. Meanwhile the sixth corps marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar, and Loison removed to Golegao with his division, reinforced by a brigade of dragoons.

These dispositions being made, general Clausel withdrew from Sobral during the night of the 14th, and the whole of the eighth corps passed the defile in the morning of the 15th, under the protection of some cavalry, left in front of Aruda, and of a strong rear-guard on the height covering Alemquer. The second corps then retreated from Alhandra by the royal causeway upon Santarem, while the eighth corps marched by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas.

This movement was not interrupted by Lord Wellington. The morning of the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after day-break ere he perceived the void space in his front which disclosed the ability of the French general's operations. Fane had reported on the 14th that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy's intention was not clearly developed. It might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras, while the allies were following the rear. Lord Wellington, therefore, kept the principal part of the army stationary, but directed the second and light divisions to follow the enemy, the former along the causeway to Villa Franca, the latter to Alemquer; at the same time he called up his cavalry, and requested admiral Berkeley to send all the boats of the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the other bank, if necessary.

Early on the 16th the enemy was tracked, marching in two columns, the one upon Rio Mayor, the other upon Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, it was clear that he had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether he was in retreat to cross the Zezere by the bridges at Punhete and Martinchel, or making for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In either case, it was important to strike a blow at the rear, before the reinforcements and convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo, could be met with. The first division was immediately brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division and cavalry marched in pursuit, and four hundred prisoners were made, principally marauders. A remarkable exploit was performed by one Baxter, a sergeant of the sixteenth dragoons. This man, having only five troopers with him, came suddenly upon a piquet of fifty men, who were cooking, but instantly running to their arms, killed one of the dragoons; nevertheless Baxter broke in amongst them so strongly, that with the assistance of some countrymen, he made forty-two captives.*

The 17th, the eighth corps marched upon Alcanhede and Pernes, and the head of the second corps reached Santarem, when Fane, deceived by some false movements, reported that they were in full retreat, and the troops at Santarem only a rear-guard. This information seeming to be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus, which were left covered with straw-ricks, it was concluded that Massena intended to pass the Zezere, over which it was known that he had cast a second bridge. Hill was immediately ordered to cross the Tagus with the second division and thirteenth dragoons, and move up-

on Abrantes, either to succour that fortress or to head the march of the French. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack's brigades upon Cartaxo, and the light division reached El Valle on the Rio Mayor. At this village there was a considerable rear-guard formed, and as general Crawford had not profited from the lesson on the Coa, an unequal engagement would have ensued, but for the opportune arrival of the commander-in-chief. In the evening the enemy joined their main body on the heights of Santarem.

Hitherto, lord Wellington, regarding the security of the Lines with a jealous eye, had acted very cautiously. On the 15th and 16th, while the French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was even slack, although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the Lines, or of the pursuing troops, to have pushed the first, second, and light divisions and Pack's brigade vigorously against the enemy's rear. On the 18th, however, when Hill had passed the Tagus at Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, the English general, whether deceived by false reports, or elated at this retrograde movement, this proof of his own superior sagacity, prepared, with a small force, to assail what he then thought the rear guard of an army in full retreat. But the French general had no intention of falling back any farther, his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his situation, he had carried off his army with admirable arrangement, and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution.

Santarem is situated on a mountain, which, rising almost precipitously from the Tagus, extends about three miles inland. In front, a secondary range of hills formed an outwork, covered by the Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, running side by side to within a mile of the Tagus, where they unite and flow in a direction parallel with that river for many miles; the ground between being an immense flat, called the plain of Santarem. In advancing by the royal road from Lisbon, the allies ascended the Rio Mayor, until they reached the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway, eight hundred yards long, leading to the foot of the French position. On the right hand of this causeway as far as the Tagus, a flat sedgy marsh, not impassable, but difficult from deep water-cuts, covered the French left. On the left, the two streams of the Rio Mayor overflowing, presented a vast impassable sheet of water and marsh, covering the French right, and, in the centre, the causeway offered only a narrow line of approach, barred at the enemy's end, by an abattis, and by a gentle eminence, with a battery looking down the whole length. To force this dangerous passage was only a preliminary step, the secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the great height of Santarem could be reached; finally, the town, with its old walls, offered a fourth point of resistance.

In this formidable position, the second corps covered the rich plain of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison's division of the sixth corps, placed there to watch the Tagus, and keep up the chain of communication with Punhete. On Reynier's right, in a rugged country, which separated Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de Alcoberte, the eighth corps was posted; not in a continuous line with the second, but having the right pushed forward to Alcanhete, the centre at Pernes, and the left thrown back to Torres Novas, where Massena's head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete, the cavalry were disposed as far as Leiria, and the sixth corps was at Thomar, in reserve, having previously obliged Wilson's militia to retire from the Zezere upon Espinhal.

Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile country, the plain of Golegao supplied him with

* Private Journal of the Hon. Captain Somers Cocks, 16th Dragoons.

maize and vegetables, and the Sierra de Alcoberte with cattle. He presented a formidable head to the allies at Santarem; commanded the road, by Leiria, to Coimbra, with the eighth corps and the cavalry; that from Thomar, by Ourem, to Coimbra, with the sixth corps; and, by his bridges over the Zezere, opened a line of operations towards the Spanish frontier, either through Castello Branco, or by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte. He also preserved the power of offensive operations, by crossing the Tagus on his left, or of turning the Monte Junta by his right, and thus paralyzing a great part of the allied force, appeared, even in retreating, to take the offensive.

His first dispositions were, however, faulty in detail. Between Santarem and the nearest division of the eighth corps there was a distance of ten or twelve miles, where the British general might penetrate, turn the right of the second corps, and cut it off from the rest of the army. Reynier, fearing such an attempt, hurried off his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by which he expected the allies to penetrate between him and the eighth corps, and then calling upon Junot for succour, and upon Massena for orders, proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was this march of Reynier's baggage, that led Paine to think the enemy was retreating to the Zezere, which, corresponding with lord Wellington's high-raised expectations, induced him to make dispositions, not for a general attack, by separating the second corps from the rest of the army; but, as I have before said, for assaulting Santarem in front with a small force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear guard.

On the 19th, the light division entering the plain between the Rio Mayor and the Tagus advanced against the heights by the sedgy marsh. The first division under Spencer, was destined to attack the causeway, and Pack's Portuguese brigade and the cavalry were ordered to cross the Rio Mayor at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeira, to turn the right of the French. The columns were formed for the attack, and the skirmishers of the light division were exchanging shots with the enemy in the sedgy marsh, when it was found that the guns belonging to Pack's brigade had not arrived, wherefore lord Wellington, not quite satisfied with the appearance of his adversary's force, after three hours' demonstrations, ordered the troops to retire to their former ground. It was, indeed, become evident, that the French were determined to maintain the position. Every advantageous spot of ground was fully occupied, the most advanced sentinels boldly returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies of reserve were descried, some in arms, others cooking; the strokes of the hatchet, and the fall of trees, resounded from the woods clothing the hills, and the commencement of a triple line of abatis, and the fresh earth of entrenchments were discernible in many places.

On the 20th the demonstrations were renewed; but, as the enemy's intention to fight was no longer doubtful, they soon ceased, and orders were sent to general Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left bank of the Tagus. General Crawford, however, still thought it was but a rear-guard at Santarem, his eager spirit was chafed, he seized a musket, and, followed only by a serjeant, advanced in the night along the causeway; thus commencing a personal skirmish with the French picquets, from whose fire he escaped by miracle, convinced at last that the enemy were not yet in flight.

Meanwhile Clausel brought his division from Alcanhete close up to Santarem, and Massena carefully examining the dispositions of the allies satisfied himself, that no great movement was in agitation; wherefore, recalling the baggage of the second corps, he directed Clausel to advance towards Rio Mayor; a feint which

instantly obliged lord Wellington to withdraw the first division and Pack's brigade to Cartaxo, the light division being also held in readiness to retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding the second corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass of troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes and Pernes; but heavy rains rendered all the roads impracticable, and as the position of Santarem was maintained for several months, and many writers have rashly censured the conduct of both generals, it may be well to shew here that they acted wisely and like great captains.

It has been already seen how, without any extreme dissemination of his force, the French general contrived to menace a variety of points and thus to command two distinct lines of retreat; but there were other circumstances that equally weighed with him. He expected momentarily to be joined by the ninth corps, which had been added to his command, and by a variety of detachments; his position touching upon Leiria and upon the Zezere, enabled him to give his hand to these reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova; at the same time he was ready to communicate with any troops coming from Andalusia to his assistance. He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack, between Santarem and Alcanhete; but he judged that his adversary would not venture on such a decisive operation, requiring rapid well-timed movements, with an army composed of three different nations, and unpractised in great evolutions. In this, guided by his long experience of war, he calculated upon moral considerations with confidence, and he that does not understand this part of war is but half a general.

Like a great commander, he calculated likewise upon the military and political effect, that his menacing attitude would have. While he maintained Santarem, he appeared, as it were, to besiege Lisbon; he prolonged the sufferings of that city; and it has been estimated that forty thousand persons died from privations within the Lines during the winter of 1810: moreover he encouraged the disaffected, and shook the power which the English had assumed in Portugal, thus rendering their final success so doubtful in appearance, that few men had sagacity enough to judge rightly upon the subject. At this period also, as the illness of George the Third, by reviving the question of a Regency in England, had greatly strengthened the opposition in parliament, it was most important that the arguments of the latter against the war should seem to be enforced by the position of the French army. It is plain therefore that, while any food was to be obtained, there were abundant reasons to justify Massena in holding his ground; and it must be admitted that, if he committed great errors in the early part of his campaign, in the latter part he proved himself a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander.

On the side of the British general, such were the political difficulties, that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded. Desirable, because a victory would have silenced his opponents both in England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation to dictate the measures of war to the ministers instead of having to struggle incessantly against their fears. Desirable, to relieve the misery of the Portuguese people, who were in a state of horrible suffering; but, above all things desirable, lest a second and a third army, now gathering in Castile and in Andalusia, should reach Massena, and again shut up the allies in their works.

Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have been tantamount to the ruin of the cause; for it was at this period that the disputes in the Regency, relative to the Lines, at Almada, were most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the Pa-

triarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the discussions relative to the appointment of a Regency in England, seeing that any serious military check would have caused the opposition to triumph, and the troops to be withdrawn from Portugal. So powerful, indeed, were the opposition, and so much did the ministers dread their cry for economy, that forgetting the safety of the army in their keen love of place, they had actually ordered Lord Wellington to send home the transports to save expense! In fine, Mr. Percival with that narrow cunning that distinguished his public career, was, to use an expression attributed to him, "*Starving the war in Portugal*," in despite of Lord Wellesley's indignation and of Lord Wellington's remonstrances. In this balanced state it was essential that a battle, upon which so many great interests hung, should not be fought, except on terms of advantage. Now those terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, who had received some reinforcements from Halifax and England, had indeed more than seventy thousand fighting men under arms, and the enemy at this time was not more than fifty thousand: nevertheless, if we analyze the composition and situation of both, it will be found that the latter, from the advantage of position, could actually bring more soldiers into the fight.

In the Portuguese army, since the month of April, the deaths had been four thousand, the disbanded four thousand, the deserters ten thousand, the recruits thirty thousand;* the numbers were therefore increased, but the efficiency for grand evolutions rather decreased; and every department under Beresford, was at its last gasp from the negligence of the government, which neither paid the troops nor provided them with food. The Spanish auxiliaries also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at open discord with the Portuguese; and their general was neither able in war himself nor amenable to those who were.

While the heights of Almada were naked, the left bank of the Tagus required twelve thousand men; and two British divisions were kept in the Lines, because the French at Alcanhete were nearer to Torres Vedras than the allies were at Cartaxo. During an attack on Pernes, Reynier might break out from Santarem, and ten thousand men were therefore necessary to hold him in check; thus the disposable troops, comprehending soldiers of three nations, and many recruits, would have fallen short of forty-five thousand, while Massena could bring nearly all his force together on one point; because a few men would have sufficed to watch the British division on the left of the Tagus and at Santarem.

Lord Wellington's experience in the movement of great armies was not at this period equal to his adversary's, and the attack was to be made in a difficult country, with deep roads, where the Alvielly, the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, furnished a succession of defensive lines to the enemy, and in case of defeat the means of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Victory might crown the attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost even a third of his force, the ninth corps could have replaced it. If Lord Wellington failed, the Lines were gone, and with them the whole Peninsula. He judged it better to remain on the defensive, to strengthen the Lines, and to get the works at Almada sufficiently forward; meanwhile to perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, improve the organization of the militia in rear of the enemy, and above all to quiet the troubles and remedy the evils occasioned by the Patriarch's faction. Amongst these evils the destitute state of the fortresses, especially Abrantes, was prominent. Lord Wellington at one moment seriously thought of with-

drawing the garrison from thence to prevent the men from starving.

In this view, the light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied Valle and the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; the bridge at the English end of the causeway was mined, and a sugar-loaf hill, looking straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery and laced in front with a zigzag covered way, capable of containing five hundred infantry: the causeway being thus blocked, the French could not, while the inundation kept up, make any sudden irruption from Santarem.

On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the inundation to Malhorquija; thence, by a range of heights to Rio Mayor; and behind the latter place, Anson's cavalry was stationed in observation of the roads leading from Pernes and Alcanhede. In rear of Anson, a position was entrenched at Alcoentre, and occupied by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes leading upon the Lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta, were secured by what are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which, the other divisions were disposed in succession. The first and the head-quarters were at Cartaxo, a few miles in the rear of Valle, the remainder at Alemquer and Sobral. Torres Vedras was, however, always occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round the Monte Junta.

Massena, satisfied that his front was safe, continued to build boats, fortified a post at Tancos, on the Tagus, and expected, with impatience, the arrival of a convoy escorted by five thousand men, with which General Gardanne was coming from Ciudad Rodrigo. This reinforcement, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in Castile when the army entered Portugal, had marched by Belmonte and the Estrada Nova, and the 27th, was at Cardijos, within a few leagues of the French bridges on the Zezere. The advance of a cavalry patrol on either side would have opened the communications, and secured the junction; but, at that moment, Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança, and deceived by a false rumour that General Hill was in Abrantes, ready to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal, with such haste and blindness, that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost many men.

Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting to be joined by the ninth corps, greatly strengthened his position at Santarem, which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and to continue his marauding excursions in the most daring manner. General Ferey, with a strong detachment of the sixth corps, crossing the Zezere, foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without difficulty, and returned without loss; Junot occupied Leiria and Ourem with detachments of the eighth corps; and on the 9th of December a battalion endeavoured to surprise Coimbra: Trant, however, baffled that project. Meanwhile, Drouet avowed a design to invade the Trás os Montes, but the 22d of December occupied the line of the Coa with the ninth corps, while Massena's patrols appeared again on the Mondego above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords: all the spies likewise reported that a great reunion of forces from the south was to take place near Madrid.

These things gave reason to fear, either that Massena intended to file behind the Mondego and seize Oporto; or that the reinforcements coming to him were so large that he meant to establish bridges over the Mondego, and occupy the northern country without quitting his present position. It was known that a tenth corps was forming at Burgos, and the head of the fifth corps was again in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete and Barquinia were numerous and large; and in all parts there was evidence of great forces assembling for a mighty effort on both sides of the Tagus.

* Mr. Stuart's Papers. MSS.

It was calculated that, before the end of January, more than forty thousand fresh troops would co-operate with Massena, and preparations were made accordingly. An outward line of defence, from Aldea Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; Abrantes, Palmella, and St. Felipe de Setuval had been at last provisioned; and a chain of forts parallel to the Tagus were constructing on the hills lining the left bank from Almada to Trafaria. Labourers had also been continually employed in strengthening the works of Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agraça, which were now nearly impregnable, soldiers only being wanting to defy the utmost force that could be brought against them. To procure these, lord Wellington wrote earnestly to lord Liverpool on the 29th of December, demonstrating the absolute necessity of reinforcing the army, wherefore five thousand British troops were ordered to embark for Lisbon, and three regiments were drafted from Sicily.

Sickness having obliged general Hill to go home in December, but, it being known that Soult was collecting a disposable force behind the Morena, the troops on the left bank of the Tagus were augmented, and marshal Beresford assumed the command, for the Portuguese army was now generally incorporated with the British divisions. His force, composed of eighteen guns, two divisions of infantry, and five regiments of cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about fourteen thousand men, exclusive of Carlos d'España's brigade, which, being at Abrantes, was also under his orders.

To prevent the passage of the Tagus; to intercept all communication between Massena and Soult; to join the main body of the army, by Vellada if in retreat, and by Abrantes if in advance; were the instructions given to Beresford. He fixed his quarters at Chamusca, disposed his troops along the Tagus, from Almeyrim by Chamusca, as high as the mouth of the Zezere, established signals between his different quarters, and scouring the roads leading towards Spanish Estremadura, established a sure and rapid intercourse with Elvas and the other frontier fortresses. He also organized good sources of intelligence at Golegao, at Santarem, and at Thomar, and, in addition to these general precautions, erected batteries opposite the mouth of the Zezere; but against the advice of the engineers, he placed them at too great distance from the river, and in other respects unsuitably, and offering nothing threatening to the enemy: the French craft dropped down frequently towards Santarem, without hindrance, until colonel Colborne, of the sixty-sixth regiment, moored a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, and disposed fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that nothing could pass without being observed.

Meanwhile on the side of Santarem, as all the country between Alcanhete and the Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, the main bodies of both armies were, of necessity, tranquil. Anson's cavalry, however, acting in concert with major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy's foraging parties; and in the Upper Beira several actions of importance had taken place with the militia, which it is time to notice as forming an essential part of lord Wellington's combinations.

It will be remembered that the ninth corps, being ordered to scour Biscay and Upper Castile in its progress towards the frontier of Portugal, was so long delayed that, instead of keeping the communications of Massena free, and securing his base, Drouet lost all connexion with the army of Portugal. Meanwhile the Partidas of Leon and Salamanca gave such employment to Serras' division that the *Tras os Montes* were unmolested, and Silveira, falling down to the Lower Douro, appeared, on the 29th of October, before Al-

meida. Its former garrison had entered the French service, yet immediately deserted to their countrymen, and Silveira then blockaded the place closely, and made an attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices, but failed.

In November, however, the head of the ninth corps reached Ciudad Rodrigo, bringing a large convoy of provisions, collected in Castile, for Massena. Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this from reaching its destination, directed Silveira to intercept it if possible, and ordered Miller on the 16th to Viseu, in support. On the 13th, general Gardanne, with four thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry, raised the blockade of Almeida, took possession of Pinhel, and supported by the ninth corps, conducted the convoy towards Sabugal and Penamacor. The 16th, he was between Valverde and Pereiro Gaviolos, but Silveira falling upon him killed some of his men, took many prisoners, and then retiring to Trancoso on the 17th, united with Miller, who took post at Guarda. Nevertheless, Gardanne pursued his march, but finally, as we have seen, retreated from Cardigos in a panic.

Drouet had not yet received the orders to put himself under Massena's command, but, at the representation of Foy, moved forward into Portugal, and to hide his object, spread the report, already noticed, of his intention to penetrate the *Tras os Montes*. The 17th December, he passed the Coa with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, and crossing the Mondego the 18th, encamped near Gouvea, the 22d. Thence the cavalry and one division under general Claparede, marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish occupied Trancoso; while Drouet with eleven battalions, and the troops under Gardanne, which he had rallied, made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella the 24th.

Hitherto lord Wellington's communications with Baccellar, had been carried on, through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson on that of Espinhal and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the ninth corps obliged Wilson to cross the Mondego to avoid being enclosed; and Drouet effecting his junction with Massena by Espinhal, established his division at Leiria, and spreading towards the sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern provinces. On the 2d of January, however, Trant intercepted a letter from Drouet to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival, and of the State of Massena's army; intimating, also, that a great operation was in contemplation, and that the fifth corps was daily expected in the *Alemtejo*; he directed Claparede to seize Guarda, to forage the neighbouring villages, to watch the road of Belmonte, and if Silveira should be troublesome, to defeat him.

Silveira, an insufficient man, naturally vain, and inflated with his former successes, had already attacked Claparede, and was defeated with the loss of two hundred men at Ponte Abad, on the side of Trancoso, and Baccellar, alarmed for the safety of Oporto, recalled Miller and Wilson. The first immediately moved upon Viseu, and the last who had already repassed the Mondego and taken a hundred stragglers of Drouet's division, marched hastily towards the same point. Meanwhile, Silveira had again provoked Claparede, who pressed him so closely, from the 10th to the 13th of January, that he drove him with loss over the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before any troops could concentrate to oppose him. However, when Baccellar brought up his reserve to the Pavia, and Miller's and Wilson's corps reached Castro d'Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira, closely followed by Wilson. Meanwhile, the arrival of the ninth corps having relieved the French troops in Leon, the latter again menaced *Tras os Montes*, which obliged Silveira to

march to Braganza, and as Miller died at Viseu, only Wilson and Trant continued to harass the enemy's parties.

Claparede taking post at Guarda, according to his instructions, seized Covilhao, while Foy, who in returning from France had collected about three thousand infantry and cavalry, convalescents, was marching by the road of Belmonte. Foy had escaped innumerable perils. At Pancorbo he was fain to fly from the Partidas, with the loss of his despatches and half his escort; and now at Enxabarda entering the Estrada Nova, notwithstanding Claparede's vicinity, he was harassed by colonel Grant with a corps of ordenança from the Lower Beira, and although he suffered nothing by the sword, three hundred of his men died on the mountain from cold. On the 2d of February he reached Santarem, where affairs were coming to a crisis.

During December and January, the country being always more or less flooded, the armies had continued in observation; but Massena's positions were much strengthened, his outposts were reinforced, and his marauding excursions extended in proportion to his increasing necessities. The weak point on either side was towards Rio Mayor, any movement there created great jealousy, especially as the season advanced and the roads became firmer. Hence, on the 19th of January (some reinforcements having landed at Lisbon a few days before) a fear lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre, had induced Junot to drive the outposts from Rio Mayor to probe the state of affairs, and a general attack was expected; but after a skirmish, he returned with a wound, which disabled him for the rest of the campaign.

Early in February, a column of six thousand French again scouring all the country beyond the Zezere, got much concealed food near Pedragoa, while other detachments arriving on the Mondego below Coimbra, carried off four hundred oxen and two thousand sheep intended for the allies. These excursions gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle, and brought in a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them an aide-de-camp of general Clausel's.

Meanwhile, Massena organized a secret communication with Lisbon, through the Portuguese general Pamplona, who effected it by the help of the fidalgos in that capital: their agents, under the pretence of selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and Torres Novas, passed by the road of Caldas and thence through the mountains of Pedragoa. Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to have gained a French officer of rank, and it is certain that both generals had excellent information.

In this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to act offensively. How both were disappointed, and how other events hitherto unnoticed, bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject of another book.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. "*War is not a conjectural art.*" Massena forgetting this, assumed that the allies would not make a stand in front of Lisbon, and that the militia would not venture to attack Coimbra; but the battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured that the English would re-embark if pressed; the Lines put an end to that dream: yet once awake, he made war like a great man, proving more formidable with reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity was rife and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem shews what thirty thousand

additional men acting on the left bank of the Tagus could have done. Had they arrived on the heights of Almada before admiral Berkeley's error was discovered, the supply of provisions, from Alemtejo and from Spain, would then have been transferred from Lisbon to the French armies; the fleet would have been driven from the Tagus, and the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the British cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, and the little chance of final success, would probably have induced the British general to embark.

2. It has been observed, that Massena, in the first week might have easily passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and driven the British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable as it might at first sight appear. The rains were heavy; the fords impassable; the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge; a weak detachment would have been useless, a strong detachment would have been dangerous: to collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the entrenchments necessary to defend it, in the face of the allied forces, would have been neither a safe nor sure operation; moreover, Massena would then have relinquished the certain aid of the ninth for the uncertain assistance of the fifth corps.

3. Lord Wellington conjecturing the French to be in full retreat, had like to have received a severe check at Santarem; he recovered himself in time, and with this exception, it would be difficult to support essential objections to his operations; yet, many have been urged, as that, he might have straightened the enemy's quarters more effectually at Santarem; that Hill's corps, passing through Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete, and lining the Zezere, have cut off Massena's reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon his positions or even to capitulate. This last idea, advanced at the time by colonel Squires, an engineer of great zeal and ability, perfectly acquainted with the localities, merits examination.

As a simple operation it was feasible, but the results were not so certain; the Lines of Almada being unfinished, the rashness of leaving the Tagus unguarded, before an enemy who possessed eighty large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the Zezere, is apparent; Hill's corps must then have been replaced, and the army before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras Lines. Nor was the forcing of the French works at Punhete a matter of certainty; the ground was strong, there were two bridges over the Zezere, and the sixth corps, being within a short march, might, by passing at Martinchel, have taken Hill in flank.

4. The same officer, at a later period, miscalculating the enemy's numbers at thirty thousand men, and the allies at more than seventy thousand regulars, proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus at Azingha, behind the Almonda, and march upon Golegao, while lord Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. It was no common head that conceived this project, by which seventy thousand men would, in a single march, have been placed in the midst of the enemy's extended quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could scarcely have launched such a thunder-bolt. Massena had still fifty thousand fighting-men; the boats from Abrantes must have been brought down, to pass the Tagus; the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor would scarcely have escaped the enemy's notice, an exact concert, in point of time, was essential. But the eighth corps could have held the allies in check on the Alviella, while Reynier, from Santarem, and Ney, from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and the Tagus: moreover the roads about Tremes were nearly impassable from rain during

December, and in January, Soult, of whose operations I shall speak in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo. Any disaster happening to the allies would have relieved the enemy's difficulties, when nothing else could. A campaign is like other works of art; accessaries, however splendid, must be rejected when not conducive to the main object. That judgement,

which duly classes the value of every feasible operation, is the best quality of a general, and lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree; to it, his genius and his courage were both subservient; without it he might have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but he could never have conducted the war to a successful end.

BOOK XII.

CHAPTER I.

General sketch of the state of the war—Lord Wellington objects to maritime operations—Expedition to Fuengirola—Minor operations in Andalusia—National Cortez assemble in the Isle de Leon—its proceedings—New regency chosen—Factions described—Violence of all parties—Unjust treatment of the colonies.

In the preceding book, Spanish affairs have been little noticed, although lord Wellington's combinations were deeply affected by them. The general position of the allies, extending from Coruña to Cadiz, presented a great crescent, in the convex of which the French armies were operating; and it was clear that, when checked at Lisbon, the most important point, their wings could reinforce the centre; unless the allied forces, at the horns of the crescent, acted vigorously on a system which the harbours and fortresses, at either extremity, pointed out as suitable to those who possessed the absolute command of the sea. A British army and fleet were therefore established at Cadiz, and a squadron of frigates at Coruña, and how far this warfare relieved the pressure on lord Wellington I shall now show.

The Gallician troops, under Mahi, usually hanging on the borders of Leon, were always reported to be above twenty thousand men, when arms or stores were demanded from England, but there were never more than ten or twelve thousand in line; and, although Serras' division, of only eight thousand, was spread over the plains, from Benevente to the Agueda, during Massena's advance, no stroke of importance was effected against it. The arrival of the ninth corps, in October, put an end to all hopes from the Gallicians in that quarter, although the Partidas often surprised both posts and convoys. Behind Mahi there was, however, a second army, from four to six thousand strong, embodied to defend the coast line towards the Asturias; and, in the latter province, about eight thousand men, including the irregular bands of Porlier and other chiefs, constantly watched Bonet's movements.

That general frequently mastered the Asturias, but could never maintain himself there; because the country is a long defile, lying between the great mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a succession of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably calculated for partizan warfare in connexion with a fleet. If he penetrated towards Gallicia, British and Spanish frigates, from Coruña, landing troops at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could always form a junction with the great bands of Longa, Mina, and Amor, and excite insurrections on his rear. In this manner Porlier, as before related, forced him to with-

draw from Castropol, after he had defeated general Ponte at Sales, about the period of Almeida being invested. The advantages of such operations being evident, the British government sent sir Home Popham to direct the naval, and general Walker the military affairs at Coruña. Preparations were then made to embark a considerable force, under Renovaes, to renew the attack at Santona and Santander; the Partidas of the interior were to move at the same time; a battalion of marines was assembled, in England, to garrison Santona, when taken, and Mahi promised to co-operate by an incursion. Serras, however, threatened the frontier of Gallicia, Mahi remained in suspense, and this, together with the usual procrastination of the Spaniards, and the late arrival of sir Home Popham, delayed the expedition until October, although Porlier, Escadron, and other chiefs had commenced an isolated attack in the beginning of September.* Finally, Serras returned to Zamora, Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonet, aware of the preparations at Coruña, first concentrated at Oviedo, and then fell back towards Santander, leaving a post at Gihon.

On the 16th of October Renovaes sailed, but with only thirteen hundred men; accompanied, however, by general Walker who carried ten thousand stand of arms and ammunition. The 19th, entering the harbour of Gihon, they captured some French vessels, and Porlier, coming up on the land side, took some treasure and eighty prisoners. The next day, Renovaes proceeded to Santona, but tempests impeded his landing, and he returned to Coruña the second of November, with only eight hundred and fifty men: a frigate and a brig had foundered, with the remainder of his troops, in a dreadful gale, which destroyed all the Spanish naval force along the coast, twelve vessels being wrecked even in the harbour of Coruña. Meanwhile, Mahi, leaving Toboado Gil's division to watch Serras, entered the Asturias with the rest of the Gallicians, and being joined first by the troops of that province, and soon after by Renovaes, was very superior to the French; yet he effected nothing, and Bonet maintained his line from Gihon, through Oviedo, to the borders of Leon.

In this manner hostilities wore feebly on; the Junta of the Asturias continued, as from the first, distinguished by their venality and indifference to the public good, their province was in a miserable and exhausted state; and the powers of the British naval officers on the coast not being defined, occasioned some dispute between them and general Walker, and gave opportunity to the Junta to in-

* Mr. Stuart's Papers. MSS.

terfere improperly with the distribution of the English stores.* Galicia was comparatively rich, but its Junta culpably inactive in the discharge of duties and oppressive in government, disgusted the whole province, and a general desire to end their power was prevalent. In the course of the winter a combination of the clergy was formed to oppose both the Local Junta and the General Cortes, and assumed so threatening an aspect, that Mahi, who was then on the coast, applied to be taken in an English vessel to Coruña, to ensure his personal safety. One Acuña was soon after arrested at Ponferrada, the discontent spread, and the army was more employed to over-awe these factions than to oppose the enemy. Little advantage, therefore, was derived from the Spanish operations in the north; and general Walker, despairing to effect any thing useful, desired either that a British force should be placed at his disposal or that he might join the army in Portugal.

These expeditions from Coruña naturally increased the audacity of the inland partidas, who could only become really dangerous, by having a sea-port where they could receive supplies and reinforcements; or embarking save themselves in extremity, and change the theatre of operations. To prevent this, the emperor employed considerable numbers of men in the military governments touching on the Bay of Biscay, and had directed, as we have seen, the "*corps d'armée*," in their progress towards Portugal, to scour all the disturbed countries to the right and left. The ninth corps had been thus employed during the months of August and September, but when it passed onward, the partidas resumed their activity. Mina, Longa, Campillo, and Amor, frequently united about Villar Caya and Espinosa in numbers sufficient to attack large French detachments with success; and to aid them, general Walker repeatedly recommended the taking possession of Santona with a corps of British troops. That town, having the best winter harbour along the coast, and being built on a mountain promontory joined to the main by a narrow sandy neck, could have been made very strong. It would have cut off Bonet's communication with France by sea, have given the British squadron a secure post from whence, to vex the French coasts, and it offered a point of connexion with the partidas of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre.

Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, desired to employ a corps of four thousand men to secure it; but, having first demanded lord Wellington's opinion, the latter "earnestly recommended that no such maritime operations should be undertaken. For," said he, "unless a very large force was sent, it would scarcely be able to effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which it might take possession. Then that large force would be unable to move or effect any object at all adequate to the expence, or to the expectations which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient. It was vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less military assistance from the Spaniards; the first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and every thing which the expedition would have a right to require from them; and, after all, *this extraordinary and perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of the expedition to have a voice in the plan of operations, to be followed when the whole should be ready to undertake any, if indeed they ever should be ready.*"†

Napoleon now caused Caffarelli's reserve to enter Spain, ordered Santona to be fortified, directed other reinforcements from France upon the northern provinces, and finally sent marshal Bessieres to command the young guard, the third and fourth governments, and that of the Asturias, including Bonet's division, the whole forming a distinct force, called the army of the north, which on the 1st of January, 1811, exceeded seventy thousand, fifty-nine thousand men and eight thousand horses being present under arms; and Bessieres, who had received unusual powers, was especially ordered to support and furnish all necessary assistance to the army of Portugal. This was the state of the northern parts of Spain.

In the middle parts, the army of the centre, or that immediately under the king, at first about twenty thousand, was, before the end of the year, carried up to twenty-seven thousand, exclusive of French and Spanish guards and juramentados, or native troops, who had taken the oath of allegiance: with this power he protected his court, watched the movements of the Valencians, and chased the Guerillas of the interior.

The summer and autumn of 1810 were, however, for reasons before-mentioned, a period of great activity with these irregulars; numerous petty actions were constantly fought around the capital, many small French posts, and numbers of isolated men and officers, were cut off, and few despatches reached their destinations without a considerable escort. To remedy this, the lines of correspondence were maintained by small fortified posts which run from Madrid; through Guadarama and Segovia to the provinces of Valladolid and Salamanca; through Buitrago and Somosierra to the army of the north; through Guadalajara and Calatayud to the army of Aragon; through La Mancha to the army of the south: and by the valley of the Tagus, Arzobispo, and Truxillo, to the fifth corps during its incursions into Estremadura; a brigade of cavalry, was also generally stationed at Truxillo.

As the warfare of the Partidas was merely a succession of surprises and massacres, little instruction, and no pleasure, can be derived from the details; but in the course of the summer and autumn, not less than twelve considerable, and an infinite number of trifling affairs, took place between the moveable columns and these bands: the latter were however almost always beaten, and at the close of the year, only the Empeñinado, Duran, Sanchez, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and Mina retained any great reputation; and the country people were so harassed, that counter Partidas, in many places assisted the French.

The situation of the army of the centre enabled the king to aid Massena, either by an advance upon the Elga, or by reinforcing, or, at least, supporting the fifth corps in Estremadura. But Joseph, troubled by the Partidas, and having many convoys to protect, was also averse to join any of the marshals, with all of whom, except Massena, he was on ill terms; neither were his relations with Napoleon such as to induce him to take an interest in any military operations, save those which affected the immediate security of his court. His poverty was extreme; he was surrounded by French and Spanish intriguers; his plan of organizing a national party was thwarted by his brother's regulations; plots were formed, or supposed to be formed, against his person; and, in this uneasy posture, the secondary part he was forced to sustain, combined with his natural gentleness, which shrunk from the terrible scenes of bloodshed and devastation continually before his eyes, rendered his situation so irksome, that he resolved to vacate the throne and retire to France, a resolution which he soon afterwards partially executed. Such being the course of affairs in the northern and central provinces, it remains

* Abstract of General Walker's Military Reports from Galicia. MSS.

† Letter to Lord Liverpool, 7th May, 1811. MSS:

to trace the more important military operations at the southern horn of the crescent, where the allies were most favourably situated to press the left flank of the invaders.

Sebastiani was peculiarly exposed to a harassing warfare, because of the city of Grenada and other towns in the interior, which he was obliged to hold at the same time with those on the coast, although the two districts were completely separated by the mountains. Hence a large body of troops were necessarily kept in the strip of country bordering the Mediterranean, although they were menaced, on the one flank, by Gibraltar and the Spanish troops at San Roque; on the other by the Murcian army; and in front, by continual descents from the sea; while, from the shallowness and length of their position, they were unable to concentrate in time to avoid being cut off in detail. Now the Murcian army, nominally twenty thousand, was based upon the cities of Murcia and Carthagena, and menaced alike the coast-line and that of Grenada by the route of Baza and Guadix; and any movement towards the latter, was sure to attract the French, while troops landing from Cadiz or Gibraltar fell upon their disseminated posts along the coast.

To meet this system, Sebastiani, keeping his reserves about Grenada, where he had entrenched a permanent camp, made sudden incursions, sometimes against the Murcians, sometimes against the Spanish forces on the side of Gibraltar; but that fortress afforded a refuge to the patriots on one side, and Carthagena, surrounded by arid lands, where, for two marches, no water is to be found, always offered a sure retreat on the other. Meanwhile the French general endeavoured to gain the important castles on the coast, and to put them into a state of defence; Estipona and Marbella were defended, and the latter sustained many attacks, nor was it finally reduced until the 9th of December, when the garrison, of one hundred men, took refuge on board the *Topaze* frigate. But Sebastiani's hold of these towns, and even the security of the French troops along the coast, depended upon the communications across the mountains with Grenada, Chiclana, and Seville; and to impede these, general Campbell sent British officers into the Ronda, who successfully directed the wild mountaineers of that district, until their operations were marred by Lasey's misconduct.

The various movements and insurrections in Grenada during the summer of 1810 have been already noted; and, in October, general Campbell and admiral Penrose, conjointly with the governor of Ceuta, renewed the design of surprising Malaga, where were many privateers and a flotilla of gunboats, supposed to be destined against the islands near Ceuta. The French depot for the siege of Marbella was at Fuengirola, which is only thirty miles from Malaga, and it was judged that an attack there would draw the troops from the latter place; and the more surely, as general Valdemoro, commanding the Spanish force at San Roque, engaged to co-operate on the side of Ronda.

EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA.

On the 13th of October, captain Hope, in the *Topaze*, sailed from Ceuta, with a division of gun-boats and a convoy, containing a brigade of twelve-pounders, sixty-five gunners, a battalion of the eighty-ninth regiment, a detachment of foreign deserters, and the Spanish imperial regiment of Toledo; in all fifteen hundred men, including serjeants.* Lord Blayney, commanding this force, was directed to make a false attack on Fuengirola, and should the enemy come out from Malaga, he was to sail against that place. A landing was effected the same day, and Sebastiani

instantly marched, leaving only three hundred men in Malaga: lord Blayney was as instantly apprised of the success of the demonstration, yet he remained two days cannonading the castle with twelve-pounders, although the heavier metal of the gun-boats and of the frigate, had before failed to make any impression on the walls; and during this time his dispositions betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules. On the second day, while he was on board a gun-boat himself, the garrison, which did not exceed two hundred men, having first descried Sebastiani's column, made a sally, took the battery, and drove the British part of the investing force headlong towards the boats. Lord Blayney landed, rallied his men, and re-took the artillery; but at this moment two squadrons of French cavalry came up, and his lordship, mistaking them for Spaniards, ordered the firing to cease. He was immediately made prisoner; his troops again fled to the beach, and would have been sabred but for the opportune arrival of the *Rodney* with the eighty-second regiment, the flank companies of which were immediately disembarked and first checked the enemy. The Spanish regiment, untouched by the panic, regained the ships regularly and without loss; of the British two officers and thirty men were killed or wounded, and one general, seven inferior officers, and nearly two hundred serjeants and privates taken. Thus an expedition, well contrived and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct, and terminated in disaster and disgrace.

Scarcely was this affair finished, when Valdemoro and the Marquis of Portasgo appeared in the Ronda; an insurrection commenced at Velez Malaga and in the neighbouring villages; and Blake, who had returned from Cadiz to the army in Murcia, advanced, with eight thousand men, towards Cullar on the side of Baza. General Campbell immediately furnished money to Portasgo, and embarked a thousand stand of arms for the people of Velez Malaga.* An English frigate was also sent to cruise along the coast. Sebastiani, however, being relieved from the fear of a descent, soon quelled this insurrection; and then sending Milhaud on before with some cavalry, followed himself with reinforcements for general Rey, who was opposed to Blake. The latter, retiring behind the Almanzora river, was overtaken by Milhaud, and defeated on the 4th of November, when his army dispersed: at the same time, a contagious fever, breaking out at Carthagena, spread along the coast to Gibraltar and Cadiz, and the Spanish operations on the side of Murcia ceased.

In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned chiefly upon the blockade of the Isla, and the movements of the Spanish armies in Estremadura. Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from the Condado de Niebla, and it has been seen that Copons, aided by descents from the ocean, endeavoured to secure this important resource; but neither his efforts, nor the descents, would have availed, if Ballasteros had not co-operated by constantly menacing Seville from Aracena and the Aroche mountains. Neither could Ballasteros have maintained the war there, were it not for the support of Badajos and Olivenza; under cover of which, Romana's army protected his line of operation, and sent military supplies and reinforcements. On the possession of Badajos, therefore, the supply of Cadiz chiefly depended.

Seville was the French point of defence; Cadiz, Estremadura and the Condado de Niebla their points of offence. The want of provisions, the desire to cut off the Spanish convoys, or the sudden irruption of troops from Cadiz, threatening their posts at Moguer and Heulva, always drew them towards the coast; the enterprises of Ballasteros brought them towards Ara-

* General C. Campbell's Correspondence, MSS.

* General Campbell's Correspondence, MSS.

ceña, and, in like manner, the advance of Romana towards the Morena brought them to Estremadura. But Romana had wasted the greater part of the latter province, and as the fifth corps alone was disposable, either for offensive movements, or for the defence of the country around Seville, Soult contented himself with such advantages as could be gained by sudden strokes; frequently, however, crossing the mountains to prevent the Spaniards from permanently establishing themselves on the frontier of Andalusia.

In October, Romana, as we have seen, entered the Lines of Torres Vedras, and Mendizabal, who remained with two divisions, finding that Mortier, unconscious of Romana's absence, had retired across the mountains, occupied Merida. He wished to establish himself in the yet unwasted country about Llerena, but the appearance of a moveable column on the frontier of La Mancha, sent him back to Badajos, and, on the 20th of November, he united with Ballasteros. The French then fortified Gibráleon and other posts in the Condado de Neibla, while Girard's division reappeared at Guadalcácanal, and being joined by the column from La Mancha, foraged the country towards Llerena. Mendizabal then took post at Zafrá with nine thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, including Madden's Portuguese brigade, but meanwhile, Copons, who had four thousand men, was totally defeated at Castillejos by D'Aremberg, and retired to Puebla de Gusman.

At Cadiz, no change or military event had occurred after the affair of Matagorda, save the expeditions against Moguer, already noticed, and a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the Chielana works in September; but all men's hopes and expectations had been wonderfully raised by political events which it was fondly hoped would secure both independence and a good constitution to Spain. After two years of intrigues and delay, the National Cortes assembled, and the long suppressed voice of the people was at last to be heard. Nevertheless, as the members of the Cortes could not be duly and legally chosen in the provinces possessed by the enemy; and as some members were captured by the French on their journey to Cadiz, many persons unknown, even by name, to their supposed constituents, were chosen; and a new principle of election was also adopted; for all persons twenty-five years old, not holding office or pension under the government, nor incapacitated by crime, nor by debts to the state, nor by bodily infirmity, were eligible to sit if chosen, which had never before been the rule. A supplement of sixty-eight members was likewise provided to supply accidental vacancies; and it was agreed that twenty-six persons then in Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent those dependencies.

Towards the latter end of September this great assembly met, and immediately took the title of Majesty; it afterwards declared the press free in respect of political, but not of religious matters, abolished some of the provincial juntas, re-appointed captains-general, and proceeded to form a constitution worded in the very spirit of democracy. These things, aided by a vehement eloquence, drew much attention to the proceedings of the Cortes, and a fresh impulse seemed given to the war; but men brought up under despotism do not readily attain the fashions of liberty.

The Provincial Junta, the Central Junta, the Junta of Cadiz, the Regency, had all been, in succession, violent and tyrannical in act, while claiming only to be popular leaders, and this spirit did not desert the Cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely promulgated, yet tyrannical and partial proceedings were of common occurrence; and the reformatorys, by outstripping the feelings and understandings of the nation, weakened the main springs of its resistance to the French. It was not for freedom, but from national pride and from religious influence, that the people struck

Liberty had no attraction for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for the merchants; and the Cortes, in suppressing old establishments and violating old forms and customs, wounded powerful interests, created active enemies, and shocked those very prejudices which had produced resistance to Napoleon.

In the administration of the armies, in the conduct of the war, in the execution of the laws, and the treatment of the colonies, there was as much of vanity, of intrigue, procrastination, negligence, folly, and violence as before. Hence the people were soon discontented; and when the power of the religious orders was openly attacked by a proposition to abolish the inquisition, the clergy became active enemies of the Cortes. The great cause of feudal privileges being once given up, the natural tendency of the Cortes was towards the enemy. A broad line of distinction was thus drawn between the objects of the Spanish and English governments in the prosecution of the war; and, ere the contest was finished, there was a schism between the British cabinet and the Spanish government, which would inevitably have thrown the latter into Napoleon's hands, if fortune had not, at the moment, betrayed him into Russia.

The Regency, jealous of the Cortes, and little pleased with the inferior title of highness accorded them, were far from partaking of the republican spirit; and so anxious to check any tendency towards innovation, that early in the year they had invited the duke of Orleans to command the provinces bordering on France, permitted him to issue proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the honours of a royal prince; intending to oppose his authority to that of the Local Juntas, at the moment, and finally, to that of the Cortes. He had touched at Taragona and had been well received, but at Cadiz the people regarded him with indifference. Mr. Wellesley opposed his stay because lord Wellington judged that his reception in Spain would tend to render the Spanish war popular in the South of France, and the English ministers wishing to prevent any future embarrassments from his intrigues in Spain, sent him a verbal invitation to reside in England. This he did not accept, but the Cortes aware of the cause of his arrival, obliged him to quit Spain, and soon after displacing the Regency of Five, appointed Joachim Blake, Gabriel Císcar, and Pedro Agar in their stead. During the absence of the two first, substitutes were provided, but one of them (Palacios) making some difficulty about taking the oath, was immediately declared to have forfeited the confidence of the nation; so peremptorily did the Cortes proceed.

Nevertheless, the new regents, not more pleased with the democratic spirit than their predecessors, and yet wishing to retain the power in their own hands, refused to listen to the princess of Brazil's claim, and thus factions sprang up on every side; for the republicans were not paramount in the Cortes at first, and the majority of that assembly were so subtly dealt with by Pedro Souza, that they privately admitted Carlotta's claims both to the succession and the immediate control of the whole Peninsula.

Don Manuel Lapeña being declared captain-general of Andalusia, and commander of the forces in the Isla, was subservient to the views of the Cortes; but the new Regency, anxious to have a counterbalancing force, and being instigated also by persons from Badajos, enemies to Romana, removed that officer in December, and ordered his divisions to separate from the British army and come to Cadiz. The conduct of those divisions had, indeed, given little satisfaction either to the British or Portuguese, but numbers were so absolutely necessary to lord Wellington, that colonel O'Neal was sent to remonstrate with the Regency; and, by shewing that the fall of Estrema-

dura, and the total loss of communication with the interior of Spain would ensue, obtained a momentary respite.*

In matters relating to the war against the French, or to the administration of the country, the Spanish leaders were incapable of acting cordially on any mature plan; but with respect to the colonies, all parties agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty, and impolicy to their utmost bounds. To please the British government, the first Regency had published, in May, a decree, permitting the South Americans to export their own products, under certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, which could not be suppressed, and which was but a decent return to England for her assistance, gave offence to the Municipal Junta of Cadiz; and its resentment was so much dreaded that the Regency, in June, disowned their own decree of the previous month and even punished the printers, as having given birth to a forged instrument. Exasperated at this treatment, the colonies, who had resisted all the intrigues of the French, with a firmness and singleness of purpose very displeasing to the government in Old Spain, openly discovered their discontent, and then the authorities in the Mother Country, throwing off the mask of liberality and patriotism, exposed their own secret views. "It is not enough that Americans should be Spanish subjects now, but that in all cases they should belong to Spain," was the proclamation of the Regency, in answer to a declaration from the Caraccas, avowing attachment to the cause of Ferdinand: meaning that, if Spain should pass under the power of the usurper America must follow, as having no right to decide in any case for herself.

When the Cortes met, America expected more justice; she had contributed ninety millions of dollars for the support of the war, and many of her sons had served zealously in person; she had also been declared an integral part of the empire by the Central Junta, and her deputies were now permitted to sit in the Great National Assembly. She was however soon made to understand, that the first of these privileges meant eternal slavery, and that the second was a mere form. "The Americans complain of having been tyrannized over for three hundred years! they shall now suffer for three thousand years," and "I know not to what class of beasts the Americans belong!" such were the expressions heard and applauded in the Cortes, when the rights of the colonists were agitated in that assembly. Better to lose Spain to Joseph, if America be retained, than to save Spain if America be separated from her, was a feeling deeply rooted in every Spanish heart, a sentiment covertly expressed in many public documents, and openly acted upon; for, when repeated insults, treachery, and continued violence, had driven the colonists to defend their rights in arms, the money and stores, supplied by England for the support of the war against the French, were applied to the fitting out of expeditions against America. Thus the convocation of the National Cortes, far from improving the posture of affairs, dried up the chief sources of revenue, weakened the army in the field, offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved the nation in a colonial war, and struck at the root of the alliance with England.

CHAPTER II.

Soult assumes the direction of the blockade of Cadiz—His flotilla—Enters the Trocadero canal—Villaneros, or cannon mortars, employed by the French—Inactivity of the Spaniards—Napoleon directs Soult to aid Massena—Has some

notion of evacuating Andalusia—Soult's first expedition to Estremadura—Carries the siege of Merida—Besieges Olivenza—Ballasteros defeated at Castellejos—Flies into Portugal—Romana's divisions march from Cartaxo to the succour of Olivenza—That place surrenders—Romana dies—His character—Lord Wellington's counsels neglected by the Spanish generals—First siege of Badajoz—Mendizabel arrives—Files the Spanish army into Badajoz—Makes a grand sally—Is driven back with loss—Pitches his camp round San Cristoval—Battle of the Gebora—Continuation of the blockade of Cadiz—Expedition of the allies under general Lapena—Battle of Barosa—Factions in Cadiz.

WHILE the Spaniards in the Isla were occupied with the debates of the Cortes, the French works were labouring with care. The chain of forts was perfected, each being complete in itself with ditch and palisades and a week's provisions; the batteries at the Trocadero were powerful, and the flotillas at San Lucar de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and Chiclana, were ready for action. Soult repaired in person to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, thirty pinnaces and gun-boats slipping out of the Guadalquivir eluded the allied fleet, passed along the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the San Pedro. But, to avoid the fire of the fleet and forts in doubling Matagorda, the duke of Dalmatia, remembering what he had formerly effected at Campo Saucos on the Minho, transported his flotilla on rollers, overland; in November, one hundred and thirty armed vessels and transports were assembled in the Trocadero canal. This success was, however, alloyed by the death of general Senarmont, an artillery officer of the highest reputation.

At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, and some notable pieces of ordnance called cannon-mortars, or Villaneros, after the inventor. These huge engines were cast in Seville, and, being placed in slings, threw shells with such prodigious force as to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than five thousand yards. But to obtain this flight the shells were partly filled with lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective explosion. Nevertheless, they produced some alarm in the city, and were troublesome to the shipping. But Soult's real design was first to ruin, by a superior fire, the opposite fort of the Puntales, then pass the straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between the Isla and the city; nor was this plan chimerical, for on the side of the besieged there was neither concert nor industry.

Two drafts, made, in August and September, by lord Wellington, had reduced Graham's force to five thousand men, and in October the fever broke out in Cadiz; but as Soult's preparations became formidable, reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar and Sicily, and, at the end of the year, seven thousand British, Germans, and Portuguese, were still behind the Santi Petri. Hence Graham felt confident, 1. That, with due preparation, he could maintain the Puntales even though its fire should be silenced. 2. That Soult must establish a stronger flotilla than the allies, or his communication with Matagorda could not be maintained. 3. That the intercourse between the army in Isla and the garrison of Cadiz could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt of the Cortadura was lost.

To ensure the superiority of naval means, admiral Keats drew all the armed craft from Gibraltar. To secure the land defence, general Graham perseveringly urged the Regency to adopt certain plans, and he was warmly seconded by sir Henry Wellesley, but neither their entreaties, nor the imminence of the danger, could overcome the apathy of the Spaniards.* Their army, reinforced by a small body from Ceuta, was wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only six-

* Mr. Stuart's Papers. MSS.

* Graham's Despatches, MSS.

teen thousand men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of twenty-three thousand. The labour of the British troops, far from being assisted, was vexatiously impeded; it was the end of December, and after many sharp altercations, ere Graham could even obtain leave to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state of defence; although, by a sudden disembarkation, the enemy might enter it from the rear, and cut off the army of the Isla from the city. But while the duke of Dalmatia was collecting means of attack, the events in Portugal prevented the execution of his design.

When Massena had passed the frontier, his communications with France became so uncertain, that the emperor's principal source of information was through the English newspapers. Foy brought the first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It was then that the army of the north was directed to support the army of Portugal; that the ninth corps was made a component part of the latter; that the prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between Santarem and the Zezere; to besiege Abrantes; and to expect the duke of Dalmatia, who had been already several times commanded to move through the Alemtejo, to his assistance.* The emperor seems even to have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, a project that would have strengthened rather than weakened the French in the Peninsula, because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in Portugal, than to hold any particular province.

Massena's instructions reached him in due time, Soult's were intercepted by the Guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive before the end of December; a delay affording proof, that thirty thousand men would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty of the French communications. Postponing his design against Cadiz, the Duke of Dalmatia then repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour Maubourg's cavalry and five thousand infantry from the first corps. His instructions neither prescribed a line of movement nor enjoined any specific operation; the prince of Esling was to communicate his plan, to which Soult's was to be subordinate. But no certain intelligence even of Massena's early proceedings had reached Seville, and such were the precautions of lord Wellington, such the activity of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted Cadiz, until his operation terminated, no communication could be effected between the two marshals, and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans and situation of the other.

The duke of Dalmatia considering that Sebastiani had his hands full; and that the blockade of Cadiz, and the protection of Seville on the side of Neibla and of Araceña, would not permit the drawing off more than twenty thousand men from Andalusia; represented to the emperor that with such a force, he durst not penetrate the Alemtejo, leaving Olivenza and Badajos, and Ballasteros, (who would certainly join Mendizabel) on his rear; and that Romana alone, without reckoning British troops, could bring ten thousand men against his front; hence he demanded leave to besiege those places, and Napoleon consented.† Meanwhile, order was taken to secure Andalusia during the operations. Dessolles' division had been recalled to form the army of the centre, and general Godinot took his place at Cordoba; a column of observation was posted under general Digeon at Ecija; Seville entrenched on the side of Neibla, was given over to general Daricau; and a detachment under Remond was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary army, consisting of sixteen thousand infantry, artil-

lery, sappers and miners, and about four thousand cavalry and fifty-four guns, was assembled on the 2d January. An equipage of siege, a light pontoon train, and seventeen hundred carts, for stores and provisions, were also prepared: and Soult's administration was now so efficient, that he ordered a levy of five thousand young Spaniards, called "*escopeteros*" (fuzileers) to maintain the police of the province.*

SOULT'S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

Mortier moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra on the 5th January, Mendizabel retired to Merida, and Ballasteros, in consequence of orders from the Regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal. But winter tempests raged, the French convoy which moved on Araceña, overwhelmed by storms, was detained at the foot of the mountains, and to protect it, Gazan marching from Zafra, drove Ballasteros out of Frejenal. Meanwhile, the Spanish leaders, as well those in Estremadura, as in Cadiz, were quite ignorant of Soult's intentions, some asserting that he was going to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, others, that his object was only to crush Ballasteros. Lord Wellington alone divined the truth, and it was he who first gave Mendizabel notice, that the French were assembling at Seville at all, so destitute of intelligence and of military knowledge were the Spaniards. Now when the French were breaking into Estremadura, terror and confusion spread far and wide; Badajos was ill provisioned, Albuquerque in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled; and, in the midst of this disorder, Ballasteros was drawn off towards the Condada de Neibla by the Regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of half its defenders at the moment of invasion.

Lord Wellington had advised that the troops should be concentrated, the bridges over the Guadiana mined for destruction, and the passage of that river disputed to gain time; but these things being neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried the bridge of Merida on the 6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry, and while Latour Maubourg's dragoons held Mendizabel in check on the side of Badajos, Briche's light horsemen collected cattle on the side of Estremadura. Gazan's division, still posted near Frejenal, protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye's brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, quitting Truxillo, marched against the Partidas and scoured the banks of the Tagus from Arzobispo to Alcantara.

FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA.

This place, although regularly fortified with nine bastions, a covered way, and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns mounted, and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it was of little importance to the French; yet, as containing four thousand troops, it was of some consequence to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to supply it with the means of resistance, and the marquis decided on the former; but Mendizabel slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into the place.

It was invested the 11th; an abandoned outwork, three hundred and forty yards south of the town, was taken possession of the first night, and breaching batteries of eight guns, and counter batteries of six guns were then marked out. The trenches were opened on the west, and approaches carried on by the flying sap against the old breach; but the rains were heavy and continual, the scarcity of entrenching-tools great, and it was not until the 18th, when the head of the convoy had passed the mountains, that the works could be properly advanced.

* The King's Correspondence, captured at Vittoria.

† Marshal Soult's Correspondence. MSS.

* King Joseph's Correspondence. MSS.

On the 19th the covered way was crowned, and the 20th the breaching batteries opened their fire; two mortars also threw shells into the town, and a globe of compression was prepared to blow in the counterscarp. In the evening, Mendizabel skirmished unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg's horsemen, and, on the 21st, the mine was completed and preparations made for the passage of the ditch. The Spanish general, unable from the absence of Ballasteros' division to relieve Olivenza, now demanded succour from Romana, who sent Carlos D'España's brigade from Abrantes the 18th, and general Virues, with his own Spanish division, from Cartaxo on the 20th. The 21st, the governor of Olivenza was informed of this, and replied that he would maintain the place to the last moment; but the next day he capitulated, having still provisions, ammunition, eighteen guns, and four thousand one hundred effective soldiers. The 26th Soult marched against Badajos.

Meanwhile Ballasteros advanced upon Neibla, but being followed by Gazan, was overtaken at Castillejos on the 28th, and, after a sharp battle, driven with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded over the Guadiana; the Spanish artillery was saved in the castle of Paymigo, and the infantry took refuge at Alcontin and Mertola. Ballasteros' force was thus in a few days reduced by three thousand men, and, that nothing might be left to alarm the French in that quarter, the Regency re-called Copon's force to Cadiz. In this manner a fortress was taken, and twelve thousand men, who, well employed, might have frustrated the French designs against Badajos, were all dispersed, withdrawn, or made prisoners in twenty days after the commencement of Soult's expedition.

For many months previous to these events lord Wellington had striven to teach the Spanish commander that there was but one safe mode of proceeding in Estremadura, and Romana had just yielded to his counsels when the sudden arrival of the French threw every thing into confusion. The defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of Olivenza, the concentration of the forces were all neglected. Romana, however, had sent his divisions towards the frontier; they reached Montemor the 22d; the 23d they received Mendizabel's orders to halt as Olivenza had surrendered; the 24th Romana died of an aneurism in the heart. He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss, yet his influence was on the wane; he had many enemies, and his authority was chiefly sustained by the attachment of his troops, and by his riches, for his estates being in the Balearic Isles, his revenues did not suffer by the war.

Mendizabel now commanded in Estremadura. He had received Romana's orders to adopt lord Wellington's plan; which was to concentrate all the Spanish troops, amounting to at least ten thousand men, on the frontier, and, before the enemy appeared on the right bank of the Guadiana, to occupy a certain position of great natural strength close to Badajos; the right touching the fort of St. Christoval, the front covered by the Gebora river and by the Guadiana, the fortress of Campo Mayor immediately in the rear of the left, and Elvas behind the centre. When Mendizabel should be entrenched on this position, and a strong garrison in Badajos, the English general thought Soult could not invest or even straighten the communications of the town; knowing well the people he dealt with, he prophetically observed, "*with soldiers of any other nation success is certain, but no calculation can be made of any operation in which Spanish troops are engaged.*"

When Olivenza fell, a small garrison was in Albuquerque, another in Valencia d'Alcantara; Carlos d'España was in Campo Mayor, and Virues, with

Romana's divisions, was at Montemor. When Soult drove back the out-posts of Badajos on the 26th, Mendizabel shut himself up with six thousand men in that fortress; but, although a siege had been expected for a year, the place was unprovisioned. It was, however, still possible to execute the English general's plan, yet no Spaniard moved, and, on the 27th, Latour Maubourg, crossing the Guadiana at Merida, forded the Gebora, and cut off the communications with Campo Mayor and Elvas.

FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This city stands on a tongue of land at the confluence of the Guadiana with the Rivillas. The first is a noble river five hundred yards broad, the second a trifling stream. A rock, one hundred feet high, and crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting of the waters; and the town, spreading out like a fan as the land opens between the rivers, is protected by eight regular curtains and bastions, from twenty-three to thirty feet in height, with good counterscarps, covered way, and glacis. On the left bank of the Guadiana the out-works were, 1. the Lunette of San Roque, covering a dam and sluice on the Rivillas, by which an inundation could be commanded; 2. an isolated redoubt, called the Picurina, situated beyond the Rivillas, and four hundred yards from the town; 3. the Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between the Lower Guadiana and the Rivillas, and two hundred yards from the ramparts.

On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill, crowned by a regular fort three hundred feet square, called San Christoval, overlooked the interior of the castle; and a quarter of a mile farther down the stream, the bridge, six hundred yards in length, was protected by a bridge-head, slightly connected with San Christoval, but commanded on every side.

Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above the confluence of the Gebora, and three attacks were opened against the town the 28th, two on the side of Picurina and one on that of the Pardaleras. The 29th and 30th slight sallies were repulsed, but tempestuous weather spoiled the works. Gazan's division was distant, the infantry before the place were few, and, on the 30th, the garrison making a vigorous sally from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded sixty men and cleared the trenches.* Meanwhile some Spanish cavalry, gliding round the left of the French, sabred several engineers and sappers, and then retired.

In the night of the 2d of February a violent tempest flooded the Rivillas, carried away the French bridges, drowned men and horses, damaged the depôts, and reduced the besiegers to the greatest distress.† The cavalry employed in the investment could no longer forage; scarcity was felt in the camp; the convoys could only arrive by detachments; the rigour of winter bivouacs caused sickness; and, on the 3d, the Spaniards, making a second sally from Pardaleras, killed or wounded eighty men and ruined a part of the parallel. The same day Gazan arrived in camp, but the French cavalry being withdrawn from the right bank of the Guadiana, in consequence of rigorous weather, the communication was re-established with Elvas, and Mendizabel called the divisions in Portugal to his assistance.‡ Virues immediately marched upon Elvas, Carlo d'España, and Madden united at Campo Mayor, and Julian Sanchez brought down his Partida from Upper Estremadura.||

In the night of the 5th, Mendizabel repaired to Elvas in person, passed the Caya the next day, and being joined on the road by the troops from Campo Mayor,

* Conquête de l'Andalousie, par Edouard Lapéne.

† Siège de Badajos, par le Col. Lamare.

‡ Lord Wellington's Correspondence. MSS.

|| Mr. Stuart's Papers. MSS.

pushed the few French horsemen still on the right of the Guadiana over the Gebora. The Portuguese brigade crossed that river in pursuit, and captured some baggage; but the infantry entered Badajos, for Mendizabal again neglecting lord Wellington's counsel, designed not to take up a position behind the Gebora, but to raise the siege by a sally; yet he delayed this until the next day, thus risking to have his whole army shut up in an ill-provided fortress; for Latour Maubourg, seeing that Madden was unsupported, turned and drove him back over the Gebora with loss.

Badajos now contained sixteen thousand men, and, early on the 7th, Carrera and Carlos d'España, at the head of five thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry, breaking out at the Picurina side, with one burst carried the trenches and the batteries; the soldiers fought with surprising ardour, but the entire want of arrangement on the part of the generals (unworthy to command the brave men under them) ruined all. They had not even provided the means to spike the guns; and when Mortier brought his reserves against the front and flank of the attack, the whole driven back in disorder, re-entered the city, having eighty-five officers and near six hundred soldiers killed and wounded; the enemy also lost several engineers and four hundred men.

While this action took place on the left bank, Latour Maubourg occupied the ground between the Gebora and the Caya, and again cut off the communication with Elvas and Campo Mayor; but his forces were too weak to maintain themselves there, and Mendizabal, leaving the defence of the town entirely to the governor, Rafael Menacho, pitched his own camp round San Christoval. Some days previous to this, the French had bombarded Badajos, a proceeding only mischievous to themselves; for the inhabitants, terrified by the shells, fled in great numbers while the communication was open, but left their provisions, which enabled Menacho to feed his garrison without difficulty.

Soult observing the numbers, and awake to all the real resources of the Spanish succouring army, feared lest delay should produce a change of commanders, or of system, and resolved to bring matters to a crisis. On the 11th he stormed the Pardaleras; on the 12th, he sent fifteen hundred cavalry across the Guadiana to Montijo; and, on the 14th, he threw shells into the camp about Christoval, which obliged Mendizabal to remove from the heights in front of that fort. Meanwhile, intelligence that Castaños was appointed captain-general of the Estremadura created the greatest anger amongst Romana's soldiers: they had long considered themselves independent of the central government, and in this mood, although the position behind the Gebora, recommended by lord Wellington, was at last occupied, little attention was paid to military discipline. The English general had expressly advised Mendizabal to increase the great natural strength of this position with entrenchments; for his design was that the Spaniards, whom he thought quite unequal to open field-operations, should have an impregnable post, whence they could safely aid in the defence of the town, and yet preserve a free communication with the Alentejo, until the arrival of his own reinforcements (which he expected in the latter end of January) should enable him to raise the siege.* Mendizabal, with that arrogance which is peculiar to his nation, rejected this counsel, and hung twelve days on the heights of Christoval in a torpid state; and when driven thence, by the French shells, he merely destroyed a small bridge over the Gebora, neither casting up entrenchments, nor keeping a guard in his front, nor disposing his men with care. Soult observing these things, suddenly leaped upon him.

BATTLE OF THE GEBORA.

The Guadiana and the Gebora rivers covered the Spanish position, but this did not deter the duke of Dalmatia from attempting to pass both and surprise the camp. And first to deprive Mendizabal of the aid of San Christoval, and to create a diversion, the French mortar-batteries again threw shells on the 17th; yet the swell of the rivers would not permit the main operation to be commenced before the evening of the 18th: but on that day the cavalry drew down the right bank of the Guadiana from Montijo, and the artillery and infantry crossed at the French ferry, four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. These combinations were so exactly executed, that, at daybreak, on the 19th, six thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry were in order of battle on the right bank of the Guadiana.

The Gebora was still to be forded, and, behind it, the Spaniards had ten thousand infantry, a considerable artillery, and fifteen hundred cavalry, besides many armed followers of the camp; the whole number not being less than fifteen thousand. But a thick mist covered the country, no Spanish posts were in advance, and Soult, riding through the French ranks, and exhorting the soldiers to fight manfully, commenced the passage of the Gebora. His cavalry forded five miles up the stream, and his infantry passed in two columns, on the right and left of the ruined bridge: a few shots, near the latter, first alarmed the Spaniards, and, as the instant clamour amongst the multitude indicated that the surprise was complete, Mortier, who directed the movements, rapidly formed the line of battle.

At eight o'clock the fog cleared away, and the first beams of the sun and the certainty of victory flashed together on the French soldiers. Their horsemen were already around the Spanish left, infantry, cavalry, and guns, heaped together in the centre, wavering to and fro in disorder, and the right having fallen away from San Christoval was unsupported. In a few moments, general Girard placed three battalions between the Spanish army and that fort, the artillery roared and the French bore forward, as one man, to the attack. Six battalions pressed the centre, Girard moved against the right, Latour Maubourg's cavalry charged the left. Thus surrounded, Mendizabel's troops instinctively crowded on the centre, and for some time resisted by their inert weight. But the French infantry soon closed on the mass with a destroying musketry, the horsemen rode in with loose bridles, and the Spaniards were shaken, divided and slaughtered. Their cavalry fled outright, and even Madden's Portuguese, disregarding alike his exhortations and example, shamefully turned their backs. At ten o'clock the fight was over; Virues was taken, Mendizabel and Carrera escaped with difficulty; España alone made good his retreat to Campo Mayor with two thousand men. A few reached Elvas, three thousand got into Badajos, by the bridge, and nine hundred bodies strewed the field. Eight thousand, including armed followers, were made prisoners, and guns, colours, muskets, ammunition, baggage, all fell into the enemy's hands. It was a disastrous and a shameful defeat. In the depth of winter, Soult, with a small force, had passed two difficult rivers, carried a strong position, and annihilated an army which had been two years in constant service. Mendizabel, instead of destroying the bridge over the Gebora, should have cast others, that he might freely issue to attack the French while crossing the Guadiana; he should have opposed them again in passing the Gebora; or he might have passed through Badajos, and fallen on the troops in the trenches, with his whole army, while Soult was still entangled between the rivers.

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool. MSS.

In the evening after the action the French cast up entrenchments, posting three battalions and the heavy cavalry on the important position they had gained, and the next day the works of the siege were renewed with greater activity; yet the difficulty of Soult's undertaking was rendered apparent by his victories. The continual rains, interrupting the arrival of his convoys, obliged him to employ a number of men at a great distance to gather provisions; nearly two thousand French had been killed or wounded in the two sieges and in this battle, many also were sick, and Badajos was still powerful. The body of the place was entire, the garrison nine thousand strong, was, by the flight of the inhabitants, well provided with food; and there was no want of other stores: the governor was resolute and confident; the season rigorous for the besiegers; no communication had been yet opened with Massena; and lord Wellington, in momentary expectation that his reinforcements would arrive, was impatient to bring on a crisis. Meanwhile, the duke of Dalmatia's power, in Andalusia, was menaced in the most serious manner.

CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

When general Graham was aware of Soult's departure, and knew, also, that the fifth corps had quitted Seville, he undertook, in concert with the Spaniards, to drive Victor out of his lines.* A force, sailing from Cadiz the 29th of January, was to have been joined, in rear of the enemy, by the troops from Tarifa under major Brown, and by three thousand Spaniards, from Algeiras and San Roque under general Beguines; contrary winds detained both the troops and the vessels carrying counter orders to Beguines and Brown, who advanced, the first to Medina, the other to Casa Vieja. Victor, having notice of this project, at first kept close, but afterwards sent troops to retake Medina and Casa Vieja; and, in the course of February, twelve thousand men, drawn from the northern governments, were directed upon Andalusia, to reinforce the different corps. The first corps was thus increased to twenty thousand men, of which fifteen thousand were before Cadiz, and the remainder at San Lucar, Medina Sidonia, and other quarters. Nevertheless, on the 21st of February, ten thousand infantry and near six hundred cavalry, of the allies, were again embarked at Cadiz, being to land at Tarifa, and march upon the rear of the enemy's camp at Chiclana. General Zayas commanding the Spanish forces left in the Isla was directed to cast a bridge over the San Petri near the sea mouth; Ballasteros, with the remains of his army was to menace Seville; the Partizans were to act against the fourth corps; insurrections were expected in all quarters, and many took place in Sebastiani's district.

The British troops passed their port in a gale, the 22d, but, landing at Algeiras, marched to Tarifa the next day, when they were joined by the twenty-eighth, and the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second regiments. Thus somewhat more than four thousand effective troops (including two companies of the twentieth Portuguese and one hundred and eighty German hussars) were assembled under general Graham; all good and hardy troops, and himself a daring old man and of a ready temper for battle.

General La Peña arrived on the 27th, with seven thousand Spaniards, and Graham, for the sake of unanimity, ceded the chief command, although it was contrary to his instructions. The next day, the whole moved forward about twelve miles, and passed the mountain ridges that, descending from Ronda to the sea, separate the plains of San Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana. Being now within four leagues of the enemy's posts, the troops were re-organized.

The vanguard was given to Lardizabal; the centre to the prince of Anglona; the reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and the British were confided to Graham; and the cavalry of both nations, formed in one body, was commanded by colonel Whittingham, then in the Spanish service.

The French covering division, under general Cassagne, consisted of three battalions and a regiment of horse placed at Medina, with outposts at Vejer de la Frontera and Casa Viejas. Before La Peña's arrival, the irregulars had attacked Casa Viejas, and general Beguines had even taken Medina; but Cassagne, reinforced by a battalion of infantry from Arcos, retook and entrenched it the 29th; and the signal of action being thus given, the French generals in the higher provinces, perceiving that the people were ready for commotion, gathered in their respective forces at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba, following the orders left by Soult. In Grenada the insurgents were especially active, and Sebastiani, doubtful if the storm would not break on his head, concentrated a column at Estipona, which was a good covering point to the coast line, and one whence he could easily gain Ronda.* Victor manned his works at Rota, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the Trocadero with a mixed force, of refugee French, juramentados, and regular troops; but he assembled eleven thousand good soldiers near Chiclana, between the roads of Conil and Medina, to await the unfolding of the allies' project.

At first, La Peña's march pointed to Medina Sidonia; his vanguard stormed Casa Viejas on the 2d of March, and the troops from Algeiras, amounting to sixteen hundred infantry besides several hundreds of irregular cavalry, coming in, increased his force to twelve thousand infantry, eight hundred horsemen, and twenty-four guns. The 3d he resumed his march, but hearing that Medina Sidonia was entrenched, turned towards the coast, and drove the French from Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he continued his movement, and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 5th, after a skirmish, in which his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerto, called by the English the heights of Barosa; being then only four miles from the sea mouth of the Santi Petri.

The hill of Barosa is a low ridge creeping in from the coast about one mile and a half, and overlooking a high broken plain of small extent. This plain was bounded on one side by the coast cliffs; on the other by the forest of Chiclana, and in front by a pine-wood, beyond which rose a long narrow height called the Bermeja, which filled the space between the Almanza creek and the sea; and which could be reached by moving either through the pine-wood in front or by the beach under the cliffs.

At Tarifa, Graham judging that Victor would surely come out of his lines to fight, had obtained from La Peña a promise to make short marches; to keep the troops fresh for battle; and not to approach the enemy except in a concentrated mass. Nevertheless, the day's march from Casa Vieja, being made through bad roads, with ignorant guides, had occupied fifteen hours, and the night march to Barosa had been still more fatiguing. The troops came up in a straggling manner, and ere they had all arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt of his colleague, without either disclosing his own plans, or communicating by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent the vanguard, reinforced by a squadron and three guns, straight against the mouth of the Santi Petri. Zayas had cast his bridge there on the 2d, and commenced an entrenchment, but, in the following night, being surprised by the French, was driven again into the Isla; hence this movement of the

* Official Abstract of Military Reports. MSS.

* Intercepted Letter of General Werle to Sebastiani, Alhama, March 12.

vanguard was exceedingly dangerous: Lardizabal, however, after a sharp skirmish, in which he lost nearly three hundred men, forced the enemy's posts between the Almanza creek and the sea, and effected a junction with Zayas.

Graham was now extremely desirous of holding the Barosa height in force, as the key both to offensive and defensive movements; and he argued that no general in his senses would lend his flank to an enemy, by attacking the Bermeja while Barosa was thus occupied. Lasey, the chief of the Spanish staff, opposed this reasoning, and La Peña, without ceremony, commanded Graham to march the British troops through the wood to Bermeja. With great temper he obeyed this uncourteous order, leaving the flank companies of the ninth and eighty-second, under major Brown, as a guard for the baggage; he marched, however, in the full persuasion that La Peña would remain with Anglona's division and the cavalry at Barosa, and the more so, as a Spanish detachment was still on the side of Medina. But scarcely had the British entered the wood, when La Peña, without any notice, carried off the corps of battle, directed the cavalry to follow by the sea-road, and repaired himself to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded with baggage, and protected only by a rear-guard of four guns and five battalions.

During these movements, Victor had remained close in the forest of Chiclana, and as the patrols of the allied cavalry reported that they could see no enemy, Graham's march being only of two miles, seemed secure. The French marshal was, however, keenly watching the allies' progress. Having recalled his infantry from Medina Sidonia as soon as La Peña had reached Barosa, he momentarily expected their arrival; and he felt so sure of success, that his cavalry then at Medina and Arcos were directed upon Vejer and other places, to cut off the fugitives after the battle. The duke of Belluno had in hand fourteen pieces of artillery and nine thousand excellent troops, of the divisions of Laval, Ruffin, and Villatte. From these he drew three grenadier battalions as reserves, and attached two of them and three squadrons of cavalry to the division of Ruffin, which formed his left wing; the other he joined to the division of Laval, which formed his centre. Villatte's troops, about two thousand five hundred in number, after retiring from Bermeja, were posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, to cover the works of the camp, and to watch the Spanish forces at Santi Petri and Bermeja.

BATTLE OF BAROSA.

When Victor observed that Graham's corps was in the wood, that a strong body of Spaniards was on the Bermeja, a third body, with all the baggage, at Barosa, and a fourth still in march from Vejer, he took Villatte's division as his pivot, and came with a rapid pace into the plain, and began the battle. Laval was directed against the English, but Victor himself, with Ruffin's brigade, ascending the reverse side of Barosa, cut off the Spanish detachment on the road to Medina, drove the whole of the rear-guard off the height towards the sea, dispersed the baggage and followers of the army in all directions, and took three Spanish guns.

Major Brown seeing the general confusion, and being unable to stem the torrent, slowly retired into the plain, and sending notice of this attack to Graham, demanded orders. That general, being then near Bermeja, answered, that he was to fight; and instantly facing about himself, regained the plain with the greatest celerity, expecting to find La Peña, with the corps of battle and the cavalry, on the height. But when the view opened, he beheld Ruffin's brigade flanked by the chosen battalions, near the top of Barosa at the one side, the Spanish rear-guard and baggage

flying in confusion on the other, the French cavalry between the summit and the sea, and Laval close on his own left flank; but La Peña he could see no where. In this desperate situation, he felt that to retreat upon Bermeja, and thus bring the enemy, pell-mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge, must be disastrous, wherefore, without a moment's hesitation, he resolved to attack, although the key of the field of battle was already in the enemy's possession.

Ten guns, under major Duncan, instantly opened a terrific fire against Laval's column, while colonel Andrew Barnard, with the riflemen and the Portuguese companies running vehemently out on the left, commenced the fight: the remainder of the British troops, without any attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed two masses, one of which under general Dilkes marched hastily against Ruffin, and the other under colonel Wheately against Laval. Duncan's guns ravaged the French ranks, Laval's artillery replied vigorously, Ruffin's batteries took Wheately's column in flank, and the infantry on both sides pressed forward eagerly, and with a pealing musketry. When near together, a fierce, rapid, prolonged charge of the British overthrew the first line of the French, and, notwithstanding its extreme valour, drove it in confusion, over a narrow dip of ground upon the second, which was almost immediately broken in the same manner, and only the chosen battalion, hitherto posted on the right, remained to cover the retreat.

Meanwhile Brown had marched headlong against Ruffin. Nearly half of his detachment went down under the enemy's first fire; yet he maintained the fight until Dilkes' column, which had crossed a deep hollow and never stopped even to reform the regiments, came up, with little order indeed, but in a fierce mood, and then the whole ran up towards the summit; there was no slackness on any side, and at the very edge of the ascent their gallant opponents met them. A dreadful, and for some time a doubtful, fight ensued; but Ruffin and Chaudron Rousseau, commanding the chosen grenadiers, both fell mortally wounded, the English bore strongly onward, and their incessant slaughtering fire forced the French from the hill with the loss of three guns and many brave soldiers.

The discomfited divisions, retiring concentrically, soon met, and with infinite spirit endeavoured to reform and renew the action. The play of Duncan's guns, close, rapid, and murderous, rendered the attempt vain. Victor quitted the field of battle, and the British having been twenty-four hours under arms, without food, were too exhausted to pursue.

While these terrible combats of infantry were fighting, La Peña looked idly on, neither sending his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery, nor any part of his army, to the assistance of his ally; nor yet menacing the right of the enemy, which was close to him and weak. The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some Guerilla cavalry, indeed turned without orders, coming up just as the action ceased; and it was expected that colonel Whittingham, an Englishman commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as much; but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed two hundred and fifty men, and it is evident that the eight hundred under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin's division, have rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain, indeed, was this, that colonel Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off the hundred and eighty German hussars belonging to the English army, reached the field of battle, and charging the French squadrons just as their retreating divisions met, overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted, though vainly, to sabre Rousseau's chosen battalions.

Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only one hour and a half, but most violent and bloody; for fifty officers, sixty sergeants, and above eleven hundred British soldiers, and more than two thousand Frenchmen were killed and wounded; six guns, an eagle, two generals (both mortally wounded,) together with four hundred other prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors.

After the action, Graham remained some hours on the height, still hoping that La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory, which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four thousand men and a powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri, and thus the Spanish general was at the head of twelve thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry, all fresh troops; while before him were only the remains of the French line of battle retreating in the greatest disorder upon Chiclana. But all military feeling was extinct in La Peña, and as Graham could no longer endure such command, the morning of the 6th saw the British filing over the bridge into the Isla.

On the French side, Cassagne's reserve came up from Medina, and a council of war being held in the night of the 5th, Victor, although of a desponding nature, proposed another attack, but the suggestion being ill received, nothing was done. On the 6th, Admiral Keats, landing his seamen and marines, dismantled, with exception of Catalina, every fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and even obtained momentary possession of the latter place. This caused such confusion and alarm in the French camp, that the duke of Belluno, leaving garrisons at the great points of his lines, and a rear guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San Pedro, where he expected to be immediately attacked.* If La Peña had even then pushed to Chiclana, Graham and Keats were willing to make a simultaneous attack upon the Trocadero: yet the 6th and 7th passed, without even a Spanish patrolle following the French. On the 8th Victor returned to Chiclana, whereupon La Peña recrossed the Santi Petri, and destroyed the bridge; and his detachment on the side of Medina being thus cut off from the Isla, was soon afterwards obliged to retire to Algeiras.

All the passages in this extraordinary battle were so broadly marked, that observations would be useless. The contemptible feebleness of La Peña furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic vigour of Graham, whose attack was an inspiration rather than a resolution, so wise, so sudden was the decision, so swift, so conclusive was the execution. The original plan of the enterprise having been however rather rashly censured, some remarks on that head may be useful. "Sebastiani," it is said, "might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have crushed them, and they had no right to calculate upon his inactivity." This is a shallow criticism. Graham, weighing the natural dislike of one general to serve under another, judged, that Sebastiani, harassed by insurrections in Grenada, would not hastily abandon his own district, menaced as it was by insurrection, to succour Victor, before it was clear where the blow was to be struck. The distance from Tarifa to Chiclana was about fifty miles, whereas, from Sebastiani's nearest post to Chiclana was above a hundred, and the real object of the allies could not be known until they had passed the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina. Combining these moral and physical considerations, Graham had reason to expect several days of free action; and thus indeed it happened, and with a worthy colleague he would have raised the blockade: more than that could scarcely have been hoped, as the French forces would have concentrated either before Cadiz or about Seville or Ecija; and they had still fifty thousand men in Andalusia.

Victor's attack on the 5th, was well-judged, well-timed, and vigorous; with a few thousand more troops he, alone, would have crushed the allies. The unconquerable spirit of the English prevented this disaster, but if Graham or his troops had given way, or even hesitated, the whole army must have been driven like sheep into an inclosure; the Almanza creek on one side, the sea on the other, the San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in all the fierceness of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña's misconduct, that the French, although defeated, gained their main point: the blockade was renewed, and it is remarkable that, during the action, a French detachment passed near the bridge of Zuazo without difficulty, and brought back prisoners; thus proving that with a few more troops Victor might have seized the Isla. Meanwhile Ballasteros, who had gone against Seville, was chased, in a miserable condition, to the Aroche hills, by Daricau.

In Cadiz violent disputes arose. La Peña, in an address to the Cortes, claimed the victory for himself. He affirmed that all the previous arrangements were made with the knowledge and approbation of the English general, and the latter's retreat into the Isla he indicated as the real cause of failure: Lasey and general Cruz-Murgeon also published inaccurate accounts of the action, and even had deceptive plans engraved to uphold their statements. Graham, stung by these unworthy proceedings, exposed the conduct of La Peña in a letter to the British envoy; refused with disdain the title of grandee of the first class voted to him by the Cortes; and when Lasey used some expressions relative to the action personally offensive, he enforced an apology with his sword. But having thus shewn himself superior to his opponents at all points, the gallant old man soon afterwards relinquished his command to general Cooke, and joined lord Wellington's army.

CHAPTER III.

Siege of Badajoz continued—Inas surrenders—His cowardice and treachery—Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara taken by the French—Soult returns to Andalusia—Relative state of the armies at Santarem—Retreat of the French—Massena's able movement—Skirmish at Pombal—Combat of Redinha—Massena halts at Condeixa—Montbrun endea-vours to seize Coimbra—Baffled by colonel Trant—Condeixa burnt by the French—Combat of Casal Nova—General Cole turns the French flank at Panella—Combat of Foz d'Aronce—Massena retires behind the Alva.

WHILE discord prevailed at Cadiz, nearly the whole of Andalusia was disturbed by insurrections of the peasantry, nevertheless, such was Soult's resolution, the siege of Badajoz continued. Early in March, the second parallel being completed and the Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches were carried by sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the counterscarp. However Rafael Menacho, the governor, was in no manner dismayed; his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he had begun to retrench in the streets behind the part attacked, the fire of the besiegers was inferior to that of the besieged, and every thing seemed to promise favourably, when on the evening of the 2d, during a sally, in which the nearest French batteries were carried, the guns spiked, and trenches partly ruined, Menacho was killed, and the command fell to Inas, a man so unworthy that a worse could not any where be found. The spirit of the garrison then died away, the besiegers' works advanced rapidly, the ditch was passed, a lodgement was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the fire of the besieged being nearly extinguished,

* Official Abstracts of Military Reports. MSS.

on the 10th of March the place was summoned in a peremptory manner.

At this time the great crisis of the campaign having passed, a strong body of British and Portuguese troops were ready to raise the siege of Badajos. In three different ways, by telegraph, by a letter, and by a confidential messenger, the governor was informed, that Massena was in full retreat and that the relieving army was actually in march. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were plentiful, the garrison above eight thousand strong, the French army reduced, by sickness, by detachments and the previous operations, to less than fourteen thousand men.* Imas read the letter, and instantly surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus obtained to the enemy. He also demanded that his grenadiers should march out of the breach; it was granted, and he was obliged to enlarge the opening himself ere they could do so! Yet this man so covered with opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty while consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, and his own character to infamy, was never punished by the Spanish rulers: lord Wellington's indignant remonstrances forced them, indeed, to bring him to trial, but they made the process last during the whole war.

When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour Maubourg seizing Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, made six hundred prisoners, but Soult alarmed by the effects of the battle of Barosa, returned to Andalusia. He had, in fifty days, mastered four fortresses and invested a fifth; he had killed or dispersed ten thousand men, and taken twenty thousand with a force which, at no time, exceeded the number of his prisoners. Yet great and daring and successful as his operations had been, the principal object of his expedition was frustrated, for Massena was in retreat! lord Wellington's combinations had palsied the hand of the conqueror!

While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no change took place in the main positions of either army at Santarem. The French general had been encouraged to maintain his ground by the state of the Portuguese army, which he hoped would break up the alliance; for such had been the conduct of the Regency, that the native troops were starving in their own country, while the British were well fed, and the deserters from the former, without knowing the cause, had a story, as true as it was pitiable, to tell of their miseries. The English general, certain that the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, must soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, only waited for his reinforcements to send Beresford with fourteen thousand men against Soult; but the battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements could not then enable him to detach a sufficient number of men to relieve Badajos, and it was no longer a question of starving Massena, but of beating him before Soult could take Badajos and the two armies be joined. Wherefore he resolved to post ten thousand men before the hill of Santarem to hold Reynier in check; to make Beresford cross the Tagus at Abrantes, and fall on Massena's rear; and meanwhile moving himself with the rest of the army by Rio Mayor and Tremes, to force back the French centre and right, and cutting off their left, to drive it into the Tagus. But nothing could be attempted until the troops from England arrived, and day after day passed in vain expectation of their coming. Being embarked in January, they would have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, if sir Joseph Yorke, the admiral, had taken advantage of a favourable wind, which blew when the troops were first put on board; he however neglected this opportunity, contrary gales

followed, and the ordinary voyage of ten days was prolonged for six weeks.

On the other hand, the French general's situation was becoming very perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and although that fortress was an important strategic point for the allies who had a moveable bridge, it would not have been so for the French. Massena could only choose then, to force the passage of the Tagus alone, or to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For some time he seemed inclined to the first, shewing great jealousy of the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left: yet that general relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his lines of observation, and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was before Badajos, but nothing more. However, time wore away, sickness wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance, and the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain was by no means relinquished.

Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena's obstinacy gave way; he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than would serve his army for the march. A tardy resolution, yet adopted at the moment, when to maintain his position was more important than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says, that the latter marshal, by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena's failure. This can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of the Gebora, Mendizabal could have assembled twenty thousand men on Soult's rear, and there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul and the Elga; Beresford had fourteen thousand British and Portuguese regulars, besides ordnance; and the infinite number of boats at lord Wellington's command would have enabled him to throw troops upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity that would have baffled any effort of Massena to assist the duke of Dalmatia. Now, if the latter had been defeated, with what argument could he have defended his reputation as a general, after having left three or four garrisoned fortresses and thirty-five thousand men upon his flank and rear; to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of Barosa. The true cause of Massena's failure was the insufficiency of his means to oppose the English general's combinations. The French army reduced by sickness to forty thousand fighting men, exclusive of Drouet's troops at Leiria, would have been unable to maintain its extended position against the attack meditated by lord Wellington; and when Massena, through the means of the fidalgos, knew that the English reinforcements were come, he prepared to retreat. Those troops landed the 2d of March, and, the 6th, the French had evacuated the position of Santarem.

At this time Napoleon directed the armies of Spain to be remodelled.* The king's force was diminished, the army of the south increased; general Drouet was ordered to march with eleven thousand men to the fifth corps, which he was appointed to command, in place of Mortier; the remainder of the ninth corps was to compose two divisions, under the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be incorporated with the army of Portugal. Marmont was appointed to relieve Ney in the command of the sixth corps; Loison was removed to the second corps; Bessieres was ordered to post six thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, to watch the fron-

* Lord Wellington's Despatch.

* Muster-Rolls of the French Army.

tiers of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the imperial guards; seven thousand were to assemble at Zamora, to hold the Gallicians in check, and the remainder at Valladolid, with strong parties of cavalry in the space between those places, that intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might be daily received. Thus Massena was enabled to adopt any operation that might seem good to him, without reference to his original base; but the order for the execution of these measures did not reach the armies until a later period.

RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM SANTAREM.

Several lines of operation were open to the prince of Esling. 1. He could pass the Tagus, between Punhete and Abrantes, by boats, or by fords which were often practicable after a week of dry weather. 2. He could retire, by the Sobreira Formosa, upon Castello Branco, and open a communication with the king by Placentia, and with the duke of Dalmatia by Alcantara. 3. He could march, by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances. 4. He could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that river towards Guarda and Almeida; or, crossing it, march upon Oporto through an untouched country. Of these four plans, the first was perilous, and the weather too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The second and third were difficult, from the ruggedness of the Sobreira, and exposed, because the allies could break out by Abrantes upon the flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided on the last, although his actual position being to the left of the line of retreat, he was necessarily forced to make a flank movement, with more than ten thousand sick men and all his stores, under the beard of an adversary, before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he executed, and in a manner befitting a great commander.

Commencing his preparations by destroying munition, and all guns that could not be horsed, he passed his sick and baggage, by degrees, upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting-men in the front, and at the same time indicating an intention of passing the Zézere. But when the impediments of the army had gained two marches, Ney suddenly assembled the sixth corps and the cavalry on the Lys, near Leiria, as if with the intention of advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement that necessarily kept lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile, the second and eighth corps, quitting Santarem, Tremes and Alcanhete, in the night of the 5th, fell back by Pernes, upon Torres Novas and Thomar, destroying the bridges on the Alviella behind them. The next morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison retreated by the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat, while the remainder of the army, by rapid concentric marches, made for a position in front of Pombal. The line of movement to the Mondego was thus secured, and four days gained; for lord Wellington, although aware that a retreat was in progress of execution, was quite unable to take any decided step, lest he should open the Lines to his adversary. Nevertheless he had caused Beresford to close to his right on the 5th, and at daylight, on the 6th, discovering the empty camps of Santarem, followed the enemy closely with his own army.

Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; but as their boats were still maintained at Punhete, general William Stewart crossed the Tagus, at Abrantes, with the greatest part of Beresford's corps, while the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, marched to Golegao; the light division also reached Pernes, where the bridge was rapidly repaired by captain Tod, of the royal staff-corps. The 7th, as the enemy had burnt his boats on the Zézere, the Abrantes bridge was brought down to that river, and Stewart, crossing, moved to Thomar,

on which place the divisions at Golegao were likewise directed. But the retreat being now decidedly pronounced for the Mondego, the troops at Thomar were ordered to halt, while the light division, German hussars, and royal dragoons followed the eighth corps, and took two hundred prisoners.

This day's march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk; and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first, all the children were dead. None were emaciated, but the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving an appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life, the women appeared patient and resigned; and, even in this distress, had covered and arranged the bodies of those who first died, with decency and care.

While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, the third and fifth divisions moved from the Lines, upon Leiria, the Abrantes' boats fell down the river to Tancos, where a bridge was fixed, and the second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were then directed to return from Thomar to the left bank of the Tagus, to relieve Badajos. Beresford, who had remained with a part of his corps near Barca, likewise sent a brigade of cavalry to Portaiegre for that purpose.

Lord Wellington, misled partly by a letter of general Trant's, partly by information obtained in Santarem, and partly by Massena's feigned movement, at first thought the retreat would be by the Puente de Murcella; but on the 8th he was convinced it was directed towards Coimbra, and on the 9th, the enemy, instead of continuing his retreat, concentrated the sixth and eighth corps and Montbrun's cavalry on a tableland, in front of Pombal, where the light division skirmished with his advanced posts, and the German horse charged his cavalry with success, taking some prisoners. Here, finding the French disposed to accept battle, the English general was compelled to alter his plans. To fight with advantage, it was necessary to bring up, from Thomar, the troops destined to relieve Badajos. Not to fight, was to give up to the enemy Coimbra, and the untouched country behind, as far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire with the advantages of a conqueror. In this state of affairs, intelligence received from Badajos, described that place as being in a sufficient state to hold out for a month. This decided the question.

The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already on the march for the Alentejo, were countermanded; general Nightingale, with a brigade of the first division and some horse, was directed by the road of Espinal, to observe the second corps; and the rest of the army was concentrically directed upon Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena could be, was here proved. His first movement began the 4th, it was the 11th before a sufficient number of troops could be assembled to fight him at Pombal, and, during these seven days, he had executed one of the most difficult operations in war, gained three or four marches, and completely organized his system of retreat. Had any rain fallen on the first day, the allies could not have followed him with artillery, such was the state of the roads, and he having before sent off or destroyed all his guns except a few light pieces would thus have had another great advantage.

SKIRMISH AT POMBAL.

Pack's brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, and the Portu-

guese troops, which were attached, like the Latin auxiliaries of the Roman legion, to each British division, were assembling in front of the enemy on the 10th; when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure river in the night by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through that town. He was closely followed by the light division, the streets were still encumbered, and Ney drawing up a rear-guard on a height behind the town, threw a detachment into the old castle of Pombal. He had, however, waited too long. The French army was moving in some confusion and in a very extended column of march, by a narrow defile, between the mountains and the Soure river, which was fordable, and the British divisions were in rapid motion along the left bank, with the design of crossing lower down, and cutting Massena's line of retreat. The fall of night prevented this operation, but a sharp skirmish took place at Pombal, where the ninety-fifth and the third caçadores of the light division, after some changes of fortune, drove the French from the castle and town with such vigour, that they could not destroy the bridge, although it was mined. About forty of the allies were hurt, and the loss of the enemy was somewhat greater.

In the night Massena continued his retreat, which now assumed a regular and concentrated form. The baggage and sick, protected by the reserve cavalry, marched first; they were followed by the eighth corps, while the sixth, with some light cavalry, and the best horsed of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been ordered to detach Marcognet's brigade on the 10th, from the Lys, to seize Coimbra; but some delay having taken place, Montbrun was now appointed for that service, which was very important; for lord Wellington's immediate object was to save Coimbra, and he designed, by skilful, rather than daring, operations, to oblige Massena to quit the Portuguese territory. The moral effect of such an event, he judged, would be sufficient for the general cause; but as his reinforcements were still distant, he was obliged to keep the fourth division and the heavy cavalry from the relief of Badajos, and was therefore willing to strike a sudden stroke also, if a fair occasion offered. Howbeit the country was full of strong positions, the roads hollow and confined by mountains on either hand; every village a defile; the weather was moderate, and favourable to the enemy, and Ney, with a wonderfully happy mixture of courage, readiness, and skill, illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war.

Day-break, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles of march, and some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the British into a hollow way, leading to a high table-land on which Ney had disposed five thousand infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and some light guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings were covered by wooded heights, which he occupied with light troops; his right rested on the ravine of the Soure; his left on the Redinha, which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and a long and dangerous defile; and, beyond the stream, some very rugged heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village, were occupied by a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of heavy guns, all so skilfully disposed as to give the appearance of a very considerable force.

COMBAT OF REDINHA.

After examining the enemy's position for a short time, lord Wellington directed the light division, now commanded by sir William Erskine, to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney's right, and in less than an hour these orders were executed. The fifty-second,

the ninety-fifth, and the caçadores, assisted by a company of the forty-third, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain; but the French battalions, supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy rolling fire, and at the same moment, colonel Ferriere, of the third French hussars, charged and took fourteen prisoners. This officer, during the whole campaign, never failed to break in upon the skirmishers in the most critical moments, sometimes with a squadron, sometimes with only a few men; he was always sure to be found in the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done, even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry.

Erskine's line, consisting of five battalions of infantry and six guns, being formed in such a manner that it outflanked the French right, tending towards the ford of the Redinha, was now reinforced with two regiments of dragoons, and meanwhile Picton seized the wooded heights protecting the French left. Thus Ney's position was laid bare. Nevertheless, that marshal observing that lord Wellington, deceived as to his real numbers was bringing the mass of the allied troops into line, far from retreating, even charged Picton's skirmishers, and continued to hold his ground with an astonishing confidence if we consider his position; for the third division was nearer to the village and bridge than his right, and there were already cavalry and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both sides remained for about an hour, when three shots were fired from the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and suddenly a most splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with troops, and in a few moments thirty thousand men, forming three gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain, bending on a gentle curve, and moving majestically onwards, while horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the French battalions: the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen!

Ney keenly watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed Picton's foremost skirmishers with his left, and, at the same moment, withdrew the rest of his people with such rapidity, that he gained the village ere the cavalry could touch him: the utmost efforts of Picton's skirmishers and of the horse-artillery scarcely enabled them to gall the hindmost of the French with their fire. One howitzer was, indeed, dismounted close to the bridge, but the village of Redinha was in flames behind it, and the marshal wishing to confirm the courage of his soldiers at the commencement of the retreat, in person superintended the carrying it off, which he effected; yet with the loss of fifteen or twenty men, and with great danger to himself, for the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops of the third division, chasing like heated blood hounds, passed the river almost at the same time with the French. The reserves of the latter then cannonaded the bridge from the heights beyond, but a fresh disposition of attack being made by lord Wellington, while the third division continued to press the left, Ney fell back upon the main body which was at Condeixa, ten miles in the rear.

The British had twelve officers and two hundred men killed and wounded in this combat, and the enemy lost as many; but he might have been utterly destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the duke of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour too long upon his first position, and that, deceived by the skilful arrangement of his reserve, lord Wellington paid him too much respect. Nevertheless the extraordinary facility and precision with which the English general handled so large a force, was a warning to the French commander,

and produced a palpable effect upon the after operations.

On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, and before ten o'clock discovered the French army, the second corps, which was at Espinhal, excepted, in order of battle. The crisis of Massena's retreat had arrived, the defiles of Condeixa, leading upon Coimbra, were behind him; those of Miranda de Corvo, leading to the Puente de Murcella, were on his left; and in the fork of these two roads Ney was seated on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, his position being only to be approached by the highway leading through a deep hollow against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct the passage, a palisado was constructed across the hollow, and breast-works were thrown up on each side. Massena here intended to stop the pursuit, while Montbrun seized Coimbra. His design was to pass the Mondego, and either capture Oporto or maintain a position between the Douro and the Mondego, until the operations of Soult should draw the British away, or until the advance of Bessieres with the army of the north, should enable himself again to act offensively.

Hitherto the French general had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary assumed the superiority. When at Thomar, lord Wellington, in expectation that Massena would cross the Mondego, had directed Baccellar to look to the security of Oporto, intending himself to follow the French with the utmost rapidity. He had also ordered Trant and Wilson to abandon the Mondego and Vouga rivers, the moment the fords should become passable and retire across the Douro. They were also to break up the roads as they retreated, to remove all boats and means of transport, and to defend that river to extremity, that the army might have time to close upon the enemy's rear.

Wilson had been in observation of the Ponte Murcella road, but hearing that the enemy were menacing an attack on Coimbra, he crossed the Mondego at Pena Cova, and thus, passing between the French parties, effected a junction with Trant. Then in pursuance of the orders above mentioned, both fell back, Wilson upon Busaco, and Trant towards the Vouga. But the latter who had destroyed an arch of the bridge at Coimbra, and placed guards at the fords as far down as Figueras, soon returned with a part of his force, for the sound of guns had reached his outposts, the river was rising, and he felt assured that the allied army was close upon the heels of the enemy.

As early as the evening of the 11th, the French appeared at the suburb of Santa Clara, and a small party of their dragoons actually forded the Mondego at Peireiras that day. On the 12th, some French officers examined the bridge of Coimbra, but a cannon-shot from the other side wounded one of them, and a general skirmish took place along the banks of the river, during which a party attempting to feel their way along the bridge, were scattered by a round of grape. The fords were, however, actually practicable for cavalry, and there were not more than two or three hundred militia and a few guns at the bridge, for Baccellar had obliged Trant again to withdraw the greatest part of his force on the 11th; nevertheless the latter opposed the enemy with the remainder, and it would appear that the French imagined the reinforcement, which reached Lisbon the 2d of March, had been sent by sea to the Mondego and was in Coimbra. This was an error. Coimbra was saved by the same man and the same militia that had captured it during the advance.*

Montbrun sent his report to Massena early on the 13th, and the latter too readily crediting his opinion of Trant's strength, relinquished the idea of passing the Mondego, and determined to retire by the Puente de

Murcella. To ensure the power of changing his front, and to secure his communication with Reynier and Loison, he had carried Clause's division to Fonte Coberta, a village about five miles on his left, situated at the point where the Anciao road falls into that leading to Murcella. There Loison re-joined him, and being thus pivoted on the Anciao Sierra, and covering the line of communication with the second corps, while Ney held Condeixa, he considered his position secure. The baggage was, however, observed filing off by the Murcella road when the allies first came upon Ney, and lord Wellington instantly comprehending the state of affairs, as instantly detached the third division by a very difficult path over the Sierra de Anciao to turn the enemy's left.

For some time all appeared quiet in the French lines. Massena, in repairing to Fonte Coberta, had left Ney orders, it is said, to set fire to Condeixa at a certain hour, when all the divisions were simultaneously to concentrate at Casal Nova, in a second position, perpendicular to the first, and covering the road to Puente Murcella. Towards three o'clock, however, Picton was descried winding round the bluff end of a mountain, about eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the French left, instant confusion pervaded their camp; a thick smoke arose from Condeixa, the columns were seen hurrying towards Casal Nova, and the British immediately pushed forward. The felled trees and other obstacles impeded their advance at first, and a number of fires, simultaneously kindled, covered the retreating troops with smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery; hence the skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with the rear of the enemy, but so rapidly, as to penetrate between the division at Fonte Coberta and the rest of the French, and it is affirmed that the prince of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture by taking the feathers out of his hat and riding through some of the light troops.

Condeixa being thus evacuated, the British cavalry pushed towards Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, and cutting off Montbrun, took some of his horsemen. The rest of the army kindled their fires, and the light division planted piquets close up to the enemy, but the night was dark, and about ten o'clock, the French divisions, whose presence at Fonte Coberta was unknown to lord Wellington, stole out, and passing close along the front of the British posts, made for Miranda de Corvo. The noise of their march being heard, was imagined to be the moving of the French baggage to the rear, and was so reported to sir William Erskine, whereupon that officer, concluding that their army was in full retreat, without any further inquiry, put the light division in march at daylight on the 14th.

COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA.

The morning was so obscured that nothing could be descried at the distance of a hundred feet, but the sound of a great multitude was heard on the hills in front, and it being evident that the French were there in force, many officers represented the rashness of thus advancing without orders and in such a fog; nevertheless Erskine, with an astounding negligence, sent the fifty-second forward in a simple column of sections, without a vanguard or other precaution, and even before the piquets had come in from their posts. As the road dipped suddenly, descending into a valley, the regiment was immediately lost in the mist, which was so thick, that the troops, unconsciously passing the enemy's out-posts, had like to have captured Ney himself, whose bivouac was close to the piquets. The riflemen followed in a few moments, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into the same gulf, when the rattling of musketry and the booming of round shot were

* Campagne des Français en Portugal.

heard, and the vapour slowly rising, discovered the fifty-second on the slopes of the opposite mountain, engaged, without support, in the midst of the enemy's army.

At this moment lord Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn the left of the French, for their front position was very strong; and behind it they occupied the mountain ridges, in succession, to the Deuca river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was, however, a road leading from Condeixa to Espinhal, and the fourth division was already in march by it for Panella, having orders, to communicate with Nightingale, to attack Reynier, and to gain the sources of the Deuca and Ceira rivers. Between the fourth division and Casal Nova the third division was more directly turning the enemy's left flank; and meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, but as it marched in one column, it required time to reach the field. Howbeit Erskine's error forced on this action, and the whole of the light division were pushed forward to succour the fifty-second.

The enemy's ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thick and so easily supported, that, in a little time, the division was necessarily stretched out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in every part, without any reserve; nor could it even thus present an equal front, until Picton sent the riflemen, of the sixtieth, to prolong the line. Nevertheless, the fight was vigorously maintained amidst the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain side, some advantages were even gained, and the right of the enemy was partially turned; yet the main position could not be shaken, until Picton near, and Cole further off, had turned it by the left. Then, the first, fifth, and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry, and the artillery, came up on the centre, and Ney commenced his retreat, covering his rear with guns and light troops, and retiring from ridge to ridge with admirable precision, and, for a long time, without confusion and with very little loss. Towards the middle of the day, however, the British guns and the skirmishers got within range of his masses, and the retreat became more rapid and less orderly; yet he finally gained the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been secured by the main body of the French. Here Montbrun rejoined the army. He had summoned Coimbra on the 13th at noon, and, without waiting for an answer, passed over the mountain and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a very difficult march.

The loss of the light division this day was eleven officers and a hundred and fifty men; that of the enemy was greater, and about a hundred prisoners were taken.

During the action of the 14th, Reynier, seeing the approach of the fourth division, hastily abandoned Panella, whereupon Cole having effected a junction with Nightingale, passed the Deuca, and Massena fearing lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town of Miranda, and passed the Ceira that night. His whole army was now compressed and crowded in one narrow line, between the higher sierras and the Mondego, and to lighten the march, he destroyed a greater quantity of ammunition and baggage. His encumbrances were, however, still so heavy, and the confusion in his army so great, that he directed Ney to cover the passage with a few battalions, charging him not to risk an action; but Ney, little regarding his orders, kept, on the left bank, ten or twelve battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and some guns, which produced the

COMBAT OF FOZ D'ARONCE.

The French right rested on some wooded and rugged ground, and their left upon the village of Foz d'Aronce, and the 15th, the weather was so obscure that the allies could not reach the Ceira, before four o'clock in the evening; wherefore the troops, as they came up, proceeded to kindle fires for the night, thinking that

as Ney's position was strong, nothing would be done. But lord Wellington, having cast a rapid glance over it, directed the light division, and Pack's brigade, to hold the right in play, ordered the third division against the left, and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney's left wing being surprised and overthrown by the first charge of the third division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such confusion towards the river, that some, missing the fords, rushed into the deeps and were drowned, and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to death. On the right the ground was so rugged and close that the action resolved itself into a skirmish, and thus Ney was enabled to use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile darkness came on and the French troops in their disorder fired on each other. Only four officers and sixty men fell on the side of the British. The enemy's loss was not less than five hundred, of which one-half were drowned, and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed of the river when the waters subsided. In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; yet Ney, notwithstanding this disastrous combat, maintained the left bank of the Ceira, until every encumbrance had passed, and then blowing up seventy feet of the bridge, sent his corps on, remaining himself, with a weak rear-guard, on the right bank.

Thus terminated the first part of the retreat from Santarem, during which the French commander, if we except his errors with regard to Coimbra, displayed infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit. I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of those towns covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must be attributed to the disorder, which usually attends a forced retreat: but the town of Leiria, and the convent of Alcobaca, were given to the flames by express orders from the French head-quarters;* and, although the laws of war rigorously interpreted, authorize such examples when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly done, for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every horror that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress, conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited violence, unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog, to devour the dead and dying, and the spirit of cruelty once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th the French general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, had ordered a number of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; the inhuman fellow, charged with the execution, hamstringed five hundred asses and left them to starve, and thus they were found by the British army on that day. The mute but deep expression of pain and grief, visible in these poor creatures' looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers, and so little weight has reason with the multitude, when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any prisoner at that moment. A humane feeling would thus have led to direct cruelty. This shows how dangerous it is in war to listen to the passions at all, since the most praiseworthy could be thus perverted by an accidental combination of circumstances.

The French have, however, been accused of many crimes, which they did not and could not commit: such as the driving of all women above ten years of age into their camp at Redinha, near which there were neither men nor women to be driven.† The country was a desert! They have also been charged by the

* Lord Wellington's Despatches.

† Southey, Peninsular War, Vol. III.

same writer with the mutilating John the First's body in the convent of Batalha, during Massena's retreat; but the body of that monarch had been wantonly pulled to pieces, and carried off by British officers, during the retreat of the allies!

CHAPTER IV.

Allies halt for provisions—State of the campaign—Passage of the Ceira—Passage of the Alva—Massena retires to Celerico—Resolves to march upon Coria—Is prevented by Ney, who is deprived of his command and sent to France—Massena abandons Celerico and takes post at Guarda—The allies oblige the French to quit that position, and Massena takes a new one behind the Coa—Combat of Sabugal—Trant crosses the Coa and cuts the communication between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo—His danger—He is released by the British cavalry and artillery—Massena abandons Portugal.

ON the 16th the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was swollen and unfordable, partly from the extreme exhaustion of the troops who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy. The latter, following his custom, carried fifteen days' bread; the allies depended upon a commissariat, which broke down under the difficulties, not from any deficiency in Mr. Kennedy, the chief of the department, who was distinguished alike for zeal, probity, and talent; but from the ill conduct of the Portuguese government, who, deaf to the repeated representations of lord Wellington and Beresford, would neither feed the Portuguese troops regularly while at Santarem, nor fill their magazines, nor collect the means of transport for the march. Hence, after passing Pombal, the greater part of the native force had been unable to continue the pursuit, and the brigades under general Pack and colonel Ashworth, which did keep up and engaged daily with the enemy, were actually four days without food of any sort. Numbers died of inanition on the roads, and to save the whole from destruction, the British supplies were shared with them. The commissary-general's means were thus overlaid, the whole army suffered, and necessity obliged lord Wellington to halt. Nevertheless he had saved Coimbra, forced the enemy into a narrow, intricate, and ravaged country, and, with an inferior force, turned him out of every strong position; and this, by a series of movements, based on the soundest principles of war. Noting the skill and tenacity with which Massena and Ney clung to every league of ground and every ridge defensible against superior numbers, he had seized the higher slopes of the mountains by Picton's flank march on the 13th, and again by Cole's on the 14th; and thus, continually menacing the passes in rear of the French, obliged them to abandon positions which could scarcely have been forced. This method of turning the strength of the country to profit is the true key to mountain warfare; he who receives battle in the hills has always the advantage, and he who first seizes the important points chooses his own field of battle.

In saying an inferior force, I advert to the state of the Portuguese army and to Badajos; for when lord Wellington had saved Coimbra, and seen that the French would not accept a general battle, except on very advantageous terms, he detached a brigade of cavalry, some guns, and a division of native infantry, from Condeixa, to the Alemtejo. And again in the night of the 13th, having received intelligence that Badajos had surrendered, and feeling all the importance of this event, he had detached the fourth division to the Alemtejo, for he designed that Beresford should immediately retake the lost fortress. Thus lord Wellington had less than twenty-five thousand men in hand during the subsequent operations, but, as the road

of Espinhal was the shortest line to the Tagus, general Cole, as we have seen, moved into it by Panella, thus threatening Massena's flank and rear at the same moment that he gained a march towards his ultimate destination. Meanwhile, Trant and Wilson, with the militia, moving up the right bank of the Mondego, parallel to the enemy's line of retreat, forbade his foragers to pass that river, and were at hand either to interfere between him and Oporto, or to act against his flank and rear.

Such were the dispositions of the English general; but the military horizon was still clouded. Intelligence came from the north that Bessieres, after providing for his government, had been able to draw together, at Zamora, about seven thousand men, and menaced an invasion of Galicia, and, although Mahi had an army of sixteen thousand men, lord Wellington anticipated no resistance. In the south, affairs were even more gloomy. The battle of Barosa, the disputes which followed, and the conduct of Imas and Mendizabal, proved that, from Spain, no useful co-operation was ever to be expected. Mortier, also, had invested Campo Mayor, and it was hardly expected to hold out until Beresford arrived. The Spaniards, to whom it had been delivered, under an engagement of honour, entered into by Romana, to keep it against the enemy, had disloyally neglected and abandoned it at the very moment when Badajos fell, hence two hundred Portuguese militia, thrown in at the moment, had to defend this fortress, which required a garrison of five thousand regulars. Nor was the enemy, immediately in the British front, the last to be considered.

Ney withdrew from the Ceira in the evening of the 16th, and on the 17th the light division forded that river with great difficulty, while the rest of the army passed over a trestle bridge, made in the night by the staff-corps. The French were, however, again in position immediately behind the Alva, and on the Sierra de Moita, and they had destroyed the Ponte Murecella and the bridge near Pombeira; the second corps had moved towards the upper part of the river, and Massena had spread his foraging parties to a considerable distance, designing to halt for several days. He was disturbed sooner than he expected; for the 1st, 3d, and 5th British divisions being directed on the 18th by the Sierra de Guiteria, made way over that rugged mountain with a wonderful perseverance and strength, and thus menaced the French left, while the 6th and the light divisions cannonaded their right on the Lower Alva.

As the upper course of the river, now threatened by lord Wellington's right, was parallel to the French line of retreat, Massena recalled the second corps, and, quitting the Lower Alva also, concentrated on the Sierra de Moita, lest the divisions, moving up the river, should cross, and fall on his troops while separated and in march. It then behoved the allies to concentrate also, lest the heads of their columns should be crushed by the enemy's masses. The Alva was deep, wide, and rapid, yet the staff-corps succeeded in forming a most ingenious raft-bridge, and the light division immediately passed between Ponte Murecella and Pombeira, and at the same time the right wing of the army entered Arganil, while Trant and Wilson closed on the other side of the Mondego. Massena then recommenced his retreat with great rapidity, and being desirous to gain Celerico and the defiles leading upon Guarda betimes, again destroyed baggage and ammunition, and abandoned even his more distant foraging-parties, who were thus intercepted and taken, to the number of eight hundred, in returning to the Alva; for lord Wellington, seeing the success of his combinations, had immediately directed all his columns upon Moita, and the whole army was assembled there on the 19th. The pursuit was renewed the 20th, through

Penhancos, but only with the light division and the cavalry; the communication was, however, again opened with Wilson and Trant who had reached the bridge of Fornos, and with Silveira, who was about Trancoso. The third and sixth divisions followed in reserve, but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, until provisions, sent by sea from Lisbon to the Mondego, could come up to them. The French having reached Celerico the 21st, with two corps and the cavalry, immediately opened the communication with Almeida, by posting detachments of horse on the Pinhel; and at the same time Reynier, who had retired through Govea, occupied Guarda with the second corps.

Massena had now regained his original base of operations, and his retreat may be said to have terminated; yet he was far from wishing to re-enter Spain, where he could only appear as a baffled general, and shorn of half his authority, because Bessieres commanded the northern provinces, which, at the commencement of the invasion, had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold on to Portugal, and that his previous retreat might appear only a change of position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other incumbances into Almeida, then, passing the Estrella at Guarda, to make a countermarch, through Sabugal and Pena Macor, to the Elga, and so establish a communication across the Tagus with Soult, and by the valley of the Tagus with the king.

But now the factions in his army had risen to such a height that he could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants; Montbrun, Junot, Drouet, Reynier, and Ney were all at variance with each other and with him. The first had, in the beginning of the retreat, been requested to secure Coimbra, instead of which he quitted Portugal, carrying with him Claparede's division. Marcognet's brigade was then ordered for that operation, but it did not move, and finally, Montbrun undertook it, and failed as we have seen in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by his wound, but his faction did not the less shew their discontent. Reynier's dislike to the prince was so strong, that the officers carrying flags of truce, from his corps, never failed to speak of it to the British, and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied Massena's authority. To Ney the dangerous delay at Pombal, the tardiness of Marcognet's brigade, and, finally, the too sudden evacuation of the position at Condeixa, have been attributed: and it is alleged by his censurers that, far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the signal for a preconcerted retreat, he had promised Massena to maintain the position for twenty-four hours longer.* The personal risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position, would seem to confirm this; but it is certain that, when Picton was observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the French, and by which the second corps could have been separated from the army, and the passes of Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have been frantic to have delayed his movement.

At Miranda, the long gathering anger broke out in a violent altercation between the prince and the marshal, and at Celerico, Ney, wishing to fall back on Almeida, to shorten the term of the retreat, absolutely refused to concur in the projected march to Coria, and even moved his troops in a contrary direction. Massena, a man not to be opposed with impunity, then deprived him of his command, and gave the sixth corps to Loison. Each marshal sent confidential officers to Paris to justify their conduct to the emperor, and from both of those officers I have derived information, but as each thinks that the conduct of his general was approved

by Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon many points; I have, therefore, set down in the narrative the leading sentiments of each, without drawing any other conclusions than those deducible from the acknowledged principles of art and from unquestioned facts. Thus judging, it appears that Massena's general views were as superior to Ney's as the latter's readiness and genius in the handling of troops in action were superior to the prince's. Yet the duke of Elchingen often played too near the flame, whereas nothing could be grander than the conceptions of Massena: nor was the project now meditated by him the least important.

From Guarda to Zarza Mayor and Coria was only two days march longer than to Ciudad Rodrigo, but the army of Portugal must have gone to the latter place a beaten army, seeking for refuge and succour in its fortresses and reserves, and being separated from the central line of invasion: whereas, by gaining Coria, a great movement of war, wiping out the notion of a forced retreat, would have been accomplished. A close and concentric direction would thus have been given to the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal; and then a powerful demonstration against Lisbon would inevitably have brought lord Wellington back to the Tagus. Thus the conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajos, and Olivenza, would have been preserved, and meanwhile the army of the north could have protected Castile and menaced the frontier of Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered this plan, gave orders, on the 23d, for the execution, but Ney, as we have seen, thwarted him. Meanwhile the English horse and the militia, hovering round Celerico, made in different skirmishes a hundred prisoners and killed as many more, and the French cavalry posts withdrew from the Pinhel. The sixth corps then took a position at Guarda; the second corps at Belmonte; the eighth corps and the cavalry in the eastern valleys of the Estrella.

Ney's insubordination had rendered null the plan of marching upon the Elga; but Massena expected still to maintain himself at Guarda with the aid of the army of the south, and to hold open the communications with the king and with Soult. His foragers had gathered provisions in the western valleys of the Estrella, and he calculated upon being able to keep his position for eight days with his own force alone. And independent of the general advantage, it was essential to hold Guarda for some time, because Drouet had permitted Julian Sanchez to cut off a large convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and had left Almeida with only ten days' provisions. Lord Wellington's ready boldness, however, disarranged all the prince's calculations.

The troops had come up from Moita on the 28th, and with them the reinforcements, which were organized as a seventh division. The light division and the cavalry then passed the Mondego at Celerico, and driving the French out of Frexadas, occupied the villages beyond that place: at the same time, the militia took post on the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with Almeida, while the third division was established at Poreia de Misarella, half way up the mountain, to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. Early on 29th the third, sixth, and light divisions, and two regiments of light cavalry, disposed in five columns of attack on a half circle round the foot of the Guarda mountain, ascended by as many paths, all leading upon the town of Guarda, and outflanking both the right and left of the enemy. They were supported on one wing by the militia, on the other by the fifth division, and in the centre by the first and seventh divisions. A battle was expected, but the absence of Ney was at once felt by both armies; the appearance of the allied

* General Pelet's Notes. See Vol. xxi. *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*.

columns for the first time threw the French into the greatest confusion, and, without firing a shot, this great and nearly impregnable position was abandoned. Had the pursuit been as vigorous as the attack, it is not easy to see how the second corps could have rejoined Massena; Reynier, however, quitted Belmonte in the night, and recovered his communication with a loss of only three hundred prisoners, although the horse-artillery and cavalry had been launched against him at daylight on the 30th, and much more could have been done, if general Slade had pushed his cavalry forward with the celerity and vigour the occasion required.

On the 1st of April, the allied army descended the mountains, and reached the Coa; but the French general, still anxious to maintain at once his hold of Portugal and the power of operating either on the side of Coria or of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was in position on the right bank of that river. The sixth corps was at Rovina, with detachments guarding the bridge of Seceiras and the ford of Atalayon, and the communication with Almeida was maintained by a brigade of the ninth corps, which was posted near the ford of Junça. The second corps was on the hills behind Sabugal, stretching towards Alfayates, and having strong detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford of Rapoulha de Coa. The eighth corps was at Alfayates; and a post was established at Rendo to maintain the communication between the second and the sixth corps. In this situation, the French army was disposed on two sides of a triangle, the apex of which was at Sabugal, and both fronts were covered by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated in a sharp bend of the stream. By holding Alfayates, Massena commanded the passes leading through St. Martin Trebeja to Coria; and in the French camp a notion prevailed, the allied divisions were scattered and might be beaten in detail by a sudden attack; the disputes amongst the generals prevented this enterprise, which was founded on false information, from being attempted.

During the first two days of April lord Wellington occupied a line parallel to the enemy's right, which could not be attacked because the Coa, which is in itself a considerable river, runs along its whole course in a rugged channel, which continually deepens as the stream flows. Trant and Wilson were, however, directed to pass below Almeida, and penetrate between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo, thus menacing the enemy's right, flank, and rear, and meanwhile lord Wellington, leaving the sixth division opposite Ney's corps at Rovina, and a battalion of the seventh corps at the bridge of Seceiras to cover the left flank and rear of the allies, prepared with the remainder of the army to turn and attack the left of the French position. For this purpose at daylight on the 3d general Slade's cavalry was directed to cross the Upper Coa, where the bed was most practicable, the light division ordered to ford the river a little below, the third division still lower, and the fifth division, with the artillery, to force the bridge of Sabugal; but the first and seventh divisions, with the exception of the battalion at Seceiras, were held in reserve. Thus ten thousand men being pivoted upon the fifth division at Sabugal were destined to turn Reynier's left, to separate him from the eighth corps, and to surround and crush him before the sixth corps could come from Rovina to his succour. One of those accidents which are frequent in war marred this well-concerted plan.

COMBAT OF SABUGAL.

The morning was so foggy, that the troops could not gain their respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is so essential to success, and in the light division no measures were taken by sir William Erskine to put the columns in a right

direction, the brigades were not even held together; he carried off the cavalry without communicating with colonel Beckwith, and this officer, who commanded the first brigade, being without any instructions, halted at a ford in expectation of further orders. While thus waiting a staff officer rode up, and somewhat hastily asked, why he did not attack? The thing appeared rash, but with an enemy in his front, he could make no reply, wherefore passing the river, which was deep and rapid, he mounted a very steep wooded hill on the other side. Four companies of the ninety-fifth led up in skirmishing order, followed by the forty-third regiment, and meanwhile the caçadores and the other brigade having passed the river, were moving independently to the right, but upon the true point of direction, and they were now distant. A dark heavy rain rendered it impossible for some time to distinguish friends or foes, and the attack was made too soon, for owing to the obscurity, none of the divisions of the army had yet reached their respective posts. It was made also in a partial, scattered, and dangerous manner, and on the wrong point; for Reynier's whole corps was directly in front, and Beckwith, having only one bayonet regiment and four companies of riflemen, was advancing against more than twelve thousand infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery.

Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill, when a compact and strong body of French drove them back upon the forty-third, the weather cleared at the instant, and Beckwith at once saw and felt all the danger, but his heart was too big to quail at it. With one fierce charge he beat back the enemy, gained and kept the summit of the hill, although two French howitzers poured showers of grape into his ranks, and a fresh force came against his front, while considerable bodies advanced on either flank. Fortunately Reynier, little expecting to be assailed, had, for the convenience of water, placed his main body in the low ground behind the height on which the action commenced. His renewed attack was, therefore, up hill, yet his musketry, heavy from the beginning, soon increased to a storm, and his men sprung up the acclivity with such violence and clamour, that it was evident nothing but the most desperate fighting could save the British from destruction.

Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the forty-third, running out to the right, with admirable presence of mind seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and commanding the ascent up which the French troops who had turned the right flank were approaching. His fire was so sharp that the assailants were thrown into confusion; they rallied, but were again disordered by the volleys of this company, and when a third time they endeavoured to form a head of attack, Hopkins with a sudden charge increased their disorder, and at the same moment the two battalions of the fifty-second regiment, which had been attracted by the fire, entered the line. Meanwhile the centre and left of the forty-third were furiously engaged, and wonderfully excited; for Beckwith wounded in the head, and with the blood streaming down his face, rode amongst the foremost of the skirmishers, directing all with ability, and praising the men, in a loud cheerful tone. The musket bullets flew thicker and closer every instant, and the fight became very dangerous; but the French fell fast, and a second charge again cleared the hill. One howitzer was taken by the 43d and the skirmishers were even descending towards the enemy's ground below, when small bodies of cavalry came galloping in from all parts, and obliged them to take refuge with the main body, which instantly reformed its line behind a low stone wall. In this state of affairs, a French squadron of dragoons having surmounted the ascent, rode with incredible daring up to the wall and were in the act of

firing over it with pistols, when a rolling volley laid nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground. By this time however a very strong column of infantry having rushed up the face of the hill, endeavoured to break in and retake the howitzer, which was on the edge of the descent and only fifty yards from the wall; but no man could reach it and live, so deadly was the forty-third's fire. Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and the 52d charging violently upon the flank of the enemy's infantry, again vindicated the possession of the height; nevertheless fresh squadrons of cavalry which had followed the infantry in the last attack, seeing the 52d men scattered by their charge, flew upon them with great briskness, and caused some disorder amongst the foremost skirmishers, but they were soon repulsed.

Reynier, convinced at last that he had acted unskilfully in sending up his troops piece-meal, now put all his reserves, amounting to nearly six thousand infantry with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and out-flanking the division on its left, appeared resolute to storm the contested height. But at this critical period, the fifth division passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the hills beyond the enemy's left, and general Colville with the leading brigade of the third division issuing out of the woods on Reynier's right, opened a fire on that flank, which instantly decided the fate of the day. The French general fearing to be surrounded then hastily retreated upon Rendo, where the sixth corps, which had been put in march when the first shots were heard, met him, and together they fell back upon Alfayates, pursued by the English cavalry. The loss of the allies in this bloody encounter, which did not last quite an hour, was nearly two hundred killed and wounded, that of the enemy was enormous: three hundred dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part round the captured howitzer, and more than twelve hundred were wounded! so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses and so true and constant was the English fire. The principal causes of this disproportion were, first, the heavy rain which gave the French only a partial view of the British, and secondly, the thick wood which ending near the top of the hill, left only an open and exposed space for the enemy to mount after the first attack; yet it was no exaggeration in lord Wellington to say, "that this was one of the most glorious actions that British troops were ever engaged in."*

The next day, the light division took the route of Valdespina, to feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading upon Coria; Massena was, however, in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th crossed the frontier of Portugal, when the vigour of the French discipline on sudden occasions was surprisingly manifested. Those men who had for months been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one continued course of violence and devastation, having now passed an imaginary line of frontier, became the most orderly of soldiers; not the slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and every thing demanded was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and moderation.

While these events were passing at Sabugal, Trant after passing the Lower Coa with four thousand militia, had taken post two miles from Almeida. But the river suddenly flooded behind him, all the bridges had been broken by Massena, and near fort Concepcion, there was a brigade of the ninth corps, which had been employed to cover the march of the battering train from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo. In this dan-

gerous situation, Trant constructed a temporary bridge with great difficulty and was going to retire on the 6th, when he received a letter from the British head-quarters, desiring him to be vigilant in cutting the communication with Almeida, and fearless, because the next morning a British force would be up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he boldly interposed between the fortress and the brigade of the ninth corps; but the promised succours did not appear, and the still advancing French were within half a mile of his position! His destruction appeared inevitable, when suddenly two cannon shots were heard to the southward, the enemy's troops formed squares in retreat, and in a few moments six squadrons of British cavalry and captain Bull's troop of horse artillery, came sweeping up the plain in their rear. Military order and coolness, marked the French retreat across the Turones, yet the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their dense masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their line of march: they however gained the rough ground, and finally escaped over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco, but with the loss of three hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. Trant was thus saved as it were by a miracle; for some unexpected accident having prevented the English infantry from marching in the morning, according to lord Wellington's promise, he had pushed on this cavalry, which would have been useless an hour later.

The prince of Esling had reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before this event, and lord Wellington now stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having executed what to others appeared incredibly rash and vain even to attempt.

CHAPTER V.

Estimate of the French loss—Anecdote, of Colonel Waters—Lord Wellington's great conceptions explained—How impeded—Affairs in the south of Spain—Formation of the fourth and fifth Spanish armies—Siege of Campo Mayor—Place falls—Excellent conduct of Major Tallia—Beresford surprises Montbrun—Combat of Cavalry—Campo Mayor recovered—Beresford takes cantonments round Elvas—His difficulties—Reflections upon his proceedings—He throws a bridge near Jerumenha and passes the Guadiana—Outpost of cavalry cut off by the French—Castanos arrives at Elvas—Arrangements relative to the chief command—Beresford advances against Latour Maubourg, who returns to Llerena—General Cole takes Olivenza—Cavalry-skirmish near Usagre—Lord Wellington arrives at Elvas, examines Badajoz—Skirmish there—Arranges the operations—Political difficulties—Lord Wellington returns to the Agueda—Operations in the north—Skirmishes on the Agueda—Massena advances to Ciudad Rodrigo—Lord Wellington reaches the army—Retires behind the Dos Casas—Combat of Fuentes Onoro—Battle of Fuentes Onoro—Evacuation of Almeida.

MASSENA entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand men, his reinforcements while at Santarem were about ten thousand, and he repassed the frontier with forty-five thousand; hence the invasion of Portugal cost him about thirty thousand men, of which fourteen thousand might have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than six thousand were lost during the retreat; but had lord Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army would have been lost. It is unquestionable that a retreating army should fight as little as possible.

When the French reached the Agueda, their cavalry detachments, heavy artillery, and convalescents, again augmented the army to more than fifty thousand men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want of provisions, would not suffer them to shew a front to the

* Official Despatch.

allies; wherefore, drawing two hundred thousand rations from Ciudad, they fell back to Salamanca, and lord Wellington invested Almeida. The light division occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army were disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the head quarters were transferred to Villa Formosa. Here colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources, he had refused his parole, and, when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house he was lodged. This man betrayed him, but a servant, detesting his master's treachery, secretly offered his aid; Waters only desired him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened, and when the French army was near Salamanca, he being in the custody of *gens d'armes*, waited until their chief, who rode the only good horse in the party, had alighted, then giving the spur to his own beast, galloped off! an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he was on a large plain, and before him, and for miles behind him, the road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and, thus distinguished, he rode along the flank of the troops, some encouraging him, others firing at him, and the *gens d'armes*, sword in hand, close at his heels; nevertheless he broke at full speed, between two columns, gained a wooded hollow, and, having baffled his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy's army. The third day he reached head-quarters, where lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent!

Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated with Bessieres, sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and lord Wellington was unable to prevent its entrance. He had sent the militia to their homes, disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, and blockaded Almeida; he also caused two temporary bridges to be laid (where the road from Cinco Villas to Pinhel across the Coa) to secure a retreat for the troops on that side, if pressed, which might easily happen; for the Portuguese army was in a dreadful state, and the continued misconduct of the Regency, and the absolute want of money, gave little hope of amelioration. It was therefore impossible to take a position beyond the Agueda.

The depots were now re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva on the Mondego, and magazines of consumption were formed at Celerico, from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way of Castello Bom. Measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments which were to be supplied from Abrantes; but the transport of stores was difficult, and this consideration, combined with the capricious nature of the Agueda and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops would have those rivers behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended. The blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from intercepted letters and other sources, it was known to have provisions only for a fortnight, but lord Wellington was prepared to relinquish it if pressed, because it formed no part of the plan which he contemplated.

The success in Portugal had given stability to the English ministers, and it would appear that they were satisfied, and at first meant to limit their future efforts to the defence of that country, for lord Liverpool now required the return of many battalions. But offensive warfare in Spain, occupied the general's thoughts, and two lines of operation had presented themselves to his mind.* 1. Under the supposition that it would

be long ere Massena could again make any serious attempt on Portugal, to remain on the defensive in Beira, and march against the army of the South to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2. If Almeida fell to the blockade, to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; if Almeida did not so fall, to besiege both together; if they were taken, to march at once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia and with the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception would have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation; for thus Madrid, the great depot of the French, would have been taken, the northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the English base momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean coast: then the whole of the Spanish and British force could have been concentrated, and one or two great battles must have decided the fate of Spain.

Filled with this grand project lord Wellington demanded reinforcements from England, and leave to carry his designs into execution, if occasion offered: yet he checked his secret aspirations, when reflecting upon the national pride and perverseness of the Spaniards, on their uncertain proceedings, and the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of ensuring any reasonable concert and assistance. When to this he added the bad disposition of the Portuguese Regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers, so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view, adapting his proceedings to circumstances as they should arise.

His projects were however necessarily conditional, because if Napoleon reinforced his armies again, new combinations would be created; and before any other measure, it was essential to recapture Badajos. The loss of that place had affected the safety of Cadiz, and it interfered with the execution of both the above mentioned plans, and with the safety of Portugal, by enabling the enemy to besiege Elvas. So deeply and sagaciously, however, had the English general probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions, and always successful.

Judging now that Massena would be unable to interrupt the blockade of Almeida lord Wellington left the command of the northern army to general Spencer, and departed for the Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating: but, as this was one of the most critical periods of the war, it is essential to have a clear notion of the true state of affairs in the South, at the moment when Beresford commenced his memorable campaign.

Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos, leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor. His arrival at Seville and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province, and confidence amongst the troops. Both had been so grievously shaken by the battle of Barosa, that the works of Arcos, Lucar, Medina, and Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the first corps, had been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed.* However discontent and gloom also prevailed in Cadiz.† The government had for some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor, but as the fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, Zayas was finally detached with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry to Huelva. His object was to gather provisions in the Conda de Neibla, where Ballasteros had, on the 10th of March, surprised and dispersed Remond's detachment. The French were however soon reinforced, Zayas was checked by D'Arenberg,

* Intercepted Letter from Chief of Engineers, Garbe, March 25th.

† Official Abstract of Military Reports, from Cadiz, 1811.

* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May 7th, 1810. MSS.

and, as many of his men deserted to Ballasteros, he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command, Ballasteros and Copons were placed under his orders, and the united corps, amounting to eleven thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry, were called the *fourth army*. Meanwhile Mendizabal rallying the fugitives from the battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa, reorganized a weak corps, called the *fifth army*. During these proceedings, Mortier had occupied Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, and carried on the siege of Campo Mayor. This fortress being commanded, at four hundred yards distance, by a hill, on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at once, but for the courage and talents of major Tallaia, a Portuguese engineer. With only two hundred men, and five mounted guns, he made such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with eleven mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and, being summoned for the second time, demanded and obtained twenty-four hours to wait for succour. None arrived, and this brave man surrendered the 21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores to Badajos.

Such was the posture of affairs when Beresford, who had quitted the northern army after the combat of Foz d'Aronce, arrived at Portalagre with twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and eighteen guns. His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and to besiege Olivenza and Badajos. The first had already surrendered, but the marshal, being within two marches of it, judged that he might surprise the besieging corps, and, with this view, put his troops in motion.

COMBAT OF CAMPO MAYOR.

In the morning of the 25th the advanced guard of cavalry, supported at some distance by a detachment of infantry under colonel Colborne, came suddenly upon Campo Mayor. Latour Maubourg was marching out in confusion, with nearly nine hundred cavalry, three battalions of infantry, some horse artillery and the battering train of sixteen guns. The English cavalry under general Long immediately turned the town by the left, and the French retreated by the Badajos road. The allies following along some gentle slopes, then formed a half circle round their enemy, who was now on a fine plain, and colonel Colborne, although still at a considerable distance, was coming up at a running pace, followed by the rest of the second division. In this state of affairs, the French infantry halted in square, with their cavalry both before and behind them. General Long, who had brought up the thirteenth dragoons, and some Portuguese squadrons, the heavy cavalry being in reserve, then ordered the former to attack.

Colonel Head immediately led the thirteenth forward, the French hussars as readily rode out from their infantry and with loose reins the two bodies came fiercely together. Many men were dismounted by the shock, but the combatants pierced clear through on both sides, then re-formed and again charged in the same fearful manner! The fighting now became desperate, until Head's troopers riding closely together, overthrew horse and man, and finally forced the enemy to fly. The French square fired upon the victorious squadrons, but the latter without flinching, galloped past the long line of the convoy, hewed down the gunners, and being joined by the Portuguese, the hussars still fighting here and there in small bodies, continued the pursuit. They thought with reason that

the heavy dragoons, the artillery, and the infantry, some of which were close up, would be sufficient to dispose of whatever part of the enemy's force was thus passed. But marshal Beresford would not suffer the heavy dragoons to charge; he would not suffer more than two guns to be brought up when he might have had six; he would not suffer those two guns to fire more than a few rounds; and the French marching steadily onward, recovered their battering train, and effected their retreat in safety! Meanwhile the thirteenth and the Portuguese, having pushed on even to the bridge of Badajos, were repulsed by the guns of that fortress, and being followed by Mortier in person, and met by the retiring square, and by all of the beaten cavalry who could find refuge with it, lost some prisoners. Of the allies one hundred men were killed or hurt, and above seventy taken. Of the enemy about three hundred suffered, one howitzer was captured, and the French colonel Chamorin was slain in single combat by a trooper of the thirteenth.

To profit from sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly with his advanced guard in an offensive movement. When this combat commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and baron Trip, a staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed him, that the thirteenth had been cut off. Hence the marshal, anxious to save his cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up the first blow, observing that the loss of one regiment was enough. But the regiment was not lost, the country was open and plain, the enemy's force and the exact posture of affairs easy to be discerned; and although the thirteenth were severely reprimanded, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, the unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them.

Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French left eight thousand rations of bread in the magazines; and they also evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, being infinitely dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south: indeed, so secretly and promptly had lord Wellington assembled it, that its existence was only known to the enemy by the blow at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the enemy no time to recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential, because the breach of Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished. Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, four hundred men had been thrown into Olivenza, three thousand into Badajos; and thus, including the losses sustained during the operations, Mortier's numbers were reduced to less than ten thousand men. He could therefore not have maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected provisions also. Beresford should have instantly marched upon Merida, driven back the fifth corps, and opened a fresh communication by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have been inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the sudden appearance of the army at Campo Mayor and the moral impression produced by the charge of the thirteenth dragoons, guaranteed the success of this march; the English general might even have passed the river at Merida before Mortier could have ascertained his object.

Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into quarters round Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of the soldiers, especially those of the fourth division, who had been marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, and were barefooted and exhausted.

He had been instructed, by lord Wellington, to throw a bridge over the Guadiana at Jerumenha, to push back the fifth corps, and to invest Olivenza and Bada-

jos. The Portuguese government were to have provided some of the means for these operations, and a report had been made, to the effect, that all things necessary, that is to say, that provisions, shoes, battering-guns, ammunition, and transport were actually collected; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable craft; that twenty large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which had been brought away from Badajos before the siege, were at Elvas; and that all other necessities would be sent from Lisbon. It now appeared that no magazines of provisions or stores were prepared; that very little transport was provided; that only five of Cuesta's boats had been brought from Badajos; that there was no serviceable craft on the river, and that some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon, were unfit to bear the force of the current, or to sustain the passage of guns. The country, also, was so deficient in provisions, that the garrison stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army.

All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true line of operations; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the evil state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the presence of an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division for shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle; but, under the circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a momentary effort from such an excellent division, and it might without danger even have been left behind.

Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the means of passing at Jerumenha, an error that may be considered as the principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained lord Wellington more than a year on the frontiers of Portugal. For, during Beresford's delay, general Philipon, one of the ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled the trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach; and Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in command of the troops, covered the country with foraging parties, and filled the magazines.

Captain Squire, of the engineers, undertook to bridge the Guadiana under Jerumenha. He fixed trestle-piers on each side in the shallows, and connected them with the five Spanish boats and a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over, by a ford, to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April, the bridge was finished, and the troops assembled during the night in the woods near Jerumenha, intending to cross at daylight, but the river suddenly swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable, and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately procured, the Spanish boats were therefore converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, and Squire constructed a slight narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks taken from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a battalion was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army commenced passing the 5th of April; but it was late in the night of the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position, which was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy rivulet.

During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in securing and provisioning Badajos, that his foragers were extended fifty miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of Beresford's proceedings. This error savoured rather of the Spanish than of the French method of making war; for it is evident that a moveable column of five thousand infantry, with guns and cavalry, could, notwithstanding the guns of Jerumenha, have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on the left bank, and thus have completely frustrated the operations. The allied troops,

being so numerous, should have been carried over in the boats, and entrenched on the other side in sufficient force to resist any attack before the construction of the bridge was attempted. It is not easy to say which general acted with the most imprudence; Latour Maubourg in neglecting, or Beresford in unnecessarily tempting fortune.

When the British were in possession of the left bank, the French general awaking, collected three thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and four guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight on the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before. He, however, surprised a squadron of the thirteenth, which was in front, and then came so close up to the main body as to exchange shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the face of more than twenty thousand men!

During these proceedings, the fifth Spanish army re-occupied Valencia d'Alcantara and Albuquerque, and pushed cavalry posts to La Rocca and Montijo, Ballasteros entered Fregenal, and Castaños, who was appointed to command in Galicia as well as Estremadura, arrived at Elvas. This general was in friendly intercourse with Beresford, but had a grudge against Blake. At first, he pretended to the chief authority, as the elder captain-general; Blake demanded a like power over Beresford, who was not disposed to admit the claim. Now Castaños, having little liking for a command under such difficult circumstances, and being desirous to thwart Blake, and fearful lest Beresford should, under these circumstances, refuse to pass the Guadiana, arranged, that he who brought the greatest force in the field should be generalissimo. Thus the inferior officer commanded in chief.

To cover his bridges, which he reconstructed in a more substantial manner, Beresford directed extensive entrenchments to be executed by the militia from Elvas, and then leaving a strong detachment for their protection, advanced with the remainder of the army. Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and the allies, who had been joined by Madden's cavalry, summoned Olivenza on the 9th. Beresford apparently expected no defence; for it was not until after the governor had rejected the summons that he sent major Dickson to Elvas to prepare a battery train for the siege. Meanwhile the army encamped round the place, the communication with Ballasteros was opened, and Castaños advancing with the fifth army to Merida pushed his cavalry to Almendralejos. The French then fell back to Llerena, and Beresford, leaving general Cole with the fourth division and Madden's cavalry to besiege Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera on the 11th. In this position he communicated by his left with Castaños, and by spreading his horsemen in front cut off all communication with Badajos. The army now lived on the resources of the country, and a brigade was sent to Talavera Real to collect supplies.

The 14th, six twenty-four pounders reached Olivenza, and, being placed in a battery constructed on an abandoned horn-work formerly noticed, played with such success, that the breach became practicable before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in the vineyards kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison, consisting of three hundred and eighty men, with fifteen guns, surrendered at discretion.

Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra by the road of Almendral. Beresford, who had recalled the brigade from Talavera, was already in motion for the same place by the royal causeway. His object was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and cut off general Maransin. The latter general, who had been in pursuit of Ballasteros ever since the retreat of Zayas, and had defeated him at Fregenal on the 12th, was following up his victory towards Salvatierra. The allies were therefore close upon him, but an alcalde

gave him notice of their approach, and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile two French regiments of cavalry, advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, reached Los Santos, between which place and Usagre they were charged by the thirteenth dragoons, and followed for six miles so vigorously that one hundred and fifty were killed or taken, without the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers.

On the 16th general Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole army being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the 18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the service of the allies. During these operations, general Charles Alten, coming from Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached Olivenza, and lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford, after drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops; they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion without any adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow, without being prudent. The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th, and, including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford commanded at least twenty-five thousand men, whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than ten thousand, many of whom were dispersed foraging, far and wide: yet the French general, without displaying much skill, had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten days; and during this time, no corps being employed to constrain the garrison of Badajos, the governor continued to bring in timber and other materials for the defence, at his pleasure.

Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22d, he forded the Guadiana just below the mouth of the Caya with Madden's cavalry and Alten's Germans, and pushed close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by some infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the country, and an effort was made to cut it off; but the governor sallied, the allies lost a hundred men, and the convoy reached the town.

Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult would certainly endeavour to disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded the assent of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined operations, before he would commence the investment of the place. 1. That Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los Caballeros. 2. That Ballasteros should occupy Burquillo on his left. 3. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at Llerena, should observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, by the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were to watch the passes of the Morena. 4. That Castaños should furnish three battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, to support the Spanish cavalry. 5. That the British army should be in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrally situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos, should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces.

The whole of the train and stores, for the attack on Badajos, being taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas, the utmost prudence was required to secure the safety of the guns, lest that fortress, half dismantled, should be exposed to a siege. Wherefore as the Guadiana, by rising ten feet, had again carried away the bridges at Jerumenha, on the 24th lord Wellington directed the line of communication with Portugal to be established by Merida, until more settled weather should admit of fresh arrangements. However, political difficulties intervening obliged him to delay the siege. The troops under Mendizabal had committed many excesses in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were pushed so far, that the Spanish general had pillaged the town of

Fernando, and the Portuguese government, in reprisal, meant to seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish Regency indeed publicly disavowed Mendizabal's conduct, and Mr. Stuart's strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the two countries into a war: but this affair, joined to the natural slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños and Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general's plans. Meanwhile, intelligence reached the latter that Massena was in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing Beresford to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should give in their assent, or until the fall of Almeida should enable a British reinforcement to arrive, he ordered the militia of the northern provinces again to take the field, and repaired with the utmost speed to the Coa.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely pressed, while the army was so disposed as to cut off all communication. The allied forces were, however, distressed for provisions, and great part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma, being smuggled by the peasants through the French posts, and passed over the Agueda by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst the deep chasms of that river, near its confluence with the Douro.

Massena was intent upon relieving the place. His retreat upon Salamanca had been to restore the organization and equipments of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo, without consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonnments extended from San Felices by Ledesma to Toro, his cavalry was in bad condition, and his artillery nearly unhorsed. But from Bessieres he expected, with reason, aid, both of men and provisions, and in that expectation was prepared to renew the campaign immediately. Discord, that bane of military operations, interfered. Bessieres had neglected and continued to neglect the army of Portugal. Symptoms of hostilities with Russia were so apparent, even at this period, that he looked rather to that quarter than to what was passing before him, and his opinion that a war in the north was inevitable was so openly expressed as to reach the English army. Meanwhile, Massena vainly demanded the aid, which was necessary to save the only acquisition of his campaign. A convoy of provisions had, however, entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 13th of April, and on the 16th a reinforcement and a second convoy also succeeded in gaining that fortress, although general Spencer crossed the Agueda, with eight thousand men, to intercept them; a rear-guard of two hundred men was indeed, overtaken, and surrounded by the cavalry in an open plain, but it was not prevented from reaching the place.

Towards the end of the month, the new organization, decreed by Napoleon, was put in execution. Two divisions of the ninth corps joined Massena; and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining eleven thousand infantry and cavalry, to reinforce and take the command of the fifth corps, when Massena, having collected all his own detachments, and received a promise of assistance from Bessieres, prevailed upon him to defer his march until an effort had been made to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army was put in motion towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division immediately resumed its former positions, the left at Gallegos and Marialva, the right at Espeja; the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the sources of the Azava, and partly behind Gallegos. While in this situation, colonel O'Meara and eighty men of the Irish brigade were taken by Julian Sanchez, the affair having been, it was said, preconcerted, to enable the former to quit the French service.

On the 23d, two thousand French infantry and a squadron of cavalry marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the bridge of Marialva, but the passage was bravely maintained by captain Dobbs, with one company of the fifty-second and some riflemen. On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo, and the 27th, his advanced guards felt all the line of the division from Espeja to Marialva. Lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Dos Casas river. The Azava being swollen and difficult to ford, the enemy continued to feel the line of the outposts, until the 2d of May, when the waters having subsided the whole French army was observed coming out of Ciudad Rodrigo. The light division, after a slight skirmish of horse at Gallegos, then commenced a retrograde movement, from that place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Dos Casas, but an open plain between the two lines of march offered the enemy's powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. The French appeared regardless of this advantage, and the division remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain until the middle of the night, when the march was renewed, and the Dos Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro.

This beautiful village had escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied alternately, for above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was well known to the light division, and it was therefore a subject of deep regret, to find, that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving only the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly population had been living in comfort. This wanton act was so warmly felt by the whole army, that eight thousand dollars were afterwards collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants, but the injury sunk deeper than the atonement.

Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the army of the north and by the ninth corps, could bring down superior numbers; for so culpably negligent had the Portuguese government been, that their troops were actually starving. The infantry had quitted their colours, or had fallen sick, from extenuation, by thousands, the cavalry were rendered useless, and it was even feared that the whole would disband. Nevertheless, when the moment of trial arrived, the English general trusting to the valour of his soldiers, and the ascendancy over the enemy which they had acquired during the pursuit from Santarem, would not retreat, although his army, reduced to thirty-two thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry in bad condition, and forty-two guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French horse, to oppose the enemy's march in the plain.

The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones and the Dos Casas. The left was at Fort Concepcion, the centre opposite to the village of Alameda, the right at Fuentes Onoro, the whole distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing in a deep ravine, protected the front of this line, and the French general could not, with any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages at Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him into the Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained by Pack's brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave the fifth division near Fort Concepcion, and the sixth division opposite Alameda. The first and third were then concentrated on a gentle rise, about a cannon shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the steppe of land, which the army occupied, turned back, and ended on the Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river.

FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO.

The French came up in three columns abreast. The cavalry, the sixth corps, and Drouet's division appeared at Fuentes Onoro, but the eighth and second corps moving against Alameda and Fort Concepcion, seemed to menace the left of the position, wherefore, the light division, after passing the Dos Casas, reinforced the sixth division. General Loison however, without waiting for Massena's orders, fell upon Fuentes Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of chosen troops, detached from the first and third divisions.

Most of the houses in this village were quite in the bottom of the ravine, and an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence, overhung one end. The low parts were vigorously defended, yet the violence of the attack was so great, and the cannonade so heavy, that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming very dangerous, when the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and the seventy-ninth regiments, marching down from the main position, charged so roughly, that the French were forced back, and, after a severe contest, driven over the stream of the Dos Casas. During the night the detachments were withdrawn; but the twenty-fourth, the seventy-first, and seventy-ninth regiments were left in the village, where two hundred and sixty of the allies and somewhat more of the French had fallen.

On the 4th Massena arrived, and, being joined by Bessieres with twelve hundred cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, examined all the line, and made dispositions for the next day. His design was to hold the left of the allies in check with the second corps, and to turn the right with the remainder of the army. Forty thousand French infantry, and five thousand horse, with thirty pieces of artillery, were under arms, and they had shewn in the action of the 3d that their courage was not abated; it was, therefore, a very audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle on such dangerous ground. His position, as far as Fuentes Onoro, was indeed strong and free for the use of all arms, and it covered his communication by the bridge of Castello Bom; but, on his right flank, the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d'Aver, where a considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded the roads leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could, therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack them while entangled between the Dos Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and the fortress of Almeida; the bridge of Castello Bom alone would have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to cover his communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, lord Wellington, yielding to general Spencer's earnest suggestions, stretched his right wing out to Nava d'Aver, the hill of which he caused Julian Sanchez to occupy, supporting him by the seventh division, under general Houston. Thus the line of battle was above seven miles in length, besides the circuit of blockade. The Dos Casas, indeed, still covered the front; but above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and Nava d'Aver. The left wing of the seventh division occupied this wood and the village of Poço Velho, but the right wing was refused.

BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO.

It was Massena's intention to have made his dispositions in the night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at day-break on the 5th; but a delay of two hours occurring, the whole of his movements

were plainly descried. The eighth corps withdrawn from Alameda, and supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the village of Poço Velho, and at the same time the sixth corps and Drouet's division took ground to their own left, yet still keeping a division in front of Fuentes. At this sight the light division and the English horse hastened to the support of general Houston, while the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the sixth corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the village of Poço Velho with loss, and was gaining ground in the wood also, when the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point, restored the fight. The French cavalry, then passing Poço Velho, commenced forming in order of battle on the plain, between the wood and the hill of Nava d'Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately retired across the Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, at the death of his lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer, and shot by a soldier of the guards, before the action commenced.

Montbrun occupied himself with this weak partida for an hour, but when the Guerilla chief had entirely fallen back, he turned the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry, which had moved up to its support. The combat was very unequal, for, by an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not more than a thousand English troopers were in the field. The French therefore with one shock drove in all the cavalry outguards, and cutting off captain Ramsay's battery, came sweeping in upon the reserves of horse and upon the seventh division. But their leading squadrons approaching in a disorderly manner, were partially checked by the British, and at the same time a great commotion was observed in their main body. Men and horses there closed with confusion and tumult towards one point, a thick dust arose, and loud cries, and the sparkling of blades and the flashing of pistols, indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude became violently agitated, an English shout pealed high and clear, the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain, the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners followed in close career. Captain Brotherton of the 14th dragoons, seeing this, instantly rode forth with a squadron, and overturned the head of the pursuing troops, and general Charles Stewart joining in the charge, took the French general Lamotte, fighting hand to hand. The enemy, however, came in strongly, and the British cavalry retired behind the light division, which was immediately thrown into squares, but ere the seventh division, which was more advanced, could do the same, the horsemen were upon them, and some were cut down. Nevertheless the men stood firm, and the Chasseurs Britanniques ranging behind a loose stone wall, poured in such a fire that their foes recoiled and seemed bewildered.

But while these brilliant actions were passing at this point, the French were making progress in the wood of Pozzo Velho, and as the English divisions were separated, and the right wing turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost, if the original concentrated position above Fuentes Onoro was not quickly regained. Lord Wellington, therefore, ordered the seventh division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to Frenada—the light division to retire over the plain and the cavalry to cover the rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, placing them and the Portuguese, in line, on

the steppe before described as running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro.

General Crawford, who had resumed the command of the light division, first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having the British cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by the enemy's horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the wood surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making colonel Hill and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their charge against the forty-second regiment, the French were repulsed. Many times Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division squares, and although the latter were too formidable to be meddled with, there was not, during the war, a more dangerous hour for England. The whole of that vast plain as far as the Turones was covered with a confused multitude, amidst which the squares appeared but as specks, for there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat followers of the camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by curiosity, and finally, the broken piquets and parties coming out of the woods. The seventh division was separated from the army by the Turones, five thousand French cavalry, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge, the infantry of the eighth corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen, and the wood was filled with the skirmishers of the sixth corps. If the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth, while Drouet's divisions fell on that village; if the eighth corps had attacked the light division, while the whole of the cavalry made a general charge, the loose multitude encumbering the plain would have been driven violently in upon the first division, in such a manner as to have intercepted the latter's fire and broken its ranks.

No such effort was made. Montbrun's horsemen merely hovered about Crawford's squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada and was there joined by Julian Sanchez.

At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great execution from the closeness of the allied masses; but twelve British guns replied with vigour and the violence of the enemy's fire abated. Their cavalry then drew out of range and a body of infantry attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards.

All this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena had directed Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when Montbrun's cavalry should turn the right wing; it was, however, two hours later ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments made a desperate resistance, but overmatched in number, and little accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, were pierced and divided. Two companies of the seventy-ninth were taken, colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town was carried; the upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the rolling of the musketry was incessant.

Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet's division thrown frankly into the fight, while the sixth corps moving through the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been forced and the left of the new position outflanked; but now lord Wellington having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The French continued also to reinforce

their troops, the whole of the sixth corps and a part of Drouet's division were finally engaged, and several turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another upon the rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the enemy's skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the main position; but the village was never entirely abandoned by the defenders, and, in a charge of the seventy-first, seventy-ninth, and eighty-eighth regiments, led by colonel M'Kinnon against a heavy mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the French fell. In this manner the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties. The British maintained the chapel and crags, the French retired a cannon shot from the stream.

After the action a brigade of the light division relieved the regiments in the village, a slight demonstration by the second corps near Fort Concepcion, was checked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, and both armies remained in observation. Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which three hundred were prisoners, constituted the loss of the allies. That of the enemy was estimated at the time to be near five thousand, but this exaggerated calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition that four hundred dead, were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcases at that point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not more than one hundred and thirty bodies were to be found, one-third of which were British.

During the battle, the French convoy for the supply of Almeida was kept at Gallegos, in readiness to move, and lord Wellington now sent Julian Sanchez from Frenada, to menace it, and to disturb the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect, and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro. Lord Wellington also entrenched that part of the position, which was immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of it would have scarcely benefited the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking, was not tenable. There was a wooded tongue of land on the British right, that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet was too distant from the position to be occupied by the allies: had Ney been at the head of the sixth corps, he would have quickly crowned this ridge, and then Fuentes could only have been maintained by submitting to a butchery.

On the 6th the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, making no demonstration of attack, and as the 7th passed in a like inaction, the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th Massena withdrew his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda, the sixth and eighth corps, and the cavalry, passing at Ciudad Rodrigo, the second corps at the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres then carried off the imperial guards, Massena was recalled to France, and Marmont assumed the command of the army of Portugal.

Both sides claimed the victory. The French, because they won the passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced lord Wellington to relinquish three miles of ground, and to change his front. The English, because the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was successfully defended, and because the principal object (the covering the blockade of Almeida) was attained.

Certain it is, that Massena at first gained great advantages. Napoleon would have made them fatal!

but it is also certain that, with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to that arm, the prince of Esling having, as it were, indicated all the errors of the English general's position, stopped short at the very moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been attributed to extreme negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont, but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at his order—Junot did not second him cordially—Loison disregarded his instructions—Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight, and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle was shaken, and would not work.

General Pelet censures lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry against Reyruier after the second position was taken up. He asserts that any danger, on that side, would have forced the French to retreat. This criticism is, however, unsustainable, being based on the notion that the allies had fifty thousand men in the field, whereas, including Sanchez' Partida, they had not thirty-five thousand. It may be, with more justice, objected to Massena that he did not launch some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge of Seeiras, or Sabugal, against Guarda and Celérico, to destroy the magazines, cut the communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport belonging to the allied army. The vice of the English general's position would then have been clearly exposed, for, although the second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected the depôts. But it can never be too often repeated that war, however adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors and accidents. All the operations, on both sides, for six weeks, furnished illustrations of this truth.

Ney's opposition had prevented Massena's march upon Coria, which would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and, probably, added Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg's tardiness had like to have cost Mortier a rear guard and a battering-train. Beresford's blunder at Campo Mayor, and his refusing of the line of Merida, enabled the French to secure Badajos. At Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet's negligence placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies, and a mistaken notion of Massena's sufferings during the retreat, induced lord Wellington to undertake two great operations at the same time, which were above his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not stop there. The prize contended for was still to present another example of the uncertainty of war.

EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA.

General Brennier, made prisoner at Vimiero, but afterwards exchanged, was governor of this fortress. During the battle of Fuentes Onoro, his garrison, consisting of fifteen hundred men, skirmished boldly with the blocking force, and loud explosions, supposed to be signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in the place. When all hopes of succour had vanished, a soldier, named Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind, to penetrate, although in uniform, through the posts of blockade. He carried an order for Brennier to evacuate the fortress.

Meanwhile Massena, by crossing the Agueda, abandoned Almeida to its fate, and the British general placed the light division in its old position on the Azava with cavalry-posts on the Lower Agueda. He also desired sir William Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba del Puerco, and he directed general

Alexander Campbell to continue the blockade with the sixth division and with general Pack's brigade. But Campbell's dispositions were either negligently made, or negligently executed, and Erskine never transmitted the orders to the fourth regiment, and it was under these circumstances that Brennier, undismayed by the retreat of the French army, resolved, like Julian Estrada, at Hostalrich, to force his way through the blockading troops. An open country and a double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty, yet Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to render the fortress useless to the allies. To effect this, he ruined all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of his artillery in a singular manner; for always he fired several guns at one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of another, so that, while some shots flew towards the besiegers and a loud explosion was heard, others destroyed pieces without attracting notice.

At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he sprung his mines, sallied forth in a compact column, broke through the picquets, and passed between the quarters of the reserves, with a nicety that proved at once his talent of observation and his coolness. General Pack following, with a few men collected on the instant, plied him with a constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his column, which in silence, and without returning a shot, gained the rough country leading upon Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment, just as daylight broke, and Pack, who was at hand, hearing that some English dragoons were in a village, a short distance to the right, sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus occasioning a slight skirmish and consequently delay. The troops of blockade had paid little attention at first to the explosion of the mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier's previous practice, but Pack's fire having roused them, the thirty-sixth regiment was now close at hand, and the fourth, also, having heard the firing at Valde Mula, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier, having driven off the cavalry, was again in march, but the British regiments, throwing off their knapsacks, followed at such a pace, that they overtook the rear of his column in the act of descending the deep chasm of Barba del Puerco. Many were killed and wounded, and three hundred were taken; but the pursuers having rashly passed the bridge in pursuit, the second corps, which was in order of battle, awaiting Brennier's approach, repulsed them with a loss of thirty or forty men. Had sir William Erskine given the fourth regiment its orders, the French column would have been lost.

Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated by several previous examples of undisciplined valour, issued a remonstrance to the army. It was strong, and the following remarks are as applicable to some writers as to soldiers:—"The officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, successfully opposed to large; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons."

CHAPTER VI.

Lord Wellington quits the army of Beira—Marshal Beresford's operations—Colonel Colborne beats up the French quarters in Estremadura, and intercepts their convoys—First English siege of Badajoz—Captain Squire breaks ground before San Cristoval—His works overwhelmed by the French fire—Soult advances to relieve the place—Beresford raises the

siege—Holds a conference with the Spanish generals, and resolves to fight—Colonel Colborne rejoins the army, which takes a position at Albuera—Allied cavalry driven in by the French—General Blake joins Beresford—General Cofe arrives on the frontier—Battle of Albuera.

WHEN Marmont had thus recovered the garrison of Almeida, he withdrew the greatest part of his army towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington then leaving the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, on the Azava, under general Spencer, directed the third and seventh divisions and the second German hussars upon Badajoz. On the 15th, hearing that Soult, although hitherto reported, by Beresford, to be entirely on the defensive, was actually marching into Estremadura, he set out himself for that province; but, ere he could arrive, a great and bloody battle had terminated the operations.

While awaiting the Spanish generals' accession to lord Wellington's plan, Beresford had fixed his headquarters at Almendralejos; but Latour Maubourg remained at Guadalecanal, whence his parties foraged the most fertile tracts between the armies. Penne Villamur was, therefore, reinforced with five squadrons; and colonel John Colborne was detached with a brigade of the second division, two Spanish guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, to curb the French inroads, and to raise the confidence of the people. Colborne, a man of singular talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden changes of direction, in concert with Villamur, created great confusion amongst the enemy's parties. He intercepted several convoys, and obliged the French troops to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La Granja, Azuaga, and most of the other frontier towns; and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with so much address, that the latter, imagining a great force was at hand, abandoned Guadalecanal also and fell back to Constantino.

Having cleared the country on that side, Colborne attempted to surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar, and, by a hardy attempt, was like to have carried it. Riding on to the drawbridge with a few officers in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant to surrender, as the only means of saving himself from the Spanish army which was close at hand and would give no quarter. The French officer, although amazed at the appearance of the party, was however too resolute to yield, and Colborne, quick to perceive the attempt had failed, galloped off under a few straggling shot. After this, taking to the mountains, he rejoined the army without any loss. During his absence, the Spanish generals had acceded to lord Wellington's proposition; Blake was in march for Xeres Caballeros, and Ballasteros was at Burgillos. The waters of the Guadiana had also subsided, the bridge under Jerumenha was restored, and the preparations completed for the

FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

The 5th of May, general William Stewart invested the place, on the left bank of the Guadiana, with two squadrons of horse, six field-pieces, and three brigades of infantry, and the formation of the depot of the siege was commenced by the engineers and artillery.

On the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced by two thousand Spaniards under Carlos d'España, encamped in the woods near the fortress; Madden's Portuguese remained in observation near Merida, and a troop of horse-artillery arriving from Lisbon was attached to the English cavalry, which was still near Los Santos and Zafra. The flying bridge was at first brought up from Jerumenha, and re-established near the mouth of the Caya, but was again drawn over, because the right bank of the Guadiana being still open, some French horse had come down the river.

The 8th general Lumley invested Christoval on the right bank, with a brigade of the second division, four light Spanish guns, the seventeenth Portuguese infant-

try, and two squadrons of horse drafted from the garrison of Elvas. These troops did not arrive simultaneously at the point of assembly, which delayed the operation, and sixty French dragoons moving under the fire of the place maintained a sharp skirmish beyond the walls.

Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army in the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the English government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of prosecuting such an enterprise. The engineer officers were exceedingly zealous, and, notwithstanding some defects in the constitution and customs of their corps, tending rather to make regimental than practical scientific officers, many of them were very well versed in the theory of their business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. Without a corps of sappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age: the best officers and the finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the commonest materials and the means necessary for their art were denied to the engineers.

Colonel Fletcher's plan was to breach the castle of Badajos, while batteries established on the right bank of the Guadiana should take the defence in reverse, and false attacks against the Pardaleras and Picurina were also to be commenced by re-opening the French trenches. It was, however, necessary to reduce the fort of Christoval ere the batteries for ruining the defences of the castle could be erected. In double operations, whether of the field or of siege, it is essential to move with an exact concert, lest the enemy should crush each in detail; but neither in the investment nor in the attack was this maxim regarded. Captain Squire, although ill provided with tools, was directed to commence a battery against Christoval on the night of the 8th, under a bright moon, and at the distance of only four hundred yards from the rampart. Exposed to a destructive fire of musketry from the fort, and of shot and shells from the town, he continued to work, with great loss, until the 10th, when the enemy, making a furious sally, carried his battery; the French were, indeed, immediately driven back, but the allies pursuing too hotly, were taken in front and flank with grape, and lost four hundred men. Thus five engineers and seven hundred officers and soldiers of the line were already on the long and bloody list of victims offered to this Moloch, and only one small battery against a small outwork was completed! On the 11th it opened, and before sunset the fire of the enemy had disabled four of its five guns, and killed many more of the besiegers. Nor could any other result be expected, seeing that this single work was exposed to the undivided fire of the fortress, for the approaches against the castle were not yet commenced, and two distant batteries on the false attacks scarcely attracted the notice of the enemy.

To check future sallies, a second battery was erected against the bridge-head, but this was also overmatched, and meanwhile Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army was again in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. On the 12th, believing this information premature, he resumed the labour, directing the trenches to be opened against the castle. The intelligence was, however, true, and being confirmed at twelve o'clock in the night, the

working parties were again drawn off, and measures taken to raise the siege.

SOULT'S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

The duke of Dalmatia resolved to succour Badajos the moment he heard of Beresford's being in Estremadura, and the tardiness of the latter had not only given the garrison time to organize a defence, but had permitted the French general to tranquillise his province and arrange a system of resistance to the allied army in the Isla. With that view, Soult had commenced additional fortifications at Seville, and renewed the construction of those which had been suspended in other places by the battle of Barosa. He thus deceived Beresford, who believed that, far from thinking to relieve Badajos, he was trembling for his own province. Nothing could be more fallacious. There were seventy thousand fighting men in Andalusia, and Drouet, who had quitted Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewise in march for that province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing with him eleven thousand men.

All things being ready, Soult quitted Seville the 10th, with three thousand heavy dragoons, thirty guns, and two strong brigades of infantry under the command of general Werlé and general Godinot. This force, which was composed of troops drawn from the first and fourth corps and from the reserve of Dessolles, entered Olalla the 11th, and was there joined by general Maramsin; but Godinot marched by Constantino to reinforce the fifth corps, which was falling back from Guadalcanal in consequence of Colborne's operations. The 13th the junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the command of the heavy cavalry, while Girard taking that of the fifth corps, advanced to Los Santos. The 14th the French head-quarters reached Villa Franca. Being then within thirty miles of Badajos, Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos during the night, to give notice of his approach to the garrison, but the expedition failed of success, and the 15th, in the evening, his army was concentrated at Santa Marta.

Beresford, as I have before said, remained in a state of uncertainty until the night of the 12th, when he commenced raising the siege, contrary to the earnest representations of the engineers, who promised to put him in possession of the place in three days, if he would persevere. This promise was ill-founded, and, if it had been otherwise, Soult would have surprised him in the trenches: his firmness, therefore, saved the army, and his arrangements for carrying off the stores were admirably executed. The artillery and the platforms were removed in the night of the 13th, and, at twelve o'clock, on the 15th, all the guns and stores on the left bank, having been passed over the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines were burnt, and the flying-bridge removed. These transactions were completely masked by the fourth division, which, with the Spaniards, continued to maintain the investment; it was not until the rear guard was ready to draw off, that the French, in a sally, after severely handling the picquets of Harvey's Portuguese brigade, learned that the siege was raised, but of the cause they were still ignorant.

Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at Valverde, on the 13th, when it was agreed to receive battle at the village of Albuera. Ballasteros' and Blake's corps having already formed a junction at Baracotta, were then falling back upon Almendral, and Blake engaged to bring them into line at Albuera, before twelve o'clock, on the 15th. Meanwhile, as Badajos was the centre of an arc, sweeping through Valverde, Albuera, and Talavera Real, it was arranged that Blake's army should watch the roads on the right, the British and the fifth Spanish army those leading

upon the centre; and that Madden's Portuguese cavalry should observe those on the left, conducting through Talavera Real. The main body of the British being in the woods near Valverde, could reach Albuera by a half march, and no part of the arc was more than four leagues from Badajos, but the enemy being, on the 14th, still at Los Santos, was eight leagues distant from Albuera; hence, Beresford, thinking that he could not be forestalled on any point, of importance to the allies, continued to keep the fourth division in the trenches. Colborne's moveable column joined the army on the 14th, Madden then retired to Talavera Real, and Blake's army reached Almendral. Meanwhile the allied cavalry, under general Long, had fallen back before the enemy from Zafra and Los Santos, to Santa Marta, and was there joined by the dragoons of the fourth army.

In the morning of the 15th, the British occupied the left of the position of Albuera, which was a ridge about four miles long, having the Aroya Val de Sevilla in rear and the Albuera river in front. The right of the army was prolonged towards Almendral, the left towards Badajos, and the ascent from the river was easy, the ground being in all parts practicable for cavalry and artillery. Somewhat in advance of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera, the former commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Allen's brigade. The second division, under general William Stewart, was drawn up in one line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Valverde road passed; the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the order of battle was continued in two lines, by the Portuguese troops under general Hamilton and colonel Collins.

The right of the position, which was stronger, and higher, and broader than any other part, was left open for Blake's army, because Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of the position, as protecting his only line of retreat, was desirous to secure it with the best troops. The fourth division and the infantry of the fifth army were still before Badajos. General Cole had orders to send the seventeenth Portuguese regiment to Elvas, and to throw a battalion of Spaniards into Olivenza; to bring his second brigade, which was before Christoval, over the Guadiana, by a ford above Badajos, if practicable, and to be in readiness to march at the first notice.

In this posture of affairs, about three o'clock in the evening of the 15th, while Beresford was at some distance on the left, the whole mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light horsemen, came in from Santa Marta, and as no infantry were posted beyond the Albuera to support them, they passed that river. Thus the wooded heights on the right bank were abandoned to the enemy, and his force and dispositions being thereby effectually concealed, the strength of the allies' position was already sapped. Beresford immediately formed a temporary right wing with the cavalry and artillery, stretching his picquets along the road to Almendral, and sending officers to hasten Blake's movements; but that general, who had only a few miles of good road to march, and who had promised to be in line at noon, did not reach the ground before eleven at night, and his rear was not there before three o'clock in the morning of the 16th; meanwhile, as the enemy was evidently in force on the Albuera road, Cole and Madden were ordered up. The orders failed to reach the latter, but, at six o'clock in the morning, the former arrived on the position with the infantry of the fifth army, two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of the fourth division; the third brigade, under colonel Kemmis, being unable to cross the Guadiana, above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenpha. The Spanish troops immediately joined Blake on the right, the two brigades of the fourth

division, were drawn up in columns behind the second division, and the Portuguese squadrons reinforced colonel Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed forward in front of the left wing. The mass of the cavalry was concentrated behind the centre, and Beresford, dissatisfied with general Long, ordered general Lumley to assume the chief command.

The position was now occupied by thirty thousand infantry, above two thousand cavalry, and thirty-eight pieces of artillery, of which eighteen were nine-pounders; but, the brigade of the fourth division being still absent, the British infantry, the pith and strength of battle, did not exceed seven thousand, and already Blake's arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority. The French had fifty guns, and above four thousand veteran cavalry, but only nineteen thousand chosen infantry; yet being of one nation, obedient to one discipline, and animated by one spirit, their excellent composition amply compensated for the inferiority of numbers, and their general's talent was immeasurably greater than his adversary's.

Soult examined Beresford's position, without hindrance, on the evening of the 15th, and having heard that the fourth division was left before Badajos, and that Blake would not arrive before the 17th, he resolved to attack the next morning, for he had detected all the weakness of the English general's position of battle.

The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was undoubtedly the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to the front. But the heights on the right presented a rough sort of broken tableland, tending backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking into the rear of the line of battle; hence it was evident that, if a mass of troops could be placed there, they must be beaten, or the right wing of the allied army would be rolled up on the centre and pushed into the narrow valley of the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be seized, the retreat cut, and the powerful cavalry of the French would complete the victory. Now the right of the allies and the left of the French approximated to each other, being only divided by a hill, about cannon-shot distance from either but separated from the allies by the Albuera, and from the French by a rivulet called the Feria. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult. During the night he placed behind it, the artillery under general Rutly, the fifth corps under Girard, and the heavy dragoons under Latour Maubourg. He thus concentrated fifteen thousand men and forty guns within ten minutes' march of Beresford's right wing, and yet that general could neither see a man nor draw a sound conclusion as to the real plan of attack.

The light cavalry, the brigades of Godinot and Werlé, and ten guns, still remained at the French marshal's disposal. These he formed in the woods, extending along the banks of the Feria towards its confluence with the Albuera. Werlé was to keep in reserve; but Godinot was to attack the village and bridge, and to bear strongly against the centre of the position, with a view to attract Beresford's attention, to separate his wings, and to double up his right at the moment when the principal attack should be developed.

BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

During the night, Blake and Cole, as we have seen, arrived with above sixteen thousand men, but so defective was the occupation of the ground, that Soult had no change to make in his plans from this circumstance, and, a little before nine o'clock in the morning, Godinot's division issued from the woods in one heavy column of attack, preceded by ten guns. He was flanked by the right cavalry, and followed by Werlé's division of reserve, and, making straight towards the bridge, commenced a sharp cannonade, attempting to

force the passage; at the same time Briché, with two regiments of hussars, drew further down the river to observe colonel Otway's horse.

Dickson's guns posted on the rising ground above the village answered the fire of the French, and ploughed through their columns, which were crowding without judgement towards the bridge, although the stream was passable above and below. Beresford observing that Werlé's division did not follow closely, was soon convinced that the principal effort would be on the right, and he, therefore, ordered Blake to form a part of the first and all the second line of the Spanish army, on the broad part of the hills, at right angles to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the left wing to the centre, he sent one brigade down to support Alten, and directed general Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns of battalions, ready to move to any part of the field. The thirteenth dragoons were posted near the edge of the river, above the bridge, and, meanwhile, the second division marched to support Blake. The horse-artillery, the heavy dragoons, and the fourth division also took ground to the right, and were posted, the cavalry and guns on a small plain behind the Aroya, and the fourth division in an oblique line about half musket shot behind them. This done, Beresford galloped to Blake, for that general had refused to change his front, and, with great heat, told colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order, that the real attack was at the village and bridge. Beresford had sent again to entreat that he would obey, but this message was as fruitless as the former, and, when the marshal arrived, nothing had been done. The enemy's columns were, however, now beginning to appear on the right, and Blake yielding to this evidence, proceeded to make the evolution, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford, impatient of his folly, took the direction in person.

Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, and ere the troops were completely formed the French were amongst them. For scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten's brigade, when Werlé, leaving only a battalion of grenadiers and some squadrons to watch the thirteenth dragoons and to connect the attacks, countermarched with the remainder of his division, and rapidly gained the rear of the fifth corps as it was mounting the hills on the right of the allies. At the same time the mass of light cavalry suddenly quitted Godinot's column, and crossing the river Albuera above the bridge, ascended the left bank at a gallop, and, sweeping round the rear of the fifth corps, joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in face of Lumley's squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render Beresford's position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of the French were in a compact order of battle on a line perpendicular to his right, and his army, disordered and composed of different nations, was still in the difficult act of changing its front. It was in vain that he endeavoured to keep the Spanish line sufficiently in advance to give room on the summit of the hill for the second division to support it; the French guns opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry fire, and their cavalry, outflanking the front, and menacing to charge here and there, put the Spaniards in disorder at all points, they fell fast, and they gave back. Soult, thinking the whole army was yielding, then pushed forward his columns, his reserves mounted the hill behind him, and general Rutly placed all the batteries in position.

At this critical moment general William Stewart arrived at the foot of the height, with colonel Colborne's brigade, which formed the head, and was the most advanced part of the second division. The colonel, seeing the confusion above, desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting the ascent, but Stewart, whose boiling courage overlaid his judgement, led up,

without hesitation, in column of companies, and having passed the Spanish right, attempted to open out his line in succession as the battalions arrived at the summit. Being under a destructive fire the foremost troops charged, but a heavy rain prevented any object from being distinctly seen, and four regiments of hussars and lancers, which had turned the right flank in the obscurity, came galloping in upon the rear of the line at the instant of its development, and slew or took two-thirds of the brigade. One battalion only (the thirty-first) being still in column, escaped the storm and maintained its ground, while the French horsemen, riding violently over every thing else, penetrated to all parts, and captured six guns. In the tumult, a lancer fell upon Beresford; the marshal, a man of great strength, putting his spear aside cast him from his saddle, and a shift of wind blowing aside the mist and smoke, the mischief was perceived from the plains by general Lumley, who sent four squadrons out upon the lancers and cut many of them off. Penne Villemur's cavalry were also directed to charge, and galloped forward, but when within a few yards wheeled round and fled.

During this first unhappy effort of the second division, so great was the disorder, that the Spanish line continued to fire without cessation, although the British were before them. Beresford, finding his exhortations to advance, fruitless, seized an ensign and bore him and his colours, by main force, to the front, yet the troops would not follow, and the man went back again on being released. In this crisis, the weather, which had ruined Colborne's brigade, also prevented Soult from seeing the whole extent of the field of battle, and he still kept his heavy columns together. His cavalry, indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, but the fire of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed of the Aroya and supported by the fourth division, to check them on the plain, Colborne still remained on the height with the thirty-first regiment, the British artillery, under major Julius Hartman, was coming fast into action, and William Stewart, who had escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill with general Houghton's brigade, which he brought on with the same vehemence, but, instructed by his previous misfortune, in a juster order of battle. The weather now cleared, and a dreadful fire poured into the thickets of the French columns convinced Soult that the day was yet to be won.

Houghton's regiments reached the height under a very heavy cannonade, and the twenty-ninth regiment was charged on the flank by the lancers, but major Way, wheeling back two companies, foiled their attack with a sharp fire. The remaining brigade of the second division then came up on the left, and the Spanish corps of Zayas and Ballasteros at last moved forward. Hartman's artillery was now in full play, and the enemy's infantry recoiled, but soon recovering, renewed the fight with greater violence than before. The cannon on both sides discharged showers of grape at half range, the peals of musketry were incessant, and often within pistol-shot, but the close formation of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would not yield them one inch of ground, nor a moment of time to open their ranks. Their fighting was, however, fierce and dangerous. Stewart was twice wounded, colonel Duckworth, of the forty-eighth, was slain, and the gallant Houghton, who had received many wounds without shrinking, fell and died in the act of cheering his men. Still the struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, twenty-two officers, and more than four hundred men, out of five hundred and seventy that had mounted the hill, fell in the fifty-seventh alone, and the other regiments were scarcely better off; not one-third were standing in any, their ammunition failed,

and as the English fire slackened, the enemy established a column in advance upon the right flank. The play of the artillery indeed checked them a moment, but in this dreadful crisis Beresford wavered! Destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated mind. He had before brought Hamilton's Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement, and he now sent orders to general Alten to abandon the bridge and village of Albuera, and to assemble with the Portuguese artillery, in such a position as would cover a retreat by the Valverde road. But while the marshal was thus preparing to resign the contest, colonel Hardinge boldly ordered general Cole to advance with the fourth division, and then riding to that brigade of the second division which was under the command of colonel Abercrombie, and which had been only slightly engaged, directed him also to push forward into the fight. The die being thus cast, Beresford acquiesced, Alten received orders to retake the village, and this terrible battle was continued.

The fourth division was composed of two brigades, the one of Portuguese under general Harvey, the other commanded by sir William Myers, consisted of the seventh and twenty-third regiments, and was called the fuzileer brigade. Harvey's Portuguese being immediately pushed in between Lumley's dragoons and the hill, were charged by some French cavalry, whom they beat off, and meanwhile general Cole led the fuzileers up the contested height. At this time six guns were in the enemy's possession, the whole of Werlé's reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column of the French, the remnant of Houghton's brigade could no longer maintain its ground, the field was heaped with carcasses, the lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the upper parts of the hill, and behind all, Hamilton's Portuguese and Alten's Germans, withdrawing from the bridge, seemed to be in full retreat. Cole's fuzileers, flanked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion under colonel Hawkshawe, soon mounted the hill, drove off the lancers, recovered five of the captured guns and one colour, and appeared on the right of Houghton's brigade precisely as Abercrombie passed it on the left.

Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke, and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy's heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory: they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed, Cole, the three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and the fuzileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled, and staggered like sinking ships. But suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult, by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes while the horsemen hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order, their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the

tumultuous crowd, as slowly and with a horrid carnage, it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the height. There, the French reserve, mixing with the struggling multitude, endeavoured to sustain the fight, but the effort only increased the irremediable confusion, the mighty mass gave way and like a loosened cliff went headlong down the steep. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and fifteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill!

CHAPTER VII.

Continuation of the battle of Albuera—Dreadful state of both armies—Soult retreats to Solano—General Hamilton resumes the investment of Badajos—Lord Wellington reaches the field of battle—Third and seventh divisions arrive—Beresford follows Soult—The latter abandons the castle of Villalba and retreats to Lereña—Cavalry action at Usagre—Beresford quits the army—General Hill reassumes the command of the second division, and Lord Wellington renews the siege of Badajos—Observations.

WHILE the fuzileers were striving on the height, the cavalry and Harvey's brigade continually advanced, and Latour Maubourg's dragoons, battered by Lefebvre's guns, retired before them, yet still threatening the fuzileers with their right, while with their left they prevented Lumley's horsemen from falling on the defeated infantry. Beresford, seeing that colonel Hardinge's decision had brought on the critical moment of the battle, then endeavoured to secure a favourable result. Alten's Germans were ordered to retake the village, which they effected with some loss. Blake's first line, which had not been at all engaged, was directed to support them, and Hamilton's and Collins's Portuguese, forming a mass of ten thousand fresh men, were brought up to support the attack of the fuzileers and Abercrombie's brigade; and at the same time the Spanish divisions of Zayas, Ballasteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was the execution of the fuzileers, that the enemy's infantry were never attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; for general Rutly got the French guns all together, and worked them with prodigious activity, while the fifth corps still made head; and when the day was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera, and protected the passage of the broken infantry.

Beresford, being too hardly handled to pursue, formed a fresh line with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had advanced to the attack in the morning, and where the French troops were now rallying with their usual celerity. Meanwhile the fight continued at the bridge, but Godinot's division and the connecting battalion of grenadiers on that side were soon afterwards withdrawn, and the action terminated before three o'clock.

The serious fighting had endured only four hours, and in that space of time, nearly seven thousand of the allies and above eight thousand of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be left on the field. On Beresford's side only two thousand Spaniards, and six hundred Germans and Portuguese, were killed or wounded, and hence it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they had only fifteen hundred men left standing! The laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it on his bleeding front.

The trophies of the French were five hundred unwounded prisoners, a howitzer, and several stand of

colours. The British had nothing of that kind to boast of, but the horrid piles of carcasses within their lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who were the conquerors; and all the night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the woods on each side, resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of dying men. Beresford, obliged to place his Portuguese in the front line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded; they far exceeded that of the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the latter's picquets were established, few men remained to help the sufferers. In this cruel situation he sent colonel Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake; but wrath and mortified pride were predominant in that general's breast, and he refused, saying, it was customary with allied armies, for each to take care of its own men.

Morning came, and both sides remained in their respective situations, the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines still menacing and dangerous. The greater multitude had fallen on the French part, but the best soldiers on that of the allies, and the dark masses of Soult's powerful cavalry and artillery, as they covered all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the victory: the right of the French also appeared to threaten the Badajos road, and Beresford, in gloom and doubt, awaited another attack. On the 17th, however, the third brigade of the fourth division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha, and enabled the second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde and the Badajos roads. On the 18th, Soult retreated.

He left to the generosity of the English general several hundred men too deeply wounded to be removed, but all that could travel he had, in the night of the 17th, sent towards Seville, by the royal road, through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio. Protecting his movements with all his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he filed the army, in the morning, to its right, and gained the road of Solano. When this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briche protected the march of the wounded men by the royal road.

The duke of Dalmatia remained the 19th at Solano. His intention was to hold a position in Estremadura until he could receive reinforcements from Andalusia; for he judged truly that, although Beresford was in no condition to hurt Badajos, lord Wellington would come down, and that fresh combats would be required to save that fortress. On the 14th he had commenced repairing the castle of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa Marta, and he now continued this work, designing to form a head of cantonments, that the allies would be unable to take before the French army could be reinforced.

When Beresford discovered the enemy's retreat, he despatched general Hamilton to make a show of re-investing Badajos, which was effected at day-break the 19th, but on the left bank only. Meanwhile the allied cavalry, supported by Alten's Germans, followed the French line of retreat. Soult then transferred his head-quarters to Fuente del Maestre, and the Spanish cavalry, cutting off some of his men, menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington reached the field of battle the same day, and, after examining the state of affairs, desired the marshal to follow the enemy cautiously; then returning to Elvas himself, he directed the third and seventh divisions, which were already at Campo Mayor, to complete the re-investment of Badajos on the right bank.

Meanwhile Beresford advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, where he found some more wounded men. His further progress was not opposed. The number of officers who had fallen in the French army, together with the privations endured, had produced de-

spondence and discontent; the garrison at Villalba was not disposed to maintain the castle, and under these circumstances, the duke of Dalmatia evacuated it, and continued his own retreat in the direction of Llerena, where he assumed a position on the 23d, and placed his cavalry near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road to Seville was a well-considered movement. The country through which Soult passed being more fruitful and open, he could draw greater advantage from his superior cavalry, the mountains behind him were so strong he had nothing to fear from an attack, and by Belalcázar and Almadén, he could maintain a communication with La Mancha, from whence he expected Drouet's division. The road of Guadalcanal was in his rear, by which he could draw reinforcements from Córdoba and from the fourth corps, and meanwhile the allies durst not venture to expose their left flank by marching on Monasterio.

From Llerena, a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish Partida corps which had cut his communications with Guadalcanal, and at the same time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country beyond Usagre; this led to an action. The town, built upon a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river with steep and rugged banks, had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side, and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley retired across the river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank, with the intention of crossing lower down and thus covering the passage of the heavy horsemen; but before they could effect this object, general Bron rashly passed the river with two regiments of dragoons, and drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was, however, lying close behind a rising ground, and when the French regiments had advanced a sufficient distance, Lefebvre's guns opened on them, and the third, and fourth dragoon guards, charged them in front while Madden's Portuguese fell on their flank. They were overthrown at the first shock, and fled towards the bridge, which being choked with the remainder of the cavalry advancing to their support, the fugitives turned to the right and left, and endeavoured to save themselves amongst some gardens situated on the banks of the river; they were however, pursued and sabred until the French on the opposite side, seeing their distress, checked the attack by a fire of carbines and artillery. Some wounded prisoners were taken, but a Guerilla party which had not joined in the attack suddenly massacred them. However above forty killed in fair fight, and more than a hundred wounded, attested the vigour of Lumley's conduct in this affair, which terminated Beresford's operations, for the miserable state to which the Regency had reduced the Portuguese army imperatively called for the marshal's presence elsewhere.* General Hill, who had returned to Portugal, then re-assumed the command of the second division, amidst the eager rejoicings of the troops, and lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of Badajos in person.

OBSERVATIONS.

No general ever gained a great battle with so little increase of military reputation as marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army withered his laurels, and his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated, without change and without abatement, even to this hour; and a close examination of his operations, while it detects many ill-founded objections, and others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general feeling was right.

* Madden's Memoir, Military Calendar.

When he had passed the Guadiana and driven the fifth corps upon Guadalcanal, the delay that intervened, before he invested Badajos, was unjustly attributed to him: it was lord Wellington's order, resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, that paralyzed his operations. But when the time for action arrived, the want of concert in the investment, and the ill-matured attack on San Christoval belonged to Beresford's arrangements; and he is especially responsible in reputation for the latter, because captain Squire earnestly warned him of the inevitable result, and his words were unheeded.

During the progress of the siege, either the want of correct intelligence, or a blunted judgement, misled the marshal. It was remarked that, at all times, he too readily believed the idle tales of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which the spies generally, and the deserters always, interlarded their information: thus he was incredulous of Soult's enterprise, and that officer was actually over the Morena before the orders were given to commence the main attack of the castle of Badajos. However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable and praiseworthy. It would have been happy if he had shewn as much magnanimity in what followed.

When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alternative of fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was the subject of consideration. The Spanish generals were both in favour of giving battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived, without danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to fight, affirming that his troops, who were already in a miserable state, would disperse entirely if they were obliged to enter Portugal. Castaños was of the same opinion. Beresford also argued that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, and ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; that a retreat would endanger Elvas, lay open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to push his incursions further, which he could safely do, having such a fortress as Badajos with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear. A battle must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer troops and after a dispiriting retreat; there was also a greater scarcity of food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province, and, finally, as the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the stores were carried over, when the latter must be abandoned, or the army endangered to protect their passage.

But these plausible reasons were but a mask. The true cause why the English general adopted Blake's proposals was the impatient temper of the British troops. None of them had been engaged in the late battles under lord Wellington. At Busaco the regiments of the fourth division were idle spectators on the left, as those of the second division were on the right, while the action was in the centre. During Massena's retreat they had not been employed under fire, and the combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without them. Thus a burning thirst for battle was general, and Beresford had not the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and unjust clamour would have been raised against him, and this was so strongly and unceremoniously represented to him, by an officer on his own staff, that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral obstacles of war. Such men as lord Wellington or sir John Moore can stride over them, but to second-rate minds they are insuperable. Practice and study may make a good general as far as the handling of troops and the designing of a campaign, but that ascendancy of

spirit which leads the wise, and controis the insolence of folly, is a rare gift of nature.

Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility to the clamour of the army and the representations of Blake, for it is unquestionable that the resolution to fight was unwarrantable on any sound military principle. We may pass over the argument founded upon the taking of Badajos, because neither the measures nor the means of the English general promised the slightest chance of success; the siege would have died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on. The true question to consider was, not whether Estremadura should be deserted or Badajos abandoned, but whether lord Wellington's combinations and his great and well considered design for the deliverance of the Peninsula, should be ruined and defaced at a blow. To say that the Alemtejo could not have been defended until the commander-in-chief arrived from the north with reinforcements was mere trifling. Soult, with twenty or even thirty thousand men, dared not have attempted the siege of Elvas in the face of twenty-four thousand men such as Beresford commanded. The result of the battle of Fuentes Onoro was known in the English and in the French camps, before Beresford broke up from Badajos, hence he was certain that additional troops would soon be brought down to the Guadiana; indeed, the third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo Mayor the 23d of May. The danger to the Alemtejo was, therefore, slight, and the necessity of a battle being by no means apparent, it remains to analyze the chances of success.

Soult's numbers were not accurately known, but it was ascertained that he had not less than twenty thousand veteran troops; he had also a great superiority of cavalry and artillery, and the country was peculiarly suitable for these arms. The martial character of the man was also known. Now the allies could bring into the field more of infantry by ten thousand than the French, but they were of various tongues, and the Spanish part, ill armed, starving, and worn out with fatigue, had been repeatedly and recently defeated by the very troops they were going to engage. The French were compact, swift of movement, inured to war, used to act together, and under the command of one able and experienced general. The allied army was unwieldy, each nation mistrusting the other, and the whole without unity of spirit, or of discipline, or of command. On what, then, could marshal Beresford found his hopes of success? The British troops. The latter were therefore to be freely used. But was it a time to risk the total destruction of two superb divisions and to encounter a certain and heavy loss of men, whose value he knew so well when he calculated upon them alone for victory in such circumstances?

To resolve on battle was, however, easier than to prepare for it with skill. Albuera, we have seen, was the point of concentration. Colonel Colborne's brigade did not arrive until the 14th, and there was no certainty that it could arrive before the enemy did. Blake did not arrive until three in the morning of the 16th. The fourth division not until six o'clock. Kemmis with three fine British regiments, and Madden's cavalry, did not come at all. These facts prove that the whole plan was faulty, it was mere accident that a sufficient force to give battle was concentrated. Beresford was too late, and the keeping up the investment of Badajos, although laudable in one sense, was a great error; it was only an accessory, and yet the success of the principal object was made subservient to it. If Soult, instead of passing by Villa Franca, in his advance, had pushed straight on from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived the 15th, when Beresford had not much more than half his force in position; the point of concentration would then have been lost, and the allies scattered in all directions. If the French had even

continued their march by Solano instead of turning upon Albuera, they must inevitably have communicated with Badajos, unless Beresford had fought without waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis's brigade. Why, then, did the French marshal turn out of the way to seek a battle, in preference to attaining his object without one? and why did he neglect to operate by his right or left until the unwieldy allied army should separate or get into confusion, as it inevitably would have done? Because the English general's dispositions were so faulty that no worse error could well be expected from him, and Soult had every reason to hope for a great and decided victory; a victory which would have more than counterbalanced Massena's failure. He knew that only one-half of the allied force was at Albuera on the 15th, and when he examined the ground, every thing promised the most complete success.

Marshal Beresford had fixed upon and studied his own field of battle above a month before the action took place, and yet occupied it in such a manner as to render defeat almost certain; his infantry were not held in hand, and his inferiority in guns and cavalry was not compensated for by entrenchments. But were any other proofs of error wanting, this fact would suffice, he had a greater strength of infantry on a field of battle scarcely three miles long, ten thousand of his troops never fired a shot, and three times the day was lost and won, the allies being always fewest in number at the decisive point. It is true that Blake's conduct was very perplexing; it is true that general William Stewart's error cost one brigade, and thus annihilated the command of colonel Colborne, a man capable of turning the fate of a battle even with fewer troops than those swept away from him by the French cavalry: but the neglect of the hill beyond the Albuera, fronting the right of the position, was Beresford's own error and a most serious one; so also were the successive attacks of the brigades, and the hesitation about the fourth division. And where are we to look for that promptness in critical moments which marks the great commander? It was colonel Hardinge that gave the fourth division and Abercrombie's brigade, orders to advance, and it was their astounding valour in attack, and the astonishing firmness of Houghton's brigade in defence that saved the day. The person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen every where, a gallant soldier! but the mind of the great commander was seen no where.

Beresford remained master of the field of battle, but he could not take Badajos, that prize was the result of many great efforts, and many deep combinations by a far greater man; neither did he clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained positions from Llerena to Usagre. What then did he gain? The power of simulating a renewal of the siege, and holding his own cantonments on the left bank of the Guadiana; I say simulating, for, if the third and seventh divisions had not arrived from Beira, even the investment could not have been completed. These illusive advantages he purchased at the price of seven thousand men. With a smaller loss lord Wellington had fought two general and several minor actions, had baffled Massena and turned seventy thousand men out of Portugal!

Such being the fruit of victory, what would have been the result of defeat? There was no retreat, save by the temporary bridge of Jerumenha, and had the hill on the right been carried in the battle, the Valverde road would have been in Soult's possession, and the line of retreat cut; had it even been otherwise, Beresford, with four thousand victorious French cavalry at his heels, could never have passed the river. Back, then, must have come the army from the north, the Lines of Lisbon would have been once more occupied—a French force fixed on the

south of the Tagus—Spain ruined—Portugal laid prostrate—England in dismay. Could even the genius of lord Wellington have recovered such a state of affairs? And yet, with these results, the terrible balance hung for two hours, and twice trembling to the sinister side, only yielded at last to the superlative vigour of the fusileers. The battle should never have been fought. The siege of Badajos could not have been renewed without reinforcements, and, with them, it could have been renewed without an action, or at least without risking an unequal one.

But would even the bravery of British soldiers have saved the day, at Albuera, if the French general had not also committed great errors. His plan of attack and his execution of it, up to the moment when the Spanish line fell back in disorder, cannot be too much admired; after that, the great error of fighting in dense columns being persisted in beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered to the arms of France. Had the fifth corps opened out while there was time to do so, that is, between the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance of Houghton's brigade, what on earth could have saved Beresford from a total defeat? The fire of the enemy's columns alone destroyed two-thirds of his British troops; the fire of their lines would have swept away all!

It has been said that Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second Soult with sufficient vigour, the latter certainly did not display any great energy, but the village was maintained by Alten's Germans, who were good and hardy troops, and well backed up by a great body of Portuguese. Latour Maubourg's movements seem to have been objected to without reason. He took six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and overthrew a whole brigade of the British, without ceasing to keep in check their cavalry. He was, undoubtedly, greatly superior in numbers, but general Lumley handled the allied squadrons with skill and courage, and drew all the advantage possible from his situation, and, in the choice of that situation, none can deny ability to marshal Beresford. The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed of the Aroya in their front, the aid of the horse-artillery, and the support of the fourth division, were all circumstances of strength so well combined that nothing could be better, and they dictated Latour Maubourg's proceedings, which seem consonant to true principles. If he had charged in mass, under the fire of Lefebvre's guns, he must have been thrown into confusion in passing the bed of the Aroya at the moment when the fourth division, advancing along the slopes, would have opened a musketry on his right flank; Lumley could then have charged, or retired up the hill, according to circumstances. In this case, great loss might have been sustained, and nothing very decisive could have accrued to the advantage of the French, because no number of cavalry, if unsustained by infantry and artillery, can make a serious impression against the three arms united. It was therefore another error in Soult not to have joined some guns and infantry to his cavalry, when he perceived that his enemy had done so on the other part. Ten guns and half the infantry, uselessly slaughtered in columns on the height above, would have turned the scale of battle below, for it is certain that when the fusileers came up the hill, Houghton's brigade was quite exhausted, and the few men standing were without ammunition; but if a French battery and a body of infantry had been joined to the French cavalry the fusileers could not have moved.

On the other hand, seeing that he was not so strengthened, a repulse might have been fatal not only to himself but to the French infantry on the hill, as their left would have been open to the enterprises of the allied cavalry. If Latour Maubourg had stretched away to his own left, he would, in like manner, have

exposed the flank of Soult's infantry, and his movements would have been eccentric, and contrary to sound principles; and, (in the event of a disaster to the corps on the hill, as really happened,) destructive to the safety of the retreating army. By keeping in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons from time to time, as favourable opportunities offered for partial charges, he gained, as we have seen, great advantages during the action, and kept his troopers well in hand for the decisive moment; finally, he covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. Still it may be admitted that, with such superior numbers, he should have more closely pressed Lumley.

When Soult had regained the hills at the other side of the Albuera, the battle ceased, each side being, as we have seen, so hardly handled that neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the greatest failure of the French commander; he had lost eight thousand men, but he had still fifteen thousand under arms, his artillery and his cavalry being, comparatively, untouched. On the side of the allies, only eighteen hundred British infantry were left standing, and the troops were suffering greatly from famine; the Spaniards had been feeding on horse-flesh, and were so extenuated by continual fatigue and misery, that, for several days previous to the battle, they had deserted in considerable numbers even to the French, hoping thus to get food: these circumstances should be borne in mind, when reflecting on their conduct in the battle; under such a commander as Blake, and, while enduring such heavy privations, it was a great effort of resolution, and honourable to them that they fought at all. Their resistance feeble, when compared to the desperate

valour of the British, was by no means weak in itself or infirm; nor is it to be wondered at that men so exhausted and so ill managed should have been deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations they probably did not understand. When the fortune of the day changed they followed the fusiliers with alacrity, and at no period did they give way with dishonour.

Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they were not and could not be equal to a second desperate struggle; a renewed attack on the 17th, would have certainly ended in favour of the French, and so conscious was Beresford of this, that, on the evening of the 16th, he wrote to lord Wellington, avowing that he anticipated a certain and ruinous defeat the next day. The resolution with which he maintained the position notwithstanding, was the strongest indication of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations; had Soult only persisted in holding his position with equal pertinacity, Beresford must have retired. It was a great and decided mistake of the French marshal not to have done so. There is nothing more essential in war than a confident front; a general should never acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front line of an army always looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom see the real state of what is behind. The importance of this maxim is finely indicated in Livy, where he relates that, after a drawn battle, a god called out, in the night, the Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans! Hereupon the former retired, and the latter, remaining on the field, gathered all the fruits of a real victory.

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington's sieges vindicated—Operations in Spain—State of Galicia—Change of commanders—Bonet's operations in the Asturias—Activity of the Partidas—their system of operations—Mina captures a large convoy at Arlaban—Bessieres contracts his position—Bonet abandons the Asturias—Santocildes advances into Leon—French dismantle Astorga—Skirmish on the Orbigo—General inefficiency of the Gallicians and Asturians—Operations in the eastern provinces—State of Aragon—State of Catalonia—State of Valencia—Suchet marches against Tortosa—Fails to burn the boat-bridge there—M'Donald repulses at Gerona—The Valencians and Catalonians combine operations against Suchet—O'Donnell enters Tortosa—Makes a sally and is repulsed—The Valencians defeated near Uldecona—Operations of the seventh corps—M'Donald reforms the discipline of the troops—Marches with a convoy to Barcelona—Returns to Gerona and dismantles the out-works of that place—O'Donnell's plans—M'Donald marches with a second convoy—Reaches Barcelona and returns to Gerona—Marches with a third convoy—Forces the pass of Ordal—Enters Reus and opens the communications with Suchet.

WHILE marshal Beresford followed Soult towards Llerena lord Wellington recommenced the siege of Badajos, but the relation of that operation must be delayed until the transactions which occurred in Spain, during Massena's invasion of Portugal, have been noticed, for it is not by following one stream of action that a just idea of this war can be obtained. Many of lord Wellington's proceedings might be called rash,

and others timid, and slow, if taken separately; yet, when viewed as parts of a great plan for delivering the whole Peninsula, they will be found discreet or daring, as the circumstances warranted: nor is there any portion of his campaigns, that requires this wide-based consideration, more than his early sieges; which, being instituted contrary to the rules of art, and unsuccessful, or, when successful, attended with a mournful slaughter, have given occasion for questioning his great military qualities, which were however, then most signally displayed.

OPERATIONS IN SPAIN.

In the northern provinces the events were of little interest. Galicia after the failure of Renouales' expedition and the shipwreck that followed, became torpid; the junta disregarded general Walker's exhortations, and, although he furnished vast supplies, the army, nominally twenty thousand strong, mustered only six thousand in the field: there was no cavalry, and the infantry kept close in the mountains about Villa Franca, while a weak French division occupied the rich plains of Leon.* General Mahi having refused to combine his operations with those of the Anglo-Portuguese army, was thought to be disaffected, and at the desire of the British authorities had been removed

* Official abstract of general Walker's despatches.

to make way for the duke of Albuquerque: he was however immediately appointed to the command of Murcia, by Blake, in defiance of the remonstrances of Mr. Wellesley, for Blake disregarded the English influence.*

When Albuquerque died, Galicia fell to Castaños, and while that officer was co-operating with Beresford in Estremadura, Santo-cildes assumed the command. Meanwhile Caffarelli's reserve having joined the army of the north, Santana was fortified, and Bessieres, as I have before observed, assembled seven thousand men at Zamora to invade Galicia.

In the Asturias, Bonet, although harassed, on the side of Potes, by the Guerillas from the mountains of Liebaña; and on the coast by the English frigates, remained at Oviedo, and maintained his communications by the left with the troops in Leon. In November 1810 he defeated a considerable body of insurgents, and in February 1811 the Spanish general St. Pol retired before him with the regular forces, from the Xalon to the Navia; but this retreat caused such discontent in Galicia that St. Pol advanced again on the 19th March, and was again driven back.† Bonet then dispersed the Partidas, and was ready to aid Bessieres' invasion of Galicia; and although the arrival of the allied forces on the Coa in pursuit of Massena stopped that enterprise, he made an incursion along the coast, seized the Spanish stores of English arms and clothing, and then returned to Oviedo. The war was, indeed, so little formidable to the French, that in May Santander was evacuated, and all the cavalry in Castile and Leon joined Massena for the battle of Fuentes Onoro, and yet the Gallician and Asturian regular armies gained no advantage during their absence.

The Partidas, who had re-assembled after their defeat by Bonet, were more active. Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Amor, and Merino cut off small French parties in the Montaña, in the Rioja, in Biscay, and in the Baston de Laredo; they were not, indeed, dangerous in action, nor was it very difficult to destroy them by combined movements, but these combinations were hard to effect, from the little accord amongst the French generals, and thus they easily maintained their posts at Espinosa de Monteres, Medina, and Villarcayo. Campillo was the most powerful after Porlier.‡ His principal haunts were in the valleys of Mena and Caranza; but he was in communication with Barbara, Honejas, and Curillas, petty chiefs of Biscay, with whom he concerted attacks upon couriers and weak detachments: and he sometimes divided his band into small parties, with which he overran the valleys of Gurieso, Soba, Carrado, and Jorrando, partly to raise contributions, partly to gather recruits, whom he forced to join him. His chief aim was, however, to intercept the despatches going from Bilbao to Santander, and for this purpose he used to infest Liendo between Ovira and Laredo, which he was enabled the more safely to do, because general Barthelemy, the governor of the Montaña, was forced to watch more earnestly towards the hilly district of Liebana, between Leon and the Asturias. This district was Porlier's strong hold, and that chief, under whom Campillo himself would at times act, used to cross the Deba and penetrate into the valleys of Cabuernigo, Rio Nauza, Cieza, and Buelna, and he obliged the people to fly to the mountains with their effects whenever the French approached: nevertheless the mass were tired of this guerilla system and tractable enough, except in Liebana.

To beat Campillo once or twice would have been sufficient to ruin him, but to ruin Porlier required great combinations. It was necessary to seize Espinosa, not that of Monteres, but a village in the mountains of Liebana, from whence the valleys all projected as from a point, and whence the troops could consequently act towards Potes with success. General Barthelemy proposed this plan to Drouet, then with the 9th corps on the Upper Douro, whom he desired to co-operate from the side of Leon, while Bonet did the same from the side of the Asturias: but though partially adopted, the execution was not effectually followed up, the districts of Liebana and Santander continued to be disturbed, and the chain of Partidas was prolonged through Biscay and the Rioja, to Navarre.

In this last province Mina had on the 22d of May defeated at the Puerto de Arlaban, near Vittoria, twelve hundred men who were escorting a convoy of prisoners and treasure to France; his success was complete, but alloyed by the death of two hundred of the prisoners, unfortunately killed during the tumult; and it was stained by the murder of six Spanish ladies, who, for being attached to French officers, were in cold blood executed after the fight.* Massena, whose baggage was captured, was to have travelled with this escort, but disliking the manner of the march, he remained in Vittoria until a better opportunity, and so escaped.

These partisan operations, combined with the descents on the coast, the aspect of the war in Estremadura, and the unprotected state of Castile, which was now menaced by Santo-cildes, were rendered more important by another event to be noticed hereafter: Bessieres therefore resolved to contract his position in the north; and first causing Reille and Caffarelli to scour Biscay and the Rioja, he ordered Bonet to abandon the Asturias. On the 14th of June that general, having dismantled the coast-batteries, sent his sick and baggage by sea to St. Ander and marched into Leon, where Santo-cildes, who had now increased the Gallician field army to thirteen thousand men, was menacing Astorga, which place the French evacuated after blowing up some of the works. Serras and Bonet then united on the Esla, and being supported by three thousand men from Rio Seco, skirmished at the Ponte de Orvigo on the 23d, but had the worst, and general Valletaux was killed on their side: and as lord Wellington's operations in Estremadura soon drew the French armies towards that quarter Santo-cildes held his ground at Astorga until August. Meanwhile two thousand French were thrown into Santana, and general Rognet coming, from the side of Burgos, with a division of the young guard, made a fruitless incursion against the Partidas of Liebana.

This system of warfare was necessarily harassing to the French divisions actually engaged, but it was evident that neither the Asturias nor Galicia could be reckoned as good auxiliaries to lord Wellington. Galicia with its lordly junta, regular army, fortified towns, rugged fastnesses, numerous population, and constant supplies from England, was of less weight in the contest than five thousand Portuguese militia conducted by Trant and Wilson. The irregular warfare was now also beginning to produce its usual effects; the tree though grafted in patriotism bore strange fruit. In Biscay, which had been longest accustomed to the presence of the invaders, the armed peasantry were often found fighting in the ranks of the enemy, and on one occasion did of themselves attack the boats of the *Amelia* frigate to save French military stores! Turning now to the other line of invasion, we shall find the contest fiercer, indeed, and more honourable to the Spaniards, but the result still more unfavourable to their cause.

* Official abstract of Mr. Wellesley's despatches, MSS.

† Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

‡ Intercepted letter of general Barthelemy to general Drouet, 1810. MSS.

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

It will be remembered that Suchet, after the fall of Mequinenza, was ordered to besiege Tortosa while Macdonald marched against Taragona. Massena was then concentrating his army for the invasion of Portugal, and it was the emperor's intention that Suchet should, after taking Tortosa, march with half of the third corps to support the prince of Esling. But the reduction of Tortosa proved a more tedious task than Napoleon anticipated, and as the course of events had now given the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon a common object, it will be well to compare their situation and resources with those of their adversary.

Suchet was completely master of Aragon, and not more by the force of his arms, than by the influence of his administration; the province was fertile, and so tranquil in the interior, that his magazines were all filled, and his convoys travelled under the care of Spanish commissaries and conductors. Mina was however in Navarre on his rear, and he communicated on the right bank of the Ebro with the Partidas in the mountains of Moncayo and Albaracin; and these last were occasionally backed by the Empecinado, Duran, and others whose strong-holds were in the Guadalupe, and who from thence infested Cuenca and the vicinity of Madrid. From Albaracin, Villa Campa continued the chain of partizan warfare and connected it with the Valencian army, which had also a line of operation towards Cuenca. Mina, who communicated with the English vessels in the bay of Biscay, received his supplies from Coruña; and the others, in like manner, corresponded with Valencia, from whence the English consul Tupper succoured them with arms, money, and ammunition. Thus a line was drawn quite across the Peninsula which it was in vain for the enemy to break, as the retreat was secure at both ends, and the excitement to renewed efforts constant.

On the other flank of Suchet's position the high valleys of the Pyrenees were swarming with small bands, forming a link between Mina and a division of the Catalonian army stationed about the Seu d'Urgel, which was a fortified castle, closing the passage leading from the plain of that name to the Cerdaña: this division in conjunction with Rovira, and other partizans, extended the irregular warfare on the side of Olot and Castelfolli to the Ampurdan; and the whole depended upon Taragona, which itself was supported by the English fleet in the Mediterranean. Aragon may therefore be considered as an invested fortress, which the Spaniards thought to reduce by famine, by assault, and by exciting the population against the garrison; but Suchet baffled them; he had made such judicious arrangements that his convoys were secure in the interior, and all the important points on the frontier circle were fortified, and connected, with Zaragoza, by chains of minor ports radiating from that common centre. Lerida, Mequinenza, and the plain of Urgel in Catalonia, the fort of Morella in Valencia, were his; and by fortifying Teruel and Alcanitz he had secured the chief passages leading through the mountains to the latter kingdom: he could thus, at will, invade either Catalonia or Valencia, and from Mequinenza he could, by water, transport the stores necessary to besiege Tortosa. Nor were these advantages the result of aught but his uncommon talents for war, a consideration which rendered them doubly formidable.

The situation of the French in Catalonia was different. Macdonald, who had assumed the command at the moment when Napoleon wished him to co-operate with Suchet, was inexperienced in the peculiar warfare of the province, and unprepared to execute any extended plan of operations. His troops were about Gerona and Hostalrich, which were in fact the bounds of the French conquest at this period; for Barcelona

was a military point beyond their field system, and only to be maintained by expeditions; and the country was so exhausted of provisions in the interior, that the army itself could only be fed by land-convoys from France, or by such coasters as, eluding the vigilance of the English cruisers, could reach Rosas, St. Filieu, and Palamos. Barcelona like the horse-leech continually cried for more, and as the inhabitants as well as the garrison depended on the convoys, the latter were enormous, reference being had to the limited means of the French general, and the difficulty of moving; for although the distance between Hostalrich and Barcelona was only forty miles, the road, as far as Granollers, was a succession of defiles, and crossed by several rivers, of which the Congosta and the Tordera were considerable obstacles; and the nature of the soil was clayey and heavy, especially in the defiles of the Trenta Pasos.

These things rendered it difficult for Macdonald to operate in regular warfare from his base of Gerona, and as the stores for the siege of Taragona were to come from France, until they arrived he could only make sudden incursions with light baggage, trusting to the resources still to be found in the open country, or to be gathered in the mountains by detachments which would have to fight for every morsel. This then was the condition of the French armies, that starting from separate bases, they had to operate on lines meeting at Tortosa. It remains to shew the situation of the Catalan general.

After the battle of Margalef, Henry O'Donnel reunited his scattered forces, and being of a stern unyielding disposition, not only repressed the discontent occasioned by that defeat, but forced the reluctant Migueletes to swell his ranks and to submit to discipline. Being assisted with money and arms by the British agents, and having free communication by sea with Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Minorca, he was soon enabled to reorganize his army, to collect vast magazines at Taragona, and to strengthen that place by new works. In July his force again amounted to twenty-two thousand men exclusive of the Partidas, and of the Somatenes, who were useful to aid in a pursuit, to break up roads, and to cut off straggling soldiers. Of this number one division under Campo Verde, was, as I have before said, in the higher valleys, having a detachment at Olot, and being supported by the fortified castles of Seu d'Urgel, Cardona, Solsona, and Berga. A second division was on the Llobregat, watching the garrison of Barcelona, and having detachments in Montserrat, Igualada, and Manresa to communicate with Campo Verde. The third division, the reserve and the cavalry were on the hills about Taragona, and that place and Tortosa had large garrisons.

By this disposition, O'Donnel occupied Falset, the Col de Balaguer, and the Col del Alba, which were the passages leading to Tortosa; the Col de Ribas and Momblanch, which commanded the roads to Lerida; San Coloma de Queralt and Igualada, through which his connection with Campo-Verde was maintained; and thus the two French armies were separated not only by the great spinal ridges descending from the Pyrenees, but by the position of the Spaniards, who held all the passes, and could at will concentrate and attack either Suchet or Macdonald.* But the Catalonian system was now also connected with Valencia, where, exclusive of irregulars, there were about fifteen thousand men under general Bassecour. That officer had in June occupied Cuenca, yet having many quarrels with his officers he could do nothing, and was driven from thence by troops from Madrid: he returned to Valencia, but the disputes continued

* General Doyle's correspondence, MSS. Colonel Green's do. MSS.

and extended to the junta or congress of Valencia, three members of which were by the general imprisoned.* Nevertheless, as all parties were now sensible that Valencia should be defended at Tortoza, Bassecour prepared to march to its succour by the coast road where he had several fortified posts. Thus, while Suchet and Macdonald were combining to crush O'Donnel, the latter was combining with Bassecour, to press upon Suchet; and there was always the English maritime force at hand to aid the attacks or to facilitate the escape of the Spaniards.

In the above exposition I have called the native armies by the names of their provinces, but in December 1810 the whole military force being reorganized by the regency the armies were designated by numbers. Thus the Catalonian forces, formerly called *the army of the right*, was now called *the first army*. The Valencians, together with Villa Campa's division, and the partidas of the Empecinado and Duran, were called the *second army*. The Murcian force was called the *third army*. The troops at Cadiz, at Algesiras, and in the Conde Niebla were called the *fourth army*. The remnants of Romana's old Gallician division which had escaped the slaughter on the Gebora formed the *fifth army*. The new-raised troops of Galicia and those of the Asturias were called the *sixth army*. And the partidas of the north, that is to say, Mina's, Longa's, Campillo's, Porlier's, and other smaller bands formed the *seventh army*.

Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon's order to besiege Tortoza arrived. Suchet was ready to execute it. More than fifty battering guns selected from those at Lerida were already equipped, and his depots were established at Mequinenza, Caspe, and Alcanitz. All the fortified posts were provisioned; twelve thousand men under general Musnier, intended for the security of Aragon, were disposed at Huesca and other minor points on the left bank of the Ebro, and at Daroca, Teruel, and Calatayud on the right bank; and while these arrangements were being executed, the troops destined for the siege had assembled at Lerida and Alcanitz, under generals Habert and Laval, their provisions being drawn from the newly conquered district of Urgel.

From Mequinenza, which was the principal depot, there was water-carriage, but as the Ebro was crossed at several points by rocky bars, some of which were only passable in full water, the communication was too uncertain to depend upon, and Suchet therefore set workmen to reopen an old road thirty miles in length, which had been made by the duke of Orleans during the war of the succession. This road pierced the mountains on the right bank of the Ebro, passed through Batea and other places to Mora, and from thence by Pinel to Tortoza, running through a celebrated defile called indifferently the *Trincheras* and the *Passage of Arms*. When these preliminary arrangements were made general Habert assembled his division at Belpuig near Lerida, and after making a feint as if to go towards Barcelona, suddenly turned to his right, and penetrating through the district of Garriga, reached Garcia on the left bank of the Lower Ebro the 5th of July. Laval at the same time quitted Alcanitz, made a feint towards Valencia by Morella, and then turning to his left, came so unexpectedly upon Tortoza by the right bank of the Ebro, that he surprised some of the outposts on the 2d, and then encamped before the bridge-head. The 4th he extended his line to Amposta, seized the ferry-boat of the great road from Barcelona to Valencia, and posted Boussard's cuirassiers, with a battalion of infantry and six guns, at Uldecona, on the Cenia river, to observe Bassecour's Valencians.

During these operations Suchet fixed his own quarters at Mora, and as the new road was not finished, he occupied Miravet, Pinel, and the Trincheras, on its intended line; and having placed flying bridges, with covering works, on the Ebro, at Mora and Xerta, made those places his depôt of siege. He likewise seized the craft on the river, established posts at Rapita, near the mouth of the Ebro, and made a fruitless attempt to burn the boat-bridge of Tortoza, with fire vessels. Following Napoleon's order, Macdonald should at this time have been before Taragona; but on the 9th, Suchet learned, from a spy, that the seventh corps was still at Gerona, and he thus found himself exposed alone to the combined efforts of the Catalans and Valencians. This made him repent of having moved from Aragon so soon, yet thinking it would be bad to retire, he resolved to blockade Tortoza; hoping to resist both O'Donnel and Bassecour until Macdonald could advance.

The Spaniards who knew his situation, sallied on the right bank the 6th and 8th, and on the 10th his outposts on the left bank were driven in at Tivisa by a division from Falcet, which, the next day, fell on his works at Mora, but was repulsed; and the 12th, general Paris pushed back the Spanish line, while Habert took post in force at Tivisa, by which he covered the roads to Xerta and Mora. O'Donoghue, who commanded Bassecour's advanced guard, now menaced Morella, but general Montmarie being detached to its succour, drove him away.

The 30th, O'Donnel having brought up fresh troops to Falcet, made a feint with ten thousand men against Tivisa, and then suddenly entered Tortoza, from whence at mid-day, on the 3d of August, he passed the bridge and fell with the bayonet on Laval's entrenchments. The French gave way at first, but soon rallied, and the Spaniards fearing for their communications regained the town in disorder, having lost two hundred prisoners besides killed and wounded.

This operation had been concerted with general Caro, who having superseded O'Donoghue, was now marching with the Valencians by the coast-road towards Uldecona: Suchet therefore, judging that the intention of the Spaniards was to force him away from the Lower Ebro, before Macdonald could pass the Llobregat, resolved first to strike a sudden blow at the Valencians, and then turn upon the Catalans. In this view he contracted his quarters on the Ebro, and united at Uldecona, on the 13th, eleven battalions with eight hundred horsemen. Caro was then in a strong position covering the two great routes to Valencia, but when the French, after driving in his advanced guard from Vinaros, came up, his Valencians would not stand a battle, and being followed beyond Pensicola separated and retreated in disorder by different roads. Whereupon Suchet returned to Mora, and there found an officer of Macdonald's army, who brought information that the seventh corps* was at last in the plains of Reus, and its communications with the third corps open.

OPERATIONS OF THE SEVENTH CORPS.

When Macdonald succeeded Augereau he found the troops in a state of insubordination, accustomed to plunder, and excited to ferocity by the cruelty of the Catalans, and by the conduct of his predecessor; they were without magazines or regular subsistence, and lived by exactions;* hence the people, driven to desperation, were more like wild beasts than men, and the war was repulsive to him in all its features. It was one of shifts and devices, and he better understood methodical movements; it was one of plunder, and he was a severe disciplinarian; it was full of cru-

* Official Abstracts of Mr. Wellesley's Despatches, MSS. Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

* Vacani. Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.

elty on all sides, and he was of a humane and just disposition. Being resolved to introduce regular habits, Macdonald severely rebuked the troops for their bad discipline and cruelty, and endeavoured to soothe the Catalans, but neither could be brought to soften in their enmity; the mutual injuries sustained, were too horrible and too recent to be forgiven. The soldiers, drawn from different countries, and therefore not bound by any common national feeling, were irritated against a general, who made them pay for wanton damages, and punished them for plundering; and the Catalans attributing his conduct to fear, because he could not entirely restrain the violence of his men, still fled from the villages, and still massacred his stragglers with unrelenting barbarity.*

While establishing his system it was impossible for Macdonald to take the field, because, without magazines, no army can be kept in due discipline; wherefore he remained about Gerona, drawing with great labour and pains his provisions from France, and storing up the overplus for his future operations. On the 10th of June however the wants of Barcelona became so serious, that leaving his baggage under a strong guard at Gerona, and his recruits and cavalry at Figueras, he marched with ten thousand men and a convoy, to its relief, by the way of the Trenta Pasos, Cardedieu, and Granollers. The road was heavy, the defiles narrow, the rivers swelled, and the manner of march rather too pompous for the nature of the war, for Macdonald took post in order of battle on each side of the defiles, while the engineers repaired the ways: in every thing adhered to his resolution of restoring a sound system; but while imitating the Jugurthine Metellus, he forgot that he had not Romans, but a mixed and ferocious multitude under his command, and he lost more by wasting of time, than he gained by enforcing an irksome discipline. Thus when he had reached Barcelona, his own provisions were expended, his convoy furnished only a slender supply for the city, and the next day he was forced to return with the empty carts in all haste to Gerona, where he resumed his former plan of action, and demolished the forts beyond that city.

In July he collected another convoy and prepared to march in the same order as before, for his intent was to form magazines in Barcelona sufficient for that city and his own supply, during the siege of Taragona; but meanwhile Suchet was unable to commence the siege of Tortosa, in default of the co-operation of the seventh corps; and Henry O'Donnel having gained time to re-organize his army and to re-establish his authority was now ready to interrupt the French marshal's march, proposing, if he failed, to raise a fresh insurrection in the Ampurdan, and thus give further occupation on that side. He had transferred a part of his forces to Caldas, Santa Coloma, and Bruñolas, taking nearly the same positions that Blake had occupied during the siege of Gerona; but the French detachments soon obliged him to concentrate again behind the defiles of the Congosta, where he hoped to stop the passage of the convoy; Macdonald, however, entered Hostalrich on the 16th, forced the Trenta Pasos on the 17th, and although his troops had only fifty rounds of ammunition he drove three thousand men from the pass of Garriga on the 18th, reached Barcelona that night, delivered his convoy, and returned immediately.

The French soldiers now became sickly from the hardships of a march rendered oppressive by the severity of their discipline, and many also deserted;† yet others who had before gone off, returned to their colours, reinforcements arrived from France, and the emperor's orders to take the field were becoming so pressing, that Macdonald, giving Baraguay d'Hilliers

the command of the Ampurdan, marched on the 8th of August with a third convoy for Barcelona, resolved at last to co-operate with Suchet. Instructed by experience he however moved this time with less formality, and having reached Barcelona the 11th, deposited his convoy, appointed Maurice Mathieu governor of that city, and on the 15th forced the pass of Ordal, and reached Villa Franca with about sixteen thousand men under arms. O'Donnel, still smarting from the affair at Tortosa, retired before him to Taragona without fighting, but directed Campo Verde to leave a body of troops under general Martinez in the mountains about Olot, and to move himself through Montserrat to the district of Garriga which lies between Lerida and Tortosa; meanwhile the seventh corps passed by Braffin and Valls into the plain of Reus, and as we have seen opened the communication with Suchet, but to how little purpose shall be shewn in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

O'Donnel withdraws his troops from Falcet and surrounds the seventh corps—M'Donald retires to Lerida—Arranges a new plan with Suchet—Ravages the plains of Urgel and the higher valleys—The people become desperate—O'Donnel cuts the French communication with the Ampurdan—Makes a forced march towards Gerona—Surprises Swartz at Abisbal—Takes Filieu and Palamos—Is wounded and returns to Taragona—Campo Verde marches to the Cerdana—M'Donald enters Solsona—Campo Verde returns—Combat of Cardona—The French retreat to Guisona, and the seventh corps returns to Gerona—M'Donald marches with a fourth convoy to Barcelona—Makes new roads—Advances to Reus—The Spaniards harass his flanks—He forages the Garriga district and joins the third corps—Operations of Suchet—General Leval dies—Operations of the Partidas—Plan of the secret junta to starve Aragon—General Chlopiski defeats Villa Campa—Suchet's difficulties—He assembles the notables of Aragon and reorganizes that province—He defeats and takes general Navarro at Falcet—Bassecour's operations—He is defeated at Uldecona.

As the Spanish general knew that the French could at Reus find provisions for only a few days, he withdrew his division from Falcet, and while Campo Verde, coming into the Garriga, occupied the passes behind them, and other troops were placed in the defiles between Valls and Villafranca, he held the main body of his army concentrated at Taragona, ready to fall upon Macdonald whenever he should move. This done, he became extremely elated, for like all Spaniards he imagined that to surround an enemy was the perfection of military operations. Macdonald cared little for the vicinity of the Catalan troops, but he had not yet formed sufficient magazines at Barcelona to commence the siege of Taragona, nor could he, as O'Donnel had foreseen, procure more than a few days supply about Reus, he therefore relinquished all idea of a siege and proposed to aid Suchet in the operation against Tortosa, if the latter would feed the seventh corps; and pending Suchet's decision he resolved to remove to Lerida.

The 25th of August leaving seven hundred sick men in Reus, he made a feint against the Col de Balaguer, but soon changing his direction marched upon Momblanch and the Col de Ribas: his rear-guard, composed of Italian troops, being overtaken near Aleover, offered battle at the bridge of Goy, but this the Spaniards declined, and they also neglected to secure the heights on each side, which the Italians immediately turned to account and so made their way to Pixamoxons. They were pursued immediately, and Sarsfield coming from the Lerida side disputed the passage of Pixamoxons; but Macdonald, keeping the troops from Taragona in check with a rear-guard, again sent his Italians up the hills on the flanks while he pushed his French troops against the front of the enemy, and so succeed-

* Vacani.

† Ibid.

ed; for the Italians quickly carried the heights, the rear-guard was very slightly pressed, the front was unopposed, and in two hours, the army reached Momblanch, whence after a short halt, it descended into the plains of Urgel.

Suchet being informed of this march came from Mora to confer with Macdonald, and they agreed that the seventh corps should have for its subsistence the magazines of Monzon and the plains of Urgel, which had not yet delivered its contributions. In return Macdonald lent the Neapolitan division to guard Suchet's convoys down the Ebro, and promised that the divisions of Severoli and Souham should cover the operations of the third corps, during the siege of Tortosa, by drawing the attention of the Catalan generals to the side of Cardona.

The seventh corps was now quartered about Tarega, Cervera, Guisona, and Agramunt, and Severola was detached with four thousand men over the Segre to enforce the requisitions about Talarn. He drove four hundred Swiss from the bridge of Tremp, and executed his mission, but with such violence that the people, becoming furious, assassinated the stragglers, and laid so many successful schemes of murder, that Macdonald was forced reluctantly to renew the executions and burnings of his predecessors.* Indeed, to feed an army forcibly when all things are paid for, will, in a poor and mountainous country, create soreness, because the things taken cannot easily be replaced; but with requisitions severity is absolutely necessary. In rich plains the inhabitants can afford to supply the troops and will do so, to avoid being plundered; but mountaineers having scarcely any thing besides food, and little of that, are immediately rendered desperate and must be treated as enemies or left in quiet.

While Severoli was ravaging Tremp and Talarn, general Eugenio marched with another Italian detachment towards Castelfollit, which had a French garrison, and Macdonald removed his own quarters to Cervera. Meanwhile O'Donnel, having replaced his division at Falcet to observe Suchet, distributed his other forces on the line of communication through San Coloma de Querault, Igualada, Montserrat, and Cardona; he thus cut off all connection between Macdonald and the Ampurdan, and enabled Campo Verde closely to follow the operations of the seventh corps, and that general seeing the French army separated, fell first upon the head-quarters at Cervera, but being unsuccessful, marched against Eugenio, and was by him also repulsed near Castelfollit. Eugenio, distinguished alike by his valour and ferocity, then returned with his booty to Agramunt, and afterwards invading Pons, spoiled and ravaged all that district without hindrance. The provisions obtained, were heaped up in Lerida and Balaguer; but while Macdonald was thus acting in the plain of Urgel, O'Donnel formed and executed the most skilful plan which had yet graced the Spanish arms.

We have seen that Baraguay d'Hilliers was left with eighteen or twenty thousand men in the Ampurdan, but these troops were necessarily scattered: seven hundred were at Palamos, San Filieu, and other small ports along the coast; twelve hundred, under general Swartz, were quartered in Abispal, one short march from Gerona, and two hundred were at Calonjé, connecting Abispal with Palamos; the rest were in Figueras, Rosas, Olot, Castelfollit, Gerona, and Hostalrich, and several thousand were in hospital. O'Donnel having exact knowledge of all this, left a small garrison in Taragona, placed the baron d'Errolles at Montserrat, colonel Georget at Igualada, and Obispo at Martorel, while with six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry he marched himself through the

mountains, by San Culgat to Mattaro on the sea-coast: then crossing the Tordera below Hostalrich, he moved rapidly by Vidreras to Llagostera which he reached the 12th of September. His arrival was unknown to Macdonald, or Maurice Mathieu, or Baraguay d'Hilliers, for though many reports of his intentions were afloat, most of them spread by himself, no person divined his real object: by some he was said to be gone against a French corps, which, from the side of Navarre, had entered the Cerdaña; by others that he was concentrating at Manresa, and many concluded that he was still in Taragona.

Having thus happily attained his first object, O'Donnel proceeded in his plan with a vigour of execution equal to the conception. Leaving Campo Verde with a reserve in the valley of Aro, he sent detachments to fall on Calonjé and the posts along the coast, the operations there being seconded by two English frigates; and while this was in progress, O'Donnel himself on the 14th marched violently down from Casa de Silva upon Abispal. Swartz, always unfortunate, had his infantry and some cavalry under arms in an entrenched camp, and accepted battle; but after losing two hundred men and seeing no retreat, yielded, and all the French troops along the coast were likewise forced to surrender. The prisoners and spoil were immediately embarked on board the English vessels and sent to Taragona.

Until this moment Baraguay d'Hilliers was quite ignorant of O'Donnel's arrival, and the whole Ampurdan was thrown into confusion; for the Somatenes, rising in all parts, cut off the communications with Macdonald, whose posts on the side of Calaf and Cervera were at the same time harassed by Errolles and Obispo: nevertheless, although a rumour of Swartz's disaster reached him, Macdonald would not credit it, and continued in the plain of Urgel. Baraguay d'Hilliers was therefore unable to do more than protect his own convoys from France, and would have been in a dangerous position if O'Donnel's activity had continued; but that general having been severely wounded, the Spanish efforts relaxed, and Napoleon, whose eyes were every where, sent general Conroux, in the latter end of October, with a convoy and reinforcement of troops from Perpignan to Gerona. O'Donnel, troubled by his wound, then embarked; and Campo Verde, who succeeded to the command, immediately sent a part of the army to Taragona, left Rovira, and Claros, and Manso, to nourish the insurrection in the Ampurdan, and took post himself at Manresa, from thence he at first menaced Macdonald's posts at Calaf; but his real object was to break up that road, which he effected, and then passed suddenly through Berga and Cardona to Puigcerda, and drove the French detachment, which had come from Navarre to ravage the fertile district of Cerdaña, under the guns of Fort Louis.

This excursion attracted Macdonald's attention, he was now fully apprized of Swartz's misfortune, and he hoped to repair it by crushing Campo Verde, taking Cardona, and dispersing the local junta of Upper Catalonia, which had assembled in Solsona; wherefore on the 18th, he put his troops in motion, and the 19th, passing the mountains of Portellas, entered Solsona; but the junta and the inhabitants escaped to Cardona and Berja, and up the valleys of Oleana and Urgel. Macdonald immediately sent columns in all directions to collect provisions and to chase the Spanish detachments, and this obliged Campo Verde to abandon the Cerdaña, which was immediately foraged by the troops from Fort Louis. It only remained to seize Cardona, and on the 21st the French marched against that place; but Campo Verde, by a rapid movement, arrived before them, and was in order of battle with a considerable force when Macdonald came up.

* Vacani.

COMBAT OF CARDONA.

This town stands at the foot of a rugged hill, which is joined by a hog's-back ridge to the great mountain spine, dividing Eastern from Western Catalonia. The Cardona river washed the walls, a castle of strength crowned the height above, and though the works of the place were weak, the Spanish army, covering all the side of the hill between the town and the castle, presented such an imposing spectacle, that the French general resolved to avoid a serious action. But the French and Italians marched in separate columns, and the latter under Eugenio, who arrived first, attacked contrary to orders; yet he soon found his hands too full, and thus, against his will, Macdonald was obliged also to engage to bring Eugenio off. Yet neither was he able to resist Campo Verde, who drove all down the mountain, and followed them briskly as they retreated to Solsona.

Macdonald lost many men in this fight, and on the 26th returned to Guisona. It was now more than two months since he had left the Ampurdan, and during that time he had struck no useful blow against the Spaniards, nor had he, in any serious manner, aided Suchet's operations; for the Catalans continually harassed that general's convoys, from the left of the Ebro, while the seventh corps, besides suffering severely from assassinations, had been repulsed at Cardona, had excited the people of the plain of Urgel to a state of rabid insurrection, and had lost its own communications with the Ampurdan. In that district the brigade of Swartz had been destroyed, the ports of Filieu and Palamos taken, and the Catalans were every where become more powerful and elated than before: Barcelona also was again in distress, and a convoy from Perpignan destined for its relief dared not pass Hostalrich. Macdonald therefore resolved to return to Gerona by the road of Manreza, Moya, and Granollers, and having communicated his intention to Suchet, and placed his baggage in Lerida, commenced his march the 4th of November.

Campo Verde getting intelligence of this design, took post to fight near Calaf, yet when the French approached, his heart failed, and he permitted them to pass. The French general therefore reached Manreza the 7th, and immediately despatched parties towards Vich and other places to mislead the Spaniards, while with his main body he marched by Moya and the Gariga pass to Granollers, where he expected to meet Baraguay d'Hilliers with the convoy from Barcelona; but being disappointed in this, he returned by the Trenta Pasos to Gerona the 10th, and sent his convalescents to Figueras.

The vicinity of Gerona was now quite exhausted, and fresh convoys from France were required to feed the troops, while the posts in the Ampurdan were re-established and the district re-organized. Macdonald's muster-rolls presented a force of fifty-one thousand men, of which ten thousand were in hospital, six thousand in Barcelona, and several thousand distributed along the coast and on the lines of communication, leaving somewhat more than thirty thousand disposable for field-operations. Of this number fourteen thousand were placed under Baraguay d'Hilliers to maintain the Ampurdan, and when the convoys arrived from France the French marshal marched, with the remaining sixteen thousand, for the fourth time, to the succour of Barcelona. His divisions were commanded by Souham and Pino, for Severoli had been recalled to Italy to organize fresh reinforcements; but following his former plan, this march also was made in one solid body, and as the defiles had been cut up by the Spaniards, and the bridge over the Tordera broken, Macdonald set his troops to labour, and in six hours opened fresh ways over the hills on the right and left

of the Trenta Pasos, and so, without opposition, reached the more open country about Granollers and Moncada. The Spaniards then retired by their own left to Tarasa and Caldas, but Macdonald continued to move on in a solid body upon Barcelona; for as he was resolved not to expose himself to a dangerous attack, so he avoided all enterprise. Thus, on the 23d, he would not permit Pino to improve a favourable opportunity of crushing the Catalans in his front, and on the 24th, after delivering his convoy and sending the carts back to Belgarde, instead of pursuing Campo Verde to Tarasa, as all the generals advised, he marched towards the Llobregat;* and as Souham and Pino remained discontented at Barcelona, their divisions were given to Frere and Fontanes.

Macdonald moved, on the 27th, towards Taragona, but without any design to undertake the siege; for though the road by Ordal and Villa Franca was broad and good, he carried no artillery or wheel-carriages: the Spaniards, seeing this, judged he would again go to Lerida, and posted their main body about Montserrat and Igualada; but he disregarded them, and after beating Sarsfield from Arbos and Vendril, turned towards the pass of Massarbones, which leads through the range of hills separating Villa Franca from the district of Valls. The Catalans had broken up both that and the pass of Christina leading to the Gaya, yet the French general again made new ways, and on the 30th spread his troops over the Paneda or plain of Taragona: thus showing of how little use it is to destroy roads as a defence, unless men are also prepared to fight.

Instead of occupying Reus as before, Macdonald now took a position about Momblanch, having his rear towards Lerida, but leaving all the passes leading from Taragona to the Ebro open for the Spaniards; so that Suchet derived no benefit from the presence of the seventh corps, nor could the latter feed itself, nor yet in any manner hinder the Catalans from succouring Tortosa. For Campo Verde, coming from Montserrat and Igualada, was encamped above the defiles between the French position and Taragona, principally at Lilla, on the road from Valls; and O'Donnel, who still directed the general movements, although his wound would not suffer him to appear in the field, sent parties into the Gariga behind Macdonald's right flank to interrupt his foraging parties, and to harass Suchet's communications by the Ebro.

From the strong heights at Lilla, the Catalans defied the French soldiers, calling upon them to come up and fight, and they would have done so if Macdonald would have suffered them, but after ten days of inactivity he divided his troops into many columns, and in concert with Abbé's brigade of the third corps, which marched from Xerta, endeavoured to inclose and destroy the detachments in the Gariga; the Spaniards however disappeared in the mountains and the French army only gained some mules and four thousand sheep and oxen. With this spoil they united again on the left bank of the Ebro, and were immediately disposed on a line extending from Vinebre, which is opposite to Flix, to Masos, which is opposite to Mora, and from thence to Garcia and Gniestar. Suchet was thus enabled to concentrate his troops about Tortosa and the siege of that place was immediately commenced.

The operations of the third corps during the five months it had been dependent upon the slow movements of the seventh corps shall now be related.

Suchet, by resigning the plain of Urgel and the magazines at Monzon, for Macdonald's subsistence, in September, had deprived himself of all the resources of the left bank of the Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortosa,

* Vacani.

and the country about the latter place was barren; hence he was obliged to send for his provisions to Zaragoza, Teruel, and other places more than one hundred miles from his camp; and meanwhile the difficulty of getting his battering train and ammunition down the river from Mequinenza was increased because of the numerous bars and weirs which impeded the navigation when the waters were low: moreover Macdonald, by going to Cardona, exposed the convoys to attacks from the left bank, by the Spanish troops which being stationed between Taragona, Mombanch, and Falcet, were always on the watch. Considering these things Suchet had, while the seventh corps was yet at Lerida, and the waters accidentally high, employed the Neapolitan brigade of the seventh corps to escort twenty-six pieces of artillery down the river. This convoy reached Xerta the 5th of September, and the Neapolitans were then sent to Guardia; general Habert was placed at Tivisa; Mas de Mora was occupied by a reserve, and the Spaniards again took post at Falcet. At this time general Laval died, and his division was given to general Harispe, a person distinguished throughout the war by his ability, courage, and humanity.

Meanwhile the Valencian army had again concentrated to disturb the blockade of Tortosa, wherefore Suchet strengthened Boussard's detachment at Uldecona, and gave the command to general Musnier, who was replaced at Zaragoza by general Paris. At the same time colonel Kliski was sent to command the detachments on the side of Montalvan, Teruel, Daroca, and Calatayud, where a partizan warfare was continued with undiminished activity by Villa Campa, who had contrived to open secret communications, and to excite some commotions, even in Zaragoza. On the 7th of August he had beaten a French foraging detachment near Cuevas, and recaptured six thousand sheep, and at Andorra had taken both convoy and escort. On the side of Navarre also, Mina coming down into the Cinco Villas destroyed some detachments, and impeded the foraging parties. Thus the third corps also began to suffer privations, and no progress was made towards the conquest of Catalonia.

In September, however, Villa Campa, having increased his forces, advanced so near Suchet that general Habert attacked and drove him over the frontier in dispersion, and recaptured all the sheep before lost, and Suchet then brought down the remainder of the battering train, and the stores for the siege; but as the waters of the Ebro were low, the new road was used for the convoys, which thus came slowly and with many interruptions and considerable loss; especially on the 17th of September, when a whole Neapolitan battalion suffered itself to be taken without firing a shot.

In this manner affairs dragged on until the 28th of October; but then Macdonald (O'Donnel having meanwhile captured Swartz and raised the Ampurdan) returned to Gerona, whereby Suchet's hopes of commencing the siege were again baffled. And, as it was at this moment that the assembling of the Cortez gave a new vigour to the resistance in Spain and the regency's plan of sending secret juntas, to organize and regulate the proceedings of the partidas, was put in execution, the activity of those bands became proportioned to the hopes excited, and the supplies and promises thus conveyed to them. One of those secret juntas composed of clergy and military men having property or influence in Aragon, endeavoured to renew the insurrection formerly excited by Blake in that province, and for this purpose sent their emissaries into all quarters and combined their operations with Mina. They, also, diligently followed a plan of secretly drawing off the provisions from Aragon, with a view to starve the French, and general Carbejal, one

of the junta, joining Villa Campa, assumed the supreme command on that side; while captain Codrington, at the desire of Bassecour, carried a Valencian detachment by sea to Peniscola to fall on the left flank of Suchet, if he should attempt to penetrate by the coast road to Valencia. Thus, at the moment when Macdonald returned to the Ampurdan, the Aragonese became unquiet, the partidas from Navarre and the district of Montalvan and Calatayud, closed in on Suchet's communications, the Valencians came up on the one side, towards Uldecona, and on the other Garcia Navarro moving from Taragona with a division again assumed the position of Falcet.

To check this tide of hostility the French general resolved first to crush the insurrection project, and for this purpose detached seven battalions and four hundred cavalry against Carbajal. Chlopiski, who commanded them, defeated the Spaniards the 21st at Alventoza on the route to Valencia, taking some guns and ammunition. Nevertheless Villa Campa rallied his men in a few days on the mountain of Fuente Santa, where he was joined by Carbajal, and having received fresh succours renewed the project of raising the Aragonese. But Chlopiski again defeated him the 12th of November, and the Spaniards fled in confusion towards the river Libras, where the bridge breaking many were drowned. The French lost more than a hundred men in this sharp attack, and Chlopiski then returned to the blockade, leaving Kliski with twelve hundred men to watch Villa Campa's further movements.

The Ebro having now risen sufficiently, the remainder of the battering train and stores were embarked at Mequinenza, and on the 3d dropt down the stream; but the craft outstripped the escort, and the convoy being assailed from the left bank, lost two boats; the others grounded on the right bank, and were there defended by the cannoneers, until the escort came up on the one side, and on the other, general Abbé, who had been sent from Guardia to their succour. The waters, however, suddenly subsided, and the convoy was still in danger until Suchet reinforced Abbé, who was thus enabled to keep the Spaniards at bay, while Habert, with fifteen hundred men, made a diversion by attacking the camp at Falcet. On the 7th the waters again rose and the boats with little loss reached Xerta on the 9th, and thus all things were ready to commence the siege, but the seventh corps still kept aloof.

Suchet was now exceedingly perplexed; for the provisions he had with so much pains collected, from the most distant parts of Aragon, were rapidly wasting; forage was every day becoming scarcer, and the plain of Urgel, was by agreement given over to the seventh corps, which thus became a burthen instead of an aid to the third corps. The latter had been, since the beginning of the year, ordered to supply itself entirely from the resources of Aragon without any help from France; and the difficulty of so doing may be judged of by the fact, that in six months they had consumed above a hundred and twenty thousand sheep and twelve hundred bullocks.

To obviate the embarrassments thus accumulating, the French general called the notables and heads of the clergy in Aragon to his head-quarters, and with their assistance reorganized the whole system of internal administration, in such a manner, that, giving his confidence to the natives, removing many absurd restrictions of their industry and trade, and leaving the municipal power and police entirely in their hands, he drew forth the resources of the provinces in greater abundance than before. And yet with less discontent, being well served and obeyed, both in matters of administration and police, by the Aragonese, whose feelings he was careful to soothe, shewing himself in all things, an able governor, as well as a great commander.

Macdonald was now in march from Barcelona towards Taragona, and Suchet to aid this operation attacked the Spanish troops at Falset. General Habert fell on their camp in front the 19th, and to cut off the retreat, two detachments were ordered to turn it by the right and left; but Habert's assault was so brisk, that before the flanking corps could take their stations the Catalans fled, leaving their general Garcia Navarro and three hundred men in the hands of the victors. But while Suchet obtained this success on the side of Falset, the Valencian general Bassecour, thinking that the main body of the French would be detained by Navarro on the left bank of the Ebro, formed the design of surprising general Musnier at Uldecona. To aid this operation, a flotilla from the harbour of Peniscola, attacked Rapita, and other small posts occupied by the French, on the coast between the Cenia and the Ebro; and at the same time the governor of Tortoza menaced Amposta and the stations at the mouth of the Ebro.

Bassecour moved against Uldecona in three columns, one of which, following the coast-road towards Alcanar, turned the French left, while another passing behind the mountains took post at Las Ventallas, in rear of Musnier's position, to cut him off from Tortoza. The main body went straight against his front, and in the night of the 26th the Spanish cavalry fell upon the French camp outside the town; but the guards, undismayed, opened a fire which checked the attack, until the troops came out of the town and formed in order of battle.

At daylight the Spanish army was perceived covering the hills in front; and those in rear also, for the detachment at Ventallas was in sight; the French were thus surrounded and the action immediately commenced; * but the Valencians were defeated with the loss of sixteen hundred men, and the detachment in the rear seeing the result made off to the mountains again. Bassecour then withdrew in some order behind the Cenia, where in the night Musnier surprised him, and at the same time sent the cuirassiers by the route of Vinaros to cut off his retreat, which was made with such haste and disorder that the French cavalry falling in with the fugitives near Benicarlo, killed or took nine hundred. Bassecour saved himself in Peniscola, and thither also the flotilla, having failed at Rapita, returned.†

Suchet having thus cleared his rear, sent his prisoners to France by Jaca, and directed a convoy of provisions, newly collected at Mequinenza, to fall down the Ebro to the magazines at Mora: fearing however that the current might again carry the boats faster than the escort, he directed the latter to proceed first, and sent general Abbé to Flix to meet the vessels. The Spaniards in the Garriga observing this disposition, placed an ambuscade near Mequinenza, and attacked the craft before they could come up with the escort; the boats were then run ashore on the right side, and seventy men from Mequinenza came down the left bank to their aid, which saved the convoy, but the succouring detachment was cut to pieces. Soon after this the seventh corps having scoured the Garriga took post on the left bank of the Ebro, and enabled the third corps to commence the long delayed siege.

CHAPTER III.

Tortoza—Its governor feeble—The Spaniards outside disputing and negligent—Captain Fane lands at Palamos—Is taken—O'Donnel resigns and is succeeded by Campo Verde—Description of Tortoza—It is invested—A division of the

seventh corps placed under Suchet's command—Siege of Tortoza—The place negotiates—Suchet's daring conduct—The governor surrenders—Suchet's activity—Habert takes the fort of Balaguer—M'Donald moves to Reus—Sarsfield defeats and kills Ugenio—M'Donald marches to Lerida—Suchet goes to Zaragoza—The confidence of the Catalans revives—The manner in which the belligerents obtained provisions explained—The Catalans attack Perillo, and Campo Verde endeavours to surprise Monjuic, but is defeated with great loss—Napoleon changes the organisation of the third and seventh corps—The former becomes the army of Aragon—The latter the army of Catalonia.

TORTOZA, with a population of ten thousand souls and a garrison of from eight to nine thousand regular troops, was justly considered the principal bulwark of both Catalonia and Valencia, but it was under the command of general Lilli, Conde d'Alacha, a feeble man, whose only claim was, that he had shewn less incapacity than others before the battle of Tudela in 1808. However, so confident were the Spaniards in the strength of the place that the French attack was considerably advanced ere any interruption was contemplated, and had any well considered project for its relief been framed, it could not have been executed, because jealousy and discord raged amongst the Spanish chiefs. Campo Verde was anxious to succeed O'Donnel in command of the Catalan army, Bassecour held unceasing dispute with his own officers, and with the members of the junta or congress of Valencia; and Villa Campa repelled the interference both of Carbajal and Bassecour.

At this critical time therefore every thing was stagnant, except the English vessels which blockaded Rosas, Barcelona, and the mouths of the Ebro, or from certain head-lands observed and pounced upon the enemy's convoys creeping along from port to port: they had thrown provisions, ammunition, and stores of all kinds into Taragona and Tortoza, and were generally successful, yet at times met with disasters. Thus captain Rogers of the Kent, having with him the Ajax, Cambrian, Sparrow-hawk, and Minstrel, disembarked six hundred men and two field-pieces under captain Fane at Palamos, where they destroyed a convoy intended for Barcelona; but as the seamen were re-embarking in a disorderly manner, the French fell upon them and took or killed two hundred, captain Fane being amongst the prisoners.

The Catalan army was thirty thousand strong, including garrisons, and in a better state than it had hitherto been; * the Valencians, although discouraged by the defeat at Uldecona, were still numerous, and all things tended to confirm the Spaniards in the confident expectation that whether succoured or unsuccoured the place would not fall. But O'Donnel, who had been created Conde de Bispal was so disabled by wounds, that he resigned the command soon after the siege commenced, and Campo Verde was by the voice of the people raised in his stead; for it was their nature always to believe that the man who made most noise was the fittest person to head them, and in this instance, as in most others, they were greatly mistaken.

Tortoza, situated on the left of the Ebro, communicated with the right bank by a bridge of boats, which was the only Spanish bridge on that river, from Zaragoza to the sea; and below and above the place there was a plain, but so narrowed by the juttings of the mountains at the point where the town was built, that while part of the houses stood close to the water on flat ground, the other part stood on the bluff rocky points shot from the hills above, and thus appeared to tie the mountains, the river, and the plains together.†

* Suchet's Memoirs.

† Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley's Despatch. MSS.

* Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley's Despatches. MSS.

† Vacani. Rogniat. Suchet.

Five of these shoots were taken into the defence, either by the ramparts or by outworks. That on the south of the town was crowned by the fort of Orleans, and on the north another was occupied by a fort called the Tenaxas. To the east a horn-work was raised on a third shoot, which being prolonged, and rising suddenly again between the suburbs and the city, furnished the site of a castle or citadel: the other two, and the deep ravines between them were defended by the ramparts of the place, which were extremely irregular, and strong from their situation, rather than their construction.

There were four fronts.

1. *The northern defending the suburb.* Although this front was built on the plain, it was so imbedded between the Ebro, the horn-work, the citadel, and the Tenaxas, that it could not even be approached without first taking the latter fort.

2. *The eastern. Extending from the horn-work to the bastion of San Pico.* Here the deep ravines and the rocky nature of the ground, which was also overlooked by the citadel and flanked by the horn-work, rendered any attack very difficult.

3. *The south eastern. From the bastion of San Pico to the bastion of Santa Cruz.* This front, protected by a deep narrow ravine, was again covered by the fort of Orleans, which was itself covered by a second ravine.

4. *The southern. From the Santa Cruz to the Ebro.* The ground of approach here was flat, the soil easy to work in, and the fort of Orleans not sufficiently advanced to flank it with any dangerous effect; wherefore against this front Suchet resolved to conduct his attack.

The Rocquetta, a rising ground opposite the bridge-head on the right bank of the Ebro, was fortified and occupied by three regiments, but the other troops were collected at Xerta; and the 15th, before day-break, Suchet crossed the Ebro by his own bridge at that point, with eight battalions, the sappers, and two squadrons of hussars. He marched between the mountains and the river upon the fort of Tenaxas, while general Habert, with two regiments and three hundred hussars, moved from the side of Perillo, and attacked a detachment of the garrison which was encamped on the Col d'Alba eastward of the city. When Suchet's column arrived in sight of the works, the head took ground, but the rear, under general Harispe, filed off to the left, across the rugged shoots from the hills, and swept round the place, leaving in every ravine and on every ridge a detachment, until the half circle ended on the Ebro, below Tortoza. The investment was then perfected on the left bank by the troops from Rocquetta; and during this movement Habert, having seized the Col d'Alba, entered the line of investment, driving before him six hundred men, who hardly escaped being cut off from the place by the march of Harispe.* The communication across the water was then established by three, and afterwards by four flying bridges, placed above and below the town; a matter of some difficulty and importance, because all the artillery and stores had come from Rocquetta, across the water, which was there two hundred yards wide, and in certain winds very rough.

The camps of investment were now secured, and meanwhile Macdonald, sending the greatest part of his cavalry, for which he could find no forage, back to Lerida by the road of Lardicans, marched, from Mas de Mora, across the hills to Perillo, to cover the siege. His patrols discovered a Spanish division in a position resting upon the fort of Felipe de Balaguer, yet he would not attack them, and thinking he could

not remain for want of provisions, returned on the 19th to Gniestar; but this retrograde movement was like to have exposed the investing troops to a disaster, for as the seventh corps retired, a second Spanish division coming from Reus reinforced the first. However, Macdonald, seeing this, placed Frere's division of six thousand infantry and a regiment of cavalry at Suchet's disposal, on condition that the latter should feed them, which he could well do. These troops were immediately stationed behind the investing force, on the road of Amposta, by which the Spaniards from Taragona could most easily approach; and the remainder of the seventh corps encamped at Gniestar, a strong position covering the siege on the side of Falcet, only fifteen miles distant from Tortoza. In this situation it could be more easily fed from Lerida, and could with greater facility send detachments up the Ebro, to protect the convoy of the third corps coming from Mequinenza.

The Catalan army was now divided, part being kept on the Llobregat, under general Caro, part under general Yranzo at Momblanch, and part, under Campo Verde, on the hills watching Frere's covering division.* O'Donnell had before directed two convoys upon Tortoza, but the rapidity with which the investment had been effected prevented them from entering the place; and while he was endeavouring to arrange with Bassecour and Campo Verde a general plan of succour, his wounds forced him to embark for Valencia, when the command, of right, belonged to Yranzo, but the people, as I have before said, insisted upon having Campo Verde.

SIEGE OF TORTOZA.

The half bastion of San Pedro, which was situated in the plain, and close to the river, was the first object of the French attack, and to prevent the fire of Fort Orleans from incommoding the trenches, the line of approach was traced in a slanting direction, refusing the right, and pushing forward the left; and to protect its flanks on the one side, Fort Orleans was masked by a false attack, while, on the other side of the Ebro, trenches were opened against the bridge-head, and brought down close to the water.

The 19th the posts of the besieged were all driven in, and an unfinished Spanish work, commenced on the heights in advance of Fort Orleans, was taken possession of. In the night, a flying sap was commenced upon an extent of three hundred and sixty yards, and at a distance of only one hundred and sixty from the fort; but in the following night, the true attack was undertaken in the plain, during a storm of wind which, together with the negligence of the Spaniards, who had placed no guards in the front of their covered way, enabled the besiegers to begin this work at only one hundred and fifty yards from the half bastion of San Pedro. This parallel was above five hundred yards long, extending from the false attack against Fort Orleans, down to the bank of the river; two communications were also begun, and on the left bank ground was broken against the bridge-head.

The 21st, at day-break, the Spaniards, perceiving the works, commenced a heavy fire, and soon after made a sally; but they were overwhelmed by musketry from the false attack of Fort Orleans, and from the trenches on the right bank of the Ebro.

In the night of the 21st, the communication in the plain was extended to fourteen hundred yards, nine batteries were commenced, and bags of earth were placed along the edge of the trenches, whence chosen men shot down the Spanish artillery men.

On the 23rd, a night sally, made from the bridge-head, was repulsed; and on the 24th, the second parallel of the true attack was commenced.

* Suchet. Official extract of Mr. Wellesley's despatches. MSS.

* Wimphen's Memoir.

In the night of the 25th, at eleven o'clock and at one o'clock, separate sallies were made, but both were repulsed, and the works were advanced to within twenty-five yards of the palisades; a tenth battery was also commenced, and when day broke the Spanish gunners quailed under the aim of the chosen marksmen.

In the night of the 26th, the besieged fell upon the head of the sap, which they overturned, and killed the sappers, but were finally repulsed by the reserve, and the approach was immediately pushed forward to the place of arms. Thus, on the seventh night of open trenches, the besiegers were lodged in the covered way, before a shot had been fired from either breaching or counter batteries; a remarkable instance of activity and boldness, and a signal proof that the defence was ill-conducted.

The night of the 27th, the works were enlarged as much as the fire of the place which was untouched would permit; but the Spaniards seeing the besiegers' batteries ready to open, made a general sally through the eastern gates, against the false attack at Fort Orleans; and through the southern gates against the works in the plain. General Habert drove them back with slaughter from the former point, but at the latter they beat the French from the covered way, and arriving at the second parallel, burnt the gabions and did much damage ere the reserves could repulse them.

The night of the 28th, the batteries were armed with forty-five pieces, of which seventeen were placed on the right bank, to take the Spanish works at the main attack in reverse and to break the bridge. At day-break all these guns opened, and with success, against the demi-bastion, on the left bank of the river; but the fire from the castle, the bridge-head, the horn-work, and the quay, overpowered the French guns on the right bank, and although the bridge was injured, it was not rendered impassable.

On the 30th, the Spanish fire was in turn overpowered by the besiegers, the bridge was then broken, and in the following night an attempt was made to pass the ditch at the true attack; but two guns which were still untouched and flanked the point of attack, defeated this effort.

In the morning of the 31st, the Spaniards abandoned the bridge-head, and the French batteries on the right bank dismounted the two guns which had defended the half bastion of San Pedro. The besiegers then effected the passage of the ditch without difficulty, and attached the miner to the scarp.

In the night of the 31st, the miner worked into the wall, and the batteries opened a breach in the curtain, where a lodgement was established in preparation for an assault. At ten o'clock in the morning the besieged, alarmed at the progress of the attack, displayed the white flag. The negotiations for a surrender were, however, prolonged until evening by the governor, without any result, and the miner resumed his work in the night.

At seven o'clock on the 1st of January, two practicable breaches beside that in the curtain were opened by the artillery, and the mine was ready to explode, when three white flags were seen to wave from different parts of the fortress; nevertheless the disposition of the garrison was mistrusted, and Suchet demanded as a preliminary the immediate possession of one of the forts.—a necessary precaution, for disputes arose among the besieged, and general Lilli intimated to Suchet, that his own authority was scarcely recognised.

In this critical moment, the French general gave proof that his talents were not those of a mere soldier, for suddenly riding up to the gates with a considerable staff, and escorted only by a company of grenadiers, he informed the Spanish officer on guard, that hostili-

ties had ceased, and then, leaving his grenadiers on the spot, desired to be conducted to the governor who was in the citadel. Lilli still wavering, was upon the point of renewing the defence, in compliance with the desires of the officers about him, when the French general thus came suddenly into his presence, and, although the appearance of the Spanish guards was threatening, assumed an imperious tone, spoke largely of the impatience of the French army, and even menaced the garrison with military execution if any further delay occurred; during this extraordinary scene, general Habert brought in the grenadiers from the gate, and the governor then signing a short capitulation, gave over the citadel to the French.

When this event was known in the city, the Spanish troops assembled, and Alacha, in the presence of Suchet, ordered them to lay down their arms. Four hundred French and about fourteen hundred Spaniards had fallen during the siege; and many thousand prisoners, nine standards, one hundred pieces of artillery, one thousand muskets, and immense magazines, enhanced the value of the conquest, which by some was attributed to general Lilli's treachery, by others to his imbecility, and it would seem that there was reason for both charges.

The fall of Tortoza, besides opening the western passage into Catalonia, and cutting off the communication between that province and Valencia, reduced the Spanish army to twenty thousand men, including the garrisons of the towns which still remained in their possession. Campo Verde immediately retired from Falcet to Momblanch, and Suchet always prompt to make one success the prelude to another, endeavoured in the first moment of consternation and surprise to get possession of the forts of Peniscola and of Felipe de Balaguer: nor was he deceived with respect to the last, for that place, in which were five guns and a hundred men, was taken on the 9th by Habert; but at Peniscola his summons was disregarded and his detachment returned.

Meanwhile Macdonald leaving the Neapolitan brigade still on the Ebro, passed by Falcet to Reus, where he encamped the 11th, as if to invest Taragona; but without any real intention to do so, for his cavalry and field artillery were left at Lerida and Tortoza, and his actual force did not exceed twelve thousand men. Campo Verde, who had retreated before him, then posted Sarsfield with six thousand men at Valls, from whence he made incursions against Macdonald's foragers, and also surprised at Tarega, on the other side of the mountains, a regiment of Italian dragoons, which would have been destroyed but for the succour of a neighbouring post.

On the 14th Macdonald having marched towards Valls, Sarsfield retired to Pla, and was pursued by general Eugenio with two thousand Italian infantry. This officer being of a headstrong intractable disposition, pushed into the plain of Pla, contrary to his orders, and was nearing that town, when a strong body of cavalry poured out of it; and on each side the Spanish infantry were seen descending the hill in order of battle. Eugenio, instead of retiring, attacked the first that entered the plain, but he fell mortally wounded, and his men retreated fighting: meanwhile the firing being heard at Valls Palombini marched to his assistance, but was himself beaten and thrown into confusion, and Sarsfield at the head of the Spanish horse was preparing to complete the victory, when the French colonel Delort, bringing up some squadrons charged with great fury, and so brought off the Italians: yet Delort himself was desperately wounded, and the whole loss was not less than six hundred men.*

* Vacani. Victoires et Conquêtes. General Doyle's despatches, MSS.

Macdonald would not suffer his main body to stir, and Vacani asserts that it was only by entreaty, that Palombini obtained permission to succour Eugenio, which was certainly a great error, for so hot and eager was Sarsfield in the pursuit, that he was come within two miles of Valls, and being on open ground might have been crushed in turn. He, however, returned unmolested to the pass of the Cabra, leaving his cavalry as before in Pla, whence through bye-roads they communicated with Taragona.

A few days after this fight Sarsfield came out again in order of battle, and at the same time Campo Verde appeared with a division on the hills in rear of Valls. Macdonald was thus surrounded, but Palombini's brigade sufficed to send Campo Verde back to Taragona, and Sarsfield refused battle; then the French marshal, who had resolved to go to Lerida, but wished to move without fighting, broke up from Valls in the night, and, with great order and silence, passed by the road of Fuencaldé, between the defiles of Cabra and Ribas, and though both were occupied by the Spaniards, they did not discover his movements until the next day. From thence, he marched by Momblanch, upon Lerida, where he arrived the 19th, and three days afterw rds spread his troops over the plains of Urgel, to collect provisions, money, and transport, and to watch the defiles of the mountains.

On the other hand the Catalan general, who had received stores and arms both from England and Cadiz, renewed the equipment of his troops, and called out all the Migueletes and Somatenes, of the hills round the plain of Urgel, to replace the loss sustained by the fall of Tortoza. These new levies were united at Santa Coloma de Queralt under Sarsfield, while the regular army assembled at Igualada and Villafranca, by which the Spaniards holding a close and concentrated position themselves, cut off Macdonald equally from Barcelona and the Ampurdan; and this latter district was continually harassed by Errolles, Rovira, and the brigade of Martinez, which still kept the mountains behind Olot, Vich, and the Cerdaña.

Meanwhile Suchet being called by the exigencies of his government to Zaragoza, carried one division there, and distributed another under Musnier at Teruel, Molina, Alcanitz, and Morella; he also withdrew his troops from Cambril, which Habert had surprised on the 7th of February, but he left that general with a division, in command of Tortoza, having two thousand men at Perillo to connect the city with San Felipe de Balaguer. Thus all things seemed to favour the Spanish side, and give importance to their success, against Eugenio; for they did not fail to attribute both Suchet's and Macdonald's retreats, to fear occasioned by the skirmish with that general; and with some shew of reason as regarded the latter, seeing that his night march had all the appearance of a flight.

Macdonald, while gathering provisions at Lerida, and stores and guns at Tortoza, also repaired the works of Balaguer near Lerida, to serve as a pivot for the troops employed to forage the country watered by the Noguera, Cinca, and Legre rivers. However Sarsfield and Campo Verde kept about Cervera and Calaf, watching for an opportunity to fall on the French detachments, and meanwhile the organization of the province went on.

It may appear extraordinary that the war could have been continued by either side under such difficulties, but the resources were still great. A patriotic junta had been formed in Catalonia to procure provisions, and although the English orders in council interfered with the trade of neutral vessels bringing grain, bread could be bought at the rate of 12lbs. to the dollar, while with lord Wellington's army in Castile it often cost half a dollar a pound. When the French foraging parties came out from Barcelona, their march could be

always traced by the swarms of boats, loaded with people and provisions, which shooting out from the coast-towns, would hover, for a while, under the protection of the English vessels, and then return when the danger was over: and the enemy did never meddle with these boats lest they should remove the cover to their own supplies. Suchet however armed Rapita, and other small places, at the mouth of the Ebro, with a view to afford shelter to certain craft, which he kept to watch for provision-vessels, sailing from Valencia for Taragona, and to aid French vessels engaged in a like course coming from France.

To feed Barcelona, Maurice Mathieu at times occupied the head-lands from St. Filieu, to Blanes, with troops, and thus small convoys crept along shore; a fleet loaded with provisions and powder, escorted by three frigates, entered it in February, and a continual stream of supply was also kept up by sailing boats and other small vessels, which could not be easily detected amidst the numerous craft belonging to the people along the coast. And besides these channels, as the claims of hunger are paramount to all others, it was necessary, for the sake of the inhabitants, to permit provision sometimes to reach Barcelona by land; the Spanish generals winked at it, and Milans and Lacy, have even been charged with permitting corn to pass into that city for private profit, as well as from consideration for the citizens. By these, and like expedients, the war was sustained.

No important event occurred after the skirmish in which Eugenio fell, until the 3d of March, when the Spaniards having observed that the garrison of Tortoza was weakened by the detachment at Perillo, endeavoured to cut the latter off, intending if successful to assault Tortoza itself.* At the same time they also attacked the fort of San Philippe, but failed, and the French at Perillo effected their retreat although with considerable loss. This attempt was however followed by a more important effort. On the 19th of March, Campo Verde having assembled eight thousand men at Molinos del Rey, four thousand at Guisols, and three thousand at Igualada, prepared to surprise the city and forts of Barcelona, for he had, as he thought, corrupted the town-major of Monjuic. Trusting to this treason, he first sent eight hundred chosen grenadiers in the night by the hills of Hospitalet, to enter that place, and they descended into the ditch in expectation of having the gate opened; but Maurice Mathieu, apprized of the plan, had prepared every thing to receive this unfortunate column, which was in an instant overwhelmed with fire.

Napoleon now changed the system of the war. All that part of Catalonia west of the Upper Llobregat, and from Igualada by Ordal to the sea, including the district of Tortoza, was placed under Suchet's government, and seventeen thousand of Macdonald's troops were united to the third corps, which was thus augmented to forty-two thousand men, and took the title of the "*Army of Aragon*." It was destined to besiege Taragona, while Macdonald, whose force was thus reduced to twenty-seven thousand under arms, including fifteen thousand in garrison and in the Ampurdan, was restricted to the upper part of Catalonia. His orders were to attack Cardona, Berga, Seu d'Urgel, and Montserrat, and to war down Martinez, Manso, Rovira, and other chiefs, who kept in the mountains between Olot and the Cerdaña: and a division of five thousand men, chiefly composed of national guards, was also ordered to assemble at Mont Louis, for the purpose of acting in the Cerdaña, and on the rear of the partizans in the high valleys. By these means the line of operations for the invasion of Catalonia was altered from France to Aragon, the difficulties were lessened, the

* Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley's Despatches. MSS

seventh corps reduced in numbers, became, instead of the principal, the secondary army; and Macdonald's formal method was thus exchanged for the lively vigorous talent of Suchet. But the delay already caused in the siege of Tortosa, could never be compensated; Suchet had been kept on the Ebro, when he should have been on the Guadalaviar, and this enabled the Murcians to keep the fourth corps in Grenada, when it should have been on the Tagus aiding Massena.

CHAPTER IV.

Suchet prepares to besiege Taragona—The power of the Partidas described—Their actions—They are dispersed on the frontier of Aragon—The Valencians fortify Saguntum—Are defeated a second time at Uldecona—Suchet comes to Lerida—McDonald passes with an escort from them to Barcelona—His troops burn Mauresa—Sarsfield harasses his march—Napoleon divides the invasion of Catalonia into two parts—Sinking state of the province—Rovira surprises Fort Fernand de Figueres—Operations which follow that event.

WHEN the troops of the seventh corps were incorporated with the army of Aragon, the preparations for the siege of Taragona, were pushed forward with Suchet's usual activity; but previous to touching upon that subject it is necessary to notice the guerilla warfare, which Villa Campa, and others, had carried on against Aragon during the siege of Tortosa. This warfare was stimulated by the appointment of the secret juntas, and by the supplies which England furnished, especially along the northern coast, from Coruña to Bilbao, where experience had also produced a better application of them than heretofore. The movements of the English squadrons, in that sea, being from the same cause better combined with the operations of the Partidas, rendered the latter more formidable, and they became more harassing to the enemy as they acquired something of the consistency of regular troops in their organization, although irregular in their mode of operations: for it must not be supposed, that because the guerilla system was in itself unequal to the deliverance of the country, and was necessarily accompanied with great evils, that as an auxiliary it was altogether useless. The interruption of the French correspondence was, as I have already said, tantamount to a diminution on their side of thirty thousand regular troops, without reckoning those who were necessarily employed to watch and pursue the Partidas; this estimate may even be considered too low, and it is certain that the moral effect produced over Europe by the struggle thus maintained, was very considerable.

Nevertheless the same number of men under a good discipline would have been more efficacious, less onerous to the country people, and less subversive of social order. When the regular army is completed, all that remains in a country may be turned to advantage as irregulars, yet they are to be valued as their degree of organization approaches that of the regular troops: thus militia are better than armed bodies of peasantry, and these last, if directed by regular officers, better than sudden insurrections of villagers. But the Spanish armies were never completed, never well organized; and when they were dispersed, which happened nearly as often as they took the field, the war must have ceased in Spain, had it not been kept alive by the Partidas, and it is there we find their moral value. Again, when the British armies kept the field, the Partidas harassed the enemy's communications, and this constituted their military value; yet it is certain that they never much exceeded thirty thousand in number; and they could not have long existed in any numbers without the supplies of England, unless a spirit of order and providence, very different from any

thing witnessed during the war, had arisen in Spain. How absurd then to reverse the order of the resources possessed by an invaded country, to confound the moral with the military means, to place the irregular resistance of the peasants first, and that of the soldiers last in the scale of physical defence.

That many of the Partida chiefs became less active, after they received regular rank, is undeniable; but this was not so much a consequence of the change of denomination, as of the inveterate abuses which oppressed the vigour of the regular armies, and by which the Partidas were necessarily affected when they became a constituent part of those armies; many persons of weight have indeed ascribed entirely to this cause, the acknowledged diminution of their general activity at one period. It seems, however, more probable that a life of toil and danger, repeated defeats, the scarcity of plunder, and the discontent of the people at the exactions of the chiefs, had in reality abated the desire to continue the struggle; inactivity was rather the sign of subjection than the result of an injudicious interference by the government. But it is time to support this reasoning by facts.

During the siege of Tortosa, the concentration of the third and seventh corps exposed Aragon and Catalonia to desultory enterprises at a moment when the Partidas, rendered more numerous and powerful by the secret juntas, were also more ardent, from the assembly of the Cortez, by which the people's importance in the struggle seemed at last to be acknowledged. Hence no better test of their real influence on the general operations can be found than their exploits during that period, when two French armies were fixed as it were to one spot, the supplies from France nearly cut off by natural difficulties, the district immediately around Tortosa completely sterile, Catalonia generally exhausted, and a project to create a fictitious scarcity in the fertile parts of Aragon diligently and in some sort successfully pursued by the secret juntas. The number of French foraging parties, and the distances to which they were sent were then greatly increased, and the facility of cutting them off proportionably augmented. Now the several operations of Villa Campa during the blockade have been already related, but, although sometimes successful, the results were mostly adverse to the Spaniards; and when that chief, after the siege was actually commenced, came down, on the 19th December 1810, towards the side of Daroca, his cavalry was surprised by colonel Kliski, who captured or killed one hundred and fifty in the village of Blancas. The Spanish chief then retired, but being soon after joined by the Empecinado from Cuença, he returned in January to the frontier of Aragon, and took post between Molina and Albaracin.

At this period Tortosa had surrendered, and Musnier's division was spread along the western part of Aragon, wherefore Suchet immediately detached general Paris with one column from Zaragoza, and general Abbé with another from Teruel, to chase these two Partidas. Paris fell in with the Empecinado near Molina, and the latter then joined Villa Campa, but the French general forced both from their mountain position near Frias, where he was joined by Abbé; and they continued the pursuit for several days, but finding that the fugitives took different routes, again separated; Paris followed Villa Campa, and Abbé pursued the Empecinado through Cuença, from whence Carbajal and the secret junta immediately fled. Paris failing to overtake Villa Campa, entered Beleta, Cobeta, and Paralejos, all three containing manufactories for arms, which he destroyed, and then returned; and the whole expedition lasted only twelve days, yet the smaller Partidas, in Aragon, had taken advantage of it to cut off a detachment of fifty men near Fuentes: and this was followed up on the side of Navarre by Mina,

who entered the Cinco Villas in April, and cut to pieces one hundred and fifty *gens d'armes* near Sadava. However Chlopiski pursued him also so closely, that he obliged his band to disperse near Coseda in Navarre.

During this time the Valencians had been plunged in disputes, Bassecour was displaced, and Coupigny appointed in his stead. The notables, indeed, raised a sum of money for recruits, but Coupigny would not take the command, because the Murcian army was not also given to him; and that army, although numerous, was in a very neglected state, and unable to undertake any service. However, when Tortosa fell, the Valencians were frightened, and set about their own defence. They repaired and garrisoned the fort of Oropesa, and some smaller posts on the coast, along which runs the only artillery-road to their capital: they commenced fortifying Murviedro, or rather the rock of Saguntum overhanging it, and they sent fifteen hundred men into the hills about Cantavieja. These last were dispersed on the 5th of April by a column from Teruel; and on the 11th another body having attempted to surprise Uldecona, which was weakly guarded, were also defeated and sabred by the French cavalry.

These different events, especially the destruction of the gun-manufactories, repressed the activity of the partizans, and Suchet was enabled to go to Lerida, in the latter end of March, to receive the soldiers to be drafted from the seventh corps: Macdonald himself could not, however, regain Barcelona without an escort, and hence seven thousand men marched with him on the 29th of the month, not by Igualada, which was occupied in force by Sarsfield, but by the circuitous way of Manresa; for neither Macdonald nor Suchet wished to engage in desultory actions with the forces destined for the siege. Nevertheless Sarsfield, getting intelligence of the march, passed by Calaf with his own and Eroles' troops, and waited on Macdonald's flanks and rear near the Cardenera river, while a detachment barricading the bridge of Manresa, opposed him in front. This bridge was indeed carried, but the town being abandoned, the Italian soldiers wantonly set fire to it in the night: an act which was immediately revenged, for the flames being seen to a great distance, so enraged the Catalans, that in the morning all the armed men in the district, whether regulars, Miguelettes, or Somatenes, were assembled on the neighbouring hills, and fell with infinite fury upon Macdonald's rear, as it passed out from the ruins of the burning city. The head of the French column was then pushing for the bridge of Villamara, over the Llobregat, which was two leagues distant; and as the country between the rivers was one vast mountain, Sarsfield, seeing that the French rear stood firm to receive the attack of the Somatenes, while the front still advanced, thought to place his division between, by moving along the heights which skirted the road. Macdonald, however, concentrated his troops, gained the second bridge, and passed the Llobregat, but with great difficulty and with the loss of four hundred men, for his march was continually under Sarsfield's fire, and some of his troops were even cut off from the bridge, and obliged to cross by a ford higher up. During the night, however, he collected his scattered men, and moved upon Sabadel, whence he pushed on alone for Barcelona, and on the 3d of April, Harispe, who commanded the escort, recommenced the march, and passing by Villa Franca, Christina, Cabra, and Momblanch, returned to Lerida the 10th.

The invasion of Catalonia was now divided into three parts, each assigned to a distinct army.

1. Suchet, with that of Aragon, was to take Taragona and subdue the lower part of the province.

2. Macdonald, with that part of the seventh corps called the active army of Catalonia, was to break the long Spanish line extending from Taragona, through

Montserrat to the Cerdaña, and the high mountains about Olot.

3. Baraguay d'Hilliers, having his head-quarters at Gerona, was to hold the Ampurdan with the troops before assigned to his charge, and to co-operate, as occasion might offer, with Macdonald, under whose orders he still remained; and the division of five thousand men before mentioned as having been collected near Mont Louis, at the entrance of the French Cerdaña, was to act on the rear of the Spaniards in the mountains, while the others attacked them in front. Nor did the success appear doubtful, for the hopes and means of the province were both sinking. The great losses of men sustained at Tortosa and in the different combats; the reputation of Suchet; the failure of the attempts to surprise Barcelona, Perillo, and San Felipe de Balaguer; the incapacity of Campo Verde, which was now generally felt, and the consequent desertion of the Miguelettes, would probably have rendered certain the French plans, if at the very moment of execution they had not been marred by Rovira, who surprised the great fortress of Figueras, the key of the Pyrenees on that side of Catalonia. This, the boldest and most important stroke made by a Partida chief, during the whole war, merits a particular detail.

SURPRISE OF FERNANDO DE FIGUERAS.

The governor of the place, general Guillot, enforced no military discipline, his guards were weak, he permitted the soldiers to use the palisades for fuel, and often detached the greatest part of the garrison to make incursions to a distance from the place; in all things disregarding the rules of service.* The town, which is situated below the hill, upon which the great fortress of Fernando stands, was momentarily occupied by the Italian general Peyri, with about six hundred men, who were destined to join Macdonald, and who trusting to the strength of the fortress above, were in no manner on their guard. And the garrison above was still more negligent; for Guillot had on the 9th of April sent out his best men to disperse some Somatenes assembled in the neighbouring hills, and this detachment having returned at night fatigued, and being to go out again the next day, slept while the gates were confided to convalescents, or men unfit for duty: thus the ramparts were entirely unguarded. Now there were in the fort two Catalan brothers named Palopos, and a man called Juan, employed as under-storekeepers, who being gained by Rovira had, such was the negligence of discipline, obtained from the head of their department the keys of the magazines, and also that of a postern under one of the gates.

Rovira, having arranged his plan, came down from the mountain of St. Lorens de Muga in the night of the 9th, and secretly reached the covered way with seven hundred chosen men of his own partida. General Martinez followed in support with about three thousand Miguelettes, and the Catalan brothers, having previously arranged the signals, opened the postern, and admitted Rovira, who immediately disarmed the guard and set wide the gates for the reserve; and although some shots were fired, which alarmed the garrison, Martinez came up so quickly that no effectual resistance could be made. Thirty or forty men were killed or wounded, the magazines were seized, the governor and sixteen hundred soldiers and camp-followers were taken in their quarters, and thus in an hour Rovira mastered one of the strongest fortresses in Europe: three cannon-shot were then fired as a signal to the Somatenes in the surrounding mountains, that the place was taken, and that they were to bring in provisions as rapidly as possible.

* Vacani. Official Abstract of Mr. Wellesley's Despatches. MSS. General Campbell's MSS. General Doyle's MSS. Capt. Codrington's MSS. Mr. Stuart's Papers. MSS.

Meanwhile general Peyri alarmed by the noise in the fortress and guessing at the cause, had collected the troops, baggage, sick men, and stores in the town below, and sent notice to Gerona, but he made no attempt to retake the place, and at daylight retired to Bascara. For having mounted the hills during the night, to observe how matters went, he thought nothing could be done, an opinion condemned by some as a great error: and indeed it appears probable that during the confusion of the first surprise, a brisk attempt by six hundred fresh men might have recovered the fortress. At Bascara five hundred men detached from Gerona, and the spur of the occasion, met him with orders to re-invest the place, and Baraguay d'Hilliers promised to follow with all his forces without any delay. Then Peyri, although troubled by the fears of his troops, many of whom were only national guards, returned to Figueras, and driving the Spaniards out of the town took post in front of the fort above; but he could not prevent Martinez from receiving some assistance in men and provisions from the Somatenes. The news of Rovira's exploit spread with inconceivable rapidity throughout the Peninsula, extending its exhilarating influence, even to the Anglo-Portuguese army, then not much given to credit or admire the exploits of the Spaniards, but Baraguay d'Hilliers with great promptness assembled his dispersed troops, and on the 13th invested the fort with six thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry; and this so quickly that the Spaniard had not time, or, more probably neglected, to remove, sixteen thousand muskets which were in the place.

Martinez remained governor, but Rovira was again in the mountains, and all Catalonia, animated by the Promethean touch of this Partida chief, seemed to be moving at once upon Figueras. Campo Verde came up to Vich, intending first to relieve Figueras, and then in concert with the English and Spanish vessels to blockade Rosas by land and sea. Rovira himself collected a convoy of provisions near Olot. Captain Bullen with the Cambrian and Volontaire frigates, taking advantage of the French troops having been withdrawn from Gerona, drove out the small garrison from San Filieu and Palamos, destroyed the batteries, and made sail to join captain Codrington at Rosas. A Spanish frigate, with a fleet of coasting-vessels loaded with supplies, anchored at Palamos; and Francisco Milans, after beating a small French detachment near Arens de Mar, invested Hostalrich; Juan Claros hovered about Gerona, and Eroles and Manso coming from Montserrat reduced Olot and Castelfolliit. Sarsfield however remained in the Seu d'Urgel, and directed the mountaineers to establish themselves at Balaguer, but they were driven away again with great loss by a detachment from the garrison of Lerida.

On the 3d of May, Rovira having brought his convoy up to Besalu, Campo Verde, who had arranged that captain Codrington should make a diversion by an attack on Rosas, drew Milans from Hostalrich, and having thus united eleven thousand men marched in several columns from Avionet and Villa Fan against the town, hoping to draw Baraguay d'Hilliers to that side; and to beat him, while Rovira, forcing a small camp near Llers, at the opposite quarter, should introduce the convoy and its escort into the fortress. The circuit of investment was wide, and very difficult, and therefore slightly furnished of men; but it was strengthened by some works, and when the Spanish columns first advanced, the French general reinforced the camp near Llers, and then hastened with four thousand men against Campo Verde, who was already in the valley of Figueras, and only opposed by one battalion. Baraguay d'Hilliers immediately fell on the right flank of the Spaniards and defeated them; the French cavalry, which had been before driven in

from the front, rallied and completed the victory, and the Spaniards retreated with a loss of fifteen hundred including prisoners. This affair was exceedingly ill-managed by Campo Verde, who was so sure of success that he kept the sheep of the convoy too far behind, to enter, although the way was open for some time, hence the succour was confined to a few artillery-men, some tobacco, and medicines. Meanwhile the English ships landed some men at Rosas, but neither did this produce any serious effect, and the attempt to relieve Figueras having thus generally failed, that place was left to its own resources which were few; for the French with an unaccountable negligence had always kept a scanty supply of provisions and stores there. Martinez, who had now above four thousand men, was therefore obliged to practice the most rigorous economy in the distribution of food, and in bearing such privations the peninsular race are unrivalled.

Macdonald was so concerned for the loss of Figueras, that, setting aside all his own plans, he earnestly adjured Suchet to suspend the siege of Taragona, and restore him the troops of the seventh corps: Maurice Mathieu also wrote from Barcelona in a like strain, thinking that the possession of Upper Catalonia depended upon one powerful effort to recover the lost fortress. But Suchet, who had no immediate interest in that part of the province, whose hopes of obtaining a marshal's staff rested on the taking of Taragona, and whose preparations were all made for that siege, Suchet I say, whose judgement was unclouded, and whose military talent was of a high order, refused to move a step towards Figueras, or even to delay, for one moment, his march against Taragona.

He said that "his battalions being scattered, in search of supplies," he could not reunite them, and reach Figueras under twenty-five days; during that time the enemy, unless prevented by Baraguay d'Hilliers, could gather in provisions, receive reinforcements, and secure the fortress. A simple blockade might be established by the nearest troops, and to accumulate great numbers on such a sterile spot would not forward the recapture, but would create infinite difficulties with respect to subsistence. It was probable Napoleon had already received information of the disaster, and given orders for the remedy; and it was by no means reasonable to renounce the attack on Taragona, the only remaining bulwark of Catalonia, at the very moment of execution, because of the loss of a fort; it was in Taragona, the greatest part of the forces of Catalonia would be shut up, and it was only in such a situation that they could be made prisoners; at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, eighteen thousand men and eight hundred officers had been captured, and if ten or twelve thousand more could be taken in Taragona, the strength of Catalonia would be entirely broken. If the Spaniards failed in revictualing Figueras, that place, by occupying their attention, would become more hurtful than useful to them; because Campo Verde might, and most probably would, march to its succour, and thus weaken Taragona, which was a reason for hastening rather than suspending the investment of the latter; wherefore he resolved, notwithstanding the separation of his battalions and the incomplete state of his preparations, to move down immediately and commence the siege." A wise determination and alone sufficient to justify his reputation as a general.

Macdonald was now fain to send all the troops he could safely draw together, to reinforce Baraguay d'Hilliers. In June, when a detachment from Toulon, and some frontier guards had arrived at Figueras, the united forces amounting to fifteen thousand men, he took the command in person and established a rigorous blockade, working day and night, to construct works of circumvallation and contravallation;

his lines six miles in length, crowning the tops of the mountains and sinking into the deepest valleys, proved what prodigious labours even small armies are capable of. Thus with incessant wakefulness Macdonald recovered the place; but this was at a late period in the year, and when Suchet's operations had quite changed the aspect of affairs.

When Tortosa fell, that general's moveable columns traversing the borders of Castile, the eastern districts of Valencia, a portion of Navarre, and all the lower province of Catalonia, protected the collection of supplies, and suppressed the smaller bands which swarmed in those parts; hence, when the siege of Taragona was confided to the third corps, the magazines, at Lerida and Mora, were already full; and a battering train was formed at Tortosa, to which place the tools, platforms, and other materials, fabricated at Zaragoza were conveyed. Fifteen hundred draft horses, the greatest part of the artillery-men and engineers, and ten battalions of infantry were also collected in that town, and from thence shot and shells were continually forwarded to San Felipe de Balaguer. This was a fine application of Cæsar's maxim, that war should maintain itself, for all the move, the guns, provisions, and materials, collected for this siege, were the fruits of former victories; nothing was derived from France but the men. It is curious, however, that Suchet so little understood the nature and effects of the English system of finance, that he observes, in his memoirs, upon the ability with which the ministers made Spain pay the expense of this war by never permitting English gold to go to the Peninsula; he was ignorant, that the paper money system had left them no English gold to send.

The want of forage in the district of Tortosa, and the advantage of the carriage-road by the Col de Balaguer, induced the French general to direct his artillery that way; but his provisions, and other stores, passed from Mora by Falset and Momblanch to Reus, in which latter town he proposed to establish his stores for the siege, while Mora, the chief magazine, was supplied from Zaragoza, Caspe, and Mequinenza. Divers other arrangements, of which I shall now give the outline, contributed to the security of the communications, and enabled the army of Aragon to undertake the great enterprize for which it was destined.

1. Detachments of *gens-d'armes* and of the frontier guards of France, descending the high valleys of Aragon, helped to maintain tranquillity on the left bank of the Ebro, and occupied the castles of Venasque and Jaca, which had been taken by Suchet in his previous campaign.

2. The line of correspondence from France, instead of running as before through Guipuscoa and Navarre, by Pampeluna, was now directed by Pau, Oleron, and Jaca to Zaragoza; and in the latter city, and in the towns around it, four or five battalions, and a proportion of horsemen and artillery, were disposed, to watch the *Partidas* from Navarre and the Moncayo mountains.

3. Four battalions with cavalry and guns, were posted at Daroca under general Paris, whose command extended from thence to the fort of Molina, which was armed and garrisoned.

4. General Abbé was placed at Teruel with five battalions, three hundred cuirassiers, and two pieces of artillery, to watch Villa Campa, and the Valencian army which was again in the field.

5. Alcanitz and Morella were occupied by fourteen hundred men, whereby that short passage through the mountains from Aragon to Valencia was secured; and from thence the line to Caspe, and down the Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortosa, was protected by twelve hundred men; Tortosa itself was garrisoned by two battalions, the forts at the mouth of the Ebro

were occupied, and four hundred men were placed in Rapita.

This line of defence from right to left was fourteen days' march, but the number of fortified posts enabled the troops to move from point to point, without much danger; and thus the army of the great and rich province of Valencia, the division of Villa Campa, the *Partidas* of New Castile and Navarre, including Mina and the *Empecinado*, the most powerful of those independent chiefs, were all set at nought by twelve thousand French, although the latter had to defend a line of one hundred and fifty miles. Under cover of this feeble chain of defence, Suchet besieged a strong city which had a powerful garrison, an open harbour, a commanding squadron of ships, and a free communication, by sea, with Cadiz, Valencia, Gibraltar, and the Balearic islands. It is true that detachments from the army of the centre, acting on a large circuit round Madrid, sometimes dispersed, and chased the *Partidas* that threatened Suchet's line of defence, but at this period, from circumstances to be hereafter mentioned, that army was in a manner paralysed.

While the French general's posts were being established, he turned his attention to the arrangements for a permanent supply of food. The difficulty of procuring meat was become great, because he wisely refrained from using up the sheep and cattle of Aragon, lest the future supply of his army should be anticipated, and the minds of the people of that province alienated by the destruction of their breeding flocks; to avoid this, he engaged contractors to furnish him from France, and so completely had he pacified the Aragonese, through whose territories the flocks were brought, and with whose money they were paid for, that none of his contracts failed. But as these resources were not immediately available, the troops on the right bank of the Ebro made incursions after cattle beyond the frontiers of Aragon; and when Harispe returned from Barcelona, eight battalions marched upon a like service up the higher valleys of the Pyrenees.

It was in this state of affairs that Suchet received intelligence of the surprise of Figueras, which induced him to hasten the investment of Taragona. Meanwhile, fearing that Mina might penetrate to the higher valleys of Aragon, and in conjunction with the *partidas* of Upper Catalonia cut off all correspondence with France, he detached Chlopiski with four battalions and two hundred hussars to watch the movements of that chief only, and demanded of the emperor, that some troops from Pampeluna should occupy Sangüesa, while others, from the army of the north, should relieve the detachments of the army of Aragon, at Soria and Calatayud.

The battalions sent up the high valleys of Catalonia returned in the latter end of April. Suchet then reviewed his troops, issued a month's pay, and six days' provisions to each soldier, loaded many carriages and mules with flour, and, having first spread a report that he was going to relieve Figueras, commenced his march to Taragona by the way of Momblanch. Some *Miguelettes* entrenched in the pass of Ribas, were dispersed by Harispe's division on the 1st of May, and the army descended the hills to Alcover; but four hundred men were left in Momblanch, where a post was fortified, to protect the line of communication with Lerida, and to prevent the Spanish partizans on that flank, from troubling the communication between Mora and Reus. The 2d head-quarters were fixed at Reus, and the 3d the Spanish outposts were driven over the Francoli; meanwhile Habert, sending the artillery from Tortosa by the Col de Balaguer, moved himself with a large convoy from Mora by Falset to Reus.

CHAPTER V.

Suchet's skilful conduct—His error about English finance—Outline of his arrangements for the siege of Taragona—He makes French contracts for the supply of his army—Forages the high valleys and the frontiers of Castile and Valencia—Marches to Taragona—Description of that place—Campo Verde enters the place—Suchet invests it—Convention relative to the sick concluded between St. Cyr and Reding faithfully observed—Sarsfield comes to Mombianch—Skirmish with the Valencians at Amposta and Rapita—Siege of Taragona—Rapita and Mombianch abandoned by Suchet—Taragona reinforced from Valencia—The Olivo stormed—Campo Verde quits Taragona, and Senens de Contreras assumes the chief command—Sarsfield enters the place and takes charge of the Port or lower town—French break ground before the lower town—The Francoli stormed—Campo Verde's plans to succour the place—General Abbé is called to the siege—Sarsfield quits the place—The lower town is stormed—The upper town attacked—Suchet's difficulties increase—Campo Verde comes to the succour of the place, but retires without effecting any thing—Colonel Skerrett arrives in the harbour with a British force—Does not land—Gallant conduct of the Italian soldier Bianchini—The upper town is stormed with dreadful slaughter.

In Taragona, although a siege had been so long expected, there was a great scarcity of money and ammunition, and so many men had, as Suchet foresaw, been drawn off to succour Figueras, that the garrison, commanded by colonel Gonzalez, was not more than six thousand, including twelve hundred armed inhabitants and the seamen of the port. The town was encumbered with defensive works of all kinds, but most of them were ill-constructed, irregular, and without convenient places for making sallies.

Taragona itself was built upon rocks, steep on the north-east and south, but sinking gently on the south-west and west into low ground. A mole formed a harbour capable of receiving ships of the line, and beyond the mole there was a roadstead. The upper town was surrounded by ancient walls, crowning the rocks, and these walls were inclosed by a second rampart with irregular bastions which ran round the whole city. On the east, across the road to Barcelona, there was a chain of redoubts connected by curtains, with a ditch and covered way; and behind this line there was a rocky space called the Milagro, opening between the body of the place and the sea. The lower town, or suburb, was separated from the upper, by the inner ramparts of the latter, and was protected by three regular and some irregular bastions with a ditch; a square work, called Fort Royal, formed a species of citadel within, and the double town presented the figure of an irregular oblong, whose length lying parallel to the sea, was about twelve hundred yards.

On the east beyond the walls, a newly constructed line of defence was carried along the coast to the mouth of the Francoli, where it ended in a large redoubt, built to secure access to that river when the ancient aqueducts which furnished the city with water should be cut by the French. This line was strengthened by a second redoubt, called the Prince, half-way between that near the Francoli and the town; and it was supported by the mole which being armed with batteries, and nearly in a parallel direction, formed as it were a second sea-line.

The approach on the side of the Francoli river was of a level character, and exposed to the fire of the Olivo, a large outwork on the north, crowning a rocky table-land of an equal height with the upper town, but divided from it by a ravine nearly half-a-mile wide, across which the aqueducts of the place were carried. This Olivo was an irregular horn-work, four hundred yards long, with a ditch twenty-four feet deep and forty wide, but the covered way was not completed, and the gorge was only closed by a loopholed wall; neither was this defence quite finished, as the steepness of the rock, and the fire of the city appeared to render it

secure. The bastion on the left of the Olivo, was cut off by a ditch and a rampart from the body of the work, and on the right also within the rampart there was a small redoubt of refuge, with a high cavalier or bank, on which three guns were placed that overlooked all the country round. The ordinary garrison of the Olivo was from twelve to fifteen hundred men, and it contained fifty out of three hundred pieces of artillery which served the defence of Taragona.

The nature of the soil combined with the peculiarities of the works, determined Suchet's line of attack. On the north and east side the ground was rocky, the fronts of defence wide, the approaches unfavourable for breaching batteries; and as all the guns and stores would have to be dragged over the hills on a great circuit, unless the Olivo was first taken, no difficulty could be avoided in an attack. Wherefore, on the side of the lower town the French resolved to approach, although the artificial defences were there accumulated, and the ground between the town and the Francoli river taken in reverse by the Olivo, which rendered it necessary first to reduce that outwork. But this part was chosen by the French, because the soil was deep and easily moved, their depôts and parks close at hand, the ground-plot of the works so salient that they could be easily embraced with fire, and because the attack would, it was supposed, cut off the garrison from fresh water, yet this last advantage was not realized.

On the 4th of May the French, passing the Francoli, drove in the outposts, took possession of two small detached redoubts, situated on the northern side, called the forts of Loretto, and invested the place. However the Spanish troops supported by the fire of the Olivo killed and wounded two hundred men, and the next day a fruitless attempt was made to retake the lost ground; at the same time the fleet under captain Codrington, consisting of three English ships of the line and three frigates, besides sloops and Spanish vessels of war, cannonaded the French right, and harassed their convoys, then coming by the coast-road from the Col de Balaguer. The investing troops whose posts were very close to the Olivo, were also greatly incommoded by the heavy fire from that outwork, yet the line was maintained and perfected.

Habert's division, forming the right wing, extended from the sea to the bridge of the Francoli; general Frere's division connected Habert with Harispe's, whose troops occupied the ground before the Olivo; the Italian division prolonged Harispe's left to the road of Barcelona which runs close to the sea on the east side of Taragona; three regiments were placed in reserve higher up on the Francoli, where a trestle bridge was cast, and the park, which was established on the right of that river, at the village of Canonja, contained sixty-six battering guns and mortars, each furnished with seven hundred rounds. There were also thirty six field pieces, two thousand artillery-men to serve the guns, seven hundred sappers and miners, fourteen hundred cavalry, and nearly fifteen thousand infantry. The head-quarters were fixed at the village of Constanti, a strong covering position, the depôt at Reus was secured by fortified convents, and the works at Mora were defended by several battalions. Other troops, placed at Falcet, guarded the communications, which were farther secured by the escorts belonging to the convoys; and the French had cut off the water of the aqueducts from the Olivo, but this water, whose source was ten or twelve miles off, was also necessary to the besiegers on that sterile land, and was again cut off by the Somatenes, which obliged the French to guard its whole course during the siege.

Meanwhile Campo Verde after his defeat at Figueras had sent Sarsfield and Eroles to their former posts near Valls, Mombianch, and Igualada, and embarking at Mattaro himself, with four thousand men, came on

the 10th to Taragona, where the sudden appearance of the French had produced great consternation. Yet when Campo Verde arrived with this reinforcement, and when colonel Green, the English military agent, arrived on the 15th from Cadiz, in the *Merope*, bringing with him fifty thousand dollars and two transports laden with arms and stores, Spanish apathy again prevailed, and the necessary measures of defence were neglected. Beyond the walls, however, the French post at Momblanch was attacked by two thousand Miguelettes, and the Somatenes assembled in the vicinity of Reus.

Suchet detached general Frere with four battalions to relieve the former place, where the attack had failed; the commandant of Reus also dispersed the Somatenes, and meanwhile Harispe pushed his patrols over the Gaya as far as Torre de Barra, where he found some wounded Spaniards. These men were within the protection of a convention, made by St. Cyr with Reding, by which the wounded men of both armies were to be left in the civil hospitals of the different towns, and mutually taken care of, without being made prisoners; and it is remarkable that this compact was scrupulously executed on both sides, while beyond those hospitals the utmost ferocity and a total disregard of civilized usages prevailed.

Sarsfield's arrival near Momblanch threatened the communications between Reus and Mora, and at the same time a Valencian column, acting in concert with captain Adam of the *Invincible*, attacked the posts of Rapita and Amposta: the former was abandoned by the garrison, and the latter was surrounded by the Valencians, but a regiment sent from Tortosa, after disengaging Amposta, defeated the Valencians near Rapita; nevertheless Suchet unwilling to lessen his already too small force, did not restore the latter post.

SIEGE OF TARAGONA.

The French general having resolved to attack the lower town, commenced his operations by constructing a fort and batteries, on the right of the Francoli, near the sea-shore, with a view to keep the English ships of war and the gun-boats at a distance from his projected trenches. These works commenced in the night of the 7th, were successfully continued towards the mouth of the river under the fire of the vessels; a trench, lined with musqueteers, was also carried from the left along the bank of the river to the bridge, but the Spaniards continually harassed the investing troops both from within and from without, and made some attempts against the camp; wherefore the brigade of general Salme, which was close to the Olivo, was obliged to entrench, and yet lost fifty or sixty men daily by the enemy's skirmishers.

On the night of the 13th, during a tempest, the French stormed two external entrenchments near the Olivo, and then turned them against the besieged; the next morning a vigorous attempt to retake them was repulsed with a loss of one hundred men, and on the Francoli side, a sally supported by the shipping failed in consequence of the cowardice of some Spanish officers. On the same day, besides this attack on the side of the Francoli, the garrison came out from the Barcelona gate, and six hundred Somatenes from the Upper Gaya fell on the patrols of the Italian division, whereupon Palombini secured the country on the 15th as far as Arbos.

The 18th a powerful sortie from the lower town was made by Gonzalez, who passed the bridge, and, aided by a fire from the place, from the Olivo, and from the fleet, pressed Habert's division hard; Suchet however came down with his reserve, pushed between the river and the Olivo, and menaced the Spanish line of retreat, which obliged Gonzalez to retire with loss.

On the 20th three other sallies were made from the Olivo, and from the upper town, on the Barcelona side, but they were all in like manner repulsed; and that day Sarsfield took post with twelve hundred men on a high and rugged place near Alcover, thus menacing the depot at Reus. The French general therefore detached two battalions of infantry and some cavalry, under general Broussard, to dislodge him, which was effected with the loss of a hundred French; but three days later he appeared before Momblanch, and was only driven away by the united brigades of Frere and Palombini, who marched against him. Divers attempts were also made upon the line of Falcet, especially at Grattalopes, where the Spanish colonel, Villamil, having attacked Morozinski, a Pole, the latter defended himself successfully, and with a bravery that has always distinguished the people of that heroic nation; a nation whose glory springs like an *ignis fatuus* from the corruption of European honour!

These repeated attacks having warned Suchet how difficult it would be to maintain, with his weak army, so great an extent of communication, he abandoned his post at Momblanch, and contented himself with preserving the lines of Falcet and of Felipe de Balaguer; a measure the more necessary, that the garrison of Taragona was now greatly augmented; for on the 16th, the Blake had sailed for Valencia to seek reinforcements, and Carlos O'Donnell, who had succeeded Bassecour, gave him above two thousand infantry and two hundred cannoniers, who were safely landed at Taragona on the 22d, two thousand stand of arms being, in return, delivered by captain Codrington to O'Donnell, to equip fresh levies. Above twelve thousand men were thus collected in the fortress, but all the richest citizens had removed with their families and effects to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and the people were dispirited.

Suchet broke ground before the Olivo in the night of the 21st, and carried on his approaches from both ends of the Spanish entrenchments which he had seized on the night of the 13th. His engineers wished to reach a round hill, close to the works, on which they proposed to plant their first breaching battery, and they crowned it on the 22d, but with much loss, being obliged to carry the earth for the work, up the hill in baskets, and they were continually interrupted by sallies. Three counter-batteries were, however, completed and armed on the 27th with thirteen pieces, of which six threw shells; but to effect this, the soldiers dragged the artillery over the rocks, under a heavy fire of grape, and the garrison making a vigorous sally, killed general Salme, when he opposed them with the reserves.* The moment was dangerous to the French, but they were finally victorious, and the fire of the batteries having opened the same morning, was sustained until the evening of the 29th, when a breach being formed, the assault was ordered.

STORMING OF THE OLIVO.

Upon the success of this attack, Suchet thought, and with reason, that his chance of taking the town would depend, seeing that his army was too feeble to bear any serious check. Wherefore, having formed his columns of assault, he personally encouraged them, and at the same time directed the troops along the whole line of investment to advance simultaneously, and menace every part of the town. The night was dark, and the Spaniards were unexpectant of an attack, because none of their guns had yet been silenced; but the French, full of hope and resolution, were watching for the signal. When that was given, the troops on the Francoli, and those on the Barcelona side, made a sudden discharge of musketry, beat all their drums,

* Suchet.

and with loud shouts approached the town at those opposite quarters; the rampart of the place was instantly covered with fire from within and from without; the ships in the offing threw up rockets, and amidst the noise of four hundred guns the storming columns rushed upon the Olivo.

The principal force made for the breach; but a second column, turning the fort, got between it and the town, at the moment when fifteen hundred men, sent to relieve the old garrison, were entering the gates. Some of the French instantly fell on their rear, which hurrying forward, gave an opportunity to the assailants to penetrate with them before the gates could be closed, and thirty sappers with hatchets having followed closely, endeavoured to break the door, while Papignay, their officer, attempted to climb over the wall; the Spaniards killed him and most of the sappers, but the other troops, planted their ladders to the right and left, and cutting through the pointed stakes above, entered the place and opened the gate.*

At the main attack the French boldly assailed the narrow breach, but the ditch was fifteen feet deep, the Spaniards firm, and the fire heavy, and they were giving way, when the historian, Vacani, followed by some of his countrymen, (it is a strange error to think the Italians have not a brave spirit!) cut down the paling which blocked the subterranean passage of the aqueduct, and thus got into the ditch and afterwards into the fort. Then the Spaniards were driven from the ramparts on all sides, back to the little works of refuge, before noticed, as being at each end of the Olivo, from whence they fired both musketry and guns; but the French and Italian reserves, followed by Harispe with a third column now entered the place, and with a terrible slaughter ended the contest. Twelve hundred men perished, some escaped, a thousand were taken, and amongst them their commander who had received ten wounds.

In the morning three thousand Spaniards came out of Taragona, yet retired without attacking, and Suchet demanded a suspension of arms to dispose of the dead; this was however treated with scorn and the heaps were burned, for the sterile rocks afforded no earth to bury them. Campo Verde now gave general Senens de Contreras the command of Taragona, and went himself to the field-army, which was about ten thousand strong, including some new levies made by the junta of Catalonia.

Suchet's investment having been precipitated by the fall of Figueras his stores were not all collected until the 1st of June, when trenches were opened to embrace the whole of the lower town including the fort of Francoli and its chain of connecting works running along the sea-shore, that is to say, 1. The Nun's bastion and a half-moon called the King's, which formed, on the Spanish right, a sort of hornwork to the royal fort or citadel. 2. The bastion of San Carlos and a half-moon called the Prince's, which stood on the left, in the retiring angle where the sea-line joined the body of the place, and served as a counter-guard to the bastion of San Carlos. 3. The sea-line itself and the Francoli fort.

The 2d of June the besieged made a fruitless sally, and in the night of the 3d some advanced Spanish entrenchments were destroyed by the French. Sarsfield then entered Taragona with a detachment, and took the command of what was called the Port, which included the Mole, the works leading to the Francoli, and the suburb or lower town, Contreras still remaining governor of all, although reluctantly, for he expected no success.

In the night of the 4th the approaches were carried forward by the sap, the second parallel was commenced,

and on the 6th the besiegers were within twenty yards of the Francoli fort which had a wet ditch and was of regular construction. The breaching batteries which had been armed as the trenches proceeded, opened their fire against it on the 7th. The fresh masonry crumbled away rapidly, and at ten o'clock that night, the fort being entirely destroyed, three hundred chosen men in three columns, one of which forded the Francoli river, attacked the ruins, and the defenders retired fighting towards the half-moon of the Prince. The assailants then made a disorderly attempt to enter with them, but were quickly repulsed with a loss of fifty men, yet the lodgement was under a heavy fire secured; and the next night a battery of six pieces was constructed there, with a view to silence the guns of the Mole, which together with that of the place, endeavoured to overwhelm the small space thus occupied, with shot.

In the nights of the 8th and 9th under terrible discharges from both the upper and lower town, the second parallel was prolonged to fort Francoli on the right, and on the left, carried to within seventy yards of the Nun's bastion.

The 11th Sarsfield making a sally, killed some men, and retarded the works; but before the 15th, three approaches by the sap were conducted against the Nun's bastion, where the besiegers crowned the glacis, and against the half-moon of the King and Prince. Fresh batteries were also constructed, whose fire embraced the whole front from the Prince to the Nun's bastion.

On the morning of the 16th fifty-four guns opened from the French batteries, and the Spaniards placing sand-bags along the parapets endeavoured by musketry to kill the gunners, who were much exposed, while all the cannon of the place which could be directed upon the trenches were employed to crush the batteries. Towards evening this fire had in a great degree mastered that of the besiegers, destroyed the centre of their second parallel, and silenced a battery on their right; but the loss and damage was great on both sides, for two consumption magazines exploded in the town and the Nun's bastion was breached. The engineers also observed that the ditch of the Prince was not carried round to the sea, and hence Suchet who feared a continuation of this murderous artillery battle, resolved to storm that point at once, hoping to enter by the defect in the ditch.

At nine o'clock two columns, supported by a reserve, issued from the trenches, and after a short resistance entered the work both by the gap of the ditch, and by escalade; the garrison fought well, and were put to the sword, a few only escaping along the quay, these were pursued by a party of the French, who passing a ditch, and drawbridge which cut off the road from the bastion of San Carlos, endeavoured to maintain themselves there, but being unsupported were mostly destroyed. The lodgement thus made was immediately secured and included in the trenches.

During the night of the 17th the old batteries were repaired and the construction of a new one, to breach the bastion of San Carlos, was begun upon the half-moon of the Prince; the saps and other approaches were also pushed forward, a lodgement was effected in the covered way of the Nun's bastion, and the third parallel was commenced; but on the right of the trenches, in advance of the Prince, the workmen came upon water which obliged them to desist at that point.

The 18th the third parallel was completed and the descent of the ditch at the Nun's bastion was commenced by an under-ground gallery; yet the fire from the upper town plunged into the trenches, and thirty-seven shells thrown very exactly into the lodgement on the counterscarp, obliged the besiegers to relinquish their operations there during the day. At this time also the

* Suchet. Vacani.

gun-boats which hitherto had been of little service in the defence, were put under the direction of the British navy, and worked with more effect; yet it does not appear that the enemy ever suffered much injury from the vessels of war, beyond the interruption sometimes given to their convoys on the Col de Balaguer road.

During the nights of the 19th and 20th all the French works were advanced, and the morning of the 21st the new battery, in the Prince, being ready, opened its fire against San Carlos, and was followed by all the other batteries. The explosion of an expense magazine silenced the Prince's battery after a few rounds, the damage was however repaired, and at four o'clock in the evening nearly all the Spanish guns being overcome and the breaches enlarged, Suchet resolved to storm the lower town. But previous to describing this terrible event, it is necessary to notice the proceedings within and without the place, that a just idea of the actual state of affairs on both sides may be formed.

Macdonald had continued the blockade of Figueras with unceasing vigilance; and as the best of the Miguelettes were shut up there, and as the defeat of Campo Verde, on the 3d of May, had spread consternation throughout the province, the operations to relieve it were confined to such exertions as Rovira, Manso, and other chiefs could call forth. In like manner Francisco Milans was left in the Hostalrich district, and by his local popularity amongst the people of the coast between Palamos and Barcelona, was enabled to keep up an irregular force; but his object was to be made captain-general of the province, and his desire of popularity, or some other motive, led him to favour the towns of his district at the expense of the general cause. Mattaro and Villa Nueva de Sitjes trafficked in corn with Barcelona, and one of their secret convoys was detected at a later period passing the outposts with Milans' written authority. He put the men to death who permitted the convoy to pass, but he did not succeed in removing the suspicion of corruption from himself. This traffic was very advantageous for the French, and Maurice Mathien being either unwilling to disturb it, or that having recently suffered in a skirmish at Mattaro, he feared to risk his troops, made no movement to aid the siege of Taragona, which it would appear, he might have done by taking possession of Villa Nueva de Sitjes.

Such was the state of eastern Catalonia, and in the western parts, the infantry of Sarsfield, and of Eroles, who had come down to the vicinity of Valls, and the cavalry under Caro, which was a thousand strong, formed, with the new levies ordered by the junta, an army of seven or eight thousand men. This force might have done much, if Campo Verde, a man of weak character, and led by others, had not continually changed his plans. At the opening of the siege, Sarsfield had acted, as we have seen, with some success on the side of Momblanch and Reus; but when he was sent into the lower town, the active army being reduced to Eroles' division, the cavalry could do no more than supply small detachments, to watch the different French convoys and posts. Campo Verde, however, fixed his quarters at Igualada, sent detachments to the Gaya and Villa Franca, and holding Villa Nueva de Sitjes as his post of communication with the fleet, demanded assistance from Murcia and Valencia, and formed a general plan for the succour of the place. But in Taragona his proceedings were viewed with dislike, and discord and negligence were rendering the courage of the garrison of no avail.

We have seen that captain Codrington landed two thousand five hundred Valencians on the 22d of May; besides that reinforcement, vessels loaded with powder

and other stores, and additional mortars for the batteries, came from Carthagena and from Cadiz in the beginning of June. From Murcia also came reinforcements; but such was the perversity of some authorities and the want of arrangement in all, that the arms of these men were taken away from them before they sailed; and yet in Taragona there were already two thousand men without arms, a folly attributed by some to the Spanish authorities of Murcia, by others to colonel Roche, the English military agent. Nor did the confusion end here; for captain Codrington, when he sailed from Taragona to Peniscola in the latter end of May, supplied O'Donnel with arms for two thousand recruits, who were to replace the Valencians then embarked; and a few days afterwards he delivered so many more at the city of Valencia, that Villa Campa and the Empecinado, whose troops, after their dispersion in April by Abbé and Paris, had remained inactive, were enabled again to take the field. Thus it appears that, while men were sent without arms from Valencia to Taragona, arms were being conveyed from the latter place to Valencia.

The troops in Taragona had, by these different reinforcements, been augmented to near seventeen thousand men; however that number was never available at one time, for the Murcians were sent to Montserrat to be armed, and the losses during the operations, including those caused by sickness, had reduced the garrison at this period to less than twelve thousand.* Several colonels of regiments, and many other officers, feigning sickness, or with open cowardice running away, had quitted the town, leaving their battalions to be commanded by captains; the general of artillery was incapable, and Contreras himself, unknown to the inhabitants, unacquainted with the place or its resources, was vacillating and deceitful to those serving under him. He was very unwilling to undertake the defence, and he was at variance with Campo Verde outside, and jealous of Sarsfield inside. In the fleet also some disagreement occurred between captain Codrington and captain Bullen, and the commanders of the Diana and Prueba Spanish ships of war were accused of gross misconduct.

Carlos O'Donnel and his brother the Conde de Abispa, at the desire of captain Codrington, had permitted Miranda to embark with four thousand of the best Valencian troops for Taragona, there to join in a grand sally; but they exacted from Codrington a pledge to bring those who survived back, for they would not suffer this their second aid in men to be shut up in the place when the object was effected. These troops landed the 12th at Taragona, yet the next day, at Campo Verde's order, Miranda, instead of making a sally as had been projected, carried them off by the sea to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and from thence marched to meet a detachment of horse coming from Villa Franca; and on the 15th two squadrons of cavalry issuing from Taragona by the Barcelona gate, passed the French line of investment, without difficulty, and also joined Miranda who then marched to unite with Campo Verde at Igualada.

This movement was in pursuance of a grand plan to succour the place; for the junta of Catalonia, having quitted Taragona after the fall of the Olivo, repaired with the archives to Montserrat, and as usual made their clamours for succour ring throughout the peninsula: they had received promises of co-operation from O'Donnel, from Villa Campa, and from the partizans, and Campo Verde proposed, that the English ships of war should keep between the Col de Balaguer and Taragona, to cannonade the French convoys on that route; that a detachment should take post at Ordal, to watch the garrison of Barcelona, and that he with the

* Report of Contreras.

remainder of his forces, which including Miranda's division amounted to ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry, should take some commanding position near Reus. In this situation he designed to send a detachment towards San Felipe de Balaguer to communicate with the fleet, and, avoiding any serious action, to operate by small corps against the French line of supply, and thus oblige them to raise the siege, or if they came out of their lines to fight them in strong positions.

Contreras treated this plan with contempt. He said it would cause the loss both of the place and the army; that the French would not raise the siege except for a general battle, and that within their lines the best mode of fighting them would be in concert with the garrison; wherefore he desired the general-in-chief to attack them in conjunction with himself, and the junta, who were at variance with Campo Verde, backed this proposal.

Neither of these plans, however, appear sound: for though it is certain, that if the generals could have depended upon their troops, such was the reduced state of Suchet's force, and so extensive was his line of investment, that it would have been easy to break through; yet, unless the French were put entirely to the route, which was unlikely, no great advantage would have followed, because the communication was already open by sea. On the other hand, Campo Verde's plan was only proposed on the 13th, and would have been too slow for the critical nature of the case. It would have been more in accord with that great maxim of war, which prescribes the *attack of an enemy's weakest point, with the greatest possible numbers*, to have marched with his whole force upon Mora, or upon Reus, to beat the troops there, and destroy the depôts; and then seizing some strong posts on the hills close to the besieger's lines to have entrenched it and operated daily and hourly against their rear. If Campo Verde had destroyed either of these depôts the siege must have been raised; and if he was unable to beat two or three thousand infantry at those places, he could not hope, even with the assistance of the garrison, to destroy sixteen thousand of all arms in the entrenchments before Taragona. Suchet did not fear a battle on the Francolí river; but so tender was he of the depôts, that when Campo Verde sent an officer to raise the Somatenes about Mora, he called Abbé with three thousand infantry from Teruel, and that general who was active and experienced in the guerilla warfare, soon dispersed the Spanish levies, and took their chief with many other prisoners, after which he joined the besieging army.

Suchet required this reinforcement. He had lost a general, two hundred inferior officers, and above two thousand five hundred men during the siege, and had not more than twelve thousand infantry fit for duty; but colonel Villamil, a partizan of Campo Verde's, taking advantage of Abbé's absence, marched with a thousand men to attack Mora, and being beaten on the 16th was succeeded by Eroles, who came with his whole division to Falcet on the 20th, and captured a convoy of loaded mules, driving back the escort with some loss to Mora. The design was to tempt Suchet to send a strong detachment in pursuit of Eroles, in which case the latter was by a rapid march to rejoin Campo Verde near Alcover, when the whole army was to attack Suchet thus weakened. However, the French general would not turn from his principal object, and his magazines at Reus were still so full that the loss of the convoy did not seriously affect him.

Such was the situation of affairs on the 21st of June, when the order to assault the lower town was given to an army, small in number, but full of vigour, and confident of success; while, in the place there was confusion, folly, and cowardice. Contreras indeed acted a shame-

ful part; for during captain Codrington's absence, Sarsfield had concerted with the navy, that in the case of the lower town being stormed, the ships should come to the mole and the garrison would retire there, rather than to the upper town; meanwhile Campo Verde recalled him to the active army, intending that general Velasco should replace him; but at three o'clock on the 21st, the breaches being then open, and the assault momentarily expected, Contreras commanded Sarsfield instantly to embark, falsely averring that such was the peremptory order of Campo Verde. Sarsfield remonstrated in vain, and a boat from the Cambrian frigate carried him and his personal staff and his effects on board that vessel; thus the command of the troops was left to an inefficient subordinate officer, the assault took place at that moment, and when Velasco arrived, he found only the dead bodies of those he was to have commanded. Contreras then assured captain Codrington and the junta, that Sarsfield had acted without his consent, and had in fact betrayed his post!

STORMING OF THE LOWER TOWN.

This calamitous event happened in the evening of the 21st. Two breaches had been made in the bastions, and one in the Fort Royal; they were not wide, and a few Spanish guns still answered the French fire; nevertheless the assault was ordered, and as some suppose, because Suchet had secret intelligence of Sarsfield's removal, and the consequent confusion in the garrison.*

Fifteen hundred grenadiers, destined for the attack, were assembled under Palombini in the trenches; a second column was formed to support the storming troops, and to repel any sally from the upper town; and while the arrangements were in progress, the French guns thundered incessantly, and the shouts of the infantry, impatient for the signal, were heard between the salvos, redoubling as the shattered walls gave way. At last Harispe's division began to menace the ramparts on the side of Barcelona, to distract the attention of the Spaniards, and then Suchet exhorting the soldiers to act vigorously, gave the signal and let them loose while it was still day. In an instant the breaches were crowned, and the assailants swarmed on the bastions, the ramparts, and the fort Royal; the Spaniards, without a leader were thrown into confusion, and falling in heaps broke and fled towards the port, towards the mole, and towards the upper town, and a reserve stationed under the walls of the latter was overthrown with the same shock. Then some of the fugitives, running towards the mole, were saved by the English launches, others escaped into the upper town, a few were made prisoners, and the rest were slaughtered.

At eight o'clock the lower town was in the possession of the enemy. Fifteen hundred bodies, many of whom were inhabitants, lay stretched upon the place, and the mercantile magazines of the port being set on fire, the flames finished what the sword had begun. When the carnage ceased, the troops were rallied, working parties were set to labour; and ere the confusion in the upper town had subsided, the besiegers were again hidden in their trenches and burrowing forward to the walls of the upper town.

The front before them consisted of four bastions with curtains, but without a ditch. The bastion of St. Paul was opposite their left, that of St. John opposite their centre, that of Jesus opposite their right; but the bastion of Cervantes, which covered the principal landing place of the Milagro, although on the same front of defence, was somewhat retired and not included within the attack. A hollow piece

* Rogniat. Vacani. Suchet. Captain Codrington's Papers, MSS.

of ground, serving as a trench, had enabled the French to establish their left in a side bastion of the wall, connecting the upper with the lower town; and their right was strongly protected by some houses lining the road, for between the two parts of the city there were four hundred yards of open garden-ground interspersed with single houses. A battery was constructed to play upon the landing places of the Milagro, two mortars which were on the hill of the fort Loretto, concurred in this object, and the light troops were pushed close up to the wall; but at daylight the ships of war passed the port delivering their broadsides in succession, Contreras then showed the heads of columns as if for a sally, and the French skirmishers retired; whereupon the Spanish general, contented with having thus cleared his front, re-entered the place.

The men saved from the mole, by the ships, were now relanded in the upper town, and the second reinforcement from Murcia arrived, but being like the first detachment without arms only added to the confusion and difficulties of the governor. Nevertheless as the loss of the French in the storming was about six hundred, and that of the Spaniards not more than two thousand, the besieged had still nine thousand fighting men; a number nearly equal to the whole infantry of Suchet's army; and hence Contreras, far from quailing beneath the blow, would not even receive a flag of truce by which the French general offered honourable conditions.

Suchet's position was becoming more embarrassing every moment; he had now delivered four assaults, his force was diminished nearly one fifth of its original number, and the men's strength was spent with labouring on his prodigious works: his line of communication with Lerida was quite intercepted and that with Mora interrupted, and he had lost a large convoy of provisions together with the mules that carried it. The resolution of the besieged seemed in no manner abated, and their communication with the sea, although partially under the French fire, was still free; the sea itself was covered with ships of war, overwhelming reinforcements might arrive at any moment, and Campo Verde with ten thousand men was daily menacing his rear. The Valencian army, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, Duran who had defeated a French detachment near Mirando del Ebro, Mina who had just then taken the convoy with Massena's baggage at the Puerto de Arlaban, in fine all the Partidas of the mountains of Albaracin, Moncayo, and Navarre, were in motion, and menacing his position in Aragon. This rendered it dangerous for him to call to his aid any more troops from the right of the Ebro, and yet a single check might introduce despondency amongst the soldiers of the siege, composed as they were of different nations, and some but lately come under his command; indeed their labours and dangers were so incessant and wearing, that it is no small proof of the French general's talent, and the men's spirit, that the confidence of both was still unshaken.

On the 24th the crisis seemed at hand, intelligence arrived in the French camp, that the Spanish army was coming down the Gaya river to fight, at the same time the garrison got under arms, and an active interchange of signals took place between the town and the fleet. Suchet immediately placed a reserve to sustain the guards of his trenches, and marched with a part of his army to meet Campo Verde. That general, pressed by the remonstrances of Contreras and the junta, had at last relinquished his own plan, recalled Eroles, and united his army at Momblanch on the 22d, and then moving by Villardona, had descended the hills between the Gaya and the Francoi; he was now marching in two columns to deliver battle, having directed Contreras to make a sally at the same moment. But Miranda, who commanded his right wing, found,

or pretended to find, some obstacles and halted, whereupon Campo Verde instantly relinquished the attack, and marched to Vendril before the French general could reach him.

The 25th he again promised Contreras to make a decisive attack, and for that purpose desired that three thousand men of the garrison should be sent to Vendril, and the remainder be held ready to cut their way through the enemy's lines during the action. He likewise assured him that four thousand English were coming by sea to aid in this project, and it is probable some great effort was really intended, for the breaching batteries had not yet opened their fire, and the wall of the place was consequently untouched; ten thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry under Campo Verde were within a few miles of the French camp on the Barcelona side; eight thousand men accustomed to fire were still under arms within the walls; and on the 26th colonel Skerrett appeared in the roadstead, not with four thousand, but with twelve hundred British soldiers, sent from Cadiz and from Gibraltar to succour Taragona.

The arrival of this force, the increase of shipping in the roadstead, and the promises of Campo Verde, raised the spirits of the garrison from the depression occasioned by the disappointment of the 27th; and they were still more elated when in the evening colonel Skerrett and his staff, accompanied by general Doyle, captain Codrington, and other officers of the navy, disembarked, and proceeded to examine the means of defence. But they were struck with consternation when they heard that the British commander, because his engineers affirmed that the wall would give way after a few salvos from the breaching batteries, had resolved to keep his troops on board the transports, idle spectators of the garrison's efforts, to defend the important place which he had been sent to succour.*

Contreras, thus disappointed on all sides, and without dependence on Campo Verde, resolved, if the French delayed the storm until the 29th, to make way by a sally on the Barcelona road, and so join the army in the field; meanwhile to stand the assault if fortune so willed it. And he had good reason for his resolution, for the ground in front of the walls was high and narrow; and although there was neither ditch nor covered way, a thick hedge of aloë trees, no small obstacle to troops, grew at the foot of the rampart, which was also cut off from the town, and from the side works, by an internal ditch and retrenchment. Behind the rampart the houses of the great street called the Rambla, were prepared for defence, furnishing a second line of resistance; and although the cuts on the flanks hindered the making of sallies in force, which at such a period was a good mode of defence, the reduced state of the French army gave reason to believe that eight thousand brave men could resist it effectually.

The 28th a general plan for breaking out on the Barcelona side, the operation of the fleet, and a combined attack of the Spanish army, was arranged; and Eroles embarked for the purpose of re-landing at Taragona, to take the leading of the troops destined to sally forth on the 29th. The French general had however completed his batteries on the night of the 27th, and in the morning of the 28th they opened with a crashing effect. One magazine blew up in the bastion of Cervantes; all the guns in that of San Paulo were dismounted; the wall fell away in huge fragments before the stroke of the batteries, and from the Olivo, and from all the old French trenches, the guns and mortars showered bullets and shells into the place. This fire was returned from many Spanish

* Contreras' Report.

pieces, still in good condition, and the shoulders of the French batteries were beaten down; yet their gunners, eager for the last act of the siege, stood to their work uncovered, the musketry rattled round the ramparts, the men on both sides crowded to the front, and while opprobrious words and mutual defiance passed between them, the generals, almost within hearing of each other, exhorted the soldiers to fight with the vigour that the crisis demanded.

STORMING OF THE UPPER TOWN.

At five o'clock in the evening the French fire suddenly ceased, and fifteen hundred men led by general Habert passing out from the parallel, went at full speed up against the breach; twelve hundred under general Ficatier followed in support, general Montmarie led a brigade round the left, to the bastion of Rosario, with a view to break the gates there during the assault, and thus penetrating, to turn the interior defence of the Rambla.* Harispe took post on the Barcelona road, to cut off the retreat of the garrison.

The columns of attack had to pass over an open space of more than a hundred yards before they could reach the foot of the breach; and when within twenty yards of it, the hedge of aloes obliged them to turn to the right, and left, under a terrible fire of musketry and of grape, which the Spaniards, who were crowding on the breach with apparent desperation, poured unceasingly upon them. The destruction was great, the head of the French column got into confusion, gave back, and was beginning to fly, when the reserves rushed up, and a great many officers coming forward in a body, renewed the attack. At that moment one Bianchini, an Italian soldier, who had obtained leave to join the column as a volunteer, and whose white clothes, amidst the blue uniforms of the French, gave him a supernatural appearance, went forth alone from the ranks, and gliding silently and sternly up the breach, notwithstanding many wounds reached the top, and there fell dead. Then the multitude bounded forward with a shout, the first line of the Spaniards fled, and the ramparts were darkened by the following masses of the French.

Meanwhile Montmarie's sappers cut away the palisades at Rosario, and his light troops finding a rope hanging from the wall, mounted by it, at the moment when the assailants at the breach broke the Spanish reserves with one shock, and poured into the town like a devastating torrent. At the Rambla a momentary stand was indeed made, but the impulse of victory was too strong to be longer resisted, and a dreadful scene of slaughter and violence ensued. Citizens and soldiers, maddened with fear, rushed out in crowds by the Barcelona gate, while others, throwing themselves over the ramparts, made for the landing-places within the Milagro; but that way also had been intercepted by general Rogniat with his sappers, and then numbers throwing themselves down the steep rocks were dashed to pieces, while they who gained the shore were still exposed to the sword of the enemy. Those that went out by the Barcelona gate were met by Harispe's men, and some being killed, the rest, three thousand in number, were made prisoners. But within the town all was horror; fire had been set to many houses, Gonzales, fighting manfully, was killed, Contreras, wounded with the stroke of a bayonet, was only saved by a French officer; and though the hospitals were respected by the soldiers, in every other part their fury was unbounded. When the assault first commenced, the ship-launches had come close into the Milagro, and now saved some of the fugitives, but their guns swept the open space beyond, killing friends and enemies, as, mixed together, they rushed to the shore; and the French dragons, passing through the flaming streets at a trot,

rode upon the fugitives, sabring those who had outstripped the infantry. In every quarter there was great rage and cruelty, and although most of the women and children had, during the siege, been removed from Taragona by the English shipping, and that the richest citizens had all gone to Sitjes, this assault was memorable as a day of blood. Only seven or eight hundred miserable creatures, principally soldiers, escaped on board the vessels; nine thousand, including the sick and wounded, were made prisoners; more than five thousand persons were slain, and a great part of the city was reduced to ashes.

CHAPTER VI.

Suchet marches against Campo Verde—Seizes Villa Nueva de Sitjes and makes fifteen hundred prisoners—Campo Verde retires to Igualada—Suchet goes to Barcelona—A council of war held at Cervera by Campo Verde—It is resolved to abandon the province as a lost country—Confusion ensues—Lacy arrives and assumes the command—Eroles throws himself into Montserrat—Suchet sends detachments to the valley of Congosta and that of Vich, and opens the communication with M'Donald at Figueras—Returns to Reus—Created a marshal—Destroys the works of the lower town of Taragona—Takes Montserrat—Negotiates with Cuesta for an exchange of the French prisoners in the island of Cabrera—Stopped by the interference of Mr. Wellesley—Mischief occasioned by the privateers—Lacy reorganizes the province—Suchet returns to Zaragoza, and chases the Partidas from the frontier of Aragon—Habert defeats the Valencians at Amposta—The Somatenes harass the French forts near Montserrat—Figueras surrenders to M'Donald—Napoleon's clemency—Observations—Operations in Valencia and Murcia.

SUCHET had lost in killed and wounded during the siege between four and five thousand men, yet scarcely had the necessary orders to efface the trenches, secure the prisoners, and establish order in the ruined city been given, than the French general was again in movement to disperse Campo Verde's force. In the night of the 29th Frere's division marched upon Villa Franca, Harispe's upon Villa Nueva, being followed by Suchet himself with Abbé's brigade and the heavy cavalry. Campo Verde then abandoned Vendril, and Harispe's column, although cannonaded by the English squadron, reached Villa Nueva, where a great multitude, military and others, were striving to embark in the vessels off the port. The light cavalry sabred some and made fifteen hundred prisoners, including the wounded men who had been carried there from Taragona during the siege; and Frere's column in a like manner dispersed the Spanish rear-guard at Vendril and Villa Franca. Campo Verde then fled with the main body to Igualada, and Suchet pushed on with the reserve to Barcelona, where he arranged with Maurice Mathieu a plan to prevent the Valencian division from re-embarking, or marching to aid the blockade of Figueras.

Distrust, confusion, and discord now prevailed amongst the Catalans. The people were enraged against Campo Verde, and the junta sent to Cadiz to demand the duke of Infantado as a chief. Milans, who had assembled some Miguelettes and Somatenes about A rens de Mar, openly proposed himself, and Sarsfield, whose division was the only one in any order, was at variance with Eroles. The country people desired to have the latter made captain-general, and a junta of general officers actually appointed him; yet he would not accept it while Campo Verde remained, and that general had already reached Agramunt, whence, overwhelmed with his misfortunes, he meant to fly towards Aragon. He was, however, persuaded to return to Cervera, and call a council of war, and then it was proposed to abandon Catalonia as a lost country, and embark the army; and this disgraceful

* Suchet. Rogniat. Vacani. Codrington's papers. MSS.
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resolution, although opposed by Sarsfield, Santa-Cruz, and even Campo Verde himself, was adopted by the council, and spread universal consternation. The junta remonstrated loudly, all the troops who were not Catalans deserted, making principally for the Segre and Cinça rivers, in hope to pass through Aragon into New Castile, and so regain their own provinces; every place was filled with grief and despair.

In this conjuncture captain Codrington refused to embark any Catalans, but he had promised to take back the Valencians, and although the conditions of his agreement had been grossly violated by Campo Verde and Miranda, he performed his contract: yet even this was not arranged without a contest between him and Doyle, on the one side, and Miranda and Caro on the other. Meanwhile colonel Green, instead of remaining at the Spanish head-quarters, returned to Peniscola with all the money and arms under his control; and the captain of the *Prueba* frigate, having under his command, several Spanish vessels of war loaded with wounded men, the archives of the municipality, ammunition, stores, and money, all belonging to Catalonia, set sail for Majorca under such suspicious circumstances, that captain Codrington thought it necessary to send a ship to fetch him back by force.

In the midst of these afflicting scenes Suchet brought up his troops to Barcelona, and Maurice Mathieu with a part of his garrison marching upon Mataro, dispersed a small body of men that Eroles had collected there; but the Valencian infantry to the number of two thousand four hundred escaped to Arens de Mar, and being received on board the English vessels were sent back to their own country. The cavalry, unwilling to part with their horses, would not embark, and menaced their general Caro, who fled from their fury; nevertheless Eroles rallied them, and having gathered some stores and money from the smaller depots, marched inland. Campo Verde then embarked privately in the *Diana* to avoid the vengeance of the people, and general Lacy, who had arrived from Cadiz, took the command; yet he would have been disregarded, if Eroles had not set the example of obedience. Suchet however moved against him, and first scouring the valley of the Congosta and that of Vich, spread his columns in all directions, and opened a communication with Macdonald at Figueras. Lacy, thus pressed, collected the cavalry and a few scattered Catalanian battalions remaining about Solsona, Cardona, Seu d'Urgel, and took refuge in the hills, while Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, where large magazines had been previously formed.

Suchet unable to find subsistence in the valleys, resolved to attack this celebrated place, and for this purpose leaving Frere and Harispe at Vich and Moya, with orders to move at a given time upon Montserrat, returned himself with the reserve to Reus. Here he received despatches from Napoleon, who had created him a marshal, and had sent him orders to take Montserrat, to destroy the works of Taragona, with the exception of a citadel, and finally to march against Valencia. He therefore preserved the upper town of Taragona, ruined the rest of the works, carried the artillery to Tortosa, and marched against Montserrat on the 22d of July by the way of Mombianch and San Coloma to Igualada. At the same time Harispe and Frere moved by Manresa, and Maurice Mathieu entered Esparaguera with a part of the garrison of Barcelona.

TAKING OF MONTSERRAT.

This strong-hold was occupied by fourteen or fifteen hundred Migueletes and Somatenes, inadequate as it proved to defend it against a great body of men such as Suchet was bringing up. But Eroles was daily raising recruits and adding works to the natural strength, and it would soon have been impregnable;

for on all sides the approaches were through the midst of steep and precipices, and high upon a natural platform, opening to the east, and overlooking the Llobregat, stood the convent of "*Nuestra Señora de Montserrat*," a great edifice, and once full of riches, but the wary monks had removed their valuables to Minorca early in the war. It was now well stored and armed, and above it huge peaks of stone shot up in the clouds so rude, so naked, so desolate, that, to use Suchet's expressive simile, "It was like the skeleton of a mountain."

There were three ways of ascending to this convent; one from Igualada which winded up on the north, from Casa Mansana, between a perpendicular rock and a precipice; this road which was the only one supposed practicable for an attack, was defended by two successive batteries, and by a retrenchment immediately in front of the convent itself. The other two ways were, a foot-path on the south leading to Colbato, and a narrow road crossing the Llobregat and running by Monistrol on the east, but both so crossed and barred by precipices as to be nearly inaccessible to troops.

Suchet disposed one brigade at Colbato to menace that front, and to intercept the retreat of the Spaniards; he then occupied the roads of Igualada and Monistrol with Harispe's and Frere's divisions, and directed Abbé's brigade to attack from the convent by the northern line. The 24th Abbé drove the Spaniards from Casa Mansana, and the 25th advanced up the mountain, flanked by some light troops, and supported by Suchet in person with the Barcelona troops, but exposed to the fire of the Somatenes, who had gathered round the peaks above. In a short time the first Spanish battery opened upon the head of the column as it turned an angle, but more light troops being sent out, they climbed the rough rocks, and getting above the battery shot down upon the gunners, while the leading companies of the column rushed forward, in front, and before a second discharge could be made, reached the foot of the battery beneath the line of fire. The Spaniards then threw down large stones upon the French until the fire of the light troops above, became so galling that the work was abandoned, the French however followed close, and the men above continued clambering along with that energy which the near prospect of success inspires; thus the Spaniards, unable to rally in time, were overtaken and bayoneted in the second battery, and the road was opened.

Abbé now re-formed his troops and marched on to assail the entrenchments of the convent, but as he advanced a sharp musketry was heard on the opposite quarter, and suddenly the Spanish garrison came flying out of the building pursued by French soldiers, who were supposed to be the brigade from Colbato; they however proved to be the light troops first sent out, to keep off the Somatenes from the right flank; for when the column advanced up the mountain, these men, about three hundred in number, had wandered too far to the right, and insensibly gaining ground up hill, had seized one or two of the hermitages with which the peaks are furnished; then growing more daring, they pressed on unopposed, until they gained the rock immediately overhanging the convent itself, and perceiving their advantage, with that intelligence which belongs only to veterans, immediately attacked the Spanish reserves. Their commanding position, the steep rocks, and narrow staircases, compensated for their inferiority of numbers, and in a little time they gained one of the doors, entered, and fought the defenders amongst the cloisters and galleries, with various turns of fortune, until the fugitives from the batteries, followed by Abbé, arrived, and then the whole garrison gave way and fled down the eastern precipices to the Llobregat, where from their knowledge of the country they easily avoided Harispe's men.

The loss of this place, which by Eroles and others was attributed to colonel Green's having carried off the money destined for strengthening it, was deeply felt from its military importance, and from the superstitious veneration in which it was held: several towns then offered their submission, many villages gave up their arms, and a general fear of Suchet's prowess began to spread all over Spain; but the Catalans, a fierce and constant race, were not yet conquered. The anarchy attendant upon the fall of Taragona and the after movements of Suchet had indeed been great; and as we have seen, most of the persons who might have aided to restore order, acted so as to increase the general confusion, and their bad example was followed by the authorities in other provinces who were most immediately connected with Catalonia: thus Cuesta, at this time governor of the Balearic isles, Bassecour who was at Cuenca, and Palacios, who had just been made captain-general of Valencia, did in no manner comport themselves as the occasion required. Cuesta who had neglected to send from Minorca the guns wanted in Catalonia, now entered into a negotiation to exchange the prisoners at Cabrera against those of Taragona, a praise-worthy thing, if, as Suchet asserts, it arose from humanity; and not an ill-judged measure in itself, because the Catalan soldiers to be exchanged were the best in Spain, and the French prisoners were ruined in constitution by their hard captivity. But at this period of distress it was impolitic, and viewed with suspicion by the Catalonians, as tending to increase the French force. At the desire of Mr. Wellesley this exchange was, however, peremptorily forbidden by the regency, and Cuesta refused to receive any more prisoners at Cabrera, which while those already there were so tormented, was, from whatever motive arising, a meritorious act, and the last important one of his life, for he soon after died. The prisoners remained, therefore, a disgrace to Spain and to England; for if her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound to insist, that thousands of men, whose prolonged captivity was the result of her interference, should not be exposed upon a barren rock, naked as they were born, and fighting for each other's miserable rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched.

This untoward state of affairs in Catalonia was aggravated by the English, Spanish, and French privateers, who taking advantage of the times, plundered the people along the coast in concert; and they were all engaged in the smuggling of tobacco, the monopoly of which here as in other parts of Spain formed the principal resource of the revenue. Yet there were many considerable resources left to the Catalans. The chief towns had fallen, but the mountainous districts were not subdued and scarcely crossed by the French lines of invasion. The Somatenes were numerous, more experienced, and still ready to come forward, under a good general, if arms were provided for them, and the English squadron was always at hand to aid them; Admiral Keats brought three thousand muskets from Gibraltar, Sir E. Pellew, who had succeeded to the command of the Mediterranean fleet, was anxious to succour the province to the full extent of his means, and Minorca was a great dépôt of guns, stores, and even men. Lacy, Eroles, Rovira, and others, therefore, raised fresh levies; and while the blockade of Figueras continued to keep all Macdonald's army employed, the Spaniards seized the opportunity to operate partially on the side of Besalu and Bispal, and even in the French Cerdaña, which being unprotected, was invaded by Lacy.

Suchet, whose posts now extended from Lerida to Montserrat on one side, and on the other from Taragona to Mequinenza, foresaw that a new and troublesome Catalan war was preparing; but he was obliged to

return to Saragoza, partly to prepare for the invasion of Valencia, partly to restore tranquillity in Aragon, which had been disturbed by the passage of the seceders from Campo Verde's army. The Valencian cavalry also, when Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, had under the conduct of general Gasca endeavoured to push through Aragon towards Navarre; and although they were intercepted by general Reille, and followed closely by Chlopiski, they finally reached Valencia without much loss, and the rest of the fugitives gained the Moncayo mountains and afterwards joined Mina. That chief was then in a very low state; he had been defeated on the 14th at Sanguessa, by Chlopiski, and Reille, who using the reinforcements then pouring into Spain, had pursued and defeated him again at Estella on the 23d of July, at Sorlada on the 24th, and at Val de Baygory on the 25th; yet he finally escaped to Motrico on the Biscay coast, where he received fresh arms and stores from the English vessels; but he was again defeated by Caffarelli, and finally driven for refuge to the district of Leibana; here the soldiers flying from Taragona and Figueras joined him, and he soon reappeared more fierce and powerful than before.

Meanwhile Villa Campa, whose division had been re-equipped from the supplies given by captain Codrington, concerted his operations with the partida chiefs Duran and Campillo,* and their combined forces being eight thousand strong, having advanced from different quarters on the right bank of the Ebro, invested Calatayud, and sought to carry off grain, which was now very scarce. This delayed the invasion of Valencia, for Suchet would not undertake it until he had again secured the frontier of Aragon, and many of his battalions were then escorting the prisoners to France. But when they returned, he directed numerous columns against the partidas, and at the same time troops belonging to the army of the centre came down by the way of Medina Celi; whereupon the Spaniards retired to their fastnesses in the mountains of Soria on one side, and in those of Albaracin on the other.

Four thousand of the Valencian army had meanwhile marched against Rapita and Amposta, for the former post was re-established after the fall of Taragona, but although Habert, marching out of Tortosa with seven or eight hundred men, defeated them with a considerable loss, the embarrassments of the third corps were not removed; for while these successes were obtained on the right of the Ebro the Catalans began to harass the posts between Lerida and Montserrat. On the 9th of August the Somatenes fell on some Italians placed in Monistrol, and were with difficulty repulsed; and a few days after, a convoy coming from Igualada to Montserrat, was attacked by fifteen hundred insurgents, and was unable to proceed until Palombini arrived with a battalion and dislodged the Catalans, but he lost more than a hundred of his own men in the action. Suchet finding from these events that he could not safely withdraw his main body from Catalonia until the fall of Figueras should let loose the army of the upper province, sent fresh troops to Montserrat, and ordered Palombini to move with his garrison to aid Macdonald in the blockade; that place had, however, surrendered before Palombini had passed Barcelona.

General Martinez, after making many vain efforts to break the line of blockade, and having used every edible substance, prepared on the 16th of August, to make a final effort, in concert with Rovira who came down to Llers. An officer deserting from the garrison betrayed the project; and Rovira was beaten in the morning before the garrison sallied, nevertheless, in

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

the night Martinez endeavoured to cut his way through the lines on the side of Rosas, but was driven back with a loss of four hundred men. Three days after, the place was given up and three thousand famished men were made prisoners. Thus ended the fourth great effort of the Catalonians. The success of the French was not without alloy, more than a fourth part of the blockading troops had died of a pestilent distemper; Macdonald himself was too ill to continue in the command, and the remainder of his army was so weakened, that no further active operations could be undertaken; Suchet was still occupied in Aragon, and Lacy thus obtained time and means to reorganize troops for a fifth effort.

The persons who had betrayed the place to Rovira were shot by Macdonald, and the commandant whose negligence had occasioned this misfortune was condemned to death; but Napoleon, who has been so foully misrepresented as a sanguinary tyrant, Napoleon, who had commuted the sentence of Dupont, now pardoned general Guillot; a clemency in both cases remarkable, seeing that the loss of an army by one, and of a great fortress by the other, not only tended directly and powerfully to the destruction of the emperor's projects, but were in themselves great crimes; and it is to be doubted if any other sovereign in Europe would have displayed such a merciful greatness of mind.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The emperor was discontented with Macdonald's operations, and that general seems to have mistaken both the nature of mountain warfare in general, and that of Catalonia in particular. The first requires a persevering activity in seizing such commanding posts on the flanks or rear of an adversary as will oblige him to fight on disadvantageous terms; and as the success greatly depends upon the rapidity and vigour of the troops, their spirit should be excited by continual enterprise, and nourished by commendation and rewards. Now Macdonald, if we may believe Vacani, an eye-witness, did neither gain the confidence of his soldiers, nor cherish their ardour; and while he exacted a more rigid discipline, than the composition of his troops and the nature of the war would bear, he let pass many important opportunities of crushing his enemies in the field. His intent was to reduce the ferocious and insubordinate disposition of his men, but the peculiar state of feeling with respect to the war on both sides, did not permit this, and hence his marches appeared rather as processions and ceremonies than warlike operations. He won no town, struck no important blow in the field, gave no turn to the public feeling, and lost a most important fortress, which, with infinite pains and trouble, he could scarcely regain.

The plans of all the French generals had been different. St. Cyr used to remain quiet, until the Spaniards gathered in such numbers that he could crush them in general battles; but then he lost all the fruit of his success by his inactivity afterwards. Augereau neither fought battles nor made excursions with skill, nor fulfilled the political hopes which he had excited. Macdonald was in constant movement, but he avoided battles; although in every previous important attack the Catalans had been beaten, whether in strong or in weak positions. Suchet alone combined skill, activity, and resolution, and the success which distinguished his operations is the best comment upon the proceedings of the others. It is in vain to allege that this last marshal was in a better condition for offensive operations, and that the emperor required of the seventh corps exertions which the extreme want of provisions prevented it from making. Napoleon might have been deceived as to the resources at first, and

have thus put it upon enterprises beyond its means; but after two years' experience, after receiving the reports of all the generals employed there, and having the most exact information of all occurrences, it is impossible to imagine that so consummate a captain would have urged Macdonald to undertake impracticable operations; and the latter gave no convincing proof that his own views were sound. Notwithstanding the continual complaints of St. Cyr, and other French writers, who have endeavoured to show that Napoleon was the only man who did not understand the nature of the war in Spain, and that the French armies were continually overmatched, it is certain that, after Baylen, the latter never lost a great battle except to the English; that they took every town they besieged, and never suffered any reverse from the Spaniards which cannot be distinctly traced to the executive officers. It would be silly to doubt the general merit of a man who in so many wars, and for many years, has maintained the noblest reputation, midst innumerable dangers, and many great political changes in his own country, but Macdonald's military talents do not seem to have been calculated for the irregular warfare of Catalonia.

2. The surprise of Figueras has been designated as a misfortune to the Spaniards, because it shut up a large body of their best Miguelettes, who fell with the place; and because it drew off Campo Verde from Taragona at a critical period. Let us, however, contrast the advantages, and, apart from the vigour and enterprise displayed in the execution, no mean help to the cause at the time, it will be seen that the taking of that fortress was a great gain to the Catalans; for, first, it carried away Macdonald from Barcelona, and thus the fall of Montserrat was deferred, and great danger of failure incurred by Suchet at Taragona; a failure infallible, if his adversaries had behaved with either skill or courage. Secondly, it employed all the French army of Upper Catalonia, the national guards of the frontier, and even troops from Toulon, in a blockade, during which the sword and sickness destroyed more than four thousand men, and the remainder were so weakened as to be incapable of field service for a long time; meanwhile Lacy reorganized fresh forces, and revived the war, which he could never have done if the seventh corps had been disposable. Thirdly, seeing that Campo Verde was incapable of handling large masses, it is doubtful if he could have resisted or retarded for any time the investment of Taragona; but it is certain that the blockade of Figueras gave an opportunity to Catalonia, to recover the loss of Taragona; and it obliged Suchet, instead of Macdonald, to take Montserrat, which disseminated the former force, and retarded the invasion of Valencia. Wherefore Rovira's daring, in the surprise, and Martinez' resolution in the maintaining of Figueras, were as useful as they were glorious.

3. The usual negligence, and slowness of the Spaniards, was apparent during this campaign; although resolution, perseverance, and talent were evinced by Suchet in all his operations, the success was in a great measure due to the faults of his opponents, and amongst those faults colonel Skerrett's conduct was prominent. It is true that captain Codrington and others agreed in the resolution not to land; that there was a heavy surf, and that the engineers predicted on the 27th that the wall would soon be beaten down; but the question should have been viewed in another light by colonel Skerrett. Taragona was the bulwark of the principality, the stay and hope of the war. It was the city of Spain whose importance was next to Cadiz, and before its walls the security or the ruin of Valencia as well as of Catalonia was to be found. Of the French scarcely fourteen thousand infantry were under arms, and those were exhausted with toil.

The upper town, which was the body of the place, was still unbreached, it was only attacked upon one narrow front, and behind it the Rambla offered a second and a more powerful defence. There were, to use the governor's expression, within the walls "*eight thousand of the most warlike troops in Spain*," and there was a succouring army without, equal in number to the whole infantry of the besiegers. Under these circumstances the stoutest assailants might have been repulsed, and a severe repulse would have been fatal to the French operations.

Captain Codrington asserts that in the skirmishes beyond the walls, the valour of the garrison was eminent; and he saw a poor ragged fellow endeavouring, such was his humanity and greatness of mind, to stifle the burning fuzes of a shell with sand, that some women and children might have time to escape. Feeling and courage, the springs of moral force, were therefore not wanting, but the virtue of the people was diminished, and the spirit of the soldiery overlaid, by the bad conduct of their leaders. The rich citizens fled early to Villa Nueva, and they were followed by many superior officers of regiments; Contreras jealous of Sarsfield had obliged him, as we have seen, to quit his post at a critical moment, and then represented it to the garrison as a desertion; the Valencians were carried off after being one day in the place, and the Murcians came without arms; and all this confusion and mischief were so palpable, that the poor Spanish soldiers could anticipate nothing but failure if left to themselves, and it was precisely for this reason that the British should have been landed to restore confidence. And is there nothing to be allowed for the impetuous fury of an English column breaking out of the place at the moment of attack? Let it be remembered also, that in consequence of the arrival of a seventy-four, conveying the transports, such was the number of ships of war, that a thousand seamen and marines might have been added to the troops; and who can believe that three or four thousand French and Italians, the utmost that could be brought to bear in mass on one point, and that not an easy point, for the breach was narrow and scarcely practicable, would have carried the place against eight thousand Spaniards and two thousand British. But then the surf and the enemy's shot at the landing place, and the opinion of general Doyle and of captain Codrington and of the engineers! The enemy's shot might have inflicted loss, but could not, especially at night, have stopped the disembarkation; and the opinion of the engineers, was a just report of the state of the walls, but in no manner touched the moral considerations.

When the Roman Pompey was adjured by his friends not to put to sea during a violent storm he replied, "*it is necessary to sail—it is not necessary to live.*" It was also necessary to save Taragona! Was no risk to be incurred for so great an object? Was an uncertain danger to be weighed against such a loss to Spain? Was the British intrepidity to be set at naught? Were British soldiers to be quiet spectators, while Spaniards stood up in a fight too dangerous for them to meddle with? Is that false but common doctrine, so degrading to soldiers, that brick-and-mortar sentiment, that the courage of the garrison is not to be taken into account, to be implicitly followed? What if the Spaniards had been successful? The result was most painful! Taragona strongly fortified, having at different periods above fifteen thousand men thrown into it, with an open harbour and free communication by sea, was taken by less than twenty thousand French and Italian infantry, in the face of a succouring army, a British brigade, and a British fleet!

4. The cruelty of the French general and the ferocity of his soldiers, have been dwelt upon by several writers, but Suchet has vindicated his own conduct, and it is therefore unnecessary here to enter into a close

investigation of facts which have been distorted, or of reasoning which has been misapplied. That every barbarity, commonly attendant upon the storming of towns was practised may be supposed; there is in the military institutions of Europe nothing calculated to arrest such atrocities. Soldiers of every nation look upon the devastation of a town taken by assault as their right, and it would be unjust to hold Suchet responsible for the violence of an army composed of men from different countries, exasperated by the obstinacy of the defence, and by a cruel warfare; in Spanish towns also the people generally formed a part of the garrison.

OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

The transactions in the first of these provinces during the siege of Taragona have been already sufficiently noticed; and those in Murcia were of little interest, for the defeat of Blake at Cullar in 1810, and the fever which raged at Carthagena, together with the frequent change of commanders, and the neglect of the government had completely ruined the Murcian army. The number of men was indeed considerable, and the fourth French corps, weakened by drafts for the expedition to Estremadura, and menaced by the Barossa expedition, could not oppose more than five or six thousand men; yet the province had never been touched by an enemy, and the circumstances were all favourable for the organization and frequent trial of new troops.

In February 1811 colonel Roche, the military agent, described the whole army as "ready to disperse on the first appearance of an enemy," and in the following June he says that "after being left to themselves for three years, the Murcian troops were absolutely in a worse state than they were at the commencement of the revolution, that general Freire, although at the head of sixteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, dared not attack the six thousand French before him, lest his men should disperse, and they thought as little of the general as he did of them; that indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevailed in all parts; that the establishment of the Cortes had proved but a slight stimulus to the enthusiasm, which was fast dying away, and that the most agreeable thing in the world at the moment to the Spaniards, would be to remain neuter, while England and France fought the battle and paid all the expense." The Murcian force was increased after Mahi's arrival to twenty-two thousand men, but remained inactive until August, when Blake assumed the command, and the events which followed will be treated of hereafter.

The petty warfare in the south of Grenada and Andalusia, deserves little notice, for during Blake's absence in Estremadura with the fourth army, it was principally confined to the Ronda, where the Serranos aided at times by the troops from Algeiras, and by succours from Gibraltar, were always in arms; yet even there the extreme arrogance and folly of the Spanish generals, so vexed the Serranos, that they were hardly prevented from capitulating in form with the French, and while Soult continued at Llerena after the battle of Albuera. The Escopeteros and civic guards sufficed to keep the Partidas in check. Thus the blockade of the Isla remained undisturbed from without, and Cadiz itself, the seat of all intrigues and follies, was fed by English fleets and defended by English troops.

The narrative of the circle of secondary operations being now completed, and the fate of Spain proved to depend upon the British general alone, it will be proper in the next book to take a view of political affairs shewing how strongly they bore upon lord Wellington's decisions; and if such an interruption of the military story should be distasteful to any reader I would have him reflect, that war is not so much a series of battles, as a series of difficulties in the preparations to fight them with success.

BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER I.

State of political affairs—Situation of king Joseph—His disputes with Napoleon—He resigns his crown and quits Spain—The emperor grants him new terms and obliges him to return—Political state of France as regards the war.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF JOSEPH.

AFTER the conquest of Andalusia, the intrusive monarch pursued his own system of policy with more eagerness than before. He published amnesties, granted honours and rewards to his followers, took many of the opposite party into his service, and treated the people generally with mildness.* But he was guided principally by his Spanish ministers, who being tainted with the national weaknesses of character were, especially Orquijo, continually making exaggerated reports, intriguing against the French generals, and striving, sometimes with, and sometimes without justice, to incense the king against them. This course, which was almost the inevitable consequence of his situation, excited angry feelings in the military, which, joined to the natural haughtiness of soldiers in command, produced constant disputes. In the conquered provinces, Joseph's civil agents endeavoured to obtain more of the spoil than comported with the wants of the armies, and hence bickerings between the French officers and the Spanish authorities were as unceasing as they were violent. The prefects, royal commissaries, and intendants would not act under military orders, with respect to the supplies, nor would they furnish sums for the military chests. On the other hand the generals often seized the king's revenue, raised extraordinary and forced contributions, disregarded legal forms, and even threatened to arrest the royal agents when they refused compliance with their wishes. Neither was Joseph's own conduct always free from violence, for in the latter part of 1811 he obliged the merchants of Madrid, to draw bills, for two millions of dollars, on their correspondents in London, to supply him with a forced loan.†

He was always complaining to the emperor that the niggardly allowances from France, the exactions of the generals, and the misery of the country left him no means of existence as a monarch; and during the greatest part of 1810 and the beginning of 1811, Santa Fè, Almenara, and Orquijo, succeeding each other as ambassadors at Paris, were in angry negotiations, with Napoleon's ministers, relating to this subject, and to a project for ceding the provinces of the Ebro in exchange for Portugal.‡ Against this project Joseph protested, on the grounds that it was contrary to the constitution of Bayonne, that it would alienate the Spaniards, was degrading to himself, and unjust as a bargain; seeing that Portugal was neither so rich, so industrious, so pleasant, nor so well affected to him as the provinces to be taken away, and the well-known hatred between the Spaniards and Portuguese would never allow the latter to be quiet subjects.¶

To these complaints, Napoleon answered with his usual force and clearness of judgment. He insisted

that the cost of the war had drained the French exchequer; that he had employed nearly four hundred thousand men for the king's interest, and that rather than increase the expenses he would withdraw some of the troops. He reproached Joseph with the feebleness of his operations, the waste and luxury of his court, his ill-judged schemes of conciliation, his extravagant rewards, his too great generosity to the opposite party, and his raising, contrary to the opinion of the marshals, a Spanish army which would desert on the first reverse.* The constitution of Bayonne, he said, was rendered null by the war, nevertheless he had not taken a single village from Spain, and he had no wish to seize the provinces of the Ebro, unless the state of the contest obliged him to do so. He required indeed a guarantee for the repayment of the money France had expended for the Spanish crown, yet the real wishes of the people were to be ascertained before any cession of territory could take place, and to talk of Portugal before it was conquered was folly.† As this last observation was Joseph's own argument, an explanation ensued, when it appeared that Almenara, thinking the seizure of the Ebro provinces a settled plan, had, of his own accord, asked for Portugal as an indemnification; a fact that marks the character of the Spanish cabinet.

Napoleon also assured the king that there must be a great deal of money in Spain, for, besides the sums sent from France, the plate of the suppressed convents, and the silver received by the Spaniards from America, there were the subsidies from England, and the enormous expenditure of her troops. Then, the seizure and sale of national domains, and of confiscated colonial produce, were to be taken into calculation, and if the king wanted more, he must extract it from the country, or go without. France would only continue her subsidy of two millions of francs monthly. The emperor had always supported his wars by the resources of the territory in which it was carried on, and the king might do the same.

Joseph replied that his court was neither luxurious nor magnificent; that he recompensed services by giving bills on the contingent sales of national domains, which could not be applied to the wants of the soldiers; that he could scarcely keep the public servants alive, and that his own expenses were not greater than the splendour of the crown required. That many of the best generals approved of his raising a Spanish army, desertions from it were less frequent than was imagined, and were daily diminishing; and these native troops served to garrison towns while the French were in the field. He wished, he said, to obtain large loans rather than small gifts from the French treasury, and desired that the confiscated property of the Spanish noblemen who had been declared traitors in 1808, should be paid to him; but with regard to harsh measures, the people could not pay the contributions, and the proceedings of a king with his subjects should not be like those of a foreign general.‡ Lenity was necessary to tranquillize the provinces subdued, and as an example to those which resisted. The first thing was to conciliate the people's affections. The plate of the suppressed

* Joseph's papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.

† Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

‡ Joseph's papers captured at Vittoria, MSS. ¶ Ibid.

* Joseph's papers captured at Vittoria, MSS. † Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

sed convents was not so valuable as it appeared at a distance, the greater part of it was already plundered by the guerillas, or by the French troops. The French marshals intercepted his revenues, disregarded his orders, insulted his government, and oppressed the country. He was degraded as a monarch and would endure it no longer. He had been appointed to the throne of Spain without his own consent, and although he would never oppose his brother's will, he would not live a degraded king, and was therefore ready to resign unless the emperor would come in person and remedy the present evils.*

Napoleon, while he admitted the reasonableness of some of the king's statements, still insisted, and with propriety of argument, that it was necessary to subdue the people before they could be conciliated. Yet to prevent wanton abuses of power, he fixed the exact sum which each person, from the general governors down to the lowest subaltern, was to receive, and he ordered every person violating this regulation to be dismissed upon the spot, and a report of the circumstance sent to Paris within twenty hours after. Before this, Bessieres, acknowledged by all to be a just and mild man, had been sent to remedy the mischief said to have been done by Kellerman, and others in the northern provinces. And in respect of conciliation, the emperor remarked that he had himself, at first, intended to open secret negotiations with the Cortes, but on finding what an obscure rabble they were, he had desisted. He therefore recommended Joseph to assemble at Madrid a counter-cortes, composed of men of influence and reputation, wherein (adverting to the insane insolence of the Spaniards towards their colonies) he might by the discussion of really liberal institutions, and by exposing the bad faith with which the English encouraged the Americans, improve public opinion, and conciliate the Spaniards with hopes of preserving the integrity of the empire, so rudely shaken by the revolt of the colonies.

An additional subsidy was peremptorily refused, but the emperor finally consented to furnish Joseph with half a million of francs monthly, for the particular support of his court; and it is worthy of notice, as illustrating the character of Napoleon, that in the course of these disputes, Joseph's friends at Paris, repeatedly advised him that the diplomatic style of his letters incensed and hardened the emperor, whereas his familiar style as a brother always softened and disposed him to concede what was demanded. Joseph, however, could not endure the decree for establishing the military governments, by which the administration was placed entirely in the hands of the generals, and their reports upon the civil and judicial administration referred entirely to the emperor. It was a measure assailing at once his pride, his power, and his purse. His mind, therefore, became daily more embittered, and his prefects and commissaries, emboldened by his opinions, absolutely refused to act under the French marshal's orders. Many of these complaints, founded on the reports of his Spanish servants, were untrue and others distorted. We have seen how the habitual exaggerations, and even downright falsehoods of the juntas and the regency, thwarted the English general's operations, and the king, as well as the French generals, must have encountered a like disposition in the Spanish ministers. Nevertheless, the nature of the war rendered it impossible but that much ground of complaint should exist.

Joseph's personal sentiments, abstractedly viewed, were high-minded and benevolent; but they sorted ill with his situation as an usurper. He had neither patience nor profundity in his policy, and at last such was his irritation, that having drawn up a private but formal renunciation of the crown, he took an escort of

five thousand men, and about the period of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, passed out of Spain and reached Paris: there Ney, Massena, Junot, St. Cyr, Kellerman, Augereau, Loison, and Sebastiani, were also assembled, and all discontented with the war, and with each other.

By this rash and ill-timed proceeding, the intrusive government was left without a head, and the army of the centre was rendered nearly useless at the critical moment when Soult, engaged in the Albuera operations, had a right to expect support from Madrid. The northern army also was in a great measure paralysed, and the army of Portugal, besides having just failed at Fuentes, was in all the disorganization attendant upon the retreat from Santarem, and upon a change of commanders. This was the principal cause why Bessieres abandoned the Asturias and concentrated his forces in Leon and Castile on the communications with France, for it behoved the French generals, everywhere to hold their troops in hand, and to be on the defensive, until the emperor's resolution in this extraordinary conjuncture should be known.

Napoleon, astounded at this precipitate action of the king, complained, with reason, that having promised not to quit the country without due notice, Joseph had failed to him both as a monarch and as a general, and that he should at least have better chosen his time; for if he had retired in January, when the armies were all inactive, the evil would have been less, as the emperor might then have abandoned Andalusia, and concentrated Soult's and Massena's troops on the Tagus; which would have been in accord with the policy fitting for the occasion. But now when the armies had suffered reverses, when they were widely separated, and in pursuit of different objects, the mischief was great, and the king's conduct not to be justified!

Joseph replied that he had taken good measures to prevent confusion during his absence, and then reiterating his complaints and declaring his resolution to retire into obscurity, he finished by observing, with equal truth and simplicity of mind, that it would be better for the emperor that he should do so, inasmuch as in France he would be a good subject, but in Spain a bad king.

The emperor had however too powerful an intellect for his brother to contend with. Partly by reason, partly by authority, partly by concession, he obliged him to return again in July, furnished with a species of private treaty, by which the army of the centre was placed entirely at his disposal. He was also empowered to punish delinquents, to change the organization, and to remove officers who were offensive to him, even the chief of the staff, general Belliard, who had been represented by Orquijo as inimical to his system. And if any of the other armies should, by the chances of war, arrive within the district of the centre army, they also, while there, were to be under the king; and at all times, even in their own districts, when he placed himself at their head. The army of the north was to remain with its actual organization and under a marshal, but Joseph had liberty to change Bessieres for Jourdan.

To prevent the oppression of the people, especially in the north, Napoleon required the French military authorities, to send daily reports, to the king, of all requisitions and contributions exacted. And he advised his brother to keep a Spanish commissary at the headquarters of each army, to watch over Spanish interests; promising that whenever a province should have the means, and the will, to resist the incursions of the guerillas, it should revert entirely to the government of the king, and be subjected to no charges, save those made by the Spanish civil authorities for general purposes. The armies of the south and of Aragon were placed in a like situation on the same terms, and meanwhile Joseph was to receive a quarter of the con-

* Joseph's papers captured at Vittoria, MSS.

tributions from each, for the support of his court and of the central army.

The entire command of the forces in Spain the emperor would not grant, observing that the marshal directing from Madrid, as major-general, would naturally claim the glory, as well as the responsibility of arranging the operations; and hence the other marshals, finding themselves, in reality, under his, instead of the king's command, would obey badly or not at all. All their reports and the intelligence necessary to the understanding of affairs were therefore to be addressed directly to Berthier, for the emperor's information. Finally the half million of francs hitherto given monthly to the king was to be increased to a million for the year 1811; and it was expected that Joseph would immediately reorganize the army of the centre, restore its discipline, and make it, what it had not yet been, of weight in the contest.

The king afterwards obtained some further concessions, the most important of which related to the employment and assembling of Spaniards according to his own directions and plans. This final arrangement and the importance given to Joseph's return, for by the emperor's orders, he was received as if he had only been to Paris to concert a great plan, produced a good effect for a short time; but after the fall of Figueras, Napoleon fearing to trust Spanish civilians, extended the plan, hitherto confined to Catalonia, of employing French intendants in all the provinces on the left of the Ebro. Then the king's jealousy was again excited and the old bickerings between him and the marshals were revived.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.

In 1811 the emperor's power over the continent, as far as the frontier of Russia, was in fact, absolute; and in France internal prosperity was enjoyed with external glory. But the emperor of Russia, stimulated by English diplomacy, and by a personal discontent; in dread also of his nobles, who were impatient under the losses which the continental system inflicted upon them, was plainly in opposition to the ascendancy of France, and Napoleon, although wishing to avoid a rupture, was too long-sighted, not to perceive, that it was time to prepare for a more gigantic contest than any he had hitherto engaged in. He therefore husbanded his money and soldiers, and would no longer lavish them upon the Spanish war. He had poured men indeed continually into that country, but these were generally conscripts, while in the north of France he was forming a reserve of two hundred thousand old soldiers; but with that art that it was doubtful whether they were intended for the Peninsula or for ulterior objects, being ready for either, according to circumstances.

Such an uncertain state of affairs, prevented him from taking more decided steps, in person, with relation to Spain, which he would undoubtedly have done if the war there, had been the only great matter on his hands, and therefore the aspect of French politics, both in Spain and other places, was favourable to lord Wellington's views. A Russian war, sooner or later, was one of the principal chances upon which he rested his hopes of final success; yet his anticipations were dashed with fear, for the situation of the Spanish and Portuguese governments, and of their armies, and the condition of the English government, were by no means so favourable to his plans, as shall be shewn in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

Political state of England with reference to the war—Retrospective view of affairs—Enormous subsidies granted to Spain—The arrogance and rapacity of the juntas encouraged

by Mr. Canning—His strange proceedings—Mr. Stuart's abilities and true judgment of affairs shewn—He proceeds to Vienna—State of politics in Germany—He is recalled—The misfortunes of the Spaniards principally owing to Mr. Canning's incapacity—The evil genius of the Peninsula—His conduct at Lisbon—Lord Wellesley's policy totally different from Mr. Canning's—Parties in the cabinet—Lord Wellesley and Mr. Perceval—Character of the latter—His narrow policy—Letters describing the imbecility of the cabinet in 1810 and 1811.

POLITICAL STATE OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE WAR.

It was very clear that merely to defend Portugal, with enormous loss of treasure and of blood, would be a ruinous policy; and that to redeem the Peninsula the Spaniards must be brought to act more reasonably than they had hitherto done. But this the national character and the extreme ignorance of public business, whether military or civil, which distinguished the generals and statesmen, rendered a very difficult task.

Lord Wellington, finding the English power weak to control, and its influence as weak to sway, the councils of Spain, could only hope by industry, patience, and the glory of his successes in Portugal, to acquire that personal ascendancy, which would enable him to direct the resources of the whole Peninsula in a vigorous manner, and towards a common object. And the difficulty of attaining that ascendancy can only be made clear by a review of the intercourse between the British government and the Spanish authorities, from the first bursting out of the insurrection, to the period now treated of; a review which will disclose the utter unfitness of Mr. Canning to conduct great affairs. Heaping treasures, stores, arms, and flattery, upon those who were unable to bear the latter, or use the former beneficially, he neglected all those persons who were capable of forwarding the cause; and neither in the choice of his agents, nor in his instructions to them, nor in his estimation of the value of events, did he discover wisdom or diligence, although he covered his misconduct, at the moment, by his glittering oratory.

Soon after the Spanish deputies had first applied for the assistance of England, Mr. Charles Stuart, who was the only regular diplomatist sent to Spain, carried, to Coruña, such a sum, as, with previous subsidies made up one million of dollars for Galicia alone. The deputies from Asturias had at the same time demanded five millions of dollars, and one was paid in part of their demand; but when this was known, two millions more were demanded for Galicia, which were not refused; and yet the first point in Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Stuart, was, *to enter into "no political engagements."*

Mr. Duff, the consul for Cadiz, carried out a million of dollars for Andalusia, the junta asked for three or four millions more, and the demands of Portugal, although less extravagant, were very great. Thus above sixteen millions of dollars were craved, and more than four millions, including the gift to Portugal, had been sent; the remainder was not denied; and the amount of arms, and other stores given, may be estimated by the fact, that eighty-two pieces of artillery, ninety-six thousand muskets, eight hundred thousand flints, six millions and a half of ball-cartridges, seven thousand five hundred barrels of powder, and thirty thousand swords and belts had been sent to Coruña and Cadiz; and the supply to the Asturias was in proportion. But Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Duff and to the other agents were still the same as to Mr. Stuart, "*His Majesty had no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which he furnished to Spain.*"

Mr. Canning observed that he considered the amount of money as nothing! but acknowledged that *specie* was at this time so scarce that it was only by a direct

and secret understanding with the former government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that any considerable amount of dollars had been collected in England. And "each province of Spain," he said, "had made its own particular application, and the whole occasioned a call for specie such as had never before been made upon England at any period of its existence. There was a rivalry between the provinces with reference to the amount of sums demanded which rendered the greatest caution necessary." And the more so, that "the deputies were incompetent to furnish either information or advice upon the state of affairs in Spain;" yet Mr. Duff was commanded, while representing these astounding things to the junta of Seville, "*to avoid any appearance of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions then making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish nation, or to lay the grounds for restraining or limiting those exertions within any other bounds than those which were prescribed by the limits of the actual means of the country.*" In proof of Mr. Canning's sincerity upon this head, he afterwards sent two millions of dollars by Mr. Frere, while the British army was left without any funds at all! Moreover the supplies, so recklessly granted, being transmitted through subordinates and irresponsible persons, were absurdly and unequally distributed.

This obsequious extravagance, produced the utmost arrogance on the part of the Spanish leaders, who treated the English minister's humble policy with the insolence it courted. When Mr. Stuart reached Madrid, after the establishment of the supreme junta, that body, raising its demands upon England, in proportion to its superior importance, required, and in the most peremptory language, additional succours so enormous as to startle even the prodigality of the English government.

Ten millions of dollars instantly, five hundred thousand yards of cloth, four million yards of linen for shirts and for the hospitals, three hundred thousand pair of shoes, thirty thousand pair of boots, twelve million of cartridges, two hundred thousand muskets, twelve thousand pair of pistols, fifty thousand swords, one hundred thousand arrobas of flour, besides salt meat and fish! These were their demands! and when Mr. Stuart's remonstrance obliged them to alter the insulting language of their note, they insisted the more strenuously upon having the succours; observing that England had as yet only done enough to set their force afloat, and that she might *naturally expect demands like the present to follow the first*. They desired also that the money should be furnished at once, by bills on the British treasury, and at the same time required the confiscation of Godoy's property in the English funds!

Such was Mr. Canning's opening policy, and the sequel was worthy of the commencement. His proceedings with respect to the Erfurth proposals for peace, his injudicious choice of Mr. Frere, his leaving of Mr. Stuart without instructions for three months at the most critical period of the insurrection, and his management of affairs in Portugal and at Cadiz, during sir John Cradock's command, have been already noticed; and that he was not misled by any curious accordance in the reports of his agents, is certain, for he was early and constantly informed of the real state of affairs by Mr. Stuart. That gentleman was the accredited diplomatist, and in all important points, his reports were very exactly corroborated by the letters of sir John Moore, and by the running course of events; yet Mr. Canning neither acted upon them nor published them, but he received all the idle, vaunting, accounts of the subordinate civil and military agents, with complacency, and published them with ostentation; thus encouraging the misrepresentations of ignorant men, increasing the arrogance of the Spaniards, de-

ceiving the English nation, and as far as he was able misleading the English general.

Mr. Stuart reached Coruña in July 1808, and on the 22d of that month informed Mr. Canning that the reports of the successes in the south were not to be depended upon, seeing that they increased exactly in proportion to the difficulty of communicating with the alledged scenes of action, and with the dearth of events, or the recurrence of disasters in the northern parts. He also assured him, that the numbers of the Spanish armies, within his knowledge, were by no means so great as they were represented.

On the 26th of July he gave a detailed history of the Gallician insurrection, by which he plainly shewed that every species of violence, disorder, intrigue, and deceit were to be expected from the leading people; that the junta's object was to separate Galicia from Spain: and that so inappropriate was the affected delicacy of abstaining from conditions, while furnishing succours; that the junta of Galicia was only kept in power, by the countenance of England, evinced in her lavish supplies, and the residence of her envoy at Coruña. The interference of the British naval officers to quell a political tumult had even been asked for, and had been successful; and Mr. Stuart himself had been intreated to meddle in the appointments of the governing members, and in other contests for power, which were daily taking place. In fine, before the end of August the system of folly, speculation, waste, and improvidence which characterized Spanish proceedings, was completely detected by Mr. Stuart, and laid before Mr. Canning, without in the slightest degree altering the latter's egregious system, or even attracting his notice; nay, he even intimated to the ambitious junta of Seville, that England would willingly acknowledge its supremacy, if the consent of the other provinces could be obtained; thus holding out a premium for the continuation of that anarchy, which it should have been his first object to suppress.

Mr. Stuart was kept in a corner of the peninsula, whence he could not communicate freely with any other province, and where his presence materially contributed to cherish the project of separating Galicia; and this without the shadow of a pretence, because there was also a British admiral and consul, and a military mission at Coruña, all capable of transmitting the necessary local intelligence. But so little did Mr. Canning care to receive his envoy's reports, that the packet, conveying his despatches, was ordered to touch at Gihon to receive the consul's letters, which caused the delay of a week when every moment was big with important events; a delay not to be remedied by the admiral on the station, because he had not even been officially informed that Mr. Stuart was an accredited person!

When the latter, thinking it time to look to the public affairs, on his own responsibility, proceeded to Madrid, and finally to Andalusia, he found the evils springing from Mr. Canning's inconsiderate conduct every where prominent. In the capital the supreme junta had regarded England as a bonded debtor; and the influence of her diplomatist at Seville may be estimated from the following note, written by Mr. Stuart to Mr. Frere, upon the subject of permitting British troops to enter Cadiz.

"When the junta refused to admit general Mackenzie's detachment, you tell me it was merely from alarm respecting the disposition of the inhabitants of Seville and Cadiz. I am not aware of the feelings which prevail in Seville, but with respect to this town, whatever the navy or the English travellers, may assert to the contrary, I am perfectly convinced that there exists only a wish to receive them, and general regret and surprise at their continuance on board."

Nor was the mischief confined to Spain. Mr.

Frere, apparently tired of the presence of a man whose energy and talent were a continued reflection upon his own imbecile diplomacy, ordered Mr. Stuart, either to join Cuesta's army or to go by Trieste to Vienna; he chose the latter, because there was not even a subordinate political agent there, although this was the critical period, which preceded the Austrian declaration of war against France in 1809. He was without formal powers as an envoy, but his knowledge of the affairs of Spain, and his intimate personal acquaintance with many of the leading statesmen at Vienna, enabled him at once to send home the most exact information of the proceedings, the wants, the wishes, and intentions of the Austrian government, in respect to the impending war.

That great diversion for Spain, which with infinite pains had been brought to maturity by count Stadion, was on the point of being abandoned because of Mr. Canning's conduct. He had sent no minister to Vienna, and while he was lavishing millions upon the Spaniards, without conditions, refused in the most haughty and repulsive terms, the prayers of Austria for a subsidy or even a loan, without which, she could not pass her own frontier. And when Mr. Stuart suggested the resource of borrowing some of the twenty-five millions of dollars which were then accumulated at Cadiz, it was rejected because Mr. Frere said it would alarm the Spaniards. Thus, the aid of a great empire with four hundred thousand good troops, was in a manner rejected in favour of a few miserable self-conceited juntas in the peninsula, while one-half the succours which they received and misused, would have sent the whole Austrian nation headlong upon France; for all their landwehr was in arms, and where the emperor had only calculated upon one hundred and fifty battalions three hundred had come forward, voluntarily, besides the Hungarian insurrection. In this way Mr. Canning proved his narrow capacity for business, and how little he knew either the strength of France, the value of Austria, the weakness of Spain, or the true interests of England at the moment; although he had not scrupled by his petulant answers to the proposals of Erfurth to confirm a war which he was so incapable of conducting. Instead of improving the great occasion thus offered, he angrily recalled Mr. Stuart, for having proceeded to Vienna without his permission. In his eyes the breach of form was of much higher importance than the success of the object. Yet it is capable of proof, that had Mr. Stuart remained, the Austrians would have been slower to negotiate after the battle of Wagram; and the Walcheren expedition would have been turned towards Germany, where a great northern confederation was then ready to take arms against France. The Prussian cabinet in defiance of the king, or rather of the queen, whose fears influenced the king's resolutions, only waited for these troops, to declare war; and there was every reason to believe that Russia would then also have adopted that side. The misfortunes of Moore's campaign, the folly and arrogance of the Spaniards, the loss of the great British army which perished in Walcheren, the exhausting of England both of troops and specie, when she most needed both; finally the throwing of Austria entirely into the hands of France, may thus be distinctly traced to Mr. Canning's incapacity as a statesman.

But through the whole of the Napoleonic wars this man was the evil genius of the Peninsula; for passing over the misplaced military powers which he gave to Mr. Villiers' legation in Portugal, while he neglected the political affairs in that country, it was he who sent lord Strangford to Rio Janeiro whence all manner of mischief flowed. And when Mr. Stuart succeeded Mr. Villiers at Lisbon, Mr. Canning insisted upon having the enormous mass of

intelligence, received from different parts of the Peninsula, translated before it was sent home; an act of undisguised indolence, which retarded the real business of the embassy, prevented important information from being transmitted rapidly, and exposed the secrets of the hour to the activity of the enemy's emissaries at Lisbon. In after times when by a notorious abuse of government he was himself sent ambassador to Lisbon, he complained that there were no archives of the former embassies, and he obliged Mr. Stuart, then minister at the Hague, to employ several hundred soldiers, as clerks, to copy all his papers relating to the previous war; these, at a great public expense, were sent to Lisbon; and there they were to be seen unexamined and unpacked in the year 1826! And while this folly was passing, the interests of Europe in general were neglected, and the particular warfare of Portugal seriously injured by another display of official importance still more culpable.

It had been arranged that a Portuguese auxiliary force was to have joined the duke of Wellington's army, previous to the battle of Waterloo; and to have this agreement executed, was the only business of real importance which Mr. Canning had to transact during his embassy. Marshal Beresford, well acquainted with the characters of the members of the Portuguese regency, had assembled fifteen thousand men, the flower of the old troops, perfectly equipped, with artillery, baggage, and all things needful to take the field; the ships were ready, the men willing to embark, and the marshal informed the English ambassador, that he had only to give the order, and in a few hours the whole would be on board, warning him at the same time, that in no other way could the thing be effected. But as this summary proceeding did not give Mr. Canning an opportunity to record his own talents for negotiation, he replied that it must be done by diplomacy; the Souza faction eagerly seized the opportunity of displaying their talents in the same line, and being more expert, beat Mr. Canning at his own weapons, and as Beresford had foreseen no troops were embarked at all. Lord Wellington was thus deprived of important reinforcements; the Portuguese were deprived of the advantage of supporting their army, for several years, on the resources of France, and of their share of the contributions from that country; last and worst, those veterans of the Peninsular war, the strength of the country, were sent to the Brazils, where they all perished by disease or by the sword in the obscure wars of Don Pedro! If such errors may be redeemed by an eloquence, always used in defence of public corruption, and a wit, that made human sufferings its sport, Mr. Canning was an English statesman, and wisdom has little to do with the affairs of nations.

When the issue of the Walcheren expedition caused a change of ministry, lord Wellesley obtained the foreign office. Mr. Henry Wellesley then replaced Mr. Frere at Cadiz, and he and Mr. Stuart received orders to make conditions to demand guarantees for the due application of the British succours; those succours were more sparingly granted, and the envoys were directed to interfere with advice and remonstrances, in all the proceedings of the respective governments to which they were accredited: Mr. Stuart was even desired to meddle with the internal administration of the Portuguese nation,—the exertions and sacrifices of Great Britain, far from being kept out of sight, were magnified, and the system adopted was in every thing a contrast to that of Mr. Canning.

But there was in England a powerful, and as recent events have proved, a most unprincipled parliamentary opposition, and there were two parties in the cabinet. The one headed by lord Wellesley, who was anxious to push the war vigorously in the Peninsula, without much regard to the ultimate pressure upon the people

of his own country; the other, headed by Mr. Perceval, who sought only to maintain himself in power. Narrow, harsh, factious, and illiberal, in every thing relating to public matters, this man's career was one of unmix'd evil. His bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence. He lived by faction; he had neither the wisdom to support, nor the manliness to put an end to, the war in the Peninsula, and his crooked, contemptible policy was shown, by withholding what was necessary to sustain the contest, and throwing on the general the responsibility of failure.

With all the fears of little minds, he and his coadjutors awaited the result of lord Wellington's operations in 1810. They affected to dread his rashness, yet could give no reasonable ground for their alarm; and their private letters were at variance with their public instructions, that they might be prepared for either event. They deprived him, without notice, of his command over the troops at Cadiz: they gave Graham power to furnish pecuniary succours to the Spaniards at that place, which threw another difficulty in the way of obtaining money for Portugal; and when Wellington complained of the attention paid to the unfounded apprehension of some superior officers more immediately about him, he was plainly told that those officers were better generals than himself. At the same time he was, from a pitiful economy, ordered to dismiss the transports on which the safety of the army depended in the event of failure.

Between these factions there was a constant struggle, and lord Wellington's successes in the field, only furthered the views of Mr. Perceval, because they furnished ground for asserting that due support had been given to him. Indeed such a result is to be always apprehended by English commanders. The slightest movement in war requires a great effort, and is attended with many vexations, which the general feels acutely and unceasingly; but the politician, believing in no difficulties because he feels none, neglects the supplies, charges disaster on the general, and covers his misdeeds with words. The inefficient state of the cabinet under both Mr. Canning and Mr. Perceval may however be judged of by the following extracts, the writers of which as it is easy to perceive were in official situations.

"I hope by next mail will be sent, something more satisfactory and useful than we have yet done in the way of instructions. But I am afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of our great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget more distant but not less interesting concerns."*

"With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are by no means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) as you who are on the spot. Here we judge only of the results, the details we read over, but being unable to remedy forget them the next day; and in the mean time the tools you have to work with good or bad, so it is that you have produced results so far beyond the most sanguine expectations entertained here by all who have not been in Portugal within the last eight months, that none inquire the causes which prevented more being done in a shorter time; of which indeed there seems to have been a great probability, if the government could have stepped forward at an earlier period with one hand in their pockets, and in the other strong energetic declarations of the indispensable necessity of a change of measures, and principles, in the government."†

"I have done every thing in my power to get people here to attend to their real interests in Portugal, and I

have clamoured for money! money! money! in every office to which I have had access. To all my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the same answer, '*that the thing is impossible.*' The prince himself certainly appears to be *à la hauteur des circonstances*, and has expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley has a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the present government, that I really despair of witnessing any decided and adequate effect, on our part, to save the Peninsula. The present feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all that is in our power, that the rest must be left to all-bounteous Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious to us as we deserved. This feeling you must allow is wonderfully moral and christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more vigorous military system and a ministry capable of directing the resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents and embarkations."*

A more perfect picture of an imbecile administration could scarcely be exhibited, and it was not wonderful, that Lord Wellington, oppressed with the folly of the peninsular governments, should have often resolved to relinquish a contest that was one of constant risks, difficulties, and cares, when he had no better support from England. In the next chapter shall be shewn the ultimate effects of Canning's policy in the Spanish and Portuguese affairs.

CHAPTER III.

Political state of Spain—Disputes amongst the leaders—Sir J. Moore's early and just perception of the state of affairs confirmed by Lord Wellington's experience—Points of interest affecting England—The reinforcement of the military force—The claims of the princess Carlotta—The prevention of a war with Portugal—The question of the colonies—Cisneros's conduct at Buenos Ayres—Duke of Infantada demanded by Mexico—Proceedings of the English ministers—Governor of Curaçoa—Lord Wellesley proposes a mediation—Mr. Bardi's strange assertion—Lord Wellington's judgment on the question—His discernment, sagacity, and wisdom shewn.

POLITICAL STATE OF SPAIN.

As the military operations were by the defeat of the regular armies, broken into a multitude of petty and disconnected actions, so the political affairs were, by the species of anarchy which prevailed, rendered exceedingly diversified and incongruous. Notwithstanding the restoration of the captain-generals, the provincial juntas remained very powerful; and while nominally responsible to the Cortes and the regency, acted independently of either, except when interested views urged them to a seeming obedience. The disputes that arose between them and the generals, who were, for the most part, the creatures of the regency, or of the Cortes, were constant. In Galicia, in the Asturias, in Catalonia, in Valencia, and in Murcia, disputes were increasing. Mahi, Abadia, Moscoso, Campo Verde, Lacy, Sarsfield, Eroles, Milans, Bassecour, Coupigny, Castaños, and Blake, were always in controversy with each other or with the juntas. Palacios dismissed from the regency for his high monarchical opinions, was made captain-general of Valencia, where he immediately joined the church-party against the cortes. In the Condado de Niebla the junta of Seville claimed superior authority, and Ballesteros of his own mo-

* A. April. 1810.

† A. April. 1811.

* B. September. 1811.

tion placed the country under martial law. The junta, strangely enough, then appealed to colonel Austin the British governor of the Algarves, but he refused to interfere.

The cortes often annulled the decrees of the regency, and the latter, of whomsoever composed, always hating and fearing the cortes, were only intent upon increasing their own power, and entirely neglected the general cause; their conduct was at once haughty and mean, violent and intriguing, and it was impossible ever to satisfy them. Thus confusion was every where perpetuated, and it is proved by the intercepted papers of Joseph, as well as by the testimony of the British officers, and diplomatists, that with the Spaniards, the only moral resource left for keeping up the war, was their personal hatred of the French, partially called into action by particular oppression. Sir John Moore, with that keen and sure judgement which marked all his views, had early described Spain as being "*without armies, generals, or government.*" And in 1811, after three years of war, lord Wellington complained that "*there was no head in Spain, neither generals, nor officers, nor disciplined troops, and no cavalry; that the government had commenced the war without a magazine or military resource of any kind, without money or financial resource, and that the people at the head of affairs, were as feeble as their resources were small.*"* But the miserable state of the armies and the unquenchable vanity of the officers, have been too frequently exposed to need further illustration. They hated and ill-used the peasantry, while their own want of discipline and subordination rendered them odious to their country. The poorer people, much as they detested the French, almost wished for the establishment of Joseph, and all spirit and enthusiasm had long been extinct.

The real points of interest affecting England in her prosecution of the contest were, therefore, 1. the improvement and the better guidance of the military power; 2. the preventing a war between Portugal and Spain; 3. the pretensions of the princess Carlotta of Portugal; 4. the dispute with the American colonies.

With respect to the first, lord Wellington had made strenuous efforts, and his advice, and remonstrances, had at times saved the armies in the field from destruction; some partial attempts were also made to form troops under British officers in the Spanish service, but to a system like that which England exercised in Portugal, the leading Spaniards would never listen. This was one result of Mr. Canning's impolitic fostering of the Spanish pride, for it was by no means apparent that the people would have objected to such an arrangement, if it had been prudently urged, before the republican party in the cortes, and the popular press, had filled their minds with alarm upon the subject. The Catalans openly and repeatedly desired to have an English general, and in 1812 colonel Green did organize a small corps there, while Whittingham and Roche formed in the Balearic isles large divisions; colonel Cox had before proposed a like scheme for the north, but it was rejected by lord Wellington, and I have been unable to trace any important service rendered by those officers with their divisions. Their reputation was however quite eclipsed by one Downie, who had passed from the British commissariat into the Spanish service, and the English ministers, taken with his boasting manner, supplied him with uniforms and equipments for a body of cavalry, called the Estremadura Legion, of such an expensive and absurd nature, as to induce a general officer to exclaim on seeing them that "he blushed for the folly of his government."

When the British ministers found themselves unable to deal with the Spanish regulars, they endeavoured to prop the war by the irregulars. But the increase of

this force, which however never exceeded thirty thousand men in arms, gave offence to the regular officers, and amidst these distractions, the soldiers, ill-organized, ill-fed, and quite incapable of moving in the field in large bodies, lost all confidence in their generals. The latter, as in the case of Friere with the Murcian army, generally expected to be beaten in every action, and cared very little about it, because the regency were sure to affirm that they were victorious; and another of those wandering starved naked bands, which they called armies, could be formed from new levies in a month.

The chances of a war with Portugal were by no means slight, the early ravages of the Spanish insurgent forces when Junot was in Lisbon, the violence of Romana's soldiers, and the burning of the village of San Fernando, together with the disputes between the people of Algarves and the Andalusians had revived all the national hatred on both sides. The two governments indeed entered into a treaty for recruiting in their respective territories; but it was with the utmost difficulty that the united exertions of Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington could prevent the Portuguese regency first, and afterwards the court of Brazil, from provoking a war by re-annexing Olivença to Portugal, when it was taken from the French by marshal Beresford. And so little were the passions of these people subordinate to their policy that this design was formed at the very moment when the princess Carlotta was, strenuously, and with good prospect of success, pushing her claim to the regency of Spain.

The intrigues of this princess were constant sources of evil; she laboured against the influence of the British at Cadiz, and her agent Pedro Souza, proffering gold to vulgar baseness, diamonds to delicate consciences, and promises to all, was adroit and persevering. In August 1810 a paper signed by only one member, but with an intimation that it contained the sentiments of the whole cortes, was secretly given to Mr. Wellesley, as a guide for his conduct. It purported that the impossibility of releasing Ferdinand and his brother from their captivity being apparent, the princess Carlotta should be called to the throne, and it was proposed to marry her eldest son, Pedro, to the princess of Wales, or some other princess of the House of Brunswick, that a "sudden and mortal blow might be given to the French empire."* Mr. Wellesley was also told that a note, of the same tendency, would in the first session of the cortes be transmitted to the English legation. This, however, did not happen, chiefly because Arguelles openly and eloquently expressed his reasons against the appointment of a royal person as regent, and some months later procured a decree, rendering such persons ineligible, to pass in the cortes. This seemed to quash Carlotta's intrigue, nevertheless her pretensions, although continually overborne by the English influence, were as continually renewed, and often on the point of being publicly admitted.

The assumption that it was hopeless to expect Ferdinand's release was founded partly on the great influence which it was known Napoleon had acquired over his mind, and partly on his extreme personal timidity, which rendered any attempt to release him hopeless. Otherwise there were at Lisbon one Francisco Sagas, and his brother, daring men, who were only deterred from undertaking the enterprise by a previous experiment made at Bayonne, where they had for an hour implored Ferdinand to escape, all things being ready, yet in vain, because Escoiquez who ruled the prince, and was as timid as himself, opposed it. To prevent ill effects from this well-known weakness, the cortes passed a decree to render null every act of Ferdinand while in captivity.

* Letter to general Dumouriez, 1811. MSS.

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

These intrigues of Carlotta were, however, of minor consequence compared to the conduct of the American colonies, which was one of the highest interest and importance. The causes and the nature of their revolt have been already touched upon, and the violence and injustice of the juntas, the regency, and the cortes, with relation to them, having been also exposed in a general way, need not be repeated here. When the Spanish insurrection first commenced, the leading men of Mexico signed a paper which was sent to the peninsula in November 1808, urging the immediate appointment of the duke of Infantado to the vice-royalty. He was averse to quitting Spain, but his wife persuaded him to consent, provided the central junta, just then established, was not opposed to it. Mr. Stuart foreseeing great advantage from this appointment, laboured to persuade Mr. Frere to support it; but the latter, always narrow in his views, refused, because Infantado was personally disliked in England! and this, joined to the duke's own reluctance, seemed to end the matter. Meanwhile the disturbances in the colonies went on, and Carlotta of Portugal, urged her claim to be regent, and ultimately, queen of that country, as well as of Spain; and her interests were strongly supported there, until May 1809, when Cisneros, the Spanish viceroy, arrived at Monte Video, and spoiled her schemes.

The cry for a free trade with England, was then raised by the colonists, and Cisneros assented, but under conditions, presenting a curious contrast to the affected generosity of Mr. Canning, and affording an additional proof how little the latter knew the temper of the people he was dealing with. After detailing the dangers of his situation from the disposition of the colonists to revolt, and the impoverishment of the royal treasury in consequence of the disturbances which had already taken place, Cisneros observed that the only mode of relief was a temporary permission to trade with England for the sake of the duties. Necessity, he said, drove him to this measure; he regretted it, and directed that the ordinary laws relative to the residence of foreigners, most rigorous in themselves, should be most rigorously executed; and he added others of such a nature, that at first sight, they appear to be directed against some common enemy of mankind, rather than against the subjects and vessels of a nation which was then supporting the mother-country with troops and treasure in the most prodigal manner. Englishmen were not to be suffered to possess property, to have a residence, to keep an hotel, or even to remain on shore except for a fixed period. Any property already acquired by them was to be confiscated, and when the goods by which he hoped to raise his revenue were landed, the owners were not to be permitted to have them carried to the warehouses by their own sailors!

In April 1810 the disposition to revolt spread; the Caracas and Porto Rico declared for independence, and the British governor of Curaçoa expressed his approval of their proceedings. This naturally gave great jealousy and alarm to the Spaniards, who looked upon it as a secret continuation of Miranda's affair. Lord Liverpool, indeed, immediately disavowed the governor's manifesto, but being very desirous to retain the trade, to conciliate the Spaniards, and to oblige the colonists to acknowledge Ferdinand and oppose France, three things incompatible, his policy produced no good result. Mexico indeed still remained obedient in outward appearance, but the desire to have Infantado existed, and a strong party of the Mexicans even purposed raising him to the throne, if Napoleon's success should separate the two countries; but the Spanish regency, with characteristic folly, chose this moment to appoint Venegas, who was the avowed enemy of Infantado, viceroy of Mexico, and thus the revolt was forced on in that country also.

This state of affairs had a bad effect upon the war in Spain in many ways. The Spaniards, thinking to retain the colonies by violence, sent out a small squadron at first, and at a later period employed the succours received from England, in fitting out large expeditions of their best troops; and that, when the enemy were most closely pressing them in the Peninsula. The remonstrances of the British on this head were considered as indications of a faithless policy; and Carlotta also wrote to Elio, the governor of Buenos Ayres, and to the cortes, warning both, to beware of the English as "a people capable of any baseness where their own interests were concerned." Hence there was a prevalent suspicion, that England had a design of connecting itself with the colonies independently of Spain, which greatly diminished the English influence at Cadiz.

By this dispute with America the supply of specie for the Peninsula was endangered, which involved the very existence of the war; all things therefore conducted to make lord Wellesley desire his brother, Mr. Wellesley, to offer the mediation of England, and to please the Spaniards he also removed the governor of Curaçoa; but his plans, like lord Liverpool's, were based upon the desire to preserve the trade with the colonies, and this feeling pervaded and vitiated his instructions to Mr. Wellesley. That gentleman was directed to enter into a full discussion of the subject, on principles founded on cordial amity and good faith; and to endeavour to convince the regency that the British course of proceeding had hitherto been the best for all parties.* For the primary object being to keep France from forming a party in America, the revolted colonies had been by England received into an amicable intercourse of trade, a measure not inconsistent with good faith to Spain, inasmuch as the colonists would otherwise have had recourse to France, whereas now England was considered by them as a safe and honourable channel of reconciliation with the mother-country. There had been, it was said, no formal recognition of the self-constituted governments, or if any had taken place by subordinate officers they would be disavowed. Protection and mediation had indeed been offered, but the rights of Ferdinand had been supported, and as war between Spain and America would only injure the great cause, a mediatory policy was pressed upon the latter.—The blockade of Buenos Ayres and the Caracas had already diverted money and forces from Spain, and driven the Americans to seek for French officers to assist them. The trade was essential to enable England to continue her assistance to Spain, and although this had been frequently represented to the regency, the latter had sent ships (which had been fitted out in English ports and stored at the expense of Great Britain for the war with France) to blockade the colonies and to cut off the English trade; and it was done also at a moment, when the regency was unable to transport Blake's army from Cadiz to the Condado di Niebla without the assistance of British vessels. "It was difficult," Lord Wellesley said, "to state an instance in which the prejudices and jealousy of individuals had occasioned so much confusion of every maxim of discretion and good policy, and so much danger to the acknowledged mutual interests of two great states engaged in a defensive alliance against the assaults of a foreign foe."—"Spain could not expect England to concur in a continuance of a system by which, at her own expense, her trade was injured, and by which Spain was making efforts not against the French but against the main sources of her own strength."

After these instructions, which were given before

* Lord Wellesley's despatch to Mr. H. Wellesley, May, 1811. MSS.

the constitution of Spain was arranged by the cortes, Mr. Wellesley pressed the mediation upon Mr. Bardaxi the Spanish minister, who agreed to accept it upon condition, that Mexico, which had not yet declared a form of government, should be excepted,—that England should immediately break off all intercourse with the colonies, and, if the mediation failed, should assist Spain to reconquer them. When the injustice and bad policy of this proposition was objected to, Mr. Bardaxi maintained that it was just and politic, and pressed it as a secret article; he however finally offered to accept the mediation, if Mr. Wellesley would only pledge England to break off the intercourse of trade. This was refused, and the negotiation continued, but as Bardaxi asserted, that lord Wellington had before agreed to the propriety of England going to war with the colonies, Mr. Wellesley referred to the latter, and that extraordinary man, while actually engaged with the enemy, under most critical circumstances, was thus called upon to discuss so grave and extensive a subject. But it was on such occasions that all his power of mind was displayed, and his manner of treating this question proved, that in political, and even in commercial affairs, his reach of thought and enlarged conceptions, immeasurably surpassed the cabinet he served. And when we consider that his opinions, stated in 1811, have been since verified in all points to the very letter, it is impossible not to be filled with admiration of his foresight and judgment.

“He denied that he had ever given grounds for Bardaxi’s observation. His opinion had always been that Great Britain should follow, as he hoped she had, liberal counsels towards Spain, by laying aside, at least during the existence of the war, all consideration of merchants’ profits. He felt certain that such a policy would equally suit her commercial interests and her warlike policy, as well as add greatly to her character. The immediate advantages extorted from an open trade with the colonies he had always considered ideal. Profit was undoubtedly to be made there, and eventually the commerce would be very great; but its value must arise from the increasing riches of the colonies and the growth of luxury there, and the period at which this would happen was more likely to be checked than forwarded by the extravagant speculations of English traders. Whatever might be the final particular relations established between Spain and her colonies, the general result must be, the relaxation, if not the annihilation, of their colonial commercial system, and Great Britain was then sure to be the greatest gainer.

“In expectation of this ultimate advantage, her policy ought to have been liberal throughout, that is, the colonies themselves should have been checked, and the endeavours of traders and captains of ships to separate them from Spain ought to have been repressed. England should, when the colonies first shewed a disposition to revolt, have considered not only what they could do but what Great Britain could assist them to effect. His knowledge of the Spanish government and its means enabled him to say she could not reduce even one of the weakest of her colonies, and to make the attempt would be a gross folly and misapplication of means. Nay England could not, in justice to the great object in the Peninsula, give Spain any effectual assistance; for it was but two true that distant colonies could always separate from the mother country when they willed it, and certainly it would be the highest madness, in Spain, to attempt at that time to prevent such a separation by force, and in England, to assist, or even to encourage her in such an attempt.

“The conduct of the latter should then have been by her influence and advice to have prevented the disputes from coming to extremity, and now should be to divert Spain from such an absurdity as having recourse to

violence. But the reception of the deputies from America which the Spaniards so much complained of, was useful to the latter. It prevented those deputies from going to France, and if they had gone, the fact, that colonies have the power to separate if they have the will, would have been at once verified.

“Great Britain, although late, had at last offered that mediation which he wished had been asked for, and it remained to consider on what terms it ought to be accepted. It would have been better if Spain had come forward with an explicit declaration of what her intentions towards the colonies in respect to constitution and commerce were. England could then have had something intelligible to mediate upon; but now Spain only desired her to procure the submission of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas; and if she failed in that impracticable object she was to aid Spain in forcing them to submission! and he, lord Wellington, was said to have approved of this! One would really, he exclaimed, believe that Mr. Bardaxi has never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, to the object they have acquired at home, nor to the efforts making by England in the Peninsula; and that he imagines I have considered these facts as little as he appears to have done! Great Britain cannot agree to that condition!

“In respect to constitution” (alluding to the acknowledgement of the civil rights of the Americans by the cortes)* “the Spaniards had gone a great way, but not so far as some of her colonies would require, they would probably ask her to have separate local representative bodies for their interior concerns, such as the English colonial assemblies, yet this important point had not been considered in the treaty of mediation, and in respect of commerce the Spanish government had said nothing; although it was quite certain her prohibitory system could not continue, and the necessary consequence of the actual state of affairs required that in the treaty of mediation the colonies should be put, with respect to trade, exactly on the same footing as the provinces of Old Spain. If that was not done it would be useless to talk to the colonists of equal rights and interests; they would feel that their interests were sacrificed to that of the mother country.

“It was true that the latter would lose immediately, though probably not eventually, very largely in revenue and commercial profit by such a concession. This was the unavoidable result of the circumstances of the times, she had therefore a fair claim to participate in the advantages the colonies would enjoy from it. To this object the treaty of mediation should have adverted. Spain should have confidentially declared to Great Britain her intended course, what system she would follow, what duties impose, and what proportion she would demand for general imperial purposes. Upon such materials England might have worked with a prospect of permanently maintaining the integrity of the Spanish empire on just and fair principles; or at all events have allayed the present disputes and so removed the difficulties they occasioned in the Peninsula, and in either case have insured her own real interests. Spain had however taken a narrow view both of her own and the relative situation of others, and if she did not enlarge it, matters would grow worse and worse. It would be useless for England to interfere, and after a long contest which would only tend to weaken the mother country and deprive her of the resources which she would otherwise find in the colonies for her war with France, the business would end in the separation of the colonies from Spain.”

The mediation was, however, after many discussions, finally accepted by the cortes, Mexico only being excepted, and an English commission of mediation,

* See page 323.

of which Mr. Stuart was the head, was even appointed in September 1811, but from various causes it never proceeded beyond Cadiz. The Spaniards continued to send out expeditions, Mr. Wellesley's remonstrances were unheeded, and although the regency afterwards offered to open the trade under certain duties, in return for a subsidy, nothing was concluded.

CHAPTER IV.

Political state of Portugal—Mr. Villiers' mission expensive and inefficient—Mr. Stuart succeeds him—Finds every thing in confusion—His efforts to restore order successful at first—Cortes proposed by lord Wellesley—Opposed by the regency, by Mr. Stuart, and by lord Wellington—Observations thereon—Changes in the regency—Its partial and weak conduct—Lord Strangford's proceedings at Rio Janeiro only productive of mischief—Mr. Stuart's efforts opposed, and successfully by the Souza faction—Lord Wellington thinks of abandoning the contest—Writes to the prince regent of Portugal—The regency continues to embarrass the English general—Effect of their conduct upon the army—Miserable state of the country—The British cabinet grants a fresh subsidy to Portugal—Lord Wellington complains that he is supplied with only one-sixth of the money necessary to carry on the contest—Minor follies of the regency—The cause of Massena's harshness to the people of Portugal explained—Case of Mascarenhas—His execution a foul murder—Lord Wellington reduced to the greatest difficulties—He and Mr. Stuart devise a plan to supply the army by trading in grain—Lord Wellington's embarrassments increase—Reasons why he does not abandon Portugal—His plan of campaign.

POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.

The power and crafty projects of the Souzas, their influence over their weak-minded prince, their cabal to place the prince of Brunswick at the head of the Portuguese army, the personal violence of the Patriarch, the resignation of Das Minas, and the disputes with lord Wellington, have been already touched upon; but the extent of the difficulties engendered by those things, cannot be understood without a more detailed exposition.

Mr. Villiers's mission, like all those emanating from Mr. Canning, had been expensive in style, tainted by intrigues, useless in business, and productive of disorders. When Mr. Stuart arrived, he found every thing, except the army under Beresford, in a state of disorganization; and the influence of England was decreasing, because of the vacillating system hitherto pursued by the British government. As early as 1808 lord Wellington had advised the ministers not only to adopt Portugal as the base of operations in the Peninsula, but to assume in reality the whole administration of that country; to draw forth all its resources, both of men and money, and to make up any deficiency, by the power of England. This advice had been neglected, and an entirely different policy pursued, which, in execution, was also feeble and uncertain.

The Portuguese constitution, like most of those springing from the feudal system, was excellent in theory, as far as regarded the defence of the kingdom: but it was overwhelmed with abuses in practice; and it was a favourite maxim with the authorities that it did not become a paternal government to punish neglect in the subordinates. When court intrigues were to be effected, or poor men to be oppressed, there was no want of vigour or of severity; but in all that regarded the administration of affairs, it was considered sufficient to give orders without looking to their execution, and no animadversion, much less punishment, followed disobedience. The character of the government was extreme weakness; the taxes, partially levied, produced only half their just amount; the payments from the treasury were in arrears; the army was neglected in all things dependent on the civil

administration, and a bad navy was kept up, at an expense of a quarter of a million, to meet a war with Algiers. This last question was, however, a knife with a double edge, for in peace, a tribute paid in coin, drained the treasury already too empty, and in war the fleet did nothing; meanwhile the feeding of Cadiz was rendered precarious by it; and of Lisbon also, for the whole produce of Portugal was only equal to four months' consumption. In commercial affairs, the usual peninsular jealousy was displayed; the imports of British goods were prohibited to the advantage of smugglers only, while the government which thus neglected its own resources to the injury of both countries, clamoured for subsidies. Finally, the power of the Souzas was so great, and the regency was so entirely subservient to them, that although Mr. Stuart had been assured by Mr. Canning, that a note forbidding Domingo Souza to meddle with affairs at Lisbon, had been procured from the Brazils, all representations, to the regency, were met by references to that nobleman, who was in London, and the business of the mission was thus paralysed.

In march 1809 the British government had taken ten thousand Portuguese troops into pay. In May they were increased to twenty thousand, and in June to thirty thousand. The cost of these forces, and the increased pay to Portuguese officers, added to the subsidy, amounted to two millions sterling; but this subsidy partly from negligence, partly from the exhaustion of England in consequence of Mr. Canning's prodigal donations to Spain, was in arrears. However, as this mode of proceeding was perfectly in unison with their own method, the regency did not much regard it, but they were eager to obtain a loan from England, in the disposal of which they would have been quite uncontrolled, and for this very reason lord Wellington strenuously opposed it. In revenge, the regency, by a wilful misunderstanding of the debates of parliament, and by the distortion of facts, endeavoured to throw a doubt upon the sincerity of England, and this, with the encouragement given to all Portuguese malcontents by the Whigs, whose clamour, just, as applied to the ministers, was unjustly extended to the generals, greatly increased the disorder of the times.

In this state of affairs Mr. Canning being happily removed from office, lord Wellesley, who succeeded him, changed the instructions of the diplomatic agents in the Peninsula. They were now directed to make conditions with respect to the succours, and in Portugal they were vigorously to interfere in all civil changes, augmentations of revenue, and military resources; and even to demand monthly reports of the condition of the army, and the expenditures of the subsidy. Lord Wellesley also, thinking that the example of a cortes in Spain, might create a desire for a more temperate government in Portugal, was prepared to forward such a change, provided old forms were preserved, and that all appeared to flow from the prince regent, whose consent he undertook to secure. Resistance to the enemy, he said, would be in proportion to the attachment of the people, and hence it was advisable to make timely concessions, giving however no more than was absolutely necessary.

The regency was strongly opposed to this notion of a cortes, and Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington affirmed, and truly, that the docility of the people, and their hatred of the French, were motives powerful enough without any other stimulus, to urge them to action. Thus the project fell to the ground, and the time was perhaps inconvenient to effect a revolution of this nature, which the people themselves certainly did not contemplate, and which, as Spain had shewn, was not a certain help to the war. Lord Wellington, who only considered what would conduce to the success of

the war, was therefore consistent upon this occasion, but it is curious to observe the course of the English cabinet. The enforcement in France of a military conscription, authorized by the laws, was an unheard-of oppression on the part of Napoleon; but in Portugal a conscription, enforced by foreigners, was a wise and vigorous measure; and lord Wellesley admitting that the Portuguese government had been harsh and oppressive, as well as weak and capricious, was content to withhold a better system from the people, expressly because they loved their country and were obedient subjects; for he would have readily granted it to them if they had been unruly and of doubtful patriotism.

Mr. Stuart in concert with lord Wellington diligently endeavoured to remedy the evils of the hour, but whenever he complained of any particular disorder, he was, by the regency, offered arbitrary power to punish, which being only an expedient to render the British odious to the people he refused. The intrigues of the Fidalgos then became apparent, and the first regency was broken up in 1810. The marquis of Das Minas retired from it under the pretext of ill health, but really because he found himself too weak to support Mr. De Mello, a Fidalgo officer, who was thrust forward to oppose the legal authority of marshal Beresford. Mr. Cypriano Freire was then made minister of finance, and of foreign affairs, and Mr. Forjas secretary-at-war, with a vote in the regency on matters of war. But the former soon after Mr. Stuart's arrival resigned his situation in consequence of some disgust, and the Conde Redondo, having undertaken the office, commenced, with the advice of Mr. Stuart, a better arrangement of the taxes, especially the "*decima*" or income tax, which was neither impartially nor strictly enforced on the rich towns, nor on the powerful people of the Fidalgo faction. The clergy also evaded the imposts, and the British merchants, although profiting enormously from the war, sought exemption under the factory privileges, not only from the taxes, which in certain cases they could legally do, but from the billets, and from those recruiting laws affecting their servants, which they could not justly demand, and which all other classes in the community were liable to.

The working of the Souzas, in the Brazils, where the minister of finance wished to have the regulation of the Portuguese treasury under his control, soon changed this arrangement. Freire's resignation was not accepted, Redondo was excluded from the government, and Forjas, who was the most efficient member of the government, was deprived of his functions. The remaining members then proposed to fill up Das Minas' vacancy themselves, but this was resisted by lord Wellington, on the ground, that, without the prince's order, the proceeding would be illegal, and involve the regency in an indefensible quarrel at the Brazils. The order for removing Redondo, and cramping the utility of Forjas, he, in concert with Mr. Stuart, withstood; and this, for the moment, prevented a change, which would have impeded the ameliorations begun. Such, however, was the disorder in the finances, that Mr. Stuart proposed, as the least difficult mode of arranging them, to take the whole direction himself, England becoming answerable for the expenditure of the country; lord Wellington thought this could not be done, without assuming, at the same time, the whole government of the country, which he had previously proposed to the British cabinet, but which it was now too late to attempt, and Mr. Stuart's project fell to the ground.

Another spring of mischief soon bubbled up, lord Strangford, whose diplomatic dexterity evinced by his Bruton-street despatch, had been rewarded by the situation of minister at the Brazils, was there bestirring himself. It had been the policy of Mr. Stuart and the English general, to keep the regency permanent, and

to support the secretariats as they were placed in the hands of Mr. de Forjas and the Conde de Redondo; for these men had been found by experience, to be better qualified to co-operate with the British authorities than any other persons, and hence lord Wellington had resisted the prince's orders for Cypriano Freire's resumption of office, and had continued the functions of Forjas and Redondo, until his own remonstrances could reach the Brazils. In this state of affairs lord Strangford informed Mr. Stuart that he had persuaded the prince to accede to the following propositions. 1. That the British plenipotentiary at Lisbon, the count Redondo, doctor Nogueiras, and the principal Souza, should be added to the old regency. 2. That admiral Berkeley should be naval commander-in-chief. 3. That all traitorous correspondence should be prevented, and that measures should be taken to limit the exuberant power assumed by subordinates. This last article was directed against Forjas, and the whole went to establish the preponderance of the Souza faction. The only useful part was the appointment of Mr. Stuart to the regency, but this was arranged before it was known that Mr. Villiers had been recalled, and consequently had the same object of favouring the Souzas in view.

Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington strongly objected to this change, although they submitted to it as not wishing to appear regardless of the prince regent's rights. Mr. Stuart, however, reflecting that a government composed of men having different views and feelings, and without any casting vote, the number being even, could not go on usefully, was at first averse to join the regency, but was finally persuaded to do so by lord Wellington, who justly considered that his presence there would give the only chance of success.

Doctor Nogueiras' appointment was described, by lord Strangford, as a tribute to democracy, the object being to counteract the power of those very secretariats which lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were labouring to preserve. But lord Strangford prided himself chiefly upon the appointment of the principal Souza, who, he said, had been recommended to him by Mr. Villiers, an avowal of great import, as shewing at once the spirit of the new arrangement: for this Souza had, in a subordinate situation, hitherto opposed every proceeding of the British in Portugal; he was the avowed enemy of Beresford, the contriver of all confusion, and the most mischievous person in Portugal; and his absence from that country was so desirable, that intimations to that effect had been formally given to him, by lord Wellesley, through Mr. Stuart. This factious person was now, however, armed with additional power, to thwart the English authorities in Portugal, and thus lord Strangford's diplomacy tended, in effect, to ruin that cause which he had been sent to the Brazils to support.

In relating these proceedings I have, following his own letter, announcing the change, described lord Strangford as acting voluntarily; but in a subsequent despatch he affirmed, that it was under Mr. Canning's instructions, he had pressed for this incorporating of the British minister in the regency, and that Nogueiras' appointment sprang entirely from the prince regent's own will, which he did not choose to oppose. In like manner, when lord Wellesley was intent upon assembling a cortes, lord Strangford called it "*a great and essential measure strongly and wisely urged by the government*," and yet afterwards acknowledged that he neglected to press it, because he thought it "*useless and even hurtful*," which inconsistency renders it difficult to determine on whom these affairs rested. As affecting Mr. Canning's policy, however, it is to be observed that if he originally arranged this change, his object was to put Mr. Villiers in the regency, not with any view to the more complete controul of Portugal for the purposes of war, but, as the instructions to sir John Cradock prove, to en-

sure a preponderance to the diplomatic department over the military in that country.

The principal reforms, in the administration, which had been sought for by lord Wellington, were a better arrangement of the financial system—the execution of the laws without favour to the *fidalgos*—the suppression of the “*junta de viveres*,” a negligent and fraudulent board, for which he wished to establish a Portuguese commissariat—the due supply of provisions and stores, for the national troops and fortresses—the consolidation of the arsenal department under one head—the formation of a military chest, distinct from the treasury, which was always diverting the funds to other purposes—the enforcing of the regulations about the means of transport—the repairs of the roads and bridges—the reformation of the hospitals—the succouring of the starving people, and the revival of agriculture in the parts desolated by the war.

These things he had hoped to accomplish; but from the moment the change effected by lord Strangford took place, unceasing acrimonious disputes ensued between the British commander and the Portuguese government, and no species of falsehood or intrigue, not even personal insult, and the writing of anonymous threatening letters, were spared by the Souza faction. In the beginning of 1811 they had organized an anti-English party, and a plot was laid to force the British out of the country, which would have succeeded if less vigilance had been used by Mr. Stuart, or less vigour of control by lord Wellington. This plot however required that the patriarch should go to the northern provinces, a journey which the envoy always dexterously prevented.

The first complaint of the British authorities, accompanied with a demand for the removal of the principal Souza, reached the Brazils in February 1811, and Das Minas died about the same time; but so strongly was the faction supported at Rio Janeiro, that in May, the prince regent expressed his entire approval of the Souzas' proceedings and his high displeasure with Forjas and Mr. Stuart. His minister, the Conde de Linhares, wrote, that the capture of Massena with his whole army, which he expected to hear of each day, would not make amends for the destruction of the country during the retreat of the allies; and in an official note to lord Strangford, he declared, that the prince regent could not permit Mr. Stuart to vote in matters concerning the internal government of the kingdom, because he was influenced by, and consulted persons suspected of disaffection, which expression lord Strangford said referred solely to Forjas.

The prince himself also wrote to lord Wellington, accusing Mr. Stuart of acting separately from the commander-in-chief, and of being the cause of all the factions which had sprung up, and he declared that he would not remove Souza, unless Mr. Stuart was recalled. He desired that Forjas, who he affirmed to be the real author of the opposition complained of by the British, should be sent to the Brazils, to answer for his conduct; and finally he announced his intention to write in a like strain to the king of England. To this lord Wellington answered that finding his conduct disapproved and Souza's applauded, he proposed to quit Portugal. Forjas immediately sent in his resignation, admiral Berkeley proposed to do the same, and Mr. Stuart withdrew from the council until the pleasure of his own cabinet should be made known: the war was then on the point of finishing, but the crisis was not perceived by the public, because the resolution of the English general was kept secret, to avoid disturbing the public mind, and in the hopes of submission on the part of the prince.

Meanwhile other embarrassments were superadded, of a nature to leave the English general little hope of being able to continue the contest, should he even defeat

the intrigues at Rio Janeiro; for besides the quarrel with the Souza faction, in which he and Mr. Stuart supported Forjas, Nogueira, and Redondo, against their enemies in the Brazils, these very persons, although the best that could be found, and men of undoubted ability, influenced partly by national habits, partly by fears of ultimate consequences, continually harassed him in the execution of the details belonging to their offices. No delinquent was ever punished, no fortress ever stored in due time and quantity, the suffering people were uncared for, disorders were unexpressed, the troops were starved, and the favouring of the *fidalgos* constant. The “*junta de viveres*” was supported, the formation of a military chest, and commissariat, delayed; many wild and foolish schemes daily broached; and the natural weakness of the government was, by instability, increased, because the prince regent had early in 1811 intimated an intention of immediately returning to Europe.

I have said that it was a favourite maxim with the regency that a paternal government should not punish delinquents in the public service, and they added to this another still more absurd, namely, that the Portuguese troops could thrive under privations of food, which would kill men of another nation; with these two follies they excused neglect, whenever the repetition, that there had been no neglect, became fatiguing to them. Besides this, collisions between the British commissariat and the “*junta de viveres*” were frequent and very hurtful, because the former, able to outbid, and more in fear of failure, overbought the latter; this contracted the already too small sphere of their activity, and lord Wellington was prevented feeding the whole Portuguese army himself by a curious obstacle. His principal dependence for the support of his own troops was upon the Spanish muleteers attached to the army, they were the very life and sustenance of the war, and their patience, hardiness, and fidelity to the British were remarkable; but they so abhorred the Portuguese people that they would not carry provisions for their soldiers, and lord Wellington only obtained their services, for those brigades which were attached to the English divisions, by making them think the food was entirely for the latter. Upon such nice management even in apparently trifling matters did this war depend. And yet it is not uncommon for politicians, versed only in the classic puerilities of public schools, and the tricks of parliamentary faction, to hold the rugged experience of Wellington's camp as nothing in the formation of a statesman.

The effects of these complicated affairs were soon and severely felt. Abrantes had like to have been abandoned from want, at the time Massena held Santarem, and the Portuguese troops were starved during that general's retreat; Beresford's operations in the Alemtejo were impeded, and his hospitals were left without succour; at Fuentes Onoro ammunition failed and the Portuguese artillery were forced to supply themselves by picking up the enemy's bullets; the cavalry of that nation were quite ruined, and out of more than forty thousand regular troops, formed by Beresford, only nineteen thousand were to be found under arms after the battle of Albuera, the rest had deserted or died from extreme want.

When Massena retreated the provincial organization of the country was restored, and to encourage the people to sow the devastated districts before the season passed, Mr. Stuart had furnished seed corn on the credit of the coming subsidy; an amnesty for deserters was also published, the feudal imposts for the year were remitted, and fairs were established to supply tools of husbandry; but notwithstanding these efforts such was the distress, that at Caldas eighty persons died daily, and at Figueras where twelve thousand people, chiefly from Portuguese Estremadura, had taken

refuge, the daily deaths were above a hundred, and the whole would have perished but for the active benevolence of major Von Linstow, an officer of general Trant's staff. Meanwhile the country was so overrun with robbers that the detached officers could not travel in safety upon the service of the army, and Wellington was fearful of being obliged to employ his troops against them. British officers were daily insulted at Lisbon, and even assassinated while on duty with impunity; the whole army was disgusted, the letters to England were engendering in that country a general dislike to the war, and the British soldiers, when not with their regiments, committed a thousand outrages on the line of operations.

As a climax to these scenes of misery and mischief, the harvest which had failed in Portugal, failed also in England; and no corn was to be got from the Baltic because there was no specie to pay for it, and bills were refused. Hence the famine spread in a terrible manner until Mr. Stuart obtained leave to license fifty American vessels with corn, whose cargoes were paid for out of funds provided partly by the charity of the people of England, and partly by a parliamentary grant which passed when Massena retreated.

In this crisis the British cabinet granted an additional subsidy to Portugal, but from the scarcity of specie, the greatest part of it was paid in kind, and the distress of the regency for money was scarcely lessened; for these supplies merely stood in the place of the plunder which had hitherto prevailed in the country. Thus Mr. Canning's prodigality, Mr. Vansittart's paper system, and Mr. Perceval's economy, all combined to press upon the British general, and to use his own words, he was supplied with only one-sixth part of the money necessary to keep the great machine going which had been set in motion. Mr. Perceval however, in answer to his remonstrances, employed a secretary of the Treasury to prove in a laboured paper, founded entirely upon false data, that the army had been oversupplied, and must have money to spare. But that minister, whose speeches breathed nothing but the final destruction of France, designed to confine the efforts of England to the defence of Portugal alone, without any regard to the rest of the Peninsula.

Amongst the other follies of the Portuguese regency was a resolution to issue proclamations, filled with bombastic adulation of themselves, vulgar abuse of the French, and altogether unsuited to the object of raising the public feeling, which flagged under their system. To the English general's remonstrances on this head, Forjas replied, that praise of themselves and abuse of the French was the national custom, and could not be dispensed with! a circumstance which certain English writers who have implicitly followed the accounts of the Portuguese authors, such as Accursio de Neves, and men of his stamp, relative to French enormities, would do well to consider. And here it is right to observe, that so many complaints were made of the cruelty committed by Massena's army while at Santarem, that lord Wellington had some thoughts of reprisals; but having first caused strict inquiry to be made, it was discovered that in most cases, the *ordenança*, after having submitted to the French, and received their protection, took advantage of it to destroy the stragglers and small detachments, and the cruelty complained of was only the infliction of legitimate punishment for such conduct:* the projected retaliation was therefore changed for an injunction to the *ordenanças* to cease from such a warfare.

The character of the regency was, however, most openly shown in their proceedings connected with the convention of Cintra. All the advantages which that treaty ensured to Portugal, they complacently reaped,

but overlooked or annulled those points in which the character of England was concerned. In violation of the convention, and in despite of the remonstrances of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, they cast the French residents at Lisbon into loathsome dungeons, without any cause of complaint; and in the affair of Mascarheñas their conduct was distinguished alike by wanton cruelty and useless treachery. This youth, when only fifteen, had with many others entered the French service in Junot's time, under the permission of his own prince; and he and the Conde de Sabugal, were taken by the peasantry in 1810 endeavouring to pass from Massena's army into Spain, Sabugal in uniform, Mascarheñas in disguise. They were both tried as traitors. The first, a general officer, and with powerful friends amongst the Fidalgos, was acquitted, as indeed was only just; but he was then appointed to a situation under the regency, which was disgraceful, as arising from faction: Mascarheñas was a boy, and had no powerful friends, and he was condemned to death. Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart represented the injustice of this sentence, and they desired that if humanity was unheeded the government would put him to death as a spy, for being in disguise, and so prevent the danger of reprisals, already threatened by Massena. The young man's mother and sisters, grovelling in the dust, implored the regency to spare him, but to shew their hatred of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, for the disputes with the regency were then highest, the government told the miserable women, that it was the British general and minister who demanded his death, and they were sent, with this brutal falsehood, to weep and to ask grace from persons who had no power to grant it. Mascarheñas was publicly executed as a traitor, for entering the French service under the authority of his native prince, while Sabugal was acquitted, and even rewarded, although precisely in the same circumstances, when the excuse of the disguise had been rejected.

In 1810 one Corea, calling himself an aide-de-camp of Massena, was likewise seized in disguise within the British lines, and, having given useful information, was by lord Wellington confined in St. Julians, to protect him from the Portuguese government. After a time he became deranged, and was released, whereupon the regency, rather than keep him, desired that he might be sent as a prisoner of war to England; thus for convenience admitting the very principle which they had rejected when only honour and humanity were concerned. A process against the marquis d'Alorna had also been commenced, but his family being powerful it was soon dropped, and yet the government refused madame d'Alorna leave to join her husband, thus shewing themselves spiteful and contemptible as well as cowardly and bloody. Even the court of Brazil was shocked. The prince rebuked the regency severely for the death of Mascarheñas, reversed the sentences on some others, and banished Sabugal to Terceira.

This was the political state of Portugal.

Lord Liverpool's intimation, that neither corn nor specie could be had from England, threw lord Wellington on his own resources for feeding his troops. He had before created a paper money by means of commissariat bills, which, being paid regularly at certain periods, passed current with the people when the national bonds called "Apolocies" were at an enormous discount. He now in concert with Mr. Stuart, entered into commerce to supply his necessities. For having ascertained that grain in different parts of the world, especially in South America, could be bought by bills, cheaper than it sold for hard cash in Lisbon; and that in Egypt, although only to be bought with specie, it was at a reduced price; they employed mercantile agents to purchase it for the army account, and after

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

filling the magazines sold the overplus to the inhabitants. This transaction was, however, greatly impeded by the disputes with North America, which were now rapidly hastening to a rupture; the American ships which frequented the Tagus being prevented by the non-importation act from bringing back merchandize, were forced to demand coin, which helped to drain the country of specie.

As Mr. Stuart could obtain no assistance from the English merchants of Lisbon, to aid him in a traffic which interfered with their profits, he wrote circular letters to the consuls in the Mediterranean, and in the Portuguese islands, and to the English minister at Washington, desiring them to negotiate treasury bills; to increase the shipments of corn to Lisbon, and pay with new bills, to be invested in such articles of British manufacture as the non-importation law still permitted to go to America. By this complicated process he contrived to keep something in the military chest; and this commerce, which lord Wellington truly observed, was not what ought to have occupied his time and attention, saved the army, and the people, when the proceedings of Mr. Perceval would have destroyed both. Yet it was afterwards cavilled at and censured by the ministers, on the representations of the merchants who found their exorbitant gains interrupted by it.

Pressed by such accumulated difficulties, and not supported in England as he deserved, the general, who had more than once intimated his resolution to withdraw from the Peninsula, now seriously thought of executing it. Yet when he considered, that the cause was one even of more interest to England than to the Peninsula; that the embarrassments of the French might be even greater than his own, and that Napoleon himself, gigantic as his exertions had been, and were likely to be, was scarcely aware of the difficulty of conquering the Peninsula while an English army held Portugal; when he considered also, that light was breaking in the north of Europe, that the chances of war are many, even in the worst of times, and above all, when his mental eye caught the beams of his own coming glory, he quelled his rising indignation, and retempered his mighty energies to bear the buffet of the tempest.

But he could not remove the obstacles that choked his path, nor could he stand still, lest the ground should open beneath his feet. If he moved in the north, Marmont's army and the army under Bessieres were ready to oppose him, and he must take Ciudad Rodrigo or blockade it before he could even advance against them. To take that place required a battering-train, to be brought up through a mountainous country from Lamego, and there was no covering position for the army during the siege. To blockade and pass it, would so weaken his forces, already inferior to the enemy, that he could do nothing effectual; meanwhile Soult would have again advanced from Llerena, and perhaps have added Elvas to his former conquests.

To act on the defensive in Beira, and follow up the blow against Soult, by invading Andalusia, in concert with the Murcians and the corps of Blake, Beguines, and Graham, while Joseph's absence paralysed the army of the centre; while the army of Portugal was being reorganized in Castile; and while Suchet was still engaged with Taragona, would have been an operation suitable to lord Wellington's fame and to the circumstances of the moment. But then Badajos must have been blockaded with a corps powerful enough to have defied the army of the centre, and the conduct of the Portuguese government had so reduced the allied forces, that this would not have left a sufficient army to encounter Soult. Hence, after the battle of Albuera, the only thing to be done, was to renew the siege of Badajos, which, besides its local interest, contained

the enemy's bridge, equipage and battering train; but which, on common military calculations, could scarcely be expected to fall before Soult and Marmont would succour it: yet it was only by the taking of that town that Portugal itself could be secured beyond the precincts of Lisbon, and a base for further operations obtained.

According to the regular rules of art, Soult should have been driven over the mountains before the siege was begun, but there was no time to do this, and Marmont was equally to be dreaded on the other side; wherefore lord Wellington could only try, as it were, to snatch away the fortress from between them, and he who, knowing his real situation, censures him for the attempt, is neither a general nor a statesman. The question was, whether the attempt should be made or the contest in the Peninsula be resigned. It failed, indeed, and the Peninsula was not lost, but no argument can be thence derived, because it was the attempt, rather than the success, which was necessary to keep the war alive; moreover the French did not push their advantages as far as they might have done, and the unforeseen circumstance of a large sum of money being brought to Lisbon, by private speculation, at the moment of failure, enabled the English general to support the crisis.

CHAPTER V.

Second English siege of Badajos—Means of the allies very scanty—Place invested—San Christoval assaulted—The allies repulsed—Second assault fails likewise—The siege turned into a blockade—Observations.

SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

THERE is no operation in war so certain as a modern siege, provided the rules of art are strictly followed, but, unlike the ancient sieges in that particular, it is also different in this; that no operation is less open to irregular daring, because the course of the engineer can neither be hurried nor delayed without danger. Lord Wellington knew that a siege of Badajos, in form, required longer time, and better means, than were at his disposal, but he was forced to incur danger and loss of reputation, which is loss of strength, or to adopt some compendious mode of taking that place. The time that he could command, and time is in all sieges the greatest point, was precisely that which the French required to bring up a force sufficient to disturb the operation; and this depended on the movements of the army of Portugal, whose march from Salamanca to Badajos, by the pass of Baños, or even through that of Gata, could not be stopped by general Spencer, because the mouths of those defiles were commanded by Marmont's positions. It was possible also at that season, for an army to pass the Tagus by fords near Alcantara, and hence more than twenty days of free action against the place were not to be calculated upon.

Now the carriages of the battering guns used in Beresford's siege were so much damaged, that the artillery officers asked eleven days to repair them; and the scanty means of transport for stores was much diminished by carrying the wounded from Albuera to the different hospitals. Thus more than fifteen days of open trenches, and nine days of fire could not be expected. With good guns, plentiful stores, and a corps of regular sappers and miners, this time would probably have sufficed; but none of these things were in the camp, and it was a keen jest of Picton to say, that "lord Wellington sued Badajos in forma pauperis."

The guns, some of them cast in Philip the Second's

reign, were of soft brass, and false in their bore; the shot were of different sizes, and the largest too small; the Portuguese gunners were inexperienced, there were but few British artillery-men, few engineers, no sappers or miners, and no time to teach the troops of the line how to make fascines and gabions. Regular and sure approaches against the body of the place, by the Pardaleras and the Picurina outworks, could not be attempted; but it was judged that Beresford's lines of attack on the castle and Fort Christoval, might be successfully renewed, avoiding the errors of that general; that is to say, by pushing the double attacks simultaneously, and with more powerful means. San Christoval might thus be taken, and batteries from thence could sweep the interior of the castle, which was meanwhile to be breached. Something also was hoped from the inhabitants, and something from the effect of Soult's retreat after Albuera.

This determination once taken, every thing was put in motion with the greatest energy. Major Dickson, an artillery officer whose talents were very conspicuous during the whole war, had with unexpected rapidity, prepared a battering train of thirty twenty-four-pounders, four sixteen-pounders, and twelve eight and ten-inch howitzers made to serve as mortars by taking off the wheels and placing them on trucks. Six iron Portuguese ship-guns were forwarded from Salvatierra, making altogether fifty-two pieces, a considerable convoy of engineer's stores had already arrived from Alcaer do Sal, and a company of British artillery marched from Lisbon to be mixed with the Portuguese, making a total of six hundred gunners. The regular engineer-officers present, were only twenty-one in number; but eleven volunteers from the line were joined as assistant-engineers, and a draft of three hundred intelligent men from the line, including twenty-five artificers of the staff corps, strengthened the force immediately under their command.

Hamilton's Portuguese division was already before the town, and on the 24th of May, at the close of evening, general Houston's division, increased to five thousand men, by the addition of the seventeenth Portuguese regiment, and the Tavira and Lagos militia, invested San Christoval. The flying bridge was then laid down on the Guadiana, and on the 27th Picton's division, arriving from Campo Mayor, crossed the river, by the ford above the town, and joined Hamilton, their united force being about ten thousand men. General Hill commanded the covering army which, including the Spaniards, was spread from Merida to Albuera. The cavalry was pushed forward in observation of Soult, and a few days after, intelligence having arrived that Drouet's division was on the point of effecting a junction with that marshal, two regiments of cavalry and two brigades of infantry, which had been quartered at Coria, as posts of communication with Spencer, were called up to reinforce the covering army.

While the allies were engaged at Albuera, Phillipon, the governor of Badajos, had levelled their trenches, repaired his own damages, and obtained a small supply of wine and vegetables from the people of Estremadura, who were still awed by the presence of Soult's army; and within the place all was quiet, for the citizens did not now exceed five thousand souls. He had also mounted more guns, and when the place was invested, parties of the townsmen mixed with soldiers, were observed working to improve the defences; wherefore, as any retrenchments made in the castle, behind the intended points of attack, would have frustrated the besiegers' object by prolonging the siege, lord Wellington had a large telescope placed in the tower of La Lyppe, near Elvas, by which the interior of the castle could be plainly looked into, and all preparations discovered.

In the night of the 29th, ground was broken for a false attack against the Pardaleras, and the following night sixteen hundred workmen, with a covering party of twelve hundred, sank a parallel against the castle, on an extent of eleven hundred yards, without being discovered by the enemy, who did not fire until after daylight. The same night twelve hundred workmen, covered by eight hundred men under arms, opened a parallel four hundred and fifty yards from San Christoval, and seven hundred yards from the bridge-head. On this line one breaching, and two counter batteries, were raised against the fort and against the bridge-head, to prevent a sally from that point; and a fourth battery was also commenced to search the defences of the castle, but the workmen were discovered, and a heavy fire struck down many of them.

On the 31st the attack against the castle, the soil being very soft, was pushed forward without much interruption, and rapidly; but the Christoval attack, being carried on in a rocky soil, and the earth brought up from the rear, proceeded slowly, and with considerable loss. This day the British artillery company came up on mules from Estremos, and the engineer hastened the works. The direction of the parallel against the castle was such, that the right gradually approached the point of attack by which the heaviest fire of the place was avoided; yet, so great was the desire to save time, that before the suitable point of distance was attained, a battery of fourteen twenty-four-pounders with six large howitzers was marked out.

On the Christoval side, the batteries were not finished before the night of the 1st of June, for the soil was so rocky, that the miner was employed to level the ground for the platforms; and the garrison having mortars of sixteen and eighteen inches diameter mounted on the castle, sent every shell amongst the workmen. These huge missiles would have ruined the batteries on that side altogether, if the latter had not been on the edge of a ridge, from whence most of the shells rolled off before bursting, yet so difficult is it to judge rightly in war, that Phillipon stopped this fire, thinking it was thrown away!*

The progress of the works was also delayed by the bringing of earth from a distance, and woolpacks purchased at Elvas, were found to be an excellent substitute.

In the night of the 2d, the batteries on both sides were completed, and armed with forty-three pieces of different sizes, of which twenty were pointed against the castle; the next day the fire of the besiegers opened, but the windage caused by the smallness of the shot, rendered it very ineffectual at first, and five pieces became unserviceable. However, before evening the practice was steadier, the fire of the fort was nearly silenced, and the covering of masonry fell from the castle-wall, discovering a perpendicular bank of clay.

In the night of the 3d the parallel against the castle was prolonged, and a fresh battery for seven guns traced out at six hundred and fifty yards from the breach. On the 4th the garrison's fire was increased by several additional guns, and six more pieces of the besiegers were disabled, principally by their own fire. Meanwhile the batteries told but slightly against the bank of clay.

At Christoval, the fort was much injured, and some damage was done to the castle, from one of the batteries on that side; but the guns were so soft and bad that the rate of firing was of necessity greatly reduced in all the batteries. In the night the new battery was armed, all the damaged works were repaired, and the next day the enemy having brought a gun in Christoval to plunge into the trenches on the castle side, the

* French Register of the Siege, MSS.

parallel there was deepened and traverses were constructed to protect the troops.

Fifteen pieces still played against the castle, but the bank of clay, although falling away in flakes, always remained perpendicular. One damaged gun was repaired on the Christoval side, but two more had become unserviceable.

In the night the parallel against the castle was again extended, a fresh battery was traced out, at only five hundred and twenty yards from the breach, to receive the Portuguese iron guns, which had arrived at Elvas; and on the Christoval side some new batteries were opened and some old ones were abandoned. During this night the garrison began to entrench themselves behind the castle breach, before morning their labourers were well covered, and two additional pieces, from Christoval, were made to plunge into the trenches with great effect. On the other hand the fire of the besiegers had broken the clay bank, which took such a slope as to appear nearly practicable, and the stray shells and shots set fire to the houses nearest the castle, but three more guns were disabled.

On the 6th there were two breaches in Christoval, and the principal one being found practicable, a company of grenadiers with twelve ladders were directed to assault it, while a second company turned the fort by the east to divert the enemy's attention. Three hundred men from the trenches were at the same time pushed forward by the west side to cut the communication between the fort and the bridge-head; and a detachment, with a six-pounder, moved into the valley of the Gebora, to prevent any passage of the Guadiana by boats.

FIRST ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.

The storming party, commanded by Major M'Intosh, of the 85th regiment, was preceded by a forlorn hope under Mr. Dyas, of the 51st, and this gallant gentleman, guided by the engineer Forster, a young man of uncommon bravery, reached the glacis about midnight, and descended the ditch without being discovered. The French had, however, cleared all the rubbish away, the breach had still seven feet of perpendicular wall, many obstacles, such as carts chained together and pointed beams of wood, were placed above it, and large shells were ranged along the ramparts to roll down upon the assailants. The forlorn hope finding the opening impracticable, was retiring with little loss, when the main body, which had been exposed to a flank fire, from the town as well as a direct fire from the fort, came leaping into the ditch with ladders, and another effort was made to escalate at different points, the ladders were too short, and the garrison, consisting of only seventy-five men, besides the cannoneers, made so stout a resistance, and the confusion and mischief occasioned by the bursting of the shells was so great, that the assailants again retired with the loss of more than one hundred men.

Bad success always produces disputes, and the causes of this failure were attributed by some to the breach being impracticable from the first; by others to the confusion which arose after the main body had entered. French writers affirm that the breach was certainly practicable on the night of the 5th, but repaired on the 6th; that as the besiegers did not attack until midnight, the workmen had time to clear the ruins away and to raise fresh obstacles; and the bravery of the soldiers, who were provided with three muskets each, did the rest.* But it is also evident, that whether from inexperience, accident, or other causes, the combinations for the assault were not very well calculated; the storming party was too weak, the ladders few and short, and the breach not sufficiently

scoured by the fire of the batteries. The attack itself was also irregular and ill-combined, for the leading troops were certainly repulsed before the main body had descended the ditch. The intrepidity of the assailants was admitted by all sides, yet it is a great point in such attacks that the supports should form almost one body with the leaders, because the sense of power derived from numbers, is a strong incentive to valour, and obstacles which would be insurmountable to a few, seem to vanish before a multitude. It is also to be recollected that this was a case where not loss of men, but time was to be considered.

During this night the iron guns were placed in battery against the castle, but two more of the brass pieces became unserviceable, and the following day three others were disabled. However, the bank of clay at the castle at last offered a practicable slope, and during the night captain Patton of the engineers examined it closely; he was wounded mortally in returning, yet lived to make his report that it was practicable. Nevertheless the garrison continued, as they had done every night at both breaches, to clear away the ruins, and with bales of wool and other materials to form defences behind the opening. They ranged also a number of huge shells and barrels of powder, with matches fastened to them, along the ramparts, and placed chosen men to defend the breach, each man being supplied with four muskets.

In this order they fearlessly awaited another attack, which was soon made. For intelligence now arrived that Drouet's corps was close to Llerena, and that Marmont was on the move from Salamanca, and hence lord Wellington, seeing that his prey was likely to escape, as a last effort resolved to assault Christoval again. But this time four hundred British, Portuguese, and French men of the chasseurs Britanniques, carrying sixteen long ladders, were destined for the attack; the supports were better closed up; the appointed hour was nine instead of twelve, and a greater number of detachments than before were distributed to the right and left to distract the enemy's attention, to cut off his communication with the town, and to be ready to improve any success which might be obtained. On the other side Phillipon increased the garrison of the fort to two hundred men.

SECOND ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.

The storming party was commanded by major M'Geechy; the forlorn hope, again led by the gallant Dyas, was accompanied by Mr. Hunt, an engineer officer, and a little after nine o'clock the leading troops bounding forward, were immediately followed by the support, amidst a shattering fire of musketry which killed major M'Geechy, Mr. Hunt, and many men upon the glacis. The troops with loud shouts jumped into the ditch, but the French scoffingly called to them to come on, and at the same time rolled the barrels of powder and shells down, while the musketry made fearful and rapid havoc. In a little time the two leading columns united at the main breach, the supports also came up, confusion arose about the ladders, of which only a few could be reared, and the enemy standing on the ramparts, bayoneted the foremost of the assailants, overturned the ladders, and again poured their destructive fire upon the crowd below. When a hundred and forty men had fallen the order to retire was given.

An assault on the castle breach might still have been tried, but the troops could not have formed between the top, and the retrenchments behind the breach, until Christoval was taken, and the guns from thence used to clear the interior of the castle; hence the siege was of necessity raised, because to take Christoval, required several days more, and Soult was now ready to advance. The stores were removed on the 10th, and the attack was turned into a blockade.

* Lamarre's Sieges.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The allies lost, during this unfortunate siege, nearly four hundred men and officers, and the whole of their proceedings were against rules. The working parties were too weak, the guns and stores too few, and the points of attack, chosen, not the best; the defences were untouched by counter-batteries, and the breaching batteries were at too great a distance for the bad guns employed; howitzers mounted on trucks, were but a poor substitute for mortars, and the sap was not practised; lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been crowned, and a musketry fire established against the breach.

2. That a siege so conducted should fail against such a brave and intelligent garrison is not strange; but it is most strange and culpable that a government, which had been so long engaged in war as the British, should have left the engineer department, with respect to organization and equipment, in such a state as to make it, in despite of the officers' experience, bravery, and zeal, a very inefficient arm of war. The skill displayed belonged to particular persons, rather than to the corps at large; and the very tools with which they worked, especially those sent from the store-keeper's department were so shamefully bad that the work required could scarcely be performed; the captured French cutting tools were eagerly sought for by the engineers as being infinitely better than the British; when the soldiers' lives and the honour of England's arms were at stake, the English cutlery was found worse than the French.

3. The neglect of rules, above noticed, was for the most part a matter of absolute necessity; yet censure might attach to the general, inasmuch as he could have previously sent to England for a battering train. But then the conduct of the Portuguese and British governments when lord Wellington was in the lines, left him so little hope of besieging any place on the frontier, that he was hourly in fear of being obliged to embark: moreover the badness of the Portuguese guns was not known, and the space of time that elapsed between the fall of Badajos and this siege, was insufficient to procure artillery from England; neither would the Portuguese have furnished the means of carriage. It may however at all times be taken as a maxim, that the difficulties of war are so innumerable that no head was ever yet strong enough to fore-calculate them all.

CHAPTER VI.

General Spencer's operations in Beira—Pack blows up Almeida—Marmont marches by the passes to the Tagus, and Spencer marches to the Alentejo—Soul and Marmont advance to succour Badajos—The siege is raised, and the allies pass the Guadiana—Lord Wellington's position on the Caya described—Skirmish of cavalry in which the British are defeated—Critical period of the war—French marshals censured for not giving battle—Lord Wellington's firmness—Inactivity of the Spaniards—Blake moves to the Condado de Niebla—He attacks the castle of Niebla—The French armies retire from Badajos, and Soul marches to Andalusia—Succours the castle of Niebla—Blake flies to Ayamonte—Sails for Cadiz, leaving Ballesteros in the Condado—French move against him—He embarks his infantry and sends his cavalry through Portugal to Estremadura—Blake lands at Almeria and joins the Murcian army—Goes to Valencia, and during his absence Soul attacks his army—Rout of Baza—Soul returns to Andalusia—His actions eulogised.

It will be remembered, that Soul instead of retiring into Andalusia, took a flank position at Llerena, and awaited the arrival of Drouet's division, which had been detached from Massena's army. At Llerena, although closely watched by general Hill, the French

marshal, with an army, oppressed by its losses and rendered unruly by want, maintained an attitude of offence until assured of Drouet's approach, when he again advanced to Los Santos, near which place a slight cavalry skirmish took place to the disadvantage of the French.

On the 14th, Drouet, whose march had been very rapid, arrived, and then Soul, who knew that lord Wellington expected large reinforcements, and was desirous to forestal them, advanced to Fuente del Maestro, whereupon Hill took measures to concentrate the covering army on the position of Albuera.* Meanwhile Marmont, who had reorganized the army of Portugal, in six divisions of infantry and five brigades of cavalry, received Napoleon's orders to co-operate with Soul; and in this view had sent Reynier with two divisions by the pass of Baños, while himself with a considerable force of infantry and cavalry and ten guns escorted a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo. General Spencer, with the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, and one brigade of cavalry, was then behind the Agueda; and Pack's Portuguese brigade was above Almeida, which had been again placed in a condition to resist an irregular assault. Spencer's orders were to make his marches correspond with those of the enemy, if the latter should point towards the Tagus; but if the French attacked, he was to take the line of the Coa, and to blow up Almeida if the movements went to isolate that fortress. On the morning of the 6th, Marmont, having introduced his convoy, marched out of Rodrigo in two columns, one moving upon Gallegos, the other upon Espeja. The light division fell back before the latter, and Slade's cavalry before the former; but in this retrograde movement, the latter gave its flank obliquely to the line of the enemy's advance, which soon closed upon, and cannonaded it, with eight pieces of artillery. Unfortunately the British rear-guard got jammed in between the French and a piece of marshy ground, and in this situation the whole must have been destroyed, if captain Purvis, with a squadron of the fourth dragoons, had not charged the enemy while the other troopers, with strong horses and a knowledge of the firmest parts, got through the marsh. Purvis then passed also, and the French horses could not follow. Thus the retreat was effected with a loss of only twenty men. After the action an officer calling himself Montbrun's aid-du-camp deserted to the allies.

General Spencer, more distinguished for great personal intrepidity than for quickness of military conception, was now undecided as to his measures; and the army was by no means in a safe situation, for the country was covered with baggage, the movements of the divisions were wide, and without concert, and general Pack who had the charge of Almeida too hastily blew it up. In this uncertainty the adjutant-general Pakenham pointed out that the French did not advance as if to give battle, that their numbers were evidently small, their movements more ostentatious than vigorous, and probably intended to cover a flank movement by the passes leading to the Tagus: he therefore urged Spencer either to take up a position of battle which would make the enemy discover his real numbers and intentions, or retire at once behind the Coa, with a view to march to lord Wellington's assistance. These arguments were supported by colonel Waters, who, having closely watched the infantry coming out of Ciudad Rodrigo, observed that they were too clean and well dressed to have come off a long march, and must therefore be a part of the garrison. He had also ascertained that a large body was actually in movement towards the passes.

Spencer yielding to these representations marched in the evening by Alfayates to Soito, and the next day

* Intercepted despatch from Soul to Marmont.

behind the Coa. Here certain intelligence, that Marmont was in the passes, reached him, and he continued his march to the Alentejo by Penamacor, but detached one division and his cavalry to Coria, as flankers, while he passed with the main body by Castello Branco, Vilha Velha, Niza, and Portalegre. The season was burning and the marches long, yet so hardened by constant service were the light division, and so well organized by general Craufurd, that, although covering from eighteen to eight-and-twenty miles daily, they did not leave a single straggler behind. The flanking troops, who had been rather unnecessarily exposed at Coria, then followed, and Marmont having imposed upon Spencer and Pack by his demonstration in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, filed off by the pass off Perales, while Reynier moved by the passes of Bejar and Baños, and the whole were by forced marches soon united at the bridge of Almaraz. Here a pontoon bridge expected from Madrid had not arrived, and the passage of the Tagus was made with only one ferry-boat which caused a delay of four days, which would have proved fatal to Badajos, if the battering guns employed in that siege had been really effective.

When the river was crossed, the French army marched in two columns with the greatest rapidity upon Merida and Medellin, where they arrived the 18th, and opened their communications with Soult.

On the other side, lord Wellington had been attentively watching these movements; he had never intended to press Badajos beyond the 10th, because he knew that when reinforced with Drouet's division, Soult alone would be strong enough to raise the siege, and hence the hurried assaults; but he was resolved to fight Soult, and although he raised the siege on the 10th, yet, by a deciphered intercepted letter, that Philippon's provisions would be exhausted on the 20th, he continued the blockade of the place, in hopes that some such accident of war as the delay at Almaraz might impede Marmont. It may be here asked, why, as he knew a few days would suffice to reduce Badajos, he did not retrench his whole army and persist in the siege? The answer is that Elvas being out of repair, and exhausted both of provisions and ammunition, by the siege of Badajos, the enemy would immediately have taken that fortress.

When Soult's advanced guard had reached Los Santos, the covering army, consisting of the second and fourth divisions and Blake's Spaniards was concentrated at Albuera, Hamilton's Portuguese were also directed there from Badajos; meanwhile the third and seventh divisions maintained the blockade, and Wellington expecting a battle repaired in person to Albuera, but, unlike Beresford, he had that position entrenched, and did not forget to occupy the hill on the right.

On the 14th, it was known that Marmont was at Truxillo, and that in four days he could unite with Soult, wherefore the blockade was also raised with a view to repass the Guadiana, yet Wellington still lingered at Albuera hoping to fall on Soult separately, but the cautious manner in which the latter moved, continually refusing his left and edging with his right, towards Almendralejos, soon extinguished this chance; on the 17th, the blockade having been raised the day before, the allies repassed the Guadiana in two columns. The British and Portuguese moved by the pontoon bridge near Badajos, the Spaniards crossed at Jerumenha;—this movement, not an easy one, was executed without any loss of men or stores, and without accident, save that general William Stewart by some error, took the same line as Blake, and at night fell in with the Spaniards, who thought his division French and were like to have fired.

The 19th the united French armies entered Badajos, which was thus succoured after two most honourable defences, and at a moment when Philippon, despairing

of aid and without provisions, was preparing his means of breaking out and escaping.

The 21st Godinot's division which had marched by Valverde took possession of Olivenza; the 22d he pushed a detachment under the guns of Jerumenha, and the same day the whole of the French cavalry crossed the Guadiana in two columns, advancing towards Villa Viciosa and Elvas on one side, and Campo Mayor on the other.

Lord Wellington being now joined by the head of Spencer's corps, had placed his army on both sides of the Caya, with cavalry posts towards the mouth of that river and on the Guadiana in front of Elvas. His right wing was extended behind the Caya to the lower bridge on that river, and his left wing had a field of battle on some high ground resting on the Gebora, a little beyond Campo Mayor, which fortress was occupied, and the open space between it and the high ground strongly entrenched. On this side also cavalry were posted in observation beyond the Gebora and about Albuquerque, the whole position forming an irregular arch embracing the bridge of Badajos. The wood and town of Aronches were behind the centre of the position and the little fortified place of Ouguella was behind the left; but the right wing was much more numerous than the left, and the Monte Reguingo, a wooded ridge between Campo Mayor and the Caya, was occupied by the light division, whose position could not be recognized by the enemy.

If the French attacked the left of the allies, a short movement would have sufficed to bring the bulk of the troops into action on the menaced point, because the whole extent of country occupied did not exceed ten or twelve miles: the communications also were good, and from Campo Mayor open plains, reaching to Badajos, exposed the French movements which could be distinguished both from Elvas, from Campo Mayor, and from the many atalayas or watch-towers on that frontier.

The chief merit of this position was the difficulty of recognizing it from the enemy's side, and to protect the rear, the first division was retained at Portalegre: from thence it could intercept the enemy at Marvaõ or Castello de Vide if he should attempt to turn the allies by Albuquerque; and was ready to oppose Soult if he should move between Elvas and Estremos; but the march from Portalegre was too long to hope for the assistance of this division in a battle near Elvas or Campo Mayor.

The French cavalry, as I have said, passed the Guadiana on the 21st, both by the bridge of Badajos and by two fords, where the road of Olivenza crosses that river, below the confluence of the Caya. The right column after driving back the outposts of the allies, was opposed by the heavy dragoons, and by Madden's Portuguese, and retired without seeing the position on the Campo Mayor side; but the horsemen of the left column, while patrolling towards Villa Viciosa and Elvas, cut off a squadron of the eleventh dragoons, and the second German hussars which were on the Guadiana escaped to Elvas with difficulty and loss. The cause of this misfortune in which nearly a hundred and fifty men were killed or taken is not very clear, for the French aver that colonel Lallemand, by a feigned retreat drew the cavalry into an ambushade, and the rumours in the English camp were various and discordant.

After this action the French troops were quartered along the Guadiana and above and below Badajos from Xeres de los Cavalheiros to Montijo, and proceeded to collect provisions for themselves and for the fortress, hence, with the exception of a vain attempt on the 26th to cut off the cavalry detachments on the side of Albuquerque, no farther operations took place.

All things had seemed to tend to a great and decisive battle, and, although the crisis glided away without any event of importance, this was one of the most critical periods of the war. For Marmont brought down, including a detachment of the army of the centre, thirty-one thousand infantry, four thousand five hundred cavalry, and fifty four guns; Soult about twenty-five thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and thirty-six guns;—to effect this, Andalusia and Castile had been nearly stripped of troops. Bessieres had abandoned the Asturias, united with general Mayer, who had succeeded Serras in Leon, was scarcely able, as we have seen, to keep the Gallicians in check on the Orbijo, the chief armies of the Peninsular were in presence, a great battle seemed to be the interest of the French, and it was in their option to fight or not. Their success at Badajos, and the surprise of the cavalry on the Caya had made ample amends for their losses at Los Santos and Usagre, and now, when Badajos was succoured, and the allied army in a manner driven into Portugal, Albuera seemed to be a victory. The general result of the Estremadura campaign had been favourable to them, and the political state of their affairs seemed to require some dazzling action to impose upon the peninsulars. Their army was powerful, and as they were especially strong in cavalry, and on favourable ground for that arm, there could scarcely be a better opportunity for a blow, which would, if successful, have revenged Massena's disasters, and sent lord Wellington back to Lisbon, perhaps from the Peninsula altogether; if unsuccessful not involving any very serious consequences, because from their strength of horse and artillery, and nearness to Badajos, a fatal defeat was not to be expected. But the allied army was thought to be stronger by the whole amount of the Spanish troops, than it really was; the position very difficult to be examined was confidently held by lord Wellington, and no battle took place.

Napoleon's estimation of the weight of moral over physical force in war was here finely exemplified. Both the French armies were conscious of recent defeats, Busaco, Sabugal, Fuentes, and the horrid field of Albuera, were fresh in their memory; the fierce blood there spilled, still reeked in their nostrils, and if Cæsar after a partial check at Dyrrachium held it unsafe to fight a pitched battle with recently defeated soldiers, however experienced or brave, Soult may well be excused, seeing that he knew there were divisions on the Caya, as good in all points, and more experienced, than those he had fought with on the banks of the Albuera. The stern nature of the British soldier had been often before proved by him, and he could now draw no hope from the unskilfulness of the general. Lord Wellington's resolution to accept battle on the banks of the Caya, was nevertheless, one of as un-mixed greatness, as the crisis was one of un-mixed danger to the cause he supported. For the Portuguese government, following up the system which I have already described, had reduced their troops to the lowest degree of misery, and the fortresses were, at times, only not abandoned to the enemy. The British government had taken the native troops into pay, but it had not undertaken to feed them; yet such was the suffering of those brave men that Wellington, after repeatedly refusing to assist them from the English stores, unable longer to endure the sight of their misfortunes, and to prevent them from disbanding, at last fed the six brigades, or three-fourths of the whole army, the English commissariat charging the expense to the subsidy. He hoped that the government would then supply the remnant, but they starved it likewise, and during the siege of Badajos these troops were of necessity thrown for subsistence upon the magazines of Elvas, which were thus exhausted; and

what with desertion, famine, and sickness, that flourishing army which had mustered more than forty thousand good soldiers in line, at the time of Massena's invasion, could now scarcely produce fourteen thousand for a battle on which the fate of their country depended. The British troops, although large reinforcements had come out, and more were arriving, had so many sick and wounded, that scarcely twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets were in the field. The enemy had therefore a superiority, of one fourth in artillery and infantry, and the strength of his cavalry was double that of the British.

To accept battle in such circumstances, military considerations only being had in view, would have been rash in the extreme, but the Portuguese government besides throwing the subsistence of the troops upon Elvas, had utterly neglected that place, and Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella, Aronches and Santa Olay, which were the fortresses covering this frontier; neither had they drawn forth any means of transport from the country. The siege of Badajos had been entirely furnished from Elvas; but all the carts and animals of burthen that could be found in the vicinity, or as far as the British detachments could go; and all the commissariat means to boot, were scarcely sufficient to convey the ammunition, the stores, and the subsistence of the native troops, day by day, from Elvas to the camp; there was consequently no possibility of replacing these things from the British magazines at Abrantes and Lisbon.

When the allies crossed the Guadiana in retreat, Elvas had only ten thousand rounds of shot left, and not a fortnight's provisions in store, even for her own garrison; her works were mouldering in many places, from want of care, houses and enclosures encumbered her glacis, most of her guns were rendered unserviceable by the fire at Badajos, the remainder were very bad, and her garrison was composed of untired soldiers and militia. Jerumenha was not better looked to; Olaya, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella had nothing but their walls. It would appear then, that if Soult had been aware of this state of affairs, he might under cover of the Guadiana, have collected his army below the confluence of the Caya, and then by means of the pontoon train from Badajos, and by the fords at which his cavalry did pass, have crossed the Guadiana, overpowered the right of the allies, and suddenly investing Elvas, have covered his army with lines, which would have ensured the fall of that place; unless the English general, anticipating such an attempt, had, with very inferior numbers, defeated him between the Caya and Elvas. But this, in a perfectly open country, offering no advantages to the weaker army, would not have been easy. Soult also, by marching on the side of Estremos, could have turned the right, and menaced the communications of the allies with Abrantes, which would have obliged him to retreat and abandon Elvas or fight to disadvantage. The position on the Caya was therefore taken up solely with reference to the state of political affairs. It was intended to impose upon the enemy, and it did so; Elvas and Jerumenha must otherwise have fallen.

While a front of battle was thus presented, the rear was cleared of all the hospitals and heavy baggage; workmen were day and night employed to restore the fortifications of the strong places, and guns, ammunition, and provisions were brought up from Abrantes, by means of the animals and carts before employed in the siege of Badajos. Until all this was effected Portugal was on the brink of perdition, but the true peninsular character was now displayed, and in a manner that proclaims most forcibly the difficulties overcome by the English general, difficulties which have been little appreciated in his own country. The danger of Elvas had aroused all the bustle of the

Portuguese government, and the regency were at first frightened at the consequences of their own conduct; but when they found their own tardy efforts were forestalled by the diligence of lord Wellington, they with prodigious effrontery asserted, that he had exhausted Elvas for the supply of the British troops, and that they had replenished it!

His imperturbable firmness at this crisis was wonderful, and the more admirable, because Mr. Perceval's policy, prevailing in the cabinet, had left him without a halfpenny in the military chest, and almost without a hope of support in his own country; yet his daring was not a wild cast of the net for fortune; it was supported by great circumspection, and a penetration and activity that let no advantages escape. He had thrown a wide glance over the Peninsula, knew his true situation, had pointed out to the Spaniards how to push their war to advantage, while the French were thus concentrated in Estremadura, and at this period had a right to expect assistance from them; for Soult and Marmont were united at Badajos, the army of the north and the army of the centre were paralysed by the flight of the king, and this was the moment, when Figueras having been surprised by Rovira, and Tarragona besieged by Suchet, the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon were entirely occupied with those places. Thus, nearly the whole of the Peninsula was open to the enterprizes of the Spaniards. They could have collected, of Murcians and Valencians only, above forty thousand regulars, besides partizans, with which they might have marched against Madrid, while the Gallicians operated in Castile, and the Asturian army supported the enterprizes of the northern partidas.

This favourable occasion was not seized. Julian Sanchez, indeed, cut off a convoy, menaced Salamanca, and blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; Santocildes came down to Astorga, and as I have before observed, Mina and the northern chiefs harassed the French communications; some stir also was made by the guerillas near Madrid, and Suchet was harassed, but the commotion soon subsided; and a detachment from Madrid having surprised a congregation of partidas at Peneranda, killed many and recovered a large convoy which they had taken; and in this complicated war, which being spread like a spider's web over the whole Peninsula, any drag upon one part would have made the whole quiver to the most distant extremities, the regular armies effected nothing. Nor did any general insurrection of the people take place in the rear of the French, who retained all their fortified posts, while their civil administrations continued to rule in the great towns as tranquilly as if there was no war!

Lord Wellington's principal measure for dissipating the storm in his front had rested upon Blake. That general had wished him to fight beyond the Guadiana, and was not well pleased at being refused; wherefore the English general, instead of taking ten or twelve thousand Spaniards, and an uneasy colleague, into the line of battle at Campo Mayor, where he knew by experience that they would quarrel with the Portuguese, and by their slowness, insubordination, and folly, would rather weaken than strengthen himself, delivered to Blake the pontoons used at Badajos, and concerted with him a movement down the right bank of the Guadiana. He was to recross that river at Mertola, and to fall upon Seville, which was but slightly guarded by a mixed force of French and Spaniards in Joseph's service; and this blow, apparently easy of execution, would have destroyed all the arsenals and magazines, which supported the blockade of Cadiz. Lord Wellington had therefore good reason to expect the raising of that siege, as well as the dispersion of the French army in its front. He likewise urged the regency at Cadiz to push forward general Beguines

from San Roque, against Seville, while the insurgents in the Ronda pressed the few troops, left in Grenada, on one side, and Freire, with the Murcian army, pressed them on the other.

Blake marched the 18th, recrossed the river at Mertola the 22d, remained inactive at Castillejos until the 30th, and sent his heavy artillery to Ayamonte by water; then instead of moving direct with his whole force upon Seville, he detached only a small body, and with a kind of infatuation wasted two successive days in assaulting the castle of Niebla; a contemptible work garrisoned by three hundred Swiss, who had in the early part of the war abandoned the Spanish service. Being without artillery he could not succeed, and meanwhile Soult, hearing of his march, ordered Olivenza to be blown up, and taking some cavalry, and Godinot's division which formed the left of his army, passed the Morena by Santa Ollalla and moved rapidly upon Seville. From Monasterio he sent a detachment to relieve the castle of Niebla; and at the same time, general Conroux, whose division was at Xeres de los Cavalheiro, crossed the mountains by the Aracena road, and endeavoured to cut off Blake from Ayamonte.

Thus far, notwithstanding the failure at Niebla, the English general's project was crowned with success. The great army in his front was broken up, Soult was gone, Marmont was preparing to retire, and Portugal was safe. Blake's cavalry under Penne Villemur, and some infantry under Ballesteros, had also, during the attack on Niebla, appeared in front of Seville on the right bank of the Guadalquivir, and a slight insurrection took place at Carmona on the left bank. The Serranos, always in arms, were assisted by Beguines with three thousand men, and blockaded the town of Ronda; and Freire advancing with his Murcians beyond Lora, menaced general Laval, who had succeeded Sebastiani in command of the fourth corps. In this crisis, general Darica, unable to keep the field, shut himself up in a great convent, which Soult had, in anticipation of such a crisis, fortified in the Triana suburb, before his invasion of Estremadura. But the Spanish troops of Joseph, shewed no disposition to quit him, the people of Seville remained tranquil, and Blake's incapacity ruined the whole combination.

Soult approached on the 6th of July, Ballesteros and Villemur immediately retired, and the insurrection at Carmona ceased. Blake, hearing of Conroux's march, precipitately fled from Niebla, and only escaped into Portugal by the assistance of a bridge laid for him at San Lucar de Guadiana by colonel Austin. He then resolved to embark some of his forces and sail to attack San Lucar de Barameda; but scarcely had a few men got on board, when the French advanced guard appeared, and he again fled in disorder to Ayamonte, and got into the island of Canelas, where fortunately a Spanish frigate and three hundred transports had unexpectedly arrived. While Ballesteros with the cavalry and three thousand infantry, protected the embarkation, by taking a position on the Rio Piedra, Blake got on board with great confusion, and sailed to Cadiz, for the French had reinforced San Lucar de Barameda, and entered Ayamonte. The Portuguese militia, of the Algarves, were then called out; and Ballesteros after losing some men on the Piedra, took post on the mountains of Arches on his left, until the French retired, when he came back with his infantry and entrenched himself in Canelas. On this island he remained until August, and then embarked under the protection of the Portuguese militia at Villa Real, while his cavalry marched up the Guadiana to rejoin Castaños, who with a few troops still remained in Estremadura. A small battalion left in the castle of Paymago was soon after unsuccessfully attacked by the French, and this finished the long partizan warfare of the Condado de Niebla.

There was now nothing to prevent the French from again pressing the allies on the Caya, except the timid operations of Freire on the side of Grenada, and these Soult was in march to repress. With indefatigable activity he had recalled the troops of the fourth corps, from Estremadura, to supply the place of the detachments which he had already sent, from Seville, Cadiz, Grenada, and Malaga, to quell the insurrection in the Ronda; and while he thus prepared the means of attacking Freire, Beguines was driven back to San Roque, and the Serranos as I have before observed, disgusted with the Spanish general's ill conduct, were upon the point of capitulating with the French. During these events in the Ronda, Godinot returned, from the pursuit of Blake, to Jaen, whence on the 7th of August, he was directed to march against Pozalçon and Baza, where the Murcian army was posted. Meanwhile Blake, re-landing his troops at Almeria, joined Freire; his intention was to have commenced active operations against Grenada, but thinking it necessary to go first to Valencia where Palacio was making mischief, he left the army, which was above twenty-seven thousand strong, under Freire, and before he could return it was utterly dispersed.

ROUT OF BAZA.

General Quadra, who commanded the right wing of the Murcians, was at Pozalçon, and it is said, had orders to rejoin Freire, but disobeyed. The centre and left under Freire himself, were at Venta de Bahul in front of Baza. The 8th, Soult, at the head of a mixed force of French and Spanish troops in Joseph's service, drove back the advanced guards from Guadix. The 9th he appeared in front of Bahul, where he discerned the Spanish army on strong ground, their front being covered by a deep ravine. As his object was to cut off the retreat upon Lorca, and the city of Murcia, he only shewed a few troops at first, and skirmished slightly, to draw Freire's attention, while Godinot attacked his right at Pozalçon and got in his rear. Godinot wasted time. His advanced guard, alone, had defeated Quadra with great loss, but instead of entering Baza, he halted for the night near it; and during the darkness, the Spaniards, who had no other line of retreat, and were now falling back in confusion before Soult, passed through that place, and made for Lorca and Caravahla. Soult's cavalry, however, soon cut this line, and the fugitives took to the by-roads, followed and severely harassed by the French horse.

At this time the whole province was in a defenceless state, but the people generally took arms to protect the city of Murcia. That place was entrenched, and the French marshal, whose troops were few, and fatigued by constant marching, not thinking fit to persevere, especially as the yellow fever was raging at Carthagena, returned to Grenada, whence he sent detachments to disperse some insurgents who had gathered under the Conde de Montijo in the Alpuxaras. Thus Grenada was entirely quieted.

Here it is impossible to refrain from admiring Soult's vigour and ability. We see him in the latter end of 1810, with a small force and in the depth of winter, taking Olivenza, Badajos, Albuquerque, Valencia d'Alcantara, and Campo Mayor; defeating a great army, and capturing above twenty thousand men. Again when unexpectedly assailed by Beresford in the north, by the Murcians in the east, by Ballesteros in the west, and by Lapeña and Graham in the south, he found means to repel three of them, to persevere in the blockade of Cadiz, and to keep Seville tranquil, while he marched against the fourth. At Albuera he lost one of the fiercest battles upon human record, and that at a moment when the king by abandoning his throne had doubled every embarrassment; nevertheless, holding fast to Estremadura, he still maintained the strug-

gle, and again taking the offensive obliged the allies to repass the Guadiana. If he did not then push his fortune to the utmost, it must be considered that his command was divided, that his troops were still impressed with the recollection of Albuera, and that the genius of his adversary had worked out new troubles for him in Andalusia. With how much resolution and activity he repressed those troubles I have just shewn; but above all things he is to be commended for the prudent vigour of his administration, which, in despite of the opposition of Joseph's Spanish counsellors, had impressed the Andalusians with such a notion of his power and resources, that no revolt of any real consequence took place, and none of his civic guards or "Escopeteros" failed him in the hour of need.

Let any man observe the wide extent of country he had to maintain; the frontiers fringed as it were with hostile armies, the interior suffering under war requisitions, the people secretly hating the French, a constant insurrection in the Ronda, and a national government and a powerful army in the Isla de Leon. Innumerable English and Spanish agents prodigal of money, and of arms, continually instigating the people of Andalusia to revolt; the coast covered with hostile vessels, Gibraltar sheltering beaten armies on one side, Cadiz on another, Portugal on a third, Murcia on a fourth; the communication with France difficult, two battles lost, few reinforcements; and all the material means to be created in the country. Let any man, I say, consider this, and he will be convinced that it was no common genius that could remain unshaken amidst such difficulties; yet Soult not only sustained himself, but contemplated the most gigantic offensive enterprises, and was at all times an adversary to be dreaded. What though his skill in actual combat was not so remarkable as in some of his contemporaries; who can deny him firmness, activity, vigour, foresight, grand perception, and admirable arrangement? It is this combination of high qualities that forms a great captain.

CHAPTER VII.

State of the war in Spain—Marmont ordered to take a central position in the valley of the Tagus—Constructs forts at Almaraz—French affairs assume a favourable aspect—Lord Wellington's difficulties augment—Remonstrances sent to the Brazils—System of intelligence described—Lord Wellington secretly prepares to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo—Marches into Beira, leaving Hill in the Alentejo—French cavalry take a convoy of wine, get drunk and lose it again—General Dorsenne invades Galicia—Is stopped by the arrival of the allies on the Agueda—Blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo—Carlos Espana commences the formation of a new Spanish army—Preparations for the siege—Hill sends a brigade to Castello Branco.

WHILE Soult was clearing the eastern frontier of Andalusia, Marmont retired gradually from Badajos and quartered his troops in the valley of the Tagus, with exception of one division which he left, at Truxillo. At the same time the fifth corps retired to Zafra, and thus lord Wellington found himself relieved from the presence of the French, at the very moment when he had most reason to fear their efforts. He had by this time secured the fortresses on the frontier, his troops were beginning to suffer from the terrible pestilence of the Guadiana, this was sufficient to prevent him from renewing the siege of Badajos, if Marmont's position had not forbid that measure, he therefore resolved to adopt a new system of operations. But to judge of the motives which influenced his conduct we must again cast a hasty glance over the general state of the Peninsula, which was hourly changing.

In Catalonia Suchet had stormed Taragona, seized Montserrat, and dispersed the Catalan army. A division of the army of the centre had chased the Partidas

from Guadalupe and Cuença, and re-established the communications with Aragon. Valencia and Murcia were in fear and confusion, both from internal intrigue and from the double disasters on each side of their frontier, at Baza and Taragona.

The French emperor was pouring reinforcements into Spain by the northern line; these troops as usual scoured the country to put down the Guerillas on each side of their march, and nearly forty thousand fresh men, mostly old soldiers from the army of the reserve, were come, or coming into the north of Spain. The young guard which was at Burgos, under general Dorsenne, was increased to seventeen thousand men; and as no efforts, except those already noticed, were made by the Spaniards, to shake the French hold of the country while Soult and Marmont were on the Guadiana, the French generals were enabled to plan extensive measures of further conquest: and the more readily, because the king was now on his return from Paris, in apparent harmony with his brother, and the powers and duties of all parties were defined.

Suchet urged by Napoleon to hasten his preparations for the invasion of Valencia, was resolved to be under the walls of that city in the middle of September, and Soult was secretly planning a gigantic enterprise, calculated to change the whole aspect of the war. In the north when the king, who re-entered Madrid the 14th, had passed Valladolid, the imperial guards entered Leon; thirteen thousand men of the army of the north were concentrated at Benevente on the 17th, and Santocildes retired into the mountains. Bessieres then sent a large convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, but following the treaty between Joseph and Napoleon, returned himself to France, and general Dorsenne taking the command of the army of the north, prepared to invade Galicia.

Meanwhile Marmont was directed to resign the whole of Castile and Leon, to the protection of the army of the north, and to withdraw all his posts and depôts, with the exception of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was to be changed at a more convenient time. His line of communication was to be with Madrid, and that city was to be his chief depôt and base; he was to take positions in the valley of the Tagus, and at Truxillo; to fortify either Alcantara or Almaraz, and to secure the communication across the river.

Thus posted, the emperor judged that Marmont could more effectually arrest the progress of the allies than in any other. The invasion of Andalusia, for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz, was, he said, the only object the allies had at the moment, but it could always be frustrated by Marmont's moving against their flank; and with respect to the north, the allies having no object on that side, would be unlikely to make any serious attempt, because they must in time be overmatched, as the French fell back upon their resources. Marmont could also act against their right flank, as he could do against their left flank, if they marched upon Andalusia; and while stationary he protected Madrid, and gave power and activity to the king's administration.

In pursuance of these instructions, Marmont, who had remained in Estremadura, to cover Soult's operations against Blake and the Murcians, now proceeded to occupy Talavera, and other posts in the valley of the Tagus; and he placed a division at Truxillo, the castle of which place, as well as that of Medellin, was repaired. Another division occupied Placentia, with posts in the passes of Bejar and Baños; Girard's division of the fifth corps, remained at Zafra, to serve as a point of connexion between Marmont and Soult, and to support Badajos, which by a wise provision of Napoleon's, was now garrisoned with detachments from the three armies, of the centre, of Portugal and of the

south. This gave each general a direct interest in moving to its succour, and in the same policy Ciudad Rodrigo was to be wholly garrisoned by the army of the north, that Marmont might have no temptation to neglect the army of the south, under pretence of succouring Ciudad.

To restore and maintain Alcantara was beyond the means of the duke of Ragusa; he therefore repaired the bridge of Almaraz, and constructed two strong forts, one at each side, to protect it, and to serve as an intermediate field depôt; a third and more considerable fort was also built on the high ridge of Mirabete, to insure a passage over the hills from Almaraz to Truxillo. A free intercourse with the army of the south was thus secured on one side, and on the other, the passes of Baños and Bejar, and the Roman road of Puerto Pico, which had been restored in 1810, served for communication with the army of the north.

The French affairs had now assumed a very favourable aspect. There was indeed a want of money, but the generals were obeyed with scrupulous attention by the people of Spain, not only within the districts occupied by them, but even in those villages where the guerillas were posted. This obedience lord Wellington attributed entirely to fear, and hoped as the exactions were heavy, that the people would at last fight or fly from their habitations on the approach of a French soldier; but this did not happen generally, and to me it appears, that the obedience was rather a symptom of the subjection of the nation, and that with a judicious mixture of mildness and severity perfect submission would have followed if England had not kept the war alive.

On the other hand the weakness and anarchy of the Spaniards were daily increasing, and the disputes, between the British general and the Portuguese government, arrived to such a height, that lord Wellington, having drawn up powerful and clear statements of his grievous situation, sent one to the Brazils and the other to his own government, with a positive intimation that if an entirely new system was not immediately adopted he would no longer attempt to carry on the contest. Lord Wellesley, taking his stand upon this ground, made strenuous exertions in both countries to prevent the ruin of the cause; but lord Wellington, while expecting the benefit of his brother's interference, had to contend with the most surprising difficulties, and to seek in his own personal resources for the means of even defending Portugal. He had sent marshal Beresford to Lisbon, immediately after Albuera, to superintend the reorganization and restoration of the Portuguese forces, and Beresford had sent Mr. De Lemos, an officer of his own staff, to the Brazils, to represent the inconveniences arising from the interference of the regency in the military affairs. On the other hand the Souzas sent one Vasconcellos, who had been about the British head-quarters as their spy, to Rio Janeiro, and thus the political intrigues became more complicated than ever.

But with respect to the war Wellington had penetrated Napoleon's object, when he saw Marmont's position in the valley of the Tagus; he felt the full force of the emperor's military reasoning, yet he did not despair, if he could overcome the political obstacles, to gain some advantage. He had now a powerful and experienced British force under his command, the different departments and the staff of the army were every day becoming more skilful and ready, and he had also seen enough of his adversaries to estimate their powers. The king he knew to be no general, and discontented with the marshals; Soult he had found able and vast in his plans, but too cautious in their execution; Marmont with considerable vigour, had already shown some rashness in the manner he had pushed Reynier's division forward, after passing

the Tagus, and it was, therefore, easy to conceive that no very strict concert would be maintained in their combined operations.

Lord Wellington had also established some good channels of information. He had a number of spies amongst the Spaniards who were living within the French lines; a British officer in disguise, constantly visited the French armies in the field; a Spanish state-counsellor, living at the head-quarters of the first corps, gave intelligence from that side, and a guitar-player of celebrity, named Fuentes, repeatedly making his way to Madrid, brought advice from thence. Mr. Stuart, under cover of vessels licensed to fetch corn for France kept *chasse marées* constantly plying along the Biscay coast, by which he not only acquired direct information, but facilitated the transmission of intelligence from the land spies, amongst whom the most remarkable was a cobbler, living in a little hutch at the end of the bridge of Irun. This man while plying his trade, continued for years, without being suspected, to count every French soldier, that passed in or out of Spain by that passage, and transmitted their numbers by the *chasse marées* to Lisbon.

With the exception of the state spy at Victor's head-quarters, who being a double traitor was infamous, all the persons thus employed were very meritorious. The greater number, and the cleverest also, were Spanish gentlemen, *alcaldes*, or poor men, who disdaining rewards and disregarding danger, acted from a pure spirit of patriotism, and are to be lauded alike for their boldness, their talent, and their virtue. Many are dead. Fuentes was drowned in passing a river, on one of his expeditions; and the *alcalde* of Caceres, a man, of the clearest courage and patriotism, who expended his own property in the cause, and spurned at remuneration, was on Ferdinand's restoration cast into a dungeon, where he perished; a victim to the unbounded ingratitude and baseness of the monarch he had served so well!

With such means lord Wellington did not despair of baffling the deep policy of the emperor in the field. He thought that the saying of Henry the Fourth of France, that "*large armies would starve and small ones be beaten in Spain*," was still applicable. He felt that a solid possession of Portugal and her resources, which, through his brother's aid, he hoped to have, would enable him either to strike partial blows against the French, or oblige them to concentrate in large masses, which, confident in his own martial genius he felt he could hold in check, while the Spaniards ruined the small posts, and disorganized the civil administrations in their rear. Hitherto, indeed, the Spaniards had not made any such efforts except by the *partidas*, which were insufficient; but time, his own remonstrances, and the palpable advantages of the system, he trusted would yet teach them what to do.

Having deeply meditated upon these matters and received his reinforcements from England, he resolved to leave Hill with ten thousand infantry, a division of cavalry, and four brigades of artillery, about Portalegre, Villa Viciosa, and Estremos. From these rich towns which were beyond the influence of the Guadiana fever, the troops could rapidly concentrate either for an advance or retreat; and the latter was secured upon Abrantes, or upon the communications with Beira, by Niza, and Vilha Velha, where a permanent boat-bridge had now been established. The front was protected by Elvas, Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella; and Castaños also remained in Estremadura with the fifth army, which by the return of the cavalry from Ayamonte and the formation of Downie's legion now amounted to about a thousand infantry and nine hundred horse. This force placed on the side of Montijo, had Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara as posts

of support, and a retreat either by the fords of the Tagus near the bridge of Alcantara, or upon Portugal by Marvão and Castello de Vide. Hill's position was thus so well covered, that he could not be surprised, nor even pressed except by a very strong army; and he was always on the watch as we shall hereafter find, to make incursions against the division of the fifth corps, which remained in Estremadura. The rest of the army was then placed in quarters of refreshment at Castello de Vide, Marvão and other places near the Tagus, partly to avoid the Guadiana fever, partly to meet Marmont's movement to that river.

When this disposition was made, the English general arranged his other measures of offence. The conduct of the Portuguese government and the new positions of the French armies had, as Napoleon had foreseen, left him no means of undertaking any sustained operation; but, as he was ignorant of the great strength of the army of the north, he hoped to find an opportunity of taking Ciudad Rodrigo before Marmont could come to its assistance. For this purpose he had caused a fine train of battering guns, and mortars, together with a reinforcement of British artillerymen, which had arrived at Lisbon from England, to be shipped in large vessels, and then with some ostentation made them sail as it were for Cadiz; at sea they were however shifted on board small craft, and while the original vessels actually arrived at Cadiz and Gibraltar, the guns were secretly brought first to Oporto and then in boats to Lamego. During this process, several engineer, artillery, and commissariat officers, were sent to meet and transport these guns, and the necessary stores for a siege, to Villaponte near Celerico; and as one of the principal magazines of the army was at Lamego, and a constant intercourse was kept up between it and Celerico, another great depôt, the arrival, and passage of the guns and stores to their destination was not likely to attract the attention of the French spies.

Other combinations were also employed, both to deceive the enemy and to prepare the means for a sudden attack, before the troops commenced their march for Beira; but the hiding of such extensive preparations from the French would have been scarcely possible, if the personal hatred borne to the invaders by the peninsulars, combined with the latter's peculiar subtlety of character, had not prevented any information spreading abroad, beyond the fact that artillery had arrived at Oporto. The operation of bringing sixty-eight huge guns, with proportionate stores, across nearly fifty miles of mountain, was however one of no mean magnitude; five thousand draft bullocks were required for the train alone, and above a thousand militia were for several weeks employed merely to repair the road.

The allies broke up from the Caya the 21st of July, and they had received considerable reinforcements, especially in cavalry, but they were sickly and required a change of cantonments; hence when an intercepted despatch gave reason to believe that Ciudad Rodrigo was in want of provisions, Wellington suddenly crossed the Tagus at Vilha Velha, and marched in the beginning of August by Castello Branco and Penamacor towards Rodrigo, hoping to surprise it in a starving state, but giving out that his movement was for the sake of healthy quarters. His movement was unmolested save by some French dragoons, from the side of Placentia, who captured a convoy of seventy mules loaded with wine near Pedrogoa, and getting drunk with their booty attacked some Portuguese infantry, who repulsed them and recovered the mules;* but there were other ostensible objects besides the obvious one of removing from the well-known pestilence of the

* General Harvey's Journal.

Guadiana, which contributed to blind the French as to the secret motives of the English general. We have seen that Dorsenne was menacing Galicia, and that Soult was in full operation against the Murcians; it was supposed that he intended to invade Murcia itself, and therefore the allies had the double object, of saving Galicia, by menacing the rear of the invading army; and of relieving Murcia by forcing Marmont to look after Ciudad Rodrigo, and thus draw him away from the support of Soult, who would not, it was supposed, then quit Andalusia.

Galicia was meanwhile in great danger, for the Partidas of the north had been vigorously repressed by Caffarelli and Reille, which enabled Dorsenne to collect about twenty thousand men on the Esla. Abadia, who had succeeded Santocildes, was posted with about seven thousand disciplined men behind this river, and he had a reserve of fifteen hundred at Foncebadon; but he could make no head, for to this number the Gallician army had again dwindled, and these were starving.* The 25th the French, having passed the river in four columns, made a concentric march upon Astorga. Abadia, whose rear-guard sustained a sharp conflict near La Baneza, retreated, precisely by the same line as sir John Moore had done in 1809, and with about the same relative proportion of force; but as he only took the Foncebadon road and did not use the same diligence and skill as that general, the enemy forestalling him by Manzanal and Bemibre, cut him off from Villa Franca del Bierzo, and from the road to Lugo, and on the 27th drove him into the Val des Orres. During this operation the division of the army of the north, which Bessieres had sent with the convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, entered that place and returned to Salamanca.

The Spanish general having thus lost his line of communication with Lugo, and the few stores he possessed at Villa Franca, took post at Domingo Flores in the Val des Orres, where he entered a strong country, and, under the worst circumstances, could retire upon Portugal and save his troops if not his province.† But his army which was in the utmost distress before, for shoes and clothing, was now ready to disband from misery, and the consternation in Galicia was excessive. That province torn by faction, stood helpless before the invader, who could, and would, have taken both Coruña and Ferrol, but for the sudden arrival of the allies on the Coa, which obliged him, for his own safety, to return to the plains. Souham, also, who was coming from Burgos, by forced marches, to support Dorsenne, halted at Rio Seco, and Abadia did not fail to ascribe all this to the loss he had inflicted, but his vanity was laughed at.

To have thus saved Galicia was a great thing. That kingdom was the base of all the operations against the line of communication with France; from thence went forth, those British squadrons which nourished the guerilla warfare in Biscay, in the Montaña, in Navarre, in the Rioja, and the Asturias; it was the chief resource for the supply of cattle to the allied army, it was the outwork of Portugal, and honestly and vigorously governed, would have been more important than Catalonia. But like the rest of Spain it was always weak from disorders, and, if the allies had remained in Alentejo, there was nothing to prevent Dorsenne from conquering it; for though he should not have taken Ferrol and Coruña, the points of St. Jago, Lugo, Villa Franca, and Orense would have given him an entire command of the interior, and the Spaniards holding the ports only would not have been able to dislodge him.

Lord Wellington arrived upon the Coa about the

8th of August, intending, as I have said, first a close blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, and finally a siege; it was however soon known that the French had on the 6th supplied the place for two months, and the first part of the design was therefore relinquished. The troops were then quartered near the sources of the Coa and Agueda, close to the line of communication between Marmont and Dorsenne, and in a country where there was still some corn. If the enemy advanced in superior numbers, the army could retire through a strong country to a position of battle near Sabugal, whence the communication with Hill was direct. Nor was the rest of Beira left unprotected, because the French would have exposed their left flank, by any advance in the direction of Almeida, and the allies could, by Guarda, send detachments to the valley of the Mondego in time to secure the magazines at Celerico. The line of supply from Lamego along which the battering-train was now moving, was however rather exposed.

While the army was in this position, the preparations for the siege went on briskly, until Wellington learned, contrary to his former belief, that the disposable force of the army of the north, was above twenty thousand good troops; and consequently, that Ciudad Rodrigo could not be attacked in face of that corps, and of Marmont's army. Then changing his plan, he resolved to blockade the place, and wait for some opportunity to strike a sudden blow, either against the fortress, or against the enemy's troops; for it was the foundation of his hopes, that as the French could not long remain in masses, for want of provisions, and that he could check those masses on the frontier of Portugal, so he could always force them to concentrate, or suffer the loss of some important post. But it is worthy of observation, that his plans were based on calculations which did not comprise the Gallician army. He had no expectation that it would act at all, or if it did, that it would act effectually. It had no cavalry, and the infantry being undisciplined dared not enter the plains in face of the enemy's horsemen; yet this was in August 1811, and Galicia had not seen the face of an enemy since June 1809!

Early in September, Marmont, pushing a detachment from Placencia through the passes, surprised a British cavalry piquet, at St. Martin de Trebejo, and opened his communications with Dorsenne. Nevertheless lord Wellington formed the blockade. His headquarters were fixed at Guinaldo, the fifth division was placed at Perales, in observation of Marmont, and the first division, now commanded by general Graham, occupied Penamacor. A battery of artillery, was withdrawn from Hill, and three brigades of that general's corps, reinforced by a Portuguese regiment, passed the Tagus, and were placed on the Ponçul, in advance of Castello Branco, to protect the magazines on that line of communication. Meanwhile the battering-train was collected at Villa de Ponte, the troops were employed to prepare gabions and fascines, and the engineers instructed two hundred men of the line, in the duties of sappers. The bridge over the Coa at Almeida which had been broken by Massena, was permanently repaired, and the works of Almeida itself, were ordered to be once more restored to form a place of arms for the battering-train and stores; Carlos d'España came also to Leon to form a new army under the protection of the allies, but he was without officers, arms, money, or stores, and his force was a mere name.

CHAPTER VIII.

The garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo make some successful excursions—Morillo operates against the French in Estremadura, is defeated and driven to Albuquerque—Civil affairs of Portugal—Bad conduct of the regency—They imagine the war

* General Walker's Correspondence, MSS. Abadia's ditto, MSS.

† Sir H. Douglas's Correspondence, MSS.

to be decided, and endeavour to drive lord Wellington away from Portugal—Indications that Napoleon would assume the command in the Peninsula observed by lord Wellington—He expects a combined attack on Lisbon by sea and land—Marmont and Dorsenne collect convoys and unite at Tamames—Advance to succour Ciudad Rodrigo—Combat of El-bodon—Allies retire to Guinaldo—To Aldea Ponte—Combat of Aldea Ponte—The allies retire to Soita—The French retire—Observations.

DURING the first arrangements, for the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, the garrison made some excursions to beat up the quarters of the British cavalry, and to forage the villages; and some lancers from Salamanca drove Julian Sanchez from Ledesma. Meanwhile in Estremadura, Morillo chased the enemy from Caceres, and advancing to Montanches, menaced Truxillo, but being beaten there by general Foy, he returned to Montijo, where some French cavalry, arriving from Zafra, again defeated him and drove him to Albuquerque. Other military operations, worth relating, there were none, but the civil transactions in Portugal were very important.

Mr. Stuart's exertions had produced some improvement in the Portuguese revenue; the ranks of the infantry were again filling by the return of deserters, and by fresh recruits, which, with the reinforcements from England had raised the actual number of the allied army to upwards of eighty thousand men, fifty-six thousand of which were British; the number under arms did not however exceed twenty-four thousand Portuguese and thirty-three thousand British, of whom five thousand were cavalry, with about ninety pieces of artillery. The previous operations in Alemtejo had produced sickness, which was increasing, and twenty-two thousand men were in hospital; and hence, Hill's corps being deducted, lord Wellington could not bring to the blockade of Ciudad above forty-four thousand of all arms, including Sanchez's Partida. But Marmont, alone, could in a few days bring as many to its succour, and Dorsenne always had from twenty to twenty-five thousand men in hand; because the French reinforcements had relieved the old garrisons in the north and the latter had joined the army in the field.

At this time the British military chest was quite bankrupt, even the muleteers, upon whose fidelity and efficiency the war absolutely depended, were six months in arrears for wages; and the disputes with the Portuguese government were more acrimonious than ever. The regency had proposed a new system of military regulations, calculated to throw the burthen of feeding the native troops entirely upon the British commissariat, without any reform of abuses, and lord Wellington had rejected it, hence renewed violence; and as Beresford had fallen sick at Cintra, Mr. Stuart deprived of his support on military questions, and himself no longer a member of the regency, was unable to restrain the triumphant faction of the Souzas. The prince regent's return to Portugal was prevented by troubles in the Brazils, and the regency expecting a long hold of power, and foolishly imagining that the war was no longer doubtful, were, after the custom of all people who employ powerful auxiliaries, devising how to get rid of the British army. With this view they objected to or neglected every necessary measure, and made many absurd demands, such as that the British general should pay the expenses of the Portuguese post office; and at the same time they preferred various vexatious, and unfounded charges against British officers, while gross corruption, and oppression of the poorer people, marked the conduct of their own magistrates.

But the fate of Portugal, which to these people appeared fixed, was in the eyes of the English general more doubtful than ever. Intercepted letters gave reasons to believe that the emperor was coming to Spain. And this notion was confirmed by the assembling of

an army of reserve in France, and by the formation of great magazines at Burgos, and other places, to supply which, and to obtain money, the French generals were exacting the fourth of the harvest, and selling the overplus of corn again even by retail. Minute reports of the state of these magazines were demanded by Napoleon; reinforcements, especially of the imperial guards, were pouring into Spain, and Wellington judging that the emperor must either drive the British from the Peninsula, or lower his tone with the world, thought that he would invade Portugal from the side of Rodrigo, the valley of the Tagus, and Alemtejo at the same time; and that he would risk his fleet in a combined attack upon Lisbon by sea and land.

Whether Napoleon really meant this; or whether he only spread the report with a view to restrain the allies from any offensive operations during the summer, and to mislead the English cabinet as to the real state of his negotiations with Russia, intending if the latter proved favourable to turn his whole force against the Peninsula, does not very clearly appear; yet it is certain that every thing in Spain at this time indicated his approach. Lord Wellington's opinion that the emperor was bound to drive the British army away or lose his influence in the world does not however seem quite just; because the mighty expedition to Moscow, proved that Napoleon did not want force to conquer Spain; and success in Russia would have enabled him to prolong the war in the Peninsula as a drain on the English resources for many years; which was so obvious a policy, that the rest of Europe could not from thence draw conclusions unfavourable to his influence.

Under the notion that Napoleon's coming was probable, the English general, with characteristic prudence, turned his own attention to the security of his ancient refuge within the lines, and therefore urgently desired the government to put the fortresses in order, repair the roads, and restore the bridges broken during Massena's invasion. An increased number of workmen were also put to the lines, for the engineers had never ceased to improve those on the northern bank of the Tagus, and on the southern bank the double lines of Almada had been continued on a gigantic scale. The defensive canal there was planned to float ships of three hundred tons, and to serve as a passage from the Tagus to Setuval by joining the navigation of the Sadao and Marateca rivers; thus conducing to objects of general utility as well as the military defence; as it will be found that lord Wellington did at all times sustain, not only the political, and financial, and military affairs, but also the agricultural, the commercial, and charitable interests of Portugal. The batteries at the mouth of the Tagus were likewise put into complete order, they were provided with furnaces for heating shot, and captain Holloway of the engineers, at a trifling expense constructed four jetties at St. Julian's, in such an ingenious manner, that they withstood the most tempestuous gales and secured the embarkation of the army in any season.* Finally the militia were again called out, a measure of greater import, in the actual state of affairs, than would at first appear; for the expense was a very heavy drain upon the finances, and the number of hands thus taken away from agriculture was a serious evil.

Had all these preparations been duly executed, lord Wellington would not have feared even Napoleon; but all that depended upon the Portuguese government, if that can be called government which was but a faction, was, as usual, entirely neglected. The regency refused to publish any proclamation to display the danger, or to call upon the people to prepare for future efforts; and although the ancient laws of Portugal provided the most ample means for meeting such

* Colonel Jones's History of the Peninsular War.

emergencies, the bridges over the Ceira, the Alva and other rivers, on the line of retreat, were left unrepared. The roads were therefore impassable, and as the rainy season was coming on, the safety of the army would have been seriously endangered if it had been obliged to retire before the emperor. The regency pleaded want of money, but this also could be traced to their own negligence in the collection of taxes, for which there was no solid reason; because, with the exception of the devastated districts, the people were actually richer than they had ever been, not indeed in goods, but in hard cash, derived from the enormous sums expended by the British army. To add to these embarrassments the secret correspondents of the army on the side of Salamanca suddenly ceased their communications, and it was at first feared they had paid with their lives for the culpable indiscretion of the Portuguese government; for the latter had published, in the Lisbon Gazette, all the secret information sent to Silveira, which being copied into the English newspapers, drew the enemy's attention. Fortunately this alarm proved false, but a sense of the other difficulties was greatly aggravated to the English general, by comparison of his situation with that of the enemy; neither necessity nor remuneration, could procure for him due assistance from the Portuguese people, while the French generals had merely to issue their orders to the Spaniards through the prefects of the provinces, and all means of transport or other succour, possible to be obtained, were sure to be provided on the day and at the place indicated.*

In the midst of these cares lord Wellington was suddenly called into military action by the approach of the enemy. Ciudad Rodrigo having been blockaded for six weeks wanted food, and Marmont, who had received a reinforcement of eleven thousand men from France, and had now fifty thousand, present under arms, in the valley of the Tagus, being in pain for the garrison, had concerted with Dorsenne a great combined operation for its succour. In this view Truxillo had been occupied by a part of the fifth corps, and Girard with the remainder had advanced to Merida, while Foy, reinforced by a strong division of the army of the centre, occupied Placentia. Marmont himself quitting Talavera had passed the mountains and collected a large convoy at Bejar; at the same time Dorsenne reinforced by eight thousand men under Souham had collected another convoy at Salamanca, and leaving Bonnet's division, which now included Mayer's troops, at Astorga, to watch the Galicians, came down to Tamames. They met on the 21st, their united armies presenting a mass of sixty thousand men, of which six thousand were cavalry: and they had a hundred pieces of artillery.

The English general, who had expected this movement, immediately concentrated his scattered troops. He could not fight beyond the Agueda, but he did not think fit to retreat until he had seen their whole army, lest a detachment should relieve the place to his dishonour. Hence to make the enemy display his force, he established himself in the following positions near the fortress.

The third division, reinforced by three squadrons of German and British cavalry, formed his centre. It was posted on the heights of Elbodon and Pastores, on the left of the Agueda, and within three miles of Ciudad, commanding a complete prospect of the plains round that place.

The right wing composed of the light division, some squadrons of cavalry, and six guns, was posted beyond the Agueda, and behind the Vadillo, a river rising in the Peña de Francia, and flowing in a rugged channel to the Agueda, which it joins about three miles above

Rodrigo; from this line an enemy coming from the eastern passes of the hills could be discerned.

The left wing, composed of the sixth division and Anson's brigade of cavalry, the whole under general Graham, was placed at Espeja, on the lower Azava, with advanced posts at Carpio and Marialva. From thence to Ciudad Rodrigo was about eight miles over a plain, and on Graham's left, Julian Sanchez's Partida, nominally commanded by Carlos d'España, was spread along the lower Agueda in observation. The heads of the columns were therefore presented on three points to the fortress; namely, at the ford of the Vadillo; and the heights of Pastores and Espeja. The communication between the left and centre was kept up by two brigades of heavy cavalry, posted on the Upper Azava, and supported at Campillo by Pack's Portuguese brigade. But the left of the army was very distant from Guinaldo, which was the pivot of operations, and to obviate the danger of making a flank march in retreat, should the enemy advance, the seventh division was placed in reserve at Alamedillo, and the first division at Nava d'Aver. Thus the allied army was spread out on the different roads which led, like the sticks of a fan, to one point on the Coa.

The fifth division remained at St. Payo watching the passes from Estremadura, lest Foy should from that direction fall on the rear of the right wing; and as Marmont's movement affected the line of communication along the eastern frontier, general Hill first sent Hamilton's Portuguese towards Albuquerque, to support the Spanish cavalry, which was menaced by the fifth corps, and then brought the remainder of his troops nearer to the Tagus, in readiness to take the place of his third brigade, which now marched from the Ponçul to Penamacor.

Wellington's position before Rodrigo was very extensive, and therefore very weak. The Agueda, although fordable in many places during fine weather, was liable to sudden freshes, and was on both sides lined with high ridges. The heights, occupied by the troops, on the left bank, were about three miles wide, ending rather abruptly above Pastores and Eldobon, and they were flanked by the great plains and woods, which extend from Ciudad to the bed of the Coa. The position of Eldobon itself, which was held by the centre of the army, was, therefore, not tenable against an enemy commanding these plains; and as the wings were distant their lines of retreat were liable to be cut, if the centre should be briskly pushed back beyond Guinaldo. But, at the latter place, three field redoubts had been constructed, on the high land, with a view to impose upon the enemy, and so gain time to assemble and feel Marmont's disposition for a battle, because a retreat behind the Coa was to be avoided if possible.

On the 23d the French advanced from Tamames, and encamped behind the hills to the north-east of Ciudad Rodrigo. Then a strong detachment entered the plain, and having communicated with the garrison, and examined the position of the light division on the Vadillo returned.

The 24th, six thousand cavalry, with four divisions of infantry, crossed the hills in two columns, and placing some troops in observation on the Vadillo, introduced the convoy. On this day the fourth division of the allies, was brought up to the position of Guinaldo, and the redoubts were completed, yet no other change was made, for it was thought the French would not advance further. But the 25th, soon after daybreak, fourteen squadrons of the imperial guards drove the outposts of the left wing from Carpio across the Azava, and the lancers of Berg crossed that river in pursuit, they were however flanked by some infantry in a wood, and then charged and beaten by two squadrons of the fourteenth, and sixteenth, dragoons, who reoccupied the post at Carpio.

* Wellington's Correspondence with lord Liverpool, MSS.

During the skirmish, fourteen battalions of infantry, thirty squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns, the whole under Montbrun, passed the Agueda by the bridge of Rodrigo and the fords above it, and marched towards Guinaldo. The road soon divided, one branch turning the Elbodon heights on the right hand, the other leading nearer to the Agueda, and passing through the villages of Pastores, La Encina, and Elbodon; and as the point of divarication was covered by a gentle ridge, it was for some time doubtful which branch the French would follow. In a short time this doubt was decided. Their cavalry poured along the right-hand road leading directly to Guinaldo, the small advanced posts which the allied squadrons had on the plain were rapidly driven in, and the enemy's horsemen without waiting for their infantry commenced the

COMBAT OF ELBODON.

The position of the third division was completely turned by this movement, and the action began very disadvantageously, for the seventy-fourth and sixtieth regiments, being at Pastores, on the right, were too distant to be called in, and Picton being with three other regiments, at Elbodon, could not take any immediate part in the fight. Hence, as the French force was considerable, Wellington sent to Guinaldo for a brigade of the fourth division, and meanwhile directed general Colville to draw up the seventy-seventh and fifth British regiments, the twenty-first Portuguese, and two brigades of artillery of the same nation, on the hill over which the road to Guinaldo passed, supporting their flanks with Alten's three squadrons. The height, thus occupied by the allies, was convex towards the enemy, and covered in front and on both flanks, by deep ravines, but it was too extensive for their numbers; and before Picton could bring in the troops from the village of Elbodon, the crisis of the combat passed. The Portuguese guns had sent their shot amongst the thickest of Montbrun's horsemen in the plain, but the latter passed the front ravine in half squadrons, and with amazing vigour riding up the rough height, on three sides, fell vehemently upon the allies. Neither the loose fire of the infantry, nor of the artillery, could stop them, but they were checked by the fine fighting of the cavalry, who charged the heads of the ascending masses, not once but twenty times, and always with a good will, thus maintaining the upper ground for above an hour.

It was astonishing to see so few troopers bearing up against that surging multitude, even favoured as the former were by the steep rocky nature of the ground; but Montbrun obstinate to win soon brought up his artillery, and his horsemen gaining ground in the centre, cut down some of the gunners and captured the guns; and one of the British squadrons by charging too far got entangled in the intricacy of the ravines. The danger was then imminent, when suddenly the fifth regiment, led by major Ridge, a daring spirit, darted into the midst of the French cavalry, and retook the artillery, which again opened its fire; and nearly at the same time the seventy-seventh, supported by the twenty-first Portuguese, repulsed the enemy on the left. However, this charging of a weak line of infantry against a powerful cavalry, could only check the foe at that particular point. Montbrun still pressed onwards with fresh masses, against the left flank of the allies, while other squadrons penetrated between the right flank and the village of Elbodon. From the enclosures and vineyards of that village, Picton was at this time with difficulty and some confusion extricating his regiments; the expected brigade of the fourth division was not yet in sight, and the French infantry was rapidly approaching: the position was no longer tenable, and lord Wellington directed both Picton and Colville to fall back and unite in the plain behind.

Colville forming his battalions in two squares immediately descended from the hill, but Picton had a considerable distance to move, and at this moment, the allied squadrons, fearing to be surrounded by the French, who had completely turned their right, galloped away, and took refuge with the Portuguese regiment, which was farthest in retreat. Then the fifth and seventy-seventh, two weak battalions formed in one square, were quite exposed, and in an instant the whole of the French cavalry came thundering down upon them. But how vain, how fruitless to match the sword with the musket! To send the charging horseman against the steadfast veteran! The multitudinous squadrons, rending the skies with their shouts, and closing upon the glowing squares, like the falling edges of a burning crater, were as instantly rejected, scorched, and scattered abroad; and the rolling peal of musketry had scarcely ceased to echo in the hills, when bayonets glittered at the edge of the smoke, and with firm and even step, the British regiments came forth like the holy men from the Assyrian's furnace.

Picton now effected his junction and the whole retired over the plain to the position at Guinaldo, which was about six miles distant. The French, although fearing to renew the close attack, followed, and plied the troops with shot and shell, until about four o'clock in the evening, when the entrenched camp was gained. Here the fourth division presented a fresh front, Pack's brigade came up from Campillo, and the heavy cavalry from the Upper Azava, being also brought into line, the action ceased. By this retrograde movement of the left and centre of the third division, the seventy-fourth and the sixtieth regiments, posted at Pastores, were cut off; they however crossed the Agueda by a ford, and moving up the right bank happily reached Guinaldo in the night, after a march of fifteen hours, in the course of which they captured a French cavalry patrol.

During the retreat from Elbodon, the left wing of the army was ordered to fall back on the first division, at Nava d'Aver, but to keep posts in observation on the Azava. Carlos d'Espana retired with Sanchez's infantry behind the Coa, and the guerilla chief himself passed with his cavalry into the French rear. The seventh division was withdrawn from Alledadilla to Albergaria, and the head-quarters baggage moved to Casilla de Flores. The light division should have marched to Guinaldo; general Craufurd received the order at two o'clock, he plainly heard the cannonade, and might easily have reached Guinaldo before midnight, but he only marched to Cespedosa, one league from the Vadillo, which river was immediately passed by fifteen hundred French. The position at Guinaldo was therefore occupied by only fourteen thousand men, of which about two thousand six hundred were cavalry. The left of the army, concentrated at Nava d'Aver, under Graham, was ten miles distant; the light division being at Cespedosa and debarred the direct route by the ford of Carros, was sixteen miles distant, and the fifth division, posted at Payo in the mountains, was twelve miles distant. Meanwhile Marmont brought up a second division of infantry, and in the course of the night, and the following day, united sixty thousand men in front of Guinaldo. The situation of the English general was become most critical, yet he would not abandon the light division, which did not arrive until after three o'clock in the evening. Marmont's fortune was fixed in that hour! He knew nothing of the allies' true situation, and having detached a strong column by the valley of the Azava to menace their left, contented himself with making an ostentatious display of the imperial guards in the plain, instead of attacking an adversary who was too weak to fight, and laughing to see him so employed, soon changed the state of affairs.

In the night, Wellington by a skilful concentric movement from Guinaldo, Nava d'Aver, Perales, and Payo, united the whole army on new ground, between the Coa and the sources of the Agueda, twelve miles behind Guinaldo; and it is a curious fact that Marmont had so little knowledge of his own advantages, that instead of harassing the allies in this difficult movement, he also retired during the night, and was actually in march to the rear, when the scouts of the column, which had marched by the valley of Azava, brought word that the allies were in retreat, and their divisions still widely separated. Dorsenne then insisted that Marmont should wheel round and pursue, but lord Wellington was already in a strong position behind the stream of the Villa Maior.

The fifth division, coming up from Payo, was now on the right at Aldea Velha, the fourth and light divisions, with Victor Alten's cavalry, and the heavy dragoons, under sir Stapleton Cotton, were in the centre in front of Alfayates; the convent of Sacaparte was on their left, and the line was prolonged to Rebulon by Pack's and McMahon's Portuguese brigades; the sixth division with Anson's cavalry closed the line at Bismula. The cavalry picquets were pushed beyond the Villa Maior in front of Aldea Ponte, in the centre, and towards Furalhos on the right; and the third and seventh divisions were in reserve behind Alfayates. This position was extensive, but the days were short, serious dispositions were required for a general attack, and the allies could not be turned, because they covered all the practicable roads leading to the bridges and fords of the Coa.

COMBAT OF ALDEA DE PONTE.

The French, moving by the roads of Furalhos and of Aldea de Ponte, were checked by the picquets of the light division on the former; but on the latter their horsemen drove the cavalry posts from the hills, and across the stream of the Villa Maior, and about ten o'clock took possession of Aldea de Ponte.

At twelve o'clock the head of the infantry came up and immediately attacked general Pakenham, then commanding a brigade of the fourth division, which was posted on the opposite heights. Lord Wellington arrived at the same moment, and directed the seventh fusiliers to charge in line, and he supported them on each flank with a Portuguese regiment in column. The French who had advanced well up the hill, were driven back, and though they afterwards attempted to turn the brigade by a wood, which was distant about musket-shot from the right, while their cavalry advanced to the foot of the hills, the artillery sufficed to baffle the effort. Then the English general taking the offensive, directed the twenty-third fusiliers and Portuguese caçadores to turn the French left, and seize the opposite hills, which finished the action, and Aldea de Ponte was again occupied by the allies. Wellington, who had been much exposed to the fire, rode to another part of the position, but scarcely had he departed when the French from the Furalhos road joined those near Aldea de Ponte, and at five o'clock renewing the attack retook the village. Pakenham, with his fusiliers, immediately recovered it, but the French were very numerous, the country rugged, and so wooded, that he could not tell what was passing on the flanks, wherefore, knowing that the chosen ground of battle was behind the Coa, he abandoned Aldea de Ponte and regained his original post.

In the night the allies retreated, and on the morning of the 28th occupied a new and very strong position in front of the Coa, the right resting on the Sierra de Mesas, the centre covered by the village of Soita, the left at Rendo upon the Coa. The whole army thus enclosed, as it were in a deep loop of the Coa river could only be attacked on a narrow front, and Mar-

mont, who had brought up but a few days' provisions and could gather none in that country, retired the same day. This terminated the operations. The French placed a fresh garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo; Dorsenne marched to Salamanca; a strong division was posted at Alba de Tormes to communicate with Marmont, and the latter resumed his old position in the valley of the Tagus. At the same time Foy, who had advanced with his two divisions as far as Zarza Mayor, in the direction of Castello Branco, returned to Placentia; Girard also, being threatened by Hamilton's Portuguese division, which Hill had sent to check his advance, left two thousand men of the fifth corps at Merida, and retired to Zafra; and when these movements were known, the light division reinforced by some cavalry resumed the nominal blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, in concert with Julian Sanchez. The rest of the army was cantoned on both sides of the Coa, and head-quarters were fixed at Frenada.

Nearly a month had been employed by the French in the preparation and execution of this great operation, which terminated so feebly and so abruptly, because the generals were as usual at variance.* They had victualled Ciudad Rodrigo, but they had lost the favourable opportunity of invading Galicia. Nothing had been gained in the field, time was lost, and the English general's plans were forwarded.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Lord Wellington's position behind the Soita has been noticed by two recent authors. The one condemns the imprudence of offering battle on ground whence there was no retreat; the other intimates that it was assumed in contempt of the adversary's prowess.† This last appears a mere shift to evade what was not understood, for if lord Wellington had despised Marmont, he would have fought him beyond the Agueda.‡ But sixty thousand French soldiers were never to be despised, neither was Wellington a man to put an army in jeopardy from any overweening confidence; and it is not difficult to show that his position was chosen well, without imprudence, and without presumption.

The space between the Sierra de Mesas and the Coa was less than six miles, the part open to attack was very much reduced by the rugged bed of a torrent which covered the left. Forty thousand men were quite able to defend this line, which was scarcely more than one-third of their full front; and as the roads were bad, the country hilly and much broken with woods and ravines, the superiority of the enemy's horse and guns would have availed him little. Lord Wellington had a right to be bold against an adversary who had not molested him at Guinaldo, and it is always of importance to show a menacing front. It was also certain that great combinations must have been made by Marmont, before he could fight a general battle on such ground; it was equally certain that he could only have a few days' provisions with his army, and that the neighbourhood could not supply him. It was, therefore, reasonable to expect that he would retire rather than fight, and he did so.

Let us however, take the other side, and suppose that Marmont was prepared and resolute to bring on a great battle. The position behind Soita would still have been good. The French were indeed too strong to be fought with on a plain, yet not strong enough to warrant a retreat indicating fear; hence the allies had retired slowly for three days, each day engaged, and the enemy's powerful horse and artillery was always close upon their rear. Now the bed of the Coa, which was extremely rugged, furnished only a few points for

* Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.

† Londonderry's Narrative.

‡ Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns.

crossing, of which the principal were, the ford of Serraleira behind the right of the allies; the ford of Rapoulha de Coa behind their left; and the bridge of Sabugal behind their centre. The ways to those points were narrow, and the passage of the river, with all the baggage, could not have been easily effected in face of an enemy without some loss and perhaps dishonour: and had lord Wellington been unable to hold his position in a battle, the difficulty of passing the river would not have been much increased, because his incumbrances would all have been at the other side, and there was a second range of heights half-a-mile in front of Sabugal favourable for a rear-guard. The position of Soita appears therefore to have been chosen with good judgment in regard to the immediate object of opposing the enemy; but it is certain that the battering train, then between Pinhel and Villa Ponte, was completely exposed to the enemy. Marmont, however, had not sufficiently considered his enterprize, and knew not where or how to strike.

2. The position of Aldea Ponte, was equally well chosen. Had the allies retreated at once from Guinaldo, to Soita, baggage and stores would have been lost, and the retrograde movement have had the appearance of a flight; the road from Payo would have been uncovered, and the junction of the fifth division endangered. But in the position taken up, the points of junction of all the roads were occupied and as each point was strong in itself, it was not difficult for a quick sighted general, perfectly acquainted with the country, and having excellent troops, to check the heads of the enemy's columns, until the baggage had gained a sufficient offing, and the fifth division had taken its place in line.

3. The position at Guinaldo was very different from the others. The previous entrenching of it proved lord Wellington's foresight, and he remained there thirty-six hours, that is, from mid-day of the 25th until mid-night of the 26th, which proved his firmness. It is said that sir George Murray advised him to abandon it in the night of the 25th, and that arrangements were actually made in that view, yet anxious for the safety of the light division he would not stir. The object was certainly one of importance sufficient to justify the resolution, but the resolution itself was one of those daring strokes of genius which the ordinary rules of art were never made to controul. The position was contracted, of no great natural strength in front, and easily to be turned; the entrenchments constructed were only a few breast works and two weak field redoubts, open in rear, and without palisades; not more than fourteen thousand British and Portuguese troops were in line, and sixty thousand French veterans with a hundred pieces of artillery were before them! When Marmont heard of the escape of the light division, and discovered the deceit, he prophetically exclaimed, alluding to Napoleon's fortune, "*And Wellington's star, it also is bright!*"

4. The positions of Aldea Ponte and Soita are to be commended, that at Guinaldo to be admired rather than imitated, but the preceding operations are censurable. The country immediately beyond Ciudad Rodrigo offered no covering position for a siege or blockade; and the sudden floods, to which the Agueda is subject, rendered the communications with the left bank precarious. Nor though bridges had been secured, could Wellington have ventured to encamp round the place with lines of contravallation and circumvallation, on both sides of the river; because Marmont's army would then have advanced from Placencia to Castello Branco, have seized the passage over the Tagus at Vilha Velha, and in concert with the fifth corps endangered the safety of Hill. This would have obliged the allies to quit their entrenched camp, and Dorsenne could then have re-

virtualled the place. It was therefore necessary to hold a strong central position with respect to Marmont and Dorsenne, to keep both in check while separate, and to oppose them while united. This position was on the Coa, and as Salamanca or Bejar, the nearest points where convoys could be collected for Ciudad Rodrigo, were from fifty to sixty miles distant, lord Wellington's object namely the forcing the French to assemble in large bodies without any adequate result, could be, and was obtained by a distant as well as by a close investment.

So far all was well calculated, but when Marmont and Dorsenne arrived with sixty thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, the aspect of affairs entirely changed, and as the English general could not dispute the entrance of the convoy, he should have concentrated his army at once behind Guinaldo. Instead of doing this he kept it extended on a line of many miles and the right wing separated from the centre by a difficult river. In his despatch, he says, that, from some uncertainty in his estimate of the enemy's numbers, it was necessary to ascertain their exact strength by actual observation; but this is rather an excuse than a valid reason, because, for this object, which could be obtained by other means, he risked the loss of his whole army, and violated two vital rules of war which forbid—

1. The parcelling of an army before a concentrated enemy.

2. The fixing of your own point of concentration within the enemy's reach.

Now lord Wellington's position on the 24th and 25th extended from the ford of the Vadillo on the right of the Agueda, to Marialva on the Azáva; the distance either from the Vadillo, or Marialva, to Guinaldo, was as great as that from Ciudad to Guinaldo, and by worse roads; and the distance from Ciudad to Elbodon was as nothing, compared to the distance of the wings from the same place. Wherefore when Montbrun attacked, at Elbodon, the allies' wings were cut off, and the escape of the third and light divisions, and of the troops at Pastores, was a matter of fortune and gallantry, rather than of generalship; that is, in the enlarged sense of the last word, for it cannot be denied that the actual movements of the troops were conducted with consummate skill.

But what if Marmont, instead of being drawn by circumstances into a series of ill-combined, and partial attacks, had previously made dispositions for a great battle? He certainly knew, through the garrison, the real situation of the allies, and he also knew of the camp at Guinaldo, which being on their line of retreat was the important point. If he had issued from the fortress before daybreak on the 25th with the whole or even half of his forces, he could have reached Campillo in two hours with one column, while another fell on the position at Pastores and Elbodon; the third division, thus attacked, would have been enveloped and captured, or broken and driven over the Agueda, by the ford of Zamara, and would have been irretrievably separated from Guinaldo. And if this division had even reached Guinaldo, the French army would have arrived with it in such overwhelming numbers, that the fourth division could not have restored the battle; meanwhile a few thousand men thrown across the ford of Caros near Robleda would have sufficed to keep the light division at bay, because the channel of the Robleda torrent, over which their retreat lay, was a very deep and rugged ravine. The centre being broken the French could, at choice, have either surrounded the light division, or directed the mass of their forces against the reserves, and then the left wing under Graham would have had to retreat from the Azáva over the plains towards Almeida.

It may be said that all the French were not up on

the 25th, but they might have been so, and as lord Wellington was resolved to see their number he would have been in the same position the 26th. It is however sufficient to remark that the allies exclusive of the fifth division, which was at Payo, did not exceed thirty-five thousand men of all arms; that they were on an irregular line of at least twenty miles, and mostly in an open country; that at no point were the troops more than eight, and at the principal point, namely Pastores, only three, miles, from a fortress from whence sixty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, with one hundred and twenty guns were ready to issue. Finally the point of concentration at Guinaldo was only twelve miles from that fortress. The allies escaped because their adversary was blind! Lord Wellington's conduct at Guinaldo was above rules, but at Elbodon it was against rules, which is just the difference between genius and error.

4. In these operations Marmont gave proof that as a general he was rather shining than great. He was in error throughout. Before he commenced his march he had desired Girard to advance on the side of the Alentejo, assuring him that the whole of the allied army, and even the Spanish troops under Castaños, had crossed the Tagus to operate against Rodrigo; but in fact only one brigade of Hill's corps had moved, and Girard would have been destroyed, if, fortunately for him, the allies had not intercepted the original and

duplicate of the letter containing this false information.

5. When Marmont brought his convoy into Ciudad, it would appear he had no intention of fighting, but tempted by the false position of the allies, and angry at the repulse of his cavalry on the Lower Azava, he turned his scouting troops into columns of attack. And yet he permitted his adversary to throw dust in his eyes for thirty-six hours at Guinaldo; and at Aldea Ponte his attack was a useless waste of men, because there was no local advantage offered, and he did not intend a great battle.

6. The loss incurred in the different combats was not great. About three thousand men and officers fell on the part of the allies, and on that of the French rather more, because of the fire of the squares and artillery at Elbodon. But the movements during the three days were full of interest, and instruction, and diversified also by brilliant examples of heroism. Ridge's daring charge has been already noticed, and it was in one of the cavalry encounters, that a French officer in the act of striking at the gallant Felton Harvey of the fourteenth dragoons, perceived that he had only one arm, and with a rapid movement brought down his sword into a salute and passed on! Such was the state of the war on the frontier of Portugal; in the next book will be found the contemporary events in Spain.

BOOK XV.

CHAPTER I.

State of the war in Spain—Northern provinces—State of Galicia—Attempt to introduce English officers into the Spanish service—Trafficked for by the Spanish government—Repelled by the Spanish military—The English government encourage the Partidas—Lord Wellington sends the chiefs presents—His after opinion of them—Sir H. Douglas succeeds general Walker—Miserable state of Galicia described—Disputes between the civil and military—Anomalous proceedings of the English government—Gross abuses in the Spanish army—Expedition against America fitted out in Galicia with the English supplies intended for the defence of the province—Sir H. Douglas's policy towards the Partidas criticised—Events in the Asturias—Santander surprised by Porlier—Reille and Caffarelli scour Biscay and the Rioja—Bonet invades the Asturias—Defeats Moscoso, Paul Lodosa, and Mendizabel, and occupies Oviedo—In Galicia the people prefer the French to their own armies—In Estremadura, Drouet joins Girard and menaces Hill—These movements parts of a great plan to be conducted by Napoleon in person.

STATE OF THE WAR IN SPAIN.

Northern Provinces. The invasion of Galicia, which had been arrested by the arrival of the allies on the Coa, would have been a most serious calamity. Abadia, a weak man, with troops, distressed for provisions and clothing, was on bad terms with the chief of his staff Moscosa, whom he feared, and on worse terms with the junta. The great road to Coruña was open, and although general Walker, seeing the danger, advised that Ferrol, which was indefensible, should be dismantled, and the guns, amounting to fifteen hundred, with the timber and vessels of war in the harbour, transferred to Coruña, neither that nor any other useful measure was executed.

Before this, overtures had been made to the Spanish government, to take Spanish troops into British pay after the manner of the Portuguese; but the regency remembering the prodigality of Canning demanded three millions yearly, besides arms and clothing, without which they said the Spaniards could make no efficient exertions! To introduce British officers into the service on any other terms was not possible, because the Spanish military were indignant at what they termed the degradation of such a proposal. The Perceval faction finding it thus, and wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington, on a scale commensurate with his talents, then turned their attention to the encouragement of the Partidas, as being less expensive, and affording an example to the continental nations of popular and protracted resistance to France.

Sir Howard Douglas, who succeeded general Walker as military agent, (these officers must not be confounded with the military agents originally sent out, and whose mischievous proceedings I have had occasion to notice,) was directed to encourage those bodies by increased supplies, and to combine their movements better with each other and with the British squadron in the Bay of Biscay. Lord Wellington at the desire of government, sent to the guerilla chiefs, military presents, with a letter acknowledging the importance of their services, and this was not mere compliment, for he had indeed derived great advantages from their exertions, and thought he had derived more, because he only knew of their exploits by hearsay.* When he afterwards advanced into Spain and saw them

* Sir H. Douglas's Correspondence, MSS.

closely, he was forced to acknowledge that the guerillas, although active and willing, and although their operations in general occasioned the utmost annoyance to the enemy, were so little disciplined that they could do nothing against the French troops unless the latter were very inferior in numbers. If the French took post in a house or church of which they only barricaded the entrance, both regular troops and guerillas were so ill equipped as military bodies, that their enemy could remain in security until relieved. In like manner Napoleon reprimanding his generals for suffering the Partidas to gain any head, observed, that when cut off from communication with the English ships they were a nullity!

Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne's retreat enabled Abadia to resume his position on the frontier, but the army was in a miserable state;* the wet season was setting in upon men, destitute of even the necessities of life, although the province abounded in cattle and goods, which could be easily procured, because money, although plentiful, was generally hoarded, and commodities were therefore cheap, and could be obtained in lieu of taxes at the market-price. An extraordinary increase of the customs, arising from the trade of Santander and Bilbao being transferred to Coruña by the war, also offered a valuable resource; the harbour was filled with colonial goods, and as the appetites of men generally stifle patriotism, and baffle power, a licensed commerce was carried on with the enemy's ports in Biscay; yet without judgment as related to the war, for the return was iron, to re-export to the colonies, whereas by an internal traffic of the same kind, clothes and grain for the troops might have been had from Castile and Leon. But confusion and corruption every where prevailed, the exigencies of the war were always the last things cared for, and the starving soldiers committed a thousand excesses with impunity, for where there is no food or pay, there can be no discipline.

The people were oppressed with imposts, legal and illegal, and yet the defalcation in the revenue was great, and the monopoly of tobacco the principal financial resource, was injured by the smuggling arising from the unsettled nature of the times. The annual charge on the province was about £1,300,000, the actual receipts were less than £500,000, and the junta endeavoured to supply the deficiency by an extraordinary contribution from all property, save that of day-labourers, which they expected would produce sixty millions of reals (£750,000). But a corrupt and vexatious collection of this tax tormented the people without filling the treasury; the clergy, and the richer classes, were, as in Portugal, favoured, and it yielded, in six months, less than a seventh part.

From this state of affairs two inferences may be safely drawn:—1. That England and not Galicia had hitherto supported the war here, as in other parts of the Peninsula. 2. That as England had in 1808–9 paid to Galicia three millions of hard dollars, and given other succours sufficient for double the number of troops employed, the deficiency of the revenue had been amply compensated, and the causes of distress must be sought for in the proceedings of the authorities, and in the anomalous nature of the war itself. The successive juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were always inert in the civil administration, and either too corrupt, or too incapable, to apply the succours from England, justly or wisely. The junta of this period was, like its predecessors, factious and intriguing; it was hostile to the junta of Leon, unfriendly to that of Asturias, jealous and contemptuous of the military leaders; in return these last abhorred the junta, and were tormented with factions of their own. The regular officers hated the guerillas, and en-

deavoured to get the controul of the succours granted, by England, to the latter; and as they necessarily lived by plundering their own countrymen, they strenuously opposed the arming of the peasants, partly from fear lest the latter should resist this license, partly because the republican, and anti-English spirit, which was growing up in the cortes had also reached this quarter.

The clergy clung to the peasantry, with whom they had great influence, but the army, which had imbibed liberal words, rather than principles, was inimical to them. A press had been established at head-quarters, from whence issued political papers either original, or repeated from the libels at Cadiz, in which, the Portuguese were called slaves, for submitting to British influence; and it was openly avowed that the French yoke was preferable to that of England; the guerilla system, and the arming of the people were also attacked, and these writings were met by other political papers from the civil press at Coruña and St. Jago. The frequent changes of commanders rendered all the evils more prominent; for the local government had legal power to meddle with the military arrangements, and every change of commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the junta refused to acknowledge Abadia as their president during the absence of Castaños, he in return complained alike of their neglect and of their interference; and when they proposed to establish a general depôt at Lugo he marched a part of his army there to prevent it.

But the occult source of most of these difficulties is to be found in the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet, to uphold, national independence with internal slavery, against foreign aggression, with an ameliorated government. The clergy who led the mass of the people, clung to the English, because they supported aristocracy and church domination; and they were also strongly for the Partidas, because these were commanded by men who sprung directly from the church itself, or from people who were attached to the church, while the regular armies being officered by the friends of the cortes, disliked the Partidas, both as interlopers and as political enemies. The English ministers, hating Napoleon, not because he was the enemy of England, but because he was the champion of equality, cared not for Spain, unless her people were enslaved. They were willing enough to use a liberal cortes to defeat Napoleon, but they also desired to put down that cortes, by the aid of the clergy, and of the bigoted part of the people: nevertheless as liberty will always have more charms than slavery, they would have missed of both objects, if the exigencies of the continental system had not induced the emperor to go to Moscow, where the snow destroyed him; and if the very advocates of liberty in Spain had not in their madness, resolved to oppress the Americans. The cortes, by discovering a rabid love of power in practice, rendered their democratic doctrines suspected, and lost partizans; but lord Wellington, in support of aristocracy, used the greatest prudence in policy, and in his actions was considerate and just.

In the first conference held at Coruña, after sir Howard Douglas's arrival, the junta, as the usual preliminary, demanded more money from England; but he advised, instead, a better management of their own resources, and pointed out the military measures requisite to render the army efficient. He recommended the adoption of the line of retreat upon Orense, rather than upon Lugo and Coruña; and he endeavoured to establish a permanent depôt in the island of Arosa, on the Vigo coast, as a secure resource in the event of defeat; he also furnished the soldiers with shoes and great coats, the hospitals with blankets, and completed the fire-locks of the army to twenty-five thousand. There were however abuses, which he could not remedy, and which would seem rather to belong to the army

* Sir H. Douglas's Correspondence, MSS.

of an Asiatic despot, than to an European force fighting for independence. Innumerable baggage animals devoured all the forage, and the personal servants and cooks, who from custom never did duty, were above five thousand! a sixth part of the whole force! When the sick men were deducted, scarcely sixteen thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry remained for service. Then there was so little organization or arrangement that, although young, robust, patient, and docile to the greatest degree, the troops could scarcely be moved, even from one quarter to another, as a military body; and the generals, unable to feed them on the frontier, more than once, menaced, and in December did actually retire to Lugo, leaving the province open to invasion.

Abadia at first exerted himself with activity, and appeared to enter loyally into the ameliorations proposed. He gave the command of the troops to Portasgo, repaired to Coruña himself, and organized the province in seven military governments, under as many chiefs, one for each division of the army. Every government was to raise a reserve, and to supply and clothe the corresponding division on the frontier. But in a little time this activity relaxed; he entered into various intrigues, displayed jealousy, both of the peasantry and the English, and no real improvement took place, save in that select part of the army, which the Cadiz regency had destined for South America, and had ordered him to equip from the English stores. This was done at the very moment when a French army on the frontier was again preparing to invade Galicia, and sir Howard Douglas vehemently opposed the disloyal proceeding; the junta also were really averse to it, and Abadia pretended to be so; but he had a personal interest in the colonies and secretly forwarded the preparations. The regency, to evade Mr. Wellesley's reproaches, promised to suspend the embarkation of these troops, but the expedition sailed from Vigo, and the organization of another, three times its strength, including all the best artillery in the province, was immediately commenced, and also sailed a few months later. This then was the state of Galicia in the latter end of 1811. She was without magazines, hospitals, or system, whether civil or military, and torn by faction, her people were oppressed, her governors foolish, her generals bad: she had no cavalry, and the infantry were starving, although the province easily supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal. As a natural consequence, those famished soldiers were too undisciplined to descend into the plains of Leon, and were consequently of light weight in the general contest.

Under these circumstances, sir Howard Douglas had nothing to work upon, save the Guerilla leaders, whose activity he very considerably increased. His policy was to augment the number of chiefs, but to keep the force of each low, lest, growing proud of their command, they should consider themselves generals, and become useless, as indeed had already happened to Campillo, Longa, and Porlier, when they were made a part of the seventh army. Nevertheless the advantage of this policy may be doubted, for of all the numerous bands in the north, seven only were not supported entirely by robbery. Mina, Pastor, Salazar, Pinto, Amor, and the curate, whose united forces did not exceed ten thousand men, were sustained by regular taxes, customs, convent revenues, and donations;* Longa supported his from the produce of the salt-mines of Paza, but all the rest were bandits, whose extinction was one of the advantages expected from the formation of the seventh army.

It is now convenient to resume the narrative of military events.

In the Asturias, previous to Mendizabal's arrival, and when Bonet had marched to the Orbio, Porlier surprised Santander, and plundered some houses; but being followed by general Caucault, a very active officer, he retired again to his strong-hold of Liebana. The British cruisers, in concert with whom he acted, then destroyed several coast-batteries, and the Iris frigate having arms on board, came to the Bay of Biscay for the purpose of arranging an intercourse with the Partidas of that province. But this was the period when Reille and Caffarelli, were, as I have before noticed, chasing Mina and Longa, whom they drove from the coast, into the mountains of Leon, and thus marred the object of the Iris. Nevertheless, when Mina was reinforced by the Valencians and other fugitives from Catalonia, he returned to Navarre, and there performed very considerable exploits, which, as belonging to other combinations of the war, will be hereafter noticed.

While Caffarelli and Reille thus scoured the line of communication, Dorsenne having the invasion of Galicia in view, relieved Bonet on the Esla, and sent him early in November, with eight thousand men to re-occupy the Asturias as a preliminary measure. The Galicians foreseeing this, had detached Moscoso with three thousand five hundred men to reinforce San Pol, who was at Pagares, below the passes leading from Leon; and on the other hand Mendizabal uniting the bands of Porlier and other chiefs, concentrated five thousand men to the eastward on the Xalon. Eleven thousand men were therefore ready to oppose the entrance of Bonet, but with the usual improvidence of the Spaniards, the passes of Cubillas and Ventana, to the westward of Pagares were left unguarded. By these roads, Bonet, an excellent officer, turned Moscoso, and drove him down the Lena with loss and disgrace; then turning upon Mendizabal, he chased him also in disorder from Lanes into the Liebana.

All the civil authorities immediately fled to Castropol, the Spanish magazines fell into the hands of the French, and Bonet having resumed his old positions at Oviedo, Gihon, and Grado, fortified several posts in the passes leading to Leon, raised contributions, and effectually ruined all the military resources of the Asturias. The organization of the seventh army was thus for the time crushed, and in Galicia great mischief ensued. For the return of Moscoso's division and the want of provisions in the Bierzo, which had obliged Abadia to retire to Lugo, while Dorsenne was menacing the frontier, had thrown that kingdom into a ferment, which was increased by the imposition of the new contributions. The people became exceedingly exasperated and so unfavourably disposed, that it was common to hear them say, "the exactions of a French army were a relief in comparison to the depredations of the Spanish troops."*

During these transactions in the north, Drouet had joined Girard at Merida, and menaced the allies in the Alemtejo, hoping thus to draw Wellington from the Coa; but the demonstration was too feeble, and the English general thought it sufficient to reinforce Hill with his own brigade from Castello Branco. These movements were undoubtedly part of a grand plan for invading Portugal, if the emperor could have arranged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move once more against Lisbon, by Massena's route, was not promising, unless the northern provinces of Portugal were likewise invaded, which required the preliminary occupation of Galicia, at least of the interior. In the south also, it was advisable to invade Alemtejo, simultaneously with Beira; and the occupation of Valencia and Murcia was necessary to protect Andalusia during the operation. The plan was vast, dangerous, and

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

* Sir H Douglas's Correspondence, MSS.

ready for execution; for though the wet season had set in, an attack on the northern parts of Portugal, and the invasion of Galicia, were openly talked of in Dorsenne's army, Caffarelli was to join in the expedition, and Monthion's reserve, which was to replace Caffarelli's on the line of communication, was already six thousand strong. Ney or Oudinot were spoken of to command the whole, and a strong division was already in march to reinforce the army of the south, arrangements which could have reference only to Napoleon's arrival; but the Russian war soon baulked the project, and Wellington's operations, to be hereafter noticed, obliged Dorsenne to relinquish the invasion of Galicia, and caused Bonet once more to abandon the Asturias.

Thus, with various turns of fortune, the war was managed in the northern provinces, and no great success attended the French arms, because the English general was always at hand to remedy the faults of the Spaniards. It was not so on the eastern line of invasion. There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable of resisting him, had continued his career of victory, and the insufficiency of the Spaniards to save their own country was made manifest; but these things shall be clearly shewn in the next chapter, which will treat of the conquest of Valencia.

CHAPTER II.

Conquest of Valencia—Suchet's preparations described—Napoleon's system eminently methodical—State of Valencia—Suchet invades that province—Blake concentrates his force to fight—His advanced guard put to flight by the French cavalry—He retires to the city of Valencia—Siege of Saguntum—The French repulsed in an assault—Palombini defeats Obispo near Segorbe—Harispe defeats C. O'Donnel at Beneguzil—Oropesa taken—The French batteries open against Saguntum—Second assault repulsed—Suchet's embarrassments—Operations in his rear in Catalonia—Medas islands taken—Lacy proposes to form a general dépôt at Palamos—Discouraged by sir E. Pellew—The Spaniards blow up the works of Berga, and fix their chief dépôt at Busa—Description of that place—Lacy surprises the French in the town of Igualada—Eroles takes a convoy near Jorbas—The French quit the castle of Igualada and join the garrison of Montserrat—That place abandoned—Eroles takes Cervera and Belpuig—Beats the French national guards in Cerdana—Invades and ravages the French frontier—Returns by Ripol and takes post in the pass of Garriga—Milans occupies Mataro—Sarsfield embarks and sails to the coast of the Ampurdan—These measures prevent the march of the French convoy to Barcelona—State of Aragon—The Empecinado and Duran invade it on one side—Mina invades it on the other—Calatayud taken—Severoli's division reinforces Musnier, and the Partidas are pursued to Daroca and Molino—Mina enters the Cinco Villas—Defeats eleven hundred Italians at Ayerbé—Carries his prisoners to Motrico in Biscay—Mazzuchelli defeats the Empecinado at Cubilejos—Blake calls in all his troops and prepares for a battle—Suchet's position described—Blake's dispositions—Battle of Saguntum—Observations.

CONQUEST OF VALENCIA.

In August and the beginning of September, Suchet, while preparing for this great enterprise, had dispersed the bands of Villa Campa and the other chiefs, who during the siege of Taragona vexed Aragon. He had sent his feeble soldiers to France, receiving conscripts in their places, and although the harvest was very bad, formed large magazines in Morella and Tortosa. Eight thousand men had been left in Catalonia under general Frere, another eight thousand were placed under general Musnier, to protect Aragon, and twenty-four thousand of all arms remained for the invasion of Valencia, but this force Suchet thought inadequate, and demanded a reinforcement from the army of reserve, then in Navarre. Napoleon, whose system of war, whatever has been said to the contrary, was eminently methodical, refused. He loved better to try a bold push, at a distant point, with a few men, than to make an overwhelming attack

if he thereby weakened his communications; he judged courage and enterprise fittest for the attack, prudence and force for the support. And yet he designed to aid Suchet's operations vigorously when the decisive blow could be struck. Then not only the divisions of the reserve were to march, but combined movements, of detachments from nearly all the armies in the Peninsula, were arranged; and we shall find, that if Wellington, by menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, saved Galicia, the French army of the north, in return, by menacing Galicia, fixed the allies on the Agueda, and so protected Suchet's invasion of Valencia.

Three roads led to the Guadalaviar, one from Tortosa by the sea-coast, one by Teruel and Segorbe, and one by Morella and San Mateo. That from Tortosa, and that by Teruel, were carriage-roads, but the first only was fit for heavy artillery, and it was blocked, partially by the fortress of Peniscola, and completed by the fort of Oropesa. Wherefore though the infantry and cavalry could move on a bye-road to the right, the convoys and the guns, which were at Tortosa, could not pass until Oropesa was reduced. Nevertheless the French general, well knowing the value of boldness in war, resolved to mask Peniscola, to avoid Oropesa, to send his field artillery by Teruel, and uniting his troops near Saguntum, to offer battle to Blake; and if the latter declined it, to reduce Oropesa and Saguntum, trusting for subsistence to the "*huerta*" or garden of Valencia, until the arrival of his convoys.

He had, however, organized his system of supply with care. From Morella and Tortosa, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in the British army, were to carry provisions to the troops, and sheep and cattle were delivered to each regiment for its subsistence in advance. This last plan, which sir John Moore had also projected in his campaign, Suchet found advantageous; and I am persuaded that the principle should be extended, so that all things requisite for the subsistence, and fighting of troops should be organized regimentally, and the persons employed wear the uniform of their different corps. Jealousies between the functionaries, of different branches of the service, would then be unknown, and the character of all the subordinate persons, being under the guardianship of the battalions to which they belonged, would be equally praiseworthy, which cannot now be said.

While Suchet was thus gathering his strength, Valencia was a prey to disorder. About the period of the siege of Taragona, Palacios, notwithstanding his high monarchical principles, which caused him to be dismissed from the regency, had been appointed captain-general of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon; and he immediately raised a strong party amongst the friars and other opponents of the cortes. When after the dispersion of the Murcian army at Baza, Blake had rallied the fugitives, and in virtue of his power as regent, assumed the chief command at Valencia, Palacios' faction opposed him, and endeavoured to draw the soldiers and the populace to their side, by proposing to inundate the plain of Murviedro, and to defend the strong country in advance.* Blake, however, resolved to act on the flanks of the French army by detachments, and, in this view, sent C. O'Donnel, with the divisions of Obispo and Villa Campa, to Albaracin, supporting them with four thousand men at Segorbe and Liria. He charged Mahy, who commanded five thousand infantry, and seven hundred cavalry of the Murcian army, to surprise the French detachment of the army of the centre, posted at Cuenca. He detached Bassecour with two thousand men to Requena, and the same time directed Duran and the Empecinado, to unite, and invade Aragon:

* Captain Codrington's papers, MSS.

and it was to aid in this expedition that Mina quitted the mountains of Leon.

Blake had, exclusive of Mahy's and Bassecour's divisions, about twenty thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. Three thousand five hundred men were placed in Saguntum, which was provisioned for three months; two hundred were in Oropesa, and fifteen hundred in Peniscola; and there were so many Partidas, that the whole country seemed to be in arms, but the assembling of these people being very uncertain, Blake could not depend upon having a permanent partizan force, of more than eight thousand.* The Valencian army contained the Albuera divisions, St. Juan's, Miranda's, and Villa Campa's veterans;† it was therefore, not only numerous, but the best that Spain had yet produced; and Valencia itself was exceedingly rich in all things necessary for its supply;‡ but there was no real power, the building, though fair enough outside, had the dry rot within. The French had many secret friends, faction was as usual at work, the populace were not favourable to Blake, and that general had rather collected than organized his forces, and was quite incapable of leading them. He was unpopular both at Cadiz and Valencia, and the regency of which he formed a part was tottering. The Cortes had quashed Mahy's command of the Murcian army, and even recalled Blake himself; but the order, which did not reach him until he was engaged with Suchet, was not obeyed. Meanwhile that part of the Murcian army, which should have formed a reserve, after Mahy's division had marched for Cuenca, fell into the greatest disorder: above eight thousand men deserted in a few weeks, and those who remained were exceedingly dispirited. Thus all the interest became concentrated in the city of Valencia; which was in fact the key of all the eastern coast because Carthage required an army to defend it, and could only be fed from Valencia, and Alicante was then quite defenceless.

It was in this state of affairs, that Suchet commenced the invasion. His army was divided into three columns, and, on the 15th of September one moved by the coast-road, one by Morella and San Mateo, and one by Teruel, where an intermediate magazine was established;|| but this latter column instead of proceeding directly to Segorbe, turned off to its left, and passed over the Sierra de Gudar to Castellon de la Plana, where the whole three were united on the 20th.§ The main column, commanded by Suchet in person, had masked Peniscola on the 15th, and invested Oropesa by a detachment on the 19th; but as the road ran directly under the fire of the last place, the main body moved by the rugged route of Cabanes to Villa Franca, leaving the battering-train still at Tortosa.

During these operations Blake appeared inclined to fight, for he brought Zayas up in front of Murviedro, and called in Obispo;¶ Mahy, who had done nothing on the side of Cuenca, was also in march to join him; but all these divisions marched slowly, and with confusion; and a slight skirmish at Almansora, on the Mingares, where a few French dragoons put a great body of Spanish infantry to flight, made Blake doubt the firmness of his troops. He therefore left O'Donnel with four thousand men on the side of the Segorbe, and then retired himself with fifteen thousand behind the Guadalaviar.** Valencia was thus thrown into great confusion, but Bassecour's division was at hand, and Suchet fearing to attack so large an army in an entrenched camp (which had cost two years to construct), while his own communication with Tortosa was intercepted, merely dispersed the armed peasants

which had assembled on his flank, and then turned against Murviedro.

SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.

This celebrated place, situated about four leagues from Valencia, was a rocky mountain, covered with the ruins of the ancient city, and the remains of Moorish towers and walls, which being connected by modern works, formed four distinct posts covering the whole summit of the rock: but in consequence of the usual Spanish procrastination the heavy guns prepared to arm it were not yet mounted, and only seventeen pieces of inferior size were available for defence. The modern town of Murviedro, situated at the foot of the rock, was covered by the river Palancia, and by a canal, and occupied by some Spanish picquets; but the 23d Habert, having passed the water, invested the rock on the east, while Harispe invested it on the west and south, and a third division drove the Spanish posts from Murviedro and entrenched itself in the houses. The rest of the army was disposed in villages, on the hills to the north west, and patrols were pushed towards Valencia. Thus the rock of Saguntum was invested, but it was inaccessible to the engineer, save on the west, where the ascent, although practicable, was very rough and difficult. It would have been impregnable, if the Spaniards had mounted their large guns; for the French were obliged to bring earth from a distance, to form the batteries and parallels, and to set the miner to level the approaches, and their parapets were too thin to withstand heavy shot.

The first point of resistance was an ancient tower called San Pedro, and immediately above it was the fort of San Fernando, which could not be attacked until San Pedro fell, and, from its height, then only by the miner. But near the eastern extremity of the rock, there were two ancient breaches which the Spaniards were still engaged repairing, and had only stopped with timber; a large tank offered cover for the assembling of troops close to these breaches, and Suchet resolved to try an escalade. To effect this, three columns were assembled before daybreak on the 28th in the tank, a strong reserve was held in support, and a false attack was directed against the San Pedro to distract the attention of the besieged: but in the previous part of the night, the Spaniards having sallied were repulsed, and the action having excited both sides, a French soldier fired from the tank before the appointed time, whereupon the columns rushing forward, in disorder, planted their ladders, and would have carried the place by noise, but the garrison thrust the ladders from the walls, and drove the stormers back, with the loss of three hundred men. After this check, as the artillery was still at Tortosa, Suchet ordered a part of his army to attack Oropesa, employed another part in making a road, for the guns, to reach the battery raised against the tower of San Pedro, and then turned his own attention to the movements of Blake.

That general following his first plan of action against the French flanks, had during the investment of Saguntum, sent C. O'Donnel with Villa Campa's division and St. Juan's cavalry, to Betera, and Beneguazil, and Obispo's division to Segorbe; thus forming a half circle round the French army, and cutting its communication with Teruel, near which place Mahy had by this time arrived. Suchet however caused Palombini to attack Obispo, whose whole division dispersed after a skirmish with the advanced guard, and the Italians then returned to the siege. The next night Harispe marched against O'Donnel, who was well posted at Beneguazil behind a canal, having his centre protected by a chapel and some houses; nevertheless the Spaniards were beaten with loss at

* Roche, MSS. Tupper, MSS. † Mr. Wellesley, MSS.

‡ Doyle, MSS. || Suchet. § Vacani.

¶ Roche, MSS. ** Tupper, MSS.

the first shock, and fled in disorder over the Guadalauiar. During these events Blake remained an idle spectator of the defeat of his division, although he had a large body of troops in hand, and was within a few miles of the field of battle.

The French train now advanced from Tortosa, and four pieces were placed in battery against Oropesa. On the 10th Suchet took the direction of the attack in person, and the fort situated upon an isolated rock, was breached in a few hours; but the garrison of the King's Tower (a separate work placed on a small promontory, and commanding the harbour) refused to surrender, and was carried off, on the 11th, under the French fire, by the *Magnificent*. The French general having thus with a loss of only thirty men opened the road for his artillery, returned to Saguntum and pushed the siege of that place; but the difficulties were very great, the formation of the road to the batteries was itself a work of pain, and although his indefatigable troops had formed a breaching battery on the 12th, while seven small mortars and howitzers, placed on the right and left, had nearly silenced the Spanish fire, the muskets of the besiegers alone brought down from fifteen to twenty men.

On the 17th the breaching battery being armed, opened its fire against the tower, and the new masonry crumbled away at once; yet the ancient work resisted the guns like a rock. On the 18th the fire recommenced, when the wall gave way to the stroke of the guns, and the assault was ordered; but from the height of the tower, which overlooked the works at a short distance, the preparations were early discovered, the Spaniards collecting on the breach repaired it with sand-bags, and regardless of the French fire, with loud cries provoked the attack. At five o'clock, four hundred men rushed forward as swiftly as the steepness of the ascent would permit. Soon, however, the head of the column was checked, the rear began to fire, the whole got into confusion, and when one-half had fallen without making the slightest impression on the defenders, the attempt was abandoned. After this signal failure the French erected a second battery of six pieces, one hundred and forty yards from the tower, and endeavoured to push the approach close to the foot of the breach, yet the plunging fire of the besieged baffled them; meanwhile Andriani the governor, having communication by signal with the ships in the Grao, was encouraged to continue his gallant defence, and was informed that he was already promoted for what he had done. But to understand Suchet's embarrassments, from the protracted resistance of Saguntum, we must take a view of Lacy's contemporary operations in Catalonia, and the proceedings of the *Partidas* against the French communications and posts in Aragon.

CATALONIA.

It will be recollected that the blockade of Figueiras produced sickness in M'Donald's army, and that the return of Suchet to Aragon, and the parcelling of his troops on the lines, from Lerida to Montserrat, Tortosa, and Taragona, had completely extinguished the French power in the field; because the divisions of the army of Aragon which still remained in Lower Catalonia, being destined for the enterprise against Valencia, could not be employed in harassing expeditions. Lacy was therefore enabled, notwithstanding the troubles which followed the fall of Taragona, to reorganize about eight thousand men in two divisions, the one under Eroles, the other under Sarsfield; the junta also called out the tercios of reserve, and arms and ammunition being supplied by the English navy, Lacy was soon in a condition to act offensively. Thus the taking of Montserrat was very injurious to the French, for it is generally supposed that Friere's division, if held

together in the field, would have prevented this reaction in the principality. Lacy at first suggested to the British navy the recapture of the Medas Islands, and it was effected in the latter end of August, by the *Undaunted*, *Lavinia*, and *Blossom*, aided by a small party of Spaniards, the whole under the command of captain Thomas. The enterprise itself was one of more labour than danger, and the Spanish allies were of little use, but the naval officers to whose exertions the success was entirely due, were indignant at finding that colonel Green, who served as a volunteer, endeavoured to raise his own reputation with the Catalans by injuring the character of those under whom he served.

Immediately after the fall of Montserrat, Lacy and the junta had proposed the fortifying of Palamos or Blanes, to be held as a marine depot and strong-hold, in common with the British navy, but with a strange folly expected that sir E. Pellew, who had no troops, would defend them from the enemy while establishing this post. Finding this scheme received coldly by the admiral, they turned their attention inland, and blowing up the works of Berga, fixed upon the position of Busa, as a place of strength and refuge. This remarkable rock which is situated between the Cardener and Bindasaes rivers and about twenty miles from Cardona could be reached by one road only, and that a very rugged one.* The rock itself, fourteen miles in circumference, healthy and full of springs, is fertile, and produces abundance of forage, and fuel. It is cut off from the rest of the world by frightful precipices, and could neither be forced, nor starved into a surrender. Busa, Cardona, Solsona, and Seu d'Urgel were therefore guarded by the tercios of reserve, and Lacy soon commenced offensive excursions with the regular army, against the long lines of the French communication.

In September while the Somatenes interrupted the passage of the convoys to Montserrat, Eroles made an unsuccessful attack on the fort of Moncada near Barcelona; Lacy who had returned from an incursion in the French Cerdania where he had gathered some booty, then united Eroles and Sarsfield's troops, and surprised the town of Igualada, where he killed two hundred French, but not daring to attack the castle retired to Calaf, and from thence again detached Eroles to Jorbas, to attack a French convoy coming to Igualada. Eroles beat the escort, and captured the convoy, and then the French quitted the fortified convent of Igualada, and joined the garrison of Montserrat, when the whole, fearful of being invested and so starved, abandoned that important point, and marched through Barcelona to Taragona; the Spaniards immediately occupied Montserrat, and recovered a large store of clothing and cavalry equipments, which had been hidden in a vault and were undiscovered by the enemy. Eroles, pursuing his success, forced the garrisons of Belpuig, and Cervera, about five hundred in all, to surrender, and thus the whole line of communication, between Lerida and Barcelona, fell into the power of the Catalonians. The confidence of the people then revived; Sarsfield occupied Granollers, and the passes leading into the valley of Vich; Manso and Rovira menaced the Ampurdan; and Eroles suddenly passing by Seu d'Urgel into the Cerdania, defeated, at Puigcerda, some national guards commanded by general Gareau, who had been sent there after Lacy's invasion. He afterwards raised large contributions on the frontier, burnt a French town, and returning with his spoil by the way of Ribas, and Ripol, took post in the pass of Garriga, while Milans occupied Mataro, and both watched to intercept a convoy which M'Donald was preparing for Barcelona.

Sarsfield at the same time embarked his division and sailed to the coast of the Ampurdan, but the weather

* Memoir upon Busa, by Capt. Zeupfanning, MSS.

would not permit him to land. Nevertheless the attention of the French general was distracted, and the convoy did not move. Lacy then recalled Sarsfield, and projected the surprise of Barcelona itself, but after putting his troops in march, feared the execution and relinquished the attempt. Meanwhile one swarm of the smaller Partidas menaced the French communication between Mequinenza and Tortosa, and another swarm settled on the plains about Lerida.

The state of Aragon was equally alarming. Duran and the Empecinado had received Blake's orders to unite near Cuença, for the purpose of invading Aragon; but the secret junta of the district were averse to the plan, and the troops of the latter chief refused to move, and even came to blows with the junta's people. In this confusion general d'Armanac, who had retired from Cuença, returned, and dispersed the whole. The Empecinado however collected them again, and having joined Duran, their united powers being about six thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse, moved against Calatayud; Mina also acting in concert with them, quitted the mountains of Leon and entered Navarre with about five thousand men, and some minor partisans were already acting against different parts of Aragon. The whole were in want of clothing and ammunition, but Mr. Tupper, the consul at Valencia, having safe means of communication with the interior supplied them.

General Musnier's force was so scattered that he could not fight either of the large Partidas, without exposing some important point to the other, and the 29th of September the Empecinado took possession of the pass of Frasco, while Duran invested the fortified convent of Calatayud. This place was garrisoned by some French and Italian troops, who differed upon the defence, and when the explosion of two mines had killed a number of them they surrendered. Musnier collected some men to succour the place, but unable to force the pass of Frasco, retired; yet being reinforced on the 5th, he again advanced, and a column sent from Navarre by general Reille also came up; whereupon the Spaniards disappeared until the French retired, and then reoccupied Calatayud. They were now in full communication with Mina and a general plan of invasion was discussed, but as Duran and Mina could not accord each acted separately.

Severoli's division eight thousand strong, and just arrived from Italy, then reinforced Musnier, and on the 9th driving the Spaniards from Calatayud pursued them on the roads to Molino, Daroca, and Medinaeli. On the other side of the Ebro however Mina fell on the post of Exca in the Cinco Villas; the garrison broke through his investment in the night, but he pursued them almost to the gates of Zaragoza, and then turning off towards Ayerbe, attacked that post and menaced the communication by Jaca. The commandant of Zaragoza had sent an Italian battalion to look after the flying garrison of Exca, which was found at Zuera, and the united forces amounting to eleven hundred infantry and sixty cavalry followed Mina and came up with him at Ayerbe; the guerilla chief instantly turned with a part of his troops, and the Italians retreated towards Huesca, but having to cross a plain were all killed or taken.

Reille and Musnier hearing of this misfortune spread their columns in all directions to intercept Mina, but he evaded their toils, and although sharply chased and several times engaged, reached Motrico on the Biscay coast with his prisoners. The Iris frigate which was then harassing the enemy's coast line took some of them off his hands, and the remainder three hundred in number, were sent to Corunna by the Asturian mountains, but only thirty-six arrived, the rest were shot by the escort, under pretence that they made a noise near a French post!

While these events were passing on the left of the Ebro, Mazzuchelli's brigade followed the Empecinado, and having defeated him in a sharp action, at Cubillejos de la Sierra, brought off the garrison of Molino and dismantled that fort; but the smaller Partidas infested the road between Tortosa and Oropesa, and in this disturbed state of affairs reports were rife that an English force was to disembark at Peniscola. Blake also sent Obispo's division against Teruel, which was thus menaced on all sides, for Mahy was still in those parts. Thus the partizan warfare seemed interminable, and Suchet's situation would really have been very dangerous, if he had been opposed by a man of ability. He had an inferior force and was cooped up between the enemy's fortresses; his communications were all interrupted; he had just met with two signal failures at Saguntum, and he was menaced by a formidable army which was entirely master of its operations. Blake however soon relieved him of his difficulties.

Palacios with the junta had retired to Alcira, and in concert with the friars of his faction had issued a manifesto, intended to raise a popular commotion to favour his own restoration to the command, but Blake was now become popular; the Valencians elated by the successful resistance of Saguntum, called for a battle, and the Spanish general urged partly by his courage, the only military qualification he possessed, partly that he found his operations on the French rear had not disturbed the siege, acceded to their desire. Mahy and Bassecour's divisions had arrived at Valencia, Obispo was called in to Betera, eight thousand irregulars were thrown upon the French communications, and the whole Spanish army amounting to about twenty-two thousand infantry, two thousand good cavalry, and thirty-six guns, made ready for battle.

Previous to this, Suchet, although expecting such an event, had detached several parties to scour the road of Tortosa, and had directed Palombini's division to attack Obispo and relieve Teruel. Obispo skirmished at Xerica on the 21st, and then rapidly marched upon Liria with a view to assist in the approaching battle; but Blake, who might have attacked while Palombini was absent, took little heed of the opportunity, and Suchet, now aware of his adversary's object, instantly recalled the Italians who arrived the very morning of the action.

The ground between Murviedro and Valencia was a low flat, interspersed here and there with rugged isolated hills; it was also intersected by ravines, torrents, and water-cuts, and thickly studded with olive-trees; but near Saguntum it became straitened by the mountain and the sea, so as to leave an opening of not more than three miles, behind which it again spread out. In this narrow part Suchet resolved to receive the attack, without relinquishing the siege of Saguntum; and he left a strong detachment in the trenches with orders to open the fire of a new battery, the moment the Spanish army appeared.

His left, consisting of Habert's division, and some squadrons of dragoons, was refused, to avoid the fire of some vessels of war and gun-boats which flanked Blake's march. The centre under Harispe, was extended to the foot of the mountains, so that he offered an oblique front, crossing the main road from Valencia to Murviedro. Palombini's division and the dragoons, were placed in second line behind the centre, and behind them the cuirassiers were held in reserve.

This narrow front was favourable for an action in the plain, but the right flank of the French, and the troops left to carry on the siege, were liable to be turned by the pass of Espiritus, through which, the roads from Betera led to Gilet, directly upon the line of retreat. To prevent such an attempt Suchet posted Chlopiski with a strong detachment of infantry and the Italian dragoons in the pass, and placed the Nea

politan brigade of reserve at Gilet: in this situation, although his fighting troops did not exceed seventeen thousand men, and those cooped up between two fortresses, hemmed in by the mountain on one side, the sea on the other, and with only one narrow line of retreat, the French general did not hesitate to engage a very numerous army. He trusted to his superiority in moral resources, and what would have been madness in other circumstances, was here a proof of skilful daring.

Blake having issued a fine address to his soldiers on the 25th of October advanced to fight. His right wing under Zayas composed of the Albuera divisions, marched by a road leading upon the village of Puzzol, and Blake followed in person, with a weak reserve, commanded by general Velasco.

The centre under Lardizabal supported by the cavalry of Loy and Caro, moved by the main road.

The left, consisting of Miranda's and Villa Campa's infantry, and of St. Juan's cavalry, and supported by Mahy's division which came from the side of Betera moved against the defile of Espiritus. Obispo, also coming from Betera, acted as a flanking corps, and entering the mountains by Naquera, menaced the right of Chlopiski, but he was met by a brigade under general Robert.

The Spaniards moved on rapidly and in good order, driving the French outposts over a ravine called the Piccador, which covered Suchet's front. Zayas and Lardizabal immediately passed this obstacle as did also Caro and Loy, and the first took possession of Puzzol while the flotilla ranged along the coast and protected his right flank. Blake with Velasco's reserve halted at El Puig, an isolated hill on the sea-coast behind the Piccador, but Lardizabal and the cavalry forming an oblique line, in order to face the French front, occupied the ground between Puzzol and the Piccador. Thus the Spanish order of battle was cut in two by the ravine, for on the hither side of it St. Juan, Miranda, and Villa Campa were drawn up, and Mahy took possession of a height called the Germanels, which was opposite the mouth of St. Espiritus.

By this disposition the Spanish line, extending from Puzzol to the Germanels, was not less than six miles, and the division of Obispo was separated from the left by about the same distance. Blake's order of battle was therefore feeble, and he was without any efficient reserve, for Velasco was distant and weak and Mahy's was actually in the line. The French order of battle covering less than three miles was compressed and strong, the reserves were well placed and close at hand; and Chlopiski's division, although a league distant from the main body, was firmly posted, and able to take a direct part in the battle, while the interval between him and Suchet was closed by impassable heights.

BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM.

The fight was commenced by Villa Campa, who was advancing against the pass of Espiritus, when the Italian dragoons galloping out overthrew his advanced guard, and put his division into confusion. Chlopiski seeing this, moved down with the infantry, drove Mahy from the Germanels, and then detached a regiment to the succour of the centre, where a brisk battle was going on to the disadvantage of Suchet.

That general had not judged his ground well at first, and when the Spaniards had crossed the Piccador, he too late perceived that an isolated height in advance of Harispe's division, could command all that part of the field. Prompt however to remedy his error, he ordered the infantry to advance, and galloped forward himself with an escort of hussars to seize the hill; the enemy was already in possession, and their guns opened from

the summit, but the head of Harispe's infantry then attacked, and after a sharp fight, in which general Paris and several superior officers were wounded, gained the height.

At this time Obispo's guns were heard on the hills far to the right, and Zayas passing through Puzzol endeavoured to turn the French left, and as the day was fine, and the field of battle distinctly seen by the soldiers in Saguntum, they crowded on the ramparts, regardless of the besieger's fire, and uttering loud cries of Victory! Victory! by their gestures seemed to encourage their countrymen to press forward. The critical moment of the battle was evidently approaching. Suchet ordered Palombini's Italians, and the dragoons, to support Harispe, and although wounded himself galloped to the cuirassiers and brought them into action. Meanwhile the French hussars had pursued the Spaniards from the height to the Piccador, where however the latter rallied upon their second line and again advanced; and it was in vain that the French artillery poured grape-shot into their ranks, their march was not checked. Loy and Caro's horsemen overthrew the French hussars in a moment, and in the same charge sabred the French gunners and captured their battery. The crisis would have been fatal, if Harispe's infantry had not stood firm while Palombini's division marching on the left under cover of a small rise of ground, suddenly opened a fire upon the flank of the Spanish cavalry, which was still in pursuit of the hussars. These last immediately turned, and the Spaniards thus placed between two fires, and thinking the flight of the hussars had been feigned, to draw them into an ambuscade, hesitated; the next moment a tremendous charge of the cuirassiers put every thing into confusion. Caro was wounded and taken, Loy fled with the remainder of the cavalry over the Piccador, the French guns were recovered, the Spanish artillery was taken, and Lardizabal's infantry being quite broken, laid down their arms, or throwing them away, saved themselves as they could. Harispe's division immediately joined Chlopiski's, and both together pursued the beaten troops.

This great, and nearly simultaneous success in the centre, and on the right, having cut the Spanish line in two, Zaya's position became exceedingly dangerous. Suchet was on his flank, Habert advancing against his front, and Blake had no reserve in hand to restore the battle, for the few troops and guns under Velasco, remained inactive at El Puig. However such had been the vigour of the action in the centre, and so inferior were Suchet's numbers, that it required two hours to secure his prisoners and to rally Palombini's division for another effort. Meanwhile Zayas, whose left flank was covered in some measure by the water-cuts, fought stoutly, maintained the village of Puzzol for a long time, and when finally driven out, although he was charged several times, by some squadrons attached to Habert's division, effected his retreat across the Piccador, and gained El Puig. Suchet had however re-formed his troops, and Zayas now attacked in front and flank, fled along the sea-coast to the Grao of Valencia, leaving his artillery and eight hundred prisoners.

During this time, Chlopiski and Harispe, had pursued Mahy, Miranda, Villa Campa, and Lardizabal, as far as the torrent of Caraxet, where many prisoners were made; but the rest being joined by Obispo, rallied behind the torrent, and the French cavalry having outstripped their infantry, were unable to prevent the Spaniards from reaching the line of the Guadalaviar. The victors had about a thousand killed and wounded, and the Spaniards had not more, but two generals, five thousand pioneers, and twelve guns were taken; and Blake's inability to oppose Suchet in the field, being made manifest by this battle, the

troops engaged were totally dispirited, and the effect reached even to Saguntum, for the garrison surrendered that night.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. In this campaign the main object on both sides was Valencia. That city could not be invested until Saguntum was taken, and the Spanish army defeated; hence to protect Saguntum without endangering his army, was the problem for Blake to solve, and it was not very difficult. He had at least twenty-five thousand troops, besides the garrisons of Peniscola, Oropesa, and Segorbe, and he could either command or influence the movements of nearly twenty thousand irregulars; his line of operations was direct, and secure, and he had a fleet to assist him, and several secure harbours. On the other hand the French general could not bring twenty thousand men into action, and his line of operation, which was long, and difficult, was intercepted by the Spanish fortresses. It was for Blake therefore to choose the nature of his defence: he could fight, or he could protract the war.

2. If he had resolved to fight, he should have taken post at Castellon de la Plana, keeping a corps of observation at Segorbe, and strong detachments towards Villa Franca, and Cabanes, holding his army in readiness to fall on the heads of Suchet's columns, as they came out of the mountains. But experience had, or should have, taught Blake, that a battle in the open field between the French and Spanish troops, whatever might be the apparent advantage, was uncertain; and this last and best army of the country ought not to have been risked. He should therefore have resolved upon protracting the war, and have merely held that position to check the heads of the French columns, without engaging in a pitched battle.

3. From Castellon de la Plana and Segorbe, the army might have been withdrawn, and concentrated at Murviedro, in one march, and Blake should have prepared an intrenched camp in the hills close to Saguntum, placing a corps of observation in the plain behind that fortress. These hills were rugged, very difficult of access, and the numerous water-cuts and the power of forming inundations in the place, were so favourable for defence, that it would have been nearly impossible for the French to have dislodged him; nor could they have invested Saguntum while he remained in this camp.

4. In such a strong position, with his retreat secure upon the Guadalaviar, the Spanish general would have covered the fertile plains from the French foragers, and would have held their army at bay while the irregulars operated upon their communication. He might then have safely detached a division to his left, to assist the Partidas, or to his right, by sea, to land at Peniscola. His forces would soon have been increased and the invasion would have been frustrated.

5. Instead of following this simple principle of defensive warfare consecrated since the days of Fabius, Blake abandoned Saguntum, and from behind the Guadalaviar, sent unconnected detachments on a half circle round the French army, which being concentrated, and nearer to each detachment than the latter was to its own base at Valencia, could and did, as we have seen, defeat them all in detail.

6. Blake, like all the Spanish generals, indulged vast military conceptions far beyond his means, and, from want of knowledge, generally in violation of strategic principles. Thus his project of cutting the communication with Madrid, invading Aragon, and connecting Mina's operations between Zaragoza and the Pyrenees, with Lacy's in Catalonia, was gigantic in design, but without any chance of success. The division of Severoli being added to Musnier's, had secured Aragon; and if it had not been so, the rein-

forcements then marching through Navarre, to different parts of Spain, rendered the time chosen for these attempts peculiarly unfavourable. But the chief objection was, that Blake had lost the favourable occasion of protracting the war about Saguntum; and the operations against Valencia, were sure to be brought to a crisis, before the affair of Aragon could have been sufficiently embarrassing, to recall the French general. The true way of using the large guerilla forces, was to bring them down close upon the rear of Suchet's army, especially on the side of Teruel, where he had magazines; which could have been done safely, because these Partidas had an open retreat, and if followed would have effected their object, of weakening and distressing the army before Valencia. This would have been quite a different operation from that which Blake adopted, when he posted Obispo and O'Donnell at Benaguazil and Segorbe; because these generals' lines of operations, springing from the Guadalaviar, were within the power of the French; and this error alone proves that Blake was entirely ignorant of the principles of strategy.

7. Urged by the cries of the Valencian population, the Spanish general delivered the battle of the 25th, which was another great error, and an error exaggerated by the mode of execution. He who had so much experience, who had now commanded in four or five pitched battles, was still so ignorant of his art, that with twice as many men as his adversary, and with the choice of time and place, he made three simultaneous attacks, on an extended front, without any connection or support; and he had no reserves to restore the fight or to cover his retreat. A wide sweep of the net without regard to the strength or fierceness of his prey, was Blake's only notion, and the result was his own destruction.

8. Suchet's operations, especially his advance against Saguntum, leaving Oropesa behind him, were able and rapid. He saw the errors of his adversary, and made them fatal. To fight in front of Saguntum was no fault; the French general acted with a just confidence in his own genius, and the valour of his troops. He gained that fortress by the battle, but he acknowledged that such were the difficulties of the siege, the place could only have been taken by a blockade, which would have required two months.

CHAPTER III.

Suchet resolves to invest the city of Valencia—Blake reverts to his former system of acting on the French rear—Napoleon orders general Reille to reinforce Suchet with two divisions—Lacy disarms the Catalan Somatenes—Their ardour diminishes—The French destroy several bands, blockade the Medas islands, and occupy Mataro—Several towns affected to the French interest—Bad conduct of the privateers—Lacy encourages assassination—Suchet advances to the Guadalaviar—Spanish defences described—The French force the passage of the river—Battle of Valencia—Mahi flies to Alcira—Suchet invests the Spanish camp—Blake attempts to break out, is repulsed—The camp abandoned—The city is bombarded—Commotion within the walls—Blake surrenders with his whole army—Suchet created duke of Albufera—Shameful conduct of the junta of the province—Montbrun arrives with three divisions—Summons Alicante, and returns to Toledo—Villa Campa marches from Carthagena to Albarracin—Gandia and Denia taken by the French—They besiege Peniscola—Lacy menaces Taragona—Defeats a French battalion at Villa Seca—Battle of Altafulla—Siege of Peniscola—The French army at Valencia weakened by draughts—Suchet's conquests cease—Observations.

SAGUNTUM having fallen, Suchet conceived the plan of enclosing and capturing the whole of Blake's force, together with the city of Valencia, round which it was encamped; and he was not deterred from this project by the desultory operations of the Partidas in Aragon

nor by the state of Catalonia. Blake however, reverting to his former system, called up to Valencia, all the garrisons and depôts of Murcia, and directed the conde de Montijo, who had been expelled by Soult from Grenada, to join Duran. He likewise ordered Freire to move upon Cuenca, with the Murcian army, to support Montijo, Duran, and the Partida chiefs, who remained near Aragon after the defeat of the Empecinado. But the innumerable small bands, or rather armed peasants, immediately about Valencia, he made no use of, neither harassing the French nor in any manner accustoming these people to action.

In Aragon his affairs turned out ill. Mazuchelli entirely defeated Duran in a hard fight, near Almunia, on the 7th of November; on the 23d Campillo was defeated at Añadon, and a Partida having appeared at Peñarova, near Morella, the people rose against it. Finally Napoleon, seeing that the contest in Valencia was coming to a crisis, ordered general Reille to reinforce Suchet not only with Severoli's Italians, but with his own French division, in all fifteen thousand good troops.

Meanwhile in Catalonia Lacy's activity had greatly diminished. He had, including the Tercios, above sixteen thousand troops, of which about twelve thousand were armed, and in conjunction with the junta he had classed the whole population in reserves; but he was jealous of the people, who were generally of the church party, and, as he had before done in the Ronda, deprived them of their arms, although they had purchased them, in obedience to his own proclamation. He also discountenanced as much as possible the popular insurrection, and he was not without plausible reasons for this, although he could not justify the faithless and oppressive mode of execution.

He complained that the Somatenes always lost their arms and ammunition, that they were turbulent, expensive, and bad soldiers, and that his object was to incorporate them by just degrees with the regular army, where they could be of service; but then he made no good use of the latter himself, and hence he impeded the irregulars without helping the regular warfare. His conduct disgusted the Catalonians. That people had always possessed a certain freedom and loved it; but they had been treated despotically and unjustly, by all the different commanders who had been placed at their head, since the commencement of the war; and now finding, that Lacy was even worse than his predecessors, their ardour sensibly diminished; many went over to the French, and this feeling of discouragement was increased by some unfortunate events.

Henriod governor of Lerida had on the 25th of October surprised and destroyed, in Balaguer, a swarm of Partidas which had settled on the plain of Urgel, and the Partizans on the left bank of the Ebro had been defeated by the escort of one of the convoys. The French also entrenched a post before the Medas Islands, in November, which prevented all communication by land, and in the same month Maurice Mathieu surprised Mattaro. The war had also now fatigued so many persons, that several towns were ready to receive the enemy as friends. Villa Nueva de Sitjes and other places were in constant communication with Barcelona; and the people of Cadaques openly refused to pay their contributions to Lacy, declaring that they had already paid the French and meant to side with the strongest. One Guinart, a member of the junta, was detected corresponding with the enemy; counter guerillas, or rather freebooting bands, made their appearance near Berga; privateers of all nations infested the coast, and these pirates of the ocean, the disgrace of civilized warfare, generally agreed not to molest each other, but robbed all defenceless flags without distinction. Then the continued bickerings between Sarsfield, Eroles, and Milans, and of all three with

Lacy, who was, besides, on bad terms with captain Codrington, greatly affected the patriotic ardour of the people, and relieved the French armies from the alarm which the first operations had created.

In Catalonia the generals in chief were never natives, nor identified in feeling with the natives. Lacy was unfitted for open warfare, and had recourse to the infamous methods of assassination. Campo Verde had given some countenance to this horrible system, but Lacy and his coadjutors have been accused of instigating the murder of French officers in their quarters, the poisoning of wells, the drugging of wines and flour, and the firing of powder-magazines, regardless of the safety even of the Spaniards who might be within reach of the explosion; and if any man shall doubt the truth of this allegation, let him read "*The History of the Conspiracies against the French Armies in Catalonia*." That work, printed in 1813 at Barcelona, contains the official reports of the military police, upon the different attempts, many successful, to destroy the French troops; and when due allowance for an enemy's tale and for the habitual falsifications of police agents is made, ample proof will remain that Lacy's warfare was one of assassination.

The facility which the great size of Barcelona afforded for these attempts, together with its continual cravings and large garrison, induced Napoleon to think of dismantling the walls of the city, preserving only the forts. This simple military precaution has been noted by some writers as an indication that he even then secretly despaired of final success in the Peninsula; but the weakness of this remark will appear evident, if we consider, that he had just augmented his immense army, that his generals were invading Valencia, and menacing Galicia, after having relieved Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo; and that he was himself preparing to lead four hundred thousand men to the most distant extremity of Europe. However the place was not dismantled, and Maurice Mathieu contrived both to maintain the city in obedience and to take an important part in the field operations.

It was under these circumstances that Suchet advanced to the Guadalaviar, although his losses and the escorts for his numerous prisoners had diminished his force to eighteen thousand men, while Blake's army, including Freire's division was above twenty-five thousand, of which near three thousand were cavalry. He first summoned the city, to ascertain the public spirit; he was answered in lofty terms, yet he knew by his secret communications, that the enthusiasm of the people was not very strong; and on the 3d of November he seized the Grao, and the suburb of Serranos on the left of the Guadalaviar. Blake had broken two, out of five, stone bridges on the river, had occupied some houses and convents which covered them on the left bank, and protected those bridges, which remained whole, with regular works. Suchet immediately carried the convents which covered the broken bridges in the Serranos, and fortified his position there and at the Grao, and thus blocked the Spaniards on that side with a small force, while he prepared to pass the river higher up with the remainder of his army.

The Spanish defences on the right bank consisted of three posts.

1. The city itself which was surrounded by a circular wall thirty feet in height, and ten in thickness with a road along the summit, the platforms of the bastions being supported from within by timber scaffolding. There was also a wet ditch and a covered way with earthen works in front of the gates.

2. An entrenched camp of an irregular form five miles in extent. It enclosed the city and the three suburbs of Quarte, San Vincente, and Ruzafa. The slope of this work was so steep as to require scaling ladders, and there was a ditch in front twelve feet deep.

3. The lines, which extended along the banks of the river to the sea at one side, and to the villages of Quarte and Manisses on the other.

The whole line, including the city and camp, was about eight miles; the ground was broken with deep and wide canals of irrigation, which branched off from the river just above the village of Quarte, and the Spanish cavalry was posted at Aldaya behind the left wing to observe the open country. Suchet could not venture to force the passage of the river until Reille had joined him, and therefore contented himself with sending parties over to skirmish, while he increased his secret communications in the city, and employed detachments to scour the country in his rear. In this manner, nearly two months passed; the French waited for reinforcements, and Blake hoped that while he thus occupied his enemy a general insurrection would save Valencia. But in December, Reille, having given over the charge of Navarre and Aragon to general Caffarelli, marched to Teruel where Severoli with his Italians had already arrived.

The vicinity of Freire, and Montijo, who now appeared near Cuenca, obliged Reille to halt at Teruel until general D'Armanac with a detachment of the army of the centre, had driven those Spanish generals away, but then he advanced to Segorbe, and as Freire did not rejoin Blake, and as the latter was ignorant of Reille's arrival, Suchet resolved to force the passage of the Guadalaviar instantly.

On the 25th, the Neapolitan division being placed in the camp at the Serranos, to hold the Spaniards in check, Habert took post at the Grao, and Palombini's division was placed opposite the village of Mislata, which was about half way between Valencia and the village of Quarte. Reille at the same time made a forced march by Liria and Benaguazil, and three bridges being thrown in the night, above the sources of the canals, opposite Ribaroya, the rest of the army crossed the Guadalaviar with all diligence on the 26th and formed in order of battle on the other side. It was then eight o'clock and Reille had not arrived, but Suchet, whose plan was to drive all Blake's army within the entrenched camp, fearing that the Spanish general would evade the danger, if he saw the French divisions in march, resolved to push at once with Harispe's infantry and the cavalry to the Albufera or salt-lake, beyond Valencia, and so cut off Blake's retreat to the Xucar river. Robert's brigade therefore halted to secure the bridges, until Reille should come up, and while the troops, left on the other bank of the Guadalaviar, attacked all the Spanish river line of entrenchments, Suchet marched towards the lake as rapidly as the thick woods would permit.

The French hussars soon fell in with the Spanish cavalry at Aldaya and were defeated, but this charge was stopped by the fire of the infantry, and the remainder of the French horsemen coming up overthrew the Spaniards. During this time Blake instead of falling on Suchet with his reserve, was occupied with the defence of the river, especially at the village of Mislata, where a false attack, to cover the passage at Ribaroya, had first given him the alarm. Palombini, who was at this point, had passed over some skirmishers and then throwing two bridges, attacked the entrenchments; but his troops were repulsed by Zayas, and driven back on the river in disorder; they rallied and had effected the passage of the canals, when a Spanish reserve coming up restored the fight, and the French were finally driven quite over the river. At that moment Reille's division, save one brigade which could not arrive in time, crossed at Ribaroya, and in concert with Robert, attacked Mahy in the villages of Manisses and Quarte, which had been fortified carefully in front, but were quite neglected on the rear, and on the side of Aldaya. Suchet who had been somewhat delayed at Aldaya by the aspect of affairs at Mis-

lata, then continued his march to the lake, while Reille meeting with a feeble resistance at Manisses and Quarte, carried both at one sweep, and turned Mislata where he united with Palombini. Blake and Zayas retired towards the city but Mahy driven from Quarte took the road to Alcira, on the Xucar, and thus passing behind Suchet's division, was entirely cut off from Valencia.

All the Spanish army, on the upper Guadalaviar, was now entirely beaten with the loss of its artillery and baggage, and below the city, Habert was likewise victorious. He had first opened a cannonade against the Spanish gun-boats near the Grao, and this flotilla although in sight of an English seventy-four and a frigate, and closely supported by the Papillon sloop, fled without returning a shot; the French then passed the water, and carried the entrenchment, which consisted of a feeble breast-work, defended by the irregulars who had only two guns. When the passage was effected Habert fixed his right, as a pivot, on the river, and sweeping round with his left, drove the Spaniards towards the camp; but before he could connect his flank with Harispe's troops, who were on the lake, Obispo's division, flying from Suchet's cavalry, passed over the rice grounds between the lake and the sea, and so escaped to Cullera. The remainder of Blake's army about eighteen thousand of all kinds retired to the camp and were closely invested during the night.

Three detachments of French dragoons, each man having an infantry soldier behind him, were then sent by different roads of Alcira, Cullera, and Cuenca, the two first in pursuit of Mahy and Obispo, the latter to observe Freire. Mahy was found in a position at Alcira, and Blake had already sent him orders to maintain the line of the Xucar; but he had lost his artillery, his troops were disheartened, and at the first shot, he fled although the ground was strong and he had three thousand men while the French were not above a thousand. Obispo likewise abandoned Cullera and endeavoured to rejoin Mahy, when a very heavy and unusual fall of snow not only prevented their junction, but offered a fine advantage to the French. For the British consul thinking the Xucar would be defended, had landed large stores of provisions and ammunition at Denia and was endeavouring to re-embark them, when the storm drove the ships of war off the coast, and for three days fifty cavalry could have captured Denia and all the stores.

In this battle which cost the French less than five hundred men, Zayas alone displayed his usual vigour and spirit, and while retiring upon the city, he repeatedly proposed to Blake to retreat by the road Mahy had followed, which would have saved the army; yet the other was silent, for he was in every way incapable as an officer. With twenty-three thousand infantry, a powerful cavalry, and a wide river in his front—with the command of several bridges by which he could have operated on either side; with strong entrenchments, a secure camp—with a fortified city in the centre, whence his reserves could have reached the most distant point of the scene of operation, in less than two hours—with all these advantages he had permitted Suchet whose force, seeing that one of Reille's brigades had not arrived, scarcely exceeded his own, to force the passage of the river, to beat him at all points, and to enclose him, by a march, which spread the French troops on a circuit of more than fifteen miles or five hours' march; and he now rejected the only means of saving his army. But Suchet's operations which indeed were of the nature of a surprise, proves that he must have had a supreme contempt for his adversary's talents, and the country people partook of the sentiment; the French parties which spread over the country for provisions, as far as Xativa, were every where well received, and Blake complained that Valencia contained a bad people.

The 2d of December, the Spanish general, finding his error, attempted at the head of ten thousand men to break out by the left bank of the Guadalaviar; but his arrangements were unskilful, and when his advanced guard of five thousand men had made way, it was abandoned, and the main column returned to the city. The next day many deserters went over to the French, and Reille's absent brigade, now arrived and reinforced the posts on the left bank of the river. Suchet fortified his camp on the right bank, and having in the night of the 30th repulsed two thousand Spaniards who made a sally, commenced regular approaches against the camp and city.

SIEGE OF VALENCIA.

It was impossible for Blake to remain long in the camp; the city contained one hundred and fifty thousand souls besides the troops, and there was no means of provisioning them, because Suchet's investment was complete. Sixty heavy guns with their pares of ammunition which had reached Saguntum, were transported across the river Guadalaviar to batter the works; and as the suburb of San Vincente, and the Olivet offered two projecting points of the entrenched camp, which possessed but feeble means of defence, the trenches were opened against them in the night of the 1st of January.

The fire killed colonel Henri, the chief engineer, but in the night of the 5th the Spaniards abandoned the camp and took refuge in the city; the French, perceiving the movement, escalated the works, and seized two of the suburbs so suddenly, that they captured eighty pieces of artillery and established themselves within twenty yards of the town wall, when their mortar batteries opened upon the place. In the evening, Suchet sent a summons to Blake, who replied, that he would have accepted certain terms the day before, but that the bombardment had convinced him, that he might now depend upon both the citizens and the troops.

This answer satisfied Suchet. He was convinced the place would not make any defence, and he continued to throw shells until the 8th; after which he made an attack upon the suburb of Quarte, but the Spaniards still held out and he was defeated. However, the bombardment killed many persons, and set fire to the houses in several quarters; and as there were no cellars or caves, as at Zaragoza, the chief citizens begged Blake to capitulate. While he was debating with them, a friar bearing a flag, which he called the Standard of the Faith, came up with a mob, and insisted upon fighting to the last, and when a piquet of soldiers was sent against him, he routed it and shot the officer; nevertheless his party was soon dispersed. Finally, when a convent of Dominicans close to the walls was taken, and five batteries ready to open, Blake demanded leave to retire to Alicante with arms, baggage, and four guns.

These terms were refused, but a capitulation guaranteeing property, and oblivion of the past, and providing that the unfortunate prisoners in the island of Cabrera should be exchanged against an equal number of Blake's army, was negotiated and ratified on the 9th. Then Blake complaining bitterly of the people, gave up the city. Above eighteen thousand regular troops, with eighty stand of colours, two thousand horses, three hundred and ninety guns, forty thousand muskets and enormous stores of powder were taken; and it is not one of the least remarkable features of this extraordinary war, that intelligence of the fall of so great a city took a week to reach Madrid, and it was not known in Cadiz until one month after!

On the 14th of January, Suchet made his triumphal entry into Valencia, having completed a series of campaigns in which the feebleness of his adversaries

somewhat diminished his glory, but in which his own activity and skill were not the less conspicuous. Napoleon created him duke of Albufera, and his civil administration was strictly in unison with his conduct in the field, that is to say vigorous and prudent. He arrested all dangerous persons, especially the friars, and sent them to France, and he rigorously deprived the people of their military resources; but he proportioned his demands to their real ability, kept his troops in perfect discipline, was careful not to offend the citizens by violating their customs, or shocking their religious prejudices, and endeavoured, as much as possible, to govern through the native authorities. The archbishop and many of the clergy aided him, and the submission of the people was secured.

The errors of the Spaniards contributed as much to this object, as the prudent vigilance of Suchet; for although the city was lost, the kingdom of Valencia might have recovered from the blow, under the guidance of able men. The convents and churches were full of riches, the towns and villages abounded in resources, the line of the Xucar was very strong, and several fortified places and good harbours remained unsubdued; the Partidas in the hills were still numerous, the people were willing to fight, and the British agents and the British fleets were ready to aid, and to supply arms and stores. The junta however dissolved itself, the magistrates fled from their posts, the populace were left without chiefs; and when the consul, Tupper, proposed to establish a commission of government, having at its head the padre Rico, the author of Valencia's first defence against Moncey, and the most able and energetic man in those parts, Mahy evaded the proposition; he would not give Rico power, and shewed every disposition to impede useful exertion. Then the leading people either openly submitted or secretly entered into connection with the French, who were thus enabled tranquilly to secure the resources of the country; and as the regency at Cadiz refused the stipulated exchange of prisoners, the Spanish army was sent to France, and the horrors of the Cabrera were prolonged.

During the siege of Valencia, Freire, with his Murcians, including a body of cavalry, had abandoned the passes of the Contreras district and retired across the Xucar to Almanza; Mahy occupied Alcoy, and Villa Campa had marched to Carthagen. Suchet wished to leave them undisturbed until he was ready to attack Alicante itself. But to ensure the fall of Valencia, Napoleon had directed Soult to hold ten thousand men in the Despeñas Peros, ready to march if necessary to Suchet's assistance; and at the same time Marmont was ordered to detach Montbrun with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, from the valley of the Tagus, to co-operate with the army of Aragon. These last-named troops should have interposed between Valencia and Alicante before the battle of the 26th, but they were delayed, and only reached Almanza on the 9th, the very day Valencia surrendered. Freire retreated before them, and Mahy, who was preparing to advance again to Alcira, took shelter in Alicante. Montbrun knew that Valencia had fallen, and was advised by Suchet to return immediately, but ambitious to share in the glory of the hour he marched against Alicante, and throwing a few shells summoned it to surrender. The municipal authorities, the governor and many of the leading people, were disposed to yield, yet Montbrun did not press them, and when he retired the place was, as Suchet had foreseen, put into a state of defence. The consul, Tupper, and Roche the military agent, by distributing clothes and food to the naked famishing soldiers, restored their courage, drew many more to Alicante, and stopped the desertion, which was so great that in one month Freire's division alone had lost two thousand men.

Montbrun's attempt therefore, hurt the French interests, and his troops on their return to Toledo wasted and pillaged the country through which they passed in a shameful manner.

Villa Campa now abandoned Carthagena and returned to the mountains of Albarazin; and Suchet, embarrassed by the failure at Alicant, and dreading the fever at Carthagena, posted Harispe's division on the Xucar, to guard against the pestilence rather than to watch the enemy. Yet he seized Gandia and Denia, which last was strangely neglected both by the Spaniards and by the British squadron after the stores were removed; for the castle had sixty guns mounted, and many vessels were in the port; and as a post it was important, and might easily have been secured until a Spanish garrison could be thrown in. When these points were secured Suchet detached a brigade on the side of Cabrillas to preserve the communication with Cuenca, and then directed Musnier's division to form the siege of Peniscola; but at the moment of investing that place, intelligence arrived that Taragona, the garrison of which, contrary to orders, had consumed the reserve-provisions, was menaced by Lacy; wherefore Severoli's division moved from Valencia to replace Musnier, and the latter marched to Tortosa in aid of Taragona. Previous to Musnier's arrival, Lafosse, governor of Tortosa, had advanced with some cavalry and a battalion of infantry to the fort of Balaguer, to observe Lacy, and being falsely told that the Spaniards were in retreat, entered Cambril the 19th, and from thence pushed on with his cavalry to Taragona. Lacy was nearer than he imagined.

It will be remembered that the Catalan army was posted in the valley of the Congosta and at Mattaro, to intercept the French convoy to Barcelona. In December Maurice Mathieu seized Mattaro, while Dacæen, who had received some reinforcements, brought down the long expected convoy, and the Spaniards being thus placed between two fires, after a slight action, opened the road. When Dacæen returned to Gerona they resumed their position, but Lacy after proposing several new projects, which he generally relinquished at the moment of execution, at last decided to fall on Taragona, and afterwards to invade Aragon. With this view, he drew off Eroles' division and some cavalry, in all about six thousand men, from the Congosta, and took post about the 18th of January, at Reus. The stores from Cadiz were landed from the English vessels at Cape Salou; captain Codrington repaired to the Spanish quarters on the 19th to concert a combined operation with the fleet, and it was at this moment the scouts brought word that Lafosse had entered Taragona with the cavalry, and that the French infantry, about eight hundred in number, were at Villa Seca, ignorant of the vicinity of the Spanish army.

Lacy immediately put his troops in motion, and captain Codrington would have returned to his ship, but a patrol of French dragoons chased him back, and another patrol pushing to Salou made two captains and a lieutenant of the squadron prisoners, and brought them to Villa Seca. By this time, however, Lacy had fallen upon the French infantry in front, and Eroles turning both their flanks, and closing upon their rear, killed or wounded two hundred when the remainder surrendered.

The naval officers, thus freed, immediately regained their ships, and the squadron was that night before Taragona; but a gale of wind off shore impeded its fire, the Spaniards did not appear on the land-side, and the next day the increasing gale obliged the ships to anchor to the eastward. Lacy had meanwhile abandoned the project against Taragona, and after sending his prisoners to Busa, went off himself towards Montserrat, leaving Eroles' division, reinforced by a considerable body of armed peasantry, in a position at Ata-

fulla, behind the Gaya. Here the bridge in front being broken, and the position strong, Eroles, who had been also promised the aid of Sarsfield's division, awaited the attack of three thousand men who were coming from Barcelona. He was however ignorant that Dacæen, finding the ways from Gerona open, because Sarsfield had moved to the side of Vich, had sent general Lamarque with five thousand men to Barcelona, and that Maurice Mathieu was thus in march not with three but eight thousand good troops.

BATTLE OF ALTAFULLA.

The French generals, anxious to surprise Eroles, took pains to conceal their numbers, and while Maurice Mathieu appeared in front, Lamarque was turning the left flank. They marched all night, and at day-break on the 24th, having forded the river, made a well combined and vigorous attack, by which the Spaniards were defeated with a loss of more than one thousand killed and wounded. The total dispersion of the beaten troops baffled pursuit, and the French in returning to Barcelona suffered from the fire of the British squadron, but Eroles complained that Sarsfield had kept away with a settled design to sacrifice him.

While this was passing in Lower Catalonia, Dacæen secured the higher country about Olot, and then descending into the valley of Vich defeated Sarsfield at Centellas, and that general himself was taken, but rescued by one of his soldiers. From Centellas, Dacæen marched by Caldas and Sabadel upon Barcelona, where he arrived the 27th January, meanwhile Musnier re-victualled Taragona. Thus the Catalans were again reduced to great straits, for the French knowing that they were soon to be reinforced, occupied all the sea-coast, made new roads out of reach of fire from the ships, established fresh posts at Moncado, Mattaro, Palamos, and Cadaques, placed detachments in the higher valleys, and obliged their enemies to resort once more to an irregular warfare; which was however but a feeble resource, because from Lacy's policy the people were now generally disarmed and discontented.

Milans, Manso, Eroles, Sarsfield and Rovira, indeed, although continually quarrelling, kept the field; and being still supplied with arms and stores which the British navy contrived to land, and send into the interior, sustained the war as partizans until new combinations were produced by the efforts of England; but Lacy's intrigues and unpopularity increased, a general gloom prevailed, and the foundations of strength in the principality were shaken. The patriots indeed still possessed the mountains, but the French held all the towns, all the ports, and most of the lines of communication; and their moveable columns without difficulty gathered the harvests of the valleys, and chased the most daring of the partizans. Meanwhile Suchet, seeing that Taragona was secure, renewed his operations.

SIEGE OF PENISCOLA.

This fortress, crowning the summit of a lofty rock in the sea, was nearly impregnable; and the only communication with the shore, was by a neck of land sixty yards wide and two hundred and fifty long. In the middle of the town there was a strong castle, well furnished with guns and provisions, and some British ships of war were at hand to aid the defence; the rock yielded copious springs of water, and deep marshes covered the approach to the neck of land, which being covered by the waves in heavy gales, had also an artificial cut defended by batteries and flanked by gun-boats. Garcia Navarro, who had been taken during the siege of Tortosa, but had escaped from France, was now governor of Peniscola, and his garrison was sufficiently numerous.

On the 20th ground was broken, and mortar-batteries being established twelve hundred yards from the fort, opened their fire on the 28th.

In the night of the 31st a parallel five hundred yards long was built of fascines and gabions, and batteries were commenced on either flank.

In the night of the second of February the approaches were pushed beyond the first parallel, and the breaching batteries being finished and armed were going to open when a privateer captured a despatch from the governor, who complained in it that the English wished to take the command of the place, and declared his resolution rather to surrender than suffer them to do so. On this hint Suchet opened negotiations which terminated in the capitulation of the fortress, the troops being allowed to go where they pleased. The French found sixty guns mounted, and the easy reduction of such a strong place, which secured their line of communication, produced a general disposition in the Valencians to submit to fortune. Such is Suchet's account of this affair, but the colour which he thought it necessary to give to a transaction, full of shame and dishonour, to Navarro, can only be considered as part of the price paid for Peniscola. The true causes of its fall were treachery and cowardice. The garrison were from the first desponding and divided in opinion, and the British naval officers did but stimulate the troops and general to do their duty to their country.

After this capture, six thousand Poles quitted Suchet, for Napoleon required all the troops of that nation for his Russian expedition. These veterans marched by Jaca, taking with them the prisoners of Blake's army, at the same time Reille's two French divisions were ordered to form a separate corps of observation on the Lower Ebro, and Palombini's Italian division was sent towards Soria and Calatayud to oppose Montijo, Villa Campa, and Bassecour, who were still in joint operation on that side. But Reille soon marched towards Aragon, and Severoli's division took his place on the Lower Ebro; for the Partidas of Durán, Impecinado, and those numerous bands from the Asturias and La Montaña composing the seventh army, harassed Navarre and Aragon and were too powerful for Caffarelli. Mina's also re-entered Aragon in January, surprised Huesca, and being attacked during his retreat at Lumbar repulsed the enemy and carried off his prisoners.

Suchet's field force in Valencia was thus reduced by twenty thousand men, he had only fifteen thousand left and consequently could not push the invasion on the side of Murcia. The approaching departure of Napoleon from Paris also altered the situation of the French armies in the Peninsula. The king was again appointed the emperor's lieutenant, and he extended the right wing of Suchet's army to Cuenca, and concentrated the army of the centre at Madrid; thus Valencia was made, as it were, a mere head of cantonments, in front of which fresh Spanish armies soon assembled, and Alicante then became an object of interest to the English government. Suchet, who had neglected the wound he received at the battle of Saguntum, now fell into a dangerous disorder, and that fierce flame of war which seemed destined to lick up all the remains of the Spanish power, was suddenly extinguished.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The events which led to the capitulation of Valencia, were but a continuation of those faults which had before ruined the Spanish cause in every part of the Peninsula, namely the neglect of all the good military usages, and the mania for fighting great battles with bad troops.

2. Blake needed not to have fought a serious action

during any part of the campaign. He might have succoured Saguntum without a dangerous battle, and might have retreated in safety behind the Guadalaviar; he might have defended that river without risking his whole army, and then have retreated behind the Xucar. He should never have shut up his army in Valencia, but having done so he should never have capitulated. Eighteen thousand men, well conducted, could always have broken through the thin circle of investment, drawn by Suchet, especially as the Spaniards had the power of operating on both banks of the river. But the campaign was one huge error throughout, and was pithily summed up in one sentence by the duke of Wellington. Being accused by the regency at Cadiz of having caused the catastrophe, by permitting the army of the north and that of Portugal to send reinforcements to Suchet, he replied thus—"The misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to Blake's ignorance of his profession, and to Mahi's cowardice and treachery!"

CHAPTER IV.

Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura—Description of Soult's position—Events in Estremadura—Ballesteros arrives at Algeiras—Advances to Alcala de Gazules—Is driven back—Soult designs to besiege Tarifa—Concludes a convention with the emperor of Morocco—It is frustrated by England—Ballesteros cooped up under the guns of Gibraltar by Semelé and Godinot—Colonel Skerrett sails for Tarifa—The French march against Tarifa—Are stopped in the pass of La Pena by the fire of the British ships—They retire from San Roque—General Godinot shoots himself—General Hill surprises general Girard at Aroyo Molino, and returns to the Alentejo—French reinforced in Estremadura—Their movements checked by insubordination amongst the troops—Hill again advances—Endeavours to surprise the French at Merida—Fine conduct of captain Neveux—Hill marches to Almendralejos to fight Drouet—The latter retires—Phillipon sends a party from Badajoz to forage the banks of the Guadiana—Colonel Ambercrombie defeats a squadron of cavalry at Fuente del Maestro—Hill returns to the Alentejo.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.

THE affairs of these provinces were so intimately connected, that they cannot be treated separately, wherefore, taking Soult's position at Seville as the centre of a vast system, I will show how, from thence, he dealt his powerful blows around, and struggled, even as a consuming fire, which none could smother though many tried.

Seville the base of his movements, and the storehouse of his army was fortified with temporary citadels, which, the people being generally submissive, were tenable against desultory attacks. From this point he maintained his line of communication, with the army of Portugal, through Estremadura, and with Madrid through La Mancha; and from this point he sustained the most diversified operations on all parts of a circle, which embraced the Condado de Niebla, Grenada, Cordoba, and Estremadura.

The Niebla, which furnished large supplies, was the most vulnerable point, because from thence the allies might intercept the navigation of the river Guadalquivir, and so raise the blockade of Cadiz; and the frontier of Portugal would cover the assembly of the troops until the moment of attack. Moreover, expeditions from Cadiz to the mouth of the Guadiana were as we have seen frequent. Nevertheless, when Blake and Ballesteros had been driven from Ayamonte, in July and August, the French were masters of the Condado with the exception of the castle of Paymago, wherefore Soult, dreading the autumnal pestilence, did not keep more than twelve hundred men on that side.

The blockade of the Isla was always maintained

by Victor, whose position formed an irregular crescent, extending from San Lucar de Barameda, on the right, to Conil on the left, and running through Xeres, Arcos, Medina, Sidonia, and Chiclana. But that marshal while thus posted was in a manner blockaded himself. In the Isla, including the Anglo-Portuguese division, there were never less than sixteen thousand troops, who, having the command of the sea, could at any moment land on the flanks of the French. The *Partidas*, although neither numerous nor powerful, often impeded the intercourse with Seville; the *Serranos* of the Ronda and the regular forces at Algeiras issuing, as it were, from the fortress of Gibraltar, cut the communication with Grenada; and as Tarifa was still held by the allies, for general Campbell would never relinquish that important point, the fresh supplies of cattle, drawn from the great plain called the *Campaña de Tarifa*, were straitened. Meanwhile the expeditions to Estremadura and Murcia, the battles of Barosa and Albuera, and the rout of Baza, had employed all the disposable part of the army of the south; hence Victor's corps, scarcely strong enough to preserve its own fortified position, could make no progress in the attack of the Isla. This weakness of the French army being well known in Cadiz, the safety of that city was no longer doubtful, a part of the British garrison therefore joined lord Wellington's army, and Blake as we have seen carried his Albuera soldiers to Valencia.

In Grenada the fourth corps, which, after the departure of Sebastiani, was commanded by general Laval, had two distinct tasks to fulfil. The one to defend the eastern frontier from the Murcian army; the other to maintain the coast line, beyond the Alpujaras, against the efforts of the *Partidas* of those mountains, against the *Serranos* of the Ronda, and against the expeditionary armies from Cadiz and from Algeiras. However, the defeat at Baza, and the calling off of Mahi, Freire and Montijo to aid the Valencian operations, secured the Grenadan frontier; and Martin Carera, who was left there with a small force, having pushed his partizan excursions rashly, was killed in a skirmish at Lorca about the period when Valencia surrendered.

Cordoba was generally occupied by a division of five or six thousand men, who were ready to operate on the side of Estremadura, or on that of Murcia, and meanwhile chased the *Partidas*, who were more numerous there than in other parts, and were also connected with those of La Mancha.

Estremadura was the most difficult field of operation. There Badajos, an advanced point, was to be supplied and defended from the most formidable army in the Peninsula; there the communications with Madrid, and with the army of Portugal, were to be maintained by the way of Truxillo; and there the fifth French corps, commanded by Drouet, had to collect its subsistence from a ravaged country; to preserve its communications over the Sierra Morena with Seville; to protect the march of monthly convoys to Badajos; to observe the corps of general Hill, and to oppose the enterprises of Morillo's Spanish army, which was becoming numerous and bold.

Neither the Spanish nor British divisions could prevent Drouet from sending convoys to Badajos, because of the want of bridges on the Guadiana, below the fortress, but Morillo incommoded his foraging parties; for being posted at Valencia de Alcantara, and having his retreat upon Portugal always secure, he vexed the country about Caceres, and even pushed his incursions to Truxillo. The French general, therefore, kept a strong detachment beyond the Guadiana, but this exposed his troops to Hill's enterprises; and that bold and vigilant commander having ten thousand excellent troops, and being well instructed by Wellington, was a very dangerous neighbour.

Marmont's position in the valley of the Tagus; the

construction of the forts and bridge at Almaraz, which enabled him to keep a division at Truxillo, and connected him with the army of the south, tended indeed to hold Hill in check, and strengthened the French position in Estremadura; nevertheless, Drouet generally remained near Zafra with his main body, because from thence he could more easily make his retreat good to the Morena, or advance to Merida and Badajos as occasion required.

Such was the state of military affairs on the different parts of the circle round Seville, at the period when Suchet invaded Valencia, and Wellington blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; and to support his extensive operations, the Duke of Dalmatia, if his share of the reinforcements which entered Spain in July and August had joined him, would have had about a hundred thousand troops, of which ninety thousand men and fourteen thousand horses were French. But the reinforcements were detained in the different governments, and the actual number of French present with the eagles was not more than sixty-seven thousand.

The first corps contained twenty thousand; the fourth and fifth about eleven thousand each; the garrison of Badajos was five thousand; twenty thousand formed a disposable reserve, and the rest of the force consisted of "*Escopeters*" and civic guards, who were chiefly employed in the garrisons and police. Upon pressing occasions, Soult could therefore take the field at any point, with twenty-four or twenty-five thousand men, and in Estremadura, on very pressing occasions, with even a greater number of excellent troops well and powerfully organized. The manner in which this great army was paralysed in the latter part of 1811, shall now be shown.

In October Drouet was in the Morena, and Girard at Merida, watching Morillo, who was in Caceres, when Soult, who had just returned to Seville after his Murcian expedition, sent three thousand men to Fregenal, seemingly to menace the Alentejo. General Hill therefore recalled his brigades from the right bank of the Tagus, and concentrated his whole corps behind the Campo Maior on the 9th.

The 11th Girard and Drouet advanced, the Spanish cavalry retired from Caceres, the French drove Morillo to *Caza de Cantellana*, and every thing indicated a serious attack; but at this moment Soult's attention was attracted by the appearance of Ballesteros in the Ronda, and he recalled the force from Fregenal. Drouet, who had reached Merida, then retired to Zafra, leaving Girard with a division and some cavalry near Caceres.

Ballesteros had disembarked at Algeiras on the 11th of September, and immediately marched with his own and Beguine's troops, in all four thousand men, to Ximena, raising fresh levies and collecting the *Serranos* of the Ronda as he advanced. On the 18th he had endeavoured to succour the castle of Alcala de Gazules, where Beguines had a garrison, but a French detachment from Chiclana had already reduced that post, and after some skirmishing both sides fell back, the one to Chiclana, the other to Ximena.

At this time six thousand French were collected at Ubrique, intending to occupy the sea-coast, from Algeiras to Conil, in furtherance of a great project which Soult was then meditating, and by which he hoped to effect, not only the entire subjection of Andalusia, but the destruction of the British power in the Peninsula. But this design, which shall hereafter be explained more fully, required several preliminary operations, amongst the most important of which was the capture of Tarifa, for that place, situated in the narrowest part of the straits, furnished either a protection, or a dangerous point of offence, to the Mediterranean trade, following the relations of its possessor with England. It affected, as we have seen, the supplies of the French

before the Isla; it was from its nearness, and from the run of the current, the most convenient and customary point for trading with Morocco; it menaced the security of Ceuta, and it possessed, from ancient recollections, a species of feudal superiority over the smaller towns, and ports along the coast, which would have given the French, if they had taken it, a moral influence of some consequence.

Soult had in August despatched a confidential officer from Conil to the African coast to negotiate with the Barbaric emperor, and the latter had agreed to a convention, by which he engaged to exclude British agents from his court; and to permit vessels of all nations to use the Moorish flag to cover their cargoes while carrying to the French those supplies hitherto sent to the allies, provided Soult would occupy Tarifa as a *dépôt*. This important convention was on the point of being ratified, when the opportune arrival of some unusually magnificent presents from England, turned the scale against the French: their agent was then dismissed, the English supplies were increased, and Mr. Stuart entered into a treaty for the purchase of horses to remount the allied cavalry.

Although foiled in this attempt, Soult, calculating on the capricious nature of barbarians, resolved to fulfil his part by the capture of Tarifa; hence it was, that when Ballesteros appeared at Ximena, he arrested the movement of Drouet against the Alemtejo, and sent troops from Seville by Ubrique against the Spanish general, whose position besides being extremely inconvenient to the first and fourth corps, was likely to affect the taking of Tarifa. Ballesteros, if reinforced, might also have become very dangerous to the blockade of Cadiz, by intercepting the supplies from the Campiña de Tarifa, and still more by menacing Victor's communications with Seville, along the Guadalquivir. A demonstration by the allies in the Isla de Leon arrested the march of these French troops for a moment, but on the 14th eight thousand men under generals Godinot and Sémélé advanced upon St. Roque and Algezirás. The inhabitants of those places immediately fled to the green island, and Ballesteros took refuge under Gibraltar, where his flanks were covered by the gun-boats of the place. The garrison was too weak to assist him with men, and thus cooped up, he lived upon the resources of the place, while efforts were therefore made to draw off the French by harassing their flanks. The naval means were not sufficient to remove his whole army to another quarter, but seven hundred were transported to Manilba, where the Seranos and some Partidas had assembled on the left of the French, and at the same time twelve hundred British troops with four guns under colonel Skerret, and two thousand Spaniards, under Copons, sailed from Cadiz to Tarifa to act upon the French right.

Copons was driven back by a gale of wind, but Skerret arrived the 17th. The next day Godinot sent a detachment against him, but the sea-road by which it marched was so swept with the guns of the Tuscan frigate, aided by the boats of the Stately, that the French after losing some men returned. Then Godinot and Sémélé being in dispute, and without provisions, retreated; they were followed by Ballesteros' cavalry as far as Ximena, where the two generals separated in great anger, and Godinot having reached Seville shot himself. This failure in the south unsettled Soult's plans, and was followed by a heavier disaster in Estremadura.

SURPRISE OF AROYO MOLINO.

When Drouet had retired to Zafra, Hill received orders from Wellington to drive Girard away from Cáceres, that Morillo might forage that country. For this purpose he assembled his corps at Albuquerque on the 23d, and Morillo brought the fifth Spanish army to

Aliseda on the Salor. Girard was then at Cáceres with an advanced guard at Aroyo de Puerco, but on the 24th Hill occupied Aliseda and Casa de Cantillana, and the Spanish cavalry drove the French from Aroyo de Puerco. The 26th at day-break Hill entered Malpartida de Cáceres, and his cavalry pushed back that of the enemy. Girard then abandoned Cáceres, but the weather was wet and stormy, and Hill, having no certain knowledge of the enemy's movements, halted for the night at Malpartida.

On the morning of the 27th the Spaniards entered Cáceres; the enemy was tracked to Torre Mocha on the road to Merida; and the British general, hoping to intercept their line of march, pursued by a cross road, through Aldea de Cano and Casa de Don Antonio. During this movement intelligence was received that the French general had halted at Aroyo Molino, leaving a rear-guard at Albala, on the main road to Cáceres, which proved that he was ignorant of the new direction taken by the allies, and only looked to a pursuit from Cáceres. Hill immediately seized the advantage, and by a forced march reached Alcuesca in the night, being then within a league of Aroyo de Molinos.

This village was situated in a plain, and behind it a sierra or ridge of rocks, rose in the form of a crescent, about two miles wide on the chord. One road led directly from Alcuesca upon Aroyo, another entered it from the left, and three led from it to the right. The most distant of the last was the Truxillo road, which rounded the extremity of the sierra; the nearest was the Merida road, and between them was that of Medellín.

During the night, though the weather was dreadful, no fires were permitted in the allied camp; and at two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, the troops moved to a low ridge, half a mile from Aroyo, under cover of which they formed three bodies; the infantry on the wings and the cavalry in the centre. The left column then marched straight upon the village, the right marched towards the extreme point of the sierra, where the road to Truxillo turned the horn of the crescent; the cavalry kept its due place between both.

One brigade of Girard's division, having marched at four o'clock by the road of Medellín, was already safe, but Dombrowski's brigade and the cavalry of Briche were still in the place; the horses of the rear-guard, unbridled, were tied to the olive-trees, and the infantry were only gathering to form on the Medellín road outside the village. Girard himself was in his quarters, waiting for his horse, when two British officers galloped down the street, and in an instant all was confusion; the cavalry bridled their horses, and the infantry run to their alarming posts. But a thick mist rolled down the craggy mountain, a terrifying shout, drowning even the clatter of the elements arose on the blast, and with the driving storm came the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments, charging down the street. Then the French rear-guard of cavalry, fighting and struggling hard, were driven to the end of the village, and the infantry, hastily forming their squares, covered the main body of the horsemen which gathered on their left.

The seventy-first immediately lined the garden-walls, and opened a galling fire on the nearest square, while the ninety-second filing out of the streets formed upon the French right; the fiftieth regiment closely following, secured the prisoners in the village, and the rest of the column, headed by the Spanish cavalry, skirted the outside of the houses, and endeavoured to intercept the line of retreat. The guns soon opened on the French squares, the thirteenth dragoons captured their artillery, the ninth dragoons and German hussars, charged their cavalry and entirely dispersed it with great loss; but Girard, an intrepid officer, although wounded, still kept his infantry together, and continued

his retreat by the Truxillo road. The right column of the allies was however already in possession of that line, the cavalry and artillery were close upon the French flank, and the left column, having re-formed, was again coming up fast; Girard's men were falling by fifties, and his situation was desperate, yet he would not surrender, but giving the word to disperse, endeavoured to escape by scaling the almost inaccessible rocks of the sierra. His pursuers, not less obstinate, immediately divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills at an easier part beyond his left, the thirty-ninth regiment and Ashworth's Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo road; the twenty-eighth and thirty-fourth, led by general Howard, followed him step by step up the rocks, and prisoners were taken every moment, until the pursuers, heavily loaded, were unable to continue the trial of speed with men who had thrown away their arms and packs. Girard, Dombrowski, and Briche, escaped at first to San Hernando, and Zorita, in the Guadalupe mountains, after which, crossing the Guadiana at Orellano on the 9th of November, they rejoined Drouet with about six hundred men, the remains of three thousand. They were said to be the finest troops then in Spain, and indeed their resolution not to surrender in such an appalling situation was no mean proof of their excellence.

The trophies of this action were the capture of twelve or thirteen hundred prisoners, including general Bron, and the prince of Aremberg; all the French artillery, baggage, and commissariat, together with a contribution just raised; and during the fight, a Portuguese brigade, being united to Penne Villamur's cavalry was sent to Merida, where some stores were found. The loss of the allies was not more than seventy killed and wounded, but one officer, lieutenant Strenowitz, was taken. He was distinguished by his courage and successful enterprises, but he was an Austrian, who having abandoned the French army in Spain to join Julian Sanchez' Partida, was liable to death by the laws of war; having been however originally forced into the French service he was, in reality, no deserter. General Hill, anxious to save him, applied frankly to general Drouet, and such was the latter's good temper, that while smarting under this disaster he released his prisoner.

Girard was only deprived of his division, which was given to general Barois, yet in a military point of view his offence was unpardonable. He knew two or three days before, that general Hill was near him; he knew that there was a good road from Malpartida to Alcuésca, because he had himself passed it coming from Caceres; and yet he halted at Aroyo de Molino without necessity, and without sending out even a patrol upon his flank, thus sacrificing two thousand brave men. Napoleon's clemency was therefore great, and yet not misplaced, for Girard, afterwards, repaid it by his devotion at the battle of Lutzen when the emperor's star was on the wane. On the other hand general Hill neglected no precaution, let no advantage escape; and to good arrangements added celerity of movement, with the utmost firmness and vigour of execution. His troops seconded him as he merited; and here was made manifest the advantage of possessing the friendship of a people so strongly influenced by the instincts of revenge as the Peninsulars; for, during the night of the 27th, every Spaniard in Aroya, as well as in Alcuésca, knew that the allies were at hand, and not one was found so base or so indiscreet as to betray the fact.

This blow being struck, Hill returned to his old quarters, and the Spanish troops fell back behind the Salor, but the report of Girard's disaster set all the French corps in motion. Drouet re-occupied Caceres with a thousand men; Foy passed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 15th of November, and moved to Truxillo; a convoy entered Badajos from Zafra on the 12th, a

second on the 20th, and Soult, while collecting troops in Seville, directed Phillipon to plant all the ground under the guns at Badajos with potatoes and corn. Every thing seemed to indicate a powerful attack upon Hill, when a serious disturbance amongst the Polish troops, at Ronquillo, obliged Soult to detach men from Seville to quell it. When that was effected, a division of four thousand entered Estremadura, and Drouet, whose corps was thus raised to fourteen thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, on the fifth of December advanced to Almendralejos, and the 18th his advanced guard occupied Merida.* At the same time Marmont concentrated part of his army at Toledo, from whence Montbrun, as we have seen, was directed to aid Suchet at Valencia, and Soult with the same view sent ten thousand men to the Despeños Peros.

Drouet's movements were, however, again stopped by some insubordination in the fifth corps. And as it was now known that Soult's principal object was to destroy Ballesteros, and take Tarifa, Hill again advanced, partly to protect Morillo from Drouet, partly to save the resources of Estremadura, partly to make a diversion in favour of Ballesteros and Tarifa, and in some sort also for Valencia. With this view he entered Estremadura by Albuquerque on the 27th of December, and having received information that the French, untaught by their former misfortunes were not vigilant, he made a forced march in hopes to surprise them. On the 28th he passed Villar del Rey and San Vincente and reached Nava de Membrillos, where he fell in with three hundred French infantry, and a few husars, part of a foraging party, the remainder of which was at a village two leagues distant. A patrol gave an alarm, the French retreated towards Merida, and were closely followed by four hundred of the allied cavalry, who had orders to make every effort to stop their march; but to use the words of general Hill, "the intrepid and admirable manner in which the enemy retreated, the infantry formed in square, and favoured as he was by the nature of the country of which he knew how to take the fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting any thing against him." Captain Neveux, the able officer who commanded on this occasion, reached Merida with a loss of only forty men, all killed or wounded by the fire of the artillery; but the French at Merida immediately abandoned their unfinished works, and evacuated that town in the night, leaving behind some bread and a quantity of wheat.

From Merida, Hill intending to fight Drouet, marched on the 1st of January to Almendralejos, where he captured another field store; but the French general, whose troops were scattered, fell back towards Zafra; the weather was so bad, and the roads so deep, that general Hill with the main body halted while colonel Abercrombie with a detachment of Portuguese and German cavalry followed the enemy's rear-guard. Meanwhile Phillipon, who never lost an advantage, sent, either the detachment which had escorted the convoy to Badajos, or some Polish troops with whom he was discontented, down the Portuguese frontier on the right of the Guadiana, by Moura, Mourão, and Serpe, with orders to drive the herds of cattle from those places into the Sierra Morena.

Abercrombie reached Fuente del Maestro, on the evening of the 3d, where, meeting with a stout squadron of the enemy, a stiff charge took place, and the French out-numbered and flanked on both sides were overthrown with a loss of thirty men. But Drouet was now in full retreat for Monasterio, and Morillo moving upon Medellin, took post at San Benito. Thus the allies remained masters of Estremadura until the 13th of January, when Marmont's divisions moved by the valley of the Tagus towards the eastern frontier of

* Mr. Stuart's Papers, MSS.

Portugal; Hill then returned to Portalegre and sent a division over the Tagus to Castello Branco. Drouet immediately returned to Llerena and his cavalry supported by a detachment of infantry marched against Morillo, but that general, instead of falling back when Hill did, had made a sudden incursion to La Mancha, and was then attacking the castle of Almagro. There, however, he was so completely defeated by general Treillard that, flying to Horeajo in the Guadalupe mountains, although he reached it on the 18th, his fugitives were still coming in on the 21st, and his army remained for a long time in the greatest disorder.

CHAPTER V.

Soult resolves to besiege Tarifa—Ballesteros is driven a second time under the guns of Gibraltar—Laval invests Tarifa—Siege of Tarifa—The assault repulsed—Siege is raised—The true history of this siege exposed—Colonel Skerrett not the author of the success.

WHILE the events, recorded in the foregoing chapter, were passing in Estremadura, the south of Andalusia was the scene of more important operations. Soult, persisting in his design against Tarifa, had given orders to assemble a battering train, and directed general Laval with a strong division of the 4th corps to move from Antequera upon San Roque. Skerrett was then menacing the communications of general Semélé on the side of Vejer de Frontera, and Ballesteros had obtained some success against that general at Bornos on the 5th of November; but Skerrett finding that Copons instead of four thousand had only brought seven hundred men, returned to Tarifa on the approach of some French from Conil.

Semélé, being thus reinforced, obliged Ballesteros, on the 27th, again to take refuge under the walls of Gibraltar, which he reached just in time, to avoid a collision with Laval's column from Antequera. Semélé's troops did not follow very close, and a combined attack upon Laval by the divisions of Ballesteros, Skerrett, and Copons, was projected. The two latter with a part of the troops under Ballesteros, were actually embarked on the 29th of November for the purpose of landing at Manilba, in pursuance of this scheme, when Semélé's column came in sight, and Skerrett and Copons instantly returned to Tarifa.

Ballesteros remained at Gibraltar, a heavy burthen upon that fortress, and his own troops without shelter from the winter rain, wherefore general Campbell proposed to send them, in British vessels, to renew the attempt against Malaga, which had formerly failed under Lord Blayney. On the 12th of January, at the very moment of embarking, the French retired from before Gibraltar, by the Puerto de Ojen, a grand pass connecting the plains of Gibraltar and the valleys of the Guadarranque, with the great and rich plain called the Campiña de Tarifa; and with the gorge of Los Pedragosos, which is the eastern entrance to the pastures called the Vega de Tarifa. This movement was preparatory to the siege of Tarifa; and as the battering train was already within five leagues of that place, Skerrett proposed to seize it by a combined operation from Cadiz, Tarifa, Gibraltar, and Los Barios, where Ballesteros had now taken post. This combination was however on two wide a scale to be adopted in all its parts; Ballesteros indeed fell on the enemy by surprise at the pass of Ojen, and Skerrett and Copons received orders from general Campbell to take advantage of this diversion; but the former, seeing that his own plan was not adopted to its full extent, would not stir, and the Spaniards after a skirmish of six hours retired. Laval then left fifteen hundred men to observe Ballesteros, and placing a detachment at Vejes

to cover his right flank, threaded Los Pedragosos and advanced against Tarifa.

This town was scarcely expected by the French to make any resistance. It was encircled with towers, which were connected by an ancient archery wall, irregular in form without a ditch, and so thin as to offer no resistance even to field artillery. To the north and east, some high ridges flanked, and seemed entirely to command the weak rampart; but the English engineer had observed that the nearest ridges formed, at half pistol-shot, a natural glacis, the plane of which, one point excepted, intersected the crest of the parapet with great nicety; and to this advantage was added a greater number of towers, better flanks, and more powerful resources for an interior defence. He judged therefore that the seemingly favourable nature of the ridges combined with other circumstances, would scarcely fail to tempt the enemy to commence their trenches on that side. With a view to render the delusion unavoidable, he strengthened the western front of the place, rendered the access to it uneasy, by demolishing the main walls and removing the flooring of an isolated suburb on the north west; and an out-work, of a convent which was situated about a hundred yards from that place, and to the east of the suburb. This done, he prepared an internal defence, which rendered the storming of the breach the smallest difficulty to be encountered; but to appreciate his design the local peculiarities must be described.

Tarifa was cloven in two by the bed of a periodical torrent which entering at the east, passed out at the opposite point. This stream was barred, at its entrance, by a tower with a portcullis, in front of which palisades were planted across the bed of the water. The houses within the walls were strongly built and occupied inclined planes rising from each side of the torrent, and at the exit of the latter there were two massive structures, forming part of the walls called the tower and castle of the Gusmans, both of which looked up the hollow formed by the meeting of the inclined planes at the stream. From these structures, first a sandy neck of land, and then a causeway, the whole being about six hundred yards long, joined the town to an island, or rather promontory, about two thousand yards in circumference, with perpendicular sides, which forbade any entrance save by the causeway; and at the island end of the latter there was an unfinished entrenchment and battery.

On the connecting neck of land were some sand hills, the highest of which, called the Catalina, was scarped and crowned with a slight field work, containing a twelve-pounder. This hill covered the causeway, and in conjunction with the tower of the Gusmans, which was armed with a ship eighteen-pounder, flanked the western front, and commanded all the ground between the walls and the island. The gun in the tower of the Gusmans also shot clear over the town on to the slope where the French batteries were expected to be raised; and in addition to these posts, the Stately ship of the line, the Druid frigate, and several gun and mortar-boats were anchored in the most favourable situation for flanking the enemy's approaches.

Reverting then to the head of the defence, it will be seen, that while the ridges on the eastern fronts, and the hollow bed of the torrent, which offered cover for troops moving to the assault, deceitfully tempted the enemy to that side; the flanking fire of the convent, the ruins of the suburb, the hill of the Catalina, and the appearance of the shipping deterred them even from examining the western side, and as it were, forcibly urged them towards the eastern ridge where the English engineer wished to find them. There he had even marked their ground, and indicated the situ-

ation of the breach; that is to say, close to the entrance of the torrent, where the hollow meeting of the inclined planes rendered the inner depth of the walls far greater than the outer depth; where he had loop-holed the houses, opened communications to the rear, barricaded the streets, and accumulated obstacles. The enemy after forcing the breach would thus have been confined between the houses on the inclined planes, exposed on each side to the musketry from the loop-holes and windows, and in front to the fire of the tower of the Gusmans, which looked up the bed of the torrent. Thus disputing every inch of ground, the garrison could at worst have reached the castle and tower of the Gusmans, which being high and massive were fitted for rear-guards to cover the evacuation of the place, and were provided with ladders for the troops to descend and retreat to the island under cover of the Catalina.

The artillery available for the defence appeared very powerful, for besides that of the shipping, and the guns in the Catalina, there were in the island twelve pieces comprising four twenty-four-pounders, and two ten-inch mortars; and in the town there were six field-pieces and four coehorns on the east front. An eighteen-pounder was on the Gusmans, a howitzer on the portcullis tower, and two field-pieces were kept behind the town in reserve for sallies; but most of the artillery in the island was mounted after the investment, so that two twenty-four-pounders and two mortars only, could take part in the defence of the town; and as the walls and towers of the latter were too weak and narrow to sustain heavy guns, only three field-pieces and the coehorns did in fact reply to the enemy's fire.

SIEGE OF TARIFA.

The garrison, including six hundred Spanish infantry and one hundred horse of that nation, amounted to two thousand five hundred men, and was posted in the following manner. Seven hundred were in the island, one hundred in the Catalina, two hundred in the convent, and fifteen hundred in the town.

On the 19th of December the enemy having driven in the advanced posts, were encountered with a sharp skirmish, and designedly led towards the eastern front.

The 20th the place was invested, but on the 21st a picquet of French troops having incautiously advanced towards the western front, captain Wren of the eleventh suddenly descended from the Catalina and carried them off. In the night the enemy approached close to the walls, but the next morning captain Wren again came down from the Catalina, and, at the same time, the troops sallied from the convent, with a view to discover the position of the French advanced posts. So daring was this sally that Mr. Welstead of the eighty-second actually pushed into one of their camps and captured a field-piece there; and although he was unable to bring it off, in face of the French reserves, the latter were drawn by the skirmish under the fire of the ships, of the island, and of the town, whereby they suffered severely and could with difficulty recover the captured piece of artillery from under the guns of the north-east tower.

In the night of the 22d the anticipations of the British engineer were realized. The enemy broke ground in two places, five hundred yards from the eastern front, and assiduously pushed forward their approaches until the 26th; but always under a destructive fire, to which they replied with musketry, and with their wall-pieces, which killed several men, and would have been very dangerous, but for the sand-bags which captain Nicolas, the chief engineer at Cadiz, had copiously supplied. This advantage was however counterbalanced by the absence of the ships which were all driven away in a gale on the 23rd.

On the 27th the French battering-train arrived, and on the 29th the sixteen-pounders opened against the town, and the howitzers against the island. These last did little damage beyond dismounting the gun in the tower of the Gusmans, which was however quickly re-established; but the sixteen-pounders brought the old wall down in such flakes, that in a few hours a wide breach was effected, a little to the left of the portcullis tower, looking from the camp.

The place was now exposed both to assault and escalade, but behind the breach the depth to the street was above fourteen feet, the space below was covered with iron window-gratings, having every second bar turned up, the houses there, and behind all points liable to escalade, were completely prepared and garrisoned, and the troops were dispersed all round the ramparts, each regiment having its own quarter assigned. The Spanish and forty-seventh British regiment guarded the breach, and on their right some riflemen prolonged the line. The eighty-seventh regiment occupied the portcullis tower and extended along the rampart to the left.

In the night of the 29th the enemy fired salvos of grape on the breach, but the besieged cleared the foot of it between the discharges.

The 30th the breaching fire was renewed, the wall was broken for sixty feet, and the whole breach offered an easy ascent, yet the besieged again cleared away the rubbish, and in the night were fast augmenting the defences behind, when a heavy rain filled the bed of the river, and the torrent bringing down, from the French camp, planks, fascines, gabions, and dead bodies, broke the palisades with a shock, bent the portcullis backward, and with the surge of the waters even injured the defences behind the breach: a new passage was thus opened in the wall, yet such was the vigour of the besieged, that the damage was repaired before the morning, and the troops calmly and confidently awaited

THE ASSAULT.

The waters subsided in the night as quickly as they had risen, but at daylight a living stream of French grenadiers glided swiftly down the bed of the river, and as if assured of victory, arrived, without shout or tumult, within a few yards of the walls, when, instead of quitting the hollow, to reach the breach, they, like the torrent of the night, continued their rapid course and dashed against the portcullis. The British soldiers, who had hitherto been silent and observant, as if at a spectacle which they were expected to applaud, now arose, and with a crashing volley smote the head of the French column! The leading officer, covered with wounds, fell against the portcullis and gave up his sword through the bars to colonel Gough; the French drummer, a gallant boy, who was beating the charge, dropped lifeless by his officer's side, and the dead and wounded filled the hollow. The remainder of the assailants then breaking out to the right and left, spread along the slopes of ground under the ramparts and opened a quick irregular musketry. At the same time, a number of men coming out of the trenches, leaped into pits digged in front, and shot fast at the garrison, but no escalade or diversion at the other points was made, and the storming column was dreadfully shattered. For the ramparts streamed forth fire, and from the north-eastern tower a field-piece, held in reserve expressly for the occasion, sent, at pistol-shot distance, a tempest of grape whistling through the French masses, which were swept away in such a dreadful manner, that they could no longer endure the destruction, but plunging once more into the hollow returned to their camp, while a shout of victory, mingled with the sound of musical instruments, passed round the wall of the town.

In this combat the allies lost five officers and thirty-one men, but the French dead covered all the slopes in front of the rampart, and choked the bed of the river, and ten wounded officers, of whom only one survived, were brought in by the breach. Skerrett, compassionating their sufferings and admiring their bravery, permitted Laval to fetch off the remainder; and the operations of the siege were then suspended, for both sides suffered severely from the weather. The rain partially ruined the French batteries, interrupted their communications, and stopped their supplies; on the other hand the torrent, again swelling, broke the stockades of the allies and injured their intrenchments, and some vessels, coming from Gibraltar with ammunition, were wrecked on the coast. Nevertheless a fresh assault was hourly expected until the night of the 4th, when, several cannon-shots being heard in the French camp, without any bullets reaching the town, it was judged that the enemy were destroying the guns previous to retreating. Soon afterwards large fires were observed, and at daylight the troops issuing out of the convent, drove the enemy from the batteries, and commenced a skirmish with the rear-guard; but a heavy storm impeded the action; the French conducted their retreat skilfully, and the British, after making a few prisoners, relinquished the pursuit. Nevertheless Laval's misfortunes did not end here. The privations his troops had endured in the trenches produced sickness; many men deserted, and it was computed, at the time, that the expedition cost the French not less than a thousand men, while the whole loss of the allies did not exceed one hundred and fifty.*

Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, but the true history of its defence cannot there be found. To hide the errors of the dead is not always a virtue, and when it involves injustice to the living it becomes a crime; colonel Skerrett has obtained the credit, but he was not the author of the success at Tarifa. He, and lord Proby, the second in command, were from the first impressed with a notion, that the place could not be defended and ought to be abandoned; all their proceedings tended to that end, and they would even have abandoned the island. At colonel Skerrett's express desire general Cooke had recalled him on the 18th, that is to say, the day before the siege commenced; and during its progress he neither evinced hopes of final success, nor made exertions to obtain it; in some instances he even took measures tending directly towards failure. To whom then was England indebted for this splendid achievement? The merit of the conception is undoubtedly due to general Campbell, the lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar. He first occupied Tarifa, and he also engaged the Spaniards to admit an English garrison into Ceuta, that the navigation of the straits and the coasting trade might be secured; for he was the only authority in the south of the Peninsula who appeared to understand the true value of those points. Finally, it was his imperious and even menacing orders, which prevented colonel Skerrett from abandoning Tarifa before the siege commenced.

General Campbell's resolution is the more to be admired, because Tarifa was, strictly speaking, not within his command, which did not extend beyond the walls of his own fortress; and he had also to contend against general Cooke, who claimed the controul of a garrison which was chiefly composed of troops from Cadiz. He acted also contrary to the opinion of lord Wellington, who, always averse to any serious co-operation with the Spaniards, as well knowing the latter would inevitably fail, and throw the burthen on the British in the hour of need, was in this instance more strongly influenced, because the reports of general Cooke, founded on colonel Skerrett's and lord Proby's representa-

tions, reprobated the defence of Tarifa. Thus misinformed of the real resources, and having no local knowledge of the place, lord Wellington judged, that the island only could be held—that Skerrett's detachment was not wanting for that purpose—and that without the island the enemy could not keep possession of Tarifa. Were they even to take both, he thought they could not retain them, while Ballesteros was in strength and succoured from Gibraltar, unless they also kept a strong force in those parts; finally, that the defence of the island was the least costly and the most certain. However, with that prudence, which always marked his proceedings, although he gave his opinion, he would not interfere from a distance, in a matter which could only be accurately judged of on the spot.

But the island had not a single house, and was defenceless; the rain alone, without reckoning the effects of the enemy's shells, would have gone near to force the troops away; and as the shipping could not always remain in the roadstead, the building of casemates and barracks, and storehouses for provisions and ammunition, would have been more expensive than the defence of the town. Tarifa was therefore an out-work to the island, and one so capable of a good defence that a much more powerful attack had been expected, and a more powerful resistance prepared by the English engineer; a defence not resting on the valour of the troops alone, but upon a skilful calculation of all the real resources, and all the chances.

That the value of the object was worth the risk may be gathered from this, that Soult, three months after the siege, thus expressed himself, "The taking of Tarifa will be more hurtful to the English and to the defenders of Cadiz, than the taking of Alican or even Badajos, where I cannot go without first securing my left and taking Tarifa."* And, besides the advantages already noticed as belonging to the possession of this place, it was close to Ceuta where there were a few British soldiers, but many French prisoners, and above two thousand discontented Spanish troops and galley-slaves; Ceuta, which was so neglected by the Spanish regency that a French general, a prisoner, did not hesitate to propose to the governor to give it up to Soult as his only means of avoiding starvation.† Neither would Soult have failed to strengthen himself at Tarifa in despite of Ballesteros, were it only to command the supplies of the Campiña, and those from Barbary which could but be brought to that port or to Conil: the latter was however seldom frequented by the Moors, because the run was long and precarious, whereas a favourable current always brought their craft well to Tarifa. Swarms of the French gun-boats would therefore soon have given Soult the command of the coasting trade, if not of the entire straits.

Tarifa then was worth the efforts made for its defence; and setting aside the courage and devotion of the troops, without which nothing could have been effected, the merit chiefly appertains to sir Charles Smith, the captain of engineers. That officer's vigour and capacity overmatched the enemy's strength without, and the weakness and cajolement of those who did not wish to defend it within. Skerrett could not measure a talent above his own mark, and though he yielded to Smith's energy, he did so with avowed reluctance, and dashed it with some wild actions, for which it is difficult to assign a motive; because he was not a dull man, and he was a brave man, as his death at Bergem-op-Zoon proved. But his military capacity was naught, and his mind did not easily catch another's enthusiasm. Tarifa was the commentary upon Tarragona.

During the siege, the engineer's works in front were

* General Campbell's Correspondence, MSS.

* Intercepted despatches, 17th April, 1812.

† Gen. Campbell's papers, MSS.

constantly impeded by colonel Skerrett; he would call off the labourers to prepare posts of retreat, and Smith's desire to open the north-gate, (which had been built up,) that the troops might have egress in case of escalade, was opposed to him, although there was no other point for the garrison to sally, save by the sea-gate which was near the castle. On the 29th of December a shell, fired from the eighteen-pounder in the tower of the Gusmans, having bursted too soon, killed or wounded one of the inhabitants, and a deputation of the citizens came to complain of the accident; colonel Skerrett, although the breach was then open, immediately ordered that gun, and a thirty-two-pound carronade, which at four hundred yards looked into the French batteries, to be dismounted and spiked! and it was done! To crown this absurd conduct, he assigned the charge of the breach entirely to the Spanish troops, and if Smith had not insisted upon posting the forty-seventh British regiment along-side of them, this alone would have ruined the defence; because hunger, nakedness, and neglect, had broken the spirit of these poor men, and during the combat general Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant soldier.

To the British engineer, therefore, the praise of this splendid action is chiefly due; because he saw from the first all the resources of the place, and with equal firmness and talent developed them, notwithstanding the opposition of his superiors; because at the same time he, by skilful impositions, induced the enemy (whose attack should have embraced the suburbs and the north-west salient angle of the place) to open his trenches on the east, where the besieged, under the appearance of weakness, had concentrated all their strength; finally, because he repressed despondency where he failed to infuse confidence. The second in merit was captain Mitchell, of the artillery; because in the management of that arm for the defence of the town, his talent and enterprise were conspicuous, especially during the assault; nor can the result of this last event be taken as the just measure of either officer's

merits, seeing that a prolonged siege and a more skilful and powerful attack was expected. In the enemy's camp was found the French engineer's sketch for a renewed operation by a cautious and extensive system of mines and breaches; but nothing was there laid down that had not been already anticipated, and provided against by his British opponents. If then the defence of Tarifa was a great and splendid exploit, and none can doubt that it was, those who conceived, planned, and executed it should have all the glory. Amongst those persons colonel Skerrett has no right to be placed; yet, such are the errors of power, that he was highly applauded for what he did not do, and general Campbell was severely rebuked by lord Liverpool for having risked his Majesty's troops!

The French displayed courage but no skill. For two days, their heavy howitzers had been directed vaguely against the interior of the town, and the distant island, whither the unfortunate people fled from their shattered and burning houses. A portion of the shells thus thrown away in cruelty would have levelled the north-east tower with the ground, and the French were aware of its importance; but throughout the siege their operations were mastered by the superior ability of the engineer and artillery officers opposed to them.

In the expectation that a more powerful attack would be made in the spring, general Campbell directed casemates and splinter proofs to be made in the island, but Skerrett's troops were recalled to Cadiz, which now contained nearly eight thousand British, exclusive of fifteen hundred of these destined for Carthage and Alicant. This arrangement was however soon changed, because the events of the war put Carthage out of the French line of operations, and the pestilence there caused the removal of the British troops. Neither was Tarifa again attacked; lord Wellington had predicted that it would not, and on sure grounds, for he was then contemplating a series of operations, which were calculated to change the state of the war, and which shall be set forth in the next book.

BOOK XVI.

CHAPTER I.

Political situation of king Joseph—Political state of Spain—Political state of Portugal—Military operations—Julian Sanchez captures the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo—General Thiebault introduces a convoy and a new governor into that fortress—Difficulty of military operations on the Agueda—The allied army, being pressed for provisions, takes wide cantonments, and preparations are secretly made for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Up to this period, the invasion, although diversified by occasional disasters on the part of the invaders, had been progressive. The tide, sometimes flowing, sometimes ebbing, had still gained upon the land, and wherever the Spaniards had arrested its progress, it was England that urged their labour and renovated their tired strength; no firm barrier, no solid dike, had been opposed to its ravages, save by the British general in Portugal, and even there the foundation of his work, sapped by the trickling waters of folly and intrigue, was sliding away. By what a surprising effort of courage and judgment he secured it shall now be

shown; and as the field operations, in this war, were always influenced more by political considerations, than by military principles, it will be necessary first to place the general's situation with respect to the former in its true light.

Political situation of king Joseph. France, abounding in riches and power, was absolute mistress of Europe from the Pyrenees to the Vistula; but Napoleon, resolute to perfect his continental system for the exclusion of British goods, now found himself, in the pursuit of that object, hastening rapidly to a new war, and one so vast, that even his force was strained to meet it. The Peninsula already felt relief from this cause. The dread of his arrival ceased to influence the operations of the allied army in Portugal, many able French officers were recalled, and as it was known that the imperial guards, and the Polish troops, were to withdraw from Spain, the scale of offensive projects was necessarily contracted. Conscripts and young soldiers instead of veterans, and in diminished numbers, were now to be expected; and in the French army there was

a general, and oppressive sense, of the enormous exertion which would be required to bring two such mighty wars to a happy conclusion. On the other hand, the Peninsulars were cheered by seeing so powerful a monarch, as the czar, rise in opposition to Napoleon, and the English general found the principal basis of his calculations realized by this diversion. He had never yet been strong enough to meet eighty thousand French troops in battle, even under a common general; but his hopes rose when he saw the great warrior of the age, not only turning himself from the contest, but withdrawing from it a reserve of four hundred thousand veterans, whose might the whole world seemed hardly able to withstand.

The most immediate effect, however, which the approaching contest with Russia produced in the Peninsula, was the necessity of restoring Joseph to his former power over the French armies. While the emperor was absent from Paris, the supreme controul of the operations could only be placed in the hands of the monarch of Spain; yet this was only to reproduce there, and with greater virulence, the former jealousies and disputes. Joseph's Spanish policy remained unchanged; the pride of the French generals was at least equal to his, prettexts for disputes were never wanting on either side, and the mischievous nature of those disputes may be gathered from one example. In November the king being pressed for money, sold the magazines of corn collected near Toledo, for the army of Portugal, and without which the latter could not exist; Marmont, regardless of the political scandal, immediately sent troops to recover the magazines by force, and desired the purchasers to reclaim their money from the monarch.

Political state of Spain. All the intrigues and corruptions and conflicting interests before described had increased in violence. The negotiations for the mediation of England with the colonies, were not ended; Carlotta still pressed her claims; and the division between the liberals and serviles, as they were called, became daily wider. Cadiz was in 1811 the very focus of all disorder. The government was alike weak and dishonest, and used many pitiful arts to extract money from England. No subterfuge was too mean. When Blake was going with the fourth army to Estremadura previous to the battle of Albuera, the minister Baxi entreated the British envoy to grant a loan, or a gift, without which, he asserted, Blake could not move; Mr. Wellesley refused, because a large debt was already due to the legation, and the next morning a Spanish ship of war from America landed a million and a half of dollars!

In July, notwithstanding the victory of Albuera, the regency was held in universal contempt, both it and the cortes were without influence, and their conduct merited it. For although vast sums were continually received, and every service was famished, the treasury was declared empty, and there was no probability of any further remittances from America. The temper of the public was soured towards England, the press openly assailed the British character, and all things so evidently tended towards anarchy, that Mr. Wellesley declared "Spanish affairs to be then worse than they had been at any previous period of the war."

The cortes, at first swayed by priests and lawyers, who cherished the inquisition and were opposed to all free institutions, was now chiefly led by a liberal or rather democratic party, averse to the British influence; hence, in August a new constitution, quite opposed to the aristocratic principle, was promulgated. With the excellencies and defects of that instrument the present History has indeed little concern, but the results were not in accord with the spirit of the contrivance, and the evils affecting the war were rather increased by it; the democratic basis of the new constitution excited many

and bitter enemies, and the time and attention, which should have been bestowed upon the amelioration of the soldiers' condition, was occupied in factions, disputes, and corrupt intrigues.

That many sound abstract principles of government were clearly and vigorously laid down in the scheme of this constitution, cannot be denied, the complicated oppressions of the feudal system were swept away with a bold and just hand; but of what avail, as regarded the war, was the enunciation of principles which were never attempted to be reduced to practice? What encouragement was it to the soldier, to be told he was a free man, fighting for a constitution as well as for national independence, when he saw the authors of that constitution, corruptly revelling in the wealth which should have clothed, and armed, and fed him? What was nominal equality to him, when he saw incapacity rewarded, crimes and treachery unpunished in the rich, the poor and patriotic oppressed? He laughed to scorn those who could find time to form the constitution of a great empire, but could not find time or honesty to feed, or clothe, or arm the men who were to defend it!

The enemies of democracy soon spread many grievous reports of misfortunes and treachery, some true, some false; and at the most critical period of the war in Valencia, they endeavoured to raise a popular commotion to sweep away the cortes. The monks and friars, furious at the suppression of the inquisition, were the chief plotters every where; and the proceedings of Palacios, in concert with them, were only part of a church project, commenced all over Spain to resist the cortes. In October, Lardizabal, the other deposed regent, published at Alicante, a manifesto, in which he accused the cortes and the Cadiz writers of jacobinism, maintained the doctrine of passive obedience, and asserted, that the regents only took the oath to the cortes, because they could not count on the army or the people at Cadiz; otherwise they would cause the king's authority to be respected in their persons as his only legitimate representatives. This manifesto was declared treasonable, and a vessel was despatched to bring the offender to Cadiz; but the following day it was discovered, that the old council of Castile had also drawn up a manifesto similar in principle, and the persons sent by the cortes to seize the paper were told that it was destroyed. The protest of three members against it was however found, and five lawyers were selected from the cortes to try the guilty councillors and Lardizabal.

In November the public cry for a new regency became general, and it was backed by the English plenipotentiary. Nevertheless the matter was deferred upon divers prettexts, and meanwhile the democratic party gained strength in the cortes, and the anti-British feeling appeared more widely diffused than it really was; because some time elapsed before the church and aristocratic party discovered that the secret policy of England was the same as their own. It was so, however, even to the upholding of the inquisition, which it was ridiculously asserted had become objectionable only in name; as if, while the frame-work of tyranny existed, there could ever be wanting the will to fill it up. Necessity alone induced the British cabinet to put on a smooth countenance towards the cortes. In this state of affairs, the negotiation for the colonial mediation, was used by the Spaniards merely as a ground for demanding loans, subsidies, and succours in kind, which they used in fitting out new expeditions against the revolted colonists; the complaints of the British legation on this point were quite disregarded. At this time also Lapena was acquitted of misconduct at Barrosa, and would have been immediately re-employed, if the English minister had not threatened to quit Cadiz, and advised general Cooke to do the same.

Mr. Wellesley seeing the most fatal consequences to the war must ensue, if a stop was not put to the misconduct of the regency, had sent Mr. Vaughan, the secretary of legation, to acquaint the British cabinet with the facts, and to solicit a more firm and decided course of policy. Above all things he desired to have the subsidies settled by treaty, that the people of Spain might really know what England had done and was still doing for them; for on every occasion, arms, clothing, ammunition, loans, provisions, guns, stores, and even workmen and funds, to form foundries, were demanded and obtained by the Spanish government, and then wasted or embezzled, without the people benefiting, or even knowing of the generosity, or rather extravagance, with which they were supplied; while the receivers and wasters were heaping calumnies on the donors.

The regency question was at last seriously discussed in the cortes, and the deputy, Capmany, who if we may believe the partizans of Joseph, was anti-English in his heart, argued the necessity of this change on the ground of pleasing the British.* This excited great discontent, as he probably intended, and many deputies declared at first that they would not be dictated to by any foreign power; but the departure of Mr. Vaughan alarmed them, and a commission, formed to improve the mode of governing, was hastening the decision of the question, when Blake's disaster at Valencia completed the work. Carlotta's agent was active in her behalf, but the eloquent and honest Arguelles was opposed to him; and the cortes although they recognized her claim to the succession, denied her the regency, because of a previous decree which excluded all royal personages from that office.

On the 21st of January 1812, after a secret discussion of twenty-four hours, a new regency, to consist of five members, of which two were Americans, was proclaimed. The men chosen, were the duke of Infantado, then in England, Henry O'Donnell, admiral Villavicencio, Joachim de Mosquera, and Ignacios de Ribas; and each was to have the presidency by rotation for six months.

They commenced beneficially. O'Donnell was friendly to the British alliance, and proposed a military feast, to restore harmony between the English and Spanish officers; he made many changes in the department of war, and finances; consulted the British generals, and disbanding several bad regiments, incorporated the men with other battalions; he also reduced many inefficient and malignant colonels, and striking off from the pay lists all unemployed and absent officers, it was found that they were five thousand in number! Ballesteros was appointed captain-general of Andalusia and received the command of the fourth army, whose head-quarters were prudently removed to Algeiras; the troops were there increased, by drafts from Cadiz to ten or twelve thousand men, and a new army was set on foot in Murcia. Finally, to check trading with the French a general blockade of all the coast in their possession, from Rosas to St. Sebastian, was declared.

But it was soon discovered that the secret object was to obtain a loan from England, and as this did not succeed, and nothing good was ever permanent in Spanish affairs, the old disputes again broke out. The democratic spirit gained strength in the cortes; the anti-English party augmented; the press abounded in libels impugning the good faith of the British nation, especially with respect to Ceuta; for which however there was some plausible ground of suspicion, because the acquisition of that fortress had actually been proposed to lord Liverpool. The new regency, also as violent as their predecessors with respect to America, disregarded the mediation, and having secretly organ-

ized in Galicia an expedition against the colonies, supplied it with artillery furnished from England for the French war, and then, under another pretence, demanded money of the British minister to forward this iniquitous folly.

Political state of Portugal.—In October all the evils before described still existed, and were aggravated. The old disputes remained unsettled, the return of the royal family was put off, and the reforms in the military system, which Beresford had repaired to Lisbon to effect, were either thwarted or retarded by the regency. Mr. Stuart indeed forced the government to repair the bridges and roads in Beira, to throw some provisions into the fortresses; and, in despite of Redondo, the minister of finance, who, for the first time, now opposed the British influence, he made the regency substitute a military chest and commissariat, instead of the "Junta de Vivieres." But Forjas and Redondo then disputed for the custody of the new chest; and when Mr. Stuart explained to the one, that, as the intent was to separate the money of the army from that of the civil departments, his claims were incompatible with such an object; and to the other that the conduct of his own department was already more than he could manage, both were offended; and this new source of disorder was only partially closed by withholding the subsidy until they yielded.

Great malversations in the revenue were also discovered; and a plan, to enforce an impartial exaction of the "decima," which was drawn up by Nogueira, at the desire of Wellington, was so ill received by those whose illegal exemptions it attacked, that the Souzas immediately placed themselves at the head of the objectors out of doors. Nogueira then modified it, but the Souzas still opposed, and as Wellington, judging the modification to be an evasion of the principle, would not recede from the first plan, a permanent dispute and a permanent evil, were thus established by that pernicious faction. In fine, not the Souzas only, but the whole regency in their folly now imagined that the war was virtually decided in their favour, and were intent upon driving the British away by disgusting the general.

A new quarrel also arose in the Brazils. Lord Wellington had been created conde de Vimiero, Beresford conde de Trancoso, Silveira conde d'Amurante; and other minor rewards, of a like nature, had been conferred on subordinate officers. These honours had however been delayed in a marked manner, and lord Strangford, who appears to have been ruled entirely by the Souza faction, and was therefore opposed to Forjas, charged, or as he termed it, reported a charge, made against the latter, at the Brazils, for having culpably delayed the official return of the officers who were thus to be rewarded. Against this accusation, which had no foundation in fact, seeing that the report had been made, and that Forjas was not the person to whose department it belonged, lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart protested, because of the injustice; and because it was made in pursuance of a design to remove Forjas from the government. The English general was however thus placed in a strange position, for while his letters to Forjas were menacing rebukes to him, and his coadjutors, for their neglect of public affairs; and while his formal complaints of the conduct of the regency were transmitted to the Brazils, he was also obliged to send other letters in support of the very persons whom he was justly rebuking for misconduct.

In the midst of these embarrassments, an accidental event was like to have brought the question of the British remaining in Portugal to a very sudden decision. While Massena was before the lines, one d'Amblemont had appeared in North America, and given to Onis, the Spanish minister, a plan for burning the British fleet in the Tagus, which he pretended to have

* Joseph's papers captured at Vittoria.

received orders from the French government to execute. This plan being transmitted to the Brazils, many persons named by d'Amblesome as implicated were, in consequence arrested at Lisbon and sent to Rio Janeiro, although Mr. Stuart had ascertained the whole affair to be a forgery. The attention paid to this man by Onís and by the court of Rio Janeiro, induced him to make farther trial of their credulity, and he then brought forward a correspondence between the principal authorities of Mexico and the French government; he even produced letters from the French ministers, directing intrigues to be commenced at Lisbon, and the French interest there to be placed in the hands of the Portuguese intendant of police.

Mr. Stuart, lamenting the ruin of many innocent persons, whom this forging villain was thus dooming, prayed lord Wellesley to interfere; but meanwhile the court of Rio Janeiro, falling headlong into the snare, sent orders to arrest more victims; and amongst others, without assigning any cause, and without any communication with the English general, the regency seized one Borel, a clerk in the department of the British paymaster-general. This act being at once contrary to treaty, hostile to the alliance, and insulting in manner, raised lord Wellington's indignation to such a pitch, that he formally notified to the Portuguese government his resolution, unless good reasons were assigned and satisfaction made for the outrage, to order all persons attached to the British to place themselves in security under the protection of the army, as if in a hostile country, until the further pleasure of the British prince regent should be made known.

The political storm which had been so long gathering then seemed ready to break, but suddenly the horizon cleared. Lord Wellington's letter to the prince, backed up by lord Wellesley's vigorous diplomacy, had at last alarmed the court of Rio Janeiro, and in the very crisis of Borel's case came letters, in which the prince regent admitted, and approved of all the ameliorations and changes proposed by the English general; and the contradiction given by Mr. Stuart to the calumnies of the Souza faction, was taken as the ground for a complete and formal retraction, by Linhares, of his former insinuations, and insulting note relative to that gentleman's conduct. Principal Souza was however not dismissed, nor was Forjas' resignation noticed, but the prince declared that he would overlook that minister's disobedience, and retain him in office; thus proving that fear, not conviction, or justice, for Forjas had not been disobedient, was the true cause of this seeming return to friendly relations with the British.

Mr. Stuart considering the submission of the prince to be a mere nominal concession of power which was yet to be ripened into real authority, looked for further difficulties, and he was not mistaken: meanwhile he made it a point of honour to defend Forjas, and Nogueira, from the secret vengeance of the opposite faction. The present submission of the court however gave the British an imposing influence, which rendered the Souzas' opposition nugatory for the moment. Borel was released and excuses were made for his arrest; the formation of a military chest was pushed with vigour; the paper money was raised in value; the revenue was somewhat increased, and Beresford was enabled to make progress in the restoration of the army. The prince had however directed the regency to revive his claim to Olivença immediately; and it was with difficulty that lord Wellington could stifle this absurd proceeding; neither did the forced harmony last, for the old abuses affecting the civil administration of the army rather increased, as will be shewn in the narration of military operations which are now to be treated of.

It will be remembered that after the action of El

Bodon, the allied army was extensively cantoned on both sides of the Coa. Ciudad Rodrigo was distantly observed by the British, and so closely by Julian Sanchez, that on the 15th he carried off more than two hundred oxen from under the guns of the place, and at the same time captured general Renaud the governor, who had imprudently ventured out with a weak escort. At this time Marmont had one division in Placentia, and the rest of his infantry between that place and Madrid; but his cavalry was at Peneranda on the Salamanca side of the mountains, and his line of communication was organized on the old Roman road of the Puerto de Pico, which had been repaired after the battle of Talavera. The army of the north stretched from the Tormes to Astorga, the walls of which place, as well as those of Zamora, and other towns in Leon, were being restored, that the flat country might be held with a few troops against the Gallician army. It was this scattering of the enemy which had enabled lord Wellington to send Hill against Girard at Aroyo de Molino; but when the reinforcements from France reached the army of Portugal, the army of the north was again concentrated, and would have invaded Galicia while Bonet attacked the Asturias, if Julian Sanchez's exploit had not rendered it necessary first to re-victual Ciudad Rodrigo.

With this view a large convoy was collected at Salamanca, in October, by general Thiebault, who spread a report that a force was to assemble towards Tamames, and that the convoy was for its support. This report did not deceive lord Wellington; but he believed that the whole army of the north and one division of the army of Portugal would be employed in the operation, and therefore made arrangements to pass the Agueda and attack them on the march. The heavy rains however rendered the fords of that river impracticable; Thiebault seized the occasion, introduced the convoy, and leaving a new governor returned on the 2d of November before the waters had subsided. One brigade of the light division was at this time on the Vadillo, but it was too weak to meddle with the French, and it was impossible to reinforce it while the Agueda was overflowed; for such is the nature of that river that all military operations on its banks are uncertain. It is very difficult for an army to pass it, at any time in winter, because of the narrow roads, the depth of the fords and the ruggedness of the banks; it will suddenly rise from rains falling on the hills, without any previous indication in the plains, and then the violence and depth of its stream will sweep away any temporary bridge, and render it impossible to pass except by the stone bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was at this time in the enemy's possession.

Early in November, Bonet, having reoccupied the Asturias, Dorsenne marched a body of troops towards the hills above Ciudad, as if to conduct another convoy; but the allied troops being immediately concentrated, passed the Agueda at the ford of Zamara, whereupon the French retired, and their rear was harassed by Carlos d'Espana and Julian Sanchez, who captured some provisions and money contributions they had raised. But now the provisions in the country between the Coa and the Agueda were all consumed, and the continued negligence of the Portuguese government, with respect to the means of transport, rendered it impossible to bring up the field magazines from the points of water-carriage to the army. Lord Wellington was therefore, contrary to all military rules, obliged to separate his divisions in face of the enemy, and to spread the troops, especially the cavalry, even to the Mondego and the valley of the Douro, or see them starved.

To cover this dangerous proceeding he kept a considerable body of men beyond the Coa, and the state of all the rivers and roads, at that season, together with

the distance of the enemy in some measure protected him; general Hill's second expedition into Estremadura was then also drawing the attention of the French towards that quarter; finally Marmont being about to detach Montbrun towards Valencia, had withdrawn Foy's division from Placentia, and concentrated the greatest part of his army at Toledo; all which rendered the scattering of the allies less dangerous, and in fact no evil consequences ensued. This war of positions had therefore turned entirely to the advantage of the allies, lord Wellington by taking post near Ciudad Rodrigo while Hill moved round Badajos, had in a manner paralysed three powerful armies. For Soult harassed by Hill in Estremadura, and by Ballesteros and Skerrett in Andalusia, failed in both quarters, and although Marmont in conjunction with Dorsenne, had succoured Ciudad Rodrigo, the latter general's invasion of Galicia had been stopped short, and his enterprises confined to the reoccupation of the Asturias.

Meanwhile the works of Almeida were so far restored as to secure it from a sudden attack, and in November when the army by crossing the Agueda had occupied the attention of the French, the battering train and siege stores were brought to that fortress, without exciting the enemy's attention, because they appeared to be only the armament for the new works; a trestle bridge to throw over the Agueda was also secretly prepared in the arsenal of Almeida by major Sturgeon of the staff corps, an officer whose brilliant talents, scientific resources, and unmitigated activity continually attracted the attention of the whole army. Thus the preparation for the attack of Ciudad advanced while the English general seemed to be only intent upon defending his own positions.

CHAPTER II.

Review of the different changes of the war—Enormous efforts of Napoleon—Lord Wellington's situation described—His great plans explained—His firmness and resolution under difficulties—Distressed state of his army—The prudence and ability of lord Fitzroy Somerset—Dissemination of the French army—Lord Wellington seizes the opportunity to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo.

HAVING now brought the story of the war to that period, when after many changes of fortune, the chances had become more equal, and the fate of the Peninsula, thrown as it were between the contending powers, became a prize for the readiest and boldest warrior, I would, ere it is shown how Wellington seized it, recal to the reader's recollection the previous vicissitudes of the contest. I would have him remember how, when the first, or insurrectional epoch of the war, had terminated successfully for the Spaniards, Napoleon vehemently broke and dispersed their armies, and drove the British auxiliaries to embark at Coruña. How the war with Austria, and the inactivity of Joseph, rendered the emperor's victories unavailing, and revived the confidence of the Spaniards. How sir Arthur Wellesley, victorious on the Douro, then marched into Spain, and, although the concentrated force of the enemy, and the ill conduct of the Spanish government, forced him to retreat again to Portugal as sir John Moore, from the same causes, had been obliged to retreat to the ocean, he had by his advance relieved Galicia, as Moore had by a like operation before saved Andalusia, which concluded the third epoch.

How the peninsulars, owing to the exertions of their allies, still possessed a country, extending from the Asturias, through Galicia, Portugal, Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and including every important harbour and fortress except Santander, Santona, Barcelona, and St. Sebastian. How Wellington ap-

preciating the advantages which an invaded people possess in their numerous lines of operation, then, counselled the Spaniards, and forced the Portuguese, to adopt a defensive war; and with the more reason that England, abounding beyond all nations in military resources, and invincible as a naval power, could form with her ships a secure exterior floating base or line of depôts round the Peninsula, and was ready to employ her armies as well as her squadrons in the struggle. How the Spaniards, unheeding these admonitions, sought great battles, and in a few months lost the Asturias, Andalusia, Estremadura, Aragon, and the best fortresses of Catalonia, and were again laid prostrate and helpless before the enemy.

How the victorious French armies then moved onwards, in swelling pride, until dashed against the rocks of Lisbon they receded, broken and refluxent, and the English general once more stood a conqueror on the frontier of Spain; and had he then retaken Badajos and Rodrigo he would have gloriously finished the fourth or defensive epoch of the war. But being baffled, partly by skill, partly by fortune; factiously opposed by the Portuguese regency, thwarted by the Spanish government, only half supported by his own cabinet, and pestered by the follies of all three, he was reduced to a seeming inactivity; and meanwhile the French added Taragona and the rich kingdom of Valencia to their conquests.

These things I would have the reader reflect upon, because they are the proofs of what it is the main object of this history to inculcate, namely that English steel, English gold, English genius, English influence, fought and won the battle of Spanish independence; and this not as a matter of boast, although it was very glorious! but as a useful lesson of experience. On the other hand also we must wonder at the prodigious strength of France under Napoleon, that strength which could at once fight England and Austria, aim at the conquest of the Peninsula, and the reduction of Russia the same moment of time, and all with good hope of success.

Let it not be said that the emperor's efforts in the war of Spain were feeble, for if the insurrectional epoch, which was unexpected and accidental, be set aside, the grandeur of his efforts will be found answerable to his gigantic reputation. In 1809 the French army was indeed gradually decreased by losses and drafts for the Austrian war, from three hundred and thirty-five thousand, which Napoleon had led into the country, to two hundred and twenty-six thousand. But in 1810 it was again raised to three hundred and sixty nine thousand, and fluctuated between that number and three hundred and thirty thousand until August 1811, when it was again raised to three hundred and seventy two thousand men with fifty-two thousand horses! And yet there are writers who assert that Napoleon neglected the war in Spain! But so great is the natural strength of that country, that had the firmness of the nation in battle and its wisdom in council, been commensurate with its constancy in resistance, even this power, backed by the four hundred thousand men who marched to Russia, would scarcely have been sufficient to subdue it; whereas, weak in fight and steeped in folly, the Spaniards must have been trampled in the dust, but for the man whose great combinations I am now about to relate.

The nicety, the quickness, the prudence, and the audacity of Wellington's operations, cannot however be justly estimated without an exact knowledge of his political, local, and moral position. His political difficulties have been already described, and his moral situation was simply, that of a man, who felt, that all depended upon himself; that he must by some rapid and unexpected stroke effect in the field what his brother could not effect in the cabinet, while the power

of the Perceval faction was prevalent in England. But to understand his local or military position, the conformation of the country and the lines of communication must be carefully considered.

The principal French magazines were at Valladolid, and their advanced troops were on the Tormes, from whence to the Agueda, where they held the important point of Ciudad Rodrigo, was four long marches through a wild forest country.

The allies' line of communication from the Agueda to Lisbon, was supplied by water to Raiva on the Mondego, after which the land carriage was at least a hundred miles, through wild mountains, or devastated valleys; it required fifteen days to bring up a convoy from Lisbon to the army.

The line of communication with Oporto on the left flank, run through eighty miles of very rugged country, before it reached the first point of water carriage on the Douro.

The line of communication with Hill's army on the right flank, running also through a country full of strong passes and natural obstacles, offered no resources for an army, save what were furnished by the allies' field magazines, which were supplied from Abrantes, the first navigable point on the Tagus. On this line the boat-bridge of Villa Velha was a remarkable feature, as furnishing the only military passage over the Tagus between Abrantes and Almaraz.

The country between the Coa and the Agueda could not supply the troops who occupied it; and the nature of the last river, and the want of a covering position beyond, rendered it a matter of the utmost danger and difficulty to besiege or even invest Ciudad Rodrigo. The disadvantage which the French suffered in being so distant from that fortress was thus balanced.

These considerations had prevented the English general from attacking Ciudad Rodrigo in May; he had then no battering train, and Almeida and her guns, were rendered a heap of ruins by the exploit of Brenier. Badajos was at that period his object, because Beresford was actually besieging it, and the recent battle of Fuentes Onoro, the disputes of the French generals, the disorganization of Massena's army, and as proved by that battle, the inefficiency of the army of the north, rendered it improbable that a serious invasion of Portugal would be resumed on that side. And as the lines of communication with the Mondego and the Douro, were not then completely re-established, and the intermediate magazines small, no incursion of the enemy could have done much mischief; and Spencer's corps was sufficiently strong to cover the line to Vilha Velha.

Affairs however soon changed. The skill of Philipon, the diligence of Marmont, and the generalship of Soult, in remaining at Llerena after his repulse at Albuera, had rescued Badajos. Lord Wellington's boldness in remaining on the Caya prevented further mischief, but the conduct of the Portuguese government, combined with the position which Napoleon had caused Marmont to take in the valley of the Tagus, effectually precluded a renewal of that siege; and then the fallacious hope of finding Ciudad unprovided, brought lord Wellington back to the Coa. This baffled the enemy's projects, yet the position of the army of the north, and that of Portugal, the one in front, the other on the flank, prevented the English general from undertaking any important operations in the field. For if he had advanced on Salamanca, besides the natural difficulties of the country, his communications with Hill, and even with Abrantes and Lisbon, would have been cut by Marmont; and if he turned against Marmont on the Tagus, Soult and Dorsenne would have closed upon his flanks.

This state of affairs not being well considered, had induced some able officers, at the time of the Elbodon

operation, to censure the line of retreat to Sabugal, because it uncovered the line of Celerico, and exposed to capture the battering train then at Villa Ponte; but war is always a choice of difficulties, and it was better to risk guns, of whose vicinity the enemy was not aware, than to give up the communication with Hill which was threatened by the advance of Foy's two divisions on Zarza Maior.

As the French armies were reinforced after the allies came to Beira, Dorsenne and Marmont became each equal to Wellington in the field, and together infinitely too strong. Soult was then master of Andalusia, and had a moveable reserve of twenty thousand men; the army of Suchet daily gained ground in Valencia, the Asturias were re-occupied by Bonet, and the army of the centre was reorganized. Hence, to commence the siege of either Ciudad or Badajos, in form, was hopeless, and when the rumour of Napoleon's arrival became rife, the English general, whose embarrassments were hourly increasing, looked once more to the lines of Torres Vedras as a refuge. But when the certainty of the Russian war removed this fear, the aspect of affairs again changed, and the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo became possible. For, first, there was a good battering train in Almeida, and the works of that place were restored; secondly, the line of communication with Oporto was completely organized, and shortened by improving the navigation of the Douro; thirdly, Ciudad itself was very weakly garrisoned and the ignorance of the French as to the state of the allies' preparations gave hope of a surprise. It was, however, only by a surprise that success could be expected, and it was not the least of lord Wellington's merits that he so well concealed his preparations, and for so long a period. No other operation, promising any success, was open; and yet the general could no longer remain inactive, because around him the whole fabric of the war was falling to pieces from the folly of the governments he was serving. If he could not effect a blow against the French while Napoleon was engaged in the Russian war, it was clear that the Peninsula would be lost.

Now the surprise of a fortress, with a garrison of only seventeen hundred men, seems a small matter in such grave circumstances, but in reality it was of the very greatest importance, because it was the first step in a plan which saved the Peninsula when nothing else could have saved it. Lord Wellington knew that the valley of the Tagus, could not long support both the army of Portugal, and the army of the centre; he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont and the king were already at open war upon the subject, and he judged, that if he could surprise Ciudad Rodrigo, the army of Portugal would be obliged, for the sake of provisions, and to protect Leon, then weakened by the departure of the imperial guards, to concentrate in that province. This was the first step.

The French kept magazines in reserve for sudden expeditions, feeding meanwhile as they could upon the country, and therefore their distress for provisions never obstructed their moving upon important occasions. Nevertheless lord Wellington thought the tempestuous season would render it very difficult for Marmont, when thus forced into Leon, to move with great masses; wherefore he proposed when Rodrigo fell, to march by Vilha Velha to Estremadura, and suddenly besiege Badajos also, the preparations to be previously made in Elvas, under the protection of Hill's corps, and unknown to the enemy. This was the second step, and in this surprise also he hoped to be successful, because of the jealousies of the marshals, the wet season, and his own combinations, which would impede the concentration of the French armies, and prevent them from keeping together if they did unite. He had hopes likewise that as Ballesteros' corps was now augmented,

it would vex Soult's posts on the coast, while Hill and Morillo harassed him on the Guadiana; and if Badajos fell, the English general was resolved to leave a force to cover the captured place against the army of the centre, and then fight Soult in Andalusia. For he judged that Marmont could not for want of provisions, pass beyond the Guadiana, nor follow him before the harvest was ripe; neither did he fear him in Beira, because the torrents would be full, the country a desert, and the militia, aided by a small regular corps, and covered by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, would, he thought, be sufficient to prevent any serious impression being made on Portugal during the invasion of Andalusia.

This was lord Wellington's plan, and his firmness and resolution in conceiving it were the more signal because his own troops were not in good plight. The army had indeed received reinforcements, but the infantry had served at Walcheren, and exposure to night air, or even slight hardship, threw them by hundreds into the hospital, while the new regiments of cavalry, inexperienced, and not acclimated, were found, men and horses, quite unfit for duty, and were sent to the rear. The pay of the army was three months in arrear, and the supplies, brought up with difficulty, were very scanty; half and quarter rations were often served, and sometimes the troops were without any bread for three days consecutively, and their clothing was so patched, that scarcely a regiment could be known by its uniform. Chopped straw, the only forage, was so scarce that the regimental animals were dying of hunger; corn was rarely distributed save to the generals and staff, and even the horses of the artillery and of the old cavalry suffered; nay, the very mules of the commissariat were pinched by the scarcity, and the muleteers were eight months in arrears of pay. The cantonments on the Coa and Agueda were unhealthy from the continued rains, above twenty thousand men were in hospital; and deduction made for other drains, only fifty-four thousand of both nations, including garrisons and posts of communication, were under arms. To finish the picture, the sulky apathy produced in the Portuguese regency by the prince regent's letter, was now becoming more hurtful than the former active opposition.

But even these distresses so threatening to the general cause, Wellington turned to the advantage of his present designs; for the enemy were aware of the misery in the army, and in their imagination magnified it; and as the allied troops were scattered, for relief, from the Gata mountains to the Douro, and from the Agueda to the Mondego, at the very moment when the battering train entered Almeida, both armies concluded, that these guns were only to arm that fortress, as a cover to the extended country quarters which necessity had forced the British general to adopt. No person, not even the engineers employed in the preparations, knew more than that a siege or the simulation of a siege was in contemplation; but when it was to be attempted, or that it would be attempted at all, none knew; even the quarter-master general Murray, was permitted to go home on leave, with the full persuasion that no operation could take place before spring.

In the new cantonments, however, abundance of provisions, and dry weather (for in Beira the first rains generally subside during December,) stopped the sickness, and restored about three thousand men to the ranks; and it would be a great error to suppose, that the privations had in any manner weakened the moral courage of the troops. The old regiments had become incredibly hardy and experienced in all things necessary to sustain their strength and efficacy; the staff of the army was well practised, and lord Fitzroy Som-

erset, the military secretary, had established such an intercourse between the head-quarters and the commanders of battalions, that the latter had, so to speak, direct communication with the general-in-chief upon all the business of their regiments; a privilege which increased the enthusiasm and zeal of all in a very surprising manner. For the battalions being generally under very young men, the distinctions of rank were not very rigidly enforced, and the merits of each officer were consequently better known, and more earnestly supported when promotion and honours were to be obtained. By this method lord Fitzroy acquired an exact knowledge of the true moral state of each regiment, rendered his own office at once powerful and gracious to the army, and yet, such was his discretion and judgment, did in no manner weaken the military hierarchy; thus also all the daring young men were excited, and being unacquainted with the political difficulties of their general, anticipated noble triumphs which were happily realized.

The favourable moment for action so long watched for by Wellington came at last. An imperial decree had remodelled the French armies. That of Aragon was directed to give up four divisions to form a new corps, under Reille, called the "*army of the Ebro*," whose head-quarters were at Lerida. The army of the south was recomposed in six divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, besides the garrison of Badajos, and marshal Victor returned to France, discontented, for he was one of those whose reputation had been abated by this war. His divisions were given to generals Conroux, Barrois, Villatte, Laval, Drouet, Darcieu, Peyremont, Digeon, and the younger Soult, Philippon continuing governor of Badajos. The reserve of Monthion was broken up, and the army of the north, destined to maintain the great communications with France and to reduce the Partidas, on that line, was ordered to occupy the districts round St. Ander, Sebastian, Burgos, and Pampeluna, and to communicate by the left with the new army of the Ebro: it was also exceedingly reduced in numbers; for the imperial guards, seventeen thousand strong, were required for the Russian war, and marched in December for France. And besides these troops, the Polish battalions, the skeletons of the cavalry regiments, and several thousand choice men destined to fill the ranks of the old guard were drafted; so that not less than forty thousand of the very best soldiers, were withdrawn, and the maimed and worn-out men being sent back to France at the same time, the force in the Peninsula was diminished by sixty thousand.

The head-quarters of the army of the north arrived at Burgos in January, and a division was immediately sent to drive Mendizabel from the Montaña de St. Ander; but as this arrangement weakened the grand line of communication with France, Marmont was ordered to abandon the valley of the Tagus and fix his headquarters at Valladolid or Salamanca. Ciudad Rodrigo, the sixth and seventh governments, and the Asturias, were also placed under his authority, by which Souham and Bouet's division, forming together about eighteen thousand men, were added to his army; but the former general returned to France. These divisions however, being pressed by want, were extended from the Asturias to Toledo, while Monbrun was near Valencia, and meanwhile Soult's attention was distracted by Tarifa, and by Hill's pursuit of Drouet. Thus the French armies, every where occupied, were spread over an immense tract of country; Marmont deceived by the seemingly careless winter attitude of the allies, left Ciudad Rodrigo unprotected within their reach, and Wellington jumped with both feet upon the devoted fortress.

CHAPTER III.

Means collected for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Major Sturgeon throws a bridge over the Agueda—Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo—Colonel Colborne storms fort Francisco—The scarcity of transport baulks lord Wellington's calculations—Marmont collects troops—Plan of the attack changed—Two breaches are made and the city is stormed—Observations.

SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

THE troops disposable for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo were about thirty-five thousand, including cavalry; the materials for the siege were established at Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and Espeja, on the left of the Agueda, and the ammunition was at Almeida. From those places, the hired carts and mules, were to bring up the stores to the parc, and seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected at Villa de Ponte. But from the scarcity of transports only thirty-eight guns could be brought to the trenches, and these would have wanted their due supply of ammunition, if eight thousand shot had not been found amidst the ruins of Almeida.

On the 1st of January the bridge was commenced at Marialva, near the confluence of the Azava with the Agueda about six miles below Ciudad, and piles were driven into the bed of the river, above and below, to which the trestles were tied to render the whole firm. The fortress was to have been invested on the 6th, but the native carters were two days moving over ten miles of flat and excellent road, with empty carts; the operation was thus delayed, and it was dangerous to find fault with these people, because they deserted on the slightest offence. Meanwhile the place being closely examined, it was found that the French, in addition to the old works, had fortified two convents, which flanked and strengthened the bad Spanish entrenchments round the suburbs. They had also constructed an enclosed and palisadoed redoubt upon the greater Teson; and this redoubt, called Francisco, was supported by two guns and a howitzer placed on the flat roof of the convent of that name.

The soil around was exceedingly rocky, except on the Teson itself, and though the body of the place was there better covered by the outworks, and could bring most fire to bear on the trenches; it was more assailable according to the English general's views; because elsewhere the slope of the ground was such, that batteries must have been erected on the very edge of the counterscarp before they could see low enough to breach. This would have been a tedious process, whereas the smaller Teson furnished the means of striking over the crest of the glacis at once, and a deep gully near the latter offered cover for the miners. It was therefore resolved to storm fort Francisco, form a lodgement there, and opening the first parallel along the greater Teson, to place thirty-three pieces in counter-batteries with which to ruin the defences, and drive the besieged from the convent of Francisco; then working forward by the sap to construct breaching-batteries on the lesser Teson, and blow in the counterscarp, while seven guns, by battering a weak turret on the left, opened a second breach, with a view to turn any retrenchment behind the principal breach.

The first, third, fourth, and light divisions, and Pack's Portuguese, were destined for the siege, but as the country on the right bank of the Agueda was destitute of fuel and cover, these troops were still to keep their quarters on the left bank; and although there was a very severe frost and fall of snow, yet one division carrying a day's provisions ready cooked, was to ford the river, every twenty-four hours, either above or below the town, and thus alternately carry on the works. Meanwhile to cover the siege, Julian Sanchez and Carlos d'Espana were posted on the Tormes in observation of the enemy.

To obviate the difficulty of obtaining country trans-

port, the English general had previously constructed eight hundred carts drawn by horses, and these were now his surest dependence for bringing up ammunition; yet so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity of the native carters and muleteers, and the chances of weather, that he calculated upon an operation of twenty-four days, and yet hoped to steal it from his adversaries; sure, even if he failed, that the clash of his arms would again draw their scattered troops to that quarter, as tinkling bells draw swarming bees to an empty hive.

The 8th of January the light division and Pack's Portuguese forded the Agueda near Caridad, three miles above the fortress, and making a circuit, took post beyond the great Teson, where they remained quiet during the day, and as there was no regular investment, the enemy believed not that the siege was commenced. But in the evening the troops stood to their arms, and colonel Colborne commanding the fifty-second, having assembled two companies from each of the British regiments of the light division, stormed the redoubt of Francisco. This he did with so much fury, that the assailants appeared to be at one and the same time, in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting on the top of the rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, where the explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate open.

Of the defenders a few were killed, not many, and the remainder, about forty in number, were made prisoners. The post being thus taken with the loss of only twenty-four men and officers, working parties were set to labour on the right of it, because the fort itself was instantly covered with shot and shells from the town. This tempest continued through the night, but at day-break the parallel, six hundred yards in length, was sunk three feet deep, and four wide, the communication over the Teson to the rear was completed, and the progress of the siege was thus hastened several days by this well-managed assault.

The 9th the first division took the trenches in hand. The place was encircled by posts to prevent any external communication, and at night twelve hundred workmen commenced three counter-batteries, for eleven guns each, under a heavy fire of shells and grape. Before day-light the labourers were under cover, and a ditch was also sunk in the front to provide earth; for the batteries were made eighteen feet thick at top, to resist the very powerful artillery of the place.

On the 10th the fourth division relieved the trenches, and a thousand men laboured, but in great peril, for the besieged had a superabundance of ammunition, and did not spare it. In the night the communication from the parallel to the batteries was opened, and on the 11th the third division undertook the siege.

This day the magazines in the batteries were excavated, and the approaches widened, but the enemy's fire was destructive, and the shells came so fast into the ditch in front of the batteries, that the troops were withdrawn, and the earth was raised from the inside. Great damage was also sustained from salvos of shells, with long fuzes, whose simultaneous explosion cut away the parapets in a strange manner, and in the night the French brought a howitzer to the garden of the convent of Francisco, with which they killed many men and wounded others.

On the 12th the light division resumed the work and the riflemen taking advantage of a thick fog covered themselves in pits, which they dugged in front of the trenches, and from thence picked off the enemy's gunners; but in the night the weather was so cold, and the besieged shot so briskly, that little progress was made.

The 13th, the first division being on duty, the same causes impeded the labourers, and now also the scarcity of transport baulked the general's operations.

One third only, of the native carts, expected, had arrived, and the drivers of those present were very indolent; much of the twenty-four pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte, and intelligence arrived that Marmont was collecting his forces to succour the place. Wellington therefore changing his first plan, resolved to open a breach with his counter-batteries, which were not quite six hundred yards from the curtain, and then to storm the place without blowing in the counter-scarp; in other words, to overstep the rules of science, and sacrifice life rather than time, for such was the capricious nature of the Agueda that in one night a flood might enable a small French force to relieve the place.

The whole army was immediately brought up from the distant quarters, and posted in the villages on the Coa, ready to cross the Agueda and give battle; and it was at this time, that Hill, who was then at Merida, returned to Portalegre, and sent a division across the Tagus, lest Marmont in despair of uniting his force in the north, in time to save Ciudad, should act against the line of communication by Castello Branco and Villa Velha.

In the night of the 13th the batteries were armed with twenty-eight guns, the second parallel and the approaches were continued by the flying sap, and the Santa Cruz convent was surprised by the Germans of the first division, which secured the right flank of the trenches.

The 14th the enemy, who had observed that the men in the trenches always went off in a disorderly manner on the approach of the relief, made a sally and overturned the gabions of the sap; they even penetrated to the parallel, and were upon the point of entering the batteries, when a few of the workmen getting together, checked them until a support arrived, and thus the guns were saved. This affair, together with the death of the engineer on duty, and the heavy fire from the town, delayed the opening of the breaching-batteries, but at half-past four in the evening, twenty-five heavy guns battered the "*fausse braye*" and rampart, and two pieces were directed against the convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle at once fearful and sublime. The enemy replied to the assailants' fire with more than fifty pieces, the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground far and wide, the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements of the place, or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires, the shells, hissing through the air, seemed fiery serpents leaping from the darkness, the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and the distant mountains, faintly returning the sound, appeared to moan over the falling city. And when night put an end to this turmoil, the quick clatter of musketry was heard like the pattering of hail after a peal of thunder, for the fortieth regiment assaulted and carried the convent of Francisco, and established itself in the suburb on the left of the attack.

The next day the ramparts were again battered, and fell so fast that it was judged expedient to commence the small breach at the turret, and in the night of the 15th five more guns were mounted. The 16th at daylight the besiegers' batteries recommenced, but at eight o'clock a thick fog obliged them to desist, nevertheless the small breach had been opened, and the place was now summoned, but without effect. At night the parallel on the lower Teson was extended, and a sharp musketry was directed from thence against the great breach. The breaching-battery as originally projected was also commenced, and the riflemen of the light division, hidden in the pits, continued to pick off the enemy's gunners.

The 17th the fire on both sides was very heavy and the wall of the place was beaten down in large cantles; but several of the besiegers' guns were dismounted, their batteries injured, and many of their men killed;

general Borthwick the commandant of artillery was wounded and the sap was entirely ruined. Even the riflemen in the pits were at first overpowered with grape, yet towards evening they recovered the upper hand, and the French could only fire from the more distant embrasures. In the night the battery, intended for the lesser breach, was armed, and that on the lower Teson raised so as to afford cover in the day-time.

On the 18th the besiegers' fire was resumed with great violence. The turret was shaken at the small breach, the large breach became practicable in the middle, and the enemy commenced retrenching it. The sap however could make no progress, the superintending engineer was badly wounded, and a twenty-four pounder having bursted in the batteries, killed several men. In the night the battery on the lower Teson was improved, and a field-piece and howitzer being placed there, kept up a constant fire on the great breach to destroy the French retrenchments.

On the 19th both breaches became practicable, major Sturgeon closely examined the place, and a plan of attack was formed on his report; the assault was then ordered, and the battering-guns were turned against the artillery of the ramparts.

ASSAULT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

This operation which was confined to the third and light divisions, and Pack's Portuguese, was organized in four parts.

1. *The right attack.* The light company of the eighty-third and the second caçadores which were posted in the houses beyond the bridge on the Agueda, were directed to cross that river and escalade an out-work in front of the castle, where there was no ditch, but where two guns commanded the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The fifth and ninety-fourth regiments posted behind the convent of Santa Cruz and having the seventy-seventh in reserve, were to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp; then to escalade the "*fausse braye*," and scour it on their left as far as the great breach.

2. *The centre attack or assault of the great breach.* One hundred and eighty men protected by the fire of the eighty-third regiment, and carrying hay-bags to throw into the ditch, were to move out of the second parallel and to be followed by a storming party, which was again to be supported by general Mackinnon's brigade of the third division.

3. *Left attack.* The light division, posted behind the convent of Francisco, was to send three companies of the ninety-fifth to scour the "*fausse braye*" to the right, and so connect the left and centre attacks. At the same time a storming party preceded by the third caçadores carrying hay-sacks, and followed by Vandeleur's and Andrew Barnard's brigades, was to make for the small breach, and when the "*fausse braye*" was carried to detach to their right, to assist the main assault, and to the left to force a passage at the Salamanca gate.

4. *The false attack.* This was an escalade to be made by Pack's Portuguese on the St. Jago gate at the opposite side of the town.

The right attack was commanded by colonel O'Toole of the caçadores.

Five hundred volunteers commanded by major Manners of the seventy-fourth with a forlorn hope under Mr. Mackie of the eighty-eighth, composed the storming party of the third division.

Three hundred volunteers led by major George Napier of the fifty-second with a forlorn hope of twenty-five men under Mr. Gurwood, of the same regiment, composed the storming party of the light division.

All the troops reached their different posts without seeming to attract the attention of the enemy, but before the signal was given, and while lord Welling-

ton, who in person had been pointing out the lesser breach to major Napier, was still at the convent of Francisco, the attack on the right commenced, and was instantly taken up along the whole line. Then the space between the army and the ditch was covered with soldiers and ravaged by a tempest of grape from the ramparts. The storming parties of the third division jumped out of the parallel when the first shout arose, but so rapid had been the movements on their right, that before they could reach the ditch, Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell with the fifth, seventy-seventh, and ninety-fourth regiments, had already scoured the "*fausse braye*," and were pushing up the great breach, amidst the bursting of shells, the whistling of grape and muskets, and the shrill cries of the French who were driven fighting behind the retrenchments. There however they rallied, and aided by the musketry from the houses, made hard battle for their post; none would go back on either side, and yet the British could not get forward, and men and officers, falling in heaps, choked up the passage, which from minute to minute was raked with grape, from two guns, flanking the top of the breach at the distance of a few yards; thus striving and trampling alike upon the dead and the wounded these brave men maintained the combat.

Meanwhile the stormers of the light division, who had three hundred yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags, but with extraordinary swiftness running to the crest of the glacis, jumped down the scarp, a depth of eleven feet, and rushed up the "*fausse braye*" under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The bottom of the ditch was dark and intricate, and the forlorn hope took too much to their left; but the storming party went straight to the breach, which was so contracted that a gun placed lengthwise across the top nearly blocked up the opening. Here the forlorn hope rejoined the stormers, but when two-thirds of the ascent were gained, the leading men, crushed together by the narrowness of the place, staggered under the weight of the enemy's fire; and such is the instinct of self-defence, that although no man had been allowed to load, every musket in the crowd was snapped. The commander, major Napier, was at this moment stricken to the earth by a grape shot which shattered his arm, but he called on his men to trust to their bayonets, and all the officers simultaneously sprang to the front, when the charge was renewed with a furious shout, and the entrance was gained. The supporting regiments coming up in sections, abreast, then reached the rampart, the fifty-second wheeled to the left, the forty-third to the right, and the place was won. During this contest which lasted only a few minutes, after the "*fausse braye*" was passed, the fighting had continued at the great breach with unabated violence, but when the forty-third, and the stormers of the light division came pouring down upon the right flank of the French, the latter bent before the storm; at the same moment, the explosion of three wall magazines destroyed many persons, and the third division with a mighty effort broke through the entrenchments. The garrison indeed still fought for a moment in the streets, but finally fled to the castle, where Mr. Gurwood who though wounded, had been amongst the foremost at the lesser breach, received the governor's sword.

The allies now plunged into the streets from all quarters, for O'Toole's attack was also successful, and at the other side of the town Pack's Portuguese, meeting no resistance, had entered the place, and the reserves also came in. Then throwing off the restraints of discipline the troops committed frightful excesses. The town was fired in three or four places, the soldiers menaced their officers, and shot each

other; many were killed in the market-place, intoxication soon increased the tumult, disorder every where prevailed, and at last, the fury rising to an absolute madness, a fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, when the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses.

Three hundred French had fallen, fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and besides the immense stores of ammunition, above one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery including the battering-train of Marmont's army, were captured in the place. The whole loss of the allies was about twelve hundred soldiers and ninety officers, and of these above six hundred and fifty men and sixty officers had been slain or hurt at the breaches. General Crawford and general Mackinnon, the former a man of great ability, were killed, and with them died many gallant men, amongst others, a captain of the forty-fifth, of whom it has been felicitously said, that "three generals and seventy other officers had fallen, but the soldiers fresh from the strife only talked of Hardyman."* General Vandaleur, colonel Colborne, and a crowd of inferior rank were wounded, and unhappily the slaughter did not end with the battle, for the next day as the prisoners and their escort were marching out by the breach, an accidental explosion took place and numbers of both were blown into the air.

To recompense an exploit so boldly undertaken and so gloriously finished, lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, and marquis of Torres Vedras by the Portuguese; but it is to be remarked, that the prince regent of Portugal had previous to that period displayed great ingratitude in the conferring of honours upon the British officers.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The duration of this siege was twelve days, or half the time originally calculated upon by the English general, and yet the inexperience both of the engineer and soldier, and the very heavy fire of the place, had caused the works to be more slowly executed than might have been expected; the cold also had impeded the labourers, and yet with a less severe frost the trenches would have been overflowed, because in open weather the water rises every where to within six inches of the surface. But the worst obstacle was caused by the disgraceful badness of the cutting-tools furnished from the storekeeper-general's office in England, the profits of the contractor seemed to be the only thing respected; the engineers eagerly sought for French implements, because those provided by England were useless.

2. The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of Francisco, and broke ground on the first night of the investment; the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the fire of the defence had been in any manner lessened, and before the counterscarp had been blown in; were the true causes of the sudden fall of the place. Both the military and political state of affairs warranted this neglect of rules. The final success depended more upon the courage of the troops than the skill of the engineer; and when the general terminated his order for the assault, with this sentence, "*Ciudad Rodrigo must be stormed this evening*," he knew well that it would be nobly understood. Yet the French fought bravely on the breach, and by their side many British deserters, desperate men, were bayoneted.

3. The great breach was cut off from the town by a perpendicular descent of sixteen feet, and the

* Captain Cooke's Memoirs, vol. i.

bottom was planted with sharp spikes, and strewn with live shells; the houses behind were all loopholed, and garnished with musketeers, and on the flanks there were cuts, not indeed very deep or wide and the French had left the temporary bridges over them, but behind were parapets so powerfully defended that it was said the third division could never have carried them, had not the light division taken the enemy in flank: an assertion perhaps easier made than proved.

4. The rapid progress of the allies on this occasion, has been contrasted with the slow proceedings of Massena in 1810, and the defence of Herrasti has been compared with that of Barrié. But Massena was not pressed for time, and he would have been blamable to have spared labour at the expense of blood; Herrasti also had a garrison of six thousand men, whereas Barrié had less than two thousand, of which only seventeen hundred were able to bear arms, and he had additional works to guard. Nevertheless his neglect of the lesser breach was a great error; it was so narrow and high, that a very slight addition to its defences would have rendered it quite impracticable; and as the deserters told him in the morning of the 19th that the light division was come up, out of its turn, he must have expected the assault and had time to prepare for it. Moreover the small breach was flanked at a very short distance, by a demi-bastion with a parapet, which though little injured, was abandoned when the head of the storming party had forced their way on to the rampart. But the true way of defending Ciudad was by external operations, and it was not until it fell, that the error of Marmont at Elbodon could be judged in its full extent. Neither can that marshal be in any manner justified for having left so few men in Ciudad Rodrigo; it is certain that with a garrison of five thousand the place would not have been taken, for when there are enough of men the engineer's art cannot be overcome by mere courage.

5. The excesses committed by the allied troops were very disgraceful. The Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and helpless, and all these claims were disregarded. "The soldiers were not to be troubled." That excuse will however scarcely suffice here, because colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man of a most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach and did constrain his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.*

CHAPTER IV.

Execution of the French partizans and English deserters found in Ciudad Rodrigo—The works are repaired—Marmont collects his army at Salamanca—Bonet abandons the Asturias—Souham advances to Matilla—Hill arrives at Castello Branco—The French army harassed by winter marches and by the Partidas—Marmont again spreads his divisions—Agueda overflows, and all communication with Ciudad Rodrigo is cut off—Lord Wellington prepares to besiege Badajos—Preliminary measures—Impeded by bad weather—Difficulties and embarrassments arise—The allied army marches in an unmilitary manner towards the Alentejo—Lord Wellington proposes some financial measures—Gives up Ciudad to the Spaniards—The fifth division is left in Beira—Carlos d'Espagna and general Victor Alten are posted on the Yeltes—The Portuguese militia march for the Coa—Lord Wellington reaches Elvas—He is beset with difficulties—Falls sick, but recovers rapidly.

In Ciudad Rodrigo, papers were found by which it appeared, that many of the inhabitants were emissaries

of the enemy: all these people Carlos d'España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters, who were taken, some were executed, some pardoned, and the rigour of the Spanish generals was thought to be overstrained.

When order had been restored workmen were set to repair the breaches and to level the trenches, and arrangements were made to provision the place quickly, for Marmont's army was gathering at Valladolid; that general was however still ignorant that Ciudad had fallen. In the latter end of December, rumour, anticipating the fact had indeed spoken of an English bridge on the Agueda, and the expedition to Alicante was countermanded; yet the report died away, and Montbrun re-commenced his march. But though the bridge was cast on the 1st and the siege commenced on the 8th, on the 12th nothing was known at Salamanca.

On the 11th Marmont arrived at Valladolid; on the 15th he for the first time heard of the siege. His army was immediately ordered to concentrate at Salamanca, Bonet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment to aid, and on the 25th six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, being about forty-five thousand in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence to Ciudad, was four marches.

On the 23d Souham had advanced to Matilla to ascertain the fate of the fortress, but meanwhile five thousand of Hill's troops had reached Castello Branco, and the allies were therefore strong enough to fight beyond the Agueda. Hence if the siege had even lasted twenty-four days, the place might still have been taken.

The 26th Marmont knew that the fortress was lost, and unable to comprehend his adversary's success, retired to Valladolid. His divisions were thus harassed by ruinous marches in winter; for Montbrun had already reached Arevalo on his return from Valencia, and Bonet in repassing the Asturian mountains, had suffered much from cold and fatigue, and more from the attacks of Porlier who harassed him without cessation. Sir Howard Douglas immediately sent money and arms to the Asturias, on one flank, and on the other flank, Morillo who had remained at Horcajo in great peril after his flight from Almagro, took the opportunity to escape by Truxillo; meanwhile Saornil's band cut off a French detachment at Medina del Campo, other losses were sustained from the Partidas on the Tietar, and the operations of those in the Rioja, Navarre, and New Castile were renewed. The regular Spanish troops were likewise put in movement. Abadia and Cabrera, advancing from Galicia, menaced Astorga and La Baneza, but the arrival of Bonet at Benevente, soon obliged them to retire again to Puebla de Senabria and Villa Franca; and Silveira who had marched across the frontier of Tras os Montes to aid them, also fell back to Portugal.

Marmont's operations were here again ill judged. He should have taken post at Tamames, or St. Martin de Rio, and placed strong advanced guards at Tenebron and St. Espiritus, in the hills immediately above Ciudad. His troops could have been concentrated at those places the 28th and on that day such a heavy rain set in, that the trestle bridge at Marialva could not stand, and the river rose two feet over the stone bridge at the town. The allies were then on the left bank, the communication with the town was entirely cut off, the repair of the breaches was scarcely complete, and Ciudad being entirely exposed for several days might have been re-taken. But the greatest warriors are the very slaves of fortune!

The English general's eyes were now turned towards Badajos, which he was desirous to invest in the second week of March; because then the flooding of the rivers in Beira, would enable him to carry nearly

* Captain Cooke's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 122.

all his forces to the Alemtejo, without risk, and the same rains would impede the junction of the enemy's force in Estremadura. Green forage was to be had in the last province considerably earlier than on the Agueda, and the success of the contemplated campaign in Andalusia depended upon the operations taking place before the harvest upon the ground should ripen, which was the enemy's resource, and would happen much earlier there than in Leon.

Preliminary measures were already in progress. In December a pontoon bridge escorted by military artificers and some Portuguese seamen, had been ordered from Lisbon to Abrantes, where draft bullocks were collected to draw it to Elvas. After the fall of Ciudad stores and tools were sent from Lisbon to Setuval, and thence in boats to Alcaçer do Sal; and a company of the military artificers, then at Cadiz, were disembarked at Ayamonte to proceed to Elvas, where an engineer officer secretly superintended the preparations for the siege. Meanwhile the repairs of Ciudad went on, two new redoubts were traced out upon the Tesons, the old one was enlarged, and the suburbs were strengthened, but the heavy storms before mentioned, impeded these works, and having entirely stopped all communication by sea and land, delayed for many days the preparations for the ulterior operations. When the weather cleared they were renewed, yet other obstacles were not wanting.

The draft bullocks, sinking from want, were unable to drag the whole battering train by the way of Vilha Velha, and only sixteen twenty-four pounders, and twenty spare carriages could be moved on that line. To supply the deficiency sixteen twenty-four pounders then in vessels in the Tagus, were ordered up to Abrantes, and admiral Berkeley was applied to for twenty ship-guns. He had none of that calibre and offered eighteen pounders, which were accepted; but when major Dickson, who superintended the arrangements for the artillery service, arrived at Lisbon, he found that these were Russian pieces whose bore was too large for English shot, and the admiral refused to give guns from his own ship the *Barfleur*, in their place. This apparently capricious proceeding produced both difficulty and delay, because the artillery-men were in consequence obliged to cull the Portuguese shot in the arsenal to obtain a sufficient supply. However the energy of major Dickson overcame every obstacle, and in the beginning of March the battering guns fifty-two in number, the pontoons from Abrantes, and most of the stores from Alcaçer do Sal, were parked at Elvas, where also gabions and fascines were piled in great numbers.

Marmont having lost his emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, and being unable to measure his adversary's talent and energy, had during these transactions again spread his troops that he might the more easily feed them. Three divisions of infantry and part of the cavalry returned to Talavera and Toledo. Souham occupied the country from Zamora and Toro to the banks of the Tormes; and Bonet after driving the Gallicians back to Senabria and Villa Franca remained about Benevente and Astorga. The army of Portugal appeared to dread no further operations on the part of the allies, yet from some secret misgiving, Marmont caused general Foy to march through the Guadalupe, by the pass of St. Vincente to ascertain whether an army could march by that line from the Tagus to the Guadiana.

This scattering of the French relieved lord Wellington from a serious embarrassment. The constant difficulty of land transport, had prevented him from bringing up the clothing of the army, and he was now obliged to send the regiments to those points on the Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus, where the clothing had arrived by boats; hence the march to the

Alemtejo was necessarily long and unmilitary, and would have been too dangerous to attempt, if Marmont had kept his troops together on the Tormes, with advanced posts pushed towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The weather was now however extremely favourable to the allies, and the new Portuguese commissariat supplied the troops on this march well, and without any of those exactions and oppressions which had always before marked the movements of the native troops; nevertheless the scarcity was so great, that rations of cassava root were served to the Portuguese instead of bread.

The talents of lord Wellington always rose with his difficulties, but the want of specie crippled every operation. A movement into Spain, such as that now intended against Andalusia, could not be effected without magazines when there was no harvest on the ground, except by paying ready money; because it was certain that the Spaniards, however favourably disposed, would never diminish their own secret resources for mere promises of payment. The English general and Mr. Stuart, therefore, endeavoured to get British bank notes accepted as cash, by the great merchants of Lisbon and Oporto; and lord Wellington reflecting that, from the enormous sums spent in Portugal, many persons must needs have secret hoards which they would be glad to invest if they could do it safely, asked for English exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner; intending to pay the interest punctually and faithfully, however inconvenient it might prove at the moment. This plan could not be adopted with Portuguese paper, because the finances were faithlessly managed by the regency; but some futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by lord Liverpool, and money became so scarce, that we shall find, even in the midst of victory, the war was more than once like to stop altogether from absolute inability to proceed.

On the 5th of March, the army being well on the way to the Alemtejo, lord Wellington who had maintained his head-quarters on the Coa to the last moment, that the enemy might not be awakened to his real designs, gave up Ciudad Rodrigo to Castaños. He also in person, and on the spot, explained to Vives, the governor, the plan and intention of the new works; he supplied him with money to complete them; furnished him with six weeks provision remaining from the field stores of the British troops, and gave him the reserved store at St. Joa de Pesqueira on the Douro, from whence Carlos d'España undertook to transport them to the fortress.

As Marmont was at this time in Salamanca, and still ignorant of the allies' march, general Victor Alten's brigade of cavalry was posted on the Yeltes, to screen the allies' movements as long as possible, and he was instructed if Marmont advanced to retire on Beira, and cover the magazines at Castello Branco, by disputing all the rivers and defiles with the enemy's advanced parties. At the same time Silveira was directed to fall back upon the Douro to cover Oporto; the militia, under Trant and J. Wilson, were ordered to concentrate about Guarda; and those of Beira to unite about Castello Branco under colonel Lecor; the orders of all being the same, namely, to dispute the passage of the rivers and defiles. Trant was to defend those of the Estrella, and Lecor those of Castello Branco, on which town Victor Alten's cavalry was finally to retire if pressed. With these forces, and the Spaniards under Sanchez and España, and with the two fortresses, for Almeida was now capable of defence, Marmont's efforts were not much to be dreaded in that season, after he had lost his battering train in Ciudad.

These things arranged, Wellington set off for Elvas which he reached the 11th, and prepared to invest

Badajos, although neither the troops nor the stores were all arrived; but even this was ten days later than he had designed, and threw his operations into the violent equinoctial rains, by which the difficulties were augmented two-fold. This was one of the evils produced by the incredibly vexatious conduct of the Portuguese regency. There was no want of transport in the country, but as the government would not oblige the magistrates to do their duty, the latter either refused to procure carts for the army, or obliged the poorer classes to supply them, from which oppression the peasants naturally endeavoured to escape by flight. Thus, all the arrangements for the investment of Badajos on the 6th of March had been made, but the rich town of Evora, which had not seen the face of an enemy for more than three years, refused to supply any carriages at all, and the operation was necessarily put off till the 17th.

But it was in vain that Wellington threatened and remonstrated, in vain that he employed his time and wasted his mental powers in devising new laws, or remedies for bad ones; it was in vain that Mr. Stuart exerted himself, with equal vigour, to give energy to this extraordinary government; for whether in matters of small or vital importance, insolent anger and falsehood, disgraceful subterfuges and stolid indifference, upon the part of all civil functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, met them at every turn. The responsibility even in small matters became too great for subordinate officers; and the English general was forced to arrange the most trifling details of the service himself; thus the iron-strength of his body and mind was strained, until all men wondered how they held, and in truth he did fall sick, but recovered after a few days. The critical nature of the war may be here judged of, for no man could have taken his place at such a moment, no man, however daring or skilful, would have voluntarily plunged into difficulties which were like to drive Wellington from the contest.

CHAPTER V.

The allies cross the Guadiana—Beresford invests Badajos—Generals Graham and Hill command the covering army—Drouet retires to Hornaches in the Llerena—Third English siege of Badajos—Sally of the garrison repulsed—Works impeded by the rain—The besieged rake the trenches from the right bank of the Guadiana—The fifth division is called up to the siege—The river rises and carries away the bridge, and the siege is upon the point of being raised—Two flying bridges are established—The fifth division invest St. Christoval and the bridge-head—The Picurina is stormed—The batteries open against the San Roque and the body of the place—The covering army drive general Drouet from the Serena into the Morena on the side of Cordova—Marmont collects his forces in Leon—The Spanish officers and the Portuguese government neglect the supplies of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida—Soult advances from Cordova towards Llerena—The fifth division is brought over the Guadiana—The works of the siege are pressed—An attempt to blow up the dam of the inundation fails—The two breaches become practicable—Soult effects his junction with Drouet and advances to the succour of the place—Graham and Hill fall back—The bridge of Merida is destroyed—The assault is ordered, but countermanded—A third breach is formed—The fortress is stormed with a dreadful slaughter, and the city is sacked by the allies.

THE 15th the pontoons were laid over the Guadiana, about four miles from Elvas, at a place where the current was dull, two large Spanish boats were arranged as flying bridges; and the 16th, Beresford, who had again joined the army, crossed the river, drove in the enemy's posts, and invested Badajos with the third, fourth, and light divisions, and a brigade of Hamilton's Portuguese; in all fifteen thousand men.

Soult was then before the Isla, Drouet's division, of five thousand men, was at Villafranca, and Darricau with a like force was at Zalamea de Serena near Medellin; wherefore general Graham passing the Guadiana with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry, and two brigades of cavalry, directed his march by Valverde, and Santa Martha, upon Llerena, while Hill moved from Albuquerque by Merida upon Almendralejos. These covering corps were together thirty thousand strong, nearly five thousand including the heavy Germans who were at Estremos being cavalry; and as the fifth division was now on the march from Beira, the whole army presented about fifty-one thousand sabres and bayonets, of which twenty thousand were Portuguese. Castaños had repaired to Galicia, but the fifth Spanish army under Morillo and Penne Villemur, being about four thousand strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the Lower Guadiana, intending to fall on Seville when Soult should advance to the succour of Badajos.

As the allies advanced, Drouet marched by his right to Hornaches, in the direction of La Serena and Medellin, with a view to keep open the communication with Marmont by Truxillo. Hill then halted at Almendralejos, and Graham took post at Zafra, placing Slade's cavalry at Villafranca; but Marmont had moved his sixth division from Talavera towards Castile, through the Puerto de Pico, on the 9th, and the four divisions and cavalry quartered at Toledo had recrossed the Tagus and marched over the Guadarama, the whole pointing for Valladolid. Thus it was already manifest that the army of Portugal would not act in conjunction with that of the south.

THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This fortress has been described. The garrison composed of French, Hessian, and Spanish troops, was now near five thousand strong including sick. Phillipon had since the last siege made himself felt in all directions, for he had continually scoured the vicinity of the place, destroyed many small bands, carried off cattle, almost from under the guns of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and his spies extended their researches from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, and from Lisbon to Ayamonte.

He had also greatly improved the defences of the place. An interior retrenchment was made in the castle, and many more guns were there mounted; the rear of fort Cristoval was also better secured, and a covered communication from the fort itself, to the work at the bridge-head, was nearly completed. Two ravelins had been constructed on the south side of the town, and a third was commenced, together with counterguards for the bastions; but the eastern front next the castle, which was in other respects the weakest point, was without any outward protection save the stream of the Rivillas. A "*cunette*" or second ditch had been dug at the bottom of the great ditch, which was also in some parts filled with water; the gorge of the Pardaleras was enclosed, and that outwork was connected with the body of the place, from whence powerful batteries looked into it. The three western fronts were mined, and on the east, the arch of the bridge behind the San Roque, was built up to form an inundation, two hundred yards wide, which greatly contracted the space by which the place could be approached with troops. All the inhabitants had been obliged, on pain of being expelled, to lay up food for three months, and two convoys with provisions and ammunition had entered the place on the 10th and 16th of February, but Phillipon's stores of powder were still inadequate to his wants, and he was very scantily supplied with shells.

As the former system of attack against Cristoval and the castle, was now impracticable, lord Wellington

desired to assail one of the western fronts which would have been a scientific operation; but the engineer represented that he had neither mortars nor miners, nor enough of guns, nor the means of bringing up sufficient stores for such an attack. Indeed the want of transport had again obliged the allies to draw the stores from Elvas, to the manifest hazard of that fortress, and hence, here, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was necessarily paid for, by the loss of life; or rather the crimes of politicians were atoned for by the blood of the soldiers.

The plan finally fixed upon, was to attack the bastion of Trinidad, because, the counterguard there being unfinished, that bastion could be battered from the hill on which the Picurina stood. The first parallel was therefore to embrace the Picurina, the San Roque, and the eastern front, in such a manner that the counter batteries there erected, might rake and destroy all the defences of the southern fronts which bore against the Picurina hill. The Picurina itself was to be battered and stormed, and from thence the Trinidad and Santa Maria bastions, were to be breached; after this all the guns were to be turned against the connecting curtain, which was known to be of weak masonry, that a third breach might be made, and a storming party employed to turn any retrenchments behind the breaches in the bastions. (In this way the inundation could be avoided, and although a French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was there eighteen feet deep, such was the general's confidence in his troops, and in his own resources for aiding their efforts, that he resolved to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp.

The battering train, directed by major Dickson, consisted of fifty-two pieces. This included sixteen twenty-four-pound howitzers, for throwing Shrapnel shells, but this species of missile, much talked of in the army at the time, was little prized by lord Wellington, who had early detected its insufficiency, save as a common shell; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a dislike to injure the inhabitants, neither in this, nor in any former siege, did he use mortars. Here indeed he could not have brought them up, for besides the neglect of the Portuguese government, the peasantry and even the ordenança employed to move the battering train from Alcacér do Sal, although well paid, deserted.

Of nine hundred gunners present, three hundred were British, the rest Portuguese, and there were one hundred and fifty sappers volunteers from the third division, who were indeed rather unskilful, but of signal bravery. The engineer's parc was established behind the heights of St. Michael, and the direction of the siege was given to general Picton. General Kempt, general Colville, and general Bowes alternately commanded in the trenches.

In the night of the 17th, eighteen hundred men, protected by a guard of two thousand, broke ground one hundred and sixty yards from the Picurina. A tempest stifled the sound of their pickaxes, and though the work was commenced late, a communication, four thousand feet in length, was formed, and a parallel of six hundred yards three feet deep, and three feet six inches wide, was opened. However, when the day broke the Picurina was reinforced, and a sharp musketry interspersed with discharges from some field-pieces, aided by heavy guns from the body of the place, was directed on the trenches.

In the night of the 18th two batteries were traced out, the parallel was prolonged both on the right and left, and the previous works were improved. On the other hand the garrison raised the parapets of the Picurina, and having lined the top of the covered way with sand-bags, planted musketeers there, to gall the men in the trenches, who replied in a like manner.

The 19th lord Wellington having secret intelligence that a sally was intended, ordered the guards to be reinforced. Nevertheless, at one o'clock some cavalry

came out by the Talavera gate, and thirteen hundred infantry under general Vielland, the second in command, filed unobserved into the communication between the Picurina and the San Roque; a hundred men were prepared to sally from the Picurina itself, and all these troops jumping out at once, drove the workmen before them, and began to demolish the parallel. Previous to this outbreak, the French cavalry forming two parties had commenced a sham fight on the right of the parallel, and the smaller party pretending to fly, and answering Portuguese, to the challenge of the picquets, were allowed to pass. Elated by the success of their stratagem, they then galloped to the engineer's parc, which was a thousand yards in rear of the trenches, and there cut down some men, not many, for succour soon came, and meanwhile the troops at the parallel having rallied upon the relief which had just arrived, beat the enemy's infantry back even to the castle.

In this hot fight the besieged lost above three hundred men and officers, the besiegers only one hundred and fifty; but colonel Fletcher, the chief engineer, was badly wounded, and several hundred entrenching tools were carried off, for Phillipon had promised a high price for each; yet this turned out ill, because the soldiers, instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather the tools. After the action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces were placed as a reserve-guard behind St. Michael, and a signal post was established on the Sierra de Venta to give notice of the enemy's motions.

The weather continued wet and boisterous, and the labour of the works was very harassing, but in the night of the 19th the parallel was opened in its whole length, and the 20th it was enlarged; yet a local obstacle and the flooding of the trenches, rendered the progress slow.

In the night of the 20th the parallel was extended to the left, across the Seville road, and three counter-batteries were commenced; but they were traced, in rear of the parallel, partly because the ground was too soft in front to admit of the guns moving; partly for safety, because the batteries were within three hundred yards of the San Roque, and as the parallel, eighteen hundred yards long, was only guarded by fourteen hundred men, a few bold soldiers might by a sudden rush have succeeded in spiking the guns if they had been placed in front of the trench. A slight sally was this day repulsed, and a shoulder was given to the right of the parallel to cover that flank.

The 21st the enemy placed two field-pieces on the right bank of the Guadiana, designing to rake the trenches, but the shoulder, made the night before, baffled the design, and the riflemen's fire soon sent the guns away. Indications of a similar design against the left flank, from the Pardaleras hill, were also observed, and a guard of three hundred men with two guns, was posted on that side in some broken ground.

In the night another battery against the San Roque was commenced, and the battery against the Picurina was finished; but heavy rain again retarded the works, and the besiegers having failed in an attempt to drain the lower parts of the parallel, by cuts, made an artificial bottom of sand-bags. On the other hand the besieged thinking the curtain adjoining the castle was the true object of attack, threw up an earthen entrenchment in front, and commenced clearing away the houses behind it. A covered communication from the Trinidad gate to the San Roque, intended to take this supposed attack in reverse, was also commenced; but the labour of digging being too great, it was completed by hanging up brown cloth, which appeared to be earth, and by this ingenious expedient, the garrison passed unseen between those points.*

* La Marre's Siege of Badajoz.

Vauban's maxim, that a perfect investment is the first requisite in a siege, had been neglected at Badajoz to spare labour, but the great master's art was soon vindicated by his countrymen. Phillipon finding the right bank of the Guadiana free, made a battery in the night for three field-pieces, which at daylight raked the trenches, and the shots pitching into the parallel, swept it in the most destructive manner for the whole day; there was no remedy, and the loss would have been still greater but for the soft nature of the ground, which prevented the touch and bound of the bullets. Orders were immediately sent to the fifth division, then at Campo Mayor, to invest the place on that side, but these troops were distant and misfortunes accumulated. In the evening heavy rain filled the trenches, the flood of the Guadiana ran the fixed bridge under water, sank twelve of the pontoons, and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the provisions of the army could not then be brought over, and the guns and ammunition being still on the right bank, the siege was upon the point of being raised. In a few days, however, the river subsided, some Portuguese craft were brought up to form another flying-bridge, the pontoons saved were employed as row-boats, and in this manner the communication was secured, for the rest of the siege, without any accident.

The 23d the besieged continued to work at the entrenchments covering the front next the castle, and the besiegers were fixing their platforms, when at three o'clock the rain again filled the trenches, the earth, being completely saturated with water, fell away, the works every where crumbled, and the attack was entirely suspended.

The 24th the fifth division invested the place on the right bank of the Guadiana, the weather was fine, and the batteries were armed with ten twenty-fours, eleven eighteens, and seven five-and-a-half-inch howitzers. The next day, at eleven o'clock, these pieces opened, but they were so vigorously answered, that one howitzer was dismounted and several artillery and engineer officers were killed. Nevertheless the San Roque was silenced, and the garrison of the Picurina was so galled by the marksmen in the trenches, that no man dared look over the parapet; hence, as the external appearance of that fort did not indicate much strength, general Kempt was charged to assault it in the night.

The outward seeming of the Picurina was however fallacious, the fort was very strong; the fronts were well covered by the glacis, the flanks were deep, and the rampart, fourteen feet perpendicular from the bottom of the ditch, was guarded with thick slanting pales above; and from thence to the top there were sixteen feet of an earthen slope. A few palings had, indeed, been knocked off at the covered-way, and the parapet was slightly damaged on that side, but this injury was repaired with sand-bags, and the ditch was profound, narrow at the bottom, and flanked by four splinter-proof casemates. Seven guns were mounted on the works, the entrance to which by the rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, the garrison was above two hundred strong, and every man had two muskets. The top of the rampart was garnished with loaded shells to push over, a retrenched guard-house formed a second internal defence, and finally, some small mines and a loop-holed gallery, under the counterscarp, intended to take the assailants in rear, were begun but not finished.

Five hundred men of the third division being assembled for the attack, general Kempt ordered two hundred, under major Rudd of the seventy-seventh, to turn the fort on the left; an equal force, under major Shaw of the seventy-fourth, to turn the fort by the right; and one hundred from each of these bodies were directed to enter the communication with San Roque and

intercept any succours coming from the town. The flanking columns were to make a joint attack on the fort, and the hundred men remaining, were placed under captain Powis of the eighty-third, to form a reserve. The engineers, Holloway, Stanway, and Gips, with twenty-four sappers bearing hatchets and ladders, guided these columns, and fifty men of the light division, likewise provided with axes, were to move out of the trenches at the moment of attack.

ASSAULT OF PICURINA.

The night was fine, the arrangements clearly and skilfully made, and about nine o'clock the two flanking bodies moved forward. The distance was short, and the troops quickly closed on the fort, which black and silent before, now seemed one mass of fire; then the assailants running up to the palisades in the rear, with undaunted courage endeavoured to break through, and when the destructive musketry of the French, and the thickness of the pales, rendered their efforts nugatory, they turned against the faces of the work and strove to break in there; but the depth of the ditch and the slanting stakes at the top of the brick-work again baffled them.

At this time, the enemy shooting fast, and dangerously, the crisis appeared imminent, and Kempt sent the reserve headlong against the front; thus the fight was continued strongly, the carnage became terrible, and a battalion coming out from the town to the succour of the fort, was encountered and beaten by the party on the communication. The guns of Badajoz, and of the castle now opened, the guard of the trenches, replied with musketry, rockets were thrown up by the besieged, and the shrill sound of alarm bells, mixing with the shouts of the combatants, increased the tumult. Still the Picurina sent out streams of fire, by the light of which, dark figures were seen furiously struggling on the ramparts; for Powis first escalated the place in front where the artillery had beaten down the pales, and the other assailants had thrown their ladders on the flanks in the manner of bridges, from the brink of the ditch to the slanting stakes, and all were fighting hand to hand with the enemy. Meanwhile the axe-men of the light division, compassing the fort like prowling wolves, discovered the gate, and hewing it down, broke in by the rear. Nevertheless the struggle continued. Powis, Holloway, Gips, and Oates, of the eighty-eighth, fell wounded on or beyond the rampart; Nixon of the fifty-second was shot two yards within the gate; Shaw, Rudd, and nearly all the other officers had fallen outside; and it was not until half the garrison were killed, that Gaspar Thiery, the commandant, and eighty-six men, surrendered, while some, not many, rushing out of the gate, endeavoured to cross the inundation and were drowned.

The French governor hoped to have delayed the siege five or six days by the resistance of Picurina, and had the assault been a day later, this would have happened; for the loop-holed gallery in the counterscarp, and the mines, would then have been completed, and the body of the work was too well covered by the glacis to be quickly ruined by fire. His calculations were baffled by this heroic assault, which lasted an hour, and cost four officers and fifty men killed, fifteen officers and two hundred and fifty men wounded; and so vehement was the fight throughout, that the garrison either forgot, or had not time to roll over the shells and combustibles arranged on the ramparts. Phillipon did not conceal the danger accruing to Badajoz from the loss of the Picurina, but he stimulated his soldiers' courage, by calling to their recollection, how infinitely worse than death it was, to be the inmate of an English hulk! an appeal which must have been deeply felt, for the annals of civilized nations,

furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war, than the prison-ships of England.

When the Picurina was taken, three battalions of reserve advanced to secure it, and though a great turmoil and firing from the town, continued until midnight, a lodgement in the works, and a communication with the first parallel, were established, and the second parallel was commenced. However at day-light the redoubt was so overwhelmed with fire, from the town, that no troops could remain in it, and the lodgement was entirely destroyed. In the evening the sappers effected another lodgement on the flanks, the second parallel was then opened in its whole length, and the next day the counter-batteries on the right of the Picurina exchanged a vigorous fire with the town; but one of the besiegers' guns was dismounted, and the Portuguese gunners, from inexperience, produced less effect on the defences than was expected.

In the night of the 27th a new communication from the first parallel to the Picurina was made, and three breaching-batteries were traced out. The first to contain twelve twenty-four pounders, occupied the space between the Picurina and the inundation, and was to breach the right face of the Trinidad bastion. The second, to contain eight eighteen pounders, was on the site of the Picurina, and was to breach the left flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The third, constructed on the prolonged line of the front to be attacked, contained three Shrapnel howitzers, to scour the ditch and prevent the garrison working in it; for Phillipon had now discovered the true line of attack, and had set strong parties in the night, to raise the counter-guard of the Trinidad and the imperfect ravelin covering the menaced front.

At day-break these works being well furnished with gabions and sand-bags, were lined with musqueteers, who severely galled the workmen employed on the breaching batteries and the artillery practice was also brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegers' guns were dismounted; the gabions placed in front of the batteries to protect the workmen were knocked over, and the musquetry then became so destructive that the men were withdrawn and threw up earth from the inside.

In the night of the 27th the second parallel was extended to the right, with the view of raising batteries, to ruin the San Roque, to destroy the dam which held up the inundation, and to breach the curtain behind; but the Talavera road proved so hard, and the moon shone so brightly, that the labourers were quite exposed and the work was relinquished.

On the 28th the screen of gabions before the batteries, was restored and the workmen resumed their labours outside; the parallel was then improved, and the besieged withdrew their guns from San Roque; but their marksmen still shot from thence with great exactness, and the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one of the counter-batteries which was therefore dismantled. The enemy had also during the night observed the tracing string, which marked the direction of the sap in front of San Roque, and a daring fellow creeping out just before the workmen arrived, brought it in the line of the castle fire, whereby some loss was sustained ere the false direction was discovered.

In the night the dismantled howitzer battery was re-armed, with twenty-four pounders, to play on the San Roque, and a new breaching battery was traced out on the site of the Picurina, against the flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The second parallel was also carried by the sap across the Talavera road, and a trench was digged, for riflemen, in front of the batteries.

The 29th a slight sally, made on the right bank of the river, was repulsed by the Portuguese, but the sap at the San Roque was ruined by the enemy's fire, and the besieged continued to raise the counter-guard and

ravelin of the Trinidad and to strengthen the front attacked. On the other hand the besiegers during the night carried the sap over the Talavera road, and armed two breaching batteries, with eighteen pounders, which the next day opened against the flank of Santa Maria; but they made little impression, and the explosion of an expense magazine killed many men and hurt others.

While the siege was thus proceeding Soult having little fear for the town, but expecting a great battle, was carefully organizing a powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricaun. Those generals had endeavoured to hold the district of La Serena with the view of keeping open the communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo; but Graham and Hill marched against their flanks and forced them into the Morena by the Cordova roads; and on the other side of the country Morillo and Penne Villemur, were lying close on the lower Guadiana waiting their opportunity to fall on Seville when Soult should advance. Nor were there wanting other combinations to embarrass and delay the French marshal; for in February, general Montes being detached, by Ballesteros, from San Roque, had defeated Maransin on the Guadajore river, driving him from Cartama into Malaga. After this the whole of the Spanish army was assembled in the Ronda hills, with a view to fall on Seville by the left of the Guadiana while Morillo assailed it on the right of that river. This had obliged Soult to send troops towards Malaga, and fatally delayed his march to Estremadura.

Meanwhile Marmont was concentrating his army in the Salamanca country, and it was rumoured that he meant to attack Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington was somewhat disturbed by this information; he knew indeed that the flooding of the rivers in the north, would prevent a blockade, and he was also assured that Marmont had not yet obtained a battering train. But the Spanish generals and engineers had neglected the new works and repairs of Ciudad Rodrigo; even the provisions at St. Joa de Pesquiera had not been brought up; the fortress had only thirty days' supply. Almeida was in as bad a state, and the grand project of invading Andalusia was likely to be baulked by these embarrassments.

On the 30th Soult's advance from Cordova being decided, the fifth division was brought over the Guadiana as a reserve to the covering army; but Power's Portuguese brigade, with some cavalry, of the same nation, still maintained the investment on the right bank, the siege was urged forward very rapidly, forty-eight pieces of artillery were in constant play, and the sap against St. Roque advanced. The enemy was equally active, his fire was very destructive, and his progress in raising the ravelin and counter-guard of the front attacked was very visible.

The 1st of April the sap was pushed close to the San Roque, the Trinidad bastion crumbled under the stroke of the bullet, and the flank of the Santa Maria, which was casemated and had hitherto resisted the batteries, also began to yield. The 2d the face of the Trinidad was very much broken, but at the Santa Maria the casemates being laid open, the bullets were lost in their cavities, and the garrison commenced a retrenchment to cut off the whole of the attacked front, from the town.

In the night a new battery against the San Roque was armed, and two officers with some sappers gliding behind that out-work, gagged the sentinel, placed powder barrels and a match against the dam of the inundation, and retired undiscovered, but the explosion did not destroy the dam, and the inundation remained. Nor did the sap make progress, because of the French musketeers; for though the marksmen set against them slew many they were reinforced by means of a raft with parapets, which crossed the inundation, and men

also passed by the cloth communication from the Trinidad gate.

On the 3d some guns were turned against the curtain behind the San Roque, but the masonry proved hard, ammunition was scarce, and as a breach there would have been useless, while the inundation remained, the fire was soon discontinued. The two breaches in the bastion were now greatly enlarged and the besieged assiduously laboured at the retrenchments behind them, and converted the nearest houses and garden walls into a third line of defence. All the houses behind the front next the castle were also thrown down, and a battery of five guns, intended to flank the ditch and breach of the Trinidad, was commenced on the castle hill, but outside the wall; the besiegers therefore traced out a counter-battery, of fourteen Shrapnel howitzers, to play upon that point during the assault.

The crisis of the siege was now approaching rapidly. The breaches were nearly practicable, Soult, having effected a junction with Drouet and Daricau, was advancing; and as the allies were not in sufficient force to assault the place and give battle at the same time, it was resolved to leave two divisions in the trenches, and to fight at Albuera with the remainder. Graham therefore fell back towards that place, and Hill having destroyed the bridge at Merida, marched from the upper Guadiana to Talavera Real.

Time being now, as in war it always is, a great object, the anxiety on both sides redoubled; but Soult was still at Llerena, when on the morning of the 5th the breaches were declared practicable, and the assault ordered for that evening. Leith's division was even recalled to the camp to assist, when a careful personal examination of the enemy's retrenchments caused some doubts in lord Wellington's mind, and he delayed the storm, until a third breach, as originally projected, should be formed in the curtain between the bastions of Trinidad and Maria. This could not, however, be commenced before morning, and during the night the enemy's workmen laboured assiduously at their retrenchments, regardless of the showers of grape with which the besiegers' batteries scoured the ditch and the breach. But the 6th, the besiegers' guns being all turned against the curtain, the bad masonry crumbled rapidly away, in two hours a yawning breach appeared, and Wellington, having again examined the points of attack in person, renewed the order for the assault. Then the soldiers eagerly made themselves ready for a combat, so fiercely fought, so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances, that posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale; but many are still alive who know that it is true.

The British general was so sensible of Phillipon's firmness and of the courage of his garrison, that he spared them the affront of a summons, yet seeing the breach strongly entrenched, and the enemy's flank fire, still powerful, he would not in this dread crisis, trust his fortune to a single effort. Eighteen thousand daring soldiers burned for the signal of attack, and as he was unwilling to lose the service of any, to each division he gave a task such as few generals would have the hardihood even to contemplate.

On the right Picton's division was to file out of the trenches, to cross the Rivillas river, and to scale the castle walls, which were from eighteen to twenty-four feet in height, furnished with all means of destruction, and so narrow at top, that the defenders could easily reach and as easily overturn the ladders.

On the left, Leith's division was to make a false attack on the Pardaleras, and a real assault on the distant bastion of San Vincente, where the glacis was mined, the ditch deep, the scarp thirty feet high, and the parapet garnished with bold troops well provided; for Phillipon, following his old plan, had three loaded

muskets placed beside each man, that the first fire might be quick and deadly.

In the centre, the fourth and light divisions under general Colville, and colonel Andrew Barnard, were to march against the breaches. They were furnished like the third and fifth divisions with ladders and axes, and were preceded by storming parties of five hundred men each with their respective forlorn hopes. The light division was to assault the bastion of Santa Maria; the fourth division to assault the Trinidad, and the curtain; and the columns were divided into storming and firing parties, the former to enter the ditch, the latter to keep the crest of the glacis.

Besides these attacks, major Wilson of the forty-eighth was to storm the San Roque with the guards of the trenches, and on the other side of the Guadiana, general Power was to make a feint on the bridge-head.

At first only one brigade, of the third division, was to have attacked the castle, but just before the hour fixed upon, a sergeant of sappers having deserted from the enemy, informed Wellington that there was but one communication from the castle to the town, whereupon he ordered the whole division to advance together.

This was the outline of the plan, but many nice arrangements filled it up, and some were followed, some disregarded, for it is seldom that all things are strictly attended to in a desperate fight. Nor were the enemy idle, for while it was yet twilight some French cavalry issued from the Pardaleras, escorting an officer who endeavoured to look into the trenches, with a view to ascertain if an assault was intended; but the picquet on that side jumped up, and firing as it ran, drove him and his escort back into the works. Then the darkness fell and the troops only awaited the signal.

ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.

The night was dry but clouded, the air thick with watery exhalations from the rivers, the ramparts, and the trenches unusually still; yet a low murmur pervaded the latter, and in the former, lights were seen to flit here and there, while the deep voices of the sentinels at times proclaimed, that all was well in Badajos. The French, confiding in Phillipon's direful skill, watched, from their lofty station, the approach of enemies, whom they had twice before baffled, and now hoped to drive a third time blasted and ruined from the walls; the British, standing in deep columns, were as eager to meet that fiery destruction as the others were to pour it down; and both were alike terrible for their strength, their discipline, and the passions awakened in their resolute hearts.

Former failures there were to avenge, and on either side, such leaders as left no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial; and the possession of Badajos was become a point of honour, personal with the soldiers of each nation. But the strong desire for glory was, in the British, dashed with a hatred of the citizens on an old grudge, and recent toil and hardship, with much spilling of blood, had made many incredibly savage: for these things render the noble-minded indeed, averse to cruelty, but harden the vulgar spirit. Numbers also, like Cæsar's centurion who could not forget the plunder of Avaricum, were heated with the recollection of Ciudad Rodrigo, and thirsted for spoil. Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, the wondrous power of discipline bound the whole together as with a band of iron, and, in the pride of arms, none doubted their might, to bear down every obstacle that man could oppose to their fury.

At ten o'clock, the castle, the San Roque, the breaches, the Pardaleras, the distant bastion of San Vincente, and the bridge-head on the other side of the Guadiana, were to have been simultaneously assailed, and it was hoped that the strength of the enemy would

shrivel within that fiery girdle. But many are the disappointments of war. An unforeseen accident delayed the attack of the fifth division; and a lighted carcass, thrown from the castle, falling close to where the men of the third division were drawn up, discovered their array, and obliged them to anticipate the signal by half an hour. Then, every thing being suddenly disturbed, the double columns of the fourth and light divisions also moved silently and swiftly against the breaches, and the guard of the trenches, rushing forward with a shout, encompassed the San Roque with fire and broke in so violently that scarcely any resistance was made.

But a sudden blaze of light and the rattling of musketry indicated the commencement of a most vehement combat at the castle. There general Kempt, for Picton hurt by a fall, in the camp, and expecting no change in the hour, was not present, there general Kempt, I say, led the third division; he had passed the Rivillas, in single files by a narrow bridge, under a terrible musketry, and then reforming, and running up the rugged hill, had reached the foot of the castle when he fell severely wounded, and being carried back to the trenches met Picton who hastened forward to take the command. Meanwhile his troops spreading along the front reared their heavy ladders, some against the lofty castle, some against the adjoining front on the left, and with incredible courage ascended amidst showers of heavy stones, logs of wood, and bursting shells rolled off the parapet, while from the flanks the enemy plied his musketry with a fearful rapidity, and in front, with pikes and bayonets, stabbed the leading assailants or pushed the ladders from the walls; and all this attended with deafening shouts, and the crash of breaking ladders, and the shrieks of crushed soldiers answering to the sullen stroke of the falling weights.

Still, swarming round the remaining ladders, these undaunted veterans strove who should first climb, until all being overturned, the French shouted victory, and the British, baffled, but untamed, fell back a few paces, and took shelter under the rugged edge of the hill. Here when the broken ranks were somewhat re-formed, the heroic colonel Ridge, springing forward, called, with a stentorian voice, on his men to follow, and, seizing a ladder, once more raised it against the castle, yet to the right of the former attack, where the wall was lower, and an embrasure offered some facility. A second ladder was soon placed alongside of the first, by the grenadier officer Canch, and the next instant he and Ridge were on the rampart, the shouting troops pressed after them, the garrison amazed, and in a manner surprised, were driven fighting through the double gate into the town, and the castle was won. A reinforcement, sent from the French reserve, then came up, a sharp action followed, both sides fired through the gate, and the enemy retired, but Ridge fell, and no man died that night with more glory—yet many died, and there was much glory.

During these events, the tumult at the breaches was such as if the very earth had been rent asunder and its central fires were bursting upwards uncontrolled. The two divisions had reached the glacis, just as the firing at the castle had commenced, and the flash of a single musket discharged from the covered way as a signal shewed them that the French were ready; yet no stir was heard, and darkness covered the breaches. Some hay-packs were then thrown, some ladders were placed, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties of the light division, about five hundred in all, had descended into the ditch without opposition, when a bright flame shooting upwards displayed all the terrors of the scene. The ramparts crowded with dark figures and glittering arms, were seen on the one side, and on the other, the red columns of the British, deep and broad, were coming

on like streams of burning lava; it was the touch of the magician's wand, for a crash of thunder followed, and with incredible violence the storming parties were dashed to pieces by the explosion of hundreds of shells and powder-barrels.

For an instant the light division stood on the brink of the ditch, amazed at the terrific sight, then, with a shout that matched even the sound of the explosion, flew down the ladders, or disdaining their aid, leaped, reckless of the depth, into the gulf below; and nearly at the same moment, amidst a blaze of musketry that dazzled the eyes, the fourth division came running in and descended with a like fury. There were however only five ladders for both columns, which were close together, and a deep cut made in the bottom of the ditch, as far as the counter-guard of the Trinidad, was filled with water from the inundation; into this watery snare the head of the fourth division fell, and it is said that above a hundred of the fuzileers, the men of Albuera, were there smothered. Those who followed, checked not, but as if such a disaster had been expected, turned to the left, and thus came upon the face of the unfinished ravelin, which, being rough and broken, was mistaken for the breach, and instantly covered with men; yet a wide and deep chasm was still between them and the ramparts from whence came a deadly fire wasting their ranks. Thus baffled, they also commenced a rapid discharge of musketry, and disorder ensued; for the men of the light division, whose conducting engineer had been disabled early, and whose flank was confined by an unfinished ditch intended to cut off the bastion of Santa Maria, rushed towards the breaches of the curtain and the Trinidad, which were indeed before them, but which the fourth division were destined to storm.

Great was the confusion, for now the ravelin was quite crowded with men of both divisions, and while some continued to fire, others jumped down and ran towards the breach, many also passed between the ravelin and the counter-guard of the Trinidad, the two divisions got mixed, and the reserves, which should have remained at the quarries, also came pouring in, until the ditch was quite filled, the rear still crowding forward, and all cheering vehemently. The enemy's shouts also, were loud and terrible, and the bursting of shells and of grenades, the roaring of the guns from the flanks, answered by the iron howitzers from the battery of the parallel, the heavy roll and horrid explosion of the powder-barrels, the whizzing flight of the blazing splinters, the loud exhortations of the officers, and the continual clatter of the muskets, made a maddening din.

Now a multitude bounded up the great breach as if driven by a whirlwind, but across the top glittered a range of sword-blades, sharp-pointed, keen-edged on both sides, and firmly fixed in ponderous beams, which were chained together and set deep in the ruins; and for ten feet in front, the ascent was covered with loose planks, studded with sharp iron points, on which the feet of the foremost being set the planks moved, and the unhappy soldiers, falling forward on the spikes, rolled down upon the ranks behind. Then the Frenchmen, shouting at the success of their stratagem, and leaping forward, plied their shot with terrible rapidity, for every man had several muskets; and each musket in addition to its ordinary charge contained a small cylinder of wood stuck full of leaden slugs, which scattered like hail when they were discharged.

Again the assailants rushed up the breaches, and again the sword-blades, immovable and impassable, stopped their charge, and the hissing shells and thundering powder-barrels exploded unceasingly. Hundreds of men had fallen, and hundreds more were dropping, but still the heroic officers called aloud for

new trials, and sometimes followed by many, sometimes by a few, ascended the ruins; and so furious were the men themselves, that in one of these charges, the rear strove to push the foremost on to the sword-blades, willing even to make a bridge of their writhing bodies, but the others frustrated the attempt by dropping down; and men fell so fast from the shot, that it was hard to know who went down voluntarily, who were stricken, and many stooped unhurt that never rose again. Vain also would it have been to break through the sword-blades, for the trench and parapet behind the breach were finished, and the assailants, crowded into even a narrower space than the ditch was, would still have been separated from their enemies, and the slaughter would have continued.

At the beginning of this dreadful conflict, colonel Andrew Barnard had with prodigious efforts separated his division from the other, and preserved some degree of military array; but now the tumult was such, that no command could be heard distinctly, except by those close at hand, and the mutilated carcasses heaped on each other, and the wounded, struggling to avoid being trampled upon, broke the formations; order was impossible! Yet officers of all stations, followed more or less numerously by the men, were seen to start out, as if struck by a sudden madness, and rush into the breach, which yawning and glittering with steel, seemed like the mouth of some huge dragon belching forth smoke and flame. In one of these attempts, colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man, whose feeble body would have been quite unfit for war, if it had not been sustained by an unconquerable spirit, was killed. Wherever his voice was heard, there his soldiers gathered, and with such a strong resolution did he lead them up the fatal ruins, that when one behind him, in falling, plunged a bayonet into his back, he complained not, and continuing his course was shot dead within a yard of the sword-blades. But there was no want of gallant leaders, or desperate followers.

Two hours spent in these vain efforts convinced the soldiers that the breach of the Trinidad was impregnable; and as the opening in the curtain, although less strong, was retired, and the approach to it impeded by deep holes, and cuts made in the ditch, the troops did not much notice it after the partial failure of one attack which had been made early. Gathering in dark groups and leaning on their muskets, they looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad, while the enemy stepping out on the ramparts, and aiming their shots by the light of the fire-balls which they threw over, asked as their victims fell, "*Why they did not come into Badajoz?*"

In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in heaps and others continually falling, the wounded crawling about to get some shelter from the merciless fire above, and withal a sickening stench from the burnt flesh of the slain, captain Nicholas, of the engineers, was observed by Mr. Shaw,* of the forty-third, making incredible efforts to force his way with a few men into the Santa Maria bastion. Shaw having collected about fifty soldiers of all regiments joined him, and although there was a deep cut along the foot of this breach also, it was instantly passed, and these two young officers at the head of their gallant band, rushed up the slope of the ruins; but when they had gained two-thirds of the ascent, a concentrated fire of musketry and grape, dashed nearly the whole dead to the earth! Nicholas was mortally wounded, and the intrepid Shaw stood alone! After this no further effort was made at any point, and the troops remained passive, but unflinching, beneath the enemy's shot, which streamed without intermission; for, of the riflemen on the glacis, many leaping early

into the ditch had joined in the assault, and the rest, raked by a cross fire of grape from the distant bastions, baffled in their aim by the smoke and flames from the explosions, and too few in number, had entirely failed to quell the French musketry.

About midnight, when two thousand brave men had fallen, Wellington, who was on a height close to the quarries, sent orders for the remainder to retire and reform for a second assault; for he had just then heard that the castle was taken, and thinking that the enemy would still hold out in the town, was resolved to assail the breaches again. This retreat from the ditch was, however, not effected without further carnage and confusion, for the French fire never slackened, and a cry arose that the enemy were making a sally from the distant flanks, which caused a rush towards the ladders; then the groans and lamentations of the wounded who could not move, and expected to be slain, increased, many officers who had not heard of the order, endeavoured to stop the soldiers from going back, and some would even have removed the ladders but were unable to break the crowd.

All this time the third division was lying close in the castle, and either from a fear of risking the loss of a point which ensured the capture of the place, or that the egress was too difficult, made no attempt to drive away the enemy from the breaches. On the other side however the fifth division had commenced the false attack on the Pardaleras, and on the right of the Guadiana, the Portuguese were sharply engaged at the bridge; thus the town was girdled with fire, for general Walker's brigade having passed on during the feint on the Pardaleras, was escalading the distant bastion of San Vincente. His troops had advanced along the banks of the river, and reached the French guard-house, at the barrier-gate, undiscovered, for the ripple of the waters smothered the sound of their footsteps; but just then the explosion at the breaches took place, the moon shone out, and the French sentinels, discovering the columns, fired. The British troops immediately springing forward under a sharp musketry began to hew down the wooden barrier at the covered way, while the Portuguese, being panic-stricken, threw down the scaling ladders. Nevertheless the others snatched them up again, and forcing the barrier, jumped into the ditch; but the guiding engineer officer was killed, and there was a *cunette*, which embarrassed the column, and when the foremost men succeeded in rearing the ladders, the latter were found too short, for the walls were generally above thirty feet high. Meanwhile the fire of the French was deadly, a small mine was sprung beneath the soldiers' feet, beams of wood and live shells were rolled over on their heads, showers of grape from the flank swept the ditch, and man after man dropped dead from the ladders.

Fortunately some of the defenders having been called away to aid in recovering the castle, the ramparts were not entirely manned, and the assailants, having discovered a corner of the bastion where the scarp was only twenty feet high, placed three ladders there under an embrasure which had no gun and was only stopped with a gabion. Some men got up, but with difficulty, for the ladders were still too short, and the first man who gained the top was pushed up by his comrades and then drew others after him, until many had gained the summit; and though the French shot heavily against them, from both flanks and from a house in front, they thickened and could not be driven back; half the fourth regiment entered the town itself to dislodge the enemy from the houses, while the others pushed along the rampart towards the breach, and by dint of hard fighting successively won three bastions.

In the last of these combats general Walker leaping forward, sword in hand, at the moment when one

* Now lieutenant-colonel Shaw Kennedy.

of the enemy's cannoneers was discharging a gun, fell covered with so many wounds that it was wonderful how he could survive, and some of the soldiers immediately after perceiving a lighted match on the ground, cried out a mine! At that word, such is the power of imagination, those troops whom neither the strong barrier, nor the deep ditch, nor the high walls, nor the deadly fire of the enemy could stop, staggered back appalled by a chimera of their own raising, and in this disorder a French reserve, under general Viellande, drove on them with a firm and ready charge, and pitching some men over the walls, and killing others outright, again cleansed the ramparts even to the San Vincente. There however Leith had placed colonel Nugent with a battalion of the thirty-eighth as a reserve, and when the French came up, shouting and slaying all before them, this battalion, about two hundred strong, arose, and with one close volley destroyed them.

Then the panic ceased, the soldiers rallied, and in compact order once more charged along the walls towards the breaches, but the French, although turned on both flanks and abandoned by fortune, did not yet yield; and meanwhile the detachment of the fourth regiment which had entered the town when the San Vincente was first carried, was strongly situated, for the streets were empty and brilliantly illuminated, and no person was seen; yet a low buzz and whisper were heard around, lattices were now and then gently opened, and from time to time shots were fired from underneath the doors of the houses by the Spaniards. However, the troops with bugles sounding, advanced towards the great square of the town, and in their progress captured several mules going with ammunition to the breaches; but the square itself was as empty and silent as the streets, and the houses as bright with lamps; a terrible enchantment seemed to be in operation, for they saw nothing but light, and heard only the low whispers close around them, while the tumult at the breaches was like the crashing thunder.

There, indeed, the fight was still plainly raging, and hence, quitting the square, they attempted to take the garrison in reverse, by attacking the ramparts from the town-side, but they were received with a rolling musketry, driven back with loss, and resumed their movement through the streets. At last the breaches were abandoned by the French, other parties entered the place, desultory combats took place in various parts, and finally general Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Cristoval, where they all surrendered early the next morning upon summons to lord Fitzroy Somerset, who had with great readiness pushed through the town to the draw-bridge ere they had time to organize further resistance. But even in the moment of ruin the night before, the noble governor had sent some horsemen out from the fort to carry the news to Soult's army, and they reached him in time to prevent a greater misfortune.

Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness, which tarnished the lustre of the soldier's heroism. All indeed were not alike, for hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the violence, but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty, and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos! on the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled. The wounded men were then looked to, the dead disposed of!

Five thousand men and officers fell during this siege, and of these, including seven hundred Portuguese, three thousand five hundred had been stricken in the assault, sixty officers and more than seven hundred men being slain on the spot. The five generals, Kempt, Harvey, Bowes, Colville, and Picton were wounded, the first three severely; about six hundred men and officers fell in the escalade of San Vincente, as many at the castle, and more than two thousand at the breaches, each division there losing twelve hundred! And how deadly the strife was, at that point, may be gathered from this, the forty-third and fifty-second regiments, of the light division, alone lost more men than the seven regiments of the third division engaged at the castle!

Let any man picture to himself this frightful carnage taking place in a space of less than a hundred square yards. Let him consider that the slain died not all suddenly, nor by one manner of death; that some perished by steel, some by shot, some by water, that some were crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by the fiery explosions; that for hours this destruction was endured without shrinking, and that the town was won at last, let any man consider this and he must admit that a British army bears with it an awful power. And false would it be to say that the French were feeble men, for the garrison stood and fought manfully and with good discipline behaving worthily. Shame there was none on any side. Yet who shall do justice to the bravery of the soldiers? the noble emulation of the officers? Who shall measure out the glory of Ridge, of Macleod, of Nicholas, or of O'Hare, of the ninety-fifth, who perished on the breach, at the head of the stormers, and with him nearly all the volunteers for that desperate service? Who shall describe the springing valour of that Portuguese grenadier who was killed the foremost man at the Santa Maria? or the martial fury of that desperate soldier of the ninety-fifth, who, in his resolution to win, thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, and there suffered the enemy to dash his head to pieces with the ends of their muskets? Who can sufficiently honour the intrepidity of Walker, of Shaw, of Canech, or the resolution of Ferguson of the forty-third, who having in former assaults received two deep wounds, was here, with his hurts still open, leading the stormers of his regiment, the third time a volunteer, and the third time wounded! Nor would I be understood to select these as pre-eminent, many and signal were the other examples of unbounded devotion, some known, some that will never be known; for in such a tumult much passed unobserved, and often the observers fell themselves ere they could bear testimony to what they saw; but no age, no nation ever sent forth braver troops to battle than those who stormed Badajos.

When the extent of the night's havoc was made known to lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers.

CHAPTER VI.

The state of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida obliges lord Wellington to relinquish his design of invading Andalusia—Soult's operations described—He reaches Villa Franca—Hears of the fall of Badajos and retires—Penne-Villemur and Morillo move from the Niebla against Seville—Ballesteros having defeated Marasin at Cartama, comes from the Ronda against Seville—A French convoy is stopped in the Morena, and the whole of Andalusia is in commotion—Seville is saved by the subtlety of a Spaniard in the French interest—Ballesteros retires—Assaults Zahara and is repulsed—Sends a division against Ossuna, which is also repulsed

by the *Escopeteros*—Drives general Rey from Allora to Malaga—Soul marches from Llerena towards Seville, and general Conroux brings a brigade up from the Guadalete to attack Ballesteros—Sir S. Cotton defeats general Peyreymont's cavalry near Usagre—Soul concentrates his army near Seville to fight the allies—Lord Wellington marches to Beira—Marmont's operations—He marches against Ciudad Rodrigo—Carlos d'España retires towards Almeida and Victor Alten towards Penamacor—The French appear before Almeida—General Trant arrives on the Cabeça Negro—The French retire and Trant unites with J. Wilson at Guarda—Marmont advances to Sabugal—Victor Alten abandons Penamacor and Castello Branco, and crosses the Tagus—The Portuguese general Lecor opposes the enemy with skill and courage—Marmont drives Trant from Guarda and defeats his militia on the Mondego—Lord Wellington crosses the Tagus and enters Castello Branco—Marmont's position perilous—Lord Wellington advances to attack him—He retreats over the Agueda—The allied army is spread in wide cantonments, and the fortresses are victualled.

THE English general having now achieved the second part of his project, was desirous to fight a great battle in Andalusia, which would have been the crown of this extraordinary winter campaign; but the misconduct of others would not suffer him to do this. At Ciudad Rodrigo, the Spanish engineers had entirely ceased the repairs of the works; Carlos d'España besides neglecting to provision that place, had by his oppressive conduct alarmed all the people of the vicinity, and created a dangerous spirit of discontent in the garrison; Almeida was insecure, and Marmont's army was already between the Agueda and the Coa.

It was essential to place those fortresses in safety, ere the march into Andalusia could take place; but the English general knowing that the danger in Beira was not very imminent, lingered a few days, hoping that Soul, in his anger at the loss of Badajos, would risk a blow on this side of the Morena; and he was certain, that the French general could not stop more than a few days, because of the secondary armies whose operations were then in progress.

Soul was indeed deeply affected by the loss of Badajos, but he was surrounded by enemies and the contest was too unequal. He had quitted Seville the 1st of April with twelve regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and one battery of artillery. His march was by Lora del Rio and Constantino upon Llerena; and, to impose upon the allies, general Gazan moved by the road of Monasterio with the remainder of the artillery and the baggage, escorted by Barois' division of infantry, and some cavalry. But this column turned into the cross roads, at Santa de Guillena, and so reached Constantino, whence they followed the main body, and thus the whole army was concentrated at Llerena on the 6th. This circuitous march had been determined by the situation of Drouet and Daricau, who having been before driven into the mountains by the Cordova roads, could not rally upon the side of Monasterio; now however they advanced to Fuentes de Ovejuña, and the allies fell back to Albuera and Talavera Real.

On the 7th the French reached Villafranca and their cavalry entered Villalba and Fuente del Maestro. The 8th they were in march to fight, when the horsemen sent by Phillipon from Badajos, during the assault, brought the news of its fall; at the same moment their general was apprized, by his spies, that Marmont by whom he expected to be joined was in the north and could not assist him. He immediately fell back to Llerena, for the allies could then bring forty-five thousand men into action, and the French army though strongly constituted and the best troops in Spain did not exceed twenty-four thousand.

Soul had now little time to deliberate, for Penne Villemur and Morillo, issuing out of Portugal with four thousand men, had crossed the Lower Guadiana, and seized San Lucar de Mayor on the 4th. This

place was ten miles from Seville, which was only garrisoned by a Spanish Swiss battalion in Joseph's service, aided by "*Escopeteros*" and by the sick and convalescent men; the commandant Rignoux had therefore, after a skirmish, shut himself up in fortified convents. The 6th the Spaniards had occupied the heights in front of the Triana bridge, and the 7th attacked the French entrenchments, hoping to raise a popular commotion. But a worse danger was gathering on the other side, for Ballesteros, after the defeat of Maransin, at Cartama, had advanced with eleven thousand men intending to fall on Seville from the left of the Guadalquivir.

To distract the attention of the French, and to keep Laval from detaching the troops to Seville, the Spanish general had sent Copons with four thousand men by Itar to Junquera, which is on the Malaga side of the Ronda; meanwhile he himself entered Los Barrios with the rest of his army and thus threatened at once Grenada and the lines of Chiclana. At the same time all the similar partidas of the Ronda were let loose in different directions, to cut the communications, to seize the small French magazines, and to collect the Spanish soldiers, who, at different periods, had quitted their colours and retired to their homes.

Copons remained at Junquera, but Ballesteros with three divisions commanded by Cruz Murgeon, the marquis de Las Cuevas, and the prince of Anglona, marched to Utrera as soon as Soul had departed from Seville; thus the communication of that city with Cadiz on one side, and with Malaga and Grenada on the other, was cut off. The situation of the French was very critical, and they wanted ammunition, because a large convoy, coming from Madrid with an escort of twelve hundred men, was stopped in the Morena by the Partidas from the Ronda and from Murcia.

On the 6th the Spanish cavalry was within a few miles of Seville, when false information adroitly given by a Spaniard in the French interest, led Ballesteros to believe that Soul was close at hand, whereupon he immediately returned to the Ronda; the next day Penne Villemur having received notice from lord Wellington that the French would soon return, also retired to Gibraltar.

Ballesteros soon discovered the deceit, when, instead of returning to Seville, he on the 9th assaulted the small castle of Zahara in the hills, and being repulsed with considerable loss, made a circuit north of Ronda, by Albodonaes, Alcala de Pruna, to Casarbonela, where he was rejoined by Copons. The division of Cuevas then marched against Ossuna, which being only garrisoned by "*Escopeteros*," was expected to fall at once; but after two days combat and the loss of two hundred killed and wounded, the three thousand patriots retired, baffled by a hundred and fifty of their own countrymen fighting for the invaders.

When Cuevas returned, Ballesteros marched in three columns, by roads leading from Casarbonela and Antequera, to attack general Rey, who was posted with eighteen hundred men near Allora, on the Guadaljore river. The centre column was first engaged without any advantage, but when Rey saw the flank columns coming on, he retired behind the Guadalmedina river, close to Malaga, having lost a colonel and two hundred men in passing the Guadaljore.

After this action Ballesteros returned to the Ronda, for Soul was now truly at hand, and his horsemen were already in the plains. He had sent Digeon's cavalry on the 9th to Cordoba, to chase the Partidas, and had ordered Drouet's division to take post at Fuentes Ovejuña; then directing Peyreymont's cavalry upon Usagre, he had come himself by forced marches to Seville, which he reached the 11th, hoping to surprise the Spaniards; but the stratagem, which

had saved Seville on the 6th also saved Ballesteros, for general Conroux was coming up on the other side from the Guadalete and the Spaniards would have been enclosed but for their timely retreat. And scarcely had Soult quitted Llerena when the French met with a disaster near Usagre, which though a strong position had always proved a very dangerous advanced post on both sides.

Sir Stapleton Cotton, while following the trail of the enemy on the evening of the 10th, had received intelligence that Peyreymont's cavalry was between Villa Garcia and Usagre, and he immediately conceived hopes of cutting it off. To effect this Anson's brigade, then commanded by colonel Frederic Ponsonby, moved during the night from Villa Franca upon Usagre, and at the same time Le Marchant's brigade marched from Los Santos upon Benvenida to intercept the retreat on Llerena. Ponsonby's advanced guard having commenced the action too soon, the French fell back, before Le Marchant could intercept them, but as some heights, skirting the Llerena road, prevented them from seeing that general, they again drew up in order of battle behind the junction of the Benvenida road.

The hostile bodies were nearly equal in numbers, about nineteen hundred sabres on each side, but sir Stapleton soon decided the action; for ably seizing the accidental advantage of ground he kept the enemy's attention engaged by skirmishing with Ponsonby's squadrons, while Le Marchant secretly passing at the back of the heights, sent the fifth dragoon guards against their flank, and the next moment Ponsonby charged their front. Thus assailed the French gave way in disorder, and being pursued for four miles left several officers and a hundred and twenty-eight men prisoners, and many were killed in the field. The loss of the British was only fifty-six men and officers, of which forty-five were of the fifth dragoon guards.

The beaten troops found refuge with Drouet's infantry which had not yet left Llerena; but after this action, that general fell back with all his troops behind the Guadalquivir, for Soult was then preparing to fight the allies at Seville.

The duke of Dalmatia was well aware of Wellington's intention to invade Andalusia. He knew exactly the amount and disposition of his forces, and was resolved to meet him coming out of the Morena, with all the French army united; neither did he doubt the final issue, although the failure of the last harvest and the non-arrival of convoys since February had lessened his resources. Wellington's plan was however deferred. He had levelled his trenches, and brought two Portuguese regiments of infantry from Abrantes and Elvas to form a temporary garrison of Badajos, until some Spaniards, who had been landed at Ayamonte in March, could arrive; then giving over the charge of the repairs to general Hill, who remained with two divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry in Estremadura, he marched himself upon Beira, which Marmont was now ravaging with great cruelty.

That marshal had been anxious to unite with Soult in Estremadura, but the emperors orders were imperative, that he should make a diversion for Badajos by an irruption into Portugal. On the 14th of March he ascertained that none of Wellington's divisions were left on the Agueda, and on the 27th he was ready to move. Bonet, reinforced by Carier's brigade, was then on the Orbiño, in observation of the Gallicians; Ferrier's division was at Valladolid, and Foy's in the valley of the Tagus; but the other five divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, had passed the mountains and concentrated on the Tormes, carrying with them fifteen days provisions, scaling ladders, and the materials for a bridge. Both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were therefore in manifest peril, and Almeida which

contained the allies' battering train was still very incompletely fortified. Hence on the first rumour of Marmont's movement, lord Wellington had thrown in two militia regiments, with a strong detachment of British artillery-men; the garrison was therefore three thousand six hundred strong, and the governor, colonel Le Mesurier, laboured hard to complete the defences.

Of the northern militia, which had been called out before the allies quitted the Coa, six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry were under Silveira, three thousand infantry under Trant, the same number under John Wilson, and two thousand five hundred under Lecor. But the law was, that persons liable to serve should be enrolled by classes in rotation, and therefore the present men, with the exception of Silveira's, were raw peasants totally unskilled in the use of arms. All these officers save Lecor, whose post was at Castello Branco, had been for some time in movement, and Trant and Wilson were on the 22d at Lamego, where general Bacellar, who commanded the province, fixed his head-quarters. Silveira had the same destination, but his march was slow, and his object rather to draw the wonder of his countrymen; for in his unquenchable vanity he always affected to act as an independent general.

When Trant was assured that Marmont's direction would be on Ciudad, and not Oporto, he advanced from Lamego followed by Wilson, intending to take post on the Lower Coa. While in march he received Le Mesurier's despatches, which induced him to make a forced march with one brigade to the Cabeça Negro mountain, behind the bridge of Almeida. His design was to break down the restored part of that structure, and so prevent the enemy from penetrating to Pinhel, where there was a magazine; and his march was well-timed, for two French divisions were then driving Carlos d'Espana over the plain beyond the Coa. It appeared that Marmont having come close to Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, the Spaniards and Victor Alten fell back from the Yeltes before him; and the latter, who had six hundred excellent German cavalry, immediately crossed the Agueda, and neither comprehending the spirit of lord Wellington's orders, nor the real situation of affairs, retreated at once to Castello Branco, four long marches from Ciudad, thus leaving all the country open to the enemy's marauding parties. Carlos d'Espana, who had eight hundred infantry, also retreated across the plain of the Cima de Coa to Fort Concepcion, but on the 3d the French, having laid their bridge at the ford of Caridad, passed the Agueda and drove him from thence, and he reached the Cabeça Negro in retreat with only two hundred men, at the very moment Trant arrived.

The latter seeing no French cavalry on the plain, and, being desirous of concerting his operations with Le Mesurier, immediately threw some skirmishers into the vineyards on the right of the road beyond the bridge, then escorted by some guides whom he had dressed in red uniform, he galloped to the glacis of the fortress, communicated with the governor, received from him a troop of English cavalry which happened to be in the place and returned at dusk. The Cabeça Negro was immediately covered with bivouac fires, and in the evening Le Mesurier sallied from the fortress, and drove back the enemy's light troops. Two divisions of infantry had come against Almeida, with orders to storm it, but these vigorous actions disturbed them; the attempt was not made, and the general commanding excused himself to Marmont, on the ground that the sudden appearance of Trant, indicated the vicinity of British troops. In this false notion he marched the next morning up the Coa towards Alfayates, where Marmont met him with two other divisions, and eight squadrons of cavalry, having left one division to blockade Ciudad.

Trant now sent back the horsemen to Le Mesurier and marched to Guarda to cover the magazines and hospital at Celerico. Here he was joined by Wilson, and here he ought also to have been joined by Silveira; but that general instead of crossing the Douro on the 5th, and marching up to Guarda, only crossed it on the 14th, and then halted at Lamego. Thus, instead of twelve thousand infantry, and four hundred cavalry, who had seen some service, there were scarcely six thousand raw peasants, in a position, strong, if the occupying force had been numerous enough to hold the ridge of Porcas and other heights behind it, but a very dangerous post for a small force, because it could be turned by the right and left, and the line of retreat to the Mondego was not favourable. Neither had Trant any horsemen to scout, for Bacellar, a weak old man, who had never seen an enemy, was now at Celerico, and retained the only squadron of dragoons in the vicinity for his own guard.

This post Trant and Wilson held, with six thousand militia and six guns, from the 9th to the 14th, keeping the enemy's marauders in check; and they were also prepared to move by the high ridge of the Estrella to Abrantes, if the French should menace that fortress, which was not unlikely. For Marmont had pushed forward on Sabugal, and Victor Alten, abandoning Castello Branco, while the French were still at Memoa, fifty miles distant from him, had crossed the Tagus at Vilha Velha, and it is said had even some thoughts of burning the bridge. The French parties then traversed the lower Beira in every direction, plundering and murdering in such a shameful manner, that the whole population fled before them. However, general Lecor, a good soldier, stood fast with the militia at Castello Branco; he checked the French cavalry detachments, removed the hospitals and some of the stores, and when menaced by a strong force of infantry on the 12th, destroyed the rest of the magazines, and fell back to Sarnadas, only one short march on the road to Vilha Velha; and the next day when the French retired, he followed and harassed their rear.

Marmont's divisions being now spread over the country in search of supplies, Trant formed the very daring design of surprising the French marshal himself in his quarters at Sabugal. Bacellar's procrastinations fortunately delayed the execution of this project, which was undoubtedly too hazardous an enterprise to undertake with such troops; for the distance was twenty miles, and it was a keen observation of lord Wellington's, when Trant adverted to the magnitude of the object, to say that, "*In war nothing is so bad as failure and defeat.*" This would undoubtedly have been the case here; for in the night of the 13th, that on which Trant would have made the attempt, Marmont having formed the design of surprising Trant, had led two brigades of infantry and four hundred cavalry up the mountain.* He cut off the outposts, and was actually entering the streets at day-break, with his horsemen, when the alarm was beaten at Trant's quarters by one drummer; this being taken up at hazard, by all the other drummers in different parts of the town, caused the French marshal to fall back at the moment, when a brisk charge would have placed every thing at his mercy, for the beating of the first drum was accidental, and no troops were under arms.†

The militia immediately took post outside Guarda, but they had only one day's provisions, and the French cavalry could turn their flank and gain Celerico in their rear, while the infantry attacked their front; the guns were therefore moved off under cover of the town, and the regiments, withdrawing in succession, retreated over three or four miles of open ground and in good

order, although the enemy's cavalry hovered close on the flank, and the infantry followed at a short distance. Further on, however, there was a wooded declivity, leading to the Mondego, and here, while the head of the troops was passing the river below, forty dragoons, sent up by Bacellar, the evening before, were pressed by the French, and galloped through the rear-guard of eight hundred infantry; these last seeing the enemy dismount to fire their carabines, and finding that the wet had damaged their own powder, fled also, and the French followed with hue and cry.

All the officers behaved firmly, and the Mondego was finally passed, yet in confusion and with the loss of two hundred prisoners; and Marmont might now have crossed the river, on the flank of the militia, and galloped into Celerico where there was nothing to defend the magazines; instead of which he halted and permitted the disorderly rabble to gain that place. Such however was his compassion, that when he found they were really nothing but poor undisciplined peasants he would not suffer his cavalry to cut them down and no man was killed during the whole action, although the French horsemen were actually in the midst of the fugitives. Bacellar having destroyed a quantity of powder at Celerico retreated with Trant's people the next day towards Lamego; Wilson remained at Celerico, and when the enemy had driven in his outposts, he ordered the magazines to be destroyed, but the order was only partly executed when the French retired, and on the 17th the militia reoccupied Guarda.

This short campaign of the militia I have treated at length, because it produced an undue effect at the time, and because it shews how trifling accidents will mar the greatest combinations; for here the English general's extensive arrangements for the protection of Beira were utterly disconcerted by the slow advance of Silveira on the one side, and the rapid retreat of general Alten on the other. Again, the French deceived by some red uniforms and by some bivouac fires, on the Cabeça Negro, had relinquished the attack of Almeida to run after a few thousand undisciplined militia men, who were yet saved by the accidental beating of a drum; and it is curious to find a marshal of France personally acting as a partizan, and yet effecting nothing against these miserable troops.

The disaster on the Mondego spread consternation as far as Coimbra, and the most alarming reports reached lord Wellington, whose operations it is now time to notice. When Soult's retreat from Llerena was ascertained, the allied army had marched towards the Tagus, and on the 11th lord Wellington, hearing of Alten's retreat, sent him orders to recross that river without delay and return to Castello Branco. The 16th the advanced guard of the army also reached that town, and the same day a militia officer flying from Coimbra in the general panic, came to headquarters and reported that the enemy was master of that town; but the next hour, brought general Wilson's report from Guarda, and the unfortunate wretch whose fears had led him to give the false information, was tried and shot by order of Beresford.

At this time the French army, in number about twenty-eight thousand, was concentrated, with the exception of Brennier's division which remained near Ciudad Rodrigo, between Sabugal and the ridge of hills overlooking Penamacor. Marmont was inclined to fight, for he had heard of a convoy of provisions which lord Wellington had some days before sent by the way of Almeida to Ciudad, and intended to cut it off; but the convoy having reached Almeida was safe, and the French general's own position was very critical. Almeida and the militia at Guarda were on his right flank, Ciudad Rodrigo was on his rear, and immediately behind him the Coa and the Agueda rivers were both swelled by heavy rains which fell from the

* Marmont's Official Reports, MSS.

† General Trant's papers, MSS.

13th to the 19th, and the flood had broken the bridge near Caridad. There remained only the Puente de Villar on the Upper Agueda for retreat, and the roads leading to it were bad and narrow; the march from thence to Tamames was also circuitous and exposed to the attack of the allies, who could move on the chord through Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont's retreat must therefore have been effected through the pass of Perales upon Coria, and the English general conceiving good hopes of falling on him before he could cross the Coa, moved forward to Pedrogao; but the rear of the army was not yet across the Tagus, and a sufficient body of troops for the attack could not be collected before the 21st. On that day, however, the Agueda having subsided, the French restored their bridge, the last of their divisions crossed it on the 24th, and Marmont thus terminated his operations without loss. After this he again spread his troops over the plains of Leon, where some of his smaller posts had indeed been harassed by Julian Sanchez, but where the Gallian army had done nothing.

The Portuguese militia were immediately disbanded, and the English general made the greatest exertions to reinvictual Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, intending when that was effected to leave Picton with a corps upon the Agueda, and march himself against Andalusia, following his original design. The first division, which had only reached Castello Branco, returned to Castello de Vide, and as Foy's division had meanwhile reoccupied Truxillo, Hill advanced to observe him, and the fifth Spanish army returned to Estremadura. But the difficulty of supplying the fortresses was very great. The incursion of Marmont had destroyed all the intermediate magazines, and dispersed the means of transport on the lines of communication; the Portuguese government would not remedy the inconvenience either there, or on the other frontier, and Elvas and Badajos were suffering from the same cause as Ciudad and Almeida.

In this dilemma lord Wellington adopted, from necessity, a very unmilitary and dangerous remedy. For having declared to the members of the Portuguese government, that on their heads he would throw the responsibility of losing Badajos and Elvas, if they did not immediately victual both, a threat which had its due effect, he employed the whole of the carriages and mules attached to the army to bring up stores to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; meanwhile he quartered his troops near the points of water-carriage, that is to say, on the Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus. Thus the army was spread from the Morena to the Tagus, from the Tagus to the Douro, from the Douro to the Mondego, on a line little less than four hundred miles long, and in the face of three hostile armies, the farthest of which was but a few marches from the outposts. It was however scarcely possible for the French to assemble again in masses, before the ripening of the coming harvest; and on the other hand, even the above measure was insufficient to gain time; the expedition against Andalusia was therefore abandoned, and the fifth great epoch of the war terminated.

CHAPTER VII.

General observations—The campaign considered—The justice of Napoleon's views vindicated, and Marmont's operations censured as the cause of the French misfortunes—The operations of the army of the centre and of the south examined—Lord Wellington's operations eulogized—Extraordinary adventures of captain Colquhoun Grant—The operations of the siege of Badajos examined—Lord Wellington's conduct vindicated.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

In this campaign the French forces were too much scattered, and they occupied the countries bordering

on Portugal rather as a conquered territory than as a field of operations. The movements of the armies of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, might have been so combined as to present a hundred thousand men on a field of battle; yet Wellington captured two great fortresses within gun-shot as it were of them all, and was never disturbed by the approach of even thirty thousand men. This arose partly from the want of union, partly from the orders of the emperor, whose plans the generals either did not or would not understand in their true spirit, and therefore executed without vigour; and yet the French writers have generally endeavoured to fasten the failures on Napoleon, as if he only was mistaken about the war in Spain! It is easy to spurn the dead lion!

The expedition of Montbrun to Alicant has been fixed upon as the chief cause of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. Napoleon however did not desire that Montbrun's march should be held in abeyance for a week, upon the strength of some vague rumours relative to the allies' proceedings, and yet be finally sent at precisely the wrong period; neither did he contemplate that general's idle display at Alicant after the city of Valencia had fallen. But ill-executed and hurtful as this expedition doubtless was, in various ways, the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo cannot be directly traced to it. Montbrun was at Almanza the 9th of January and the 19th Ciudad was stormed; now, if he had not been at Almanza he would have been at Toledo, that is, eight marches from Salamanca; and as the commencement of the siege was not known until the 15th, even at Valladolid, he could not have been on the Tormes before the 25th, which would have been five days too late. The emperor wished to strengthen Suchet at the crisis of the Valencian operations, and his intent was that Montbrun should have reached that city in December, but the latter did not arrive before the middle of January; had he been only a week earlier, that is, had he marched at once from Toledo, Mahy could not have escaped, Alicant would then have fallen, and if Blake had made an obstinate defence at Valencia the value of such a reinforcement would have been acknowledged.

At this period Valencia was the most important point in the Peninsula, and there was no apparent reason why Ciudad should be in any immediate danger; the emperor could not calculate upon the errors of his own generals. It is futile therefore to affirm that Montbrun's detachment was made on a false principle; it was on the contrary conceived in perfect accord with the maxim of concentrating on the important point at the decisive moment; errors, extraneous to the original design, alone brought it within the principle of dissemination.

The loss of Ciudad Rodrigo may be directly traced to the duke of Ragusa's want of vigilance, to the scanty garrison which he kept in the place, to the Russian war which obliged the emperor to weaken the army of the north; finally, to the extravagance of the army of the centre. Marmont expressly asserts that at Madrid three thousand men devoured and wasted daily the rations of twenty-two thousand, and the stores thus consumed would have enabled the army of Portugal to keep concentrated, in which case Wellington could not have taken Ciudad; and if the army of the centre had been efficient, Hill would have incurred great danger and Soult's power been vastly augmented.

It is not Napoleon's skill only, that has been assailed by these writers. Lord Wellington also is blamed for not crushing Souham's division at Tamames between the 23d and the 26th of January; although Souham, a good general, never entered Tamames, except with cavalry scouts, and kept his main body at Matilla, whence one forced march would have placed

him behind the Tormes in safety! In such a shallow manner have the important operations of this period been treated. Nor will the causes commonly assigned for the fall of Badajos better bear examination.

"Marmont instead of joining Soult in Estremadura, followed a phantom in Beira." *"It was his vanity and jealousy of the duke of Dalmatia that lost Badajos."* Such are the assertions of both French and English writers; nevertheless the duke of Ragusa never anticipated any success from his movement into Beira, and far from avoiding Soult, earnestly desired to co-operate with him; moreover this invasion of Beira, which has been regarded as a folly, was the conception of Napoleon, the greatest of all captains! and it is not difficult to shew that the emperor's design was, notwithstanding the ill result, capacious and solid.

Let us suppose that Marmont had aided Soult, and that the army of the centre had also sent men. If they had made any error in their combinations the English general would have defeated them separately; if they had effected their junction, he would have retreated, and Badajos would have been succoured. But then eighty thousand French would have been assembled by long marches in the winter rains, to the great detriment of their affairs elsewhere, and unless they came prepared to take Elvas, without any adequate object; for lord Wellington could, after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, have repeated this operation as often as he pleased, which, besides the opening thus made for insurrection in Spain, would have stamped a character of weakness on the French arms, extremely injurious, since character is half the strength of an army.

The emperor judged better; he disliked such timid operations, he desired that his powerful armies should throw the allies on the defensive and he indicated the means of doing so. Wellington, he said, expecting an effort to retake Ciudad Rodrigo, had called Hill across the Tagus, and to prevent that movement Soult was directed to send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. The fall of Ciudad had thus by obliging the allies to defend it, given the French their choice of ground for a battle, and at a distance from the sea; it was for Marmont to avail himself of the occasion, not by marching to aid Soult, who had eighty thousand excellent troops, and at the worst could be only driven from Andalusia upon Valencia or Madrid; whereas if the army of Portugal or a part of it should be defeated on the Guadiana the blow would be felt in every part of Spain. Marmont's business was, he said, first to strengthen his own position at Salamanca, as a base of operations, and then to keep the allies constantly engaged on the Agueda until he was prepared to fight a general battle. Meanwhile Soult should either take the fortresses of the Alemtejo, or draw off Hill's corps from Wellington, who would then be very inferior to Marmont and yet Hill himself would be unequal to fight Soult.

"Fix your quarters," said the emperor, "at Salamanca, work day and night to fortify that place—organize a new battering train—form magazines—send strong advanced guards to menace Ciudad and Almeida—harass the allies' outposts, even daily—threaten the frontier of Portugal in all directions, and send parties to ravage the nearest villages—repair the ways to Almeida and Oporto, and keep the bulk of your army at Toro Zamora, Benevente, and Avila, which are fertile districts, and from whence, in four days, you can concentrate the whole upon Salamanca. You will thus keep the allies in check on the Agueda, and your troops will repose, while you prepare for great operations. You have nothing to do with the south. Announce the approach of your new battering train, and if Wellington marches to invest Badajos with a few divisions, Soult will be able to relieve it; but if Wellington goes with all his forces, unite your army, march straight

upon Almeida, push parties to Coimbra, overrun the country in various directions, and be assured he will return. Twenty-four hours after the receipt of this letter you should be on your way to Salamanca, and your advanced guards should be in march towards Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida."

Now, if Marmont had thus conceived the war himself, he could have commenced operations before the end of January; but this letter, written the 15th of February, reached him in the latter end of that month, and found him desponding and fearful even in defence. Vacillating between his own wishes and the emperor's orders, he did nothing; but had he, as his despatch recommended, commenced his operations in twenty-four hours, his advanced posts would have been near Ciudad early in March, that is at the moment when the allies were, as I have before shewn, disseminated all over Portugal, and when only the fifth division was upon the Coa to oppose him. The works of Almeida were then quite indefensible, and the movement upon Badajos must have necessarily been suspended. Thus the winter season would have passed away uselessly for the allies unless Wellington turned to attack Marmont, which was a difficult operation in itself, and would have been dangerous to the Alemtejo, while Soult held Badajos, for that marshal, as we have seen, had received orders to attack Hill with twenty thousand men. Here then the errors were of execution, not of design, and the first part of the emperor's combinations was evidently just and solid. It remains to test the second part which was to have been executed if lord Wellington invested Badajos.

It must be remembered, that Marmont was so to hold his army, that he could concentrate in four days; that he was to make an incursion into Beira the moment Wellington crossed the Tagus; that Oporto was to be menaced, Almeida to be attacked, Coimbra to be occupied. These operations would undoubtedly have brought the allies back again at the commencement of the siege, because the fall of Badajos could not be expected under three weeks, which would have been too long to leave Beira and the fortresses at the mercy of the invader. Now Marmont did not reach the Agueda before the 31st March, when the siege of Badajos was approaching its conclusion; he did not storm Almeida, nor attack Ciudad Rodrigo, nor enter Coimbra, nor menace Oporto; and yet his operation, feebly as it was executed, obliged lord Wellington to relinquish his meditated attack on Andalusia, and return to the assistance of Beira. Again therefore the error was in the execution. And here we may observe how inferior in hardihood the French general was to his adversary. Wellington with eighteen thousand men had escalated Badajos, a powerful fortress and defended by an excellent governor with five thousand French veterans; Marmont with twenty-eight thousand men would not attempt to storm Ciudad, although its breaches were scarcely healed, and its garrison disaffected. Nor did he even assail Almeida, which hardly meriting the name of a fortress, was only occupied by three thousand militia, scarcely able to handle their arms; and yet if he had captured Almeida, as he could scarcely have failed to do with due vigour, he would have found a battering train with which to take Ciudad Rodrigo, and thus have again balanced the campaign.

The duke of Ragusa was averse to serving in the Peninsula, he wished to be employed in the Russian expedition, and he had written to the emperor to desire his recall, or that the whole of the northern district, from Sebastian to Salamanca, including Madrid, should be placed under his orders. Unless that were done, he said he could only calculate the operations of his own troops. The other generals would make difficulties, would move slowly, and the king's court was in open hostility to the French interest. The army of

the north had in retiring from Leon scrupulously carried away every thing that could be useful to him, in the way of bridge, or battering equipages, or of ammunition or provisions, although he was in want of all these things.

Then he painted all the jealousies and disputes in the French armies, and affirmed that his own force, care being had for the posts of communication, and the watching of the army of Galicia, would not furnish more than thirty-four thousand men for the field; a calculation contradicted by the imperial muster-rolls, which on the 1st of March bore sixty thousand fighting men present with the eagles. He also rated the allies at sixty thousand, well provided with every thing and ready to attack him, whereas the returns of that army gave only fifty-two thousand men including Hill's corps; about thirty-five thousand only could have passed the Agueda, and their penury of means had, as we have seen, prevented them from even holding together, on the northern frontier. In like manner he assumed that two of the allied divisions were left upon the Agueda, when the army marched against Badajos, whereas no more than six hundred cavalry remained there. All these things prove that Marmont, either from dislike to the war, or natural want of vigour, was not equal to his task, and it is obvious that a diversion, begun so late, and followed up with so little energy, could have had little effect upon the siege of Badajos; it would have been far better to have followed his own first design of detaching three divisions to aid Soult, and retained the other two to menace Ciudad Rodrigo.

It is fitting now to test the operations of the armies of the south, and of the centre. The latter is easily disposed of. The secret of its inactivity is to be found in Marmont's letter. Every thing at Madrid was confusion and intrigue, waste and want of discipline; in fine, the union of a court and an army, had destroyed the latter. Not so at Seville. There the hand of an able general, an indefatigable administrator were visible, and the unravelling the intricate combinations, which produced such an apparent want of vigour in the operations of the duke of Dalmatia, will form at once the apology for that general, and the just eulogium of lord Wellington.

First it must be held in mind that the army of the south; so powerful in appearance, did not furnish a proportionate number of men for field-service, because the reinforcements, although borne on the rolls, were for the most part retained in the northern governments. Soult had sixty-seven thousand French and six thousand "*Escopeteros*" present under arms in September; but then followed the surprise of Girard at Aroyo de Molinos, the vigorous demonstrations of Hill in December, the failure of Godinot at Gibraltar, the check sustained by Semélé at Bornos, and the siege of Tarifa, which diminished the number of men, and occasioned fresh arrangements on the different points of the circle. The harvest of 1811 had failed in Andalusia, as in all other parts, and the inhabitants were reduced to feed on herbs; the soldiers had only half rations of bread, and neither reinforcements of men, nor convoys of money, nor ammunition, nor clothes, had come either from France or from Madrid for a long period.

It was under these circumstances that Soult received the order to send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. But the whole of the Polish troops, and the skeletons of regiments, and the picked men for the imperial guards, in all fifteen thousand, after being collected at the Despeñas Peros, while Suchet was before Valencia, had now marched to Talavera de la Reyna on the way to France; at that moment also Ballesteros appeared, with the fourth Spanish army, twelve thousand strong, in the Ronda, and his detachments defeated Maransin at Cartaña, which of necessity occasioned another change in the French disposi-

tions. Moreover the very success of Suchet had at this time increased Soult's difficulties, because all the fugitives from Valencia gathered on the remains of the Murcian army; and fifteen thousand men, including the garrisons of Carthagea and Alicant, were again assembled on the frontier of Grenada, where, during the expedition to Estremadura, the French had only three battalions and some cavalry.

Thus the army of the south was, if the garrison of Badajos be excluded, reduced to forty-eight thousand French sabres and bayonets present with the eagles, and this at the very moment when its enemies were augmented by twenty-five thousand fresh men. Soult had indeed besides this force five thousand artillerymen and other attendant troops, and six thousand "*Escopeteros*" were capable of taking the field, while thirty thousand civic guards held his fortified posts. Nevertheless he was forced to reduce all the garrisons, and even the camp before the Isla to the lowest numbers, consistent with safety, ere he could bring twenty-four thousand French into the field for the succour of Badajos, and even then as we have seen, he was upon the point of losing Seville. These things prevented him from coming against the Alemtejo in March, when his presence with an army would have delayed the commencement of the siege until a battle had been fought; but he was the less fearful for the fortress because Marmont on the 22d of February and Foy on the 28th had announced, that if Badajos should be menaced, three divisions of the army of Portugal, then in the valley of the Tagus, would enter Estremadura; and these divisions uniting with Daricau's and Drouet's troops would have formed an army of thirty thousand men, and consequently would have sufficed to delay the operations of the allies. But Marmont, having subsequently received the emperor's orders to move into Beira, passed the Gredos mountains instead of the Tagus river, and thus unintentionally deceived Soult; and whether his letters were intercepted, or carelessly delayed, it was not until the 8th of April, that the duke of Dalmatia was assured of his departure for Salamanca.

On the other hand lord Wellington's operations were so rapidly pushed forward, that Soult cannot be censured for false calculations. No general could suspect that such an outwork as the Picurina, would be taken by storm without being first battered; still less that Badajos, with its lofty walls, its brave garrison, and its celebrated governor, would in like manner be carried before the counterscarp was blown in, and the fire of the defences ruined. In fine, no man accustomed to war could have divined the surpassing resolution and surpassing fortune also, of the British general and his troops; neither is it impertinent to observe here, that as the French never use iron ordnance in a siege, their calculations were necessarily formed upon the effect of brass artillery, which is comparatively weak and slow: with brass guns the breaches would have been made three days later.

The fall of Badajos may therefore be traced partly to the Russian war, which drew fifteen thousand men from the army of the south, partly to the irresolution of Marmont, who did neither execute the emperor's plan nor his own; finally, to the too great extent of country occupied, whereby time and numbers were swallowed. And here the question arises, if Soult, acting upon the principles laid down in his letter to Joseph, just before the battle of Talavera, should not have operated against the allies in great masses, relinquishing possession of Grenada, Malaga, in fine of every thing, save Seville and the camp before the Isla. If beaten, he would have lost Andalusia and fallen back on Suchet, but then the head of the French invasion, might have been more formidable at Valencia than at Seville, and Marmont could have renewed the

battle. And such a chequered game, lord Wellington's political situation both in England and Portugal being considered, would have gone near to decide the question of the British troops remaining in the latter country. This however is a grave and difficult matter to resolve.

In whatever light this campaign is viewed the talent of the English general is conspicuous. That fortune aided him is true, but it was in the manner she favours the pilot, who watching every changing wind, every shifting current, makes all subservient to his purpose. Ascertaining with great pains the exact situation of each adversary, he had sagaciously met their different modes of warfare, and with a nice hand had adapted his measures to the successive exigences of the moment. The army of the centre, where disorder was paramount, he disregarded; Marmont whose temperament was hasty he deceived by affected slowness; and Soult he forestalled by quickness. Twice he induced the duke of Ragusa to send his divisions into distant quarters, when they should have been concentrated, and each time, he gained a great advantage; once when he took Ciudad Rodrigo, and again when, using a like opportunity, to obviate the difficulties presented by the conduct of the Portuguese government, he spread his own troops over the country, in an un-military manner, that he might feed and clothe them on their march to the Alemtejo. This he could not have done if the French had been concentrated; neither could he have so well concealed that march from the enemy.

In Estremadura, he kept his force compact and strong to meet Soult, from whose warfare he expected a powerful opposition, hard indeed to resist, yet not likely to abound in sudden strokes, and therefore furnishing more certain ground for calculation as to time; and then he used that time so wonderfully at the siege, that even his enemies declared it incomprehensible, and he who had hitherto been censured for over caution was now dreaded as over daring! This daring was, however, in no manner allied to rashness, his precautions multiplied as his enterprises augmented. The divisions of the army of Portugal, quartered in the valley of the Tagus, could by moving into Estremadura in March have delayed if not prevented the siege; lord Wellington had therefore with forecast of such an event, designed that Hill should, when the allies entered the Alemtejo, make a forced march to surprise the bridge and forts at Almaraz, which would have obliged the French divisions to make a long circuit by the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera to reach the scene of action in Estremadura.

This bold and skilful stroke was balked by the never-ceasing misconduct of the Portuguese government, with respect to means of transport; for the battering-guns intended for Hill's enterprise were thus prevented passing Evora. Nevertheless the siege was commenced, because it was ascertained that Marmont was still ignorant of the allies' march, and had made no change in his extended quarters, indicating a design to aid Soult; Hill also soon drove Drouet back towards the Morena, and by occupying Merida, intercepted the line of communication with Almaraz, which answered the same purpose. But the best testimony to the skill of the operation is to be found in the enemy's papers. "So calculated," said Soult, "was this affair (the siege of Badajos) that it is to be supposed lord Wellington had intercepted some despatches which explained to him the system of operations and the irresolution of Marmont."*

Nor when the duke of Ragusa was ravaging Beira, and both Almeida and Ciudad appeared in the utmost danger, did lord Wellington's delay in Estremadura

arise from any imprudence; he had good grounds for believing, that the French would not attempt the latter place, and that the loss of a few days would not prove injurious. For when the first intelligence that the army of Portugal was concentrating on the Tormes reached him, he sent captain Colquhoun Grant, a celebrated scouting officer, to watch Marmont's proceedings. That gentleman in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with subtlety of genius, and both so tempered by discretion, that it is hard to say which quality predominated, very rapidly executed his mission; and the interesting nature of his adventures on this occasion will perhaps excuse a digression concerning them.

Attended by Leon, a Spanish peasant of great fidelity and quickness of apprehension, who had been his companion on many former occasions of the same nature, Grant arrived in the Salamanacan district, and passing the Tormes in the night, remained in uniform, for he never assumed any disguise, three days in the midst of the French camp. He thus obtained exact information of Marmont's object, and more especially of his preparations of provisions and scaling ladders, notes of which he sent to lord Wellington from day to day by Spanish agents. However, on the third night, some peasants brought him a general order, addressed to the French regiments, and saying, that the notorious Grant being within the circle of their cantonments, the soldiers were to use their utmost exertions to secure him, for which purpose also guards were placed as it were in a circle round the army.

Nothing daunted by this news, Grant consulted with the peasants, and the next morning, before daylight, entered the village of Huerta, which is close to a ford on the Tormes, and about six miles from Salamanca. Here there was a French battalion, and on the opposite side of the river cavalry videttes were posted, two of which constantly patrolled back and forward, for the space of three hundred yards, meeting always at the ford. When day broke the French battalion assembled on its alarm-post, and at that moment Grant was secretly brought with his horse behind the gable of a house, which hid him from the infantry, and was opposite to the ford. The peasants standing on some loose stones and spreading their large cloaks, covered him from the cavalry videttes, and thus he calmly waited until the latter were separated the full extent of their beat; then putting spurs to his horse he dashed through the ford between them, and receiving their fire without damage, reached a wood, not very distant, where the pursuit was baffled, and where he was soon rejoined by Leon, who in his native dress met with no interruption.

Grant had already ascertained that the means of storming Ciudad Rodrigo were prepared, and that the French officers openly talked of doing so, but he desired still further to test this project, and to discover if the march of the enemy might not finally be directed by the pass of Perales, towards the Tagus; he wished also to ascertain more correctly their real numbers, and therefore placed himself on a wooded hill, near Tamames, where the road branches off to the passes, and to Ciudad Rodrigo. Here lying perdué, until the whole French army had passed by in march, he noted every battalion and gun, and finding that all were directed towards Ciudad, entered Tamames after they had passed, and discovered that they had left the greatest part of their scaling-ladders behind, which clearly proved that the intention of storming Ciudad Rodrigo was not real. This it was which allayed Wellington's fears for that fortress.

When Marmont afterwards passed the Coa, in this expedition, Grant preceded him with intent to discover if his further march would be by Guarda upon Coimbra, or by Sabugal upon Castello Branco; for to reach the latter it was necessary to descend from a very high

* Intercepted despatch of marshal Soult, 1812. MSS.

ridge, or rather succession of ridges, by a pass, at the lower mouth of which stands Penamacor. Upon one of the inferior ridges in the pass, this persevering officer placed himself, thinking that the dwarf oaks, with which the hills were covered, would effectually secure him from discovery; but from the higher ridge above, the French detected all his movements with their glasses, in a few moments Leon, whose lynxes were always on the watch, called out "*the French! the French!*" and pointed to the rear, whence some dragoons came galloping up. Grant and his follower, instantly darted into the wood for a little space, and then suddenly wheeling, rode off in a different direction; yet at every turn new enemies appeared, and at last the hunted men dismounted and fled on foot through the thickest of the low oaks; but again they were met by infantry, who had been detached in small parties down the sides of the pass, and were directed in their chase by the waving of the French officers' hats on the ridge above. At last Leon fell exhausted, and the barbarians who first came up, killed him in despite of his companion's entreaties.

Grant himself they carried, without injury, to Marmont, who receiving him with apparent kindness, invited him to dinner. The conversation turned upon the prisoner's exploits, and the French marshal affirmed that he had been for a long time on the watch, that he knew all his haunts, and his disguises, and had discovered that, only the night before, he had slept in the French head-quarters, with other adventures, which had not happened, for this Grant never used any disguise; but there was another Grant, a man also very remarkable in his way, who used to remain for months in the French quarters, using all manner of disguises; hence the similarity of names caused the actions of both to be attributed to one, which is the only palliative for Marmont's subsequent conduct.

Treating his prisoner as I have said, with great apparent kindness, the French general exacted from him an especial parole, that he would not consent to be released by the Partidas, while on his journey through Spain to France, which secured his captive, although lord Wellington offered two thousand dollars to any guerrilla chief who should rescue him. The exaction of such a parole, however harsh, was in itself a tacit compliment to the man; but Marmont, also, sent a letter, with the escort, to the governor of Bayonne, in which, still labouring under the error that there was only one Grant, he designated his captive as a dangerous spy, who had done infinite mischief to the French army, and whom he had only not executed on the spot, out of respect to something resembling an uniform which he wore at the time of his capture. He therefore desired, that at Bayonne, he should be placed in irons and sent up to Paris.

This proceeding was too little in accord with the honour of the French army to be supported, and before the Spanish frontier was passed, Grant, it matters not how, was made acquainted with the contents of the letter. Now the custom at Bayonne, in ordinary cases, was for the prisoner to wait on the authorities, and receive a passport to travel to Verdun, and all this was duly accomplished; meanwhile the delivering of the fatal letter being, by certain means, delayed, Grant, with a wonderful readiness and boldness, resolved not to escape towards the Pyrenees, thinking that he would naturally be pursued in that direction. He judged that if the governor of Bayonne could not recapture him at once, he would for his own security suppress the letter in hopes the matter would be no further thought of; judging, I say, in this acute manner, he on the instant inquired at the hotels, if any French officer was going to Paris, and finding that general Souham, then on his return from Spain, was so bent, he boldly introduced himself, and asked permission to join his party. The

other readily assented; and while thus travelling, the general, unacquainted with Marmont's intentions, often rallied his companion about his adventures, little thinking that he was then himself an instrument in forwarding the most dangerous and skilful of them all.

In passing through Orleans, Grant, by a species of intuition, discovered an English agent, and from him received a recommendation to another secret agent in Paris, whose assistance would be necessary to his final escape; for he looked upon Marmont's double dealing, and the expressed design to take away his life, as equivalent to a discharge of his parole, which was moreover only given with respect to Spain. When he arrived at Paris he took leave of Souham, opened an intercourse with the Parisian agent, from whom he obtained money, and by his advice, avoided appearing before the police, to have his passport examined. He took a lodging in a very public street, frequented the coffee-houses, and even visited the theatres without fear, because the secret agent, who had been long established and was intimately connected with the police, had ascertained that no inquiry about his escape had been set on foot.

In this manner he passed several weeks, at the end of which, the agent informed him that a passport was ready for one Jonathan Buck, an American, who had died suddenly, on the very day it was to have been claimed. Seizing this occasion, Grant boldly demanded the passport, with which he instantly departed for the mouth of the Loire, because certain reasons, not necessary to mention, led him to expect more assistance there than at any other port. However, new difficulties awaited him and were overcome by fresh exertions of his surprising talents, which fortune seemed to delight in aiding.

He first took a passage for America in a ship of that nation, but its departure being unexpectedly delayed, he frankly explained his true situation to the captain, who desired him to assume the character of a discontented seaman, and giving him a sailor's dress and forty dollars, sent him to lodge the money in the American consul's hands as a pledge, that he would prosecute the captain for ill usage when he reached the United States; this being the custom on such occasions the consul gave him a certificate which enabled him to pass from port to port as a discharged sailor seeking a ship.

Thus provided, after waiting some days, Grant prevailed upon a boatman, by a promise of ten Napoleons, to row him in the night towards a small island, where, by usage, the English vessels watered unmolested, and in return permitted the few inhabitants to fish and traffic without interruption. In the night the boat sailed, the masts of the British ships were dimly seen on the other side of the island, and the termination of his toils appeared at hand, when the boatman, either from fear or malice, suddenly put about and returned to port. In such a situation, some men would have striven in desperation to force fortune, and so have perished; the spirits of others would have sunk in despair, for the money which he had promised was all that remained of his stock, and the boatman, notwithstanding his breach of contract, demanded the whole; but with inexpressible coolness and resolution, Grant gave him one Napoleon instead of ten, and a rebuke for his misconduct. The other having threatened a reference to the police, soon found that he was no match in subtlety for his opponent, who told him plainly that he would then denounce him as aiding the escape of a prisoner of war, and would adduce the great price of his boat as a proof of his guilt!

This menace was too formidable to be resisted, and Grant in a few days engaged an old fisherman, who faithfully performed his bargain; but now there were no English vessels near the island; however the fisher-

man east his nets and caught some fish, with which he sailed towards the southward, where he had heard there was an English ship of war. In a few hours they obtained a glimpse of her, and were steering that way, when a shot from a coast-battery brought them to, and a boat with soldiers put off to board them; the fisherman was steadfast and true; he called Grant his son, and the soldiers by whom they expected to be arrested were only sent to warn them not to pass the battery, because the English vessel they were in search of was on the coast. The old man, who had expected this, bribed the soldiers with his fish, assuring them he must go with his son or they would starve, and that he was so well acquainted with the coast he could always escape the enemy. His prayers and presents prevailed, he was desired to wait under the battery till night, and then depart; but under pretence of arranging his escape from the English vessel, he made the soldiers point out her bearings so exactly, that when the darkness came, he ran her straight on board, and the intrepid officer stood in safety on the quarter-deck.

After this Grant reached England and obtained permission to choose a French officer of equal rank with himself, to send to France, that no doubt might remain about the propriety of his escape; and great was his astonishment to find, in the first prison he visited, the old fisherman and his real son, who had meanwhile been captured notwithstanding a protection given to them for their services. Grant, whose generosity and benevolence were as remarkable as the qualities of his understanding, soon obtained their release, and having sent them with a sum of money to France returned himself to the Peninsula, and within four months from the date of his first capture was again on the Tormes, watching Marmont's army! Other strange incidents of his life I could mention, were it not more fitting to quit a digression, already too wide; yet I was unwilling to pass an occasion of noticing one adventure of this generous and spirited, and yet gentlemanly man, who having served his country nobly and ably in every climate, died, not long since, exhausted by the continual hardships he had endured.

Having now shewn the prudence of lord Wellington with respect to the campaign generally, it remains to consider the siege of Badajos, which has so often been adduced in evidence, that not skill but fortune plumed his ambitious wing; a proceeding indeed most consonant to the nature of man; for it is hard to avow inferiority, by attributing an action so stupendous to superior genius alone. A critical scientific examination would be misplaced in a general history, but to notice some of the leading points which involve the general conception will not be irrelevant. The choice of the line of attack has been justified by the English engineers, as that requiring least expenditure of means and time; but this has by the French engineer been denied. Colonel Lamarre affirms that the front next the castle was the one least susceptible of defence; because it had neither ravelin nor ditch to protect it, had fewer flanks, and offered no facility of retrenching behind it; a view which is confirmed by Phillipon, who being the best judge of his own weak points, did for many days imagine that this front was the true object of the allies' approaches. But Lamarre advances a far more interesting question, when he affirms that the English general might have carried Badajos by escalade and storm, on the first night of the siege, with less difficulty than he experienced on the 7th of April. On that night, he says, the defences were not so complete, that the garrison was less prepared, and the surprise would have availed somewhat; whereas at the second period the breaches were the strongest part of the town, and as no other advantage had been gained by the besiegers, the chances were in favour of the first period.

This reasoning appears sound, yet the fact is one which belongs, not to the rules but the secrets of the art, and they are only in the keeping of great captains. That the breaches were impregnable has indeed been denied by the English engineers. Colonel Jones affirms that the centre breach had not the slightest interior retrenchment, and that the sword-blades in the Trinidad, might have been overturned by the rush of a dense mass of troops. This opinion is quite at variance with that of the officers and men engaged; it is certain also that all the breaches were protected by the sword-blades, and if the centre breach was not retrenched, it was rendered very difficult of approach by the deep holes dugged in front, and it was more powerfully swept by flank-fire than the others were. It is also a mistake to suppose that no dense rush was made at the great breach. Engineers intent upon their own art sometimes calculate on men as they do on blocks of stone or timber, nevertheless where the bullet strikes the man will fall. The sword-blades were fitted into ponderous beams, and these last chained together, were let deep into the ground; how then was it possible for men to drag or push them from their places, when behind them stood resolute men, whose fire swept the foremost ranks away? This fire could not be returned by the soldiers engaged in removing the obstacles, nor by those in rear, because, from the slope of the breach, they could only see their own comrades of the front ranks; and then the dead bodies, and the struggling wounded men, and still more the spiked planks, rendered a simultaneous exertion impossible. The breaches were impregnable!

And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter, when the application of a just science would have rendered the operation comparatively easy? Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge into war, were quite ignorant of its exigencies; because the English people are warlike without being military, and under the pretence of maintaining a liberty which they do not possess, oppose in peace all useful martial establishments. Expatriating in their schools and colleges, upon Roman discipline and Roman valour, they are heedless of Roman institutions; they desire like that ancient republic, to be free at home and conquerors abroad, but start at perfecting their military system, as a thing incompatible with a constitution, which they yet suffer to be violated by every minister who trembles at the exposure of corruption. In the beginning of each war, England has to seek in blood for the knowledge necessary to insure success, and like the fiend's progress towards Eden, her conquering course is through chaos followed by death!

But it is not in the details of this siege we must look for Wellington's merits. The apportioning of the number of guns, the quantity of ammunition, the amount of transport, the tracing of the works, and the choice of the points of attack, are matters within the province of the engineer; the value and importance of the place to be attacked in reference to other objects of the campaign, the time that can be spared to effect its reduction, the arrangements necessary to elude or to resist the succouring army, the calculation of the resources, from whence the means of attack are to be drawn, these are in the province of the general. With him also rests the choice of shortening the scientific process, and the judging of how much or how little ought to be risked, how much trusted to the valour and discipline of his army, how much to his own genius for seizing accidents, whether of ground, of time; or of conjunction to accelerate the gain of his object.

Now all armies come to the siege of a town with great advantages; for first the besieged cannot but be

less confident than the assailants; they are a few against a many, and being on the defensive, are also an excised portion of their own army, and without news, which damps the fiery spirit. They are obliged to await their adversary's time and attack, their losses seem more numerous, in proportion to their forces, because they are more concentrated, and then the wounded are not safe even in the hospitals. No troops can hope to maintain a fortress eventually, without the aid of a succouring army; their ultimate prospect is death or captivity. The besiegers on the contrary have a certain retreat, know the real state of affairs, feel more assured of their object, have hope of profit, and a secure retreat if they fail, while the besieged faintly look for succour, and scarcely expect life. To this may be added that the inhabitants are generally secret enemies of the garrison as the cause of their own sufferings.

The number of guns and quantity of ammunition, in a fortress, are daily diminished; the besiegers' means, originally calculated to overpower the other, may be increased. Time and materials are therefore against the besieged, and the scientific foundation of the defence depends on the attack which may be varied, while the other is fixed. Finally the firmness and skill of the defence generally depends upon the governor, who may be killed, whereas many officers amongst the besiegers are capable of conducting the attack; and the general, besides being personally less exposed, is likely, as the chief of an army, to be a man of more spirit and capacity than a simple governor. It follows then that fortresses must fall if the besiegers sit down before them according to the rules of art; and when no succouring army is nigh, the time, necessary to reduce any place, may be calculated with great exactness. When these rules cannot be attended to, when every thing is irregular and doubtful, when the general is hurried on to the attempt, be it easy or difficult, by the force of circumstances, we must measure him by the greatness of the exigency, and the energy with which he acts.

This is the light in which to view the siege of Badajos. Wellington's object was great, his difficulties foreseen, his success complete. A few hours' delay, an accident, a turn of fortune, and he would again have been foiled! aye! but this is war, always dangerous and uncertain, an ever-rolling wheel and armed with scythes. Was the object worth the risk—did its gain compensate the loss of men—was it boldly, greatly acquired? These are the true questions and they may be answered thus. Suchet had subjugated Aragon by his mildness, Catalonia and Valencia by his vigour. In Andalusia, Soult had tranquillized the mass of the people, and his genius, solid and vast, was laying the deep foundation of a kingdom close to Portugal. He was forming such great establishments, and contriving such plans, as would, if permitted to become ripe, have enabled him to hold the Peninsula, alone, should the French armies fail in all other parts. In the centre of Spain the king, true to his plan of raising a Spanish party, was likely to rally round him all those of the

patriots whom discontent, or weakness of mind, or corruption, might induce to seek a plausible excuse, for joining the invaders; and on the northern line the French armies, still powerful, were strengthening their hold of the country by fortifying all the important points of Leon and Old Castile. Meanwhile the great army, which the emperor was carrying to Russia, might or might not be successful, but in either case, it was the only moment when an offensive war, against his army in Spain, could have been carried on with success.

But how could any extensive offensive operation have been attempted while Badajos remained in the enemy's possession? If Wellington had advanced in the north, Soult making Badajos his base would have threatened Lisbon; if Wellington marched against the French centre, the same thing would have happened, and the army of the north would also have acted on the left flank of the allies or have retaken Ciudad Rodrigo. If an attempt had been made against Soult, it must have been by the Lower Guadiana, when the French army of Portugal coming down to Badajos, could have either operated against the rear of the allies, or against Lisbon.

Badajos was therefore the key to all offensive operations by the allies, and to take it was an indispensable preliminary. Yet how take it? By regular or by irregular operations? For the first a certain time was required, which from the experience of former sieges it was not to be expected that the enemy would allow. What then would have been the result, if thus, year after year, the allies showed they were unable even to give battle to their enemies, much less to chase them from the Peninsula. How was it to be expected that England would bear the expense of a protracted warfare, affording no hope of final success. How were the opposition clamours to be replied to in Parliament? How were the secret hopes of the continental governments to be upheld if the military power of England, Portugal, and Spain united was unable to meet even a portion of the secondary armies of Napoleon, while with four hundred thousand men he stalked, a gigantic conqueror, over the wastes of Russia? To strike irregularly then was Wellington's only resource. To strike without regard to rules, trusting to the courage of his men and to fortune to bear him through the trial triumphant. Was such a crisis to be neglected by a general who had undertaken on his own judgement to fight the battle of the Peninsula. Was he to give force to the light declamation of the hour, when general officers in England were heard to say that every defeat of the French was a snare to decoy the British further into Spain! was he, at such a moment, to place the probable loss of a few thousand men, more or less, in opposition to such a conjuncture, and by declining the chance offered, shew that he despaired of success himself? What if he failed? he would not have been, save the loss of a few men, worse off than if he had not attacked. In either case, he would have been a baffled general with a sinking cause. But what if he succeeded? The horizon was bright with the coming glory of England!

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR HARRY BURRARD.

Head-quarters, at Lavos, August 8th, 1808.

SIR,

Having received instructions from the secretary of state that you were likely to arrive on the coast of Portugal with a corps of ten thousand men, lately employed in the north of Europe under the orders of sir John Moore, I now submit to you such information as I have received regarding the general state of the war in Portugal and Spain, and the plan of operations which I am about to carry into execution.

The enemy's force at present in Portugal consists, as far as I am able to form an opinion, of from 16,000 to 18,000 men, of which number there are about 500 in the fort of Almeida, about the same number in Elvas, about 6 or 800 in Peniche, and 16 or 1800 in the province of Alemtejo, at Setuval, &c.; and the remainder are disposable for the defence of Lisbon, and are in the forts of St. Julian and Cascaes, in the batteries along the coast as far as the Rock of Lisbon, and the old citadel of Lisbon, to which the enemy have lately added some works.

Of the force disposable for the defence of Lisbon, the enemy have lately detached a corps of about 2000, under general Thomieres, principally I believe to watch my movements, which corps is now at Alcobaca; and another corps of 4000 men, under general Loison, was sent across the Tagus into Alemtejo on the 26th of last month, the object of which detachment was to disperse the Portuguese insurgents in that quarter, to force the Spanish corps, consisting of about 2000 men, which had advanced into Portugal as far as Evora from Estremadura, to retire, and then to be enabled to add to the force destined for the defence of Lisbon the corps of French troops which had been stationed at Setuval and in the province of Alemtejo; at all events Loison's corps will return to Lisbon, and the French corps disposable for the defence of that place will probably be about 14,000 men, of which at least 3000 must be left in the garrisons and forts on the coast and in the river.

The French army under Dupont, in Andalusia, surrendered on the 20th of last month to the Spanish army under Castaños; so that there are now no French troops in the south of Spain. The Spanish army of Galicia and Castille, to the northward, received a check at Rio Seco, in the province of Valladolid, on the 14th of July, from a French corps supposed to be under the command of general Bessieres, which had advanced from Burgos.

The Spanish troops retired on the 15th to Benevente, and I understand there has since been an affair between the advanced posts in that neighbourhood, but I am not certain of it; nor am I acquainted with the position of the Spanish army, or of that of the French, since the 14th July. When you will have been a short time in this country, and will have observed the degree to which this deficiency of real information is supplied by the circulation of unfounded reports, you will not be surprised at my want of accurate knowledge on these subjects.

It is, however, certain that nothing of importance has occurred in that quarter since the 14th of July; and from this circumstance I conclude that the corps called Bessieres' attacked the Spanish army at Rio Seco solely with a view to cover the march of king Joseph Buonaparte to Madrid, where he arrived on the 21st July. Besides their defeat at Andalusia, the enemy, as you may probably have heard, have been beat off in an attack upon Zaragoza, in Aragon, in another upon the city of Valencia; (in both of which it is said that they have lost many men;) and it is reported that, in Catalonia, two of their detachments have been cut off, and that they have lost the fort of Figueras in the Pyrenees, and that Barcelona is blockaded. Of these last-mentioned actions and operations I have seen no official accounts, but the report of them is generally circulated and believed; and at all events, whether these reports are founded or otherwise, it is obvious, that the insurrection against the French is general throughout Spain; that large parties of Spaniards are in arms; amongst others, in particular, an army of 20,000 men, including 4000 cavalry, at Almaraz on the Tagus, in Estremadura, and that the French cannot carry on their operations by means of small corps. I should imagine, from their inactivity, and from the misfortunes they have suffered, that they have not the means of collecting a force sufficiently large to oppose the progress of the insurrection and the efforts of the insurgents and to afford supplies to their different detached corps, or that they find that they cannot carry on their operations with armies so numerous as they must find it necessary to employ without magazines.

In respect to Portugal, the whole kingdom, with the exception of the neighbourhood of Lisbon, is in a state of insurrection against the French; their means of resistance are, however, less powerful than those of the Spaniards, their troops have been completely dispersed, their officers had gone off to the Brazils, and their arsenals pillaged, or in the power of the enemy, and their revolt under the circumstances in which it had taken place is still more extraordinary than that of the Spanish nation.

The Portuguese may have in the northern part of the kingdom about 10,000 men in arms, of which number 5000 are to march with me towards Lisbon. The remainder with a Spanish detachment of about 1,500 men which came from Galicia, are employed in a distant blockade of Almeida, and in the protection of Oporto, which is now the seat of government.

The insurrection is general throughout Alemtejo and Algarve to the southward, and Entre Minho e Duero and Trás-os-Montes and Beira to the northward; but for want of arms the people can do nothing against the enemy.

Having consulted sir C. Cotton, it appeared to him and to me that the attack proposed upon Cascaes-bay was impracticable, because the bay is well defended by the fort of Cascaes and the other works constructed for its defence, and the ships of war could not approach sufficiently near to silence them. The landing in the Passa d'Arcos in the Tagus could not be effected without silencing fort St. Julian, which appeared to be impracticable to those who were to carry that operation into execution.

There are small bays within which might admit of landing troops, and others to the northward of the rock of Lisbon, but they are all defended by works which must have been silenced; they are of small extent, and but few men could have landed at the same time. There is always a surf on them which affects the facility of landing at different times so materially, as to render it very doubtful whether the troops first landed could be supported in sufficient time by others, and whether the horses for the artillery and cavalry, and the necessary stores and provisions could be landed at all. These inconveniences attending a landing in any of the bays near the rock of Lisbon would have been aggravated by the neighbourhood of the enemy to the landing-place, and by the exhausted state of the country in which the troops would have been landed. It was obviously the best plan, therefore, to land in the northern parts of Portugal, and I fixed upon Mondego bay as the nearest place which afforded any facility for landing, except Peniche, the landing-place of which peninsula is defended by a fort occupied by the enemy, which it would be necessary to attack regularly, in order to place the ships in safety.

A landing to the northward was further recommended, as it would insure the co-operation of the Portuguese in the expedition to Lisbon. The whole of the corps placed under my command, including those under the command of general Spencer, having landed, I propose to march on Wednesday, and I shall take the road by Alcobaça and Obidos, with a view to keep up my communication by the sea-coast, and to examine the situation of Peniche, and I shall proceed towards Lisbon by the route of Mafra, and by the hills to the northward of that city.

As I understand from the secretary of state that a body of troops under the command of brigadier-general Ackland may be expected on the coast of Portugal before you arrive, I have written to desire he will proceed from hence along the coast of Portugal to the southward; and I propose to communicate with him by means of captain Bligh of the Alfred, who will attend the movements of the army with a few transports, having on board provisions and military stores. I intend to order brigadier-general Ackland to attack Peniche, if I should find it necessary to obtain possession of that place, and if not, I propose to order him to join the fleet stationed off the Tagus, with a view to disembark in one of the bays near the rock of Lisbon, as soon as I shall approach sufficiently near to enable him to perform that operation. If I imagined that general Ackland's corps was equipped in such a manner as to be enabled to move

from the coast, I should have directed him to land at Mondego, and to march upon Santarem, from which station he would have been at hand either to assist my operations, or to cut off the retreat of the enemy, if he should endeavour to make it either by the north of the Tagus and Almeida, or by the south of the Tagus and Elvas; but as I am convinced that general Ackland's corps is intended to form a part of some other corps which is provided with a commissariat, that he will have none with him, and consequently that his corps must depend upon the country; and as no reliance can be placed upon the resources of this country, I have considered it best to direct the general's attention to the sea-coast; if, however, the command of the army remained in my hands, I should certainly land the corps which has lately been under the command of sir John Moore at Mondego, and should move it upon Santarem. I have the honour to enclose a return of the troops, &c. &c.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR HARRY BURRARD.
Camp at Lugar, 8 miles north of Lerya, August 10, 1808.

SIR,

Since I wrote to you on the 8th inst., I have received letters from Mr. Stuart and colonel Doyle at Coruña, of which I enclose copies. From them you will learn the state of the war in that part of Spain, and you will observe that Mr. Stuart and colonel Doyle are of opinion that marshal Bessieres will take advantage of the inefficiency of the Gallician army under general Blake to detach a corps to Portugal to the assistance of general Junot; we have not heard yet of that detachment and I am convinced it will not be made till King Joseph Buonaparte will either be reinforced to such a degree as to be in safety in Madrid, or till he shall have effected his retreat into France, with which view it is reported that he left Madrid on the 29th of last month.

I conceive, therefore, that I have time for the operations which I propose to carry on before a reinforcement can arrive from Leon, even supposing that no obstacles would be opposed to its march in Spain or Portugal; but it is not probable that it can arrive before the different reinforcements will arrive from England; and as marshal Bessieres had not more than 20,000 men in the action at Rio Seco on the 14th July, I conceive that the British troops, which will be in Portugal, will be able to contend with any part of that corps which he may detach.

The possibility that, in the present state of affairs, the French corps at present in Portugal may be reinforced, affords an additional reason for taking the position at Santarem, which I apprised you, in my letter of the 8th, I should occupy, if the command of the army remained in my hands, after the reinforcements should arrive. If you should occupy it, you will not only be in the best situation to support my operations, and to cut off the retreat of the enemy, but if any reinforcements of the French troops should enter Portugal, you will be in the best situation to collect your whole force to oppose him, &c. &c.

(Signed)

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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No. II.

ARTICLES OF THE DEFINITIVE CONVENTION FOR THE
EVACUATION OF PORTUGAL BY THE FRENCH ARMY.

The generals commanding in chief, &c. &c., being determined to negotiate, &c. &c.

Article 1. All the places and forts in the kingdom of Portugal occupied by the French troops shall be given up to the British army in the state in which they are at the period of the signature of the present convention.

Art. 2. The French troops shall evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage, they shall not be considered as prisoners of war, and on their arrival in France they shall be at liberty to serve.

Art. 3. The English government shall furnish the means of conveyance for the French army, which shall be disembarked in any of the ports of France between Rochefort and L'Orient inclusively.

Art. 4. The French army shall carry with it all its artillery of French calibre, with the horses belonging thereto, and the tumbrils supplied with sixty rounds per gun: all other artillery arms, and ammunition, as also the military and naval arsenals, shall be given up to the British army and navy, in the state in which they may be at the period of the ratification of the convention.

Art. 5. The French army shall carry with it all its equipments, and all that is comprehended under the name of property of the army; that is to say, its military chest, and carriages attached to the field commissariat and field hospital; or shall be allowed to dispose of such part of the same on its accounts, as the commander-in-chief may judge it unnecessary to embark. In like manner, all individuals of the army shall be at liberty to dispose of their private property of every description, with full security hereafter for the purchasers.

Art. 6. The cavalry are to embark their horses, as also the generals and other officers of all ranks. It is, however, fully understood that the means of conveyance for horses, at the disposal of the British commanders, are very limited; some additional conveyance may be procured in the port of Lisbon. The number of horses, to be embarked by the troops shall not exceed 600, and the number embarked by the staff shall not exceed 200. At all events, every facility will be given to the French army to dispose of the horses belonging to it which cannot be embarked.

Art. 7. In order to facilitate the embarkation, it shall take place in three divisions, the last of which will be principally composed of the garrisons of the places, of the cavalry, the artillery, the sick, and the equipment of the army. The first division shall embark within seven days of the date of the ratification, or sooner if possible.

Art. 8. The garrison of Elvas and its forts, and of Peniche and Pamela, will be embarked at Lisbon. That of Almeida at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries, charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.

Art. 9. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are entrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country at the expense of the British government, under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when the final evacuation is effected. The English government will provide for their return to France, which will take place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.

Art. 10. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given to them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.

Art. 11. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.

Art. 12. The forts of St. Julien, the Bugio, and Cascaes, shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries as far as the lazaretto or Trafaria on one side, and fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the 2d division; as shall also the harbour and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmela, shall be given up as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the meantime, the general-in-chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.

Art. 13. Commissioners shall be named on both sides to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.

Art. 14. Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.

Art. 15. From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever, of the French government against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops, in the month of December, 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled; and all sequestration laid upon their property, moveable or immoveable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.

Art. 16. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be protected; their property of every kind, moveable and immoveable, shall be respected; and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or of disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose. It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement, only however in as far as regards leaving the port, and that none of the stipulations above mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculations.

Art. 17. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of this country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders; they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property; it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French government, they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.

Art. 18. The Spanish troops detained on board ship, in the port of Lisbon, shall be given up to the commander-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain, without hav-

in that country, they formed a corps of 1876 men, which being re-embodied under the name of the battalions of detachments, did good service at Oporto and Talavera.

The pieces of artillery abandoned during the retreat were six 3-pounders.

These guns were landed at Coruna without the general's knowledge: they never went beyond Villa Franca, and, not being horsed, they were thrown down the rocks when the troops quitted that town.

The guns used in the battle of Coruna were spiked and buried in the sand, but the French discovered them.

N. B. Some trifling errors may possibly have crept into the regimental states in consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining exactly where each man was lost, but the inaccuracies could not affect the total amount above fifty men more or less.



NO. VI.

The following letters from lord Collingwood did not come into my possession before the present volume was in the press. It will be seen that they corroborate many of the opinions, and some of the facts that I have stated, and they will doubtless be read with the attention due to the observations of such an honourable and able man.

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Ocean, Gibraltar, 30th August, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have been in great expectation of hearing of your progress with the army, and hope the first account will be of your success whenever you move. I have heard nothing lately of Junot at Cadiz; but there have been accounts, not very well authenticated, that Joseph Buonaparte, in his retiring to France, was stopped by the mass rising in Biscay. to the amount of fourteen thousand well-armed men, which obliged him to return to Burgos, where the body of the French army was stationed.

At Zaragoza, the French, in making their fourteenth attack upon the town, were defeated, repulsed with great loss, and had retired from it. There is a deputy here from that city with a commission from the marquis de Palafox to request supplies. The first aid upon their list is for ten or fifteen thousand troops. The deputy states they have few regulars in the province, and the war has hitherto been carried on by all being armed. In this gentleman's conversation I observe, what I had before remarked in others, that he had no view of Spain beyond the kingdom of Aragon; and in reply to the observations I made on the necessity of a central government, he had little to say, as if that had not yet been a subject of much consideration. I have great hope that general Castaños, Cuesta, and those captains-general who will now meet at Madrid, will do something effectual in simplifying the government. In a conversation I had with Morla on the necessity of this, he seemed to think the juntas would make many difficulties, and retain their present power as long as they could.

I hope, my dear sir, you will give some directions about this puzzling island (*Perexil*) which it appears to me will not be of any future use; but the people who are on it will suffer much in the winter, without habitations, except tents; I conceive the purpose for which it was occupied is past, and will probably never return; whenever they quit it, they should bring the stores away as quietly as possible; for, if I am not mistaken, the emperor has an intention to keep

them, and will remonstrate against their going. I hope you have received good accounts from lady Dalrymple, &c.

* * * * *

I am to sail to-day for Toulon, where everything indicates an intention in the French to sail. Mr. Duff brought a million of dollars to Seville, and has instructions to communicate with the junta; but he appears to me to be too old to do it as major Cox has done; he is still there, and I conclude will wait for your instructions. Mr. Markland would accept with great thankfulness the proposal you made to him to go to Valencia.

I beg my kind regards, &c.

COLLINGWOOD.

P. S. Prince Leopold is still here, and I understand intends to stay until he hears from Eng'and. I have given passports for Dupont and a number of French officers to go to France on parole, ninety-three in number. General Morla was impatient to get them out of the country. The Spaniards were much irritated against them: they were not safe from their revenge, except in St. Sebastian's castle.

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Ocean, off Toulon, October 18, 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have received the favour of your letters of the 27th August and 5th September, and beg to offer you my sincere congratulations on the success of the British army in Portugal, which I hope will have satisfied the French that they are not those invincible creatures which Buonaparte had endeavoured to persuade them they were.

It is a happy event to have rescued Portugal from the government of France; and their carrying off a little plunder is a matter of very secondary consideration; perhaps it may have the good effect of keeping up the animosity of the Portuguese who suffer, and incite them to more resistance in future.

The great business now is to endeavour to establish that sort of government, and organize that sort of military force, which may give security to the country; and the great difficulty in Portugal will be to find men who are of ability to place at the head of the several departments, who have patriotism to devote themselves to its service, and vigour to maintain its independence. In a country exhausted like Portugal, it will require much ingenious expedient to supply the want of wealth and of everything military. If it is not found in the breasts of those to whom the people look up, Portugal will remain in a hapless and uncertain state still.

I have not heard from sir Charles Cotton how he settled his terms with the Russian admiral: but as soon as he has got possession of the ships to be sent to England, they cannot but be good. The hoisting the English flag on the fort which surrendered to our troops, I conclude, would be explained to the Portuguese as not to be understood as taking possession by England for other purpose than to be restored to its prince, as was done at Madeira; but in this instance it ought to have been thought necessary to deprive Siniavin of the argument he would have used of the neutrality of the Portuguese flag, with whom his nation was not at war.

I left Cadiz the moment everything in that quarter was pacific; and Mr. Duff arrived there with a million of dollars for their use; this money was sent to the junta of Se-

ville, where I am afraid there are many members unworthy of the trust.

I have only heard once from Cox since I left that quarter. After getting the money, father Gill seemed to have dropt his communications with major C., and their discussions were not of a nature to excite much public interest; they consisted more in private bickerings than of grave consult for the public weal. Tilly seems to have been entirely disappointed in his project, both in respect to the annexation of southern Portugal to Andalusia and the pension of 12,000 dollars for his service in the supreme council: of those you will be informed by major Cox. I am afraid I related the proceedings to his majesty's ministers of events which were passing almost under my eye, and gave my opinion on them with too great freedom; I mean with a freedom that is not usual; but they were facts of which, without being possessed, his majesty's ministers could not have a knowledge of the real state of affairs in Spain; and the sentiments those facts inspired were necessary to explain my motives and the rule of conduct which I pursued. And still I consider the great and only danger to which Spain is now exposed is, the supposition that the whole nation is possessed of the same patriotism which, in Andalusia, Aragon, and Valencia, led to such glorious results. It is far otherwise. There are not many Castanoses, nor Cuestas, nor Palafoxes; and take from Spain the influence of the clergy, and its best resource of power would be lost; wherever this influence is least, the war is languid.

I wrote to you some time since to represent the state of Catalonia. Nothing can be more indifferent to the cause than they appear to be; yet the common peasantry have not less spirit nor less desire to repel their enemy. They have no leaders. Palacio, the captain-general, stays at Villa Franca, west of Barcelona, talking of what he intends to do; and the people speak of him as either wanting zeal in their cause or ability to direct them; while the French from Barcelona and Figueras do just what they please. When the French attacked Gerona, he did nothing to succour it. The greatest discomfiture they suffered was from Lord Cochrane, who, while they were employed at the siege, blew up the road, making deep trenches in a part where the fire of his ships could be brought upon; and when they came there he drove them from their guns, killed many, and took some cannon.

The French fleet is here quite ready for sea, and I am doing all that is in my power to meet them when they do come out. It is an arduous service: the last ten days we have had gales of wind incessantly; the difficulty of keeping a sufficient squadron is very great. I think the storms from those Alpine mountains are harder than in England, and of more duration. I beg my best regards to captain Dalrymple, and my sincerest wishes for every success to attend you.

I am, my dear sir Hew,

Your obedient and most humble servant,
COLLINGWOOD.

P. S. In the letter which I wrote to you on the state of Catalonia I represented the necessity of sending a body of British troops to Catalonia. There is no other prospect of the French being kept in any bounds. The avenues to France are as open now as at any time they have been.

I have kept a ship always at Rosas Bay; her marines have garrisoned the castle, and her company assisted in repairing the works. The French appear to have designs on that place. The presence of the English alone prevents them. If 18,000 men were here of our army, I think they

would make Mr. Palacio come forward, and put the whole country into activity, which till then I don't think they ever will be.

COLLINGWOOD.

They want an English resident at Gerona, that they may have somebody to apply to for succour
[The rest torn off in the original.]

TO SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.

Ocean, off Minorca, April 8, 1809.

MY DEAR SIR,

I received the favour of your letter a few days ago, which gave me great pleasure, after all the trouble and vexations you have had, to hear you were all well.

I was exceedingly sorry when I saw the angry mood in which the convention in Portugal was taken up, even before the circumstances which led to it were at all known. Before our army landed in Portugal, the French force was reported to be very small. I remember its being said that a body of 5000 troops were all that was necessary to dispossess Junot. I conclude the same sort of report went to England; and this, with the victory that was obtained, led people to expect the extermination of the few French which were supposed to be there; and when once the idea is entertained, people shut their eyes to difficulties.

I remember what you told me, the last time I saw you off Cadiz, of the communication which might be made to you by an officer who possessed the entire confidence of ministers. I thought then, that whatever ministers had to communicate to a commander-in-chief, could not be done better than by themselves: for intermediate communications are always in danger of being misunderstood, and never fail to cause doubts and disturb the judgement. I hope now it is all over, and your uneasiness on that subject at an end.

My labours I think will never cease. I am worn down by fatigue of mind, with anxiety and sorrow; my health is very much impaired; and while our affairs require an increased energy, I find myself less able to conduct them from natural causes. I give all my thoughts and time, but have interruptions, from my weak state of body, which the service will scarcely admit of. I never felt the severity of winter more than this last. They were not gales of wind, but hurricanes; and the consequence is, that the fleet has suffered very much, and many of the ships very infirm.

I would not have kept the sea so long, because I know the system of blockading must be ruinous to our fleet at last, and in no instance that I can recollect has prevented the enemy from sailing. In the spring we are found all rags, while they, nursed through the tempest, are all trim. I would not have done it; but what would have become of me if, in my preserving the ships, the French had sailed, and effected any thing in any quarter? The clamour would have been loud, and they would have sought only for the cause in my treachery or folly, for none can understand that there is any bad weather in the Mediterranean. The system of blockade is ruinous; but it has continued so long, and so much to the advantage of the mercantile part of the nation, that I fear no minister will be found bold enough to discontinue it. We undertake nothing against the enemy, but seem to think it enough to prevent him taking our brigs; his fleet is growing to a monstrous force, while ours every day gives more proof of its increasing decrepitude.

Of the Spaniards I would not say much; I was never

sanguine in the prospect of success, and have no reason to change my opinion; the lower class of people, those who are under the influence of priests, would do anything were they under proper direction; but directors are difficult to be found. There is a canker in the state: none of the superior orders are serious in their resistance to the French, and have only taken part against them thus far from apprehension of the resentment of the people. I believe the junta is not free from the taint of the infection, or would they have continued Vives Don Miguel, in high and important command after such evident proofs as he gave of want of loyalty? I do not know what is thought of Infantado in England; but in my mind, the man, the duke (for his rank has a great deal to do with it,) who would seat himself in Buonaparte's council at Bayonne, sign his decrees, which were distributed in Spain, and then say he was forced to do it, is not the man who will do much in maintaining the glory or the independence of any country; no such man should be trusted now. The French troops are mostly withdrawn from Spain, except such as are necessary to hold certain strong posts, and enable them to return without impediment. Figueras, Barcelona, and Rosas, are held here in Catalonia, and of course the country quite open to them. Will the Spaniards dispossess them? The junta does not seem to know anything of the provinces at a distance from them. At Tarragona the troops are ill-clothed, and without pay; on one occasion they could not march against the enemy, having no shoes, and yet at Cadiz they have fifty-one millions of dollars. Cadiz seems to be a general depot of everything they can get from England. If they are not active the next two months, Spain is lost.

I hope lady Dalrymple, &c. &c.

I ever am, my dear sir,

Your very faithful and obedient servant,
COLLINGWOOD.



No. VII.

NARRATIVE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACKENZIE'S DETACHMENT FROM LISBON TO CADIZ.

"The detachment sailed from Lisbon on the 2d February, 1809, and arrived at Cadiz harbour on the 5th, at night. I immediately waited on rear-admiral Purvis, and from him I learnt there are some difficulties started by the marquis Villel (the commissioner from the central junta, as well as a member of it) to our landing and occupying Cadiz. I then waited on Sir George Smith, on shore, where this intelligence was, in some degree, confirmed; but Sir George still expressed an expectation that the objections would be got over. These objections had been, it seems, but lately started. Next morning I saw Mr. Charles Stewart, who was acting under a diplomatic authority from Mr. Frere, and had a conference with him and sir G. Smith, when I explained the nature of my orders, and it was determined to wait on the marquis Villel. Mr. Stuart explained to the marquis that the object of my coming was to offer our assistance in the occupation and defence of Cadiz, and in making the necessary preparations for such an event; that we were only the advance of a larger corps coming from England, to act from this side against the common enemy. The marquis hesitated, and, after some speeches of compliment, said his authority did not extend so far; that he must wait for instructions from the central government; and, in the mean time, said he could permit our landing at Port St. Mary's. This I declined, as an unnecessary loss of

time, and contrary to my orders; and it was then agreed to wait for the decision of the central junta from Seville. I thereupon wrote to Mr. Frere, and sent him a copy of my instructions from sir J. Cradock.

The decision of the junta was received on the 8th: and I received a letter from Mr. Frere, which put an end, for the moment, to our hope of occupying Cadiz. The reason assigned by the junta was of the most flimsy nature, viz. "That they had ordered two of their own battalions to occupy Cadiz;" a measure which was evidently the thought of the moment, and a mere pretext.

Although I cannot presume to judge of the evil political consequences which might arise from such a measure, as alluded to in Mr. Frere's, yet I had every reason to believe, as well from the opinion of sir G. Smith, as of all others conversant in the sentiments of the people of Cadiz, that our landing and occupying the place would be a very popular measure. Mr. Frere's letter expressed a great desire that we should not appear to have made an offer that was refused; and was desirous that we should not immediately depart, but that we should land and occupy the cantonments offered to us. On consulting with sir G. Smith and Mr. Stuart, this appeared to be contrary to the grounds on which we had set out; but as we were equally desirous not to appear at variance with the Spanish government, we agreed to submit to Mr. Frere, whether it would not be better for the troops to remain for the present in their transports, as we had already stated that we were in expectation of being immediately joined by a force from England, the scene of whose operations was uncertain; and our remaining in the harbour under this idea would answer every purpose Mr. Frere proposed by a landing.

I had, besides, some military objections to a landing; for, without reckoning the uncertainty of an embarkation from Port St. Mary's, I knew how dilatory all proceedings are in Spain. That if we were once placed in the scattered cantonments proposed, and we had a sudden call for embarkation, above a week would have been lost in effecting it; and from former experience, the effects of a certain disorder would, probably, have thrown a large number of our men into the hospitals. It is further evident that the detachment could not have been re-embarked without some stain on the national honour. It must have very soon marched into the interior of Spain, and thus have involved our country in its support, without having obtained the object for which it was detached—the possession of Cadiz. On all these considerations I thought it right to defer landing, until we should hear further from Mr. Frere, to whom both Mr. Stuart and myself wrote, and I presume he was satisfied with the reasons given. In all these proceedings I had the cordial approbation of sir G. Smith, who, notwithstanding unfavourable appearances, seemed sanguine to the last that the point would be carried. I therefore wrote to sir J. Cradock, by the Hope brig, on the 9th, stating what had been done, and that we should remain in Cadiz harbour (with Mr. Frere's approbation) until we received orders from him or from England. And I wrote, by the same conveyance, to the same purport, to Lord Castlereagh.

On the 15th, we had the misfortune to lose sir G. Smith, who died that morning; and on the 18th, I received a letter from Mr. Frere, in which he seemed to have altered his opinion as to the propriety of our occupying Cadiz, and stating that the only mode which appeared to him likely to succeed in obtaining the possession was my leaving a small part of my detachment there, and proceeding with the rest to join Cuesta's army; that, as a force was expected from

England for the same purpose for which my detachment came, what I left behind might follow me on their arrival.

I confess I was much disappointed at this proposal, the whole of my detachment not appearing more than equal to the charge of the place; but as it had not been laid before the junta, I considered it my duty to state the objections to it, as they arose out of my instructions. Such a measure would have completely committed our country, in a particular point, in the interior, with a very small detachment, a thing which I was instructed his majesty's ministers wished to avoid; whilst the admittance of a handful of men could not be considered as any possession of the place, where there were about four thousand volunteers well drilled. I therefore submitted to Mr. Frere, to defer the proposition of this measure until the arrival of the troops from England, which might be looked for, according to his statement, every hour. We should be, then, in a condition to take possession of Cadiz effectually, and advance, in some point, respectfully, towards the enemy. If, however, Mr. Frere should determine to bring forward the measure immediately, I further informed him, that I was ready to move on, as soon as we could obtain the necessary equipments.

Mr. Stuart embarked on the 21st, on board the Ambuscade, on a secret mission. On the 22d, and before I received any further communication from Mr. Frere, a popular commotion broke out suddenly at Cadiz, in consequence of the measure which the junta had adopted, of marching some of their own troops into the town, as the reason (or rather pretext) for declining to receive us. The regiment now on its march in, was composed of Poles, Swiss, and other foreigners, deserters from the French army, whose entrance the people were determined to resist. The utmost care was taken to prevent our officers or soldiers from taking any part whatever on this occasion; and, except in some cases where I was applied to by the governor, for the interference of some British officers as mediators, we steered perfectly clear. It was now evident that the people were favourable to our landing and occupying the town, for it was frequently called for during the tumult.

As soon as I could safely send an account of this commotion to Mr. Frere, I despatched an officer (captain Kelly, assistant quarter-master-general) with a detail. The Fishguard sailed on the 24th, for Lisbon and England, by which ship I informed sir J. Cradock, as well as lord Castlereagh, of all that had passed since my last; and just at that time colonel Roche arrived from Seville. He was sent down, by M. Frere, to Cadiz, in consequence of Mr. Stuart's mission. I had till now expected Mr. Frere's decision, on the subject of the proposition in his letter of the 18th; but as so much time had elapsed, I conjectured he might have dropped it for the present; and conceiving that something favourable to the object of my mission might be drawn from the present state of things, I had a full conversation with colonel Roche on the subject. He told me the junta were dissatisfied with our not having accepted the cantonments offered to us; but he did not seem to think our views unattainable, particularly at the present moment. I asked his opinion as to the practicability of general Stuart's being admitted, with two of my three battalions, into Cadiz, if I advanced with the third to Seville to join the fortieth regiment, thus making an equal division of my force. Colonel Roche was of opinion that this would be acceded to; and I, therefore, despatched him, as soon as possible, with a proposal to this effect to Mr. Frere. Though two battalions could not be considered a sufficient garrison, yet, from the evident popularity of our troops, and the speedy expecta-

tion of a reinforcement from England, I thought it would be extremely proper to make the trial. It also appeared to me that by advancing to Seville I should not run much risk of involving those two battalions in any operations before the arrival of general Sherbrooke, which could embarrass him in the execution of the orders he might bring from home.

This proposition certainly exceeded any thing authorized by my instructions, but, I trust, the circumstances will be found to warrant it.

After colonel Roche's departure for Seville, Captain Kelly returned from thence, on the 26th, with a verbal confidential message from Mr. Frere, stating that marshal Soult was marching from Galicia into Portugal, in three columns, and that Mr. Frere would write to me by express, or by next post. On the 27th, I received this promised letter, enclosing the copy of an intercepted letter from Soult to Joseph Buonaparte; and Mr. Frere expresses his opinion that my detachment may now be more useful in Portugal than at Cadiz.

Knowing, as I did before I left Lisbon, that every proper step was taking for evacuating Portugal, in case of necessity, and that nothing else than succours from home could enable sir John Cradock to hold his ground there, it became more than ever necessary to ascertain whether his army will be received into Cadiz, in case of the evacuation of Portugal. In case the present negotiation succeeded, I had arranged with admiral Purvis to send a frigate with the intelligence to Lisbon immediately. If it failed, every thing was in readiness to sail with the detachment thither: for, although the assistance I should bring might not be sufficient of itself to make any alteration in the resolutions already taken, yet, if reinforcements arrived from England, we should be a welcome addition.

On the morning of the 2d of March I received a letter from colonel Roche, dated February 28, stating that my proposition had not yet been decided on, but that it would be taken into consideration that day. He expressed much apprehension of a party in the French interest.

The morning of the 3d having passed without any letter from Mr. Frere or colonel Roche, as I had been assured by the latter I should receive, at furthest by the post of that morning, I despatched another courier, dreading some accident. In the afternoon, however, I received a long and important letter from Mr. Frere, from which I concluded the negotiation had failed (although he did not say so in terms;) and a letter I received shortly afterwards from colonel Roche confirmed this failure. Mr. Frere's letter entered very minutely into the state of the Spanish and French armies; mentioned the failure of Soult's attempt to penetrate into Portugal by the Minho, and the improbability of his persisting in it, from the position of the Spanish army, assisted by the Portuguese. He then points out, in strong terms, the essential use my detachment would be of at Tarragona, in giving spirit and vigour to the cause in that country, where it is most in need of support.

As the return of my detachment to Portugal, except in the case of resisting the enemy, would not have a favourable appearance; and the proceeding to Tarragona would so evidently show our determination to support the general cause, and leave the Spanish government without an excuse afterwards for refusing to admit our troops into Cadiz, it was my intention to have complied with Mr. Frere's solicitations, as the employment of my detachment on the seacoast would easily admit of its being afterwards withdrawn, without committing any other British force for its support; and the motives urged by Mr. Frere

were so strong, that I scarcely thought myself vindicable in hesitating to comply.

I accordingly wrote on the night of the 3d March to this effect to Mr. Frere, sir J. Cradock, and lord Castlereagh. But on the 4th, in the evening, Captain Cooke, of the Coldstream guards, arrived from England with despatches from general Shérbrooke, who had not yet arrived. Captain Cooke came in the Eclair brig of war, and had stopped at Lisbon, which he again left on the evening of the 2d, and brought me a message to the following purport from sir J. Cradock, viz. "That he was determined to defend Portugal to the utmost of his power; that in this situation he considered my detachment as the choice part of his little army; that the enemy were actually on the borders, though there was not yet any intelligence of their having entered Portugal; and that unless some extraordinary circumstance, of which he could form no idea, prevented it, he should look for my immediate return to Lisbon."

This order, of course, put an end to all further deliberation. The idea of proceeding to Tarragona was abandoned. I wrote to this effect to Mr. Frere, and embarked at midnight on the 4th. Contrary winds detained in Cadiz harbour the whole of the 5th, but on the 6th the fleet sailed, and arrived in the Tagus on the 12th.

I trust, in the whole of these proceedings, in a very intricate and delicate situation, an honest and anxious desire has been evinced on my part, to accomplish the object of my mission; the failure of which, I am persuaded, will be found to arise from the apprehensions and disunion of the central junta, and not from the inclinations of the people at Cadiz.

(Signed)

J. R. MACKENZIE,
Major-General.

Lisbon, March 13, 1809.



No. VIII.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO SIR J. CRADOCK.

Lisbon, April 23.

Mr. Villiers will have informed you of my arrival here yesterday, and of the concurrence of my opinion with that which you appear to entertain in respect to the further movements to the northward. I conclude that you will have determined to halt the army at Leyria. I think that, before any further steps are taken in respect to Soult, it would be desirable to consider the situation of Victor; how far he is enabled to make an attack upon Portugal, and the means of defence of the east of Portugal while the British will be to the northward, and, eventually, the means of defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, in case this attack should be made upon the country.

All these subjects must have been considered by you; and I fear, in no very satisfactory light, as you appear to have moved to the northward unwillingly: and I should be glad to talk them over with you.

In order to consider of some of them, and to make various arrangements, which can be made only here, I have requested marshal Beresford to come here, if he should not deem his absence from the Portuguese troops, in the present state, likely to be disadvantageous to the public service; and I have directed him to let you know whether he will come or not.

It might, probably, also be more agreeable and convenient to you to see me here than with the army; and if this should be the case, it would be a most convenient arrange-

ment to me to meet you here. I beg, however, that you will consider this proposition only in a view to your own convenience and wishes. If you should, however, choose to come, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will bring with you the adjutant-general and quarter-master-general, the chief engineer and the commanding officer of the artillery, and the commissary.

Ever yours, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

N. B. Some paragraphs of a private nature are omitted.

EXTRACTS OF A LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

Lisbon, April 24, 1809.

"I arrived here on Saturday, and found that sir John Cradock and general Beresford had moved up the country, to the northward, with the troops under their command respectively; the former to Leyria, and the latter to Thomar. Sir John Cradock, however, does not appear to have entertained any decided intention of moving forward; on the contrary, indeed, he appears, by his letters to Mr. Villiers, to have intended to go no further till he should hear that Victor's movements were decided, and, therefore, I consider affairs in this country to be exactly in the state in which, if I found them, it was the intention of the king's minister that I should assume the command; and, accordingly, I propose to assume it as soon as I shall communicate with sir John Cradock. I have written to him, and to general Beresford, to apprise him that I conceive advantage will result from our meeting here, and I expect them both here as soon as possible. In respect to the enemy, Soult is still at Oporto, and he has not pushed his posts to the southward further than the river Vouga. He has nothing in Tras os Montes since the loss of Chaves, of which you have been most probably apprized; but he has some posts on the river Tamega, which divides that province from Minho, and it is supposed that he wishes to reserve for himself the option of retreating through Tras os Montes into Spain, if he should find it necessary. General Silveira, with a Portuguese corps, is in Tras os Montes, but I am not acquainted with its strength or its composition. General Lapisse, who commands the French corps which, it was supposed, when I left England, was marching from Salamanca into Portugal, has turned off to his left, and has marched along the Portuguese frontier to Alcantara, where he crossed the Tagus, and thence he went to Merida, on the Guadiana, where he is in communication with, indeed I may say, part of the army of Victor; he has an advanced post at Montejo, nearer to the Portuguese frontier than Merida. Victor has continued at Medellin since the action with Cuesta; he is either fortifying that post, or making an entrenched camp there. Cuesta is at Llerena, collecting a force again, which, it is said, will soon be twenty-five thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, a part of them good troops; I know nothing of the marquis de la Romana, or of anything to the northward of Portugal. I intend to move upon Soult, as soon as I can make some arrangements upon which I can depend for the defence of the Tagus, either to impede or delay Victor's progress, in case he should come in while I am absent. I should prefer an attack upon Victor, in concert with Cuesta, if Soult was not in possession of a fertile province of this kingdom and of the favourite town of Oporto, of which it is most desirable to deprive him; and if any operation upon Victor, connected with Cuesta's movements, did not require time to

concert it, which may as well be employed in dislodging Soult from the north of Portugal. If Soult should go, I think it most advisable, for many reasons, in which I need not enter at present, to act upon the defensive in the north of Portugal, and to bring the British army to the eastern frontier. If the light brigade should not have left England, when you receive this letter, I trust that you will send them off without loss of time; and I request you to desire the officer commanding them to endeavour to get intelligence, as he will go along the coast, particularly at Aveiro and the mouth of the Mondego; and I wish that he should stop at the latter place for orders, if he should find that the British army is engaged in operations to the northward, and if he should not already have received orders at Aveiro. The twenty-third dragoons might also receive directions to a similar purport. The hussars, I conclude, have sailed before this time. We are much in want of craft here; now that we are going to carry on an operation to the northward constant convoys will be necessary, and the admiral does not appear to have the means in his power of supplying all that is required of him. The twenty-fourth regiment arrived this day, &c. &c.

(Signed) "ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

LETTER FROM SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

Abrantes, June 22, 1809.

MY LORD,

When I wrote to you last I was in hopes that I should have marched before this time, but the money is not yet arrived. Things are in their progress as they were when I wrote on the 17th. The French are continuing their retreat. Sebastiani has also fallen back towards Toledo, and Venegas has advanced, and Cuesta had his headquarters at Truxillo, on the 19th. I am apprehensive that you will think I have delayed my march unnecessarily since my arrival upon the Tagus. But it was, and is, quite impossible to move without money. Not only were the officers and soldiers in the greatest distress, and the want of money the cause of many of the disorders of which I have had occasion to complain; but we can no longer obtain the supplies of the country, or command its resources for the transport of our own supplies either by land or by water. Besides this, the army required rest, after their expedition to the frontiers of Galicia, and shoes, and to be furnished up in different ways; and I was well aware that, if necessity had not obliged me to halt at the present moment, I should have been compelled to make a longer halt some time hence. To all this add, that, for some time after I came here, I believed that the French were retiring, (as appears by my letters to your lordship,) and that I should have no opportunity of striking a blow against them, even if I could have marched. I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for money; not only am I in want, but the Portuguese government, to whom Mr. Villiers says that we owe £125,000. I repeat, that we must have £200,000 a month, from England, till I write you that I can do without it; in which sum I include £40,000 a month for the Portuguese government, to pay for twenty thousand men. If the Portuguese government are to receive a larger sum from Great Britain, the sum to be sent to Portugal must be proportionably increased. Besides this, money must be sent to pay the Portuguese debt and our debts in Portugal. There are, besides, debts of sir John Moore's army still due

in Spain, which I am called upon to pay. In short, we must have £125,000, and £200,000 a month, reckoning from the beginning of May, &c. &c.

(Signed)

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

Badajos, October 30, 1809.

MY LORD,

I have had the honor of receiving your excellency's despatch, (marked I.) of the 17th instant, containing a copy of your note to M. de Garay, of the 8th of September; and a copy of his note, in answer to your excellency, of the 3d of October.

I am not surprised that M. de Garay should endeavour to attribute to the irregularities of the English commissariat the deficiencies of supplies and means of transport experienced by the British army in its late service in Spain; I am not disposed to justify the English commissariat where they deserve blame; but I must think it but justice to them to declare that the British army is indebted to their exertions for the scanty supplies it received.

From some of the statements contained in M. de Garay's note it would appear that the British army had suffered no distress during the late service; others have a tendency to prove that great distress was suffered, at a very early period, by both armies; particularly the quotation of a letter from general Cuesta, of the 1st of August, in answer to a complaint which I am supposed to have made, that the Spanish troops and *their prisoners* were better supplied than the British army. The answer to all these statements is a reference to the fact that the army suffered great distress for want of provisions, forage, and means of equipment; and, although that distress might have been aggravated, it could not have been occasioned by the inexperience or irregularity of the English commissariat.

I know nothing of the orders which M. de Garay states were sent by the government to the different provincial juntas, to provide provisions and means of transport for the British army on its passage through the different towns in the provinces. If such orders were sent, it was obvious, that the central junta, as a government, have no power or influence over the provincial juntas and magistrates, to whom their orders were addressed, as they produced no effect; and the supplies, such as they were, were procured only by the requisitions and exertions of the English commissaries. But it is obvious, from M. de Garay's account of these orders, that the central junta had taken a very erroneous view of the operations to be carried on by the army, and of the provision to be made for the troops, while engaged in those operations. The government provided, by their orders, for the troops only while on their passage through the towns; relying upon their immediate success, and making no provision for the collection of one body, of not less than fifty thousand men, even for one day. At the same time, that they were guilty of this unpardonable omission, which paralyzed all our efforts, they rendered that success doubtful, by countermanding the orders given to general Venegas by general Cuesta, and thus exposing the combined armies to a general action with the enemy's concentrated force. The effect of their orders will appear more fully in the following detail:—

As soon as the line of my operations in Spain was decided, I sent a commissary to Ciudad Rodrigo, to endeavour

to procure mules to attend the army, in concert with don Lozano des Torres, that city and its neighbourhood being the places in which the army commanded by the late sir John Moore had been most largely supplied. M. de Garay expresses the astonishment of the government, that the British army should have entered Spain unprovided with the means of transport, notwithstanding that a few paragraphs preceding this expression of astonishment, he informs your excellency, in the name of the government, that they had given orders to the provincial juntas of Badajoz and Castile (at Ciudad Rodrigo) and the magistrates, to provide and supply us with the means which, of course, they must have been aware that we should require. No army can carry on its operations if unprovided with means of transport; and the British army was, from circumstances, particularly in want at that moment.

The means of transport, commonly used in Portugal, are carts, drawn by bullocks, which are unable, without great distress, to move more than twelve miles in a day, a distance much shorter than that, which the state of the country in which the army was to carry on operations in Spain, and the nature of the country, would oblige the army to march. The number of carts which we had been able to bring from Portugal was not sufficient to draw our ammunition, and there were none to carry provisions.

Having failed in procuring, at Ciudad Rodrigo and in the neighbourhood, the means of transport which I required, I wrote to general O'Donaghue, on the 16th of July, a letter, in which after stating our wants and the failure of the country in supplying them, I gave notice that if they were not supplied I should discontinue my co-operation with general Cuesta, after I should have performed my part in the first operation which we had concerted, viz. the removal of the enemy from the Alberche; and, if not supplied as I required, I should eventually withdraw from Spain altogether. From this letter of the 16th July, it will appear, that I called for the supplies, and gave notice that I should withdraw from Spain, if they were not furnished, not only long previous to the retreat across the Tagus of the 4th of August, but even previous to the commencement of the operations of the campaign.

Notwithstanding that this letter of the 16th of July was communicated to the central junta, both by Mr. Frere and general Cuesta, the British army has, to this day, received no assistance of this description from Spain, excepting twenty carts, which joined at Merida, ten on the 30th of August, and ten on the 2d of September; and about three hundred mules of about five hundred, which were hired at Bejar, and joined at a subsequent period. None of the mules stated to have been hired and despatched to the army from Seville, or by Igea or Cevallos, or the two brigades of forty each, or the horses, have ever joined the British army; and I conclude, that they are with the Spanish army of Estremadura, as are the remainder of the (one hundred) ten brigades of carts which were intended and are marked for the British army. But none of these mules or carts, supposing them to have been sent from Seville for our use, reached Estremadura till after the 21st of August, the day on which, after five weeks' notice, I was obliged to separate from the Spanish army.

It is not true, therefore, that my resolution to withdraw from Spain, as then carried into execution, was "sudden," or ought to have surprised the government: nor does it appear to have been perilous from what has since appeared in this part of Spain.

I ought, probably, on the 16th of July, to have determined to suspend all operations till the army should be sup-

plied with the means required; but having, on the 11th of July, settled with general Cuesta a plan of operations to be carried into execution by the armies under the command of general Venegas, general Cuesta, and myself, respectively, I did not think it proper to disappoint general Cuesta. I believed that general Venegas would have carried into execution that part of the plan of operations allotted to his army, although I was afterwards disappointed in that expectation; and I preferred that the British army should suffer inconvenience than that general Venegas's corps should be exposed alone to the attack of the enemy; and, above all, I was induced to hope that I should be supplied.

Accordingly, I marched, on the 18th of July, from Plasencia, the soldiers carrying on their backs their provisions to the 21st, on which day a junction was formed with general Cuesta's army; and, from that day to the 24th of August, the troops or their horses did not receive one regular ration. The irregularity and deficiency, both in quality and quantity, were so great, that I considered it a matter of justice to the troops to remit to them, during that period, half of the sum usually stopped from their pay for rations.

The forage for the horses was picked up for them by their riders wherever they could find it, and was generally wheat or rye, which are considered unwholesome food; and the consequence was that, exclusive of the loss by engaging with the enemy, the army lost, in the short period of five weeks, not less than one thousand five hundred horses.

I have no knowledge of what passed between general Cuesta and don Lozano des Torres and the intendant of provisions of the Spanish army. I never saw the latter gentleman excepting twice; the first time on the 22d of July, when he waited upon me to claim, for the Spanish army, sixteen thousand rations of bread which had been brought into Talavera, and had been sent to my quarters, and which were delivered over to him, notwithstanding that the British troops were in want; and the second time, on the 25th of July, when he waited upon me, also at Talavera, to desire that the ovens of that town might be delivered over for the use of the Spanish army, they having moved to St. Ollalla, and the British army being still at Talavera. This request, which was not complied with, is an example of the preference which was given to the British troops while they were in Spain.

The orders stated to have been given by the central to the provincial juntas and magistrates, were not more effectual in procuring provisions than in procuring means of transport. In the interval between the 15th and 21st of July, the British commissaries had made contracts with the magistrates in the different villages of the Vera de Plasencia, a country abounding in resources of every description, for the delivery at Talavera, on different days before the 24th of July, of two hundred and fifty thousand rations of provisions. These contracts were not performed; the British army was consequently unable to move in pursuit of the enemy when he retired on that day; and, I conclude, that the French army have since subsisted on these resources.

The British army never received any salt meat, nor any of the rice or other articles stated to have been sent from Seville for their use, excepting to make up the miserable ration by which the men were only prevented from starving during the period to which I have adverted; nor was it attended by the troop of biscuit bakers, nor did it enjoy any of the advantages of their labours, nor was the supposed magazine of four hundred thousand pounds of biscuit ever performed. These are notorious facts, which cannot be disputed, of the truth of which every officer and soldier

in the army can bear testimony. I assure your excellency, that not only have the supplies furnished to the army under my command been paid for whenever the bills for them could be got in, but the old debts due to the inhabitants for supplies furnished to the army, under the command of the late sir John Moore, have been discharged; and I have repeatedly desired the Spanish agents, and others acting with the army, and the different juntas with which I have communicated, to let the people know that all demands upon the British government, which could be substantiated, would be discharged.

I beg to refer your excellency to my despatches of the 21st of August, No. 12, for an account of the state of the magazine at Truxillo, on the 20th of August. Of the state of supplies and provisions at that period, lieutenant-colonel Waters had, by my desire, made an arrangement with the Spanish commissariat for the division of the magazine at Truxillo between the two armies; and he as well as I was satisfied with the principle and detail of that arrangement. But if the British army received only one-third of a ration on the 18th of August, and only one-half of a ration on the 19th, not of bread, but of flour; if the horses of the army received nothing; and if the state of the magazine at Truxillo was such, at that time, as to hold out no hope, not of improvement, (for it was too late to wait for improvement,) but of a full and regular supply of provisions and forage of all descriptions, I was justified in withdrawing from Spain. In point of fact, the magazine at Truxillo, which, under the arrangement made by lieutenant-colonel Waters was to be the sole source of the supply to both armies, did not contain, on the 20th of August, a sufficiency to supply one day's demand upon it.

But it is said that M. de Calvo promised and engaged to supply the British army; upon which I have only to observe that I had trusted too long to the promises of the Spanish agents, and that I had particular reason for want of confidence in M. de Calvo; as, at the moment he was assuring me that the British army should have all the provisions the country could afford, in preference to, and to the exclusion of the Spanish army, I had in my possession an order from him, (of which your excellency has a copy,) addressed to the magistrates of Guadalupe, directing him to send to the head-quarters of the Spanish army provisions which a British commissary had ordered to be prepared and sent to the magazines at Truxillo, to be divided between both armies, in conformity to the agreement entered into with the Spanish commissaries by lieutenant-colonel Waters.

As the state of the magazine at Truxillo was the immediate cause (as far as the want of provisions went) of my withdrawing from Spain, I beg to observe to your excellency that I was not mistaken in my opinion of its insufficiency; as, if I am not misinformed, general Eguia's army suffered the greatest distress in the neighbourhood of Truxillo, even after that part of the country and the magazines had been relieved from the burthen of supporting the British army.

In respect to the conduct of the operations in Spain by the Spanish general officers, many things were done of which I did not approve; some contrary to my expectations, and some contrary to positive agreements.

M. de Garay has stated that the orders of the marquis de Romana were framed in conformity with suggestions from marshal Beresford; and thence he infers that the operations of that corps were approved of by me.

The marquis de Romana was still at Coruna on the 5th, and I believe as late as the 9th of August; and the armies

of Estremadura retired across the Tagus on the 4th of August. This reference to dates shews that there was, and could have been no connexion in the operations of those different armies. In fact, I knew nothing of the marquis of Romana's operations; and till I heard, on the 3d of August, that marshal Ney's corps had passed through the mountains of Estremadura at Banos, and was at Naval Moral, I did not believe that that part of the enemy's army had quitted Astorga, or that the marquis was at liberty, or had it in his power to quit Galicia.

Marshal Beresford's corps was collected upon the frontiers of Portugal in the end of July, principally for the purpose of forming the troops; and it was hoped he would keep in check the enemy's corps under Soult, which was at Zamora, and threatened Portugal; that he would act as a corps of observation in that quarter, and on the left of the British army; and I particularly requested marshal Beresford to attend to the Puerto de Perales. But I never intended, and never held out any hope to the Spanish officers that the corps under marshal Beresford could effect any operations at that period of the campaign, and never was a party to any arrangement of an operation in which that corps was to be concerned.

In the cases in which measures were carried on in a manner of which I did not approve, or which I did not expect, or contrary to the positive agreement, those who acted contrary to my opinion may have been right; but still they acted in a manner of which they were aware I did not approve: and the assertion in the note, that the operations were carried on with my concurrence, is unfounded.

I expected, from the communications I had with general Cuesta, through sir Robert Wilson and colonel Roche, that the Puerto de Banos would have been effectually occupied and secured; and, at all events, that the troops appointed to guard that point, upon which I was aware that all the operations, nay, the security, of the army depended, would not have retired without firing a shot.

It was agreed, between general Cuesta and me, on the 11th of July, that general Venegas, who was under his command, should march by Tembleque, Ocana, Puente Dueros, to Arganda, near Madrid; where he was to be on the 22d and 23d of July, when the combined armies should be at Talavera and Escala. This agreement was not performed, and the consequence of its non-performance (which had been foreseen) occurred; viz. that the combined armies were engaged with the enemy's concentrated force. I have heard that the cause of the non-performance of this agreement was that the central junta had countermanded the orders which general Venegas had received from general Cuesta; of which countermand they gave us no notice. I shall make no observation upon this proceeding, except that the plan of operations, as agreed upon with me, was not carried into execution, by general Venegas, in this instance.

It was agreed, by general Cuesta, on the 2d of August, that when I marched against Soult on the 3d, he would remain at Talavera. That agreement was broken when he withdrew from Talavera, in my opinion without sufficient cause. And it is also my opinion that he ought not to have withdrawn, particularly considering that he had the charge of my hospital, without my consent. I do not conceive that if general Cuesta had remained at Talavera, it would have made any difference in the result of the campaign. When Soult added thirty-four thousand to the numbers already opposed to the combined armies in Estremadura, the enemy was too strong for us; and it was necessary that we should retire across the Tagus. But if

general Cuesta had held the post of Talavera, according to agreement, I should have been able to remove my hospital, or, at least, to know the exact situation of every individual left there; and I think that other disadvantages might have been avoided in the retreat.

When adverting to this part of the subject, I cannot avoid to observe upon the ambiguity of language used in the note respecting the assistance afforded by general Cuesta to remove the hospital from Talavera. That assistance amounted to four carts on the 4th of August, at Oropesa. In the subsequent removal of the wounded, and of the men subsequently taken sick, we had absolutely no assistance from the Spanish army or the country. We were obliged to lay down our ammunition, which was delivered over to the Spanish army, and to unload the treasure, and employ the carts in the removal of the wounded and sick. At Truxillo, in particular, assistance which could have been afforded was withheld, on the 22d and 23d of August, M. de Calvo and don Lozano de Torres being in town.

In respect to the refusal to make movements recommended by me, I am of opinion that if general Bassecourt had been detached towards Plasencia on the 30th of July, when I recommended that movement, and if the troops had done their duty, Soult would have been stopped at the Tietar, at least for a sufficient length of time to enable me to secure the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz; and here again the hospital would have been saved.

He was not detached, however, till the 2d; and then I understood, from M. de Garay's note, that it was general Cuesta's opinion that the movement was useless.

It could not have been considered as useless by general Cuesta on the 30th, because the proposition for making a detachment from the combined armies originated with himself on that day; and it could not have been considered as useless even on the morning of the 2d, as, till the evening of that day, we did not receive intelligence of the arrival of Soult at Plasencia. A reference to the date of the period at which the general considered this detachment as useless would have been desirable.

I cannot account for the surprise stated to have been felt by general Cuesta upon finding the British army at Oropesa on the morning of the 4th of August. The army had left Talavera on the morning of the 3d, and had marched to Oropesa, six leagues, or twenty-four miles, on that day; which I conceive a sufficient distance for a body of men which had been starving for many days before. The accounts received, on the evening of the 3d, of the enemy's position at Naval Moral, and of his strength, and of general Cuesta's intended march on that evening, leaving my hospital to its fate, were sufficient to induce me to pause and consider our situation, and, at least not to move before daylight on the 4th; shortly after which time, general Cuesta arrived at Oropesa.

Upon considering our situation at that time, it was evident to me that the combined armies must retire across the Tagus, and that every moment's delay must expose them to the risk of being cut off from their only remaining point of retreat. A battle, even if it had been successful, could not have improved our situation; two battles, or probably three, must have been fought and gained before our difficulties, resulting from the increased strength of the enemy in Estremadura, could be removed. I did not consider the British army, at least, equal to such an exertion at that moment. It is unnecessary to make any observation upon the Spanish army; but the occurrences at Arzobispo, a few days afterwards, shewed that they were not equal to any great contest.

M. de Garay complains of the alteration in the line of our operations, and of the sudden changes in the direction of our marches, to which he attributes the deficiency of our supplies, which, in this part of the note, he is disposed to admit that the British army experienced. I know of but one alteration in the plan of operations and in the direction of the march, which was occasioned by the circumstances to which I have just referred.

When intelligence was first received of the arrival of the enemy at Plasencia, and of the retreat, without resistance, of the corps appointed to guard the Puerto de Banos, my intention was to move towards Plasencia, to attack the enemy's corps which had passed through the Puerto. That intention was altered only when I heard of the numbers of which that corps consisted; and when I found that, by general Cuesta's movement from Talavera, the rear of the army was not secure, that the only retreat was liable to be cut off, and that the enemy had it in their power, and at their option, to join or to attack us in separate bodies.

It could not be attributed to me, that this large reinforcement was allowed to enter Estremadura, or that we had not earlier intelligence of their approach.

The Puerto de Banos was abandoned, without firing a shot, by the Spanish troops sent there to guard it; and the junta of Castile, if they knew of the collection of the enemy's troops at Salamanca, sent no notice of it; and no notice was in fact received, till the accounts arrived that the enemy had ordered rations at Fuente Noble and Los Santos; and they arrived on the following day. But when the enemy arrived at Naval Moral, in Estremadura, in such strength, and the post of Talavera was abandoned, the central junta will find it difficult to convince this country and the world that it was not expedient to alter the plan of our operations and the direction of our march.

But this alteration, instead of aggravating the deficiency of our supplies, ought to have alleviated our distresses, if any measures had been adopted at Seville to supply the British army, in consequence of my letter of the 16th July. The alteration was from the offensive to the defensive; the march was retrograde; and if any supplies had been prepared and sent, the army must have met them on the road, and must have received them sooner. Accordingly we did meet supplies on the road, but they were for the Spanish army; and although our troops were starving at the time, they were forwarded, untouched, to their destination.

I have sent to marshal Beresford a copy of that part of M. de Garay's note which refers to the supplies for the Portuguese army under his command, upon which he will make his observations, which I propose to forward to your excellency. I shall here, therefore, only repeat that the want of magazines, and the apathy and disinclination of the magistrates and people in Spain to furnish supplies for the armies, even for payment, were the causes that the Portuguese army, as well as the British army, suffered great distress from want, while within the Spanish frontier.

Till the evils, of which I think I have reason to complain, are remedied, till I shall see magazines established for the supply of the armies, and a regular system adopted for keeping them filled, and an army, upon whose exertions I can depend, commanded by officers capable and willing to carry into execution the operations which may have been planned by mutual agreement, I cannot enter upon any system of co-operation with the Spanish armies. I do not think it necessary now to enter into any calculations to shew the fallacy of M. de Garay's calculations of the relative numerical strength of the allies, and of the enemy, in the Peninsula; if the fallacy was not so great, as I am certain it is, I should

be of the same opinion, respecting the expediency of co-operating with the Spanish troops. But if the British and the Portuguese armies should not actively co-operate with them, they will at least do them no injury; and if M. de Garay is not mistaken, as I believe he is, in his calculations of numbers; and if the Spanish armies are in a state of efficiency in which they are represented to be, and which they ought to be, to invite our co-operation, the deficiency of thirty-six thousand men, which the British and Portuguese armies might add to their numbers, can be no objection to their undertaking, immediately, the operations which M. de Garay is of opinion would give to his countrymen the early possession of those blessings for which they are contending.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

WELLINGTON.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL HILL TO SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Camp, August 17, 1809.

SIR,

I beg leave to report to you that the parties sent out by the officers of my division, yesterday, to procure forage, were, in more instances than one, opposed by the Spaniards. The following circumstances have been made known to me, and I take the liberty of repeating them for your excellency's information.

My servants were sent about three leagues on the Truxillo road, in order to get forage for me; and after gathering three mule loads, a party of Spanish soldiers, consisting of five or six, came up to them with their swords drawn, and obliged them to leave the corn they had collected. My servants told me, that the same party fired two shots towards other British men employed in getting forage. The assistant commissary of my division likewise states to me, that the men he sent out for forage were fired at by the Spaniards.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

R. HILL, major-general.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL STOPFORD TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SHERBROOKE.

Jaraceijo, August 16, 1809.

SIR,

I beg leave to inform you that I have just received intimations of some Spaniards having fired at some of the guards, for taking some forage. As there is no forage given us by the commissary, I wish to know what I am to do, in order to get some for the horses.

(Signed) E. STOPFORD, second brigade of guards.

No. IX.

LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL F. PONSONBY TO COLONEL NAPIER.

AFTER the very handsome manner in which you have mentioned my name, in your account of the battle of Talavera, it may appear extraordinary that I should trouble you with this letter; but my silence might be interpreted into the wish of taking praise to myself which I do not deserve.

The whole of your account of the charge made by general Anson's brigade is substantially correct; you have

given the reason for it, and the result; but there are two points, in the detail, which are inaccurate. The first affecting the German hussars; the other respecting myself.

The Germans, on the left of the twenty-third, could not reach the French columns, from the impracticability of the ravine where they charged; this I ascertained, by personal observation, the following day; the obstacle was much less serious where the twenty-third attacked, headed by general Anson and colonel Seymour. The mountain torrent, which gradually decreased as it descended into the plain, was about thirty yards in front of the enemy, and the twenty-third, though much broken in passing this obstacle, charged up to the columns, and was repulsed, no rally could be attempted; but the right squadron, under captain Drake, having an easier passage of the ravine, and no French column immediately in front, passed through the intervals, and caused much confusion, which, together with the delay occasioned by the charge, prevented the masses of infantry which were in readiness on the French right flank, from joining in the general attack on our line.

You will perceive that this account, which I believe to be the exact truth, does not, in the slightest degree, affect the accuracy of your description of the movement; but, if I am correct, it proves that the Germans were obliged to halt by an insuperable difficulty, and that I had no particular merit in the execution of the charge of the twenty-third.

Believe me

Very sincerely yours,

F. PONSONBY.

Malta, Dec. 30, 1829.

No. X.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

SECTION 1.

"November 30, 1809.

"I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army with the corps of the duke of Albuquerque and the duke Del Parque in this plan of diversion.

"Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his majesty's ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that I could have encouraged the advance of general Areizaga, or could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army.

"The first official information which I had from the government of the movement of general Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which I now enclose a copy.

"I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his march from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the Spanish ministers and members of the junta, I communicated to them my conviction that general Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of fifty thousand men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated, and, accordingly, your lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the government began to think it necessary to endeavour to make a diversion in favour of general Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the general's own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant."—"I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the

British army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any important object, and which best answers for my future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have requested Mr. Frere to urge the government to reinforce the duke D'Albuquerque's corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move."

SECTION 2.

"December 7, 1809.

"——I had urged the Spanish government to augment the army of the duke D'Albuquerque to twenty thousand men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the duke D'Albuquerque which I had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the duke Del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the government have given orders to the duke D'Albuquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it."

SECTION 3.

"January 31, 1810.

"——There is no doubt that, if the enemy's reinforcements have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making a diversion in favour of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the enclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Frere, have obliged me to refrain from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances will permit."

SECTION 4.

"January 12, 1811.

"My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least some days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry."

SECTION 5.

"January 19, 1811.

"At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville general Ballasteros received an order from the Regency, dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condado de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza."

"The circumstances which I have above related will show your lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with corps so ill organised, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence which general Mendizabal received of the assembly of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the Regency, to detach general Ballasteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville."

SECTION 6.

"February 2, 1811.

"The various events of the war will have shown your lordship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any other nation (ten thousand) were to be employed on this operation, (the opening the communication with Badajos,) I should have no doubt of their success, or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on this service."

SECTION 7.

"February 9, 1811.

"General Mendizabal has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late marquess De la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I don't believe that the strength of the enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos, and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year."

SECTION 8.

"February 23, 1811.

"Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, if the misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-general Madden did every-

thing in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain." "The operations of the Guerillas continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one."

SECTION 9.

"March 21, 1811.

"It (Campa Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the marquis of Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honourable engagements to defend the place into which the marquis entered when it was delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that marshal Bessieres has collected at Zamora about seven thousand men, composed principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castile. He thus threatens an attack upon Galicia, in which province there are, I understand, sixteen thousand men under general Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that general will make no defence, and that Galicia will fall into the hands of the enemy."

SECTION 10.

"May 7, 1811.

"Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I don't know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the prince regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing proposed for the increase of the resources of the government, and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged."

"I have not received the consent of Castanos and Blake to the plan of co-operation which I proposed for the siege of Badajos; and I have been obliged to write to marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence."

"Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some resources from the country and some assistance from the Spanish armies."

SECTION 11.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM MR. STUART TO LORD WELLESLEY, RELATIVE TO DISPUTES WITH THE PATRIARCH AND SOUZA.

"Sept. 8, 1810.

"I could have borne all this with patience, if not accompanied by a direct proposal that the fleet and transports

should quit the Tagus, that the Regency should send an order to marshal Beresford to dismiss his quarter-master-general and military secretary, followed by a reflection on the persons composing the family of that officer, and by hints to the same purpose respecting the Portuguese who are attached to lord Wellington."

SECTION 12.

LETTER FROM SIR JOHN MOORE TO MAJOR-GENERAL M'KENZIE, COMMANDING IN PORTUGAL.

Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.

SIR,

The armies of Spain, commanded by generals Castanos and Blake, the one in Biscay, the other in Arragon, have been beaten and dispersed. This renders my junction with sir David Baird's corps impracticable; but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against this country; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head against it.

I have ordered sir David Baird to fall back on Coruna, re-embark, and proceed to the Tagus; I myself, with the corps which marched from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and by taking up such positions, as offer, endeavour to defend, for a time, the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now with you and that which I am bringing.

We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence; colonel Murray wrote on this subject to colonel Donkin yesterday, that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired sir D. Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to send her there. On the subject of provisions the commissary-general will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the Tras os Montes. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had better remain at Lisbon; but if he does not write to him, this, together with colonel Murray's letter to colonel Donkin, will be sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies of the country for ourselves and horses, &c. In order to alarm as little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from England, to join us through Portugal; this will do at first, but gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. MOORE.

P. S. Elvas should be provisioned.

No. XI.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON.

SECTION I.

Celerico, May 11, 1810.

"—— I observe that the minister don Miguel Forjas considers the inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing you, as of ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and, however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the regency and the ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. I have no doubt of the ability or the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties rather than to their private interests in this time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty, and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is in vain to expect any serious or continued exertion in the country, and the regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of his majesty's government, which I have communicated to them, that the continuance of his majesty's assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. I have to mention, however, that, since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay. I enclose

a proclamation which I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as follow:—1st, refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2dly, refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy; 3dly, disobedience of the orders of the magistrate to proceed to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, &c.; 4th, desertion from the service either with or without carriages, &c.; 5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows:—1st, disobedience of the orders of their superiors; 2d, inactivity in the execution of them; 3d, receiving bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them."

SECTION 2.

LORD WELLINGTON TO M. FORJAS.

Gouvea, September 6, 1810.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

I have received your letter of the first of this month, informing me that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined, after the most serious deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the prince regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shews to be the only one likely to produce a good end.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

SECTION 3.

Gouvea, September 7, 1810.

—— In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that *I will not stay* in the country, and that I will advise the king's government to withdraw the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointment of marshal Beresford's staff, for

which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I propose, also, to report to his majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago, and marshal Beresford did not write to government upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, laying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavour to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of the enemy's force in the country. But it appears that the government have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call; and if I had, the cause would now have been safe; and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the government; and, as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the prince regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter that you may think proper to the regency.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

SECTION 4.

Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810.

— You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all the principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent having entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations, I will not suffer them, or any body else, to interfere with them. That I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz. to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the gov-

ernment; that, being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I have obtained his majesty's leave to resign my charge, if principal Souza is to remain either a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I will; and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3d, which I have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that instead of endeavouring to render all further defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure.

WELLINGTON.

P. S.—All I ask from the Portuguese Regency is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but, as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands.

SECTION 5.

Pero Negro, October 28, 1810.

The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are still on the island, and most probably the secretary of state, Don M. Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature; first, they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon information that they are absent from their corps without leave; secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and, lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them to call for the names of those officers and soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments or militia, to disgrace one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and send these men to serve with any of the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures without favour or distinction of any individuals in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws *bona fide* upon the subject; and I shall be satisfied of their good

intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but, if we are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the head of the government, with laws and power to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be false, that they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects in the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial of these deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and soldiers at great inconvenience for the purpose, cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or number of them. The defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the Prince Regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there was no law for the government of the army than that the existing laws should continue without being executed."——

"WELLINGTON."

SECTION 6.

"October 29, 1810.

"——In answer to lord Wellesley's queries respecting the Portuguese Regency, my opinion is that the Regency ought to be appointed by the Prince Regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short, every power which the prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The prince ought to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal not recommended by the Regency. The smaller the number of persons composing the Regency the better; but my opinion is that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it excepting principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. If we should succeed in removing the

principal (which *must* be done,) I think the patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. If there is I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to interfere themselves, or that the Prince Regent should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the part of the Regency or any body else. I should like to see principal Souza's detailed instructions for his "*embuscados*" on the left bank of the Tagus. If principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government, is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but, instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost, because the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, everything which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. In answer to M. de Forjas' note of the 22d, enclosed in yours, (without date,) I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army excepting by the commissary-general, and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese government, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders; or the regiment, or where they are stationed; but this they will never do. All that we can do with the carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, &c. many articles required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this must be left to the commissary-general of the army, under a recommendation to him, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to frame them as they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point."

"WELLINGTON."

SECTION 9.

"*Pero Negro*, October 31, 1810.

"——I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as the desertion of the militia. The *ordenanza* artillery now begin to desert from the works, although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No.—, of 29th, is strictly true in all its parts, the French could not have staid here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places from which there existed means of remov-

ing everything, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually ; in front all the roads are occupied, and they can get nothing from their rear ; but all the military arrangements which have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly."

" WELLINGTON."

SECTION 8.

Pera Negro, November 1, 1810.

" I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying those orders. The fact is that the government, after the appointment of principal Souza to be a member of the Regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz. that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing, with me, the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco he must have been in his present situation long before the order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that I was the author of that measure, and the government might have sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob of Lisbon. I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment by the secretary of state that the measure should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in Upper Beira, notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service, not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind ; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered useless. But

there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks ; the inhabitants have fled from their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the government ; but they have left behind them every thing that could be useful to the enemy, and could subsist their army, and all the mills untouched ; accordingly, the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military body ; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the difference of a measure, adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment ; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the evil consequences of the ill fated propensity of the existing Portuguese Regency to seek popularity. In the same manner the other measure since recommended, viz. the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security has been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and has been adopted at last against their inclination ; as usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus, they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the ———, to which I propose to draw the attention of his royal highness the prince Regent and of his majesty's government. His royal highness and his majesty's government will then see in what manner the existing regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures from M. Forjas, shew the sense, which the regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to the Disembargador Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country, and principal Souza and other members of the Regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than I am. In this case they should desire his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it ; and the records of this government will shew what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their prince, to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the pleasure of receiving the support and co-operation of the government ; and I regret that his royal highness the prince regent should have been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to the

detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the ordenanca would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the ordenanca would disperse. The truth is that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different descriptions of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable, if the government would leave, exclusively, to marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment, which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenanca as usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their 3-pounders. These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations, who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus."

SECTION 9.

"December 5, 1810.

"All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: First, That, by my appointment of marshal-general of the Portuguese army with the same powers as those vested in the late duc de la Foens, I hold the command of the army independent of the local government of Portugal. Secondly, That, by the arrangements made by the governors of the kingdom with the king's government, when sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force. Thirdly, That, supposing that my appointment of marshal-general did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that, as commander-in-chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to; it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly, It never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss, which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation; and, undoubtedly, his majesty's government never intended to give over the British army to the government of the kingdom, to make ducks and drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation,

and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by me and marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.

"WELLINGTON."

SECTION 10.

"Cartaxo, January 18, 1811

"It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the Patriarch, in recent discussions at the meeting of the Regency. It appears that his eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, 'which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly, they can scarcely be deemed those of a ministerial council, but they are those of persons whom his royal highness the Prince Regent has called to govern his kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his eminence the Patriarch as one of those in-Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, provided the kingdom could preserve its independence; and, I think it most important that the British government, and the government of the Prince Regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we have been mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of his royal highness's armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the Patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the kingdom in 1809, and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio Salter de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom; and that he expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their parts, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system, for they abandoned all alliances and all political systems in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his eminence the Patriarch, and they called upon his majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal,

whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his majesty has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on 'the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' The patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions which have principally involved his country in the contest when he talks of discontinuing it, because, it has again, for the third time, been brought into 'the heart of the kingdom.' Although the patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made the seat of war which has since occurred, I admit that his eminence, or any of those members may fairly disapprove of the campaign, and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy's position in this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, as that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if my counsels had been followed these sufferings would at least have been alleviated, and I observe that is the first time I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had for its object the deliverance of the whole. The patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of these armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure all plans and systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment although all the corps are concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, by means of transport, easy, by the Tagus the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the

hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores, and funds, of the British army. It may likewise occur to his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should annihilate at one blow both army and expenditure. The objection then to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government, go to decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in any manner. By desiring his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of their armies, his eminence would endeavour to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the Patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of his majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds, to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the Regency, and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the prince regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I have given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the independence of his country.

"WELLINGTON."

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No. XII.

SECTION 1.

LETTER FROM LIEUT-GENERAL GRAHAM TO THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE HENRY WELLESLEY.

Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811.

SIR,

You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late expedition.

But a copy of a printed statement of general La Pena having been shewn to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence.

Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the earl of Liverpool, with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides.

Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I was most anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in an exhausted state, nor be exposed

to the attack of the enemy but when it was well collected ; and, in consequence of representations to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the 4th, was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near Conil ; to prepare which, staff officers, of both nations, were sent forward with a proper escort.

The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those frequent and harassing halts, which the necessity of groping for the way occasioned.

When the British division began its march from the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, *I left the general on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it* ; and, when I ordered the division to counter-march in the wood, I did so to support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack, which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be, and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army. The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions, (Walloon guards and Ciudad Real,) which had been detached from my division, brought them alone back from the wood ; but, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action.

Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse-artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to envelop the enemy's left ; had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what success might have been expected from such decisive movements ? The enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion ; a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit ; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on and would have done so trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour's ride of the scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing, *and nothing was done !* Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form any part of the general result of the transactions of the day ; it was an accidental feature ; it was the result of no combination, it was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff ; the British division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to justify my determination of declining any further co-operation in the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition ? I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself and the British division under the direction of the Spanish commander-in-chief in the field, (contrary to my instructions,) I should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But I have a right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from what it was ; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish

army the utmost efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprize, *had we been supported as we had a right to expect ?*

There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was within our grasp as it were.

The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty and independence ; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever be with them ; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one.

I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me, at head quarters, on the morning of the 6th, on knowing of my intention to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was *that the opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was lost* ; and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained.

In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper to remark on the report published relative to the enemy's number at St. Petri, (4500 men of Villat's division,) that, by the concurrent testimony of all the French officers here, general Villat's division had charge of the whole line,—what, then, must be the strength of that division to have afforded 4500 men to St. Petri alone ? In order to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the reports of various officers of this division.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed)

THOS. GRAHAM,
Lt.-General

P. S. I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the difficulty of conversing in a foreign language.

With this, I send you a sketch of the ground, &c. of the action of Barrosa ; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my judgment, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by making a direct attack through the wood on the Bermeja position, while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army.

SECTION 2.—BATTLE OF BARROSA.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF GENERAL FREDERICK PONSONBY.

"I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army. We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly abreast of our front line and about three hundred yards apart from it on our right flank, our line had just halted and the firing was gradually decreasing at the time we charged. I do not imagine the French dragoons much exceeded us in number, they behaved well, but if we had had half a dozen stout squadrons the mass of beaten infantry would not have returned to their camp."

SECTION 3.—BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM COLONEL LIGHT, SERVING IN THE 4TH DRAGOONS AT THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

"After our brigade of infantry, first engaged, were repulsed, I was desired by General D'Urban to tell the Count de Penne Villamur, to charge the lancers, and we all started, as I thought, to do the thing well; but when within a few paces of the enemy the whole pulled up, and there was no getting them farther; and in a few moments after I was left alone to run the gauntlet as well as I could."



No. XIII.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN SQUIRE, OF THE ENGINEERS.

SECTION 1.

"March 1, 1811.

"I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the mouth of the Zezere, for twenty-five guns! though we have only one brigade of nine pounders to arm them.

"Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries from the first, in my reports which were sent to lord Wellington, and now I verily believe the marshal himself is ashamed of their construction. Punhete, you know, is situated precisely at the confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, the enemy's bridge is about half a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile, by measurement, from the nearest of our heights, which we have crowned with an eight-gun battery."

SECTION 2.

"I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above Badajos. Don Carlos Espana, an active officer, whom I know very well, reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, who was playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, we'll go and look at it to-morrow! At day-break the Spanish army was surprised."

SECTION 3.

"May 17, 1811. I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, and was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made, however, no difficulties, and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at the full: our work was barely four hundred yards from Cristoval. In spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and shells, from various parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in completing our battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning of the 11th, at four a. m. its first fire was opened. The enemy's fire was, however, superior to our own, and before sunset, the three guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little attack was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, and we sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told the marshal, when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to fight our battery was a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, order us to desist till our guns were silenced. If doubt and in-

decision had not governed all our operations, and had we begun even on the night of the 9th, I am satisfied that our plan of attack was excellent, and that we should have entered the place on the 15th. It is true that two distant batteries were erected, on the left bank of the river, against the place, but they scarcely excited the enemy's attention, our little corps bore the brunt of the enemy's exertions, which were great and spirited. Including those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been from six to seven hundred men. Both officers and men were exhausted, mind and body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed."

SECTION 4.

Elvas, May 20, 1811.

"Had our operations been conducted with common activity and common judgment, Badajos would have been in our hands before the 15th of May. But what has been the fact? Our little corps on the Cristoval side was absolutely sacrificed. The whole fire and attention of Badajos was directed against our unsupported attack, and our loss in consequence was severe."—"Our operation before Cristoval was absurdly pressed forward *without any co-operation on the left bank of the river.* The marshal hesitated—delayed, and at last withdrew his troops at such a moment that he was scarcely time enough to meet the enemy in the field!"



No. XIV.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

Gibraltar, October 23, 1810.

"The troops at Malaga, with the exception of three hundred men, moved upon Fuengirola, of which lord Blaney was apprised; but, in place of his lordship taking advantage of this fortunate event, he wasted two days in a fruitless attack on the fort of Fuengirola, cannonading it from twelve-pounders, although he perceived that no impression had been made on it by the fire of the shipping and gun-boats, the artillery of which were double the calibre. In this situation he was surprised by an inferior force, and, whilst he was on board of a gun-boat, his guns taken, and the whole thrown into confusion; at this moment he was informed of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he retook his guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French cavalry to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave way, and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and the field."



No. XV.

SECTION 1.

SIEGE OF TARAGONA.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR C. COTTON.

Taragona, May 15, 1811.

"During the panic which seems to have prevailed upon the unexpected arrival of the French army, the greatest exertions and the most extensive sacrifices appear to have been readily submitted to. But from the present apathy and indifference in those who should set an example of activity, and from the general deficiency of ordnance stores.

by no means consider the place in that state of security which the strength of its works and position would otherwise lead me to expect."

"A well planned sortie was made yesterday, but failed through the backwardness of some of the officers employed in it."—"I had the satisfaction of being assured by an officer, who conspicuously did his duty on this occasion, and who was outflanked by the enemy, from the backwardness of the column directed to support him, that he attributes the salvation of his troops entirely to the fire from the shipping."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR C. COTTON.

"Blake, off Villa Nueva, June 15, 1811.

"Leaving Taragona on the 16th (May), we reached Peniscola in the forenoon of the 17th."—"From thence general Doyle wrote to general O'Donnel an account of the situation of Taragona and of my detaining captain Adam at Peniscola, in readiness to receive any reinforcement which he might be pleased to send to that garrison. Upon our arrival off Murviedro, we found general O'Donnel had already ordered the embarkation of two thousand three hundred infantry and two hundred and eleven artillery-men."—"Delivering to general O'Donnel two thousand stand of arms, accoutrements and clothing to enable him to bring into the field as many recruits already trained as would supply the place of the regular soldiers; thus detached from his army, we proceeded to Valencia and landed the remainder of our cargo, by which means the troops of general Villa Campa, then dispersed as peasantry for want of arms, were enabled again to take the field, and the corps of Mina and the Empecinado completed in all the requisites of active warfare."

"At Alicant we proceeded to take in as many necessary materials for Taragona as the ship would actually stow, besides eighty artillery-men and a considerable quantity of powder, ball-cartridge, &c. sent in the Paloma Spanish corvette from Carthage in company with a Spanish transport from Cadiz, deeply laden with similar supplies."

"After returning to Valencia, where we landed the additional arms, &c. for the Aragonese army, we moved on to Murviedro, where the conde of Bispal proceeded from Valencia to join us in a consultation with his brother, although, on account of his wound, he was very unfit for such a journey. The result of this conference was a determination on the part of general O'Donnel to commit to my protection, for the succour of Taragona, another division of his best troops under general Miranda, consisting of four thousand men, whilst he himself would move forward with the remainder of his army to the banks of the Ebro."

"The frequent disappointments which the brave Catalan army had heretofore met with from Valencian promises, made the sight of so extensive and disinterested a reinforcement the more truly welcome, because the less expected, and the admiration which was thus created in the besieged appeared to produce proportionate anxiety on the part of the enemy."

"I shall direct the whole of my attention to the neighbourhood of Taragona, in readiness for harassing the retreat of the French, if general Suchet should unfortunately be obliged to raise the siege, and for re-embarking and restoring to general O'Donnel whatever may remain of the Valencian troops, according to the solemn pledge he exacted from me before he would consent thus to part with the flower and strength of his army. He even went so far as

to declare, in the presence of general Miranda, the principal officer of his staff, general Doyle, captain Adam, captain White, and myself, that he considered me as entirely answerable for the safety of the kingdom of Valencia, and that if I failed in redeeming my pledge he would resign his command for that particular account."

"It is but justice to myself, however, that I should tell you that I did most distinctly warn general O'Donnel, that I would in no case answer for his army if placed under the immediate command of Campo Verde, for any distant inland operation, more particularly as I knew that, in addition to his own deficiency in ability, he was surrounded by people whose advice and whose conduct was in no case to be relied on."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR C. COTTON.

"Blake, Taragona, June 22, 1811.

"I found upon my last return here an arrangement made, that in case of the enemy gaining the Puerto, general Sarsfield should retire to the Mole with part of his division, from whence I had only to assist, but was much astonished to find, by a message, through colonel Green, from general Contreras, that although he had heard of such a disposition being made by general Sarsfield, and assented to by the English squadron, it had not his official knowledge or approbation."—"I understand that an order had arrived in the morning from the marquis of Campo Verde for general Velasco to take the command of the Puerto, and for general Sarsfield to join his army, that the latter had given up his command to some colonel at about three o'clock, who was, by his own confession, totally unfit for it, and that general Velasco only arrived in time to find the Spanish troops flying in confusion from the want of being properly commanded and the French assaulting the place."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR E. PELLEW.

"Mattaro, November 1, 1811.

"Having stated in a letter to Sir Charles Cotton, on the 22d June last, that I understand general Sarsfield had quitted the Puerto and embarked without the knowledge of general Contreras, (which indeed was the substance of a message sent me by general Contreras himself,) I owe it to an officer of general Sarsfield's high military character to declare my conviction that the statement there made by general Contreras is absolutely false and unfounded, and I beg leave to enclose in justification of my present opinion; 1st, a passport sent by general Contreras to general Sarsfield in consequence, as he alleged, of an order from the marquis of Campo Verde. 2d. An extract from the manifesto of the marquis, in which he disavows having any knowledge of the passports. 3d. A letter from general Contreras to general Sarsfield in answer to one written by the latter requesting to see the order by which he was directed to quit the Puerto at such a critical moment, in which he says, 'that he cannot send him a copy of that letter, because it is confidential, but that his presence is necessary at the head quarters to assist in the operations about to take place for the relief of the garrison, and that he has not a moment to lose.' 4th. The copy of another letter written on the same day by general Contreras to the superior junta, in which he says that general Sarsfield quitted the Puerto without his knowledge!!!"

GENERAL DOYLE TO COLONEL ROCHE.

"June 23, 1811.

"Is it possible to conceive any thing so absurd, and I could almost say *wicked*, as the conduct of the junta or captain-general of Cartagena in taking away the firelocks from the regiments *they sent with such a parade of their patriotism to relieve Taragona*. Two thousand men are already in this city without firelocks, such is the daily destruction of arms by the enemy's fire, and the getting out of repair from constant use."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR CHARLES COTTON.

"Off Taragona, June 23, 1811.

"Another regiment arrived from Carthage yesterday under convoy of the Cossack, but, as on a former occasion, their arms were taken from them by colonel Roche, upon their going to embark, and therefore, as being of no use to the garrison, I have by desire of the general sent them to Villa Nueva, and as there are already 2000 men in the place without arms, I have sent the Termagant to Carthage, to endeavour to procure those which have been thus inconsiderately taken from the troops belonging to that place."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR C. COTTON.

(Extract.)

"June 29, 1811.

"The Regulus with five transports including a victualler arrived with colonel Skerrett and his detachments on the 26th. The surf was so great on that day that we had no other communication in the forenoon than by a man swimming on shore with a letter, and upon colonel Skerrett putting questions to general Doyle and myself upon the conduct he should pursue according to his orders, we agreed in our opinion that although the arrival of the troops before the Puerto (lower town) was taken would probably have saved the garrison, it was now too late, and that he being landed, if practicable, would only serve to prolong the fate of the place for a very short time at the certain sacrifice of the whole eventually. This opinion was grounded on a number of different circumstances, and was in perfect coincidence with that of captains Adam and White. In the evening the surf abated sufficiently for general Doyle, colonel Skerrett, and some of his officers, as well as the captains of the squadron and myself, to wait upon general Contreras, who repeated his determination to cut his way out, and join the marquis of Campo Verde *the instant the enemy's breaching battery should open*, and which he expected would take place the following morning, and who agreed the English ought not to land with any view of defending the town, although he wished them to join in his meditated sortie."

EXTRACTS FROM GENERAL CONTRERAS' REPORT.

(Translated.)

"I saw myself reduced to my own garrison." "I considered if my force was capable of this effort (defending the breach), one of the most heroic that war furnishes, and to which few men can bring themselves. I recollected *however that I had still eight thousand of the best and*

most experienced troops in Spain." "All conspired against this poor garrison. Campo Verde in quitting the place promised to come back quickly to its succour, but he did not, although he daily renewed his promises. The kingdom of Valencia sent Miranda with a division which disembarked, and the day following re-embarked and went to join Campo Verde.

"An English division came on the 26th, colonel Skerrett, who commanded them, came in the evening to confer with me and to demand what I wished him to do. *I replied that if he would disembark and enter the place, he should be received with joy and treated as he merited; that he had only to choose the point that he wished to defend and I would give it to him, but that all was at his choice, since I would neither command nor counsel him.* The 27th the English commandants of artillery and engineers came to examine the front attacked, and being convinced that the place was not in a state to resist, returned to their vessels, and then all went away from the place they came to succour.

"*This abandonment on the part of those who came to save was the worst of all; it made such an impression on the soldiers, that they began to see that they were lost, became low-spirited and only resisted from my continual exhortations, and because they saw my coolness and the confidence I had, that if they executed my orders the French would fail. But this only lasted a few hours, the notion of being abandoned again seized them and overcame all other ideas.*"

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR C. COTTON.

"12th July, 1811.

"The vacillating conduct of general Contreras regarding the defence of Taragona is a principal feature in the loss of that important fortress."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR E. PELLEW.

"12th July, 1811.

"The marquis blames generals Caro and Miranda, whilst the latter retort the accusation; and I am inclined to think that in giving full credit to what each says of the other, neither will suffer ignominy beyond that to which his conduct has entitled him."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO MR. WELLESLEY.

(Extract.)

"20th July, 1811.

"The disasters which have befallen the principality will produce material accusations against the generals who lately commanded in it, without, I fear, any of them meeting the punishment which is their due. Some of the enclosed papers may help you to form a just opinion of their conduct and that of the Spanish marine; and those respecting the arms for which I sent to Carthage will show how far colonel Roche is entitled to the merit which he so largely assumes on that occasion.

"To enable you to form a correct opinion of general Contreras I must refer you to general Doyle, as from his ignorance of our service, the various requests and proposals which arose from the vacillations in what he called his determinations, were signified to me through him. It does

appear to me that he ever visited the works himself, or it would not have fallen to the lot of captain Adams and myself to remove two boats, two large stages, sixteen gun-carriages, and a mortar from the mole, long after the French were advanced beyond the Francoli battery, and two nights previous to their gaining the Puerto; an accidental visit to the mole one night, just after placing the gun boats and launches, discovered to me this mortar with no less than twelve guns in readiness for forming a battery; and upon general Doyle, by my request, representing this to the general of artillery, he talked of *inquiring into it to-morrow.*"

"It would be a waste of words to describe further the conduct of the general of artillery, or I might find sufficient subject in the events of every passing day from the first investment of the place."—"I shall be very ready to come forward personally in aid of that justice which is due to the numberless brave men who fell a sacrifice to the criminality of the persons alluded to who have so grossly misconducted themselves."

SECTION 2.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR E. PELLEW.

"29th July, 1811.

"Had colonel Green, the military agent appointed to succeed general Doyle, adopted the plan of his predecessor of continuing at the head-quarters of the army and in personal communication with the captain-general instead of retiring to Peniscola with the money and arms remaining, we should not be left as we are to the precarious source of mere accidental communications for receiving intelligence."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO DON F. SAVARTES, VOCAL OF THE JUNTA.

"28th July, 1811.

"—Colonel Green, the British military agent, being at Peniscola, I have opened the letter from the junta to him."—"Had I not in this instance opened the letters to the admiral and the military agent, the junta would have received no answer to them until it would have been too late to execute their object."

CAPTAIN THOMAS TO CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

(Extract.)

"H. M. S. *Undaunted*, off *Arens*, 7th Oct. 1811.

"Having observed, in the Catalonia Gazette of the 24th of September, the copy of a letter said to be written by colonel Green to his excellency general Lacy, relative to our operations on the Medas Islands, from the surrender of the castle to the period of our quitting them, I beg leave to state to you my surprise and astonishment at seeing facts so grossly misrepresented, and request you will be pleased to contradict in the most positive manner the assertions there made use of. To prove how inconsistent this letter is with real facts, it may be necessary for me only to say that colonel Green, in the presence and hearing of all the English officers, on my asking him a question relative to the practicability of keeping the island, did declare that he had nothing to do with the expedition; that my instructions pointed him out as a volunteer only. But immediately after, in

the hearing of all, did declare it to be his opinion that the island was not tenable.

"As I understood it was intended to form an establishment on the larger island, I judged it proper to retire from it for a short time and destroy the remains of the castle, which might induce the enemy to withdraw from the works he had thrown up, and thereby afford our ally an opportunity whenever he chose to occupy them again, to fortify himself without molestation; and this supposition it has appeared was well grounded. But while the ruins of the castle stood, it was an object of jealousy to the French; nor would they in my opinion have quitted the ground they occupied, nor the Spaniards have been enabled to settle themselves, had this measure not been adopted. I therefore gave orders for embarking the guns and stores.

"If necessary, I could say much more on the subject of this most extraordinary letter; the few remarks I have made will, I think, be sufficient. As an act of courtesy to colonel Green, on landing the marines I directed the marine officers to receive their orders from him; but military aid was not necessary, for you may recollect before the expedition sailed, on your informing me that general Lacy had offered some Spanish troops, and asking how many I thought would be necessary, my answer was 'about forty;' and I have no hesitation in declaring that without the assistance of even a single soldier the castle would have fallen into our hands as speedily as it did on this occasion."

SECTION 3.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON'S ORDERS TO CAPTAIN ADAM OF THE INVINCIBLE.

"July 1st, 1811.

"You are hereby directed in consequence of a representation made to me by general Doyle, to proceed towards Majorca in search of the Spanish frigates *Prueba*, *Diana*, and *Astrea*, which the general reports to be going to that island (contrary to orders) with the treasure, archives of the province, and the vessels laden with stores and ammunition destined for the inland fortresses of Catalonia, together with the officers and soldiers which were saved from Taragona, and which are required to join the army immediately. Upon meeting them you are to deliver the accompanying order for them to return here, and you are, if necessary, to enforce obedience."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR CHARLES COTTON.

"*Villa Nueva*, 3d July, 1811.

"I should feel the more hurt by being driven to adopt such a measure had not the whole conduct both of the *Prueba* and *Diana* made their captains a disgrace to the situation they hold. These two frigates remained quiet spectators of the British squadron engaging the batteries of the enemy on the 22d of last month, and never attempted to give any assistance to the garrison, except by now and then sending a gun-boat to join those manned by the English. They did not assist in the embarkation of the numberless women, children, and wounded soldiers, until goaded into it by the orders of general Contreras, after I had already sent above two thousand to this place; and even when I had no longer any transports for their reception, the captain of the *Prueba* refused to receive some wounded officers."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR CHARLES COTTON.

"18th July, 1811.

"I cannot describe to you the difficulties which I have been put to by the misconduct of all the Spanish ships and vessels of war which I have had to communicate with upon the coast, with exception of the *Astrea* frigate and the *Paloma* corvette. In the others I have seen neither courage to oppose the enemy nor humanity to alleviate the distresses of their countrymen."—"I have heard also that the *Algesiras*, which lately arrived at Arens, has landed the stores and ammunition, with which she was charged, at the risk of their falling into the hands of the enemy, and has quitted the station!"

SECTION 4.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR E. PELLEW.

"12th July, 1811.

"General Milans is collecting a mixture of troops, consisting of those who have escaped the enemy."

"He speaks loudly of his indifference to a command, while he boasts that if he were captain-general he would raise forty thousand men and clear the country of the enemy! But in the midst of this disgusting rodomontade it is not difficult to see that self-interest is the main spring of all his actions, and that instead of raising an army he is more likely, by the system he has adopted, to shake the stability of that which is still left for the defence of the principality."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO SIR H. WELLESLEY.

"September 1, 1811.

"The affair of general Milans" (namely, the sending of corn to Barcelona under his passport) "which I mentioned to you in my last private letter, is still involved in mystery, which I hope however to penetrate upon my return to Arens de Mar. The Mataro papers reported that two soldiers were shot and a serjeant flogged at Arena for suffering corn to pass their guard at Mongat on its way to Barcelona. The *fact* of the punishment is I believe truly stated, but the *cause* no less falsely, entirely as I suspect with the view of terminating my investigation into this nefarious traffic. General Lacy, instead of answering my letter, refers me by word of mouth to the junta, and the deputation from the junta, who went to Mataro (as they assured me) purposely to investigate the business, now tell me that it is an affair purely military, and refer me to general Milans himself."

SECTION 5.

EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE MADE BY CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

"Mataro, July 6, 1811.

"Colonel O'Ronan, aid-du-camp to the marquis of Campo Verde, arrived, and informed me that he came from the marquis, who was on his march to this town or Arens, for the purpose of embarking all the infantry not Catalans, and the whole of the remaining cavalry, leaving the horses on the beach. Colonel O'Ronan said this determination was the result of a junta, composed of the marquis, general St. Juan, general Caro, general Miranda, the general of artillery, brigadier Santa Cruz, Velasco, and Sarsfield; that after the thing had been proposed and discussed a long

time, Sarsfield was the first to give his vote, that he rose from his seat and said, 'any officer who could give such an opinion must be a traitor to his country, and that he and his division would stand or fall with the principality.' Every other officer was of a contrary opinion, except the marquis (it afterwards appeared that Santa Cruz also supported Sarsfield,) who thought with Sarsfield, and yet it seems he allowed himself to be led on by the other generals. *In short, it appears he was resolved to abandon the principality.*

"I told him, without hesitation, that to embark the Valencians I felt a duty to general O'Donnel, to the kingdom of Valencia, and to the whole nation, but that I felt it equally my duty upon no account to embark the army of Catalonia, and thus become a party concerned in the abandonment of a province I had been sent to protect."—"The colonel, who could not venture on shore again, lest he should be murdered by the inhabitants of Mataro, for having been the bearer of a commission to arrest brigadier Milans about a month ago, sent to the marquis my answer."

EXTRACT FROM A MINUTE OF INFORMATION GIVEN BY THE BARON D'EROLES.

"July 9, 1811.

"The baron d'Eroles was appointed captain-general of Catalonia by the junta of general officers, of which the marquis of Campo Verde was president, and by the voice of the people. His reply was, that so long as the army continued in the principality, and that there was a senior general officer, he would not admit it, but that the moment the army passed the frontier (it was then at Agramunt, in full march to Aragon), he would accept the command, unmindful of the dreadful situation in which he should place himself, but he would do so in order to continue the struggle, and to prevent anarchy and confusion. In this state things were when general Lacy arrived. The baron instantly sought him, could not find, but met one of his aid-du-camps, by whom he wrote to him to say what had occurred, but that he was resolved to support general Lacy in his command, not only with all his local influence, but by his personal exertions, and that he would immediately join him to put this resolution in practice."

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL DOVLE'S LETTER AFTER SEEING THE ABOVE.

"The Valencian division, that is to say, two thousand four hundred of the four thousand three hundred soldiers who disembarked in this province, are now on board to return to Valencia. General Miranda says the desertion took place in consequence of the marquis's determination to proceed to Aragon, which made them believe they would not be embarked. In short, most disgraceful has been the conduct of this division, and the marquis, as you will see by this letter to me, attaches to it no small portion of blame."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON TO THE MARQUIS OF CAMPO VERDE.

"Blake, July 5, 1811.

"I have to remind you that by ordering the Valencian division out of Taragona, in breach of the terms by which I bound myself when I brought them, you yourself broke the pledge given by me, and dissolved the contract."

EXTRACTED FROM CAPTAIN CODRINGTON'S PAPERS.

"Minute of a conference betwixt generals Caro and Miranda with general Doyle and myself this day.

" July 9, 1811.

"About eight o'clock generals Caro and Miranda came on board the Blake. After being seated in the cabin with general Doyle and myself, general Caro begged general Doyle would explain to me, that they were come in consequence of my promise, to request I would embark the division of Valencian troops which I had brought from Peniscola. I desired to know what promise general Caro understood me to have made? He answered, that I would take the above troops back to Valencia. I denied positively that I had made any promise to re-embark them if they should ever join the marquis of Campo Verde, although I had deeply pledged myself to restore them to general O'Donnel if they joined in a sortie from the garrison, which I was confident would be very decisive of its success. I then referred general Miranda to a similar explanation, which I gave to him, through general Doyle, on the day after our quitting Peniscola, when he had said he was ordered, both by his written instructions and by verbal explanation from general O'Donnel, not to land within the garrison. General Miranda instantly repeated that so he was; upon which general Doyle, to whom he had shown those instructions jointly with myself, after leaving Taragona for Villa Nueva, when under a difficulty as to how he should proceed, referred him to them again, when it appearing that he was therein positively ordered 'desembarcar en la plaza de Tarragona,' general Doyle stopped.

"General Miranda. 'Ah! but read on.'

"General Doyle. 'No, sir, there is the positive proof of your receiving such an order.'

"General Miranda. 'Well, but read on.'

"General Doyle. 'No sir. This (pointing to the paper) is the positive proof of your receiving such an order, which we wanted to establish, because you positively denied it.'

"Upon this general Caro, shrugging up his shoulders, said, 'he was not aware of there being any such order.' And general Miranda again requested general Doyle would read on.

"General Doyle. 'For what purpose?'

"General Miranda. 'To prove that I was not to shut myself up with the division in the plaza de Taragona.'

"General Doyle. 'There is no occasion, sir, for any proof of that, for it was a part of the very stipulation made by captain Codrington when he strongly pledged himself to general O'Donnel.'


"General Doyle continued,—'And now, general Caro, that we have proved to you that general Miranda had orders to land in Taragona, and that captain Codrington is bound by no such promise as you had imagined, I must inform you that he has been eight days upon the coast with all the ships of war and transports which are wanted for other services, for the sole purpose of embarking these troops; and he desires me to add that in consideration of what is due to the liberal and exemplary assistance afforded by general O'Donnel and Valencia in aid of Taragona, but not at all on account of any pledge he has been said to have given, that he will use the same exertion in re-embarking and restoring the troops which he would have done if so bound by his word of honour.'"

MR. WELLESLEY TO LORD WEELESLEY.

" July 28.

"The morning of 30th of June, a few hours after the arrival of the British squadron and Spanish vessels in the roadstead of Villa Nueva, five thousand French infantry and five hundred cavalry surprised the place by a night-march, and seized all the property of Taragona, which had been sent there before the siege. Twenty-five thousand dollars for each of the next three months was demanded, but no violence or plunder allowed. Eroles narrowly escaped. Lacy, appointed to command in Catalonia, arrived 1st July at Villa Nueva, the 6th went to Igualada to join Campo Verde."

"Desertion in the army at Mataro has been carried to a most alarming extent since the fall of Taragona; the first night fifteen hundred men disappeared, nearly three hundred cavalry had likewise set off towards Aragon; and these desertions are to be attributed to the gross neglect and want of activity on the part of the officers."—"The only division that keeps together in any tolerable order is that of general Sarsfield, of about two thousand men."—"He had however disputes with Eroles, and the people called for the latter to lead them."



No. XVI.

SIEGE OF TARIFA.

(Extracts.)

LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

" January 9, 1812.

"From the accounts which I have received of the place (Tarifa) it appears to me quite impossible to defend it, when the enemy will be equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the island contiguous to Tarifa; for which object colonel Skerrett's detachment does not appear to be necessary. I don't believe that the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without which the town will be entirely useless to them, and, indeed, if they had the island as well as the town, I doubt their being able to retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them with which general Ballesteros might be supplied by the garrison of Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their neighbourhood to protect them."

LORD WELLINGTON TO MAJOR GENERAL COOKE.

" February 1, 1812.

"SIR,—I have omitted to answer your letters of the 27th December and of the 7th January, relating to the correspondence which you had had, with the governor of Gibraltar, upon the conditional orders, which you had given colonel Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I conclude that you referred that correspondence to the secretary of state with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty to recal colonel Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient that you should give colonel Skerrett the orders in question. From the report of colonel Skerrett and Lord Proby, and other information which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the

orders that you gave to colonel Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject is not at all changed by what has occurred since. We have a right to expect that his majesty's officers and troops will perform their duty upon every occasion; but we have no right to expect that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in every direction, and unprovided with artillery and the walls scarcely cannon proof. The enemy, however, retired with disgrace infinitely to the honour of the brave men who defended Tarifa, and it is useless to renew the discussion. It is necessary, however, that you should now come to an understanding with general Campbell regarding the troops which have been detached from Cadiz and this army under colonel Skerrett."

LORD WELLINGTON TO MAJOR-GENERAL COOKE.

"February 25, 1812.

"I have already, in my letter of the 1st instant, stated to you my opinion regarding Tarifa, I do not think that captain Smith's letter throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be the principal point to defend, and the easiest to be defended at a small expense and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of Santa Catalina can be made subservient to the defence of the island depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide only by having a local knowledge of the place. It is very clear to me, however, that the enemy will not attack Tarifa in this spring, and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon either by the Spanish government or the governor of Gibraltar you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I made to you in my despatch of the 15th instant. If you should send a detachment from Cadiz at the desire of the Spanish government for purposes connected with the operations of general Ballesteros, I conceive that the governor of Gibraltar has nothing to say to such detachments, if you should send one to Tarifa at the desire of the governor of Gibraltar, or of the Spanish government, it is better not to discuss the question whether the detachment shall or shall not obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occupied Tarifa permanently, and he is about to improve the defences of the place which he conceives to be under his orders; but, according to all the rules of his majesty's service, the senior officer should command the whole. I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the island and town of Tarifa, which I conclude has been settled by the governor of Gibraltar."

EXTRACT FROM THE NOTES OF AN OFFICER ENGAGED IN THE SIEGE.

"Though the duke of Wellington yielded to the opinions and wishes of general Cooke, colonel Skerrett, and lord Proby, yet his characteristic and never-failing sagacity seems to have suggested to him a fear or a fancy, that part of the case was kept concealed. A local knowledge was necessary, not only to judge of the relation and reciprocal defences and capabilities of the town and island, but to estimate the vast importance of the post, the necessity in fact of its possession. It was my impression then, and it amounts to conviction now, that the island, particularly

during the winter, half fortified as it was, and totally destitute of shelter from bombardment or from weather, could not have been maintained against an enemy in possession of the town, the suburb, and the neighbouring heights. But even if it had, by means of British bravery, resolution, and resource, been provisioned and defended, still the original and principal objects of its occupation would have been altogether frustrated, namely, the command and embarkation of supplies for Cadiz and the fostering of the patriotic flame." It is demonstrable that, had the duke of Dalmatia once become possessor of the old walls of Tarifa, every city, village, fort, and watch-tower on the Andalusian coast, would soon have displayed the banner of king Joseph, and the struggle in the south of Spain was over."

GENERAL CAMPBELL TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

"Gibraltar, April 2, 1812.

"MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the 8th of February last, and I beg leave to refer your lordship to the documents herewith, particularly to the report of captain Smith, royal engineers, which I trust will prove that the defence of the town of Tarifa was not taken up on slight grounds, and that the detachment from Cadiz under the orders of colonel Skerrett, together with the troops from hence which formed the garrison of the town, were never in any danger of being cut off, as their retreat would have been covered by the castle of the Guzmans, the redoubt of Santa Catalina, and the island: the two first of these points being connected by a field work, and the whole mounting twenty-nine pieces of cannon and mortars exclusively of what remained in the town: the enemy's batteries being completely kept in check during such an operation by the island and castle of the Guzmans. My lord, colonel Skerrett stood alone in his opinion respecting this post, and in direct opposition to my own and that of captain Smith, royal engineers, who is considered by his corps as an officer of first-rate professional abilities. Major-general Cooke must therefore have acted on the reports of the colonel when he authorized him to abandon his post, for the major-general was unacquainted with its resources: besides, my lord, I had a right to expect that troops sent to that point to assist in its defence should not be withdrawn without my consent. Had the place been lost, my lord, by such misrepresentation, it would have been attributed to any other than the real cause, and the odium would have been fixed upon me, as having taken up the position; I am happy, however, that its capability has been proved whilst it remained under my orders, and that by interposing my authority the valuable possession of Tarifa has been saved from the grasp of the enemy. I was besides deeply concerned in the fate of the place; a great quantity of military stores and provision having been embarked on that service by my authority, from a conviction that they were fully protected by this additional force.

"After the execution of a service, my lord, from which I concluded I was entitled to some consideration, it is no small mortification for me to find that my conduct should be deemed questionable; but I flatter myself that if the government of his royal highness the prince regent will do me the justice to read the annexed papers, they will perceive that if I had done less his majesty's arms must have been dishonoured. In regard to the assumption of command on that occasion, I have only to observe that, consi-

dering the post of Tarifa as a dependency of Gibraltar, having occupied it exclusively for these two years past, and that a commandant and staff were appointed from my recommendation, with salaries annexed, and this with the approbation of both governments, these circumstances, added to what I have seen on similar occasions, put it past a doubt in my mind, and colonel Skerrett having applied to me for 'precise orders,' shows that he was aware that such was the case. If, my lord, I ever had a right to exercise an authority over the post of Tarifa from what I have stated, the entry of troops from another quarter, unless actually commanded by an officer senior to myself, could not, according to the custom of our service, deprive me of it; and I have heard that the case has been referred to lord Wellington, who was of the same opinion. This, however, I only take the liberty to advance in justification of my conduct, and not in opposition to the opinion formed by the government of his royal highness the prince regent. I trust, therefore, I shall be excused in the eyes of government in declaring without reserve, that if I had not retained the command the place would not now be in our possession, and the wants of our enemies would have been completely supplied by its affording a free communication with the states of Barbary. I have the honour to report that I have made the necessary communication with major-general Cooke in consequence of its being the wish of government that Tarifa shall be occupied by troops from Cadiz. The major-general informs me, in answer thereto, that he has communicated with lord Wellington, as he has not received orders to that effect, nor has he the means at present to make the detachment required, and your lordship is aware that I have it not in my power to reinforce that post in case of need." &c. &c.—P. S. "Should your lordship wish any further information with respect to that post, it will be found on referring to my report made after I had visited Tarifa, where commodore Penrose and colonel sir Charles Holloway, royal engineers, accompanied me."

EXTRACT FROM CAPTAIN C. F. SMITH'S REPORT.

"Tarifa, December 14, 1811.

"I do not hesitate to declare that I place the utmost reliance on the resources of the place, and consider them as such as ought to make a good and ultimately successful defence."

EXTRACT FROM CAPTAIN C. F. SMITH'S REPORT.

"December 24, 1811.

"My opinion respecting the defences of this post is unalterable and must ever remain so,—that till the island is more independent in itself, there is a necessity of fairly defending the town as an outwork."



No. XVII.

STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOS.

[The anonymous extracts are taken from the memoirs and journals of officers engaged in, or eye-witnesses of the action described. The Roman characters mark different sources of information.]

SECTION I.—CIUDAD RODRIGO.

A.

"The duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the convent of Francisco, pointed out to colonel

Colborne and to major Napier,* commanding the storming-party of the light division, the spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, '*Now do you understand exactly the way you are to take so as to arrive at the breach without noise or confusion?*' He was answered, '*Yes, perfectly.*' Some one of the staff then said to major Napier, 'Why don't you load?' He answered, 'No, if we cannot do the business without loading we shall not do it at all.' The duke of Wellington immediately said, 'Leave him alone.'

—"The cadadores under colonel Elder were to carry haybags to throw into the ditch, but the signal of attack having been given, and the fire commencing at the great breach, the stormers would not wait for the hay-bags, which, from some confusion in the orders delivered, had not yet arrived; but from no fault of colonel Elder or his gallant regiment; they were always ready for and equal to any thing they were ordered to do.

"The troops jumped into the ditch; the '*fausse braye*' was faced with stone, so as to form a perpendicular wall about the centre of the ditch; it was scaled, and the foot of the breach was attained. Lieutenant Gurwood had gone too far to his left with the forlorn hope, and missed the entrance of the breach; he was struck down with a wound on the head, but sprang up again, and joined major Napier, captain Jones 52d regt., Mitchell 95th, Ferguson 43d, and some other officers, who at the head of the stormers were all going up the breach together."

—"Colonel Colborne, although very badly wounded in the shoulder, formed the fifty-second on the top of the rampart, and led them against the enemy."

"The great breach was so strongly barricaded, so fiercely defended, that the third division had not carried it, and were still bravely exerting every effort to force their way through the obstacles when colonel M'Leod of the forty third poured a heavy flank fire upon the enemy defending it."

B.

"The third division having commenced firing, we were obliged to hurry to the attack. The forlorn hope led, we advanced rapidly across the glacis and descended into the ditch near the ravelin, under a heavy fire. We found the forlorn hope placing ladders against the face of the work, and our party turned towards them, when the engineer officer called out, '*You are wrong, this is the way to the breach, or the fausse braye which leads to the breach you are to attack.*'"

—"We ascended the breach of the *fausse braye*, and then the breach of the body of the place, without the aid of ladders."—"We were for a short time on the breach before we forced the entrance. A gun was stretched across the entrance, but did not impede our march. Near it some of the enemy were bayoneted, amongst the number some deserters, who were found in arms defending the breach."

—"Major Napier was wounded at the moment when the men were checked by the heavy fire and determined resistance of the enemy about two thirds up the ascent. It was then that the soldiers, forgetting they were not loaded, as the major had not permitted them, snapped all their firelocks."

—"No individual could claim being the first that entered the breach; it was a simultaneous rush of about twenty or thirty. The forlorn hope was thrown in some degree behind, being engaged in fixing ladders against the

* Brother to the author of this work.

face of the work, which they mistook for the point of attack.

"Upon carrying the breach, the parties moved as before directed by major Napier; that is, the fifty-second to the left, the forty-third to the right. The forty-third cleared the ramparts to the right, and drove the enemy from the places they attempted to defend, until it arrived near the great breach at a spot where the enemy's defences were overlooked. At this time the great breach had not been carried, and was powerfully defended by the enemy. The houses being on it were loop-holed, and a deep trench lined with musketry bearing directly upon it; the flanks of the breach were cut off, and the descent into the town from the ramparts at the top of it appeared considerable, so as to render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to force it without other aid than a front attack."

"The moment the light division storming-party arrived at the spot described, they opened a heavy enfilading fire of musketry upon the trench, which was the main defence of the great breach, and drove the enemy from it with the aid of the storming-party of the third division that now entered. I was wounded at this time, and retired a short way back on the rampart, when I saw the first explosion on the rampart near the great breach. It was in my opinion next to impossible, as I have said before, to force the great breach by a front attack as long as the enemy held their defences, but the moment the light division turned their defences the breach was instantly carried."

ABSTRACT OF THE JOURNAL OF GENERAL HARVEY, PORTUGUESE SERVICE.

"I stood on rising ground and watched the progress of the attack. The great breach was attacked first. At the top of it the third division opened their fire heavily, and it was returned heavily, but there was a distressing pause. The small breach was carried first, and there was one considerable explosion and two or three smaller ones on the ramparts."

SECTION 2.

BADAJOS.—ASSAULT OF PICURINA.

C.

"An engineer officer, who led the attack, told me, two days after, that the place never would have been taken had it not been for the intelligence of these men (a detachment from the light division) in absolutely walking round the fort, and finding out the gate, which was literally beaten down by them, and they entered at the point of the bayonet. Lieutenant Nixon of the fifty-second was shot through the body by a Frenchman a yard or two inside the gate."

D.

ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.

"For the descent of the light and fourth division into the ditch only *five ladders* were placed, and those five ladders were close to each other. The *advance* (or storming-party) of the eighth division preceded that of the fourth division, and I believe that no part of the fourth division was up in time to suffer from the first great explosion, and the storming-party only had entered when that explosion took place; but observe that although the *advance* of the light division preceded the *advance* of the fourth division, I only mean by that, that the head of the light division en-

tered the ditch sooner than the *head* of the fourth division, for the main bodies of the two divisions joined at the ladders, and were descending into the ditch at the same time.

"I consider that the centre breach at Badajos was never seriously attacked. I was not at the centre breach on the night of the assault, therefore I cannot positively assert what took place there. But there were not bodies of dead and wounded at the centre or curtain breach in the morning to indicate such an attack having been made upon it, and being in the curtain it was far retired from the troops, and the approach to it was made extremely difficult by *deep cuts*, and I think it passed unobserved, except by a straggling few."

"I consider that '*chevaux de frise*' were placed upon the summit of the centre breach during the assault. I was there at day-break. The approach to it was extremely difficult, both from the difficulty of finding it, and from the deep holes that were before it, which to my recollection resembled the holes you see in a clay-field, where they make bricks. Another great obstruction was the fire from the faces and flanks of the two bastions, which crossed before the curtain."

EXTRACT FROM A MEMOIR BY CAPTAIN BARNEY, CHASSEURS BRITANNIQUES, ACTING ENGINEER AT THE SIEGE.

"The explosion of the '*Bariques foudroyantes*' resembled '*fougasses*,' and I expected the bastion would have crumbled to pieces. At this moment I perceived one person in the midst of fire, who had gained the top of the breach in the face of the bastion, he seemed impelling himself forward towards the enemy in an offensive position when he sank down, apparently destroyed by the fire. On examining this breach at day-light I found a Portuguese grenadier, whom I suppose to be the person, as he lay dead the foremost on this breach."

"Twice the bugles sounded to retire from the breaches. The fire diminished, and passing along the glacis of the ravelin I hastened to the attack of general Picton, and found but *two ladders*, one only just long enough to reach the embrasure, and the other with several of the upper rounds destroyed. The castle was full of men, and had the enemy thrown shells among them, I do not think it could have been kept possession of. Major Burgh came to ascertain the result of the attack, and the reserves were ordered up. On coming down from the castle I met general Picton, and told him the castle was full of men, but they had not advanced into the town. He immediately ordered sorties to be made to clear the breach, and a good look-out to be kept towards Christoval."—"Passing in front of the battery where lord Wellington was, I went on the right bank of the inundation till I could cross, and going towards the breach, I was overtaken by the prince of Orange, carrying an order for colonel Barnard to occupy the breach. The enemy's fire had ceased, yet none of the storming-party knew whether we were successful or not. I told the prince I was just come from the castle, which was occupied in force. As we approached the breach the stench of burnt hair and scorched flesh was horrible, and on the crest of the glacis the dead and wounded lay in such numbers it was impossible to pass without treading on them."

"Here I also found but *three ladders*, one broken so as to render it useless. On arriving at the *curtain-breach*, some men of the light division assisted me in removing from the top the *chevaux de frise* of sword-blades and pikes.

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THE END.

HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,

FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

BY W. F. P. NAPIER, C. B.,
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ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCE.

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HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER I.

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GREAT and surprising as the winter campaign had been, its importance was not understood, and therefore not duly appreciated by the English ministers. But the French generals saw with anxiety that lord Wellington, having snapped the heavy links of the chain which bound him to Lisbon, had acquired new bases of operation on the Guadiana, the Agueda, and the Douro, that he could now choose his own field of battle, and Spain would feel the tread of his conquering soldiers. Those soldiers, with the confidence inspired by repeated successes, only demanded to be led forward, but their general had still to encounter political obstacles, raised by the governments he served.

In Spain, the leading men, neglecting the war at hand, were entirely occupied with intrigues, with the pernicious project of reducing their revolted colonies, or with their new constitution. In Portugal, and in the Brazils, a jealous opposition to the general on the part of the native authorities had kept pace with the military successes. In England the cabinet, swayed by Mr. Perceval's narrow policy, was still vacillating between its desire to conquer and its fear of the expense. There also the Whigs, greedy of office and dexterous in parliamentary politics, deafened the country with their clamours, while the people, deceived by both parties as to the nature of the war, and wondering how the French should keep the field at all, were, in common with the ministers, still doubtful, if their commander was truly a great man or an impostor.

The struggle in the British cabinet having ended with the resignation of lord Wellesley, the consequent predominance of the Perceval faction, left small hopes of a successful termination to the contest in the Peninsula. Wellington had, however, carefully

abstained from political intrigues, and his brother's retirement, although a subject of regret, did not affect his own personal position; he was the general of England, untrammelled, undegraded by factious ties, and responsible to his country only for his actions. The ministers might, he said, relinquish or continue the war, they might supply his wants, or defraud the hopes of the nation by their timorous economy: his efforts must be proportioned to his means; if the latter were great, so would be his actions; under any circumstances he would do his best, yet he was well assured the people of England would not endure to forego triumph at the call of a niggard parsimony. It was in this temper that he had undertaken the siege of Badajos, in this temper he had stormed it, and meanwhile political affairs in England were brought to a crisis.

Lord Wellesley had made no secret of Mr. Perceval's mismanagement of the war, and the public mind being unsettled, the Whigs were invited by the Prince Regent, his year of restrictions having now expired, to join a new administration. But the heads of that faction would not share with Mr. Perceval, and he, master of the secrets relating to the detestable persecution of the Princess of Wales, was too powerful to be removed. However, on the 11th of May, Perceval was killed in the house of Commons, and this act, which was a horrible crime, but politically no misfortune either to England or the Peninsula, produced other negotiations, upon a more enlarged scheme with regard both to parties and to the system of government. Personal feelings again prevailed. Lord Liverpool would not unite with lord Wellesley, the Grey and Grenville faction would not serve their country without having the disposal of all the household offices, and lord Moira, judging a discourtesy to the Prince Regent too high a price to pay for their adhesion, refused that condition.* The materials of a new cabinet were therefore drawn from the dregs of the Tory faction, and lord Liverpool became prime minister.

It was unfortunate that a man of lord Wellesley's vigorous talent should have been rejected for lord Liverpool; but this remnant of a party being too weak to domineer, proved less mischievous with respect to the Peninsula than any of the preceding governments.

There was no direct personal interest opposed to lord Wellington's wishes, and the military policy of the cabinet yielding by degrees to the attraction of his ascending genius, was finally absorbed in its meridian splendour. Many practical improvements had also been growing up in the official departments, especially in that of war and colonies, where colonel Bunbury, the under-secretary, a man experienced in the wants of an army on service, had reformed the incredible disorders which pervaded that department during the first years of the contest. The result of the political crisis was therefore comparatively favourable to the war in the Peninsula, the story of which shall now be resumed.

It has been shewn how the danger of Galicia, and the negligence of the Portuguese and Spanish authorities with reference to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, stopped the invasion of Andalusia, and brought the allies back to Beira. But if Wellington, pursuing his first plan, had overthrown Soult on the banks of the Guadalquivir and destroyed the French arsenal at Seville, his campaign would have ranked amongst the most hardy and glorious that ever graced a general; and it is no slight proof of the uncertainty of war, that combinations, so extensive and judicious, should have been marred by the negligence of a few secondary authorities, at points distant from the immediate scenes of action. The English general had indeed under-estimated the force opposed to him, both in the north and south; but the bravery of the allied troops, aided by the moral power of their recent successes, would have borne that error, and in all other particulars his profound military judgment was manifest.

Yet to obtain a true notion of his views, the various operations which he had foreseen and provided against must be considered, inasmuch as they shew the actual resources of the allies, the difficulty of bringing them to bear with due concert, and the propriety of looking to the general state of the war, previous to each of Wellington's great movements. For his calculations were constantly dependent upon the ill-judged operations of men, over whom he had little influence, and his successes, sudden, accidental, snatched from the midst of conflicting political circumstances, were as gems brought up from the turbulence of a whirlpool.

Castaños was captain-general of Galicia, as well as of Estremadura, and when Ciudad Rodrigo fell, lord Wellington, expecting from his friendly feeling some efficient aid, had counselled him upon all the probable movements of the enemy during the siege of Badajos.

First. He supposed Marmont might march into Estremadura, either with or without the divisions of Souham and Bonnet. In either case, he advised that Abadia should enter Leon, and, according to his means, attack Astorga, Benavente, Zamora, and the other posts fortified by the enemy in that kingdom; and that Carlos d'Espana, Sanchez, Saornil, in fine all the partidas in Castile and the Asturias, and even Mendizabel, who was then in the Montaña St. Ander, should come to Abadia's assistance. He promised also that the regular Portuguese cavalry, under Silveira and Bacellar, should pass the Spanish frontier. Thus a force of not less than twenty-five thousand men would have been put in motion on the rear of Marmont, and a most powerful diversion effected in aid of the siege of Badajos and the invasion of Andalusia.

The next operation considered, was that of an invasion of Galicia, by five divisions of the army of Portugal, the three other divisions, and the cavalry, then in the valley of the Tagus and about Bejar, being left to contend, in concert with Soult, for Badajos. To help Abadia to meet such an attack, Bacellar and

Silveira had orders to harass the left flank and rear of the French, with both infantry and cavalry, as much as the nature of the case would admit, regard being had to the safety of their raw militia, and to their connection with the right flank of the Gallician army, whose retreat was to be by Orense.

Thirdly. The French might invade Portugal north of the Douro. Abadia was then to harass their right flank and rear, while the Portuguese opposed them in front; and whether they fell on Galicia or Portugal, or Estremadura, Carlos d'Espana, and the partidas, and Mendizabel, would have an open field in Leon and Castile.

Lastly. The operation which really happened was considered, and to meet it lord Wellington's arrangements were, as we have seen, calculated to cover the magazines on the Douro, and the Mondego, and to force the enemy to take the barren difficult line of country, through Lower Beira, towards Castelo Branco, while Abadia and the Guerilla chiefs entered Castile and Leon on his rear. Carlos d'Espana had also been ordered to break down the bridges on the Yelves, and the Huebra, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, and that of Barba de Puerco on the Agueda to the left of that fortress. Marmont would thus have been delayed two days, and the magazines both at Castelo Branco and Celorico saved by the near approach of the allied army.

Espana did none of these things, neither did Abadia nor Mendizabel operate in a manner to be felt by the enemy, and their remissness, added to the other faults noticed in former observations, entirely marred Wellington's defensive plan in the north, and brought him back to fight Marmont. And when that general had passed the Agueda in retreat, the allied army wanting the provisions which had been so foolishly sacrificed at Castelo Branco, was unable to follow; the distant magazines on the Douro and the Mondego were its only resource; then also it was found that Ciudad and Almeida were in want, and before those places could be furnished, and the intermediate magazines on the lines of communication restored, it was too late to march against Andalusia. For the harvest which ripens the beginning of June in that province, and a fortnight later in Estremadura, would have enabled the army of Portugal to follow the allies march by march.

Now Marmont, as Napoleon repeatedly told him, had only to watch lord Wellington's movements, and a temporary absence from Castile would have cost him nothing of any consequence, because the army of the north would have protected the great communication with France. The advantages of greater means, and better arrangements for supply, on which Wellington had calculated, would thus have been lost, and moreover, the discontented state of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the approach of a new battering train from France, rendered it dangerous to move far from that fortress. The invasion of Andalusia, judicious in April, would in the latter end of May have been a false movement; and the more so that Castaños having, like his predecessors, failed to bring forward the Gallician army, it was again made painfully evident, that in critical circumstances no aid could be obtained from that quarter.

Such being the impediments to an invasion of Andalusia, it behoved the English general to adopt some other scheme of offence more suitable to the altered state of affairs. He considered that as the harvest in Leon and Castile, that is to say, in the districts north of the Gredos and Gata mountains, was much later than in Estremadura and Andalusia, he should be enabled to preserve his commissariat advantages over the French in the field for a longer period in the

north than in the south. And if he could strike a decisive blow against Marmont, he would relieve Andalusia as securely as by a direct attack, because Madrid would then fall, and Soult, being thus cut off from his communications with France, would fear to be hemmed in on all sides. Wherefore to make the duke of Ragusa fight a great battle, to calculate the chances, and prepare the means of success, became the immediate objects of lord Wellington's thoughts.

The French general might be forced to fight by a vigorous advance into Castile, but a happy result depended upon the relative skill of the generals, and the number and goodness of the troops. Marmont's reputation was great, yet hitherto the essays had been in favour of the Englishman's talents. The British infantry was excellent, the cavalry well horsed, and more numerous than it had ever been. The French cavalry had been greatly reduced by drafts made for the Russian contest, by the separation of the army of the north from that of Portugal, and by frequent and harassing marches. Marmont could indeed be reinforced with horsemen from the army of the centre, and from the army of the north, but his own cavalry was weak, and his artillery badly horsed, whereas the allies' guns were well and powerfully equipped. Every man in the British army expected victory, and this was the time to seek it, because, without pitched battles the French could never be dispossessed of Spain, and they were now comparatively weaker than they had yet been, or were expected to be; for such was the influence of Napoleon's stupendous genius, that his complete success in Russia, and return to the Peninsula with overwhelming forces, was not doubted even by the British commander. The time, therefore, being propitious, and the chances favourable, it remained only to combine the primary and secondary operations in such a manner, that the French army of Portugal, should find itself isolated for so long as would enable the allies to force it singly into a general action. If the combinations failed to obtain that great result, the march of the French succouring corps, would nevertheless relieve various part of Spain, giving fresh opportunities to the Spaniards to raise new obstacles, and it is never to be lost sight of, that this principle was always the base of Wellington's plans. Ever, while he could secure his final retreat into the strong holds of Portugal without a defeat, offensive operations, beyond the frontiers, could not fail to hurt the French.

To effect the isolating of Marmont's army, the first condition was to be as early in the field as the rainy season would permit, and before the coming harvest enabled the other French armies to move in large bodies. But Marmont could avail himself, successively, of the lines of the Tormes and the Douro to protract the campaign until the ripening of the harvest enabled reinforcements to join him, and hence the security of the allies' flanks and rear during the operations, and of their retreat, if overpowered, was to be previously looked to. Soult, burning to revenge the loss of Badajos, might attack Hill with superior numbers, or detach a force across the Tagus, which, in conjunction with the army of the centre, now directed by Jourdan, could advance upon Portugal by the valley of the Tagus, and so turn the right flank of the allied army in Castile. Boats and magazines supplied from Toledo and Madrid, were already being collected at the fort of Lugar Nueva, near Almaraz, and from hence, as from a place of arms, the French could move upon Coria, Placencia, and Castelo Branco, menacing Abrantes, Celorico, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida, while detachments from the army of the north reinforced the army of Portugal. But to obviate this

last danger Wellington had planned one of those enterprises, which as they are successful, principally because of their exceeding boldness, are beheld with astonishment when achieved, and are attributed to madness when they fail.

SURPRISE OF ALMARAZ.

For a clear understanding of this event, the reader must call to mind, 1st, that the left bank of the Tagus, from Toledo to Almaraz, is lined with rugged mountains, the ways through which, impracticable for an army, are difficult even for small divisions; 2d, that from Almaraz to the frontier of Portugal, the banks, although more open, were still difficult, and the Tagus was only to be crossed at certain points, to which bad roads leading through the mountains descended. But from Almaraz to Alcantara, all the bridges had been long ruined, and those of Arzobispo and Talavera, situated between Almaraz and Toledo, were of little value, because of the ruggedness of the mountains above spoken of. Soult's pontoon equipage had been captured in Badajos, and the only means of crossing the Tagus, possessed by the French, from Toledo to the frontier of Portugal, was a boat-bridge laid down at Almaraz by Marmont, and to secure which he had constructed three strong forts and a bridge-head.

The first of these forts, called Ragusa, was a magazine, containing many stores and provisions, and it was, although not finished, exceedingly strong, having a loopholed stone tower, twenty-five feet high within, and being flanked without by a field-work near the bridge.

On the left bank of the Tagus the bridge had a fortified head of masonry, which was again flanked by a redoubt, called Fort Napoleon, placed on a height a little in advance. This redoubt, though imperfectly constructed, inasmuch as a wide berm, in the middle of the scarp, offered a landing place to troops escalading the rampart, was yet strong because it contained a second interior defence or retrenchment, with a loopholed stone tower, a ditch, draw-bridge, and palisades.

These two forts, and the bridge-head, were armed with eighteen guns, and they were garrisoned by above a thousand men, which seemed sufficient to insure the command of the river; but the mountains on the left bank still precluded the passage of an army towards Lower Estremadura, save by the royal road to Truxillo, which road, at the distance of five miles from the river, passed over the rugged Mirabete ridge, and to secure the summit of the mountain the French had drawn another line of works, across the throat of the pass. This line consisted of a large fortified house, connected by smaller posts, with the ancient watch-tower of Mirabete, which itself contained eight guns, and was surrounded by a rampart twelve feet high.

If all these works and a road, which Marmont, following the traces of an ancient Roman way, was now opening across the Gredos mountains had been finished, the communication of the French, although circuitous, would have been very good and secure. Indeed Wellington fearing the accomplishment, intended to have surprised the French at Almaraz previous to the siege of Badajos, when the redoubts were far from complete, but the Portuguese government neglected to furnish the means of transporting the artillery from Lisbon, and he was baffled. General Hill was now ordered to attempt it with a force of six thousand men, including four hundred cavalry, two field brigades of artillery, a pontoon equipage, and a battering train of six iron twenty-four pound howitzers.

The enterprise, at all times difficult, was become one of extreme delicacy. When the army was round Badajos, only the resistance of the forts themselves was to be looked for; now Foy's division of the army of Portugal had returned to the valley of the Tagus, and was in no manner fettered, and d'Armagnac, with troops from the army of the centre, occupied Talavera. Drouet also was, with eight or nine thousand men of the army of the south, at Hinojosa de Cordoba, his cavalry was on the road to Medellin, he was nearer to Merida than Hill was to Almaraz, he might intercept the latter's retreat, and the king's orders were imperative that he should hang upon the English army in Estremadura. Soult could also detach a corps from Seville by St. Ollala to fall upon sir William Erskine, who was posted with the cavalry and the remainder of Hill's infantry, near Almendralejo. However lord Wellington placed general Graham near Portalegre, with the first and sixth divisions, and Cotton's cavalry, all of which had crossed the Tagus for the occasion, and thus including Erskine's corps, above twenty thousand men were ready to protect Hill's enterprise.

Drouet by a rapid march might still interpose between Hill and Erskine, and beat them in detail before Graham could support them, wherefore the English general made many other arrangements to deceive the enemy. First, he chose the moment of action when Soult having sent detachments in various directions, to restore his communications in Andalusia, had marched himself with a division to Cadiz, and was consequently unfavourably placed for a sudden movement. Secondly, by rumours adroitly spread, and by demonstrations with the Portuguese militia of the Alemeitejo, he caused the French to believe that ten thousand men were moving down the Guadiana, towards the Niebla, preparatory to the invasion of Andalusia, a notion upheld by the assembling of so many troops under Graham, by the pushing of cavalry parties towards the Morena, and by restoring the bridge at Merida, with the avowed intention of sending Hill's battering and pontoon train, which had been formed at Elvas, to Almendralejo. Finally, many exploring officers, taking the roads leading to the province of Cordoba, made ostentatious inquiries about the French posts at Belalcazar and other places, and thus every thing seemed to point at Andalusia.

The restoration of the bridge at Merida proving unexpectedly difficult, cost a fortnight's labour, for two arches having been destroyed the opening was above sixty feet wide, and large timber was scarce. Hill's march was thus dangerously delayed, but on the 12th of May, the repairs being effected and all else being ready, he quitted Almendralejo, passed the Guadiana, at Merida, with near six thousand men and twelve field-pieces, and joined his pontoons and battering-train. These last had come by the way of Montijo, and formed a considerable convoy, nearly fifty country carts, besides the guns and limber carriages, being employed to convey the pontoons, the ladders, and the ammunition for the howitzers.

The 13th the armament reached the Burdalo river on the road to Truxillo; the 14th it was at Villa Mesias; the 15th at Truxillo. Meanwhile, to mislead the enemy on the right bank of the Tagus the guerrillas of the Guadalupe mountains made demonstrations at different points between Almaraz and Arzobispo, as if they were seeking a place to cast a bridge that Hill might join lord Wellington. General Foy was deceived by these operations, and though his spies at Truxillo had early informed him of the passage of the Guadiana by the allies, they led him

to believe that Hill had fifteen thousand men, and that two brigades of cavalry were following in his rear; one report even stated that thirty thousand men had entered Truxillo, whereas there were less than six thousand of all arms.

Hill having reached Jaraiacejo early on the 16th, formed his troops in three columns, and made a night march, intending to attack by surprise and at the same moment, the tower of Mirabete, the fortified house in the pass, and the forts at the bridge of Almaraz. The left column, directed against the tower, was commanded by general Chowne. The centre column, with the dragoons and the artillery, moved by the royal road, under the command of general Long. The right column, composed of the 50th, 71st, and 92d regiments, under the direction of Hill in person, was intended to penetrate by the narrow and difficult way of La Cueva, and Roman Gordo, against the forts at the bridge. But the day broke before any of the columns reached their destination, and all hopes of a surprise were extinguished. This untoward beginning was unavoidable on the part of the right and centre column, because of the bad roads; but it would appear that some negligence had retarded general Chowne's column, and that the castle of Mirabete might have been carried by assault before daylight.

The difficulty, great before, was now much increased. An attentive examination of the French defences convinced Hill that to reduce the works in the pass, he must incur more loss than was justifiable, and finish in such plight that he could not afterwards carry the forts at the bridge, which were the chief objects of his expedition. Yet it was only through the pass of Mirabete that the artillery could move against the bridge. In this dilemma, after losing the 17th and part of the 18th in fruitless attempts to discover some opening through which to reach the valley of Almaraz with his guns, he resolved to leave them on the Sierra with the centre column, and to make a false attack upon the tower with general Chowne's troops while he himself, with the right column, secretly penetrated by the scarcely practicable line of La Cueva and Roman Gordo to the bridge, intent, with infantry alone, to storm works which were defended by eighteen pieces of artillery and powerful garrisons!

This resolution was even more hardy, and bold, than it appears without a reference to the general state of affairs. Hill's march had been one of secrecy, amidst various divisions of the enemy; he was four days' journey distant from Merida, which was his first point of retreat; he expected that Drouet would be reinforced, and advance towards Medellin, and hence, whether defeated or victorious at Almaraz, that his own retreat would be very dangerous; exceedingly so if defeated, because his fine British troops could not be repulsed with a small loss, and he should have to fall back through a difficult country, with his best soldiers dispirited by failure, and burthened with numbers of wounded men. Then harassed on one side by Drouet, pursued by Foy and d'Armagnac on the other, he would have been exposed to the greatest misfortunes; every slanderous tongue would have been let loose on the rashness of attacking impregnable forts, and a military career, hitherto so glorious, might have terminated in shame. But general Hill being totally devoid of interested ambition, was necessarily unshaken by such fears.

The troops remained concealed in their position until the evening of the 18th, and then the general, reinforcing his own column with the 6th Portuguese regiment, a company of the 60th rifles, and the artillery-men of the centre column, commenced the

descent of the valley. His design was to storm Fort Napoleon before daylight, and the march was less than six miles, but his utmost efforts could only bring the head of the troops to the fort, a little before daylight; the rear was still distant, and it was doubtful if the scaling-ladders, which had been cut in halves to thread the short narrow turns in the precipitous descent, would serve for an assault. Fortunately some small hills concealed the head of the column from the enemy, and at that moment general Chowne commenced the false attack on the castle of Mirabete. Pillars of white smoke rose on the lofty brow of the Sierra, the heavy sound of artillery came rolling over the valley, and the garrison of Fort Napoleon, crowding on the ramparts, were anxiously gazing at these portentous signs of war, when, quick and loud, a British shout broke on their ears, and the gallant 50th regiment, aided by a wing of the 71st, came bounding over the nearest hills.

The French were surprised to see an enemy so close while the Mirabete was still defended, yet they were not unprepared, for a patrol of English cavalry had been seen from the fort on the 17th in the pass of Roman Gordo; and in the evening of the 18th a woman of that village had carried very exact information of Hill's numbers and intentions to Lugar Nueva. This intelligence had caused the commandant Aubert to march in the night with reinforcements to Fort Napoleon, which was therefore defended by six companies, including the 39th French and the voltigeurs of a foreign regiment. These troops were ready to fight, and when the first shout was heard, turning their heads, they, with a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, smote the assailants in front, while the guns of Fort Ragusa took them in flank from the opposite side of the river; in a few moments, however, a rise of ground, at the distance of only twenty yards from the ramparts, covered the British from the front fire, and general Howard, in person, leading the foremost troops into the ditch, commenced the escalade. The great breadth of the berm kept off the ends of the shortened ladders from the parapet, but the soldiers who first ascended, jumped on to the berm itself, and drawing up the ladders planted them there, and thus, with a second escalade, forced their way over the rampart; then, closely fighting, friends and enemies went together into the retrenchment round the stone tower. Colonel Aubert was wounded and taken, the tower was not defended, and the garrison fled towards the bridge-head, but the victorious troops would not be shaken off, and entered that work also in one confused mass with the fugitives, who continued their flight over the bridge itself. Still the British soldiers pushed their headlong charge, slaying the hindmost, and they would have passed the river if some of the boats had not been destroyed by stray shots from the forts, which were now sharply cannonading each other, for the artillery-men had turned the guns of Napoleon on Fort Ragusa.

Many of the French leaped into the water and were drowned, but the greatest part were made prisoners, and to the amazement of the conquerors, the panic spread to the other side of the river; the garrison of Fort Ragusa, although perfectly safe, abandoned that fort also and fled with the others along the road to Naval Moral. Some grenadiers of the 92d immediately swam over and brought back several boats, with which the bridge was restored, and Fort Ragusa was gained. The towers and other works were then destroyed, the stores, ammunition, provisions, and boats were burned in the course of the day, and in the night the troops returned to the Sierra above, carrying with them the colours of the

foreign regiment, and more than two hundred and fifty prisoners, including a commandant and sixteen other officers. The whole loss on the part of the British was about one hundred and eighty men, and one officer of artillery was killed by his own mine, placed for the destruction of the tower; but the only officer slain in the actual assault was captain Candler, a brave man, who fell while leading the grenadiers of the 50th on to the rampart of Fort Napoleon.

This daring attack was executed with a decision similar to that with which it had been planned. The first intention of general Hill was, to have directed a part of his column against the bridge-head, and so to have assailed both works together; but when the difficulties of the road marred this project, he attacked the nearest work with the leading troops, leaving the rear to follow as it could. This rapidity was an essential cause of the success, for Foy hearing on the 17th that the allies were at Truxillo, had ordered D'Armagnac to reinforce Lugar Nueva with a battalion, which being at Naval Moral the 18th, might have entered Fort Ragusa early in the morning of the 19th; but instead of marching before day-break, this battalion did not move until eleven o'clock, and meeting the fugitives on the road, caught the panic and returned.

The works of Mirabete being now cut off from the right bank of the Tagus, general Hill was preparing to reduce them with his heavy artillery, when a report from sir William Erskine, caused him, in conformity with his instructions, to commence a retreat on Merida, leaving Mirabete blockaded by the guerrillas of the neighbourhood. It appeared that Soult, being at Chiclana, heard of the allies' march the 19th, and then only desired Drouet to make a diversion in Estremadura without losing his communication with Andalusia; for he did not perceive the true object of the enterprise, and thinking he had to check a movement, which the king told him was made for the purpose of reinforcing Wellington in the north, resolved to enforce Hill's stay in Estremadura. In this view he recalled his own detachments from the Niebla, where they had just dispersed a body of Spaniards at Castillejos, and then forming a large division at Seville, he purposed to strengthen Drouet, and enable him to fight a battle. But that general, anticipating his orders, had pushed an advance guard of four thousand men to Dom Benito the 17th, and his cavalry patrols passing the Guadiana on the 18th had scoured the roads to Miajadas and Merida, while Lallemand's dragoons drove back the British outposts from Ribera, on the side of Zafra.

Confused by these demonstrations, sir William Erskine immediately reported to Graham, and to Hill, that Soult himself was in Estremadura with his whole army, whereupon Graham came up to Badajoz, and Hill, fearful of being cut off, retired, as I have said, from Mirabete on the 21st, and on the 26th reached Merida unmolested. Drouet then withdrew his advanced guards, and Graham returned to Castello de Vide. Notwithstanding this error, Wellington's precautions succeeded, for if Drouet had been aware of Hill's real object, instead of making demonstrations with a part of his force, he would with the whole of his troops, more than ten thousand, have marched rapidly from Medellin to fall on the allies as they issued out of the passes of Truxillo, and before Erskine or Graham could come to their aid; whereas acting on the supposition that the intention was to cross the Tagus, his demonstrations merely hastened the retreat and saved Mirabete. To meet Hill in the right place would, however, have required very nice arrangements and great activity, as he could

have made his retreat by the road of Caceres as well as by that of Merida.

Lord Wellington was greatly displeased that this false alarm, given by Erskine, should have rendered the success incomplete; yet he avoided any public expression of discontent, lest the enemy, who had no apparent interest in preserving the post of Mirabete, should be led to keep it, and so embarrass the allies when their operations required a restoration of the bridge of Almaraz. To the ministers, however, he complained, that his generals, stout in action, personally, as the poorest soldiers, were commonly so overwhelmed with the fear of responsibility when left to themselves, that the slightest movement of the enemy deprived them of their judgment, and they spread unnecessary alarm far and wide. But instead of expressing his surprise, he should rather have reflected on the cause of this weakness. Every British officer of rank knew, that without powerful interest, his future prospects, and his reputation for past services, would have withered together under the first blight of misfortune; that a selfish government would instantly offer him up, a victim to a misjudging public and a ribald press, with whom success is the only criterion of merit. English generals are and must be prodigal of their blood to gain a reputation, but they are necessarily timid in command, when a single failure, even without a fault, consigns them to an old age of shame and misery. It is, however, undeniable that sir William Erskine was not an able officer.

On the other side the king was equally discontented with Soult, whose refusal to reinforce Drouet he thought had caused the loss of Almaraz, and he affirmed, that if Hill had been more enterprising the arsenal of Madrid might have fallen as well as the depot of Almaraz, for he thought that general had brought up his whole corps instead of a division only six thousand strong.

CHAPTER II.

Progress of the war in different parts of Spain—State of Galicia—French precautions and successes against the Partidas of the north—Marmont's arrangements in Castile—Maritime expedition suggested by sir Howard Douglas—He stimulates the activity of the northern Partidas—The curate Merino defeats some French near Aranda de Duero—His cruelty to the prisoners—Mina's activity—Harasses the enemy in Arragon—Is surprised at Robres by general Pannetier—Escapes with difficulty—Re-appears in the Rioja—Gains the defiles of Navas Tolosa—Captures two great convoys—Is chased by general Abbé and nearly crushed, whereby the Partidas in the north are discouraged—Those in other parts become more enterprising—The course of the Ebro from Tudela to Tortosa so infested by them that the army of the Ebro is formed by drafts from Suchet's forces and placed under general Reille to repress them—Operations of Palombini against the Partidas—He moves towards Madrid—Returns to the Ebro—Is ordered to join the king's army—Operations in Arragon and Catalonia—The Catalonians are cut off from the coast line—Eroles raises a new division in Talar—Advances into Arragon—Defeats general Bourke at Rhoda—Is driven into Catalonia by Severoli—Decaen defeats Sarzfield and goes to Lerida—Lacy concentrates in the mountains of Olot—Descends upon Mattaro—Flies from thence disgracefully—Lamarque defeats Sarzfield—Lacy's bad conduct—Miserable state of Catalonia.

WHILE the Anglo-British army was thus cleansing and strengthening its position on the frontier of Portugal, the progress of the war in other parts had not been so favourable to the common cause. It has already been shewn that Galicia, in the latter part

of 1811, suffered from discord, poverty, and ill-success in the field; that an extraordinary contribution imposed upon the province, had been resisted by all classes, and especially at Coruña the seat of government; finally that the army torn by faction was become hateful to the people. In this state of affairs, Castaños having, at the desire of lord Wellington, assumed the command, removed the seat of government to St. Jago, leaving the troops in the Bierzo under the marquis of Portazgo.

Prudent conduct and the personal influence of the new captain-general soothed the bitterness of faction, and stopped, or at least checked for the moment, many of the growing evils in Galicia, and the regency at Cadiz assigned an army of sixty thousand men for that province. But the revenues were insufficient even to put the few troops already under arms in motion, and Castaños, although desirous to menace Astorga while Marmont was on the Agueda, could not, out of twenty-two thousand men, bring even one division into the field. Nevertheless, so strange a people are the Spaniards, that a second expedition against the colonies, having with it all the field-artillery just supplied by England, would have sailed from Vigo but for the prompt interference of sir Howard Douglas.

When Castaños saw the penury of his army, he as usual looked to England for succour, at the same time, however, he and the Junta made unusual exertions to equip their troops, and the condition of the soldiers was generally ameliorated. But it was upon the efforts of the partidas that the British agent chiefly relied. His system, with respect to those bodies, had been before described, and it is certain that under it, greater activity, more perfect combination, more useful and better timed exertions, had marked their conduct, and their efforts directed to the proper objects, were kept in some subordination to the operations of the allies. This was, however, so distasteful to the regular officers, and to the predominant faction, always fearful of the priestly influence over the allies, that sir Howard was offered the command of six thousand troops to detach him from the guerilla system; and the partidas of the northern provinces would now have been entirely suppressed, from mere jealousy, by the general government, if lord Wellington and sir H. Wellesley had not strenuously supported the views of Douglas, which were based on the following state of affairs.

The French line of communication extending from Salamanca to Irun, was never safe while the Gallician and Asturian forces, the English squadrons, and the partidas in the Montaña, in Biscay, in the Rioja, and in the mountains of Burgos and Leon, menaced it from both sides. The occupation of the Asturias, the constant presence of a division in the Montaña, the employment of a corps to threaten Galicia, and the great strength of the army of the north were all necessary consequences of this weakness. But though the line of communication was thus laboriously maintained, the lines of correspondence, in this peculiar war of paramount importance, were, in despite of numerous fortified posts, very insecure, and Napoleon was always stimulating his generals to take advantage of each period of inactivity on the part of the British army, to put down the partidas. He observed, that without English succours they could not remain in arms, that the secret of their strength was to be found on the coast, and that all the points which favoured any intercourse with vessels should be fortified. And at this time so anxious was he for the security of his correspondence, that he desired, if necessary, the whole army of the north

should be employed merely to scour the lines of communication.

In accordance with these views, Santona, the most important point on the coast, had been rendered a strong post in the summer of 1811, and then Castro, Portagalete at the mouth of the Bilbao river, Bermeo, Lesquito, and Guetaria, were by degrees fortified. This completed the line eastward from Santander to St. Sebastian, and all churches, convents, and strong houses, situated near the mouths of the creeks and rivers between those places were entrenched. The partidas being thus constantly intercepted while attempting to reach the coast, were nearly effaced in the latter end of 1811, and a considerable part of the army of the north was, in consequence, rendered disposable for the aid of the army of Portugal. But when Bonet, because of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, evacuated the Asturias, the French troops in the Montaña were again exposed to the enterprises of the seventh army, which had been immediately succoured by Douglas, and which, including guerillas, was said to be twenty-three thousand strong. Wherefore Napoleon had so early as March directed that the Asturias should be re-occupied, and one of Bonet's brigades, attached to the army of the north, rejoined him in consequence; but the pass of Pajares being choked with snow, Bonet, who was then on the Orbijo, neglected this order until the approach of finer weather.

In May, Marmont having returned from Portugal, the emperor's order was reiterated, and the French troops on the Orbijo, being augmented to fifteen thousand, drew the attention of the Gallicians to that quarter, while Bonet, passing the mountains of Leon, with eight thousand men, re-occupied Oviedo, Grado, and Gihon, and established small posts communicating through the town of Leon, with the army of Portugal. Thus a new military line was established which interrupted the Gallicians' communications with the partidas, the chain of sea-port defences was continued to Gihon, a constant intercourse with France was maintained, and those convoys came safely by water which otherwise would have had to travel by land escorted by many troops and in constant danger.

Meanwhile Marmont, having distributed his division in various parts of Leon, was harassed by the partidas, especially Porlier's, yet he proceeded diligently with the fortifying of Toro and Zamora, on the Douro, and converted three large convents at Salamanca into so many forts capable of sustaining a regular siege; the works of Astorga and Leon were likewise improved, and strong posts were established at Benavente, La Baneza, Castro-Contrigo, and intermediate points. The defensive lines of the Tormes and the Douro were thus strengthened against the British general, and as four thousand men sufficed to keep the Gallician forces of the Bierzo and Puebla Senabria in check, the vast and fertile plains of Leon, called the *Tierras de Campos*, were secured for the French, and their detachments chased the bands from the open country.

Sir Howard Douglas observing the success of the enemy in cutting off the partidas from the coast, and the advantage they derived from the water communication; considering also that, if lord Wellington should make any progress in the coming campaign, new lines of communication with the sea would be desirable, proposed that a powerful squadron with a battalion of marines and a battery of artillery, should be secretly prepared for a littoral warfare on the Biscay coast. This suggestion was approved of, and sir Home Popham was sent from England, in May, with an armament, well provided with scaling lad-

ders, arms, clothing, and ammunition for the partidas, and all means to effect sudden disembarkations. But the ministers were never able to see the war in its true point of view, they were always desponding, or elated and sanguine, beyond what reason warranted in either case. Popham was ordered not only to infest the coast, but, if possible, to seize some point, and hold it permanently as an entrance into Biscay, by which the French positions might be turned if, as in 1808, they were forced to adopt the line of the Ebro! Now at this period three hundred thousand French soldiers were in the Peninsula, one hundred and twenty thousand were in the northern provinces, and, without reckoning the army of the centre which could also be turned in that direction, nearly fifty thousand were expressly appropriated to the protection of this very line of communication, on which a thousand marines were to be permanently established, in expectation of the enemy being driven over the Ebro by a campaign which was not yet commenced!

While Marmont was in Beira, the activity of the seventh army, and of the partidas, in the Montaña, was revived by the supplies which sir Howard Douglas, taking the opportunity of Bonet's absence, had transmitted to them through the Asturian ports. The ferocity of the leaders was remarkable. Mina's conduct was said to be very revolting; and on the 16th of April the curate Merino coming from the mountains of Espinosa, to the forests between Aranda de Duero, and Hontorica Valdearados, took several hundred prisoners and hanged sixty of them, in retaliation for three members of the local junta, who had been put to death by the French; he executed the others also in the proportion of ten for each of his own soldiers who had been shot by the enemy. The ignorance and the excited passions of the guerilla chiefs, may be pleaded in mitigation of their proceedings, but to the disgrace of England, these infamous executions by Merino were recorded with complacency in the newspapers, and met with no public disapprobation.

There are occasions when retaliation, applied to men of rank, may stop the progress of barbarity, yet the necessity should be clearly shewn, and the exercise restricted to such narrow limits that no reasonable ground should be laid for counter-retaliation.

Here, sixty innocent persons were deliberately butchered to revenge the death of three, and no proof offered that even those three were slain contrary to the laws of war; and though it is not to be doubted that the French committed many atrocities, some in wantonness, some in revenge, such savage deeds as the curate's are inexcusable. What would have been said if Washington had hanged twenty English gentlemen, of family, in return for the death of captain Handy; or if sir Henry Clinton had caused twenty American officers to die for the execution of André? Like atrocities are, however, the inevitable consequence of a guerilla system not subordinate to the regular government of armies, and ultimately they recoil upon the helpless people of the country, who cannot fly from their enemies. When the French occupied a district, famine often ensued, because, to avoid distant forages, they collected large stores of provisions from a small extent of country, and thus the guerilla system, while it harassed the French without starving them, both harassed and starved the people. And many of the chiefs of bands, besides their robberies, when they dared not otherwise revenge affronts or private feuds, would slay some prisoners or stragglers, so as to draw down the vengeance of the French on an obnoxious village or district. This in return produced associations of

the people for self-defence in many places, by which the enemy profited.

Soon after this exploit a large convoy having marched from Burgos towards France, Merino endeavoured to intercept it, and Mendizabel, who, notwithstanding his defeat by Bonet, had again gathered twelve hundred cavalry, came from the Liebana and occupied the heights above Burgos. The French immediately placed their baggage and followers in the castle and recalled the convoy, whereupon the Spaniards, dispersing in bands, destroyed the fortified posts of correspondence at Sasamon and Gamonal, and then returned to the Liebana. But Bonet had now reoccupied the Asturias, the remnant of the Spanish force, in that quarter, fled to Mendizabel, and the whole shifted as they could in the hills. Meanwhile Mina displayed great energy. In February he repulsed an attack near Lodosa, and having conveyed the prisoners taken at Huesca to the coast, returned to Aragon and maintained a distant blockade of Zaragoza itself. In March he advanced with a detachment to Pina, and captured one of Suchet's convoys going to Mequinenza; but having retired, with his booty, to Robres, a village on the eastern slopes of the Sierra de Alcubierre, he was there betrayed to general Pannetier, who, with a brigade of the army of the Ebro, came so suddenly upon him that he escaped death with great difficulty.

He reappeared in the Rioja, and although hotly chased by troops from the army of the north, escaped without much loss, and, having five thousand men, secretly gained the defiles of Navas Tolosa, behind Vittoria, where, on the 7th of April, he defeated with great loss a Polish regiment, which was escorting the enormous convoy that had escaped the curate and Mendizabel at Burgos. The booty consisted of treasure, Spanish prisoners, baggage, followers of the army, and officers retiring to France. All the Spanish prisoners, four hundred in number, were released and joined Mina, and it is said that one million of francs fell into his hands besides the equipages, arms, stores, and a quantity of church plate.

On the 28th he captured another convoy going from Valencia to France, but general Abbé, who had been recently made governor of Navarre, now directed combined movements from Pampeluna, Jacca, and Sanguesa, against him. And so vigorously did this general, who I have heard Mina declare to be the most formidable of all his opponents, urge on the operations, that after a series of actions on the 25th, 26th, and 28th of May, the Spanish chief, in bad plight, and with the utmost difficulty, escaped by Los Arcos to Guardia, in the Rioja. Marshal Victor seized this opportunity to pass into France, with the remains of the convoy shattered on the 7th, and all the bands in the north were discouraged. However, Wellington's successes, and the confusion attending upon the departure of so many French troops for the Russian war, gave a powerful stimulus to the partizan chiefs in other directions. The Empecinado, ranging the mountains of Cuenca and Guadalajara, pushed his parties close to Madrid; Duran entered Soria, and raised a contribution in the lower town; Villa Campa, Bassecour and Montijo, coming from the mountains of Albarracin, occupied Molino and Orejuella, and invested Daroca; the Catalanian Gayan, taking post in the vicinity of Belchite, made excursions to the very gates of Zaragoza; the Frayle, haunting the mountains of Alcañiz and the Sierra de Gudar, interrupted Suchet's lines of communication by Morella and Teruel, and along the right bank of the Ebro towards Tortosa. Finally, Gay and Miralles infested the Garriga on the left bank.

It was to repress these bands that the army of the

Ebro, containing twenty thousand men, of whom more than sixteen thousand were under arms, was formed by drafts from Suchet's army, and given to general Reille. That commander immediately repaired to Lerida, occupied Upper Aragon with his own division, placed Severoli's division between Lerida and Zaragoza, and general Frere's between Lerida, Barcelona, and Taragona; but his fourth division, under Palombini, marched direct from Valencia towards the districts of Soria and Calatayud, to form the link of communication between Suchet and Caffarelli. The latter now commanded the army of the north, but the imperial guards, with the exception of one division, had quitted Spain, and hence, including the government's and the reserve of Monthion, this army was reduced to forty-eight thousand under arms. The reserve at Bayonne was therefore increased to five thousand men, and Palombini was destined finally to reinforce Caffarelli, and even to march, if required, to the aid of Marmont in Leon. However, the events of the war soon caused Reille to repair to Navarre, and broke up the army of the Ebro, whereof it will be clearer to trace the operations of these divisions successfully and separately, and in the order of the provinces towards which they were at first directed.

Palombini having left a brigade at the entrenched bridge of Teruel, relieved Daroca on the 23d of February, and then deceiving Villa Campa, Montijo, and Bassecour, who were waiting about the passes of Toralva to fall on his rear-guard, turned them by the Xiloca, and reached Calatayud. This effected, he fortified the convent of La Peña, which, as its name signifies, was a rocky eminence, commanding that city and forming a part of it. But on the 4th of March, having placed his baggage and artillery in this post, under a guard of three hundred men, he dispersed his troops to scour the country and to collect provisions, and the partidas, seeing this, recommenced operations. Villa Campa cut off two companies at Campillo on the 8th, and made a fruitless attempt to destroy the Italian colonel Pisa at Ateca. Five hundred men were sent against him, but he drew them towards the mountains of Albarracin, and destroyed them at Pozonhonda on the 28th; then marching another way, he drove the Italians from their posts of communication as far as the town of Albarracin on the road to Teruel, nor did he regain the mountains until Palombini came up on his rear and killed some of his men. The Italian general then changing his plan, concentrated his division on the plains of Hused, where he suffered some privations, but remained unmolested until the 14th of April, when he again marched to co-operate with Suchet in a combined attempt to destroy Villa Campa. The Spanish chief evaded both by passing over to the southern slopes of the Albarracin mountains, and before the Italians could return to Hused, Gayan, in concert with the alcalde of Calatayud, had exploded a plot against the convent of La Peña.

Some of the Italian officers, including the commandant, having rashly accepted an invitation to a feast, were sitting at table, when Gayan appeared on a neighbouring height; the guests were immediately seized, and many armed citizens ran up to surprise the convent, and sixty soldiers were made prisoners, or killed in the tumult below; but the historian, Vacani, who had declined to attend the feast, made a vigorous defence, and on the 1st of May general St. Pol and colonel Schiazzetti, coming from Hused, and Daroca, raised the siege. Schiazzetti marched in pursuit, and as his advanced guard was surprised at Mochales by a deceit of the

alcalde, he slew the latter, whereupon the Spaniards killed the officers taken at the feast of Calatayud.

Gayan soon baffled his pursuers, and then moved by Medina Celi and Soria to Navarre, thinking to surprise a money convoy going to Burgos for the army of Portugal, but being followed on one side by a detachment from Hused, and met on the other by Caffarelli, he was driven again to the hills above Daroca. Here he renewed his operations in concert with Villa Campa and the Empecinado, who came up to Medina Celi, while Duran descended from the Moncayo hills, and this menacing union of bands induced Reille, in May, to detach general Paris, with a French regiment and a troop of hus-sars, to the aid of Palombini. Paris moved by Calatayud, while Palombini briskly interposing between Duran and Villa Campa, drove the one towards Albarracin and the other towards Soria; and in June, after various marches, the two French generals uniting, dislodged the Empecinado from Sigüenza, chasing him so sharply that his band dispersed and fled to the Somosierra.

During these operations, Mina was pressed by Abbé, but Duran entering Tudela by surprise, destroyed the artillery parc, and carried off a battering train of six guns. Palombini was only a few marches from Madrid, and the king, alarmed by lord Wellington's preparations for opening the campaign, ordered him to join the army of the centre; but these orders were intercepted, and the Italian general retraced his steps, to pursue Duran. He soon recovered the guns taken at Tudela, and drove the Spanish chief through the Rioja into the mountains beyond the sources of the Duero; then collecting boats, he would have passed the Ebro, for Caffarelli was on the Arga, with a division of the army of the north, and a brigade had been sent by Reille to the Aragon river with the view of destroying Mina. This chief, already defeated by Abbé, was in great danger, when a duplicate of the king's orders having reached Palombini, he immediately recommenced his march for the capital, which saved Mina. Caffarelli returned to Vittoria, and the Italians reaching Madrid the 21st of July, became a part of the army of the centre, having marched one hundred and fifty miles in seven days without a halt. Returning now to the other divisions of the army of the Ebro, it is to be observed, that their movements being chiefly directed against the Catalans, belong to the relation of that warfare.

OPERATIONS IN ARAGON AND CATALONIA.

After the battle of Altafulla, the fall of Peniscola, and the arrival of Reille's first division on the Ebro, Decaen, who had succeeded Macdonald in Upper Catalonia, spread his troops along the coast, with a view to cut off the communication between the British navy and the interior, where the Catalan army still held certain positions.

Lamarque, with a division of five thousand men, first seized and fortified Mataro, and then driving Milans from Blanes, occupied the intermediate space, while detachments from Barcelona fortified Moncada, Mongat, and Molino del Rey, thus securing the plain of Barcelona on every side.

The line from Blanes to Cadagués, including Canets, St. Filieu, Palamos, and other ports, was strengthened, and placed under general Bearman.

General Clement was posted in the vicinity of Gerona, to guard the interior French line of march from Hostalrich to Figueras.

Tortosa, Mequinenza, and Taragona were garrisoned by detachments from Severoli's division, which was quartered between Zaragoza and Lerida, and in

communication with Bourke's and Pannetier's brigades of the first division of the army of reserve.

General Frere's division was on the communication between Aragon and Catalonia, and there was a division under general Quesnel, composed partly of national guards, in the Cerdaña. Finally there was a movable reserve, of six or eight thousand men, with which Decaen himself marched from place to place as occasion required; but the supreme command of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia was with Suchet.

The Catalans still possessed the strong holds of Cardona, Busa, Sceu d'Urgel, and the Medas islands, and they had ten thousand men in the field. Lacy was at Cardona with Sarzfield's division, and some irregular forces; colonel Green was organizing an experimental corps at Montserrat, near which place Erolles was also quartered; Rovira continued about the mountains of Olot; Juan Claros, who occupied Arenis de Mar when the French were not there, was now about the mountains of Hostalrich; Milans, Manso, and the brigand Gros, being driven from the coast line, kept the hills near Manreza; Gay and Miralles were on the Ebro. But the communication with the coast being cut off, all these chiefs were in want of provisions and stores, and the French were forming new roads along the sea line, beyond the reach of the English ship guns.

Lacy thus debarred of all access to the coast, feeding his troops with difficulty, and having a great number of prisoners and deserters to maintain in Cardona, and Busa, because Coupigny refused to receive them in the Balearic isles, Lacy, I say, disputing with the junta, and the generals, and abhorred by the people, in his spleen desired captain Codrington to cannonade all the sea-coast towns in the possession of the French, saying he would give the inhabitants timely notice; but he did not do so, and when Codrington reluctantly opened his broadsides upon Mataro, many of the people were slain. The Catalans complained loudly of this cruel, injudicious operation, and hating Lacy, affected Erolles more than ever, and the former sent him with a few men to his native district of Talarn, ostensibly to raise recruits, and make a diversion in Aragon, but really to deprive him of his division and reduce his power.

The distress in the Catalan army now became so great, that Sarzfield was about to force his way to the coast, and embark his division to commence a littoral warfare, when Erolles having quickly raised and armed a new division entered Aragon, whereupon Sarzfield followed him. The baron having entered the valley of Venasque, advanced to Graus, menacing all the district between Fraga and Huesca; but those places were occupied by detachments from Bourke's brigade of the army of the Ebro, and at this moment Severoli arrived from Valencia, whereupon the Spaniards, instead of falling back upon Venasque, retired up the valley of the Isabena, to some heights above Roda, a village on the confines of Aragon.

Erolles had not more than a thousand regular infantry, three guns, and two hundred cavalry, for he had left five hundred in the valley of Venasque, and Bourke knowing this, and encouraged by the vicinity of Severoli, followed hastily from Benavarre, with about two thousand men of all arms, thinking Erolles would not stand before him. But the latter's position besides being very steep and rough in front, was secured on both flanks by precipices, beyond which, on the hills, all the partidas of the vicinity were gathered; he expected aid also from Sarzfield, and was obliged to abide a battle or lose the detachment left in the valley of Venasque.

Bourke keeping two battalions in reserve attacked with the third, but he met with a stubborn opposition, and after a long skirmish, in which he lost a hundred and fifty men, and Erolles a hundred, was beaten, and being wounded himself, retreated to Monza, in great confusion. This combat was very honorable to Erolles, but it was exposed to doubt and ridicule, at the time, by the extravagance of his public despatch; for he affirmed, that his soldiers finding their muskets too hot, had made use of stones, and in this mixed mode of action had destroyed a thousand of the enemy!

Severoli now advanced, and Erolles being still unsupported by Sarzfield, retired to Talarn, whereupon the Italian general returned to Aragon. Meanwhile Lacy, who had increased his forces, approached Cervera, while Sarzfield, accused by Erolles of having treacherously abandoned him, joined with Gay and Miralles, occupying the hills about Tarragona, and straitening that place for provisions. Milans and Manso also uniting, captured a convoy at Arenis de Mar, and the English squadron intercepted several vessels going to Barcelona.

Decaen observing this fresh commotion came down from Gerona with his reserve. He relieved Tarragona on the 28th of April, and then marched with three thousand men upon Lerida, but on the way, hearing that Sarzfield was at Fuentes Rubino, near Villa Franca, he took the road of Braflin and Santa Coloma instead of Momblanch, and suddenly turning to his right defeated the Spanish general, and then continued his march by Cervera towards Lerida. Lacy in great alarm immediately abandoned Lower Catalonia and concentrated Manso's, Milans', Green's, and Sarzfield's divisions, in the mountains of Olot, and as they were reduced in numbers he reinforced them with select Somatenes, called the Companies of Preferencia. After a time however seeing that Decaen remained near Lerida, he marched rapidly against the convent of Mataro, with five thousand men and with good hope, for the garrison consisted of only five hundred, the works were not strong and captain Codrington, who had anchored off Mataro at Lacy's desire, lent some ship guns; but his sailors were forced to drag them to the point of attack, because Lacy and Green had, in breach of their promise, neglected to provide means of transport.

The wall of the convent gave way in a few hours, but on the 5th, Lacy, hearing that Decaen was coming to succour the place, broke up the siege and buried the English guns without having any communication with captain Codrington. The French found these guns and carried them into the convent, yet Lacy, to cover his misconduct, said in the official gazette, that they were safely re-embarked.

After this disreputable transaction, Manso, who alone had behaved well, retired with Milans to Vich, Lacy went to Cardona, the French sent a large convoy into Barcelona, and the men of Erolles' ancient division were, to his great discontent, turned over to Sarzfield, who took post near Molina del Rey, and remained there until the 5th of June, when a detachment from Barcelona drove him to the Campo de Tarragona. On the 14th of the same month, Milans was defeated near Vich by a detachment from the Ampurdan, and being chased for several days, suffered considerably. Lamarque followed Sarzfield into the Campo and defeated him again on the 24th, near Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and this time the Spanish general was wounded, yet made his way by Santa Coloma de Querault and Calaf to Cardona, where he rejoined Lacy. Lamarque then joined Decaen in the plains of Lerida, where all the French movable forces were now assembled, with

a view to gather the harvest; a vital object to both parties, but it was attained by the French.

This with Lacy's flight from Mataro, the several defeats of Milans, and Sarzfield, and the discontent of Erolles, disturbed the whole principality; and the general disquietude was augmented by the increase of all the frauds and oppressions, which both the civil and military authorities under Lacy, practised with impunity. Every where there was a disinclination to serve in the regular army. The Somatene argued, that while he should be an ill-used soldier, under a bad general, his family would either become the victims of French revenge or starve, because the pay of the regular troops was too scanty, were it even fairly issued, for his own subsistence; whereas, remaining at home, and keeping his arms, he could nourish his family by his labour, defend it from straggling plunderers, and at the same time always be ready to join the troops on great occasions. In some districts the people, seeing that the army could not protect them, refused to supply the partidas with food, unless upon contract not to molest the French in their vicinity. The spirit of resistance would have entirely failed, if lord Wellington's successes at Ciudad and Badajos, and the rumour that an English army was coming to Catalonia, had not sustained the hopes of the people,

Meanwhile the partidas in the north, being aided by Popham's expedition, obliged Reille to remove to Navarre, that Caffarelli might turn his whole attention to the side of Biscay, and the Montaña. Decaen then received charge of the Lower as well as of the Upper Catalonia, which weakened his position; and at the same time some confusion was produced by the arrival of French prefects and councillors of state, to organize a civil administration. This measure, ostensibly to restrain military licentiousness, had probably the ultimate object of preparing Catalonia for an union with France, because the Catalans, who have peculiar customs and a dialect of their own, scarcely call themselves Spaniards. Although these events embarrassed the French army, the progress of the invasion was visible in the altered feelings of the people, whose enthusiasm was stifled by the folly and corruption, with which their leaders aided the active hostility of the French.

The troops were reduced in number, distressed for provisions, and the soldiers deserted to the enemy, a thing till then unheard of in Catalonia, nay, the junta having come down to the coast were like to have been delivered up to the French, as a peace offering. The latter passed, even singly, from one part to the other, and the people of the sea-coast towns readily trafficked with the garrison of Barcelona, when neither money nor threats could prevail on them to supply the British squadron. Claros and Milans were charged with conniving at this traffic, and of exacting money for the landing of corn, when their own people and soldiers were starving. But to such a degree was patriotism overlaid by the love of gain, that the colonial produce, seized in Barcelona, and other parts, was sold, by the enemy, to French merchants, and the latter undertook both to carry it off, and pay with provisions on the spot, which they successfully executed by means of Spanish vessels, corruptly licensed for the occasion by Catalan authorities.

Meanwhile the people generally accused the junta of extreme indolence, and Lacy, of treachery and tyranny, because of his arbitrary conduct in all things, but especially that after proclaiming a general rising, he had disarmed the Somatenes, and suppressed the independent bands. He had quarreled

with the British naval officers, was the avowed enemy of Erolles, the secret calumniator of Sarzfield, and withal a man of no courage or enterprise in the field. Nor was the story of his previous life calculated to check the bad opinion generally entertained of him. It was said that, being originally a Spanish officer, he was banished, for an intrigue, to the Canaries, from whence he deserted to the French, and again deserted to his own countrymen, when the war of independence broke out.

Under this man, the frauds, which characterize the civil departments of all armies in the field, became destructive, and the extent of the mischief may be gathered from a single fact. Notwithstanding the enormous supplies granted by England, the Catalans paid nearly three millions sterling for the expense of the war, besides contributions in kind, and yet their soldiers were always distressed for clothing, food, arms, and ammunition.

This amount of specie might excite doubt, were it not that here, as in Portugal, the quantity of coin accumulated from the expenditure of the armies and navies was immense. But gold is not always the synonyme of power in war, or of happiness in peace. Nothing could be more wretched than Catalonia. Individually the people were exposed to all the licentiousness of war, collectively to the robberies, and revenge, of both friends and enemies. When they attempted to supply the British vessels, the French menaced them with death; when they yielded to such threats, the English ships menaced them with bombardment, and plunder. All the roads were infested with brigands, and in the hills large bands of people, whose families and property had been destroyed, watched for straggling Frenchmen and small escorts, not to make war but to live on the booty; when this resource failed they plundered their own countrymen. While the land was thus harassed, the sea swarmed with privateers of all nations, differing from pirates only in name; and that no link in the chain of infamy might be wanting, the merchants of Gibraltar forced their smuggling trade at the ports, with a shameless disregard for the rights of the Spanish government. Catalonia seemed like some huge carcass, on which all manner of ravenous beasts, all obscene birds, and all reptiles had gathered to feed

CHAPTER III.

Operations in Valencia and Murcia—Suchet's able government of Valencia—O'Donel organizes a new army in Murcia—Origin of the Sicilian expedition to Spain—Secret intrigues against Napoleon in Italy and other parts—Lord William Bentinck proposes to invade Italy—Lord Wellington opposes it—The Russian admiral Tchichagoff projects a descent upon Italy—Vacillating conduct of the English ministers productive of great mischief—Lord William Bentinck sweeps the money-markets to the injury of lord Wellington's operations—Sir John Moore's plan for Sicily rejected—His ability and foresight proved by the ultimate result—Evil effects of bad government shewn by examples.

OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

SUCHET having recovered his health was again at the head of the troops, but the king's military authority was so irksome to him, that he despatched an officer to represent the inconvenience of it to the emperor, previous to that monarch's departure for Russia. The answer in some degree restored his independence; he was desired to hold his troops concentrated, and move them in the manner most

conducive to the interests of his own command. Hence, when Joseph, designing to act against lord Wellington in Estremadura, demanded the aid of one division, Suchet replied that he must then evacuate Valencia; and as the natural line of retreat for the French armies would, during the contemplated operations, be by the eastern provinces, it would be better to abandon Andalusia first! an answer calculated to convince Joseph that his authority in the field was still but a name.

Suchet, from a natural disposition towards order, and because his revenue from the fishery of the Albufera depended upon the tranquillity of the province, took infinite pains to confirm his power; and his mode of proceeding, at once prudent and firm, was wonderfully successful. Valencia, although one of the smallest provinces in Spain, and not naturally fertile, was, from the industry of the inhabitants, one of the richest. Combining manufactures with agriculture, it possessed great resources, but they had been injured by the war, without having been applied to its exigencies; and the people expected that a bloody vengeance would be taken for Calvo's murder of the French residents at the commencement of the contest. Their fears were soon allayed: discipline was strictly preserved, and Suchet, having suppressed the taxes imposed by the Spanish government, substituted others, which, being more equal, were less onerous. To protect the people from oppression in the collection, he published in every corner his demands, authorising resistance to contributions which were not named in his list and demanded by the proper officers; and he employed the native authorities, as he had done in Aragon. Thus, all impolitic restrictions upon the industry and traffic of the country being removed, the people found the government of the invaders less oppressive than their own.

Napoleon, in expectation of Suchet's conquest, had however imposed a war contribution, as a punishment for the death of the French residents, so heavy, that his lieutenant imagined Valencia would be quite unable to raise the sum; yet the emperor, who had calculated the Valencians' means by a comparison with those of Aragon, would not rescind the order. And so exact was his judgment, that Suchet, by accepting part payment, in kind, and giving a discount for prompt liquidation, satisfied this impost in one year, without much difficulty, and the current expenses of the army were provided for besides; yet neither did the people suffer as in other provinces, nor was their industry so cramped, nor their property so injured, as under their own government. Valencia therefore remained tranquil, and, by contrast, the mischief of negligence and disorder was made manifest.

The advantages derived from the conquest were even extended to the province of Aragon, and to the court of Joseph, for the contributions were diminished in the former, and large sums were remitted to the latter to meet Napoleon's grant of one-fifth of the war contributions in favour of the intrusive government. This prosperous state of French affairs in Valencia was established also in the face of an enemy daily increasing in strength. For the regent, Abispa, had given Blake's command to his own brother Joseph O'Donel, who collecting the remains of the armies of Murcia and Valencia, had raised new levies, and during Suchet's illness formed a fresh army of twelve or fourteen thousand men in the neighbourhood of Alicante. In the Balearic Isles also Roche and Whittingham's divisions were declared ready to take the field, and fifteen hundred British troops, commanded by general Ross, arrived

at Carthage. To avoid the fever there, these last remained on shipboard, and were thus more menacing to the enemy than on shore, because they seemed to be only awaiting the arrival of a new army, which the French knew to be coming from Sicily to the eastern coast of Spain. And as the descent of this army was the commencement of a remarkable episode in the history of the Peninsular War, it is proper to give an exact account of its origin and progress.

Sir John Stuart had been succeeded, in Sicily, by lord William Bentinck, a man of resolution, capacity, and spirit, just in his actions, and abhorring oppression, but of a sanguine, impetuous disposition. Being resolved to ameliorate the condition of the Sicilian people, after surmounting many difficulties, he removed the queen from power, vested the direction of affairs in the crown-prince, obtained from the barons a renunciation of their feudal privileges, and caused a representative constitution to be proclaimed. Believing then that the court was submissive because it was silent; that the barons would adhere to his system, because it gave them the useful power of legislation, in lieu of feudal privileges alloyed by ruinous expenses and the degradation of courtiers; because it gave them the dignity of independence at the cost only of maintaining the rights of the people and restoring the honour of their country:—believing thus, he judged that the large British force hitherto kept in Sicily, as much to overawe the court as to oppose the enemy, might be dispensed with; and that the expected improvement of the Sicilian army, and the attachment of the people to the new political system, would permit ten thousand men to be employed in aid of lord Wellington, or in Italy. In January, therefore, he wrote of these projects to the English ministers, and sent his brother to lord Wellington to consult upon the best mode of acting.

Such an opportune offer to create a diversion on the left flank of the French armies was eagerly accepted by Wellington, who immediately sent engineers, artificers, and a battering train complete, to aid the expected expedition. But lord William Bentinck was soon made sensible, that in large communities working constitutions are the offspring, and not the generators, of national feelings and habits. They cannot be built like cities in the desert, nor cast, as breakwaters, into the sea of public corruption, but gradually, and as the insect-rocks come up from the depths of the ocean, they must arise, if they are to bear the storms of human passions.

The Sicilian court opposed lord William with falsehood and intrigue; the constitution was secretly thwarted by the barons; the Neapolitan army, a body composed of foreigners of all nations, was diligently augmented, with a view to overawe both the English and the people; the revenues and the subsidy were alike misapplied, and the native Sicilian army, despised and neglected, was incapable of service. Finally, instead of going to Spain himself, with ten thousand good troops, lord William could only send a subordinate general with six thousand—British, Germans, Calabrese, Swiss, and Sicilians; the British and Germans only, being either morally or militarily well organized. To these, however, Roche's and Whittingham's levies, represented to be twelve or fourteen thousand strong, were added, the Spanish government having placed them at the disposition of general Maitland, the commander of the expedition. Thus, in May, twenty thousand men were supposed ready for a descent on Catalonia, to which quarter lord Wellington recommended they should proceed.

But now other objects were presented to lord William Bentinck's sanguine mind. The Austrian government, while treating with Napoleon, was secretly encouraging insurrections in Italy, Croatia, Dalmatia, the Venetian states, the Tyrol and Switzerland. English, as well as Austrian agents, were active to organize a vast conspiracy against the French emperor, and there was a desire, especially on the part of England, to create a kingdom for one of the Austrian archdukes. Murat was discontented with France, the Montenegrins were in arms on the Adriatic coast, and the prospect of a descent upon Italy in unison with the wishes of the people, appeared so promising to lord William Bentinck, that supposing himself to have a discretionary power, he stopped the expedition to Catalonia, reasoning thus.

"In Spain, only six thousand middling troops can be employed on a secondary operation, and for a limited period, whereas twelve thousand British soldiers, and six thousand men composing the Neapolitan army of Sicily, can land in Italy, a grand theatre, where success will most efficaciously assist Spain. The obnoxious Neapolitan force being thus removed, the native Sicilian army can be organized and the new constitution established with more certainty." The time, also, he thought critical for Italy, not so for Spain, which would suffer but a temporary deprivation, seeing that failure in Italy would not preclude after aid to Spain.

Impressed with these notions, which, it must be confessed, were both plausible and grand, he permitted the expedition, already embarked, to sail for Palma in Sardinia, and Mahon in Minorca, yet merely as a blind, because, from those places, he could easily direct the troops against Italy, and meanwhile they menaced the French in Spain. But the conception of vast and daring enterprises, even the execution of them up to a certain point, is not very uncommon; they fail only by a little! that little is, however, the essence of genius, the phial of wit, which, held to Orlando's nostril, changed him from a frantic giant to a perfect commander.

It was in the consideration of such nice points of military policy that lord Wellington's solid judgement was always advantageously displayed. Neither the greatness of this project nor the apparent facility of execution weighed with him. He thought the recovery of Italy by the power of the British arms would be a glorious, and might be a feasible exploit, but it was only in prospect; Spain was the better field, the war in the Peninsula existed, years had been devoted to the establishment of a solid base there, and experience had proved that the chance of victory was not imaginary. England could not support two armies. The principle of concentration of power on an important point was as applicable here as on a field of battle, and although Italy might be the more vital point, it would be advisable to continue the war already established in Spain: nay it would be better to give up Spain, and direct the whole power of England against Italy, rather than undertake double operations, on such an extensive scale, at a moment when the means necessary to sustain one were so scanty.

The ministers, apparently convinced by this reasoning, forbade lord William Bentinck to proceed, and they expressed their discontent at his conduct. nevertheless their former instructions had unquestionably conferred on him a discretionary power to act in Italy, and so completely had he been misled by their previous despatches, that besides delaying the expedition to Spain, he had placed twelve hundred men under admiral Fremantle, to assist the Montenegrins. And he was actually entangled in

a negotiation with the Russian admiral, Greig, relative to the march of a Russian army; a march planned, as it would appear, without the knowledge of the Russian court, and which, from the wildness of its conception and the mischief it would probably have effected, deserves notice.

While the Russian war was still uncertain, admiral Tchtchagoff, who commanded sixty thousand men on the Danube, proposed to march with them, through Bosnia and the ancient Epirus, to the mouths of the Cattaro, and, there embarking, to commence the impending contest with France in Italy. He was, however, without resources, and expecting to arrive in a starving and miserable condition on the Adriatic, demanded, through admiral Greig, then commanding a squadron in the Mediterranean, that lord William Bentinck should be ready to supply him with fresh arms, ammunition, and provisions, and to aid him with an auxiliary force. That nobleman saw at a glance the absurdity of this scheme, but he was falsely informed that Tchtchagoff, trusting to his good will, had already commenced the march; and thus he had only to choose between aiding an ally, whose force, if it arrived at all, and was supplied by England, would help his own project, or permit it, to avoid perishing, to ravage Italy, and so change the people of that country from secret friends into deadly enemies. It would be foreign to this history to consider what effect the absence of Tchtchagoff's army during the Russian campaign would have had upon Napoleon's operations, but this was the very force whose march to the Beresina afterwards obliged the emperor to abandon Smolensko, and continue the retreat to Warsaw.

It was in the midst of these affairs, that the English minister's imperative orders to look only to the coast of Spain arrived. The negotiation with the Russians was immediately stopped, the project of landing in Italy was relinquished, and the expedition, already sent to the Adriatic, was recalled. Meanwhile the descent on Catalonia had been delayed, and as a knowledge of its destination had reached Suchet through the French minister of war, and through the rumours rife amongst the Spaniards, all his preparations to meet it were matured. Nor was this the only mischief produced by the English minister's want of clear views and decided system of policy. Lord William Bentinck had been empowered to raise money on bills for his own exigencies, and being desirous to form a military chest for his project in Italy, he had invaded lord Wellington's money markets. With infinite trouble and difficulty that general had just opened a source of supply at the rate of five shillings and four-pence, to five shillings and eight-pence the dollar, when lord William Bentinck's agents offering six shillings and eight-pence, swept four millions from the markets, and thus, as shall be hereafter shewn, seriously embarrassed lord Wellington's operations in the field.

This unhappy commencement of the Sicilian expedition led to other errors, and its arrival on the coast of Spain did not take place, until after the campaign in Castile had commenced; but as its proceedings connected the warfare of Valencia immediately with that of Catalonia, and the whole with lord Wellington's operations, they cannot be properly treated of in this place. It is, however, worthy of observation, how an illiberal and factious policy, inevitably recoils upon its authors.

In 1807, sir John Moore, with that sagacity and manliness which distinguished his career through life, had informed the ministers, that no hope of a successful attack on the French in Italy could be entertained while the British army upheld the ty-

rannical system of the dissolute and treacherous Neapolitan court in Sicily. And as no change for the better could be expected while the queen was allowed to govern, he proposed, that the British cabinet should either relinquish Sicily, or, assuming the entire control of the island, seize the queen and send her to her native Austria. This he judged to be the first step necessary to render the large British army in Sicily available for the field, because the Sicilian people could then be justly governed, and thus only could the organization of an effective native force attached to England, and fitted to offer freedom to Italy, be effected.

He spoke not of constitutions but of justice to the people, and hence his proposal was rejected as a matter of Jacobinism. Mr. Drummond, the English plenipotentiary, even betrayed it to the queen, a woman not without magnanimity, yet so capable of bloody deeds, that, in 1810, she secretly proposed to Napoleon the perpetration of a second Sicilian vespers upon the English. The emperor, detesting such guilt, only answered by throwing her agent into prison, yet the traces of the conspiracy were detected by the British authorities in 1811; and in 1812 lord William Bentinck was forced to seize the government, in the manner before recommended by Moore, and did finally expel the queen by force. But because these measures were not resorted to in time, he was now, with an army of from twenty-five to thirty thousand men, sixteen thousand of which were British, only able to detach a mixed force of six thousand to aid lord Wellington. And at the same time the oppression of Ireland required that sixty thousand fine soldiers should remain idle at home, while France, with a Russian war on hand, was able to overmatch the allies in Spain. Bad government is a scourge with a double thong!

CHAPTER IV.

Operations in Andalusia and Estremadura—Advantage of lord Wellington's position shewn—Soult's plans vast but well-considered—He designs to besiege Tarifa, Alcant, and Carthagena, and march upon Lisbon—Restores the French interest at the court of Morocco—English embassy to the Moorish emperor fails—Soult bombards Cadiz, and menaces a serious attack—Ballesteros, his rash conduct—He is defeated at Bornos—Effect of his defeat upon the allies in Estremadura—Foy succours the fort of Mirabete—Hill is reinforced—Drouet falls back to Azagua—Followed by Hill—General Slade defeated by Lallemande in a cavalry combat at Macquilla—Exploit of cornet Strenowitz—General Barrois marches to reinforce Drouet by the road of St. Ollala—Hill falls back to Albuera—His disinterested conduct.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.

A SHORT time previous to Hill's enterprise against Almaraz, Soult, after driving Ballesteros from the Ronda, and restoring the communication with Grenada, sent three thousand men into the Niebla; partly to interrupt the march of some Spaniards coming from Cadiz to garrison Badajos, partly to menace Penne Villemur and Morillo, who still lingered on the Odiel against the wishes of Wellington. The French arguments were more effectual. Those generals immediately filed along the frontier of Portugal towards Estremadura; they were hastily followed by the Spanish troops sent from Cadiz, and the militia of the Algarves were called out to defend the Portuguese frontier. Soult then remained on the defensive, for he expected the advance of lord Wellington, which the approach of so many troops,

the seeming reluctance of the Spaniards to quit the Niebla, the landing of fresh men from Cadiz at Ayamonte, and the false rumours purposely set afloat by the British general seemed to render certain. Nor did the surprise of Almaraz, which he thought to be aimed at the army of the south and not against the army of Portugal, alter his views.

The great advantage which lord Wellington had gained by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos was now very clearly illustrated; for, as he could at will advance either against the north or the south or the centre, the French generals in each quarter expected him, and they were anxious that the others should regulate their movements accordingly. None would help the other, and the secret plans of all were paralysed until it was seen on which side the thunderbolt would fall. This was of most consequence in the south, for Soult's plans were vast, dangerous, and ripe for execution.

After the fall of Badajos he judged it unwise to persevere in pushing a head of troops into Estremadura, while his rear and flanks were exposed to attacks from Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Murcia; but it was essential, he thought, to crush Ballesteros before his forces should be increased, and this was not to be effected while that general could flee to Gibraltar on the one side and Tarifa on the other. Whereupon Soult had resolved first to reduce Tarifa with a view to the ruin of Ballesteros, and then to lay siege to Carthagena and Alicante, and he only awaited the development of Wellington's menacing demonstrations against Andalusia to commence his own operations. Great and difficult his plan was, yet profoundly calculated to effect his main object, which was to establish his base so firmly in Andalusia that, maugre the forces in Cadiz and the Isla, he might safely enter upon and follow up regular offensive operations in Estremadura and against Portugal, instead of the partial uncertain expeditions hitherto adopted. In fine, he designed to make lord Wellington feel that there was a powerful army within a few marches of Lisbon.

Thinking that Carthagena and Tarifa, and even Alicante must fall, with the aid of Suchet which he expected, or that the siege of the first would bring down Hill's corps, and all the disposable Spanish troops to save it, he desired that the army of Portugal and the army of the centre should operate so as to keep lord Wellington north of the Tagus. He could then by himself carry on the sieges he contemplated, and yet leave a force under Drouet on the edge of Estremadura, strong enough to oblige Hill to operate in the direction of Carthagena instead of Seville. And if this should happen as he expected, he proposed suddenly to concentrate all his finely organized and experienced troops, force on a general battle, and, if victorious, the preparations being made before hand, to follow up the blow by a rapid march upon Portugal, and so enter Lisbon; or by bringing Wellington in all haste to the defence of that capital, confine the war, while Napoleon was in Russia, to a corner of the Peninsula.

This great project was strictly in the spirit of the emperor's instructions. For that consummate commander had desired his lieutenants to make lord Wellington feel that his enemies were not passively defensive. He had urged them to press the allies close on each flank, and he had endeavoured to make Marmont understand that, although there was no object to be attained by entering the north-east of Portugal and fighting a general battle on ground favourable to lord Wellington, it was contrary to all military principles, to withdraw several days' march from the allies' outposts, and by such a timid defensive

system, to give the English general the power of choosing when and where to strike. Now the loss of Badajos, and the difficulty of maintaining a defensive war against the increasing forces of the allies in the south of Andalusia, rendered it extremely onerous for Soult to press Wellington's flank in Estremadura; and it was therefore a profound modification of the emperor's views, to urge the king and Marmont to active operation in the north, while he besieged Tarifa and Carthagena, keeping his army in mass ready for a sudden stroke in the field, if fortune brought the occasion, and if otherwise, sure of fixing a solid base for future operations against Portugal.

The duke of Dalmatia wished to have commenced his operations by the siege of Tarifa in May, when Wellington's return to Beira had relieved him from the fear of an immediate invasion of Andalusia; but the failure of the harvest in 1811, and the continual movements during the winter, had so reduced his magazines, both of provisions and ammunition, that he could not undertake the operation until the new harvest was ripe, and fresh convoys had replenished his exhausted stores. His soldiers were already on short allowance, and famine raged amongst the people of the country. Meanwhile his agents in Morocco had so firmly re-established the French interests there that the emperor refused all supplies to the British, and even fitted out a squadron to insure obedience to his orders. To counteract this mischief, the Gibraltar merchant, Viali, who had been employed in the early part of the war by sir Hew Dalrymple, was sent by sir Henry Wellesley with a mission to the court of Fez, which failed, and it was said, from the intrigues of the notorious Charmilly, who was then at Tangier, and being connected by marriage with the English consul there, unsuspected: indeed, from a mean hatred to sir John Moore, there were not wanting persons in power who endeavoured still to uphold this man.

So far every thing promised well for Soult's plans, and he earnestly demanded that all his detachments, and sufficient reinforcements, together with artillery, officers, money, and convoys of ammunition should be sent to him for the siege of Carthagena. Pending their arrival, to divert the attention of the allies, he repaired to Port St. Mary where the French had, from the circumstances of the war in Estremadura, been a long time inactive. He brought down with him a number of the Villantroy mortars, and having collected about thirty gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, commenced a serious bombardment of Cadiz on the 16th of May. While thus engaged, a sudden landing from English vessels was effected on the Grenada coast, Almeria was abandoned by the French, the people rose along the sea line, and general Frere, advancing from Murcia, entrenched himself in the position of Venta de Bahul, on the eastern frontier of Grenada. He was indeed surprised and beaten with loss, and the insurrection on the coast was soon quelled, but these things delayed the march of the reinforcements intended for Drouet; meanwhile Hill surprised Almaraz, and Ballesteros, whose forces had subsisted during the winter and spring upon the stores of Gibraltar, advanced against Conroux's division then in observation at Bornos on the Guadalete.

This Spanish general caused equal anxiety to Soult and to Wellington, because his proceedings involved one of those intricate knots by which the important parts of both their operations were fastened. Lord Wellington judged, that, while a large and increasing corps which could be aided by a disembarkation of five or six thousand men from the

Isla de Leon, menaced the blockade of Cadiz and the communications between Seville and Grenada, Soult must keep a considerable body in observation, and, consequently, Hill would be a match for the French in Estremadura. But the efficacy of this diversion depended upon avoiding battles, seeing that if Ballesteros' army was crushed, the French, reinforced in Estremadura, could drive Hill over the Tagus, which would inevitably bring Wellington himself to his succour. Soult was for the same reason as earnest to bring the Spanish general to action, as Wellington was to prevent a battle, and Ballesteros, a man of infinite arrogance, despised both. Having obtained money and supplies from Gibraltar to replace the expenditure of his former excursion against Seville, he marched with eight thousand men against Conroux, and that Frenchman, aware of his intention, induced him, by an appearance of fear, to attack an entrenched camp in a disorderly manner. On the 1st of June the battle took place, and Conroux issuing forth unexpectedly killed or took fifteen hundred Spaniards, and drove the rest to the hills, from whence they retreated to San Roque. How this victory was felt in Estremadura shall now be shewn.

The loss of Almaraz had put all the French corps in movement. A division of Marmont's army crossed the Gredos mountains, to replace Foy in the valley of the Tagus, and the latter general passing that river by the bridge of Arzobispo, moved through the mountains of Guadalupe, and succoured the garrison of Mirabete on the 26th of May. When he retired the partidas of the Guadalupe renewed the blockade, and Hill, now strongly reinforced by lord Wellington, advanced to Zafra, whereupon Drouet, unable to meet him, fell back to Azagua. Hill, wishing to protect the gathering of the harvest, then detached Penne Villemor's horsemen from Llerena on the right flank, and general Slade with the third dragoon guards and the royals, from Llera on the left flank; General Lallemande, having a like object, came forward with two regiments of French dragoons, on the side of Valencia de las Torres, whereupon Hill, hoping to cut him off, placed Slade's dragoons in a wood with directions to await further orders. Slade hearing that Lallemande was so near, and no wise superior to himself in numbers, forgot his orders, advanced and drove the French cavalry with loss beyond the defile of Maquilla, a distance of eight miles; and through the pass also the British rashly galloped in pursuit, the general riding in the foremost ranks, and the supports joining tumultuously in the charge.

But in the plain beyond stood Lallemande with his reserves well in hand. He broke the disorderly English mass thus rushing on him, killed or wounded forty-eight men, pursued the rest for six miles, recovered all his own prisoners, and took more than a hundred, including two officers, from his adversary; and the like bitter results will generally attend what is called "*dashing*" in war, which in other words means courage without prudence. Two days after this event the Austrian Strenowitz, whose exploits have been before noticed, marched with fifty men of the same regiments, to fetch off some of the English prisoners who had been left by the French under a slender guard in the village of Maquilla. Eighty of the enemy met him on the march, yet by fine management he overthrew him, and losing only one man himself, killed many French, executed his mission, and returned with an officer and twenty other prisoners.

Such was the state of affairs, when the defeat of Ballesteros at Bornos, enabled Soult to reinforce

Drouet, with Barois's division of infantry and two divisions of cavalry; they marched across the Morena, but for reasons, to be hereafter mentioned, by the royal road of St. Ollala, a line of direction which obliged Drouet to make a flank march by his left towards Llerena to form his junction with them. It was effected on the 18th, and the allies then fell back gradually towards Albuera, where, being joined by four Portuguese regiments from Badajoz, and by the fifth Spanish army, Hill formed a line of battle furnishing twenty thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns.

Drouet had only twenty-one thousand men, of which three thousand were cavalry, with eighteen pieces of artillery; the allies were therefore the most numerous, but the French army was better composed, and battle seemed inevitable, for both generals had discretionary orders. However the French cavalry did not advance further than Almendrales, and Hill, who had shewn himself so daring at Aroyo Molino and Almaraz, now, with an uncommon mastery of ambition, refrained from an action which promised him unbounded fame, simply because he was uncertain whether the state of lord Wellington's operations in Castile, then in full progress, would warrant one. His recent exploits had been so splendid that a great battle gained at this time would, with the assistance of envious malice, have placed his reputation on a level with Wellington's. Yet he was habituated to command, and his adversary's talents were moderate; his forbearance must therefore be taken as a proof of the purest patriotism.

Early in July the French cavalry entered Almendrales and Santa Marta, cut off two hundred Spanish horsemen, and surprised a small British cavalry post; Hill, who had then received fresh instructions, and was eager to fight, quickly drove them with loss from both places. Drouet immediately concentrated his forces and retired to La Granja, and was followed by the allies, but the account of the transactions in Andalusia and Estremadura must be here closed, because those which followed belong to the general combinations. And as the causes of these last movements, and their effects upon the general campaign, are of an intricate nature, to avoid confusion the explanation of them is reserved for another place; meanwhile I will endeavour to describe that political chaos, amidst which Wellington's army appeared as the ark amongst the meeting clouds and rising waters of the deluge.

CHAPTER V.

Political situation of France—Secret policy of the European courts—Causes of the Russian war—Napoleon's grandeur and power—Scene on the Niemen—Design attributed to Napoleon of concentrating the French armies behind the Ebro—No traces of such an intention to be discovered—His proposals for peace considered—Political state of England—Effects of the continental system—Extravagance, harshness, and improvident conduct of the English ministers—Dispute with America—Political state of Spain—Intrigues of Carlotta—New scheme of mediation with the colonies—Mr. Sydenham's opinion of it—New constitution adopted—Succession to the crown fixed—Abolition of the Inquisition agitated—Discontent of the clergy and absolute-monarchy-men—Neglect of the military affairs—Dangerous state of the country—Plot to deliver up Ceuta—Foreign policy of Spain—Negotiations of Bardaxi at Stockholm—Fresh English subsidy—Plan of enlisting Spanish soldiers in British regiments fails—The councillor of state Sobral offers to carry off Ferdinand from Valençay, but Ferdinand rejects his offer—Joseph talks of assembling

a cortes at Madrid, but secretly negotiates with that in the Isla.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.

THE unmatched power of Napoleon's genius was now being displayed in a wonderful manner. His interest, his inclination, and his expectation were alike opposed to a war with Russia, but Alexander and himself, each hoping that a menacing display of strength would reduce the other to negotiation, advanced, step by step, until blows could no longer be avoided. Napoleon, a man capable of sincere friendship, had relied too much and too long on the existence of a like feeling in the Russian emperor; and misled, perhaps, by the sentiment of his own energy, did not sufficiently allow for the daring intrigues of a court, where secret combinations of the nobles formed the real governing power.

That the cabinet of Petersburg should be, more than ordinarily, subject to such combinations at this period, was the necessary consequence of the greatness of the interests involved in the treaties of Tilsit and Erfurth; the continental system had so deeply injured the fortunes of the Russian noblemen, that their sovereign's authority in support of it was as nothing. During the Austrian war of 1809, when Alexander was yet warm from Napoleon's society at Erfurth, the aid given to France was a mockery, and a desire to join a northern confederation against Napoleon was even then scarcely concealed at St. Petersburg, where the French ambassador was coldly treated. The royal family of Prussia were, it is true, at the same time, mortified by a reception which inclined them to side with France, against the wishes of their people and their ministers; but in Russia, Romanzow alone was averse to choose that moment to declare against Napoleon. And this was so certain that Austria, anticipating the explosion, was only undecided whether the king of Prussia should be punished or the people rewarded, whether she herself should befriend or plunder the Prussian monarchy.

At that time also, the Russian naval commander, in the Adriatic, being ordered to sail to Ancona for the purpose of convoying Marmont's troops from Dalmatia to Italy, refused, on the plea that his ships were not sea-worthy; yet secretly he informed the governor of Trieste that they would be in excellent order to assist an Austrian corps against the French! Admiral Tchitchagoff's strange project of marching upon Italy from Bucharest has been already noticed, and it is remarkable that this expedition was to be conducted upon popular principles, the interests of the Sicilian court being to be made subservient to the wishes of the people. At a later period, in 1812, admiral Grieg proposed to place an auxiliary Russian army under either Wellington or lord William Bentinck, and it was accepted; but when the Russian ambassador in London was applied to upon the subject, he unequivocally declared that the emperor knew nothing of the matter!

With a court so situated, angry negotiations once commenced rendered war inevitable, and the more especially that the Russian cabinet, which had long determined on hostilities, though undecided as to the time of drawing the sword, was well aware of the secret designs and proceedings of Austria in Italy, and of Murat's discontent. The Hollanders were known to desire independence, and the deep hatred which the people of Prussia bore to the French was a matter of notoriety. Bernadotte, who very early had resolved to cast down the ladder by which he rose, was the secret adviser of these practices against Napoleon's power in Italy, and he was also

in communication with the Spaniards. Thus Napoleon, having a war in Spain which required three hundred thousand men to keep in a balanced state, was forced, by resistless circumstances, into another and more formidable contest in the distant north, when the whole of Europe was prepared to rise upon his lines of communication, and when his extensive sea-frontier was exposed to the all-powerful navy of Great Britain.

A conqueror's march to Moscow, amidst such dangers, was a design more vast, more hardy, more astounding than ever before entered the imagination of man; yet it was achieved, and solely by the force of his genius. For having organized two hundred thousand French soldiers, as a pretorian guard, he stepped resolutely into the heart of Germany, and monarchs and nations bent submissively before him; secret hostility ceased, and, with the exception of Bernadotte, the crowned and anointed plotters quitted their work to follow his chariot-wheels. Dresden saw the ancient story of the King of Kings renewed in his person; and the two hundred thousand French soldiers arrived on the Niemen in company with two hundred thousand allies. On that river four hundred thousand troops, I have seen the imperial returns, were assembled by this wonderful man, all disciplined warriors, and, notwithstanding their different national feelings, all proud of the unmatched genius of their leader. Yet, even in that hour of dizzy elevation, Napoleon, deeply sensible of the inherent weakness of a throne unhalloved by time, described by one emphatic phrase the delicacy of his political situation. During the passage of the Niemen, twelve thousand cuirassiers, whose burnished armour flashed in the sun while their cries of salutation pealed in unison with the thunder of the horses' feet, were passing like a foaming torrent towards the river, when Napoleon turned and thus addressed Gouvion St. Cyr, whose republican principles were well known,

"No monarch ever had such an army?"

"No, sire."

"The French are a fine people; they deserve more liberty, and they shall have it; but, St. Cyr, no liberty of the press! That army, mighty as it is, could not resist the songs of Paris!"

Such, then, was the nature of Napoleon's power that success alone could sustain it; success which depended as much upon others' exertions as upon his own stupendous genius, for Russia was far distant from Spain. It is said, I know not upon what authority, that he at one moment, had resolved to concentrate all the French troops in the Peninsula behind the Ebro during this expedition to Russia, but the capture of Blake's force at Valencia changed his views. Of this design there are no traces in the movements of his armies, nor in the captured papers of the king, and there are some indications of a contrary design; for at that period several foreign agents were detected examining the lines of Torres Vedras, and on a Frenchman, who killed himself when arrested in the Brazils, were found papers proving a mission for the same object. Neither is it easy to discern the advantage of thus crowding three hundred thousand men on a narrow slip of ground, where they must have been fed from France, already overburthened with the expenses of the Russian war; and this when they were numerous enough, if rightly handled, to have maintained themselves on the resources of Spain, and near the Portuguese frontier, for a year at least.

To have given up all the Peninsula, west of the Ebro, would have been productive of no benefit, save what might have accrued from the jealousy

which the Spaniards already displayed towards their allies; but if that jealousy, as was probable, had forced the British general away, he could have carried his army to Italy, or have formed in Germany the nucleus of a great northern confederation on the emperor's rear. Portugal was, therefore, in truth, the point of all Europe in which the British strength was least dangerous to Napoleon during the invasion of Russia; moreover, an immediate war with that empire was not a certain event previous to the capture of Valencia. Napoleon was undoubtedly anxious to avoid it while the Spanish contest continued; yet, with a far-reaching European policy, in which his English adversaries were deficient, he foresaw and desired to check the growing strength of that fearful and wicked power which now menaces the civilized world.

The proposal for peace which he made to England before his departure for the Niemen is another circumstance where his object seems to have been misrepresented. It was called a device to reconcile the French to the Russian war; but they were as eager for that war as he could wish them to be, and it is more probable that it sprung from a secret misgiving, a prophetic sentiment of the consequent power of Russia, lifted, as she then would be, towards universal tyranny, by the very arm which he had raised to restrain her. The ostensible ground of his quarrel with the emperor Alexander was the continental system; yet, in this proposal for peace, he offered to acknowledge the house of Braganza in Portugal, the house of Bourbon in Sicily, and to withdraw his army from the Peninsula, if England would join him in guaranteeing the crown of Spain to Joseph, together with a constitution to be arranged by a national Cortes. This was a virtual renunciation of the continental system for the sake of peace with England; and a proposal which obviated the charge of aiming at universal dominion, seeing that Austria, Spain, Portugal, and England would have retained their full strength, and the limits of his empire would have been fixed. The offer was made also at a time when the emperor was certainly more powerful than he had ever yet been, when Portugal was, by the avowal of Wellington himself, far from secure, and Spain quite exhausted. At peace with England, Napoleon could easily have restored the Polish nation, and Russia would have been repressed. Now, Poland has fallen, and Russia stalks in the plenitude of her barbarous tyranny.

Political state of England.—The new administration, despised by the country, was not the less powerful in parliament; its domestic proceedings were therefore characterized by all the corruption and tyranny of Mr. Pitt's system, without his redeeming genius. The press was persecuted with malignant ferocity, and the government sought to corrupt all that it could not trample upon. Repeated successes had rendered the particular contest in the Peninsula popular with the ardent spirits of the nation, and war-prices passed for glory with the merchants, land-owners, and tradesmen; but as the price of food augmented faster than the price of labour, the poorer people suffered; they rejoiced, indeed, at their country's triumphs, because the sound of victory is always pleasing to warlike ears, but they were discontented. Meanwhile all thinking men, who were not biassed by factions, or dazzled by military splendour, perceived in the enormous expenses incurred to repress the democratic principle, and in the consequent transfer of property, the sure foundation of future reaction and revolution. The distresses of the working classes had already produced partial insurrections, and the nation at

large was beginning to perceive that the governing powers, whether representative or executive, were rapacious usurpers of the people's rights; a perception quickened by malignant prosecutions, by the insolent extravagance with which the public money was lavished on the family of Mr. Perceval, and by the general profusion at home, while lord Wellesley declared that the war languished for want of sustenance abroad.

Napoleon's continental system, although in the nature of a sumptuary law, which the desires of men will never suffer to exist long in vigour, was yet so efficient, that the British government was forced to encourage and protect illicit trading, to the great detriment of mercantile morality. The island of Heligoland was the chief point of deposit for this commerce, and either by trading energy, or by the connivance of continental governments, the emperor's system was continually baffled; nevertheless its effects will not quickly pass away; it pressed sorely upon the manufacturers at the time, and by giving rise to rival establishments on the continent, has awakened in Germany a commercial spirit by no means favourable to England's manufacturing superiority.

But ultimate consequences were never considered by the British ministers; the immediate object was to procure money, and by virtually making bank-notes a legal tender, they secured unlimited means at home, through the medium of loans and taxes, which the corruption of the parliament insured to them, and which, by a reaction, insured the corruption of the parliament. This resource failed abroad. They could, and did, send to all the allies of England, enormous supplies in kind, because to do so, was, in the way of contracts, an essential part of the system of corruption at home; a system aptly described, as bribing one-half of the nation with the money of the other half, in order to misgovern both. Specie was however only to be had in comparatively small quantities, and at a premium so exorbitant, that even the most reckless politician trembled for the ultimate consequences.

The foreign policy of the government was very simple, namely, to bribe all powers to war down France. Hence to Russia every thing, save specie, was granted; and hence also, amicable relations with Sweden were immediately re-established, and the more readily that this power had lent herself to the violation of the continental system by permitting the entry of British goods at Stralsund; but wherever wisdom, or skill, was required, the English minister's resources failed altogether. With respect to Sicily, Spain, and Portugal, this truth was notorious; and to preserve the political support of the trading interests at home, a degrading and deceitful policy, quite opposed to the spirit of lord Wellington's counsels, was followed in regard to the revolted Spanish colonies.

The short-sighted injustice of the system was however most glaring with regard to the United States of America. Mutual complaints, the dregs of the war of independence, had long characterized the intercourse between the British and American governments, and these discontents were turned into extreme hatred by the progress of the war with France. The British government in 1806 proclaimed, contrary to the law of nations, a blockade of the French coast, which could not be enforced. Napoleon, in return, issued the celebrated decrees of Berlin and Milan, which produced the no less celebrated orders in council. The commerce of all neutrals was thus extinguished by the arrogance of the belligerents; but the latter very soon finding

that their mutual convenience required some relaxation of mutual violence, granted licences to each other's ships and by this scandalous evasion of their own policy caused the whole of the evil to fall upon the neutral, who was yet called the friend of both parties.

The Americans, unwilling to go to war with two such powerful states, were yet resolved not to submit to the tyranny of either; but the injustice of the English government was the most direct and extended in its operations, and it was rendered infinitely more bitter by the violence used towards the seamen of the United States: not less than six thousand sailors, it was said, were taken from merchant vessels on the high seas, and forced to serve in the British men-of-war. Wherefore, after first passing retaliatory, or rather warning acts, called the non-intercourse, non-importation, and embargo acts, the Americans finally declared war, at the moment when the British government, alarmed at the consequences of their own injustice, had just rescinded the orders in council.

The immediate effects of these proceedings on the contest in the Peninsula, shall be noticed in another place, but the ultimate effects on England's prosperity have not yet been unfolded. The struggle prematurely told the secret of American strength, and it has drawn the attention of the world to a people, who, notwithstanding the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the most horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit, and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous, do in their general government uphold civil institutions, which have startled the crazy despotisms of Europe.

Political state of Spain.—Bad government is more hurtful than direct war; the ravages of the last are soon repaired, and the public mind is often purified and advanced by the trial of adversity, but the evils springing from the former, seem interminable. In the Isla de Leon the unseemly currents of folly, although less raging than before, continued to break open new channels and yet abandoned none of the old. The intrigues of the princess Carlotta were unremitted, and though the danger of provoking the populace of Cadiz, restrained and frightened her advocates in the cortes, she opposed the English diplomacy, with reiterated, and not quite unfounded accusations, that the revolt of the colonies was being perfidiously fostered by Great Britain:—a charge well calculated to lower the influence of England, especially in regard to the scheme of mediation, which being revived in April by lord Castlereagh, was received by the Spaniards with outward coldness, and a secret resolution to reject it altogether; nor were they in any want of reasons to justify their proceedings.

This mediation had been commenced by lord Wellesley, when the quarrel between the mother country and the colonies was yet capable of adjustment; it was now renewed when it could not succeed. English commissioners were appointed to carry it into execution; the duke of Infantado was to join them on the part of Spain, and at first Mr. Stuart was to have formed part of the commission, Mr. Sydenham being to succeed him at Lisbon, but finally he remained in Portugal and Mr. Sydenham was attached to the commission, whose composition he thus described.

"I do not understand a word of the Spanish language, I am unacquainted with the Spanish character, I know very little of Old Spain, and I am quite ignorant of the state of the colonies, yet I am part of a commission composed of men of different pro-

fessions, views, habits, feelings, and opinions. The mediation proposed is at least a year too late, it has been forced upon the government of Old Spain, I have no confidence in the ministers who employ me, and I am fully persuaded that they have not the slightest confidence in me."

The first essential object was to have Bardaxi's secret article, which required England to join Old Spain if the mediation failed, withdrawn; but as this could not be done without the consent of the cortes, the publicity thus given would have ruined the credit of the mediation with the colonists. Nor would the distrust of the latter have been unfounded, for though lord Wellesley had offered the guarantee of Great Britain to any arrangement made under her mediation, his successors would not do so!

"They empower us," said Mr. Sydenham, "to negotiate and sign a treaty, but will not guarantee the execution of it! My opinion is, that the formal signature of a treaty by plenipotentiaries is in itself a solemn guarantee, if there is good faith and fair dealing in the transaction; and I believe that this opinion will be confirmed by the authority of every writer on the law of nations. But this is certainly not the doctrine of our present ministers, they make a broad distinction between the ratification of a treaty and the intention of seeing it duly observed."

The failure of such a scheme was inevitable. The Spaniards wanted the commissioners to go first to the Caraccas, where the revolt being full blown, nothing could be effected; the British government insisted that they should go to Mexico, where the dispute had not yet been pushed to extremities. After much useless diplomacy, which continued until the end of the year, the negotiation, as Mr. Sydenham had predicted, proved abortive.

In March the new constitution of Spain had been solemnly adopted, and a decree settling the succession of the crown was promulgated. The infant Francisco de Paula, the queen of Etruria, and their respective descendants were excluded from the succession, which was to fall first to the princess Carlotta if the infant don Carlos failed of heirs, then to the hereditary princess of the Two Sicilies, and so on, the empress of France and her descendants being especially excluded. This exhibition of popular power, under the pretext of baffling Napoleon's schemes, struck at the principle of legitimacy. And when the extraordinary cortes decided that the ordinary cortes, which ought to assemble every year, should not be convoked until October 1813, and thus secured to itself a tenure of power for two years instead of one, the discontent increased both at Cadiz and in the provinces, and a close connection was kept up between the malcontents and the Portuguese government, which was then the strong hold of arbitrary power in the Peninsula.

The local junta of Estremadura adopted Carlotta's claims, in their whole extent, and communicated on the subject, at first secretly with the Portuguese regency, and then more openly with Mr. Stuart. Their scheme was to remove all the acting provincial authorities, and to replace them with persons acknowledging Carlotta's sovereignty; they even declared that they would abide by the new constitution, only so far as it acknowledged what they called legitimate power, in other words, the princess was to be sole regent. Nevertheless this party was not influenced by Carlotta's intrigues, for they would not join her agents in any outcry against the British; they acted upon the simple principle of opposing the encroachments of democracy, and they desired to know how England would view their proceedings. The other provinces received the new

constitution coldly, and the Biscayens angrily rejected it as opposed to their ancient privileges. In this state of public feeling, the abolition of the Inquisition, a design now openly agitated, offered a point around which all the clergy, and all that the clergy could influence, gathered against the cortes, which was also weakened by its own factions; yet the republicans gained strength, and they were encouraged by the new constitution established in Sicily, which also alarmed their opponents, and the fear and distrust extended to the government of Portugal.

However, amidst all the varying subjects of interest the insane project of reducing the colonies by force, remained a favourite with all parties; nor was it in relation to the colonies only, that these men, who were demanding aid from other nations, in the names of freedom, justice, and humanity, proved themselves to be devoid of those attributes themselves. "The humane object of the abolition of the slave-trade has been frustrated," said lord Castlereagh, "because not only Spanish subjects but Spanish public officers and governors, in various parts of the Spanish colonies, are instrumental to, and accomplices in the crimes of the contraband slave-traders of Great Britain and America, furnishing them with flags, papers, and solemn documents to entitle them to the privileges of Spanish cruisers, and to represent their property as Spanish."

With respect to the war in Spain itself, all manner of mischief was abroad. The regular cavalry had been entirely destroyed, and when, with the secret permission of their own government, some distinguished Austrian officers, proffered their services to the regency, to restore that arm, they were repelled. Nearly all the field artillery had been lost in action, the arsenals at Cadiz were quite exhausted, and most of the heavy guns on the works of the Isla were rendered unserviceable by constant and useless firing; the stores of shot were diminished in an alarming manner, no sums were appropriated to the support of the founderies, and when the British artillery officers made formal representations of this dangerous state of affairs, it only produced a demand of money from England to put the founderies into activity. To crown the whole, Abadia, recalled from Galicia, at the express desire of sir Henry Wellesley, because of his bad conduct, was now made minister of war.

In Ceuta, notwithstanding the presence of a small British force, the Spanish garrison, the galley slaves, and the prisoners of war who were allowed to range at large, joined in a plan for delivering that place to the Moors; not from a treacherous disposition in the two first, but to save themselves from starving, a catastrophe which was only staved off by frequent assistance from the magazines of Gibraltar. Ceuta might have been easily acquired by England at this period, in exchange for the debt due by Spain, and general Campbell urged it to lord Liverpool, but he rejected the proposal, fearing to awaken popular jealousy. The notion, however, came originally from the people themselves, and that jealousy which lord Liverpool feared, was already in full activity, being only another name for the democratic spirit rising in opposition to the aristocratic principle upon which England afforded her assistance to the Peninsula.

The foreign policy of Spain was not less absurd than their home policy, but it was necessarily contracted. Castro, the envoy at Lisbon, who was agreeable both to the Portuguese and British authorities, was removed, and Bardaxi, who was opposed to both, substituted. This Bardaxi had been just

before sent on a special mission to Stockholm, to arrange a treaty with that court, and he was referred to Russia for his answer, so completely subservient was Bernadotte to the czar. One point however was characteristically discussed by the Swedish prince and the Spanish envoy. Bardaxi demanded assistance in troops, and Bernadotte in reply asked for a subsidy, which was promised without hesitation, but security for the payment being desired, the negotiation instantly dropped! A treaty of alliance was however concluded between Spain and Russia in July, and while Bardaxi was thus pretending to subsidize Sweden, the unceasing solicitations of his own government had extorted from England a grant of one million of money, together with arms and clothing for one hundred thousand men, in return for which five thousand Spaniards were to be enlisted for the British ranks.

To raise Spanish corps had long been a favourite project with many English officers; general Graham had deigned to offer his services, and great advantages were anticipated by those who still believed in Spanish heroism. Joseph was even disquieted, for the Catalans had formally demanded such assistance, and a like feeling was now expressed in other places; yet when it came to the proof only two or three hundred starving Spaniards of the poorest condition enlisted; they were recruited principally by the light division, were taught with care and placed with English comrades, yet the experiment failed, they did not make good soldiers. Meanwhile the regency demanded and obtained from England, arms, clothing, and equipments for ten thousand cavalry, though they had scarce five hundred regular horsemen to arm at the time, and had just rejected the aid of the Austrian officers in the organization of new corps. Thus the supplies granted by Great Britain continued to be embezzled or wasted; and with the exception of a trifling amelioration in the state of Carlos d'Espanias' corps effected by the direct interposition of Wellington, no public benefit seemed likely at first to accrue from the subsidy, for every branch of administration in Spain, whether civil or military, foreign or domestic, was cankered to the core. The public mischief was become portentous.

Ferdinand living in tranquillity at Valençay was so averse to encounter any dangers for the recovery of his throne, that he rejected all offers of assistance to escape. Kolli and the brothers Sagas had been alike disregarded. The councillor Sobral, who while in secret correspondence with the allies, had so long lived at Victor's head-quarters, and had travelled with that marshal to France, now proposed to carry the prince off, and he also was baffled as his predecessors had been. Ferdinand would listen to no proposal save through Escoiquez, who lived at some distance, and Sobral, who judged this man one not to be trusted, immediately made his way to Lisbon, fearful of being betrayed by the prince to whose succour he had come.

Meanwhile Joseph was advancing towards the political conquest of the country, and spoke with ostentation, of assembling a cortes in his own interests; but this was to cover a secret intercourse with the cortes in the Isla de Leon where his partizans called "*Afrancesados*" were increasing: for many of the democratic party, seeing that the gulf which separated them from the clergy, and from England, could never be closed, and that the bad system of government deprived them of the people's support, were willing to treat with the intrusive monarch as one whose principles were more in unison with their own. Joseph secretly offered to adopt the new

constitution, with some modifications, and as many of the cortes were inclined to accept his terms, the British policy was on the eve of suffering a signal defeat, when Wellington's iron arm again fixed the destiny of the Peninsula.

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of Portugal—Internal condition not improved—Government weak—Lord Strangford's conduct condemned—Lord Wellesley resolves to recall him and send lord Louvaine to Rio Janeiro—Reasons why this did not take place—Lord Strangford's career checked by the fear of being removed—Lord Wellington obtains full powers from the Brazils—Lord Castlereagh's vigorous interference—Death of Linhares at Rio Janeiro—Domingo Souza succeeds him as chief minister, but remains in London—Lord Wellington's moderation towards the Portuguese regency—His embarrassing situation described—His opinion of the Spanish and Portuguese public men—His great diligence and foresight aided by the industry and vigour of Mr. Stuart supports the war—His administrative views and plans described—Opposed by the regency—He desires the prince regent's return to Portugal without his wife—Carlotta prepares to come without the prince—Is stopped—Mr. Stuart proposes a military government, but lord Wellington will not consent—Great desertion from the Portuguese army in consequence of their distressed state, from the negligence of the government—Severe examples do not check it—The character of the Portuguese troops declines—Difficulty of procuring specie—Wellington's resources impaired by the shameful cupidity of English merchants at Lisbon and Oporto—Proposal for a Portuguese bank made by Domingo Souza, Mr. Vansittart, and Mr. Villiers—Lord Wellington ridicules it—He permits a contraband trade to be carried on with Lisbon by Soult for the sake of the resources it furnishes.

POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.

THE internal condition of this country was not improved. The government, composed of civilians, was unable, as well as unwilling to stimulate the branches of administration connected with military affairs, and the complaints of the army, reaching the Brazils, drew reprimands from the prince; but instead of meeting the evil with suitable laws, he only increased Beresford's authority, which was already sufficiently great. Thus while the foreigner's power augmented, the native authorities were degraded in the eyes of the people; and as their influence to do good dwindled, their ill-will increased, and their power of mischief was not lessened, because they still formed the intermediate link between the military commander and the subordinate authorities. Hence what with the passive patriotism of the people, the abuses of the government, and the double dealing at the Brazils, the extraordinary energy of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart was counterbalanced.

The latter had foreseen that the regent's concessions at the time of Borel's arrest would produce but a momentary effect in Portugal, and all the intrigues at Rio Janeiro revived when lord Wellesley, disgusted with Perceval's incapacity, had quitted the British cabinet. But previous to that event, Mr. Sydenham, whose mission to Portugal has been noticed, had so strongly represented the evil effects of lord Strangford's conduct, that lord Wellesley would have immediately dismissed him, if Mr. Sydenham, who was offered the situation, had not refused to profit from the effects of his own report. It was then judged proper to send lord Louvaine with the rank of ambassador, and he was to touch at Lisbon and consult with lord Wellington whether

to press the prince's return to Portugal, or insist upon a change in the regency; meanwhile a confidential agent, despatched direct to Rio Janeiro, was to keep lord Strangford in the strict line of his instructions until the ambassador arrived.

But lord Louvaine was on bad terms with his uncle, the duke of Northumberland, a zealous friend to lord Strangford; and for a government, conducted on the principle of corruption, the discontent of a nobleman, possessing powerful parliamentary influence, was necessarily of more consequence than the success of the war in the Peninsula. Ere a fit successor to lord Strangford could be found, the prince regent of Portugal acceded to lord Wellington's demands, and it was then judged expedient to await the effect of this change of policy. Meanwhile the dissensions, which led to the change of ministry, arose, and occupied the attention of the English cabinet to the exclusion of all other affairs. Thus lord Strangford's career was for some time uncontrolled, yet after several severe rebukes from lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, it was at last arrested, by a conviction that his tenure of place depended upon their will.

However, prior to this salutary check on the Brazilian intrigues, lord Wellesley had so far intimidated the prince regent of Portugal, that besides assenting to the reforms, he despatched Mr. De Lemos from Rio Janeiro, furnished with authority for Beresford to act despotically in all things connected with the administration of the army. Moreover lord Wellington was empowered to dismiss Principal Souza from the regency; and lord Castlereagh, following up his predecessor's policy on this head, insisted that all the obnoxious members of the regency should be set aside and others appointed. And these blows at the power of the Souza faction, were accompanied by the death of Linhares, the head of the family, an event which paralyzed the court of Rio Janeiro for a considerable time; nevertheless the Souzas were still so strong, that Domingo Souza, now count of Funchal, was appointed prime minister, although he retained his situation as ambassador to the English court, and continued to reside in London.

Lord Wellington, whose long experience of Indian intrigues rendered him the fittest person possible to deal with the exactions and political cunning of a people who so much resemble Asiatics, now opposed the removal of the obnoxious members from the regency. He would not even dismiss the Principal Souza; for with a refined policy he argued, that the opposition to his measures arose, as much from the national, as from the individual character of the Portuguese authorities, several of whom were under the displeasure of their own court, and consequently dependant upon the British power, for support against their enemies. There were amongst them also, persons of great ability, and hence no beneficial change could be expected, because the influence already gained would be lost with new men. The latter would have the same faults, with less talent, and less dependance on the British power, and the dismissed ministers would become active enemies. The patriarch would go to Oporto, where his power to do mischief would be greatly increased, and Principal Souza would then be made patriarch. It was indeed very desirable to drive this man, whose absurdity was so great as to create a suspicion of insanity, from the regency, but he could neither be persuaded, nor forced, to quit Portugal. His dismissal had been extorted from the prince by the power of the British government, he would therefore maintain his secret influence over the civil admin-

istration, he would be considered a martyr to foreign influence, which would increase his popularity, and his power would be augmented by the sanctity of his character as patriarch. Very little advantage could then be derived from a change, and any reform would be attributed to the English influence, against which the numerous interests, involved in the preservation of abuses, would instantly combine with active enmity.

On the other hand, the government of Portugal had never yet laid the nature of the war fairly before the people. The latter had been deceived, flattered, cajoled, their prowess in the field extolled beyond reason, and the enemy spoken of contemptuously; but the resources of the nation, which essentially consisted neither in its armies, nor in its revenue, nor in its boasting, but in the sacrificing of all interests to the prosecution of the contest, had never been vigorously used to meet the emergencies of the war. The regency had neither appealed to the patriotism of the population, nor yet enforced sacrifices, by measures, which were absolutely necessary, because, as the English general honestly observed, no people would ever voluntarily bear such enormous, though necessary burthens; strong laws and heavy penalties could alone insure obedience. The Portuguese government relied upon England and her subsidies, and resisted all measures which could render their natural resources more available. Their subordinates on the same principle executed corruptly and vexatiously, or evaded, the military regulations, and the chief supporters of all this mischief were the Principal and his faction.

Thus dragged by opposing forces, and environed with difficulties, Wellington took a middle course. That is, he strove by reproaches and by redoubled activity, to stimulate the patriotism of the authorities; he desired the British ministers at Lisbon, and at Rio Janeiro, to paint the dangerous state of Portugal in vivid colours, and to urge the prince regent in the strongest manner, to enforce the reform of those gross abuses, which in the taxes, in the customs, in the general expenditure, and in the execution of orders by the inferior magistrates, were withering the strength of the nation. At the same time, amidst the turmoil of his duties in the field, sometimes actually from the field of battle itself, he transmitted memoirs upon the nature of these different evils, and the remedies for them; memoirs which will attest to the latest posterity the greatness and vigour of his capacity.

These efforts, aided by the suspension of the subsidy, produced partial reforms, yet the natural weakness of character and obstinacy of the prince regent, were insurmountable obstacles to any general or permanent cure; the first defect rendered him the tool of the court intriguers, and the second was to be warily dealt with, lest some dogged conduct should oblige Wellington to put his often repeated threat, of abandoning the country, into execution. The success of the contest was in fact of more importance to England, than to Portugal, and this occult knot could neither be untied nor cut; the difficulty could with appliances be lessened, but might not be swept away; hence the British general involved in ceaseless disputes, and suffering hourly mortifications, the least of which would have broken the spirit of an ordinary man, had to struggle as he could to victory.

Viewing the contest as one of life or death to Portugal, he desired to make the whole political economy of the state a simple provision for the war, and when thwarted, his reproaches were as bitter as they were just; nevertheless, the men to whom

they were addressed, were not devoid of merit. In after times, while complaining that he could find no persons of talent in Spain, he admitted that amongst the Portuguese, Redondo possessed both probity and ability, that Nogueira was a statesman of capacity equal to the discussion of great questions, and that no sovereign in Europe had a better public servant than Forjas. Even the restless Principal disinterestedly prosecuted measures, for forcing the clergy to pay their just share of the imposts. But greatness of mind, on great occasions, is a rare quality. Most of the Portuguese considered the sacrifices demanded, a sharper ill than submission, and it was impossible to unite entire obedience to the will of the British authorities, with an energetic, original spirit, in the native government. The Souza faction was always violent and foolish, the milder opposition of the three gentlemen, above mentioned, was excusable. Lord Wellington, a foreigner, was serving his own country, pleasing his own government, and forwarding his own fortune; final success was sure to send him to England, resplendent with glory, and beyond the reach of Portuguese ill-will. The native authorities had no such prospects. Their exertions brought little of personal fame, they were disliked by their own prince, hated by his favourites, and they feared to excite the enmity of the people, by a vigour, which, being displeasing to their sovereign, would inevitably draw evil upon themselves; from the French, if the invasion succeeded, from their own court, if the independence of the country should be ultimately obtained.

But thus much conceded, for the sake of justice, it is yet to be affirmed, with truth, that the conduct of the Portuguese and Brazilian governments was always unwise, often base. Notwithstanding the prince's concessions, it was scarcely possible to remedy any abuses. The Lisbon government substituting evasive for active opposition, baffled Wellington and Stuart, by proposing inadequate laws, or by suffering the execution of effectual measures to be neglected with impunity; and the treaty of commerce with England always supplied them a source of dispute, partly from its natural difficulties, partly from their own bad faith. The general's labours were thus multiplied, not abated, by his new powers, and in measuring these labours, it is to be noted, so entirely did Portugal depend upon England, that Wellington instead of drawing provisions for his army from the country, in a manner fed the whole nation, and was often forced to keep the army magazines low, that the people might live. This is proved by the importation of rice, flour, beef, and pork from America, which increased, each year of the war, in a surprising manner, the price keeping pace with the quantity, while the importation of dried fish, the ordinary food of the Portuguese, decreased.

In 1808 the supply of flour and wheat, from New York, was sixty thousand barrels. In 1811 six hundred thousand; in 1813, between seven and eight hundred thousand. Ireland, England, Egypt, Barbary, Sicily, the Brazils, parts of Spain, and even France, also contributed to the consumption, which greatly exceeded the natural means of Portugal; English treasure therefore, either directly or indirectly, furnished the nation as well as the armies.

The peace revenue of Portugal, including the Brazils, the colonies, and the islands, even in the most flourishing periods, had never exceeded thirty-six millions of cruzada novas; but in 1811, although Portugal alone raised twenty-five millions, this sum, added to the British subsidy, fell very short of the actual expenditure; yet economy was opposed by

the local government, the prince was continually creating useless offices for his favourites, and encouraging law-suits and appeals to Rio Janeiro. The troops and fortresses were neglected, although the military branches of expense amounted to more than three-fourths of the whole receipts; and though Mr. Stuart engaged that England, either by treaty or tribute, would keep the Algerines quiet, he could not obtain the suppression of the Portuguese navy, which always fled from the barbarians. It was not until the middle of the year 1812, when admiral Berkeley, whose proceedings had at times produced considerable inconvenience, was recalled, that Mr. Stuart, with the aid of admiral Martin, who succeeded Berkeley, without a seat in the regency, effected this naval reform.

The government, rather than adopt the measures suggested by Wellington, such as keeping up the credit of the paper-money, by regular payments of the interest, the fair and general collection of the "*Decima*," and the repression of abuses in the custom-house, in the arsenal, and in the militia, always more costly than the line, projected the issuing of fresh paper, and endeavoured, by unworthy stock-jobbing schemes, to evade instead of meeting the difficulties of the times. To check their folly the general withheld the subsidy, and refused to receive their depreciated paper into the military chest; but neither did this vigorous proceeding produce more than a momentary return to honesty, and meanwhile, the working people were so cruelly oppressed that they would not labour for the public, except under the direction of British officers. Force alone could overcome their repugnance, and force was employed, not to forward the defence of the country, but to meet particular interests and to support abuses. Such also was the general baseness of the Fidalgos, that even the charitable aid of money, received from England, was shamefully and greedily claimed by the rich, who insisted, that it was a donation to all, and to be equally divided.

Confusion and injustice prevailed every where, and Wellington's energies were squandered on vexatious details; at one time he was remonstrating against the oppression of the working people, and devising remedies for local abuses, at another superintending the application of the English charities, and arranging the measures necessary to revive agriculture in the devastated districts; at all times endeavouring to reform the general administration, and in no case was he supported. Never during the war did he find an appeal to the patriotism of the Portuguese government answered frankly; never did he propose a measure which was accepted without difficulties. This opposition was at times carried to such a ridiculous extent, that when some Portuguese nobles in the French service took refuge with the curate Merino, and desired from their own government, a promise of safety, to which they were really entitled, the regency refused to give that assurance; nor would they publish an amnesty, which the English general desired for the sake of justice and from policy also, because valuable information as to the French army, could have been thus obtained. The authorities would neither say yes! nor no! and when general Pamplona applied to Wellington personally for some assurance, the latter could only answer, that in like cases Mascarheñas had been hanged and Subugal rewarded!

To force a change in the whole spirit and action of the government, seemed to some the only remedy for the distemperature of the time; but this might have produced anarchy, and would have given countenance to the democratic spirit, contrary to the

general policy of the British government. Wellington therefore desired rather to have the prince regent at Lisbon, or the Azores, whence his authority might, under the influence of England, be more directly used to enforce salutary regulations; he, however, considered it essential that Carlotta, whose intrigues were incessant, should not be with him, and, she on the other hand, laboured to come back without the prince, who was prevented from moving, by continued disturbances in the Brazils. Mr. Stuart, then despairing of good, proposed the establishment of a military government at once, but Wellington would not agree, although the mischief afloat clogged every wheel of the military machine.

A law of king Sebastian, which obliged all gentlemen holding land to take arms, was now revived; but desertion, which had commenced with the first appointment of British officers, increased; and so many persons sailed away in British vessels of war, to evade military service in their own country, that an edict was published to prevent the practice. Beresford checked the desertion for a moment, by condemning deserters to hard labour, and offering rewards to the country people to deliver them up; yet griping want renewed the evil at the commencement of the campaign, and the terrible severity of condemning nineteen at once to death, did not repress it. The cavalry, which had been at all times very inefficient, was now nearly ruined, the men were become faint-hearted, the breed of horses almost extinct, and shameful speculations amongst the officers increased the mischief: one guilty colonel was broke and his uniform stripped from his shoulders in the public square at Lisbon. However these examples produced fear and astonishment rather than correction, the misery of the troops continued, and the army, although by the care of Beresford it was again augmented to more than thirty thousand men under arms, declined in moral character and spirit.

To govern armies in the field, is at all times a great and difficult matter; and in this contest the operations were so intimately connected with the civil administration of Portugal, Spain, and the Brazils, and the contest, being one of principles, so affected the policy of every nation of the civilized world, that unprecedented difficulties sprung up in the way of the general, and the ordinary frauds and embarrassments of war were greatly augmented. Napoleon's continental system joined to his financial measures, which were quite opposed to debt and paper money, increased the pernicious effects of the English bank restriction; specie was abundant in France, but had nearly disappeared from England; it was only to be obtained from abroad, and at an incredible expense. The few markets left for British manufactures, and colonial produce, did not always make returns in the articles necessary for the war; and gold, absolutely indispensable in certain quantities, was only supplied, and this entirely from the incapacity of the English ministers, in the proportion of one-sixth of what was required, by an army which professed to pay for every thing. Hence continual efforts, on the part of the government, to force markets; hence a depreciation of value both in goods and bills; hence also a continual struggle, on the part of the general, to sustain a contest, dependant on the fluctuation of such a precarious system. Dependant also it was upon the prudence of three governments, one of which had just pushed its colonies to rebellion, when the French armies were in possession of four-fifths of the mother country; another was hourly raising up obstacles to its own defence, though the enemy had

just been driven from the capital; and the third was forcing a war with America, its greatest and surest market, when by commerce alone it could hope to sustain the struggle in the Peninsula.

The failure of the preceding year's harvest all over Europe, had rendered the supply of Portugal very difficult. Little grain was to be obtained in any country of the north of Europe accessible to the British, and the necessity of paying in hard money, rendered even that slight resource null. Sicily and Malta were thrown for subsistence upon Africa, where colonial produce was indeed available for commerce, yet the quantity of grain to be had there, was small, and the capricious nature of the barbarians rendered the intercourse precarious. In December 1811, there was only two months' consumption of corn in Portugal for the population, although the magazines of the army contained more than three. To America, therefore, it was necessary to look. Now, in 1810, Mr. Stuart had given treasury bills to the house of Sampaio for the purchase of American corn; but the disputes between England and the United States, the depreciation of English bills from the quantity in the market, together with the expiration of the American bank charter, had prevented Sampaio from completing his commission; nevertheless, although the increasing bitterness of the disputes with America discouraged a renewal of this plan, some more bills were now given to the English minister at Washington, with directions to purchase corn, and consign it to Sampaio, to resell in Portugal as before, for the benefit of the military chest. Other bills were also sent to the Brazils, to purchase rice; and all the consuls in the Mediterranean were desired to encourage the exportation of grain and the importation of colonial produce. In this manner, despite of the English ministers' incapacity, lord Wellington found resources to feed the population, to recover some of the specie expended by the army, and to maintain the war. But as the year advanced, the Non-intercourse-Act of Congress, which had caused a serious drain of specie from Portugal, was followed by an embargo for ninety days; and then famine, which already afflicted parts of Spain, menaced Portugal.

Mr. Stuart knew of this embargo before the speculators did, and sent his agents orders to buy up with hard cash, at a certain price, a quantity of grain which had lately arrived at Gibraltar. He could only forestall the speculators by a few days, the cost soon rose beyond his means in specie, yet the new harvest being nearly ripe, this prompt effort sufficed for the occasion, and happily so, for the American declaration of war followed, and American privateers were to take the place of American flour-ships. But as ruin seemed to approach, Stuart's energy redoubled. His agents, seeking for grain in all parts of the world, discovered that in the Brazils a sufficient quantity might be obtained in exchange for English manufactures, to secure Portugal from absolute famine; and to protect this traffic, and to preserve that with the United States, he persuaded the regency to declare the neutrality of Portugal, and to interdict the sale of prizes within its waters. He also, at Wellington's desire, besought the English admiralty to reinforce the squadron in the Tagus, and to keep cruisers at particular stations. Finally he pressed the financial reforms in Portugal with the utmost vigour and with some success. His efforts were, however, strangely counteracted from quarters least expected. The English consul in the Western Isles, with incredible presumption, publicly excited the islanders to war with

America, when Mr. Stuart's efforts were directed to prevent such a calamity; the admiralty neglecting to station cruisers in the proper places, left the American privateers free to range along the Portuguese and African coast; and the cupidity of English merchants broke down the credit of the English commissariat paper-money, which was the chief medium of exchange on the immediate theatre of war.

This paper had arisen from a simple military regulation. Lord Wellington, on first assuming the command in 1809, found that all persons gave their own vouchers in payment for provisions, whereupon he proclaimed that none save commissaries should thus act; and that all local accounts should be paid within one month, in ready money, if it was in the chest, if not, with bills on the commissary-general. These bills soon became numerous, because of the scarcity of specie, yet their value did not sink, because they enabled those who had really furnished supplies, to prove their debts without the trouble of following the head-quarters; and they had an advantage over receipts, inasmuch as they distinctly pointed out the person who was to pay; they were also in accord with the customs of the country, for the people were used to receive government bills. The possessors were paid in rotation, whenever there was money; the small holders, who were the real furnishers of the army, first, the speculators last; a regulation by which justice and the credit of the paper were alike consulted.

In 1812, this paper sunk twenty per cent., from the sordid practices of English mercantile houses, whose agents secretly depreciated its credit and then purchased it; and in this dishonesty they were aided by some of the commissariat, notwithstanding the vigilant probity of the chief commissary. Sums, as low as ten pence, payable in Lisbon, I have myself seen in the hands of poor country people on the frontiers. By these infamous proceedings the poorer dealers were ruined or forced to raise their prices, which hurt their sales and contracted the markets to the detriment of the soldiers; and there was much danger, that the people generally, would thus discover the mode of getting cash for bills by submitting to high discounts, which would soon have rendered the contest too costly to continue. But the resources of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were not exhausted. They contrived to preserve the neutrality of Portugal, and by means of licenses continued to have importations of American flour, until the end of the war; a very fine stroke of policy, for this flour was paid for with English goods, and resold at a considerable profit for specie which went to the military chest. They were less successful in supporting the credit of the Portuguese government paper; bad faith, and the necessities of the native commissariat, which now caused an extraordinary issue, combined to lower its credit.

The conde de Funchal, Mr. Villiers, and Mr. Vansittart proposed a bank, and other schemes, such as a loan of one million and a half from the English treasury, which shall be treated more at length in another place. But lord Wellington ridiculing the fallacy of a government, with revenues unequal to its expenditure, borrowing from a government which was unable to find specie sufficient to sustain the war, remarked, that the money could not be realised in the Portuguese treasury, or it must be realised at the expense of a military chest, whose hollow sound already mocked the soldiers' shout of victory. Again therefore he demanded the reform of abuses, and offered to take all the responsibility and odium upon himself, certain that the exigences of the war

could be thus met, and the most vexatious imposts upon the poor abolished; neither did he fail to point out in detail the grounds of this conviction. His reasoning made as little impression upon Funchal, as it had done upon Linhares; money was no where to be had, and the general, after being forced to become a trader himself, now tolerated, for the sake of the resources it furnished, a contraband com-

merce, which he discovered Soult to have established with English merchants at Lisbon, exchanging the quicksilver of Almaden for colonial produce; and he was still to find in his own personal resources, the means of beating the enemy, in despite of the matchless follies of the governments he served. He did so, but complained that it was a hard task.

BOOK XVIII.

CHAPTER I.

Numbers of the French in the Peninsula shewn—Joseph commander-in-chief—His dissensions with the French generals—His plans—Opposed by Soult, who recommends different operations and refuses to obey the king—Lord Wellington's plans described—His numbers—Colonel Sturgeon skilfully repairs the bridge of Alcantara—The advantage of this measure—The navigation of the Tagus and the Douro improved and extended—Rash conduct of a commissary on the Douro—Remarkable letter of lord Wellington to lord Liverpool—Arrangements for securing the allies' flanks and operating against the enemy's flanks described—Marmont's plans—His military character—He restores discipline to the army of Portugal—His measures for that purpose and the state of the French army described and compared with the state of the British army and Wellington's measures.

In the foregoing book, the political state of the belligerents, and those great chains, which bound the war in the Peninsula to the policy of the American as well as to the European nations, have been shewn; the minor events of the war have also been narrated, and the point where the decisive struggle was to be made has been indicated; thus nought remains to tell, save the particular preparations of each adverse general ere the noble armies were dashed together in the shock of battle.

Nearly three hundred thousand French still trampled upon Spain, above two hundred and forty thousand were with the eagles, and so successful had the plan of raising native soldiers proved, that forty thousand Spaniards well organized marched under the king's banners.

In May the distribution of this immense army, which however according to the French custom included officers and persons of all kinds attached to the forces, was as follows:—

Seventy-six thousand, of which sixty thousand were with the eagles, composed the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, under Suchet, and they occupied Valencia, and the provinces whose name they bore.

Forty-nine thousand men, of which thirty-eight thousand were with the eagles, composed the army of the north, under Caffarelli, and were distributed on the grand line of communication, from St. Sebastian to Burgos; but of this army, two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry with artillery, were destined to reinforce Marmont.

Nineteen thousand, of which seventeen thousand were with the eagles, composed the army of the centre, occupying a variety of posts in a circle round the capital, and having a division in La Mancha.

Sixty-three thousand, of which fifty-six thousand were with the eagles, composed the army of the south, under Soult, occupying Andalusia and a part of Estremadura; but some of these troops were detained in distant governments by other generals.

The army of Portugal, under Marmont, consisted of seventy thousand men, fifty-two thousand being with the eagles, and a reinforcement of twelve thousand men were in march to join this army from France. Marmont occupied Leon, part of Old Castile, and the Asturias, having his front upon the Tormes, and a division watching Galicia.

The numerous Spanish *juramentados* were principally employed in Andalusia and with the army of the centre, and the experience of Ocaña, of Badajos, and many other places, proved that for the intrusive monarch, they fought with more vigour than their countrymen did against him.

In March Joseph had been appointed commander-in-chief of all the French armies, but the generals, as usual, resisted his authority. Dorsenne denied it altogether, Caffarelli, who succeeded Dorsenne, disputed even his civil power in the governments of the north, Suchet evaded his orders, Marmont neglected them, and Soult firmly opposed his injudicious military plans. The king was distressed for money, and he complained that Marmont's army had consumed or plundered in three months, the whole resources of the province of Toledo and the district of Talavera, whereby Madrid and the army of the centre were famished. Marmont retorted by complaints of the wasteful extravagance of the king's military administration in the capital. Thus dissensions were generated when the most absolute union was required.

After the fall of Badajos Joseph judged that the allies would soon move, either against Marmont in Castile, against himself by the valley of the Tagus, or against Soult in Andalusia. In the first case he designed to aid Marmont, with the divisions of the north, with the army of the centre, and with fifteen thousand men to be drawn from the army of the south. In the second case to draw the army of Portugal and a portion of the army of the south into the valley of the Tagus, while the divisions from the army of the north entered Leon. In the third case, the half of Marmont's army, reinforced by a division of the army of the centre, was to pass the Tagus at Arzobispo and follow the allies. But the army of the centre was not ready to take the field, and Wellington knew it; Marmont's complaint was just, waste and confusion prevailed at Madrid, and there was so little military vigour that the Empecinado,

with other partida chiefs, pushed their excursions to the very gates of that capital.

Joseph finally ordered Suchet to reinforce the army of the centre, and then calling up the Italian division of Palombini from the army of the Ebro, directed Soult to keep Drouet, with one-third of the army of the south, so far advanced in Estremadura as to have direct communication with general Trielhard in the valley of the Tagus; and he especially ordered that Drouet should pass that river if Hill passed it. It was necessary, he said, to follow the English army, and fight it with advantage of numbers, to do which required a strict co-operation of the three armies, Drouet's corps being the pivot. Meanwhile Marmont and Soult being each convinced that the English general would invade their separate provinces, desired that the king would so view the coming contest, and oblige the other to regulate his movements thereby. The former complained, that having to observe the Galicians, and occupy the Asturias, his forces were disseminated, and he asked for reinforcements to chase the partidas, who impeded the gathering of provisions in Castile and Leon. But the king, who over-rated the importance of Madrid, designed rather to draw more troops round the capital; and he entirely disapproved of Soult besieging Tarifa and Cartagena, arguing that if Drouet was not ready to pass the Tagus, the whole of the allies could unite on the right bank, and penetrate without opposition to the capital, or that lord Wellington would concentrate to overwhelm Marmont.

The duke of Dalmatia would not suffer Drouet to stir, and Joseph, whose jealously had been excited by the marshal's power in Andalusia, threatened to deprive him of his command. The inflexible duke replied that the king had already virtually done so by sending orders direct to Drouet; that he was ready to resign, but he would not commit a gross military error. Drouet could scarcely arrive in time to help Marmont, and would be too weak for the protection of Madrid, but his absence would ruin Andalusia, because the allies, whose force in Estremadura was very considerable, could in five marches reach Seville and take it on the sixth; then communicating with the fleets at Cadiz, they would change their line of operations without loss, and unite with thirty thousand other troops, British and Spanish, who were at Gibraltar, in the Isla, in the Niebla, on the side of Murcia, and under Ballesteros in the Ronda. A new army might also come from the ocean, and Drouet, once beyond the Tagus, could not return to Andalusia in less than twelve days; Marmont could scarcely come there in a month; the force under his own immediate command was spread all over Andalusia; if collected it would not furnish thirty thousand sabres and bayonets, exclusive of Drouet, and the evacuation of the province would be unavoidable.

The French misfortunes, he said, had invariably arisen from not acting in large masses, and the army of Portugal, by spreading too much to its right, would ruin this campaign as it had ruined the preceding one. "Marmont should leave one or two divisions on the Tormes, and place the rest of his army in position, on both sides of the pass of Baños, the left near Placentia, and the right, extending towards Somosierra, which could be occupied by a detachment. Lord Wellington could not then advance by the valley of the Tagus without lending his left flank; nor to the Tormes without lending his right flank. Neither could he attack Marmont with effect, because the latter could easily concentrate, and according to the nature of the attack secure his retreat

by the valley of the Tagus, or by the province of Avila, while the two divisions on the Tormes, reinforced by two others from the army of the north, would act on the allies' flank." For these reasons Soult would not permit Drouet to quit Estremadura, yet he promised to reinforce him, and so to press Hill that Graham, whom he supposed still at Portalegre, should be obliged to bring up the first and sixth divisions. In fine he promised that a powerful body of the allies should be forced to remain in Estremadura, or Hill would be defeated and Badajos invested. This dispute raged during May and the beginning of June, and meanwhile the English general, well acquainted from the intercepted letters with these dissensions, made his arrangements so as to confirm each general in his own peculiar views.

Soult was the more easily deceived, because he had obtained a Gibraltar newspaper, in which, so negligent was the Portuguese government, lord Wellington's secret despatches to Forgas containing an account of his army and of his first designs against the south were printed, and it must be remembered that the plan of invading Andalusia was only relinquished about the middle of May. Hill's exploit at Almaraz menaced the north and south alike, but that general had adroitly spread a report, that his object was to gain time for the invasion of Andalusia, and all Wellington's demonstrations were calculated to aid this artifice and impose upon Soult. Graham indeed returned to Beira with the first and sixth divisions and Cotton's cavalry; but as Hill was at the same time reinforced, and Graham's march sudden and secret, the enemy were again deceived in all quarters. For Marmont and the king, reckoning the number of divisions, thought the bulk of the allies was in the north, and did not discover that Hill's corps had been nearly doubled in numbers though his division seemed the same, while Soult, not immediately aware of Graham's departure, found Hill more than a match for Drouet, and still expected the allies in Andalusia.

Drouet willing rather to obey the king than Soult, drew towards Medellin in June, but Soult, as we have seen, sent the reinforcements from Seville, by the road of Monasterio, and thus obliged him to come back. Then followed those movements and counter-movements in Estremadura, which have been already related, each side being desirous of keeping a great number of their adversaries in that province. Soult's judgment was thus made manifest, for Drouet could only have crossed the Tagus with peril to Andalusia, whereas, without endangering that province, he now made such a powerful diversion for Marmont, that Wellington's army in the north was reduced below the army of Portugal, and much below what the latter could be raised to, by detachments from the armies of the north and of the centre. However in the beginning of June, while the French generals were still disputing, lord Wellington's dispositions were completed, he had established at last an extensive system of gaining intelligence all over Spain, and as his campaign was one which posterity will delight to study, it is fitting to shew very exactly the foundation on which the operations rested.

His political and military reasons for seeking a battle have been before shewn, but this design was always conditional; he would fight on advantage, but he would risk nothing beyond the usual chances of combat. While Portugal was his, every movement which obliged the enemy to concentrate was an advantage, and his operations were ever in subservience to this vital condition. His whole force amounted to nearly ninety thousand men, of which about six thousand were in Cadiz, but the Walche-

ren expedition was still to be atoned for: the sick were so numerous amongst the regiments which had served there, that only thirty-two thousand or a little more than half of the British soldiers, were under arms. This number, with twenty-four thousand Portuguese, made fifty-six thousand sabres and bayonets in the field; and it is to be remembered that now and at all times the Portuguese infantry were mixed with the British either by brigades or regiments; wherefore in speaking of English divisions in battle the Portuguese battalions are always included, and it is to their praise, that their fighting was such as to justify the use of the general term.

The troops were organized in the following manner.

Two thousand cavalry and fifteen thousand infantry, with twenty-four guns, were under Hill, who had also the aid of four garrison Portuguese regiments, and of the fifth Spanish army. Twelve hundred Portuguese cavalry were in the *Tras Os Montes* under general D'Urban, and about three thousand five hundred British cavalry and thirty-six thousand infantry, with fifty-four guns, were under Wellington's immediate command, which was now enlarged by three thousand five hundred Spaniards, infantry and cavalry, under Carlos D'Espana and Julian Sanchez.

The bridge of Almaraz had been destroyed to lengthen the French lateral communications, and Wellington now ordered the bridge of Alcantara to be repaired to shorten his own. The breach in that stupendous structure was ninety feet wide, and one hundred and fifty feet above the water line. Yet the fertile genius of colonel Sturgeon furnished the means of passing this chasm, with heavy artillery, and without the enemy being aware of the preparations made until the moment of execution. In the arsenal of Elvas he secretly prepared a network of strong ropes, after a fashion which permitted it to be carried in parts, and with the beams, planking, and other materials, it was transported to Alcantara on seventeen carriages. Straining beams were then fixed in the masonry, on each side of the broken arch, cables were stretched across the chasm, the net-work was drawn over, tarpaulin blinds were placed at each side, and the heaviest guns passed in safety. This remarkable feat produced a new, and short, internal line of communication, along good roads, while the enemy, by the destruction of the bridge at Almaraz, was thrown upon a long external line, and very bad roads.

Hill's corps was thus suddenly brought a fortnight's march nearer to Wellington than Drouet was to Marmont, if both marched as armies with artillery; but there was still a heavy drag upon the English general's operations. He had drawn so largely upon Portugal for means of transport, that agriculture was seriously embarrassed, and yet his subsistence was not secured for more than a few marches beyond the Agueda. To remedy this he set sailors and workmen to remove obstructions in the Douro and the Tagus; the latter, which in Philip the Second's time had been navigable from Toledo to Lisbon, was opened to Malpica, not far from Alcantara, and the Douro was opened as high as Barca de Alva, below which it ceases to be a Spanish river. The whole land transport of the interior of Portugal was thus relieved; the magazines were brought up the Tagus, close to the new line of communication by Alcantara, on one side; on the other, the country vessels conveyed provisions to the mouth of the Douro, and that river then served to within a short distance of Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca. Still danger was to be apprehended from the American

privateers along the coast, which the Admiralty neglected; and the navigation of the Douro was suddenly suspended by the overheated zeal of a commissary, who being thwarted by the delays of the boatmen, issued, of his own authority, an edict, establishing regulations, and pronouncing pains and penalties upon all those who did not conform to them. The river was immediately abandoned by the craft, and the government endeavoured by a formal protest to give political importance to this affair, which was peculiarly vexatious, inasmuch as the boatmen were already so averse to passing the old points of navigation, that very severe measures were necessary to oblige them to do so.

When this matter was arranged, Wellington had still to dread that if his operations led him far into Spain, the subsistence of his army would be insecure; for there were many objects of absolute necessity, especially meat, which could not be procured except with ready money, and not only was he unfurnished with specie, but his hopes of obtaining it were nearly extinguished, by the sweep lord William Bentinck had made in the Mediterranean money market; moreover the English ministers chose this period of difficulty to interfere, and in an ignorant and injurious manner, with his mode of issuing bills to supply his necessities. His resolution to advance could not be shaken, yet before crossing the Agueda, having described his plan of campaign to lord Liverpool, he finished in these remarkable words.

"I am not insensible to losses and risks, nor am I blind to the disadvantages under which I undertake this operation. My friends in Castile, and I believe no officer ever had better, assure me that we shall not want provisions even before the harvest will be reaped; that there exists concealed granaries which shall be opened to us, and that if we can pay for a part, credit will be given to us for the remainder, and they have long given me hopes that we should be able to borrow money in Castile upon British securities. In case we should be able to maintain ourselves in Castile, the general action and its results being delayed by the enemy's manœuvres, which I think not improbable, I have in contemplation other resources for drawing supplies from the country, and I shall have at all events our own magazines at Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. *But with all these prospects I cannot reflect without shuddering upon the probability that we shall be distressed; nor upon the consequences which may result from our wanting money in the interior of Spain.*"

In the contemplated operations lord Wellington did not fail to look both to his own and his enemy's flanks. His right was secured by the destruction of the forts, the stores, and boats at Almaraz; for the valley of the Tagus was exhausted of provisions, and full of cross rivers which required a pontoon train to pass if the French should menace Portugal seriously in that line; moreover he caused the fortress of Monte Santos, which covered the Portuguese frontier between the Tagus and Ciudad Rodrigo, to be put in a state of defence, and the restoration of Alcantara gave Hill the power of quickly interfering. On the other side if Marmont, strengthened by Caffarelli's division, should operate strongly against the allies' left, a retreat was open either upon Ciudad Rodrigo, or across the mountains into the valley of the Tagus. Such were his arrangements for his own interior line of operations, and to menace his enemy's flanks his measures embraced the whole Peninsula.

1st. He directed Silveira and D'Urban, who were on the frontier of *Tras os Montes*, to file along the

Douro, menace the enemy's right flank and rear, and form a link of connection with the Gallician army, with which Castaños promised to besiege Astorga, as soon as the Anglo-Portuguese should appear on the Tormes. Meanwhile sir Home Popham's expedition was to commence its operations, in concert with the seventh Spanish army, on the coast of Biscay, and so draw Caffarelli's divisions from the succour of Marmont.

2nd. To hinder Suchet from reinforcing the king, or making a movement towards Andalusia, the Sicilian expedition was to menace Catalonia and Valencia, in concert with the Murcian army.

3rd. To prevent Soult overwhelming Hill, Wellington trusted, 1st. to the garrison of Gibraltar, and to the Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish troops, in the Isla de Leon; 2nd. to insurrections in the kingdom of Cordoba, where Echevaria going from Cadiz, by the way of Ayamonte, with three hundred officers, was to organize the partidas of that district, as Mendizábal had done those of the northern parts; 3rd. to Ballesteros's army; but he ever dreaded the rashness of this general, who might be crushed in a moment, which would have endangered Hill and rendered any success in the north nugatory.

It was this fear of Ballesteros's rashness that caused Wellington to keep so strong a corps in Estremadura, and hence Soult's resolution to prevent Drouet from quitting Estremadura, even though Hill should cross the Tagus, was wise and military. For though Drouet would undoubtedly have given the king and Marmont a vast superiority in Castile, the general advantage would have remained with Wellington. Hill could at any time have misled Drouet by crossing the bridge of Alcantara, and returning again, when Drouet had passed the bridge of Toledo or Arzobispo. The French general's march would then have led to nothing, for either Hill could have joined Wellington, by a shorter line, and Soult, wanting numbers, could not have taken advantage of his absence from Estremadura; or Wellington could have retired within the Portuguese frontier, rendering Drouet's movement to Castile a pure loss; or reinforcing Hill by the bridge of Alcantara, he could have gained a fortnight's march and overwhelmed Soult in Andalusia. The great error of the king's plan was that it depended upon exact co-operation amongst persons who, jealous of each other, were far from obedient to himself, and whose marches it was scarcely possible to time justly, because the armies were separated by a great extent of country and their lines of communication were external, long, and difficult, while their enemy was acting on internal, short, and easy lines. Moreover the French correspondence, continually intercepted by the partidas, was brought to Wellington, and the knowledge thus gained by one side and lost by the other caused the timely reinforcing of Hill in Estremadura, and the keeping of Palombini's Italian division from Madrid for three weeks; an event which in the sequel proved of vital consequence, inasmuch as it prevented the army of the centre moving until after the crisis of the campaign had passed.

Hill's exploit at Almaraz, and the disorderly state of the army of the centre, having in a manner isolated the army of Portugal, the importance of Galicia and the Asturias, with respect to the projected operations of lord Wellington was greatly increased. For the Gallicians could either act in Castile upon the rear of Marmont, and so weaken the line of defence on the Douro; or, marching through the Asturias, spread insurrection along the coast to the Montaña de Santander, and there join the seventh army. Hence the necessity of keeping Bonet in the

Asturias, and watching the Gallician passes, was become imperative, and Marmont, following Napoleon's instructions, had fortified the different posts in Castile, but his army was too widely spread, and, as Soult observed, was extended to its right instead of concentrating on the left near Baños.

The duke of Ragusa had resolved to adopt the Tormes and Douro, as his lines of defence, and never doubting that he was the object of attack, watched the augmentation of Wellington's forces and magazines with the utmost anxiety. He had collected considerable magazines himself; and the king had formed others for him at Talavera and Segovia, yet he did not approach the Agueda, but continued to occupy a vast extent of country for the convenience of feeding them until June. When he heard of the restoration of the bridge of Alcantara, and of magazines being formed at Caceres, he observed that the latter would be on the left of the Guadiana if Andalusia were the object; and although not well placed for an army acting against himself, were admirably placed for an army which, having fought in Castile, should afterwards operate against Madrid, because they could be transported at once to the right of the Tagus by Alcantara, and could be secured by removing the temporary restorations. Wherefore, judging that Hill would immediately rejoin Wellington, to aid in the battle, that, with a prophetic feeling he observed, would be fought near the Tormes, he desired Caffarelli to put the divisions of the army of the north in movement; and he prayed the king to have guns, and a pontoon train sent from Madrid that Drouet might pass at Almaraz and join him by the Puerto Pico.

Joseph immediately renewed his orders to Soult, and to Caffarelli, but he only sent two small boats to Almaraz; and Marmont, seeing the allied army suddenly concentrated on the Agueda, recalled Foy from the valley of the Tagus, and Bonet from the Asturias. His first design was to assemble the army at Medina del Campo, Valladolid, Valdesillas, Toro, Zamora, and Salamanca, leaving two battalions and a brigade of dragoons at Benavente to observe the Gallicians. Thus the bulk of the troops would line the Duero, while two divisions formed an advanced guard, on the Tormes, and the whole could be concentrated in five days. His ultimate object was to hold the Tormes until Wellington's whole army was on that river, then to assemble his own troops on the Duero, and act so as to favour the defence of the forts at Salamanca until reinforcements from the north should enable him to drive the allies again within the Portuguese frontier; and he warned Caffarelli that the forts could not hold out more than fifteen days after they should be abandoned by the French army.

Marmont was a man to be feared. He possessed quickness of apprehension and courage, moral and physical, scientific acquirements, experience of war, and great facility in the moving of troops; he was strong of body, in the flower of life, eager for glory, and although neither a great nor a fortunate commander, such a one as might bear the test of fire. His army was weak in cavalry but admirably organized, for he had laboured with successful diligence to restore that discipline which had been so much shaken by the misfortunes of Massena's campaign, and by the unceasing operations from the battle of Fuentes Onoro to the last retreat from Beira. Upon this subject a digression must be allowed, because it has been often affirmed, that the bad conduct of the French in the Peninsula, was encouraged by their leaders, was unmatched in wickedness, and peculiar to the nation. Such assertions springing from mor-

bid national antipathies it is the duty of the historian to correct. All troops will behave ill, when ill-governed, but the best commanders cannot at times prevent the perpetration of the most frightful mischief; and this truth, so important to the welfare of nations, may be proved with respect to the Peninsular war, by the avowal of the generals on either side, and by their endeavours to arrest the evils which they deplored. When Dorsenne returned from his expedition against Galicia, in the latter end of 1811, he reproached his soldiers in the following terms. "The fields have been devastated and houses have been burned; these excesses are unworthy of the French soldier, they pierce the hearts of the most devoted and friendly of the Spaniards, they are revolting to honest men, and embarrass the provisioning of the army. The general-in-chief sees them with sorrow, and orders; that besides a permanent court-martial, there shall be at the head-quarters of each division, of every arm, a military commission, which shall try the following crimes, and on conviction, sentence to death, without appeal; execution to be done on the spot, in presence of the troops.

"1st. Quitting a post to pillage. 2nd. Desertion of all kinds. 3rd. Disobedience in face of the enemy. 4th. Insubordination of all kinds. 5th. Marauding of all kinds. 6th. Pillage of all kinds.

"All persons, military or others, shall be considered as pillagers, who quit their posts or their ranks to enter houses, &c. or who use violence to obtain from the inhabitants more than they are legally entitled to.

"All persons shall be considered deserters who shall be found without a passport beyond the advanced posts, and frequent patrols day and night shall be sent to arrest all persons beyond the outposts.

"Before the enemy when in camp or cantonments, roll-calls shall take place every hour, and all persons absent without leave twice running shall be counted deserters and judged as such. The servants and sutlers of the camp are amenable to this as well as the soldier."

This order Marmont, after reproaching his troops for like excesses, renewed with the following additions.

"Considering that the disorders of the army have arrived at the highest degree, and require the most vigorous measures of repression, it is ordered,

"1st. All non-commissioned officers and soldiers found a quarter of a league from their quarters, camp, or post without leave, shall be judged pillagers and tried by the military commission.

"2nd. The *gens d'armes* shall examine the baggage of all sutlers and followers, and shall seize all effects that appear to be pillaged, and shall burn what will burn, and bring the gold and silver to the paymaster-general under a 'proces verbal,' and all persons whose effects have been seized as pillage to the amount of one hundred livres shall be sent to the military commission, and on conviction suffer death.

"3d. All officers who shall not take proper measures to repress disorders under their command shall be sent in arrest to head-quarters there to be judged."

Then appointing the number of baggage animals to each company, upon a scale which coincides in a remarkable manner with the allowances in the British army, Marmont directed the overplus to be seized and delivered, under a legal process, to the nearest villages, ordering the provost-general to look to the execution each day, and report thereon. Finally, he clothed the provost-general with all the powers of the military commissions; and proof was soon given that his orders were not mere threats, for two captains were arrested for trial, and a soldier of the twenty-sixth regiment was condemned to death by

one of the provisional commissions for stealing church vessels.

Such was the conduct of the French, and touching the conduct of the English, lord Wellington, in the same month, wrote thus to lord Liverpool.

"The outrages committed by the British soldiers, belonging to this army, have become so enormous, and they have produced an effect on the minds of the people of the country, so injurious to the cause, and likely to be so dangerous to the army itself, that I request your lordship's early attention to the subject. I am sensible that the best measures to be adopted on this subject are those of prevention, and I believe there are few officers who have paid more attention to the subject than I have done, and I have been so far successful, as that few outrages are committed by the soldiers who are with their regiments, after the regiments have been a short time in this country."

"But in the extended system on which we are acting, small detachments of soldiers must be marched long distances, through the country, either as escorts, or returning from being escorts to prisoners, or coming from hospitals, &c. and notwithstanding that these detachments are never allowed to march, excepting under the command of an officer or more, in proportion to its size, and that every precaution is taken to provide for the regularity of their subsistence, there is no instance of the march of one of these detachments that outrages of every description are not committed, and I am sorry to say with impunity."

"The guard-rooms are therefore crowded with prisoners, and the offences of which they have been guilty remain unpunished, to the destruction of the discipline of the army, and to the injury of the reputation of the country for justice. I have thought it proper to lay these circumstances before your lordship. I am about to move the army further forward into Spain, and I assure your lordship, that I have not a friend in that country, who has not written to me in dread of the consequences, which must result to the army and to the cause, from a continuance of these disgraceful irregularities, which I declare I have it not in my power to prevent."

To this should have been added, the insubordination, and the evil passions, awakened by the unchecked plunder of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos. But long had the English general complained of the bad discipline of his army, and the following extracts from a letter dated a few months later, shew that his distrust at the present time was not ill-founded. After observing that the constitutions of the soldiers were so much shaken from disorders acquired by their service at Walcheren, or by their own irregularities, that a British army was almost a moving hospital, more than one-third or about twenty thousand men being sick, or attending upon the sick, he thus describes their conduct.

"The disorders which these soldiers have are of a very trifling description, they are considered to render them incapable of serving with their regiments, but they certainly do not incapacitate them from committing outrages of all descriptions on their passage through the country, and in the last movements of the hospitals the soldiers have not only plundered the inhabitants of their property, but the hospital stores which moved with the hospitals, and have sold the plunder. And all these outrages are committed with impunity, no proof can be brought on oath before a court-martial that any individual has committed an outrage, and the soldiers of the army are becoming little better than a band of robbers." "I have carried the establishment and authority of the provost-marshal as far as either will go; there are at this moment not less than one provost-marshal and nine-

teen assistant provost-marshal, attached to the several divisions of cavalry and infantry and to the hospital stations, to preserve order, but this establishment is not sufficient, and I have not the means of increasing it."

The principal remedies he proposed, were the admitting less rigorous proof of guilt, before courts martial; the forming a military police, *such as the French, and other armies possessed*; the enforcing more attention on the part of the officers to their duties; the increasing the pay and responsibility of the non-commissioned officers, and the throwing upon them the chief care of the discipline. But in treating this part of the subject he broached an opinion which can scarcely be sustained even by his authority. Assuming, somewhat unjustly, that the officers of his army were, from consciousness of like demerit, generally too lenient in their sentences on each other for neglect of duty, he says, "I am inclined to entertain the opinion that in the British army duties of inspection and control over the conduct and habits of the soldiers, the performance of which by somebody is the only effectual check to disorder and all its consequences, are imposed upon the subaltern officers of regiments, which duties British officers, being of the class of gentlemen in society, and being required to appear as such, have never performed, *and which they will never perform*. It is very necessary, however, that the duties should be performed by somebody, and for this reason, and having observed the advantage derived in the guards, from the respectable body of non-commissioned officers in those regiments, who perform all the duties required from subalterns in the marching regiments, I had suggested to your lordship the expediency of increasing the pay of the non-commissioned officers in the army."

Now it is a strange assumption, that a gentleman necessarily neglects his duty to his country. When well taught, which was not always the case, gentlemen by birth generally performed their duties in the Peninsula more conscientiously than others, and the experience of every commanding officer will bear out the assertion. If the non-commissioned officers could do all the duties of subaltern officers, why should the country bear the useless expense of the latter? But in truth the system of the guards produced rather a medium goodness, than a superior excellence; the system of sir John Moore, founded upon the principle, that the officers should thoroughly know, and be responsible for the discipline of their soldiers, better bore the test of experience. All the British regiments of the light division were formed in the camps of Shorn-Cliff by that most accomplished commander; very many of the other acknowledged good regiments of the army had been instructed by him in Sicily; and wherever an officer, formed under Moore, obtained a regiment, whether British or Portuguese, that regiment was distinguished in this war for its discipline and enduring qualities; courage was common to all.

CHAPTER II.

Campaign of 1812—Wellington advances to the Tormes—Marmont retires—The allies besiege the forts of Salamanca—General aspect of affairs changes and becomes gloomy—The king concentrates the army of the centre—Marmont returns to the Tormes and cannonades the allies on the position of San Christoval—Various skirmishes—Adventure of Mr. Mackay—Marmont retires to Monte Rubia—Crosses the Tormes with a part of his army—Fine conduct of general Bock's German cavalry—Graham crosses the Tormes and Marmont retires again to Monte Rubia—Observations on this movement—Assault on San Vincente fails—Heroic

death of general Bowes—Siege suspended for want of ammunition—It is renewed—Cajetano is stormed—San Vincente being on fire surrenders—Marmont retires to the Duero followed by Wellington—The French rear-guard suffers some loss between Rueda and Tordesillas—Positions of the armies described—State of affairs in other parts described—Procrastination of the Gallician army—General Bonet abandons the Asturias—Coincidence of Wellington's and Napoleon's views upon that subject—Sir Home Popham arrives with his squadron on the coast of Biscay—His operations—Powerful effect of them upon the campaign—Wellington and Marmont alike cautious of bringing on a battle—extreme difficulty and distress of Wellington's situation.

CAMPAIGN OF 1812.

On the 13th of June, the periodic rains having ceased, and the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda and marched toward the Tormes in four columns, one of which was composed of the Spanish troops. The 16th he reached the Valmusa stream, within six miles of Salamanca, and drove a French detachment across the Tormes. All the bridges, save that of Salamanca, which was defended by the forts, had been destroyed, and there was a garrison in the castle of Alba de Tormes, but the 17th the allies passed the river above and below the town, by the deep fords of Santa Marta and Los Cantos, and general Henry Clinton invested the forts the same day with the sixth division. Marmont, with two divisions and some cavalry, retired to Fuente el Saucó, on the road of Toro, followed by an advanced guard of the allies; Salamanca instantly became a scene of rejoicing, the houses were illuminated, and the people, shouting, singing, and weeping for joy, gave Wellington their welcome while his army took a position on the mountain of San Christoval about five miles in advance.

SIEGE OF THE FORTS AT SALAMANCA.

Four eighteen-pounders had followed the army from Almeida, three twenty-four pound howitzers were furnished by the field artillery, and the battering train used by Hill at Almaraz, had passed the bridge of Alcantara the 11th. These were the means of offence, but the strength of the forts had been under-rated; they contained eight hundred men, and it was said that thirteen convents and twenty-two colleges had been destroyed in their construction. San Vincente, so called from the large convent it enclosed, was the key-fort. Situated on a perpendicular cliff overhanging the Tormes, and irregular in form, but well flanked, it was separated by a deep ravine from the other forts, which were called St. Cajetano and La Merced. These were also on high ground, smaller than San Vincente, and of a square form, but with bomb-proofs and deep ditches, having perpendicular scarps and counterscarps.

In the night of the 17th colonel Burgoyne, the engineer directing the siege, commenced a battery for eight guns at the distance of two hundred and fifty yards from the main wall of Vincente, and as the ruins of the destroyed convents rendered it impossible to excavate, earth was brought from a distance; but the moon was up, the night short, the enemy's fire of musquetry heavy, the workmen of the sixth division were inexperienced, and at daybreak the battery was still imperfect. Meanwhile an attempt had been made to attach the miner secretly to the counterscarp, and, when the vigilance of a trained dog baffled this design, the enemy's picquet was driven in, and the attempt openly made, yet it was rendered vain by a plunging fire from the top of the convent.

On the 18th, eight hundred Germans, placed in the ruins, mastered all the enemy's fire save that

from loop-holes, and colonel May, who directed the artillery service, then placed two field pieces on a neighbouring convent, called San Bernardo, overlooking the fort; however these guns could not silence the French artillery.

In the night the first battery was armed, covering for two field-pieces as a counter-battery was raised a little to its right, and a second breaching battery for two howitzers was constructed on the Cajetano side of the ravine.

At daybreak on the 19th seven guns opened, and at nine o'clock the wall of the convent was cut away to the level of the counterscarp. The second breaching battery, which saw lower down the scarp, then commenced its fire; but the iron howitzers proved unmeet battering ordnance, and the enemy's musketry being entirely directed on this point, because the first battery, to save ammunition, had ceased firing, brought down a captain and more than twenty gunners. The howitzers did not injure the wall, ammunition was scarce, and as the enemy could easily cut off the breach in the night, the fire ceased.

The 20th at mid-day colonel Dickson arrived with the iron howitzers from Elvas, and the second battery being then reinforced with additional pieces, revived its fire against a re-entering angle of the convent a little beyond the former breach. The wall here was soon broken through, and in an instant a huge cantle of the convent with its roof went to the ground, crushing many of the garrison and laying bare the inside of the building: carcasses were immediately thrown into the opening to burn the convent, but the enemy undauntedly maintained their ground and extinguished the flames. A lieutenant and fifteen gunners were lost this day on the side of the besiegers, and the ammunition being nearly gone the attack was suspended until fresh stores could come up from Almeida.

During the progress of this siege, the general aspect of affairs had materially changed on both sides. Lord Wellington had been deceived as to the strength of the forts, and intercepted returns of the armies of the south and of Portugal now shewed to him, that they also were far stronger than he had expected; at the same time he heard of Ballesteros's defeat at Bornos, and of Slade's unfortunate cavalry action of Llera. He had calculated that Bonet would not quit the Asturias, and that general was in full march for Leon, Caffarelli also was preparing to reinforce Marmont, and thus the brilliant prospect of the campaign was suddenly clouded. But on the other hand, Bonet had unexpectedly relinquished the Asturias after six days' occupation; three thousand Galicians were in that province and in communication with the seventh army, and the maritime expedition under Popham had sailed for the coast of Biscay.

Neither was the king's situation agreeable. The partidas intercepted his despatches so surely, that it was the 19th ere Marmont's letter announcing Wellington's advance, and saying that Hill also was in march for the north, reached Madrid. Soult detained Drouet, Suchet refused to send more than one brigade towards Madrid, and Caffarelli, disturbed that Palombini should march upon the capital instead of Burgos, kept back the divisions promised to Marmont. Something was, however, gained in vigour, for the king, no longer depending upon the assistance of the distant armies, gave orders to blow up Mirabete and abandon La Mancha on one side, and the forts of Somosierra and Buitrago on the other, with a view to unite the army of the centre.

A detachment of eight hundred men under colonel Noizet, employed to destroy Buitrago, was attacked on his return by the Empecinado with three thou-

sand, but Noizet, an able officer, defeated him and reached Madrid with little loss. Palombini's march was then hastened, and imperative orders directed Soult to send ten thousand men to Toledo. The garrison of Segovia was reinforced to preserve one of the communications with Marmont, that marshal was informed of Hill's true position, and the king advised him to give battle to Wellington, for he supposed the latter to have only eighteen thousand English troops, but he had twenty-four thousand, and had yet left Hill so strong that he desired him to fight Drouet if occasion required.

Meanwhile Marmont, who had remained in person at Fuente el Saucó, united there, on the 20th, four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, furnishing about twenty-five thousand men of all arms, with which he marched to the succour of the forts. His approach over an open country was descried at a considerable distance, and a brigade of the fifth division was immediately called off from the siege, the battering train was sent across the Tormes, and the army, which was in bivouac on the Salamanca side of St. Christoval, formed in order of battle on the top. This position of Christoval was about four miles long, and rather concave, the ascent in front steep, and tangled with hollow roads and stone enclosures, belonging to the villages, but the summit was broad, even, and covered with ripe corn; the right was flanked by the Upper Tormes, and the left dipped into the country bordering the Lower Tormes, for in passing Salamanca, that river makes a sweep round the back of the position. The infantry, the heavy cavalry, and the guns crowned the summit of the mountain, but the light cavalry fell back from the front to the low country on the left, where there was a small stream and a marshy flat. The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind the left of the position; the village of Cabrerizos marked the extreme right, though the hill still trended up the river. The villages of Christoval, Castellanos, and Moresco, were nearly in a line along the foot of the heights in front, the last was somewhat within the allies' ground, and nothing could be stronger than the position, which completely commanded all the country for many miles; but the heat was excessive, and there was neither shade, nor fuel to cook with, nor water nearer than the Tormes.

About five o'clock in the evening the enemy's horsemen approached, pointing towards the left of the position, as if to turn it by the Lower Tormes, whereupon the British light cavalry made a short forward movement and a partial charge took place; but the French opened six guns, and the British retired to their own ground near Monte Rubio and Villares. The light division, which was held in reserve, immediately closed towards the left of the position until the French cavalry halted, and then returned to the centre. Meanwhile the main body of the enemy bore, in one dark volume, against the right, and halting at the very foot of the position, sent a flight of shells on to the lofty summit; nor did this fire cease until after dark, when the French general, after driving back all the outposts, obtained possession of Moresco, and established himself behind that village and Castellanos within gun-shot of the allies.

The English general slept that night on the ground amongst the troops, and at the first streak of light the armies were again under arms. Nevertheless, though some signals were interchanged between Marmont and the forts, both sides were quiet until towards evening, when Wellington detached the sixty-eighth regiment from the line to drive the French from Moresco. This attack, made with vigour, suc-

ceeded, but the troops being recalled just as daylight failed, a body of French coming unperceived through the standing corn, broke into the village as the British were collecting their posts from the different avenues, and did considerable execution. In the skirmish an officer of the sixty-eighth, named Mackay, being suddenly surrounded, refused to surrender, and, singly fighting against a multitude, received more wounds than the human frame was thought capable of sustaining, yet he still lives to shew his honourable scars.

On the 22d, three divisions and a brigade of cavalry joined Marmont, who having now nearly forty thousand men in hand, extended his left and seized a part of the height in advance of the allies' right wing, from whence he could discern the whole of their order of battle and attack their right on even terms. However general Graham advancing with the seventh division dislodged this French detachment with a sharp skirmish before it could be formidably reinforced, and that night Marmont withdrew from his dangerous position to some heights about six miles in his rear.

It was thought that the French general's tempestuous advance to Moresco with such an inferior force on the evening of the 20th, should have been his ruin. Lord Wellington saw clearly enough the false position of his enemy, but he argued that if Marmont came up to fight, it was better to defend a very strong position than to descend and combat in the plain, seeing that the inferiority of force was not such as to insure the result of the battle being decisive of the campaign; and in case of failure a retreat across the Tormes would have been very difficult. To this may be added, that during the first evening there was some confusion amongst the allies before the troops of the different nations could form their order of battle. Moreover, as the descent of the mountain towards the enemy was by no means easy, because of the walls and avenues, and the two villages which covered the French front, it is probable that Marmont, who had plenty of guns, and whose troops were in perfect order and extremely ready of movement, could have evaded the action until night. This reasoning, however, will not hold good on the 21st. The allies, whose infantry was a third more and their cavalry three times as numerous and much better mounted than the French, might have poured down by all the roads passing over the position at daybreak; then Marmont, turned on both flanks and followed vehemently, could never have made his retreat to the Douro through the open country; but on the 22d, when the French general had received his other divisions, the chances were no longer the same.

Marmont's new position was skilfully chosen; one flank rested on Cabeza Velloso, the other at Huerta, the centre was at Aldea Rubia. He thus refused his right and abandoned the road of Toro to the allies, but he covered the road of Tordesillas, and commanded the fort of Huerta with his left, and he could in a moment pass the Tormes, and operate by the left bank to communicate with the forts. Wellington made corresponding dispositions, closing up his left towards Moresco, and pushing the light division along the salient part of his position to Aldea Lengua, where it overhung a ford, which was however scarcely practicable at this period. General Graham with two divisions was placed at the fords of Santa Marta, and the heavy German cavalry under general Bock crossed the Tormes to watch the ford of Huerta. By this disposition the allies covered Salamanca, and could operate on either side of the Tormes on a shorter line than the French could operate.

The 23d, the two armies again remained tranquil,

but at break of day on the 24th some dropping pistol-shots, and now and then a shout, came faintly from the mist which covered the lower ground beyond the river; the heavy sound of the artillery succeeded, and the hissing of the bullets as they cut through the thickened atmosphere, plainly told that the French were over the Tormes. After a time the fog cleared up, and the German horsemen were seen in close and beautiful order retiring before twelve thousand French infantry, who in battle array were marching steadily onwards. At intervals, twenty guns, ranged in front, would start forwards and send their bullets whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, while scattered parties of light cavalry, scouting out, capped all the hills in succession, and peering abroad, gave signals to the main body. Wellington immediately sent Graham across the river by the fords of Santa Marta with the first and seventh divisions and Le Marchant's brigade of English cavalry; then concentrating the rest of the army between Cabrerizos and Moresco, he awaited the progress of Marmont's operation.

Bock continued his retreat in the same fine and equable order, regardless alike of the cannonade and of the light horsemen on his flanks, until the enemy's scouts had gained a height above Calvarisa Abaxo, from whence, at the distance of three miles, they for the first time, perceived Graham's twelve thousand men, and eighteen guns, ranged on an order of battle, perpendicular to the Tormes. From the same point also Wellington's heavy columns were to be seen, clustering on the height above the fords of Santa Marta, and the light division was descried at Aldea Lengua, ready either to advance against the French troops left on the position of Aldea Rubia, or to pass the river to the aid of Graham. This apparition made the French general aware of his error, whereupon hastily facing about, and repassing the Tormes, he resumed his former ground.

Wellington's defensive dispositions on this occasion were very skilful, but it would appear that unwilling to stir before the forts fell, he had again refused the advantage of the moment; for it is not to be supposed that he misjudged the occasion, since the whole theatre of operation was distinctly seen from St. Christoval, and he had passed many hours in earnest observation; his faculties were indeed so fresh and vigorous, that after the day's work he wrote a detailed memoir upon the proposal for establishing a bank in Portugal, treating that and other financial schemes in all their bearings, with a master hand. Against the weight of his authority, therefore, any criticism must be advanced.

Marmont had the easiest passage over the Tormes, namely, that by the ford of Huerta; the allies had the greatest number of passages and the shortest line of operations. Hence if Graham had been ordered vigorously to attack the French troops on the left bank, they must have been driven upon the single ford of Huerta, if not reinforced from the heights of Aldea Rubia. But the allies could also have been reinforced by the fords of Santa Marta and those of Cabrerizos, and even by that of Aldea Lengua, although it was not good at this early season. A partial victory would then have been achieved, or a general battle would have been brought on, when the French troops would have been disadvantageously cooped up in the loop of the Tormes, and without means of escaping if defeated. Again, it is not easy to see how the French general could have avoided a serious defeat if Wellington had moved with all the troops on the right bank, against the divisions left on the hill of Aldea Rubia; for

the French army would then have been separated, one part on the hither, one on the further bank of the Tormes. It was said at the time that Marmont hoped to draw the whole of the allies across the river, when he would have seized the position of Christoval, raised the siege and maintained the line of the Tormes. It may however be doubted that he expected Wellington to commit so gross an error. It is more likely that holding his own army to be the quickest of movement, his object was to separate the allies' force in the hopes of gaining some partial advantage to enable him to communicate with his forts, which were now in great danger.

When the French retired to the heights at Aldea Rubia on the night of the 23d, the heavy guns had been already brought to the right of the Tormes, and a third battery, to breach San Cajetano, was armed with four pieces, but the line of fire being oblique, the practice, at four hundred and fifty yards, only beat down the parapet and knocked away the palisades. Time was however of vital importance, the escalade of that fort and La Merced was ordered, and the attack commenced at ten o'clock, but in half an hour failed with a loss of one hundred and twenty men and officers. The wounded were brought off the next day under truce, and the enemy had all the credit of the fight, yet the death of general Bowes must ever be admired. That gallant man, whose rank might have excused his leading so small a force, being wounded early, was having his hurt dressed when he heard that the troops were yielding, and returning to the combat fell.

The siege was now perforce suspended for want of ammunition, and the guns were sent across the river, but were immediately brought back in consequence of Marmont having crossed to the left bank. Certain works were meanwhile pushed forward to cut off the communication between the forts and otherwise to straiten them, and the miner was attached to the cliff on which La Merced stood. The final success was not however influenced by these operations, and they need no further notice.

The 26th, ammunition arrived from Almeida, the second and third batteries were rearmed, the field-pieces were again placed in the convent of San Bernardo, and the iron howitzers, throwing hot shot, set the convent of San Vincente on fire in several places. The garrison again extinguished the flames, and this balanced combat continued during the night, but on the morning of the 27th, the fire of both batteries being redoubled, the convent of San Vincente was in a blaze, the breach of San Cajetano was improved, a fresh storming party assembled, and the white flag waved from Cajetano. A negotiation ensued, but lord Wellington, judging it an artifice to gain time, gave orders for the assault; then the forts fell, for San Cajetano scarcely fired a shot, and the flames raged so violently at San Vincente that no opposition could be made.

Seven hundred prisoners, thirty pieces of artillery, provisions, arms, and clothing, and a secure passage over the Tormes, were the immediate fruits of this capture, which was not the less prized, that the breaches were found to be more formidable than those at Ciudad Rodrigo. The success of a storm would have been very doubtful if the garrison could have gained time to extinguish the flames in the convent of San Vincente, and as it was the allies had ninety killed; their whole loss since the passage of the Tormes was nearly five hundred men and officers, of which one hundred and sixty men with fifty horses, fell outside Salamanca, the rest in the siege.

Marmont had allotted fifteen days as the term of

resistance for these forts, but from the facility with which San Vincente caught fire, five would have been too many if ammunition had not failed. His calculation was therefore false. He would however have fought on the 23d, when his force was united, had he not on the 22d received intelligence from Caffarelli, that a powerful body of infantry, with twenty-two guns, and all the cavalry of the north, were actually in march to join him. It was this which induced him to occupy the heights of Villa Rubia, on that day, to avoid a premature action, but on the evening of the 26th the signals, from the forts, having indicated that they could still hold out three days, Marmont, from fresh intelligence, no longer expected Caffarelli's troops, and resolved to give battle on the 28th. The fall of the forts, which was made known to him on the evening of the 27th, changed this determination, the reasons for fighting on such disadvantageous ground no longer existed, and hence, withdrawing his garrison from the castle of Alba de Tormes, he retreated during the night towards the Duero, by the roads of Tordesillas and Toro.

Wellington ordered the works both at Alba and the forts of Salamanca to be destroyed, and following the enemy by easy marches, encamped on the Guarena the 30th. The next day he reached the Trancos, his advanced guard being at Nava del Rey. On the 2d, he passed the Zapardiel in two columns, the right marching by Medina del Campo, the left following the advanced guard towards Rueda. From this place the French rear guard was cannonaded and driven upon the main body, which was filing over the bridge of Tordesillas. Some were killed and some made prisoners, not many, but there was great confusion, and a heavy disaster would have befallen the French if the English general had not been deceived by false information, that they had broken the bridge the night before. For as he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont intended to take a position near Tordesillas, this report made him suppose the enemy was already over the Duero, and hence he had spread his troops, and was not in sufficient force to attack during the passage of the river.

Marmont, who had fortified posts at Zamora and Toro, and had broken the bridges at those places and at Puente Duero and Tudela, preserving only that of Tordesillas, now took a position on the right of the Duero. His left was at Simancas on the Pisuerga, which was unfordable, and the bridges at that place and Valladolid were commanded by fortified posts. His centre was at Tordesillas, and very numerous, and his right was on some heights opposite to Pollos. Wellington indeed caused the third division to seize the ford at the last place, which gave him a command of the river, because there was a plain between it and the enemy's heights, but the ford itself was difficult and insufficient for passing the whole army. Head-quarters were therefore fixed at Rueda, and the forces were disposed in a compact form, the head placed in opposition to the ford of Pollos and the bridge of Tordesillas, the rear occupying Medina del Campo and other points on the Zapardiel and Trancos rivers, ready to oppose the enemy if he should break out from the Valladolid side. Marmont's line of defence, measured from Valladolid to Zamora, was sixty miles, from Simancas to Toro above thirty, but the actual line of occupation was not above twelve; the bend of the river gave him the chord, the allies the arc, and the fords were few and difficult. The advantage was therefore on the side of the enemy; but to understand the true position of the contending generals it is necessary to know the secondary coincident operations.

While the armies were in presence at Salamanca, Silveira had filed up the Duero, to the Esla river, menacing the French communications with Benavente. D'Urban's horsemen had passed the Duero below Zamora on the 25th, and cut off all intercourse between the French army and that place; but when Marmont fell back from Aldea Rubia, D'Urban recrossed the Duero at Fresno de la Ribera to avoid being crushed, yet immediately afterwards advanced beyond Toro to Castromonte, behind the right wing of the enemy's new position. It was part of Wellington's plan, that Castaños, after establishing the siege of Astorga, should come down by Benavente with the remainder of his army and place himself in communication with Silveira. This operation, without disarranging the siege of Astorga, would have placed twelve or fifteen thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, behind the Esla and with secure lines of retreat; consequently able to check all the enemy's foraging parties, and reduce him to live upon his fixed magazines, which were scanty. The usual Spanish procrastination defeated this plan.

Castaños, by the help of the succours received from England, had assembled fifteen thousand men at Ponteferada, under the command of Santocildes, but he pretended that he had no battering guns until sir Howard Douglas actually pointed them out in the arsenal of Ferrol and shewed him how to convey them to the frontier. Then Santocildes moved, though slowly, and when Bonet's retreat from the Asturias was known, eleven thousand men invested Astorga and four thousand others marched to Benavente, but not until Marmont had called his detachment in from that place. The Spanish battering train only reached Gilla Franca del Bierzo on the 1st of July. However the guerilla chief Marquinez appeared about Palencia, and the other partidas of Castile acting on a line from Leon to Segovia, intercepted Marmont's correspondence with the king. Thus the immense tract called the *Campo de Tierras* was secured for the subsistence of the Gallician army; and to the surprise of the allies, who had so often heard of the enemy's terrible devastations, that they expected to find Castile a desert, those vast plains and undulating hills were covered with ripe corn or fruitful vines, and the villages bore few marks of the ravages of war.

While the main body of the Gallicians was still at Ponte Ferrada, a separate division had passed along the coast road into the Asturias, and in concert with part of the seventh army had harassed Bonet's retreat from that kingdom; the French general indeed forced his way by the eastern passes, and taking post the 30th of June at Reynosa and Aguilar del Campo, chased the neighbouring bands away, but this movement was one of the great errors of the campaign. Napoleon and Wellington felt alike the importance of holding the Asturias at this period. The one had ordered that they should be retained, the other had calculated that such would be the case, and the judgment of both was quickly made manifest. For the Gallicians, who would not have dared to quit the Bierzo if Bonet had menaced their province by Lugo, or by the shore line invested Astorga the moment he quitted the Asturias. And the partidas of the north, who had been completely depressed by Mina's defeat, recovering courage, now moved towards the coast, where Popham's expedition, which had sailed on the 18th of June from Coruña, soon appeared, a formidable spectacle, for there were five sail of the line with many frigates and brigs, in all twenty ships of war.

The port of Lesquito was immediately attacked on the sea-board by this squadron, on the land side

by the Pastor, and when captain Bouverie got a gun up to breach the convent the Spanish chief assaulted but was repulsed; however the garrison, two hundred and fifty strong, surrendered to the squadron the 22d, and on the two following days Bermeo and Plencia fell. The partidas failed to appear at Guetaria, but Castro and Portagalete in the Bilbao river were attacked the 6th of July in concert with Longa, and though the latter was rebuffed at Bilbao the squadron took Castro. The enemy recovered some of their posts on the 10th, and on the 19th, the attempt on Guetaria being renewed, Mina and the Pastor came down to co-operate, but a French column beat those chiefs and drove the British seamen to their vessels with the loss of thirty men and two guns.

It was the opinion of general Carrol, who accompanied this expedition, that the plan of operations was ill-arranged, but the local successes merit no attention, the great object of distracting the enemy was obtained. Caffarelli heard at one and the same time that Palombini's division had been called to Madrid, that Bonet had abandoned the Asturias, that a Gallician division had entered that province, that a powerful English fleet containing troops was on the coast and acting in concert with all the partidas of the north, that the seventh army was menacing Burgos, and that the whole country was in commotion. Trembling for his own districts he instantly arrested the march of the divisions destined for Marmont; and although the king, who saw very clearly the real object of the maritime expedition, reiterated the orders to march upon Segovia or Cuellar, with a view to reinforce either the army of the centre or the army of Portugal, Caffarelli delayed obedience until the 13th of July, and then sent but eighteen hundred cavalry with twenty guns.

Thus Bonet's movement which only brought a reinforcement of six thousand infantry to Marmont, kept away Caffarelli's reserves, which were twelve thousand of all arms, uncovered the whole of the great French line of communication, and caused the siege of Astorga to be commenced. And while Bonet was in march by Palencia and Valladolid to the position of Tordesillas, the king heard of Marmont's retreat from the Tormes, and that an English column menaced Arevalo; wherefore not being ready to move with the army of the centre, and fearing for Avila, he withdrew the garrison from that place, and thus lost his direct line of correspondence with the army of Portugal, because Segovia was environed by the partidas. In this state of affairs neither Wellington nor Marmont had reason to fight upon the Duero. The latter because his position was so strong he could safely wait for Bonet's and Caffarelli's troops, and meanwhile the king could operate against the allies' communications. The former because he could not attack the French except at great disadvantage, for the fords of Duero were little known, and that of Pollos was very deep. To pass the river there and form within gun-shot of the enemy's left without other combinations, promised nothing but defeat, and the staff officers, sent to examine the course of the river, reported that the advantage of ground was entirely on the enemy's side, except at Castro Nuño, half way between Pollos and Toro.

While the enemy commanded the bridge at Tordesillas no attempt to force the passage of the river could be safe, seeing that Marmont might fall on the allies' front and rear if the operation was within his reach; and if beyond his reach, that is to say near Zamora, he could cut their communication with Ciudad Rodrigo and yet preserve his own with Caffarelli and with the king. Wellington therefore resolved to wait until the fords should become lower,

or the combined operations of the Gallicians and partidas should oblige the enemy either to detach men or to dislodge altogether for want of provisions. In this view he urged Santocildes to press the siege of Astorga vigorously, and to send every man he could spare down the Esla; and an intercepted letter gave hopes that Astorga would surrender on the 7th, yet this seems to have been a device to keep the Gallicians in that quarter, for it was in no danger. Santocildes expecting its fall would not detach men, but the vicinity of D'Urban's cavalry, which remained at Castromonte, so incommoded the French right that Foy marched to drive them beyond the Esla. General Packenham, however, crossed the ford of Pollos with some of the third division, which quickly brought Foy back, and Marmont then endeavoured to augment the number and efficiency of his cavalry by taking a thousand horses from the infantry officers and the sutlers.

On the 8th, Bonet arrived, and the French marshal immediately extending his right to Toro, commenced repairing the bridge there. Wellington, in like manner, stretched his left to the Guarena, yet kept his centre still on the Trabancos, and his right at Rueda, with posts near Tordesillas and the ford of Pollos. In this situation the armies remained for some days. Generals Graham and Picton went to England in bad health, and the principal powder magazine at Salamanca exploded with hurt to many, but no other events worth recording occurred. The weather was very fine, the country rich, and the troops received their rations regularly; wine was so plentiful that it was hard to keep the soldiers sober; the caves of Rueda, either natural or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were so immense and so well stocked, that the durnkards of the two armies failed to make any very sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men of both sides perished in that labyrinth, and on both sides, also, the soldiers passing the Duero in groups, held amicable intercourse, conversing of the battles that were yet to be fought; the camps on the banks of the Duero seemed at times to belong to one army, so difficult is it to make brave men hate each other.

To the officers of the allies all looked prosperous, their only anxiety was to receive the signal of battle, their only discontent that it was delayed, and many amongst them murmured that the French had been permitted to retreat from Christoval. Had Wellington been finally forced back to Portugal his reputation would have been grievously assailed by his own people, for the majority, peering through their misty politics, saw Paris in dim perspective, and overlooked the enormous French armies that were close at hand. Meanwhile their general's mind was filled with care and mortification, and all cross and evil circumstances seemed to combine against him.

The mediation for the Spanish colonies had just failed at Cadiz, under such circumstances as left no doubt that the English influence was powerless and the French influence visibly increasing in the Cortez. Soult had twenty-seven gun-boats in the Trocadero canal, shells were cast day and night into the city, and the people were alarmed; two thousand French had marched from Santa Mary, apparently to reinforce Drouet in Estremadura; Echevaria had effected nothing in the kingdom of Cordoba, and a French division was assembling at Bornos to attack Ballesteros, whose rashness, inviting destruction, might alone put an end to the campaign in Leon and bring Wellington back to the Tagus. In the north of Spain, also, affairs appeared equally gloomy, Mina's defeats, and their influence upon the oth-

er partidas, were positively known, but the effect of Popham's operations was unknown, or at least doubtful. Boner's division had certainly arrived, and the Gallicians, who had done nothing at Astorga, were already in want of ammunition. In Castile the activity of the partidas instead of increasing had diminished after Wellington crossed the Tormes, and the chiefs seemed inclined to leave the burthen of the war entirely to their allies. Nor was this feeling confined to them. It had been arranged, that new corps, especially of cavalry, should be raised, as the enemy receded in this campaign, and the necessary clothing and equipments supplied by England, were placed at the disposal of lord Wellington, who, to avoid the burthen of carriage, had directed them to Coruña; yet now, when Leon and the Asturias were in a manner recovered, no man would serve voluntarily. There was great enthusiasm, in words, there had always been so, but the fighting men were not increased, and even the *juramentados*, many of whom deserted at this time from the king, well clothed and soldier-like men, refused to enter the English ranks.

Now also came the news that lord William Bentinck's plans were altered, and the intercepted despatches shewed that the king had again ordered Drouet to pass the Tagus, but Soult's resistance to this order was not known. Wellington therefore at the same moment saw Marmont's army increase, heard that the king's army, reinforced by Drouet, was on the point of taking the field; that the troops from Sicily, upon whose operations he depended to keep all the army of Aragon in the eastern part of Spain, and even to turn the king's attention that way, were to be sent to Italy; and that two millions of dollars, which he hoped to have obtained at Gibraltar, had been swept off by lord William Bentinck for this Italian expedition, which thus at once deprived him of men and money! The latter was the most serious blow; the promised remittances from England had not arrived, and as the insufficiency of land-carriage rendered it nearly impossible to feed the army even on the Duero, to venture further into Spain without money would be akin to madness. From Galicia, where no credit was given, came the supply of meat; a stoppage there would have made the war itself stop, and no greater error had been committed by the enemy, than delaying to conquer Galicia, which could many times have been done.

To meet the increasing exigences for money, the English general had, for one resource, obtained a credit of half a million from the treasury to answer certain certificates, or notes of hand, which his Spanish correspondents promised to get cashed; but of this resource he was now suddenly deprived by the English ministers, who objected to the irregular form of the certificates, because he, with his usual sagacity, had adapted them to the habits of the people he was to deal with. Meanwhile his troops were four, his staff six, his muleteers nearly twelve months in arrears of pay, and he was in debt every where and for every thing. The Portuguese government had become very clamorous for the subsidy; Mr. Stuart acknowledged that their distress was very great, and the desertion from the Portuguese army, which augmented in an alarming manner, and seemed rather to be increased than repressed by severity, sufficiently proved their misery. The personal resources of Wellington alone enabled the army to maintain its forward position, for he had, to a certain extent, carried his commercial speculations into Galicia, as well as Portugal; and he had persuaded the Spanish authorities in Castile to give up a part of their revenue in kind to the army, re-

ceiving bills on the British embassy at Cadiz in return. But the situation of affairs may be best learned from the mouths of the generals.

"The arrears of the army are certainly getting to an alarming pitch, and if it is suffered to increase we cannot go on: we have only here two brigades of infantry fed by our own commissariat, and we are now reduced to one of them having barely bread for this day, and the commissary has not a farthing of money. I know not how we shall get on!"

Such were Beresford's words on the 8th of July, and on the 15th, Wellington wrote even more forcibly.

"I have never," said he, "been in such distress as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen, if the government do not attend seriously to the subject, and supply us regularly with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese government are a joke to ours, and if our credit was not better than theirs, we should certainly starve. As it is, if we don't find means to pay our bills for butcher's meat there will be an end to the war at once."

Thus stript as it were to the skin, the English general thought once more to hide his nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont, proud of his own unripened skill, and, perhaps, from the experience of San Christoval, undervaluing his adversary's tactics, desirous also, it was said, to gain a victory without the presence of a king, Marmont, pushed on by fate, madly broke the chain which restrained his enemy's strength.

CHAPTER III.

Bonet arrives in the French camp—Marmont passes the Duero—Combat of Castrejon—Allies retire across the Guarena—Combat on that river—Observations on the movements—Marmont turns Wellington's flank—Retreat to San Christoval—Marmont passes the Tormes—Battle of Salamanca—Anecdote of Mrs. Dalbiac.

WHEN Wellington found by the intercepted letters that the king's orders for Drouet to cross the Tagus, were reiterated and imperative, he directed Hill to detach troops in the same proportion. And as this reinforcement, coming by the way of Alcantara, could reach the Duero as soon as Drouet could reach Madrid, he hoped still to maintain the Tormes, if not the Duero, notwithstanding the king's power; for some money, long expected from England, had at last arrived in Oporto, and he thought the Gallicians, maugre their inertness, must soon be felt by the enemy. Moreover, the harvest on the ground, however abundant, could not long feed the French multitudes if Drouet and the king should together join Marmont. Nevertheless, fearing the action of Joseph's cavalry, he ordered D'Urban's horsemen to join the army on the Duero. But to understand the remarkable movements which were now about to commence, the reader must bear in mind, that the French army, from its peculiar organization, could, while the ground harvest lasted, operate without any regard to lines of communication; it had supports on all sides and procured its food every where, for the troops were taught to reap the standing corn, and grind it themselves if their cavalry could not seize flour in the villages. This organization approaching the ancient Roman military perfection, gave them great advantages; in the field it baffled the irregular, and threw the regular force of the allies entirely upon the defensive; because when the flanks were turned, a retreat only could save the

communications, and the French offered no point for retaliation in kind. Wherefore, with a force composed of four different nations, Wellington was to execute the most difficult evolutions in an open country, his chances of success being to arise only from the casual errors of his adversary, who was an able general, who knew the country perfectly, and was at the head of an army, brave, excellently disciplined, and of one nation. The game would have been quite unequal if the English general had not been so strong in cavalry.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE DUERO

In the course of the 15th and 16th, Marmont, who had previously made several deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant army between Toro and the Hornija river; and intercepted letters, the reports of deserters, and the talk of peasants, had for several days assigned the former place as his point of passage. On the morning of the 16th, the English exploring officers, passing the Duero near Tordesillas, found only the garrison there, and in the evening the reports stated that two French divisions had already passed the repaired bridge of Toro. Wellington united his centre and left at Canizal on the Guarena during the night, intending to attack those who had passed at Toro; but as he had still some doubts of the enemy's real object, he caused sir Stapleton Cotton to halt on the Trabancos with the right wing, composed of the fourth and light divisions and Anson's cavalry. Meanwhile Marmont, recalling his troops from the left bank of the Duero, returned to Tordesillas and Pollos, passed that river at those points and occupied Nava del Rey, where his whole army was concentrated in the evening of the 17th, some of his divisions having marched above forty miles, and some above fifty miles, without a halt. The English cavalry posts being thus driven over the Trabancos, advice of the enemy's movement was sent to lord Wellington, but he was then near Toro, it was midnight ere it reached him, and the troops under Cotton remained near Castrejon behind the Trabancos during the night of the 17th, without orders, exposed, in a bad position, to the attack of the whole French army. Wellington hastened to their aid in person, and he ordered Bock's, Le Marchant's, and Alten's brigades of cavalry to follow him to Alaejos, and the fifth division to take post at Torreccilla de la Orden, six miles in rear of Castrejon.

At daybreak Cotton's outposts were again driven in by the enemy, and the bulk of his cavalry with a troop of horse artillery immediately formed in front of the two infantry divisions, which were drawn up, the fourth division on the left, the light division on the right, but at a considerable distance from each other and separated by a wide ravine. The country was open and hilly, like the downs of England, with here and there water-gulleys, dry hollows, and bold naked heads of land, and behind the most prominent of these last, on the other side of the Trabancos, lay the whole French army. Cotton, however, seeing only horsemen, pushed his cavalry again towards the river, advancing cautiously by his right along some high table-land, and his troops were soon lost to the view of the infantry, for the morning fog was thick on the stream, and at first nothing could be descried beyond. But very soon the deep tones of artillery shook the ground, the sharp ring of musketry was heard in the mist, and the forty-third regiment was hastily brought through Castrejon to support the advancing cavalry; for besides the ravine which separated the fourth from the light division, there was another ravine with a marshy bottom, between

the cavalry and infantry, and the village of Castrejon was the only good point of passage.

The cannonade now became heavy, and the spectacle surprisingly beautiful, for the lighter smoke and mist, curling up in fantastic pillars, formed a huge and glittering dome tinged of many colours by the rising sun; and through the grosser vapour below, the restless horsemen were seen or lost as the fume thickened from the rapid play of the artillery, while the bluff head of land, beyond the Trabancos, covered with French troops, appeared, by an optical deception, close at hand, dilated to the size of a mountain, and crowned with gigantic soldiers, who were continually breaking off and sliding down into the fight. Suddenly a dismounted cavalry officer stalked from the midst of the smoke towards the line of infantry; his gait was peculiarly rigid, and he appeared to hold a bloody handkerchief to his heart, but that which seemed a cloth, was a broad and dreadful wound; a bullet had entirely effaced the flesh from his left shoulder and from his breast, and had carried away part of his ribs, his heart was bared, and its movement plainly discerned. It was a piteous and yet a noble sight, for his countenance though ghastly was firm, his step scarcely indicated weakness, and his voice never faltered. This unyielding man's name was Williams; he died a short distance from the field of battle, and it was said, in the arms of his son, a youth of fourteen, who had followed his father to the Peninsula in hopes of obtaining a commission, for they were not in affluent circumstances.

General Cotton maintained this exposed position with skill and resolution, from daylight until seven o'clock, at which time Wellington arrived, in company with Beresford, and proceeded to examine the enemy's movements. The time was critical, and the two English generals were like to have been slain together by a body of French cavalry, not very numerous, which, breaking away from the multitude on the head of land beyond the Trabancos, came galloping at full speed across the valley. It was for a moment thought they were deserting, but with headlong course they mounted the table-land on which Cotton's left wing was posted, and drove a whole line of British cavalry skirmishers back in confusion. The reserves indeed soon came up from Alaejos, and these furious swordsmen being scattered in all directions were in turn driven away or cut down, but meanwhile thirty or forty, led by a noble officer, had brought up their right shoulders, and came over the edge of the table-land above the hollow which separated the British wings at the instant when Wellington and Beresford arrived on the same slope. There were some infantry picquets in the bottom, and higher up, near the French, were two guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry, which was disposed in perfect order. When the French officer saw this squadron, he reined in his horse with difficulty, and his troopers gathered in a confused body round him as if to retreat. They seemed lost men, for the British instantly charged, but with a shout the gallant fellows soused down upon the squadron, and the latter turning, galloped through the guns; then the whole mass, friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind to the bottom, carrying away Lord Wellington, and the other generals, who with drawn swords and some difficulty, got clear of the tumult. The French horsemen were now quite exhausted, and a reserve squadron of heavy dragoons coming in cut most of them to pieces; yet their invincible leader, assaulted by three enemies at once, struck one dead from his horse, and with surprising exertions saved himself from the others,

though they rode hewing at him on each side for a quarter of a mile.

While this charge was being executed, Marmont, who had ascertained that a part only of Wellington's army was before him, crossed the Trabancos in two columns, and passing by Alaejos, turned the left of the allies, marching straight upon the Guarena. The British retired by Torecilla de la Orden, the fifth division being in one column on the left, the fourth division on the right as they retreated, and the light division on an intermediate line and nearer to the enemy. The cavalry were on the flanks and rear, the air was extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds, and the close order of the troops rendered it very oppressive, but the military spectacle was exceedingly strange and grand. For then were seen the hostile columns of infantry, only half musket-shot from each other, marching impetuously towards a common goal, the officers on each side pointing forwards with their swords, or touching their caps, and waving their hands in courtesy, while the German cavalry, huge men, on huge horses, rode between in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision. At times the loud tones of command, to hasten the march, were heard passing from the front to the rear, and now and then the rushing sound of bullets came sweeping over the columns, whose violent pace was continually accelerated.

Thus moving for ten miles, yet keeping the most perfect order, both parties approached the Guarena, and the enemy seeing that the light division, although more in their power than the others, were yet outstripping them in the march, increased the fire of their guns and menaced an attack with infantry. But the German cavalry instantly drew close round, the column plunged suddenly into a hollow dip of ground on the left, which offered the means of baffling the enemy's aim, and ten minutes after the head of the division was in the stream of the Guarena between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth division entered the river at the same time but higher up on the left, and the fourth division passed it on the right. The soldiers of the light division, tormented with thirst, yet long used to their enemy's mode of warfare, drunk as they marched, and the soldiers of the fifth division stopped in the river for only a few moments, but on the instant forty French guns gathered on the heights above sent a tempest of bullets amongst them. So nicely timed was the operation.

The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources, which are united below Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence, and Marmont, hoping to carry it in the first confusion of the passage, and so seize the table-land of Vallesa, had brought up all his artillery to the front; and to distract the allies' attention he had directed Clausel to push the head of the right column over the river at Castrillo, at the same time. But Wellington expecting him at Vallesa from the first, had ordered the other divisions of his army, originally assembled at Canizal, to cross one of the upper branches of the river; and they reached the table-land of Vallesa, before Marmont's infantry, oppressed by the extreme heat and rapidity of the march, could muster in strength to attempt the passage of the other branch. Clausel, however, sent Carier's brigade of cavalry across the Guarena at Castrillo and supported it with a column of infantry; and the fourth division had just gained the heights above Canizal, after passing the stream, when Carier's horsemen entered the valley on their left, and the infantry in one column menaced their front. The sedgy banks of the river would have

been difficult to force in face of an enemy, but Victor Alten, though a very bold man in action, was slow to seize an advantage, and suffered the French cavalry to cross and form in considerable numbers without opposition; he assailed them too late and by successive squadrons instead of by regiments, and the result was unfavourable at first. The fourteenth and the German hussars were hard-pressed, the third dragoons came up in support, but they were immediately driven back again by the fire of some French infantry, the fight waxed hot with the others, and many fell, but finally general Carier was wounded and taken, and the French retired. During this cavalry action the twenty-seventh and fortieth regiments coming down the hill, broke the enemy's infantry with an impetuous bayonet charge, and Alten's horsemen being then disengaged sabred some of the fugitives.

This combat cost the French, who had advanced too far without support, a general and five hundred soldiers; but Marmont, though baffled at Vallesa and beaten at Castrillo, concentrated his army at the latter place in such a manner as to hold both banks of the Guarena. Whereupon Wellington recalled his troops from Vallesa; and as the whole loss of the allies during the previous operations was not more than six hundred, nor that of the French more than eight hundred, and that both sides were highly excited, the day still young, and the positions, although strong, open, and within cannon shot, a battle was expected. Marmont's troops had, however, been marching for two days and nights incessantly, and Wellington's plan did not admit of fighting unless forced to it in defence, or under such circumstances as would enable him to crush his opponent, and yet keep the field afterwards against the king.

By this series of signal operations, the French general had passed a great river, taken the initiatory movement, surprised the right wing of the allies, and pushed it back above ten miles. Yet these advantages are to be traced to the peculiarities of the English general's situation, which have been already noticed, and Wellington's tactical skill was manifested by the extricating of his troops from their dangerous position at Castrejon without loss and without being forced to fight a battle. He however appears to have erred in extending his troops to the right when he first reached the Duero, for seeing that Marmont could at pleasure pass that river and turn his flanks, he should have remained concentrated on the Guarena and only pushed cavalry posts to the line of the Duero above Toro. Neither should he have risked his right wing so far from his main body from the evening of the 16th to the morning of the 18th. He could scarcely have brought it off without severe loss if Marmont had been stronger in cavalry, and instead of pushing forwards at once to Guarena had attacked him on the march. On the other hand, the security of the French general's movements from the Trabancos to the Guarena, depended entirely on their rapidity; for as his columns crossed the open country on a line parallel to the march of the allies, a simple wheel by companies to the right would have formed the latter in order of battle on his flank, while the four divisions already on the Guarena could have met them in front.

But it was on the 16th that the French general failed in the most glaring manner. His intent was, by menacing the communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the allies back, and strike some decisive blow during their retreat. Now on the evening of the 16th, he had passed the Duero at Toro, gained a day's march, and was then actually nearer to Salamanca than the allies were;

and had he persisted in his movement Wellington must have fought him to disadvantage or have given up Salamanca and passed the Tormes at Huerta to regain the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This advantage Marmont relinquished, to make a forced march of eighty miles in forty-eight hours, and to risk the execution of a variety of nice and difficult evolutions, in which he lost above a thousand men by the sword or by fatigue, and finally found his adversary on the 18th still facing him in the very position which he had turned on the evening of the 16th!

On the 19th, the armies maintained their respective ground in quiet until the evening, when Marmont concentrated his troops in one mass on his left near the village of Tarazona, and Wellington fearing for his right, again passed the second branch of the Guarena at Vallesa and El Olmo, and took post on the table-land above those villages. The light division, being in front, advanced to the edge of the table-land, overlooking the enemy's main body, which was at rest round the bivouac fires; yet the picquets would have been quietly posted if sir Stapleton Cotton, coming up at the moment, had not ordered captain Ross to turn his battery of six-pounders upon a group of French officers. At the first shot the enemy seemed surprised, at the second their gunners run to their pieces, and in a few moments a reply from twelve eight-pounders shewed the folly of provoking a useless combat. An artillery officer was wounded in the head, several of the British soldiers fell in different parts of the line, one shot swept away a whole section of Portuguese, and finally the division was obliged to withdraw several hundred yards in a mortifying manner to avoid a great and unnecessary effusion of blood.

The allies being now formed in two lines on the table-land of Vallesa, offered a fair though not an easy field to the enemy; Wellington expected a battle the next day, because the range of heights which he occupied trended backwards to the Tormes on the shortest line, as he had thrown a Spanish garrison into the castle of Alba de Tormes, he thought Marmont could not turn his right, or if he attempted it, that he would be shouldered off the Tormes at the ford of Huerta. He was mistaken. The French general was more perfectly acquainted with the ground and proved that he could move an army with wonderful facility.

On the 20th at day-break, instead of crossing the Guarena to dispute the high land of Vallesa, Marmont marched rapidly in several columns, covered by a powerful rear guard, up the river to Canta la Piedra, and crossed the stream there, though the banks were difficult, before any disposition could be made to oppose him. He thus turned the right flank of the allies and gained a new range of hills trending towards the Tormes and parallel to those leading from Vallesa. Wellington immediately made a corresponding movement. Then commenced an evolution similar to that of the 18th, but on a greater scale both as to numbers and length of way. The allies moving in two lines of battle within musket-shot of the French, endeavoured to gain upon and cross their march at Cantalpino; the guns on both sides again exchanged their rough salutations as the accidents of ground favoured their play, and again the officers, like gallant gentlemen who bore no malice and knew no fear, made their military recognitions, while the horsemen on each side watched with eager eyes for an opening to charge; but the French general moving his army as one man along the crest of the heights, preserved the lead he had taken and made no mistake.

At Cantalpino it became evident that the allies were outflanked, and all this time Marmont had so skilfully managed his troops that he furnished no opportunity even for a partial attack. Wellington therefore fell off a little and made towards the heights of Cabeça Velloso and Aldea Rubia, intending to halt there while the sixth division and Alten's cavalry, forcing their march, seized Aldea Lengua and secured the position of Christoval. But he made no effort to seize the ford of Huerta, for his own march had been long and the French had passed over nearly twice as much ground, wherefore he thought they would not attempt to reach the Tormes that day. However when night approached, although his second line had got possession of the heights of Velloso, his first line was heaped up without much order in the low ground between that place and Hornillos; the French army crowned all the summit of the opposite hills, and their fires stretching in a half circle from Villaruela to Babila Fuente, shewed that they commanded the ford of Huerta. They could even have attacked the allies with great advantage had there been light for the battle. The English general immediately ordered the bivouac fires to be made, but filed the troops off in succession with the greatest celerity towards Velloso and Aldea Rubia, and during the movement the Portuguese cavalry, coming in from the front, were mistaken for French, and lost some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognised.

Wellington was deeply disquieted at the unexpected result of this day's operations, which had been entirely to the advantage of the French general. Marmont had shewn himself perfectly acquainted with the country, had outflanked and outmarched the allies, had gained the command of the Tormes, and as his junction with the king's army was thus secured, he might fight or wait for reinforcements, or continue his operations as it seemed good to himself. But the scope of Wellington's campaign was hourly being more restricted. His reasons for avoiding a battle except at advantage were stronger than before, because Caffarelli's cavalry was known to be in march, and the army of the centre was on the point of taking the field; hence, though he should fight and gain a victory, unless it was decisive, his object would not be advanced. That object was to deliver the Peninsula, which could only be done by a long course of solid operations incompatible with sudden and rash strokes unauthorized by any thing but hope; wherefore yielding to the force of circumstances, he prepared to return to Portugal and abide his time; yet with a bitter spirit, which was not soothed by the recollection, that he had refused the opportunity of fighting to advantage exactly one month before, and upon the very hills he now occupied. Nevertheless that steadfast temper which then prevented him from seizing an adventitious chance, would not now let him yield to fortune more than she could ravish from him; he still hoped to give the lion's stroke, and resolved to cover Salamanca and the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment. A letter stating his inability to hold his ground was, however, sent to Castaños, but it was intercepted by Marmont, who exultingly pushed forwards without regard to the king's movements; and it is curious that Joseph afterwards imagined this to have been a subtlety of Wellington's to draw the French general into a premature battle.

On the 21st, while the allies occupied the old position of Christoval, the French threw a garrison into Alba de Tormes, from whence the Spaniards had been withdrawn by Carlos D'Espana, without the knowledge of the English general. Marmont

then passed the Tormes, by the fords between Alba and Huerta, and moving up the valley of Machecho, encamped behind Calvariza Ariba at the edge of a forest which extended from the river to that place. Wellington also passed the Tormes in the course of the evening by the bridges and by the fords of Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua; but the third division and D'Urban's cavalry remained on the right bank, and entrenched themselves at Cabrerizos, lest the French, who had left a division on the heights of Babila Fuente, should recross the Tormes in the night and overwhelm them.

It was late when the light division descended the rough side of the Aldea Lengua mountain to cross the river, and the night came suddenly down with more than common darkness, for a storm, that common precursor of a battle in the Peninsula, was at hand. Torrents of rain deepened the ford, the water foamed and dashed with increasing violence, the thunder was frequent and deafening, and the lightning passed in sheets of fire close over the column, or played upon the points of the bayonets. One flash falling amongst the fifth dragoon guards, near Santa Marta, killed many men and horses, while hundreds of frightened animals, breaking loose from their piquet ropes and galloping wildly about, were supposed to be the enemy's cavalry charging in the darkness, and indeed some of their patrols were at hand; but to a military eye there was nothing more imposing than the close and beautiful order in which the soldiers of that noble light division, were seen by the fiery gleams to step from the river to the bank and pursue their march amidst this astounding turmoil, defying alike the storm and the enemy.

The position now taken by the allies was nearly the same as that occupied by general Graham a month before, when the forts of Salamanca were invested. The left wing rested in the low ground on the Tormes near Santa Marta, having a cavalry post in front towards Calvariza de Abaxo. The right wing extended along a range of heights which ended also in low ground, near the village of Arapiles, and this line being perpendicular to the course of the Tormes from Huerta and Salamanca, and parallel to its course from Alba to Huerta, covered Salamanca. But the enemy, extending his left along the edge of the forest, still menaced the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and in the night advice came that general Chauvel, with near two thousand of Caffarelli's horsemen and twenty guns, had actually reached Pollos on the 20th, and would join Marmont the 22nd or 23rd. Hence Wellington, feeling that he must now perforce retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and fearing that the French cavalry thus reinforced would hamper his movements, determined, unless the enemy attacked him or committed some flagrant fault, to retire before Chauvel's horsemen could arrive.

At day-break on the 22nd, Marmont, who had called the troops at Babila Fuente over the Tormes by the ford of Encina, brought Bonet's and Maucune's divisions up from the forest and took possession of the ridge of Calvariza de Ariba; he also occupied in advance of it a wooded height on which was an old chapel called Nuestra Señora de la Pena. But at a little distance from his left and from the English right, stood a pair of solitary hills, called the *Two Arapiles*, about half cannon-shot from each other; steep and savagely rugged they were, and the possession of them would have enabled the French general to form his army across Wellington's right, and thus bring on a battle with every disadvantage to the allies, confined, as the latter would have been, between the French army and the Tormes. These

hills were neglected by the English general until a staff officer, who had observed the enemy's detachments stealing towards them, first informed Beresford, and afterwards Wellington, of the fact. The former thought it was of no consequence, but the latter immediately sent the seventh *Caçadores* to seize the most distant of the rocks, and then a combat occurred similar to that which happened between *Cæsar* and *Afranius* at *Lerida*; for the French seeing the allies' detachment approaching, broke their own ranks, and running without order to the encounter gained the first *Arapiles* and kept it, but were repulsed in an endeavour to seize the second. This skirmish was followed by one at *Nuestra Señora de la Pena*, which was also assailed by a detachment of the seventh division, and so far successfully, that half that height was gained, yet the enemy kept the other half, and *Victor Alten*, flanking the attack with a squadron of German hussars, lost some men and was himself wounded by a musket-shot.

The result of the dispute for the *Arapiles* rendered a retreat difficult to the allies during day-light, for though the rock gained by the English was a fortress in the way of the French army, *Marmont*, by extending his left, and by gathering a force behind his own *Arapiles*, could still frame a dangerous battle and pounce upon the allies during their movement. Wherefore *Wellington* immediately extended his right into the low ground, placing the light companies of the guards in the village of *Arapiles*, and the fourth division, with exception of the twenty-seventh regiment, which remained at the rock, on a gentle ridge behind them. The fifth and sixth divisions he gathered in one mass upon the internal slope of the English *Arapiles*, where, from the hollow nature of the ground, they were quite hidden from the enemy; and during these movements a sharp cannonade was exchanged from the tops of those frowning hills, on whose crowning rocks the two generals sat like ravenous vultures watching for their quarry.

Marmont's project was not yet developed; his troops coming from *Babila Fuente* were still in the forest and some miles off; he had only two divisions close up, and the occupation of *Calvariza Ariba* and *Nuestra Señora de la Pena* was a daring defensive measure to cover the formation of his army. The occupation of the *Arapiles* was, however, a start forward, for an advantage to be afterwards turned to profit, and seemed to fix the operations on the left of the *Tormes*. *Wellington*, therefore, brought up the first and the light divisions to confront the enemy's troops on the height of *Calvariza Ariba*, and then calling the third division and *D'Urban's* cavalry over the river, by the fords of *Santa Marta*, he posted them in a wood near *Aldea Tejada*, entirely refused to the enemy and unseen by him, yet in a situation to secure the main road to *Ciudad Rodrigo*. Thus the position of the allies was suddenly reversed, the left rested on the English *Arapiles*, the right on *Aldea Tejada*; that which was the rear became the front, and the interval between the third and the fourth division was occupied by *Bradford's* Portuguese infantry, by the *Spaniards*, and by the British cavalry.

This ground had several breaks and hollows, so that few of these troops could be viewed by the enemy, and those which were, seemed, both from their movement and from their position, to be pointing to the *Ciudad Rodrigo* road as in retreat. The commissariat and baggage had also been ordered to the rear, the dust of their march was plainly to be seen many miles off, and hence there was nothing in the relative position of the armies, save their proximity, to

indicate an approaching battle. Such a state of affairs could not last long. About twelve o'clock *Marmont*, fearing that the important bearing of the French *Arapiles* on *Wellington's* retreat would induce the latter to drive him thence, hastily brought up *Foy's* and *Ferey's* divisions in support, placing the first, with some guns, on a wooded height between the *Arapiles* and *Nuestra Señora de la Pena*, the second, and *Boyer's* dragoons, behind *Foy* on the ridge of *Calvariza de Ariba*. Nor was this fear ill-founded, for the English general, thinking that he could not safely retreat in daylight without possessing both *Arapiles*, had actually issued orders for the seventh division to attack the French, but perceiving the approach of more troops, gave counter-orders lest he should bring on the battle disadvantageously. He judged it better to wait for new events, being certain that at night he could make his retreat good, and wishing rather that *Marmont* should attack him in his now strong position.

The French troops coming from *Babila Fuente* had not yet reached the edge of the forest, when *Marmont*, seeing that the allies would not attack, and fearing that they would retreat before his own dispositions were completed, ordered *Thomieres's* division, covered by fifty guns and supported by the light cavalry, to menace the *Ciudad Rodrigo* road. He also hastened the march of his other divisions, designing, when *Wellington* should move in opposition to *Thomieres*, to fall upon him, by the village of *Arapiles*, with six divisions of infantry and *Boyer's* dragoons, which last, he now put in march to take fresh ground on the left of the *Arapiles* rocks, leaving only one regiment of cavalry, to guard *Foy's* right flank at *Calvariza*.

In these new circumstances, the positions of the two armies embraced an oval basin formed by different ranges of hills, that rose like an amphitheatre of which the *Arapiles* rocks might be considered the door-posts. This basin was about a mile broad from north to south, and more than two miles long from east to west. The northern and western half formed the allies' position, which extended from the English *Arapiles* on the left to *Aldea Tejada* on the right. The eastern heights were held by the French right, and their left, consisting of *Thomieres's* division with the artillery and light cavalry, was now moving along the southern side of the basin; but the march was wide and loose, there was a long space between *Thomieres's* and the divisions, which, coming from the edge of the forest were destined to form the centre, and there was a longer space between him and the divisions about the *Arapiles*. Nevertheless, the mass of artillery placed on his right flank was very imposing, and opened its fire grandly, taking ground to the left by guns, in succession, as the infantry moved on; and these last marched eagerly, continually contracting their distance from the allies, and bringing up their left shoulders as if to envelope *Wellington's* position and embrace it with fire. At this time also, *Bonet's* troops, one regiment of which held the French *Arapiles*, carried the village of that name, and, although soon driven from the greatest part of it again, maintained a fierce struggle.

Marmont's first arrangements had occupied several hours, yet as they gave no positive indication of his designs, *Wellington*, ceasing to watch him, had retired from the *Arapiles*. But at three o'clock, a report reached him that the French left was in motion and pointing towards the *Ciudad Rodrigo* road; then starting up he repaired to the high ground, and observed their movements for some time with a stern contentment, for their left wing was entirely separa-

ted from the centre. The fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunder-bolt. A few orders issued from his lips like the incantations of a wizard, and suddenly the dark mass of troops which covered the English Arapiles, was seemingly possessed by some mighty spirit, and rushing violently down the interior slope of the mountain, entered the great basin amidst a storm of bullets which seemed to shear away the whole surface of the earth over which the soldiers moved. The fifth division instantly formed on the right of the fourth, connecting the latter with Bradford's Portuguese, who hastened forward at the same time from the right of the army, and the heavy cavalry galloping up on the right of Bradford, closed this front of battle. The sixth and seventh divisions flanked on the right by Anson's light cavalry, which had now moved from the Arapiles, were ranged at half cannon-shot in a second line, which was prolonged by the Spaniards in the direction of the third division; and this last, reinforced by two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, and by D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, formed the extreme right of the army. Behind all, on the highest ground, the first and light divisions and Pack's Portuguese were disposed in heavy masses as a reserve.

When this grand disposition was completed, the third division and its attendant horsemen, the whole formed in four columns and flanked on the left by twelve guns, received orders to cross the enemy's line of march. The remainder of the first line, including the main body of the cavalry, was directed to advance whenever the attack of the third division should be developed; and as the fourth division must in this forward movement necessarily lend its flank to the enemy's troops stationed on the French Arapiles, Pack's brigade was commanded to assail that rock the moment the left of the British line should pass it. Thus, after long coiling and winding, the armies came together, and drawing up their huge trains like angry serpents mingled in deadly strife.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

Marmont, from the top of the French Arapiles, saw the country beneath him suddenly covered with enemies at a moment when he was in the act of making a complicated evolution, and when, by the rash advance of his left, his troops were separated into three parts, each at too great a distance to assist the other, and those nearest the enemy neither strong enough to hold their ground, nor aware of what they had to encounter. The third division was, however, still hidden from him by the western heights, and he hoped that the tempest of bullets under which the British line was moving in the basin beneath, would check it until he could bring up his reserve divisions, and by the village of Arapiles fall on what was now the left of the allies' position. But even this, his only resource for saving the battle, was weak, for on that point there were still the first and light divisions and Pack's brigade, forming a mass of twelve thousand troops with thirty pieces of artillery; the village itself was well disputed; and the English Arapiles rock stood out as a strong bastion of defence. However, the French general, nothing daunted, despatched officer after officer, some to hasten up the troops from the forest, others to stop the progress of his left wing, and with a sanguine expectation still looked for the victory until he saw Pakenham with the third division shoot like a meteor across Thomieres' path; then pride and hope alike died within him, and desperately he was hurrying in person to that fatal point, when an exploding shell stretched him on the earth with a broken arm and two deep wounds in his side. Confusion

ensued, and the troops, distracted by ill-judged orders and counter-orders, knew not where to move, who to fight, or who to avoid.

It was about five o'clock when Pakenham fell upon Thomieres, and it was at the instant when that general, the head of whose column had gained an open isolated hill at the extremity of the southern range of heights, expected to see the allies in full retreat towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, closely followed by Marmont from the Arapiles. The counter-stroke was terrible! Two batteries of artillery placed on the summit of the western heights suddenly took his troops in flank, and Pakenham's massive columns supported by cavalry, were coming on full in his front, while two-thirds of his own division, lengthened out and unconnected, were still behind in a wood where they could hear, but could not see the storm which was now bursting. From the chief to the lowest soldier, all felt that they were lost, and in an instant Pakenham, the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle.

The British columns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners standing up manfully for the honour of their country, sent showers of grape into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light troops poured in a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavoured to display a front. But bearing onwards through the skirmishers with the might of a giant, Pakenham broke the half-formed lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancing supports; one only officer, with unyielding spirit, remained by the artillery; standing alone he fired the last gun at the distance of a few yards, but whether he lived or there died could not be seen for the smoke. Some squadrons of light cavalry fell on the right of the third division, but the fifth regiment repulsed them, and then D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, reinforced by two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons under Felton Harvey, gained the enemy's flank. The Oporto regiment, led by the English major Watson, instantly charged the French infantry, yet vainly, Watson fell deeply wounded and his men retired.

Pakenham continued his tempestuous course against the remainder of Thomieres' troops, which were now arrayed on the wooded heights behind the first hill, yet imperfectly, and offering two fronts, the one opposed to the third division and its attendant horsemen, the other to the fifth division, to Bradford's brigade and the main body of cavalry and artillery, all of which were now moving in one great line across the basin. Meanwhile Bonet's troops having failed at the village of Arapiles were sharply engaged with the fourth division, Maucune kept his menacing position behind the French Arapiles, and as Clauzel's division had come up from the forest, the connection of the centre and left was in some measure restored; two divisions were however still in the rear, and Boyer's dragoons were in march from Calvariza Ariba. Thomieres had been killed, and Bonet, who succeeded Marmont, had been disabled, hence more confusion; but the command of the army devolved on Clauzel, and he was of a capacity to sustain this terrible crisis.

The fourth and fifth divisions, and Bradford's brigade, were now hotly engaged and steadily gaining ground; the heavy cavalry, Anson's light dragoons and Bull's troop of artillery were advancing at a trot on Pakenham's left; and on that general's right D'Urban's horsemen overlapped the enemy. Thus in less than half an hour, and before an order of battle had even been formed by the French, their commander-in-chief and two other generals had fallen, and the left of their army was turned, thrown into

confusion and enveloped. Clauzel's division had indeed joined Thomières', and a front had been spread on the southern heights, but it was loose and unfit to resist; for the troops were, some in double lines, some in columns, some in squares; a powerful sun shone full in their eyes, the light soil, stirred up by the trampling of men and horses, and driven forward by a breeze, which arose in the west at the moment of attack, came full upon them mingled with smoke in such stifling clouds, that scarcely able to breathe and quite unable to see, their fire was given at random.

In this situation, while Pakenham, bearing onward with a conquering violence, was closing on their flank and the fifth division advancing with a storm of fire on their front, the interval between the two attacks was suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust, which moving swiftly forward carried within its womb the trampling sound of a charging multitude. As it passed the left of the third division Le Marchant's heavy horsemen flanked by Anson's light cavalry, broke forth from it at full speed, and the next instant twelve hundred French infantry, though formed in several lines, were trampled down with a terrible clamour and disturbance. Bewildered and blinded, they cast away their arms and run through the openings of the British squadrons stooping and demanding quarter, while the dragoons, big men and on big horses, rode onwards smiting with their long glittering swords in uncontrollable power, and the third division followed at speed, shouting as the French masses fell in succession before this dreadful charge.

Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. Their own general, Le Marchant, and many officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff was at their head, and with ranks confused, and blended together in one mass, still galloping forward they sustained from a fresh column an irregular stream of fire which emptied a hundred saddles; yet with fine courage, and downright force, the survivors broke through this the third and strongest body of men that had encountered them, and lord Edward Somerset, continuing his course at the head of one squadron, with a happy perseverance captured five guns. The French left was entirely broken, more than two thousand prisoners were taken, the French light horsemen abandoned that part of the field, and Thomières' division no longer existed as a military body. Anson's cavalry, which had passed quite over the hill and had suffered little in the charge, was now joined by D'Urban's troopers, and took the place of Le Marchant's exhausted men; the heavy German dragoons followed in reserve, and with the third and fifth divisions and the guns, formed one formidable line, two miles in advance of where Pakenham had first attacked; and that impetuous officer with unmitigated strength still pressed forward spreading terror and disorder on the enemy's left.

While these signal events, which occupied about forty minutes, were passing on the allies' right, a terrible battle raged in the centre. For when the first shock of the third division had been observed from the Arapiles, the fourth division, moving in a line with the fifth, had passed the village of that name under a prodigious cannonade, and vigorously driving Bonet's troops backwards, step by step, to the southern and eastern heights, obliged them to mingle with Clauzel's and with Thomières' broken remains. When the combattants had passed the French Arapiles, which was about the time of Le Marchant's charge, Pack's Portuguese assailed that rock, and the front of battle was thus completely defined, because Foy's division was now exchanging a

distant cannonade with the first and light divisions. However Bonet's troops, notwithstanding Marmont's fall, and the loss of their own general, fought strongly, and Clauzel made a surprising effort, beyond all men's expectations, to restore the battle. Already a great change was visible. Ferey's division drawn off from the height of Calvaraza Ariba arrived in the centre behind Bonet's men; the light cavalry, Boyer's dragoons, and two divisions of infantry, from the forest, were also united there, and on this mass of fresh men, Clauzel rallied the remnants of his own and Thomières' division. Thus by an able movement, Sarrut's, Brénier's, and Ferey's unbroken troops, supported by the whole of the cavalry, were so disposed as to cover the line of retreat to Alba de Tormes, while Maucune's division was still in mass behind the French Arapiles, and Foy's remained untouched on the right.

But Clauzel, not content with having brought the separated part of his army together and in a condition to effect a retreat, attempted to stem the tide of victory in the very fullness of its strength and roughness. His hopes were founded on a misfortune which had befallen general Pack; for that officer ascending the French Arapiles in one heavy column, had driven back the enemy's skirmishers and was within thirty yards of the summit, believing himself victorious, when suddenly the French reserves leapt forward from the rocks upon his front, and upon his left flank. The hostile masses closed, there was a thick cloud of smoke, a shout, a stream of fire, and the side of the hill was covered to the very bottom with the dead, the wounded and the flying Portuguese, who were scoffed at for this failure without any justice; no troops could have withstood that crash upon such steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at all seems very questionable. The result went nigh to shake the whole battle. For the fourth division had just then reached the southern ridge of the basin, and one of the best regiments in the service was actually on the summit, when twelve hundred fresh adversaries, arrayed on the reverse slope, charged up hill; and as the British fire was straggling and ineffectual, because the soldiers were breathless and disordered by the previous fighting, the French, who came up resolutely and without firing, won the crest. They were even pursuing down the other side when two regiments placed in line below, checked them with a destructive volley.

This vigorous counter-blow took place at the moment when Pack's defeat permitted Maucune, who was no longer in pain for the Arapiles hill, to menace the left flank and rear of the fourth division, but the left wing of the fortieth regiment immediately wheeled about, and with a rough charge cleared the rear. Maucune would not engage himself more deeply at that time, but general Ferey's troops pressed vigorously against the front of the fourth division, and Brénier did the same by the first line of the fifth division, Boyer's dragoons also came on rapidly, and the allies being outflanked and overmatched lost ground. Fiercely and fast the French followed, and the fight once more raged in the basin below. General Cole had before this fallen deeply wounded, and Leith had the same fortune, but Beresford promptly drew Spry's Portuguese brigade from the second line of the fifth division and thus flanked the advancing columns of the enemy; yet he also fell desperately wounded, and Boyer's dragoons then came freely into action because Anson's cavalry had been checked after Le Marchant's charge by a heavy fire of artillery.

The crisis of the battle had now arrived, and the

victory was for the general who had the strongest reserves in hand. Wellington, who was seen that day at every point of the field exactly when his presence was most required, immediately brought up from the second line, the sixth division, and its charge was rough, strong and successful. Nevertheless the struggle was no slight one. The men of general Hulse's brigade, which was on the left, went down by hundreds, and the sixty-first and eleventh regiments won their way desperately, and through such a fire, as British soldiers only, can sustain. Some of Boyer's dragoons also breaking in between the fifth and sixth divisions slew many men, and caused some disorder in the fifty-third; but that brave regiment lost no ground, nor did Clauzel's impetuous counter-attack avail at any point, after the first burst, against the steady courage of the allies. The southern ridge was regained, the French general Menne was severely, and general Ferey, mortally wounded, Clauzel himself was hurt, and the reserve of Boyer's dragoons coming on at a canter were met and broken by the fire of Hulse's noble brigade. Then the changing current of the fight once more set for the British. The third division continued to outflank the enemy's left, Maucune abandoned the French Arapiles, Foy retired from the ridge of Calvariza, and the allied host righting itself as a gallant ship after a sudden gust, again bore onwards in blood and gloom, for though the air, purified by the storm of the night before, was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled along the basin, and within it was the battle with all its sights and sounds of terror.

When the English general had thus restored the fight in the centre, he directed the commander of the first division to push between Foy and the rest of the French army, which would have rendered it impossible for the latter to rally or escape; but this order was not executed, and Foy's and Maucune's divisions were skillfully used by Clauzel to protect the retreat. The first, posted on undulating ground and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, covered the roads to the fords of Huerta and Encina; the second, reinforced with fifteen guns, was placed on a steep ridge in front of the forest, covering the road to Alba de Tormes; and behind this ridge, the rest of the army, then falling back in disorder before the third, fifth, and sixth divisions, took refuge. Wellington immediately sent the light division, formed in two lines and flanked by some squadrons of dragoons, against Foy; and he supported them by the first division in columns, flanked on the right by two brigades of the fourth division which he had drawn off from the centre when the sixth division restored the fight. The seventh division and the Spaniards followed in reserve, the country was covered with troops, and a new army seemed to have risen out of the earth.

Foy throwing out a cloud of skirmishers retired slowly by wings, turning and firing heavily from every rise of ground upon the light division, which marched steadily forward without returning a shot, save by its skirmishers; for three miles the march was under this musketry, which was occasionally thickened by a cannonade, and yet very few men were lost, because the French aim was baffled, partly by the twilight, partly by the even order and rapid gliding of the lines. But the French general Desgraviens was killed, and the flanking brigades from the fourth division having now penetrated between Maucune and Foy, it seemed difficult for the latter to extricate his troops from the action; nevertheless he did it, and with great dexterity. For having increased his skirmishers on the last defen-

sible ridge, along the foot of which run a marshy stream, he redoubled his fire of musketry, and made a menacing demonstration with his horsemen just as the darkness fell; the British guns immediately opened their fire, a squadron of dragoons galloped forwards from the left, the infantry, crossing the marshy stream, with an impetuous pace hastened to the summit of the hill, and a rough shock seemed at hand, but there was no longer an enemy; the main body of the French had gone into the thick forest on their own left during the firing, and the skirmishers fled swiftly after, covered by the smoke and by the darkness.

Meanwhile Maucune maintained a noble battle. He was outflanked and outnumbered, but the safety of the French army depended on his courage; he knew it, and Pakenham, marking his bold demeanour, advised Clinton, who was immediately in his front, not to assail him until the third division should have turned his left. Nevertheless the sixth division was soon plunged afresh into action under great disadvantage, for after being kept by its commander a long time without reason, close under Maucune's batteries, which ploughed heavily through the ranks, it was suddenly directed by a staff officer to attack the hill. Assisted by a brigade of the fourth division, the troops then rushed up, and in the darkness of the night the fire shewed from afar how the battle went. On the side of the British a sheet of flame was seen, sometimes advancing with an even front, sometimes pricking forth in spear-heads, now falling back in waving lines, and anon darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the apex of which often approached, yet never gained the actual summit of the mountain; but the French musketry, rapid as lightning, sparkled along the brow of the height with unvarying fulness, and with what destructive effects the dark gaps and changing shapes of the adverse fire showed too plainly. Yet when Pakenham had again turned the enemy's left, and Foy's division had glided into the forest, Maucune's task was completed, the effulgent crest of the ridge became black and silent, and the whole French army vanished as it were in the darkness.

Meanwhile Wellington, who was with the leading regiment of the light division, continued to advance towards the ford of Huerta, leaving the forest to his right, for he thought the Spanish garrison was still in the castle of Alba de Tormes, and that the enemy must of necessity be found in a confused mass at the fords. It was for this final stroke that he had so skilfully strengthened his left wing, nor was he diverted from his aim by marching through standing corn, where no enemy could have preceded him; nor by Foy's retreat into the forest, because it pointed towards the fords of Encina and Gonzalo, which that general might be endeavoring to gain, and the right wing of the allies would find him there. A squadron of French dragoons also burst hastily from the forest in front of the advancing troops, soon after dark, and firing their pistols passed at full gallop towards the ford of Huerta, thus indicating great confusion in the defeated army, and confirming the notion that its retreat was in that direction. Had the castle of Alba been held, the French could not have carried off a third of their army, nor would they have been in much better plight if Carlos D'-España, who soon discovered his error in withdrawing the garrison, had informed Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed it and suffered the colonel who had only obeyed his orders to be censured; the left wing therefore continued their march to the ford without meeting any enemy, and, the night being far spent, were there halted; the right wing, ex-

nausted by long fighting, had ceased to pursue after the action with Maucune, and thus the French gained Alba unmolested; but the action did not terminate without two remarkable accidents. While riding close behind the forty-third regiment, Wellington was struck in the thigh by a spent musket-ball, which passed through his holster; and the night picquets had just been set at Huerta, when sir Stapleton Cotton, who had gone to the ford and returned a different road, was shot through the arm by a Portuguese sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded. These were the last events of this famous battle, in which the skill of the general was worthily seconded by troops whose ardour may be appreciated by the following anecdotes.

Captain Brotherton of the fourteenth dragoons, fighting on the 18th, at the Guarena, amongst the foremost, as he was always wont to do, had a sword thrust quite through his side, yet on the 22d, he was again on horseback, and being denied leave to remain in that condition with his own regiment, secretly joined Pack's Portuguese in an undress, and was again hurt in the unfortunate charge at the Arapiles. Such were the officers. A man of the forty-third, one by no means distinguished above his comrades, was shot through the middle of the thigh, and lost his shoes in passing the marshy stream; but refusing to quit the fight, he limped under fire in rear of his regiment, and with naked feet, and streaming of blood from his wound, he marched for several miles over a country covered with sharp stones. Such were the soldiers, and the devotion of woman was not wanting to the illustration of this great day.

The wife of colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers, and endured the privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude which belongs only to her sex; and in this battle, forgetful of everything but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling yet irresistibly impelled forwards by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death.

CHAPTER IV.

Clauzel passes the Tormes at Alba—Cavalry combat at La Serna—Chauvel's cavalry joins the French army—The king reaches Blasco Sancho—Retires to Espinar on hearing of the battle—Receives letters from Clauzel which induce him to march on Segovia—Wellington drives Clauzel across the Duero—Takes Valladolid—Brings Santocildes over the Duero—Marches upon Cuellar—The king abandons Segovia and recrosses the Guadarama—State of affairs in other parts of Spain—General Long defeats Lollemand in Estremadura—Caffarelli is drawn to the coast by Popham's expedition—Wellington leaves Clinton at Cuellar, and passes the Guadarama—Cavalry combat at Majadahonda—The king unites his army at Valdemoro—Misery of the French convoy—Joseph passes the Tagus; hears of the arrival of the Sicilian expedition at Alicante—Retreats upon Valencia instead of Andalusia—Maupoint's brigade succours the garrison of Cuenca, is beaten at Utiel by Villa Campa—Wellington enters Madrid—The Retiro surrenders—Empecinado takes Guadalaxara—Extraordinary journey of colonel Fabvier—Napoleon hears of Marmont's defeat—His generous conduct towards that marshal—Receives the king's report against Soult—His magnanimity—Observations.

DURING the few hours of darkness which succeeded the cessation of the battle, Clauzel had with a wonderful diligence, passed the Tormes by the narrow bridge of Alba, and the fords below it, and at day-

light was in full retreat upon Peneranda, covered by an organized rear-guard. Wellington also, having brought up the German dragoons, and Anson's cavalry to the front, crossed the river with his left wing at daylight, and moving up the stream, came about ten o'clock upon the French rear, which was winding without much order, along the Almar, a small stream at the foot of a height near the village of Le Serna. He launched his cavalry against them, and the French squadrons, flying from Anson's troopers, towards their own left, abandoned three battalions of infantry, who in separate columns were making up a hollow slope on their right, hoping to gain the crest of the heights before the cavalry could fall on. The two foremost did reach the higher ground, and there formed squares, general Foy being in the one, and general Chemineau in the other; but the last regiment when half-way up, seeing Bock's dragoons galloping hard on, faced about, and being still in column, commenced a disorderly fire. The two squares already formed above, also plied their muskets with far greater effect; and as the Germans, after crossing the Almar stream, had to pass a turn of narrow road, and then to clear some rough ground before they could range their squadrons on a charging front, the troopers fell fast under the fire. By two's, by three's, by ten's, by twenties they fell, but the rest keeping together, surmounted the difficulties of the ground, and hurtling on the column, went clean through it; then the squares above retreated, and several hundred prisoners were made by these able and daring horsemen.

This charge had been successful even to wonder, the joyous victors, standing in the midst of their captives and of thousands of admiring friends, seemed invincible; yet those who witnessed the scene, nay the actors themselves, remained with the conviction of this military truth, that cavalry are not able to cope with veteran infantry save by surprise. The hill of La Serna offered a frightful spectacle of the power of the musket, that queen of weapons, and the track of the Germans was marked by their huge bodies. A few minutes only had the combat lasted and above a hundred had fallen; fifty-one were killed outright; and in several places man and horse had died simultaneously, and so suddenly, that falling together on their sides, they appeared still alive, the horse's legs stretched out as in movement, the rider's feet in the stirrup, his bridle in hand, the sword raised to strike, and the large hat fastened under the chin, giving to the grim, but undistorted countenance, a supernatural and terrible expression.

When the French main body found their rear-guard attacked, they turned to its succour, but seeing the light division coming up, recommenced the retreat and were followed to Nava de Sotroval. Near that place Chauvel's horsemen joined them from the Duero, and covered the rear with such a resolute countenance, that the allied cavalry, reduced in numbers, and fatigued with continual fighting, did not choose to meddle again. Thus Clauzel carried his army clear off without further loss, and with such celerity, that his head-quarters were that night at Flores de Avila, forty miles from the field of battle. After remaining a few hours there, he crossed the Zapardiel, and would have halted the 24th, but the allied cavalry entered Cisla, and the march was then continued to Arevalo. This was a wonderful retreat, and the line was chosen with judgment, for Wellington naturally expected the French army would have made for Tordesillas instead of the Adaja. The pursuit was however somewhat slack, for on the very night of the action, the British left wing, being quite fresh, could have as-

cended the *Tormes* and reached the *Almar* before day-light, or, passing at *Huerta*, have marched by *Ventosa* to *Peneranda*; but the vigorous following of a beaten enemy, was never a prominent characteristic of lord Wellington's campaigns in the Peninsula.

The 25th, the allied army halted on the *Zapardiel* and *Adaja* rivers, to let the commissariat, which had been sent to the rear the morning of the battle, come up. Meanwhile the king, having quitted *Madrid* with fourteen thousand men on the 21st, reached the *Adaja*, and pushed his cavalry towards *Fontiveros*; he was at *Blasco Sancho* on the 24th, within a few hours' march of *Arevalo*, and consequently able to effect a junction with *Clauzel*, yet he did not hurry his march, for he knew only of the advance upon *Salamanca*, not of the defeat, and having sent many messengers to inform *Marmont* of his approach, concluded that general would await his arrival. The next day he received letters from the duke of *Ragusa* and *Clauzel*, dated *Arevalo*, describing the battle, and telling him that the defeated army must pass the *Duero* immediately to save the depot of *Valladolid*, and to establish new communications with the army of the north. Those generals promised, however, to halt behind that river, if possible, until the king could receive reinforcements from *Suchet* and *Soult*.

Joseph, by a rapid movement upon *Arevalo*, could still have effected a junction, but he immediately made a forced march to *Espinar*, leaving in *Blasco Sancho* two officers and twenty-seven troopers, who were surprised and made prisoners on the evening of the 25th by a corporal's patrol; *Clauzel* at the same time marched upon *Valladolid*, by *Olmedo*, thus abandoning *Zamora*, *Toro*, and *Tordesillas*, with their garrisons, to the allies. Wellington immediately brought *Santocildes*, who was now upon the *Esla* with eight thousand Gallicians, to the right bank of the *Duero*, across which river he communicated by *Castro Nuño* with the left of the allies, which was then upon the *Zapardiel*.

The 27th, the British, whose march had become more circumspect from the vicinity of the king's army, entered *Olmedo*. At this place, general *Ferey* had died of his wounds, and the Spaniards tearing his body from the grave were going to mutilate it, when the soldiers of the light division who had so often fought against this brave man rescued his corpse, remade his grave, and heaped rocks upon it for more security, though with little need; for the Spaniards, with whom the sentiment of honour is always strong when not stifled by the violence of their passions, applauded the action.

On the 26th, *Clauzel*, finding the pursuit had slackened, sent colonel *Fabvier* to advise the king of it, and then sending his own right wing across the *Duero*, by the ford near *Boecillo*, to cover the evacuation of *Valladolid*, marched with the other wing towards the bridge of *Tudela*; he remained however still on the left bank, in the hope that *Fabvier's* mission would bring the king back. Joseph, who had already passed the *Puerta de Guadarama*, immediately repassed it without delay and made a flank movement to *Segovia*, which he reached the 27th, and pushed his cavalry to *Santa Maria de Nieva*. Here he remained until the 31st, expecting *Clauzel* would join him, for he resolved not to quit his hold of the passes over the *Guadarama*, nor to abandon his communication with *Valencia* or *Andalusia*. But Wellington brought *Santocildes* over the *Duero* to the *Zapardiel*, and crossing the *Eresma* and *Ciga* rivers himself, with the first and light divisions and the cavalry, had obliged *Clauzel* to retire over the *Duero* in the night of the 29th; and the next day the French general, whose army was very much dis-

couraged, fearing that Wellington would gain *Aranza* and *Lerma* while the Gallicians seized *Dueñas* and *Torquemada*, retreated in three columns by the valleys of the *Aranza*, the *Duero* and the *Esquiva*, towards *Burgos*.

The English general entered *Valladolid* amidst the rejoicings of the people, and there captured seventeen pieces of artillery, considerable stores, and eight hundred sick and wounded men; three hundred other prisoners were taken by the *partida* chief, *Marquinez*, and a large French convoy intended for *Andalusia* returned to *Burgos*. While the left wing of the allies pursued the enemy up the *Aranza*, Wellington, marching with the right wing against the king, reached *Cuellar* the 1st of August; on the same day the garrison of *Tordesillas* surrendered to the Gallicians, and Joseph, having first dismantled the castle of *Segovia* and raised a contribution of money and church plate, retreated through the *Puerta de Guadarama*, leaving a rear-guard of cavalry which escaped by the *Ildefonso* pass on the approach of the allied horsemen. Thus the army of the centre was irrevocably separated from the army of Portugal, the operations against the latter were terminated, and new combinations were made conformable to the altered state of affairs; but to understand these it is necessary to look at the transactions in other parts of the Peninsula.

In *Extremadura*, after *Drouet's* retreat to *Azagua*, *Hill* placed a strong division at *Merida* ready to cross the *Tagus*, but no military event occurred until the 24th of July, when general *Lallemand*, with three regiments of cavalry, pushed back some Portuguese horsemen from *Ribera* to *Villa Franca*. He was attacked in front by general *Long*, while general *Slade* menaced his left, but he succeeded in repassing the defile of *Ribera*; *Long* then turned him by both flanks, and aided by *Lefebvre's* horse artillery, drove him, with the loss of fifty men and many horses, upon *Llera*, a distance of twenty miles. *Drouet*, desirous to retaliate, immediately executed a flank march towards *Merida*, and *Hill*, fearing for his detachments there, made a corresponding movement, whereupon the French general returned to the *Serena*; but though he received positive orders from *Soult* to give battle, no action followed, and the affairs of that part of the Peninsula remained balanced.

In *Andalusia*, *Ballesteros* surprised colonel *Beauvais*, at *Ossuna*, took three hundred prisoners, and destroyed the French depot there. After this he moved against *Malaga*, and was opposed by general *Laval* in front, while general *Villatte*, detached from the blockade of *Cadiz*, cut off his retreat to *San Roque*. The road to *Murcia* was still open to him, but his rashness, though of less consequence since the battle of *Salamanca*, gave Wellington great disquietude; and the more so, that Joseph O'Donel had just sustained a serious defeat near *Alicant*. This disaster, which shall be described in a more fitting place, was, however, in some measure counterbalanced by the information, that the revived expedition from *Sicily* had reached *Majorca*, where it had been reinforced by *Whittingham's* division, and by the stores and guns sent from Portugal to *Gibraltar*. It was known also, that in the northern provinces *Popham's* armament had drawn all *Caffarelli's* troops to the coast, and although the littoral warfare was not followed up, the French were in confusion, and the diversion complete.

In *Castile* the siege of *Astorga* still lingered; but the division of *Santocildes*, seven thousand strong, was in communication with Wellington, *Silveira's* militia were on the *Duero*, *Clauzel* had retreated to *Burgos*, and the king, joined by two thousand men

from Suchet's army, could concentrate twenty thousand to dispute the passes of the Guadarama. Hence Wellington, having nothing immediate to fear from Soult, nor from the army of Portugal, nor from the army of the north, nor from Suchet, menaced as that marshal was by the Sicilian expedition, resolved to attack the king in preference to following Clauzel. The latter general could not be pursued without exposing Salamanca and the Gallicians to Joseph, who was strong in cavalry; but the monarch could be assailed without risking much in other quarters, seeing that Clauzel could not be very soon ready to renew the campaign, and it was expected Castaños would reduce Astorga in a few days, which would give eight thousand additional men to the field army. Moreover, a strong British division could be spared to co-operate with Santocildes, Silveira, and the partidas, in the watching of the beaten army of Portugal, while Wellington gave the king a blow in the field, or forced him to abandon Madrid; and it appeared probable that the moral effect of regaining the capital would excite the Spaniards' energy every where, and would prevent Soult from attacking Hill. If he did attack him, the allies, by choosing this line of operations, would be at hand to give success.

These reasons being weighed, Wellington posted general Clinton at Cuellar with the sixth division, which he increased to eight thousand men, by the addition of some sickly regiments, and by Anson's cavalry; Santocildes also was put in communication with him, and the partidas of Marquez, Saornil, and El Principe, agreed to act with Anson on a prescribed plan. Thus, exclusive of Silveira's militia, and of the Gallicians about Astorga, eighteen thousand men were left on the Duero, and the English general was still able to march against Joseph with twenty-eight thousand old troops, exclusive of Carlos D'Espana's Spaniards. He had also assurance from lord Castlereagh, that a considerable sum in hard money, to be followed by other remittances, had been sent from England; a circumstance of the utmost importance, because grain could be purchased in Spain at one-third the cost of bringing it up from Portugal.

Meanwhile, the king, who had regained Madrid, expecting to hear that ten thousand of the army of the south were at Toledo, received letters from Soult positively refusing to send that detachment; and from Clauzel, saying that the army of Portugal was in full retreat to Burgos. This retreat he regarded as a breach of faith, because Clauzel had promised to hold the line of the Duero if Wellington marched upon Madrid; but Joseph was unable to appreciate Wellington's military combinations; he did not perceive, that, taking advantage of his central position, the English general, before he marched against Madrid, had forced Clauzel to abandon the Duero to seek some safe and distant point to reorganize his army. Nor was the king's perception of his own situation much clearer. He had the choice of several lines of operations; that is, he might defend the passes of the Guadarama, while his court and enormous convoys evacuated Madrid, and marched either upon Zaragoza, Valencia, or Andalusia; or he might retire, army and convoy together, in one of those directions.

Rejecting the defence of the passes, lest the allies should then march by their right to the Tagus, and so intercept his communication with the south, he resolved to direct his march towards the Morena; and he had, from Segovia, sent Soult orders to evacuate Andalusia, and meet him on the frontier of La Mancha; but to avoid the disgrace of flying before a detachment, he occupied the Escorial mountain, and

placed his army across the roads leading from the passes of the Guadarama to Madrid. While in this position, Wellington's advanced guard, composed of D'Urban's Portuguese, a troop of horse artillery and a battalion of infantry, passed the Guadarama, and the 10th, the whole army was over the mountains. Then the king, retaining only eight thousand men in position, sent the rest of his troops to protect the march of his court, which quitted Madrid the same day, with two or three thousand carriages of different kinds, and nearly twenty thousand persons, of all ages and sexes.

The 11th, D'Urban drove back Trielhard's cavalry posts, and entered Majadahonda, whilst some German infantry, Bock's heavy cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, occupied Las Rozas, about a mile in his rear. In the evening, Trielhard, reinforced by Schiazzetti's Italian dragoons and the lancers of Berg, returned; whereupon D'Urban called up the horse artillery, and would have charged the enemy's leading squadrons, but the Portuguese cavalry fled. The artillery officer, thus abandoned, made a vigorous effort to save his guns; yet, three of them being overturned on the rough ground, were taken, and the victorious cavalry passed through Majadahonda in pursuit. The German dragoons, although surprised in their quarters, mounted, and stopped the leading French squadrons until Schiazzetti's Italians came up, when the fight was like to end badly; but Ponsonby's cavalry and the seventh division arrived, and Trielhard immediately abandoned Majadahonda, leaving the captured guns behind him, yet carrying away prisoners the Portuguese general Visconde de Barbacena, the colonel of the German cavalry, and others of less rank. The whole loss of the allies was above two hundred; and when the infantry passed through Rozas, a few hours after the combat, the German dead were lying thickly in the streets, many of them in their shirts and trousers, and thus stretched across the sills of the doors they furnished proof at once of the suddenness of the action and of their own bravery. Had the king been prepared to follow up this blow with his whole force, the allies must have suffered severely; for Wellington, trusting to the advanced guard, had not kept his divisions very close together.

After this combat the king retired to Valdemoro, where he met his convoy from Madrid; and when the troops of the three different nations forming his army thus came together, a horrible confusion arose; the convoy was plundered, and the miserable people who followed the court, were made a prey by the licentious soldiers. Marshal Jourdan, a man at all times distinguished for the noblest sentiments, immediately threw himself into the midst of the disorderly troops, and aided by the other generals, with great personal risk arrested the mischief, and succeeded in making the multitude file over the bridge of Aranjues. The procession was, however, lugubrious and shocking; for the military line of march was broken by crowds of weeping women and children and by despairing men, and courtiers of the highest rank were to be seen in full dress, desperately struggling with savage soldiers for the possession of even the animals on which they were endeavouring to save their families. The cavalry of the allies could have driven the whole before them into the Tagus, yet lord Wellington did not molest them. Either from ignorance of their situation, or what is more probable, compassionating their misery, and knowing that the troops, by abandoning the convoy, could easily escape over the river, he would not strike where the blow could only fall on helpless people, without affecting the military operations. Perhaps,

also, he thought it wise to leave Joseph the burthen of his court.

On the evening of the 13th, the whole multitude was over the Tagus, the garrisons of Aranjues and Toledo joined the army, order was restored, and the king received letters from Soult and Suchet. The first named marshal opposed the evacuation of Andalusia; the second gave notice that the Sicilian expedition had landed at Alicante, and that a considerable army was forming there. Then, irritated by Soult, and alarmed for the safety of Suchet, the king relinquished his march towards the Morena, and commenced his retreat to Valencia. The 15th, the advanced guard moved with the sick and wounded, who were heaped on country cars, and the main body of the convoy followed under charge of the infantry, while the cavalry, spreading to the right and left, endeavoured to collect provisions. But the people, remembering the wanton devastation committed a few months before by Montbrun's troops, on their return from Alicante, fled with their property; and as it was the hottest time of the year, and the deserted country was sandy and without shade, this march, of one hundred and fifty miles, to Almanza, was one of continual suffering. The partida chief, Chaleco, hovered constantly on the flanks and rear, killing, without mercy, all persons, civil or military, who straggled or sunk from exhaustion; and while this disastrous journey was in progress, another misfortune befel the French on the side of Requena. For the hussars and infantry belonging to Suchet's army, having left Madrid to succour Cuenca, before the king returned from Segovia, carried off the garrison of that place in despite of the Empecinado, and made for Valencia; but Villa Campa crossing their march on the 25th of August, at the passage of a river, near Utiel, took all their baggage, their guns, and three hundred men. And after being driven away from Cuenca, the Empecinado invested Guadalupe, where the enemy had left a garrison of seven hundred men.

Wellington, seeing that the king had crossed the Tagus in retreat, entered Madrid; a very memorable event, were it only for the affecting circumstances attending it. He, a foreigner, and marching at the head of a foreign army, was met and welcomed to the capital of Spain by the whole remaining population. The multitude, who before that hour had never seen him, came forth to hail his approach, not with feigned enthusiasm, not with acclamations extorted by the fear of a conqueror's power, nor yet excited by the natural proneness of human nature to laud the successful, for there was no tumultuous exultation; famine was amongst them, and long-endured misery had subdued their spirits; but with tears, and every other sign of deep emotion, they crowded around his horse, hung upon his stirrups, touched his clothes, or throwing themselves upon the earth, blessed him aloud as the friend of Spain. His triumph was as pure, and glorious, as it was uncommon, and he felt it to be so.

Madrid was, however, still disturbed by the presence of the enemy. The Retiro contained enormous stores, twenty thousand stand of arms, more than one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery, and the eagles of two French regiments; and it had a garrison of two thousand fighting men, besides invalids and followers, but its inherent weakness was soon made manifest. The works consisted of an interior fort called La China, with an exterior entrenchment; but the fort was too small, the entrenchment too large, and the latter could be easily deprived of water. In the lodgings of a French officer, also, was found an order, directing the commandant to con-

fine his real defence to the fort; and accordingly, in the night of the 12th, being menaced, he abandoned the entrenchment, and the next day accepted honourable terms, because La China was so contracted and filled with combustible buildings, that his fine troops would, with only a little firing, have been smothered in the ruins; yet they were so dissatisfied that many broke their arms, and their commander was like to have fallen a victim to their wrath. They were immediately sent to Portugal, and French writers with too much truth assert, that the escort basely robbed and murdered many of the prisoners. This disgraceful action was perpetrated, either at Avila, or on the frontier of Portugal; wherefore, the British troops, who furnished no escorts after the first day's march from Madrid, are guiltless.

Coincident with the fall of the Retiro was that of Guadalupe, which surrendered to the Empecinado. This mode of wasting an army, and its resources, was designated by Napoleon as the most glaring and extraordinary of all the errors committed by the king and by Marmont. And surely it was so. For including the garrisons of Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora and Astorga, which were now blockaded, six thousand men had been delivered, as it were, bound, to the allies; and with them, stores and equipments sufficient for a new army. These forts had been designed by the emperor to resist the partidas, but his lieutenants exposed them to the British army, and thus the positive loss of men from the battle of Salamanca was doubled.

Napoleon had notice of Marmont's defeat as early as the 2d of September, a week before the great battle of Borodino; the news was carried by colonel Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in one course, and having fought on the 22d of July at the Arapiles, was wounded on the heights of Moskowa the 7th of September! However, the duke of Ragusa, suffering alike in body and in mind, had excused himself with so little strength, or clearness, that the emperor, contemptuously remarking that the despatch contained more complicate stuffing than a clock, desired his war minister to demand, why Marmont had delivered battle without the orders of the king? why he had not made his operations subservient to the general plan of the campaign? why he broke from defensive into offensive operations before the army of the centre joined him? why he would not even wait two days for Chauvel's cavalry, which he knew were close at hand? "From personal vanity," said the emperor, with seeming sternness, "the duke of Ragusa has sacrificed the interests of his country, and the good of my service; he is guilty of the crime of insubordination, and is the author of all this misfortune."

But Napoleon's wrath, so just, and apparently so dangerous, could not, even in its first violence, overpower his early friendship. With a kindness, the recollection of which must now pierce Marmont's inmost soul, twice, in the same letter, he desired that these questions might not even be put to his unhappy lieutenant until his wounds were cured and his health re-established. Nor was this generous feeling shaken by the arrival of the king's agent, colonel Désprez, who reached Moscow the 18th of October, just after Murat had lost a battle at the outposts, and when all hopes of peace with Russia were at an end. Joseph's despatches, bitter against all the generals, were especially so against Marmont and Soult; the former for having lost the battle, the latter because of his resistance to the royal plan. The recall of the duke of Dalmatia was demanded imperatively, because he had written a letter to the emperor, extremely offensive to the king; and it was also hinted,

that Soult designed to make himself king of Andalusia. Idle stories of that marshal's ambition seem always to have been resorted to, when his skilful plans were beyond the military judgment of ordinary generals; but Marmont was deeply sunk in culpable misfortune, and the king's complaints against him were not unjust. Napoleon had, however, then seen Wellington's despatch, which was more favourable to the duke of Ragusa, than Joseph's report; for the latter was founded on a belief, that the unfortunate general, knowing the army of the centre was close at hand, would not wait for it; whereas, the partidas had intercepted so many of Joseph's letters, it is doubtful if any reached Marmont previous to the battle. It was in vain, therefore, that Désprez pressed the king's discontent on the emperor; that great man, with unerring sagacity, had already disentangled the truth, and Désprez was thus roughly interrogated as to the conduct of his master.

Why was not the army of the centre in the field a month sooner to succour Marmont? Why was the emperor's example, when, in a like case, he marched from Madrid against sir John Moore, forgotten? Why, after the battle, was not the Duero passed, and the beaten troops rallied on the army of the centre? Why were the passes of the Guadarama so early abandoned? Why was the Tagus crossed so soon? Finally, why were the stores and gun-carriages in the Retiro not burnt, the eagles and the garrison carried off?

To these questions the king's agent could only reply by excuses which must have made the energetic emperor smile; but when, following his instructions, Désprez harped upon Soult's demeanour, his designs in Andalusia, and still more upon the letter so personally offensive to the king, and which shall be noticed hereafter, Napoleon replied sharply, that he could not enter into such pitiful disputes while he was at the head of five hundred thousand men, and occupied with such immense operations. With respect to Soult's letter, he said he knew his brother's real feelings, but those who judged Joseph by his language could only think with Soult, whose suspicions were natural, and partaken by the other generals; wherefore, he would not, by recalling him, deprive the armies in Spain of the only military head they possessed. And then, in ridicule of Soult's supposed treachery, he observed, that the king's fears on that head must have subsided, as the English newspapers said the duke of Dalmatia was evacuating Andalusia, and he would of course unite with Suchet and with the army of the centre to retake the offensive.

The emperor, however, admitted all the evils arising from these disputes between the generals and the king, but said that at such a distance he could not give precise orders for their conduct. He had foreseen the mischief, he observed, and regretted more than ever, that Joseph had disregarded his counsel not to return to Spain in 1811, and thus saying, he closed the conversation; but this expression about Joseph not returning to Spain is very remarkable. Napoleon spoke of it as of a well known fact; yet Joseph's letters shew, that he not only desired, but repeatedly offered to resign the crown of Spain and live a private man in France! Did the emperor mean that he wished his brother to remain a crowned guest at Paris? or had some subtle intriguers misrepresented the brothers to each other? The noblest buildings are often defiled in secret by vile and creeping things.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. *Menace your enemy's flanks, protect your own, and be ready to concentrate on the important points:*

VOL. II.—G

These maxims contain the whole spirit of Napoleon's instructions to his generals, after Badajos was succoured, in 1811. At that time he ordered the army of Portugal to occupy the valley of the Tagus and the passes of the Gredos mountains, in which position it covered Madrid, and from thence it could readily march to aid either the army of the south, or the army of the north. Dorsenne, who commanded the latter, could bring twenty-six thousand men to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult could bring a like number to Badajos, but Wellington could not move against one or the other without having Marmont upon his flank; he could not move against Marmont without having the others on both flanks, and he could not turn his opponent's flanks, save from the ocean. If, notwithstanding this combination, he took Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, it was by surprise, and because the French did not concentrate on the important points, which proved indeed his superiority to the executive general opposed to him, but in no manner affected the principle of Napoleon's plan.

Again, when the preparations for the Russian war had weakened the army of the north, the emperor, giving Marmont two additional divisions, ordered him to occupy Castile, not as a defensive position, but as a central offensive one, from whence he could keep the Gallicians in check, and by prompt menacing movements, prevent Wellington from commencing serious operations elsewhere. This plan also had reference to the maxim respecting flanks. For Marmont was forbidden to invade Portugal while Wellington was on the frontier of Beira, that is, when he could not assail him in flank; and he was directed to guard the Asturias carefully, as a protection to the great line of communication with France; in May, also, he was rebuked for having withdrawn Bonet from Oviedo, and for delaying to reoccupy the Asturias when the incursion against Beira terminated. But neither then, nor afterwards, did the duke of Ragusa comprehend the spirit of the emperor's views; and that extraordinary man, whose piercing sagacity seized every chance of war, was so disquieted by his lieutenant's want of perception, that all the pomp, and all the vast political and military combinations of Dresden, could not put it from his thoughts.

"Twice," said he, "has the duke of Ragusa placed an interval of thirty leagues between his army and the enemy, contrary to all the rules of war; the English general goes where he will, the French general loses the initial movements, and is of no weight in the affairs of Spain. Biscay and the north are exposed by the evacuation of the Asturias; Santona and St. Sebastian are endangered, and the guerrillas communicate freely with the coast. If the duke of Ragusa has not kept some bridges on the Agueda, he cannot know what Wellington is about, and he will retire before light cavalry instead of operating so as to make the English general concentrate his whole army. The false direction already given to affairs by marshal Marmont, makes it necessary that Caffarelli should keep a strong corps always on hand; that the commander of the reserve, at Bayonne, should look to the safety of St. Sebastian, holding three thousand men always ready to march; finally, that the provisional battalions, and the troops from the depots of the interior, should immediately reinforce the reserve at Bayonne, be encamped on the Pyrenees, and exercised and formed for service. *If Marmont's oversights continue, these troops will prevent the disasters from becoming extreme.*"

Napoleon was supernaturally gifted in warlike matters. It has been recorded of Cæsar's generalship, that he foretold the cohorts mixed with his

cavalry would be the cause of victory at Pharsalia. But this letter was written by the French emperor on the 28th of May, before the allies were even collected on the Agueda, and when a hundred thousand French troops were between the English general and Bayonne, and yet its prescience was vindicated at Burgos in October!

2nd. To fulfil the conditions of the emperor's design, Marmont should have adopted Soult's recommendation; that is, leaving one or two divisions on the Tormes, he should have encamped near Baños, and pushed troops towards the upper Agueda to watch the movements of the allies. Caffarelli's divisions could then have joined those on the Tormes, and thus Napoleon's plan for 1811 would have been exactly renewed; Madrid would have been covered, a junction with the king would have been secured, Wellington could scarcely have moved beyond the Agueda, and the disaster of Salamanca would have been avoided.

The duke of Ragusa, apparently because he would not have the king in his camp, run counter both to the emperor and to Soult. 1st. He kept no troops on the Agueda, which might be excused on the ground that the feeding of them there was beyond his means; but then he did not concentrate behind the Tormes to sustain his forts, neither did he abandon his forts, when he abandoned Salamanca; and thus eight hundred men were sacrificed, merely to secure the power of concentrating behind the Duero. 2nd. He adopted a line of operations perpendicular to the allies' front, instead of lying on their flank; he abandoned sixty miles of country between the Tormes and the Agueda, and he suffered Wellington to take the initial movements of the campaign. 3rd. He withdrew Bonet's division from the Asturias, whereby he lost Caffarelli's support, and realized the emperor's fears for the northern provinces. It is true that he gained the initial power by passing the Duero on the 18th; and, had he deferred the passage until the king was over the Guadarama, Wellington must have gone back upon Portugal with some shew of dishonour, if not great loss. But if Castaños, instead of remaining with fifteen thousand Gallicians before Astorga, a weak place, with a garrison of only twelve hundred men, had blockaded it with three or four thousand, and detached Santocildes with eleven or twelve thousand down the Esla to co-operate with Silveira and D'Urban, sixteen thousand men would have been acting upon Marmont's right flank in June; and as Bonet did not join until the 8th of July, the line of the Duero would scarcely have availed the French general.

3rd. The secret of Wellington's success is to be found in the extent of country occupied by the French armies and the impediments to their military communication. Portugal was an impregnable central position, from whence the English general could rush out unexpectedly against any point. This strong post was, however, of his own making, he had chosen it, had fortified it, had defended it, he knew its full value and possessed quickness and judgment to avail himself of all its advantages; the battle of Salamanca was accidental in itself, but the tree was planted to bear such fruit, and Wellington's profound combinations must be estimated from the general result. He had only sixty thousand disposable troops, and above a hundred thousand French were especially appointed to watch and controul him, yet he passed the frontier, defeated forty-five thousand in a pitched battle, and drove twenty thousand others from Madrid in the greatest confusion, without risking a single strategic point of importance to his own operations. His campaign up

to the conquest of Madrid was therefore strictly in accord with the rules of art, although his means and resources have been shewn to be precarious, shifting, and uncertain. Indeed, the want of money alone would have prevented him from following up his victory if he had not persuaded the Spanish authorities in the Salamanca country to yield him the revenues of the government in kind under a promise of repayment at Cadiz. No general was ever more entitled to the honours of victory.

4th. The success of Wellington's daring advance would seem to indicate a fault in the French plan of invasion. The army of the south, numerous, of approved valour, and perfectly well commanded, was yet of so little weight in this campaign as to prove that Andalusia was a point pushed beyond the true line of operations. The conquest of that province in 1811 was an enterprise of the king's, on which he prided himself, yet it seems never to have been much liked by Napoleon, although he did not absolutely condemn it. The question was indeed a very grave one. While the English general held Portugal, and while Cadiz was unsubdued, Andalusia was a burthen rather than a gain. It would have answered better either to have established communications with France by the southern line of invasion, which would have brought the enterprise within the rules of a methodical war, or to have held the province partially by detachments, keeping the bulk of the army of the south in Estremadura, and thus have strengthened the northern line of invasion. For in Estremadura, Soult would have covered the capital and have been more strictly connected with the army of the centre; and his powerful co-operation with Massena in 1810 would probably have obliged the English general to quit Portugal. The same result could doubtless have been obtained by reinforcing the army of the south with thirty or forty thousand men, but it is questionable if Soult could have fed such a number; and in favour of the invasion of Andalusia it may be observed, that Seville was the great arsenal of Spain, that a formidable power might have been established there by the English without abandoning Portugal, that Cadiz would have compensated for the loss of Lisbon, and finally that the English ministers were not at that time determined to defend Portugal.

5th. When the emperor declared that Soult possessed the only military head in the Peninsula he referred to a proposition made by that marshal which shall be noticed in the next chapter; but having regard merely to the disputes between the duke of Dalmatia, Marmont, and the king, Suchet's talents not being in question, the justice of the remark may be demonstrated. Napoleon always enforced with precept and example the vital military principle of concentration on the important points; but the king and the marshals, though harping continually upon this maxim, desired to follow it out each in his own sphere. Now to concentrate on a wrong point is to hurt yourself with your own sword, and as each French general desired to be strong, the army at large was scattered instead of being concentrated.

The failure of the campaign was, by the king, attributed to Soult's disobedience, inasmuch as the passage of the Tagus by Drouet would have enabled the army of the centre to act before Palombini's division arrived. But it has been shewn that Hill could have brought Wellington an equal or superior reinforcement in less time, whereby the latter could either have made head until the French dispersed for want of provisions, or, by a rapid counter-movement, he could have fallen upon Andalusia. And if the king had menaced Ciudad Rodrigo, in return it

would have been no diversion, for he had no battering train, still less could he have revenged himself by marching on Lisbon, because Wellington would have overpowered Soult and established a new base at Cadiz before such an operation could become dangerous to the capital of Portugal. Oporto might indeed have been taken, yet Joseph would have hesitated to exchange Madrid for that city. But the ten thousand men required of Soult by the king, on the 19th of June, could have been at Madrid before August, and thus the passes of the Guadarama could have been defended until the army of Portugal was reorganized! Aye! but Hill could then have entered the valley of the Tagus, or, being reinforced, could have invaded Andalusia, while Wellington kept the king's army in check. It would appear, therefore, that Joseph's plan of operations, if all its combinations had been exactly executed, might have prevented Wellington's progress on some points, but to effect this the French must have been concentrated in large masses from distant places without striking any decisive blow, which was the very pith and marrow of the English general's policy. Hence it follows that Soult made the true and Joseph the false application of the principle of concentration.

6th. If the king had judged his position truly he would have early merged the monarch in the general, exchanged the palace for the tent; he would have held only the Retiro and a few fortified posts in the vicinity of Madrid, he would have organized a good pontoon train and established his magazines in Segovia, Avila, Toledo, and Talavera; finally, he would have kept his army constantly united in the field, and exercised his soldiers, either by opening good roads through the mountains or in chasing the partidas, while Wellington remained quiet. Thus acting, he would have been always ready to march north or south to succour any menaced point. By enforcing good order and discipline in his own army he would also have given a useful example, and he could by vigilance and activity have ensured the preponderance of force in the field on whichever side he marched. He would thus have acquired the esteem of the French generals and obtained their willing obedience, and the Spaniards would more readily have submitted to a warlike monarch. A weak man may safely wear an inherited crown, it is of gold and the people support it; but it requires the strength of a warrior to bear the weight of an usurped diadem, it is of iron.

7th. If Marmont and the king were at fault in the general plan of operations, they were not less so in the particular tactics of the campaign.

On the 18th of July the army of Portugal passed the Douro in advance. On the 30th, it repassed that river in retreat, having, in twelve days, marched two hundred miles, fought three combats and a general battle. One field marshal, seven generals, twelve thousand five hundred men and officers had been killed, wounded, or taken; and two eagles, besides those taken in the Retiro, several standards, twelve guns, and eight carriages, exclusive of the artillery and stores captured at Valladolid, fell into the victors' hands. In the same period, the allies marched one hundred and sixty miles, and had one field-marshal, four generals, and somewhat less than six thousand officers and soldiers killed or wounded.

This comparison furnishes the proof of Wellington's sagacity when he determined not to fight except at great advantage. The French army although surprised in the midst of an evolution and instantly swept from the field, killed and wounded six thousand of the allies; the eleventh and sixty-first regiments of the sixth division had not together

more than one hundred and sixty men and officers left standing at the end of the battle; twice six thousand then would have fallen in a more equal contest, the blow would have been less decisive, and as Chauvel's cavalry and the king's army were both at hand a retreat into Portugal would probably have followed a less perfect victory. Wherefore this battle ought not and would not have been fought but for Marmont's false movement on the 22nd. Yet it is certain that if Wellington had retired without fighting the murmurs of his army, already louder than was seemly, would have been heard in England, and if an accidental shot had terminated his career all would have terminated. The cortex, ripe for a change, would have accepted the intrusive king, and the American war, just declared against England, would have rendered the complicated affairs of Portugal so extremely embarrassed that no new man could have continued the contest. Then the cries of disappointed politicians would have been raised. Wellington, it would have been said, Wellington, desponding, and distrusting his brave troops, dared not venture a battle on even terms, hence these misfortunes! His name would have been made, as sir John Moore's was, a butt for the malice and falsehood of faction, and his military genius would have been measured by the ignorance of his detractors.

8th. In the battle Marmont had about forty-two thousand sabres and bayonets; Wellington, who had received some detachments on the 19th, had above forty-six thousand, but the excess was principally Spanish. The French had seventy-four guns, the allies, including a Spanish battery, had only sixty pieces. Thus Marmont, over-matched in cavalry and infantry, was superior in artillery, and the fight would have been most bloody if the generals had been equal, for courage and strength were in even balance until Wellington's genius struck the beam. Scarcely can a fault be detected in his conduct. It might indeed be asked why the cavalry reserves were not, after Le Marchant's charge, brought up closer to sustain the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions and to keep off Boyer's dragoons, but it would seem ill to cavil at an action which was described at the time by a French officer, as the "*beating of forty thousand men in forty minutes.*"

9th. The battle of Salamanca, remarkable in many points of view, was not least so in this, that it was the first decided victory gained by the allies in the Peninsula. In former actions the French had been repulsed, here they were driven headlong as it were before a mighty wind, without help or stay, and the results were proportionate. Joseph's secret negotiations with the cortex were crushed, his partizans in every part of the Peninsula were abashed, and the sinking spirit of the Catalans was revived, the clamours of the opposition in England were checked, the provisional government of France was dismayed, the secret plots against the French in Germany were resuscitated, and the shock, reaching even to Moscow, heaved and shook the colossal structure of Napoleon's power to its very base.

Nevertheless Salamanca was as most great battles are, an accident; an accident seized upon with astonishing vigour and quickness, but still an accident. Even its results were accidental, for the French could never have repassed the Tormes as an army if Carlos D'Espana had not withdrawn the garrison from Alba, and hidden the fact from Wellington; and this circumstance alone would probably have led to the ruin of the whole campaign, but for another of those chances which, recurring so frequently in war, render bad generals timid, and make great generals trust their fortune under the most ad-

verse circumstances. This is easily shewn. Joseph was at Blasco Sancho on the 24th, and notwithstanding his numerous cavalry, the army of Portugal passed in retreat across his front at the distance of only a few miles without his knowledge; he thus missed one opportunity of effecting his junction with Clauzel. On the 25th, this junction could still have been made at Arevalo, and Wellington, as if to mock the king's generalship, halted that day behind the Zapardiel; yet Joseph retreated towards Guadarama, wrathful that Clauzel made no effort to join him, and forgetful that as a beaten and pursued army must march, it was for him to join Clauzel. But the true cause of these errors was the different inclinations of the generals. The king wished to draw Clauzel to Madrid, Clauzel desired to have the king behind the Duero, and if he had succeeded the probable result may be thus traced.

Clauzel during the first confusion wrote that only twenty thousand men could be reorganized, but in this number he did not include the stragglers and marauders who always take advantage of a defeat to seek their own interest; a reference to the French loss proves that there were nearly thirty thousand fighting men left, and in fact Clauzel did in a fortnight reorganize twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry and fifty guns, besides gaining a knowledge of five thousand stragglers and marauders. In fine, no soldiers rally quicker after a defeat than the French, and hence, as Joseph brought to Blasco Sancho thirty guns and fourteen thousand men, of which above two thousand were horsemen, forty thousand infantry, and more than six thousand cavalry with a powerful artillery, might then have been rallied behind the Duero, exclusive of Caffarelli's divisions. Nor would Madrid have been meanwhile exposed to an insurrection nor to the operation of a weak detachment from Wellington's army, for the two thou-

sand men sent by Suchet had arrived in that capital on the 30th, and there were in the several fortified points of the vicinity six or seven thousand other troops who could have been united at the Retiro to protect that depot and the families attached to the intrusive court.

Thus Wellington, without committing any fault, would have found a more powerful army than Marmont's again on the Duero, and capable of renewing the former operations with the advantage of former errors as warning beacons. But his own army would not have been so powerful as before, for the reinforcements sent from England did not even suffice to replace the current consumption of men, and neither the fresh soldiers nor the old Walcheren regiments were able to sustain the toil of the recent operations. Three thousand troops had joined since the battle, yet the general decrease, including the killed and wounded, was above eight thousand men, and the number of sick was rapidly augmenting from the extreme heat. It may, therefore, be said that if Marmont was stricken deeply by Wellington, the king poisoned the wound. The English general had forecalculated all these superior resources of the enemy, and it was only Marmont's flagrant fault, on the 22nd, that could have wrung the battle from him; yet he fought it as if his genius disdained such trial of its strength. I saw him late in the evening of that great day, when the advancing flashes of cannon and musketry, stretching as far as the eye could command, shewed in the darkness how well the field was won; he was alone, the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and watchful, but his voice was calm and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater warriors than Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed only to accept this glory as an earnest of greater things.

BOOK XIX.

CHAPTER I.

State of the war—Eastern operations—Lacy's bad conduct—French army of the Ebro dissolved—Lacy's secret agents blow up the magazines in Lerida—He is afraid to storm the place—Calumniate Sarzfield—Suchet comes to Reus—The hermitage of St. Dimas surrendered to Decaen by colonel Green—The French general burns the convent of Montserret and marches to Lerida—General Maitland with the Anglo-Sicilian army appears off Palamos—Sails for Alicant—Reflections on this event—Operations in Murcia—O'Donel defeated at Castalla—Maitland lands at Alicant—Suchet concentrates his forces at Xativa—Entrenches a camp there—Maitland advances to Alcoy—His difficulties—Returns to Alicant—The king's army arrives at Almanza—The remnant of Maupoint's brigade arrives from Cuenca—Suchet reoccupies Alcoy—O'Donel comes up to Yecla—Maitland is reinforced from Sicily and entrenches a camp under the walls of Alicant.

As Wellington's operations had now deeply affected the French affairs in the distant provinces, it is necessary again to revert to the general process of the war, lest the true bearings of his military policy should be overlooked. The battle of Salamanca, by

clearing all the centre of Spain, had reduced the invasion to its original lines of operation. For Palombini's division having joined the army of the centre, the army of the Ebro was broken up; Caffarelli had concentrated the scattered troops of the army of the north, and when Clauzel had led back the vanquished army of Portugal to Burgos, the whole French host was divided in two distinct parts, each having a separate line of communication with France and a circuitous, uncertain, attenuated line of correspondence with each other by Zaragoza instead of a sure and short one by Madrid. But Wellington was also forced to divide his army in two parts, and though, by the advantage of his central position, he retained the initial power, both of movement and concentration, his lines of communication were become long and weak, because the enemy was powerful at either flank. Wherefore on his own simple strength in the centre of Spain he could not rely, and the diversions he had projected against the enemy's rear and flanks became more important than ever. To these we must now turn.

EASTERN OPERATIONS.

It will be recollected that the narrative of Catalonian affairs ceased at the moment when Decaen, after fortifying the coast line and opening new roads beyond the reach of shot from the English ships, was gathering the harvest of the interior. Lacy, inefficient in the field and universally hated, was thus confined to the mountain chain which separates the coast territory from the plains of Lerida and from the Cerdaña. The insurrectionary spirit of the Catalonians was indeed only upheld by Wellington's successes, and by the hope of English succour from Sicily; for Lacy, devoted to the republican party in Spain, had now been made captain-general as well as commander-in-chief, and sought to keep down the people, who were generally of the priestly and royal faction. He publicly spoke of exciting a general insurrection, yet, in his intercourse with the English naval officers, avowed his wish to repress the patriotism of the Somatenes; he was not ashamed to boast of his assassination plots, and received with honour a man who had murdered the aid-de-camp of Maurice Mathieu; he sowed dissensions amongst his generals, intrigued against all of them in turn, and when Eroles and Manso, who were the people's favourites, raised any soldiers, he transferred the latter as soon as they were organized to Sarzfield's division, at the same time calumniating that general to depress his influence. He quarrelled incessantly with captain Codrington, and had no desire to see an English force in Catalonia lest a general insurrection should take place, for he feared that the multitude, once gathered and armed, would drive him from the province and declare for the opponents of the cortes. And in this view, the constitution itself, although emanating from the cortes, was long withheld from the Catalans lest the newly declared popular rights should interfere with the arbitrary power of the chief.

Such was the state of the province when intelligence that the Anglo-Sicilian expedition had arrived at Mahon, excited the hopes of the Spaniards and the fears of the French. The coast then became the great object of interest to both, and the Catalans again opened a communication with the English fleet by Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and endeavoured to collect the grain of the Campo de Taragona. Decaen coming to meet Suchet, who had arrived at Reus with two thousand men, drove the Catalans to the hills again; yet the Lerida district was thus opened to the enterprises of Lacy, because it was at this period that Reille had detached general Paris from Zaragoza to the aid of Palombini; and that Severoli's division was broken up to reinforce the garrisons of Lerida, Taragona, Barcelona, and Zaragoza. But the army of the Ebro being dissolved, Lacy resolved to march upon Lerida, where he had engaged certain Spaniards in the French service to explode the powder magazine when he should approach; and this odious scheme, which necessarily involved the destruction of hundreds of his own countrymen, was vainly opposed by Eroles and Sarzfield.

On the 12th of July, Eroles' division, that general being absent, was incorporated with Sarzfield's and other troops at Guisona, and the whole journeying day and night reached Tremp on the 13th. Lacy having thus turned Lerida, would have resumed the march at mid-day, intending to attack the next morning at dawn, but the men were without food and exhausted by fatigue, and fifteen hundred had fallen behind. A council of war being then held, Sarzfield, who thought the plot wild, would have returned, observing that all communication with the sea was abandoned, and the harvests of the Camps de

Taragona and Valls being left to be gathered by the enemy, the loss of the corn would seriously affect the whole principality. Displeased at the remonstrance, Lacy immediately sent him back to the plain of Urgel with some infantry and the cavalry to keep the garrison of Balaguer in check; but in the night of the 16th, when Sarzfield had reached the bridge of Alentorna on the Segre, fresh orders caused him to return to Limiana on the Noguera. Meanwhile Lacy himself had advanced by Ager towards Lerida, the explosion of the magazine took place, many houses were thrown down, two hundred inhabitants and one hundred and fifty soldiers were destroyed; two bastions fell, and the place was laid open.

Henriod, the governor, although ignorant of the vicinity of the Spaniards, immediately manned the breaches, the garrison of Balaguer, hearing the explosion, marched to his succour, and when the Catalan troops appeared the citizens, enraged by the destruction of their habitations, aided the French; Lacy then fled back to Tremp, bearing the burthen of a crime which he had not feared to commit, but wanted courage to turn to his country's advantage. To lessen the odium thus incurred, he insidiously attributed the failure to Sarzfield's disobedience; and as that general, to punish the people of Barbastro for siding with the French and killing twenty of his men, had raised a heavy contribution of money and corn in the district, he became so hateful, that some time after, when he endeavoured to raise soldiers in those parts, the people threw boiling water at him from the windows as he passed.

Before this event, Suchet had returned to Valencia, and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu marched against colonel Green, who was entrenched in the hermitage of St. Dimas, one of the highest of the peaked rocks overhanging the convent of Montserrat. Manso immediately raised the Somatenes to aid Green, and as the latter had provisions, the inaccessible strength of this post seemed to defy capture; yet he surrendered in twenty-four hours, and at a moment when the enemy, despairing of success, were going to relinquish the attack. He excused himself as being forced by his own people, but he signed the capitulation. Decaen then set fire to the convent of Montserrat, and the flames seen for miles around was the signal that the warfare on that holy mountain was finished. After this the French general marched to Lerida to gather corn, and Lacy again spread his troops on the mountains.

During his absence, Eroles had secretly been preparing a general insurrection to break out when the British army should arrive, and it was supposed that his object was to effect a change in the government of the province; for though Lacy himself again spoke of embodying the Somatenes, if arms were given to him by sir Edward Pellew, there was really no scarcity of arms, the demand was a deceit to prevent the muskets from being given to the people, and there was no levy. Hence the discontent increased and a general desire for the arrival of the British troops became prevalent; the miserable people turned anxiously towards any quarter for aid, and this expression of conscious helplessness was given in evidence by the Spanish chiefs, and received as proof of enthusiasm by the English naval commanders, who were more sanguine of success than experience would warrant. All eyes were, however, directed towards the ocean, the French in fear, the Catalans in hope; and the British armament did appear off Palamos, but after three days, spread its sails again, and steered for Alicant, leaving the principality stupefied with grief and disappointment.

This unexpected event was the natural result of

previous errors on all sides, errors which invariably attend warlike proceedings when not directed by a superior genius, and even then, not always to be avoided. It has been shewn how ministerial vacillation marred lord William Bentinck's first intention of landing in person with ten or twelve thousand men on the Catalanian coast; and how, after much delay, general Maitland had sailed to Palma with a division of six thousand men, Calabrians, Sicilians, and others, troops of no likelihood save that some three thousand British and Germans were amongst them. This force was afterwards joined by the transports from Portugal having engineers and artillery officers on board, and that honoured battering train which had shattered the gory walls of Badajos. Wellington had great hopes of this expedition; he had himself sketched the general plan of operations; and his own campaign had been conceived in the expectation, that lord William Bentinck, a general of high rank and reputation, with ten thousand good troops, aided with at least as many Spanish soldiers, disciplined under the two British officers, Whittingham and Roche, would have early fallen on Catalonia, to the destruction of Suchet's plans. And when this his first hope was quashed, he still expected that a force would be disembarked of strength sufficient, in conjunction with the Catalan army, to take Tarogona.

Roche's corps was most advanced in discipline, but the Spanish government delayed to place it under general Maitland, and hence it first sailed from the islands to Murcia, and returned without orders, again repaired to Murcia, and at the moment of general Maitland's arrival off Palamos, was, under the command of Joseph O'Donel, involved in a terrible catastrophe already alluded to, and hereafter to be particularly narrated. Whittingham's levy remained, but when inspected by the quarter-master general Donkin, it was found in a raw state, scarcely mustering four thousand effective men, amongst which were many French deserters from the island of Cabrera.

The sumptuous clothing and equipments of Whittingham's and Roche's men, their pay regularly supplied from the British subsidy, and very much exceeding that of the other Spanish corps, excited envy and dislike; there was no public inspection, no check upon the expenditure, nor upon the delivery of the stores, and Roche's proceedings on this last head, whether justly or unjustly I know not, were very generally and severely censured. Whittingham acknowledged that he could not trust his people near the enemy without the aid of British troops, and though the captain-general Coupigny desired their departure, his opinion was against a descent in Catalonia. Maitland hesitated, but sir Edward Pellew urged this descent so very strongly, that he finally assented and reached Palamos with nine thousand men of all nations, on the 31st of July, yet in some confusion as to the transport service, which the staff officers attributed to the injudicious meddling of the naval chiefs.

Maitland's first care was to open a communication with the Spanish commanders. Eroles came on board at once, and vehemently and unceasingly urged an immediate disembarkation, declaring that the fate of Catalonia and his own existence depended upon it; the other generals shewed less eagerness, and their accounts differed greatly with respect to the relative means of the Catalans and the French. Lacy estimated the enemy's disposable troops at fifteen thousand, and his own at seven thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and even that number he said he could with difficulty feed or provide

with ammunition. Sarzfield judged the French to be, exclusive of Suchet's movable column, eighteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry; he thought it rash to invest Taragona with a less force, and that a free and constant communication with the fleet was absolutely essential to any operation. Eroles rated the enemy at thirteen thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, including Suchet's column; but the reports of the deserters gave twenty-two thousand infantry, exclusive of Suchet's column and of the garrisons and Miguelettes in the enemy's service.

No insurrection of the Somatenes had yet taken place, nor was there any appearance that such an event would happen, as the French were descried conducting convoys along the shore, with small escorts, and concentrating their troops for battle without molestation. The engineers demanded from six to ten days to reduce Taragona after investment, and Decaen and Maurice Mathieu were then near Montserrat with seven or eight thousand good troops, which number could be doubled in a few days; the Catalans could not so soon unite and join Maitland's force, and there was a general, although apparently an unjust notion abroad, that Lacy was a Frenchman at heart. It was feared also, that the Toulon fleet might come out and burn the transports at their anchorage during the siege, and thus Wellington's battering train and even the safety of the army would be involved in an enterprise promising little success. A full council of war was unanimous not to land, and the reluctance of the people to rise, attributed, by captain Codrington, to the machinations of traitors, was visible; Maitland also was farther swayed by the generous and just consideration, that as the Somatenes had not voluntarily taken arms, it would be cruel to excite them to such a step, when a few days might oblige him to abandon them to the vengeance of the enemy. Wherefore as Palamos appeared too strong for a sudden assault, the armament sailed towards Valencia with intent to attack that place, after a project, furnished by the quarter-master general Donkin, and in unison with lord Wellington's plan of operations; but Maitland, during the voyage, changed his mind, and proceeded at once to Alicante.

The Catalans were not more displeased than the British naval commanders, at seeing the principalities thus shaken off; yet the judgment of the latter seems to have been swayed partly from having given stronger hopes of assistance to the former than the circumstances would rigorously warrant; partly from that confidence, which inspired by continual success, is strength on their own element, but rashness on shore. Captain Codrington, from the great interest he took in the struggle, was peculiarly discontented; yet his own description of the state of Catalonia at the time, shows that his hopes rested more on some vague notions of the Somatenes' enthusiasm, than upon any facts which a general ought to calculate upon. Lord Wellington indeed said, that he could see no reason why the plan he had recommended, should not have been successful; an observation made, however, when he was somewhat excited by the prospect of having Suchet on his own hands, and probably under some erroneous information. He had been deceived about the strength of the forts at Salamanca, although close to them; and as he had just established a sure channel of intelligence in Catalonia, it was probable that he was also deceived with respect to Taragona, which if not strong in regular works, was well provided, and commanded by a very bold, active governor, and offered great resources in the facility of making interior retrenchments.

The force of the Catalans lord Wellington knew principally from sir Edward Pellew, who had derived his information chiefly from Eroles, who very much exaggerated it, and lessened the enemy's power in proportion. And general Maitland could scarcely be called a commander-in-chief, for lord William Bentinck forbade him to risk the loss of his division lest Sicily itself should thereby be endangered; and to avoid mischief from the winter season, he was instructed to quit the Spanish coast in the second week of September. Lord William and lord Wellington were therefore not agreed in the object to be attained. The first considered the diversion on the Spanish coast, as secondary to the wants of Sicily, whereas Wellington looked only to the great interests at stake in the Peninsula, and thought Sicily in no danger until the French should reinforce their army in Calabria. He desired vigorous combined efforts of the military and naval forces, to give a new aspect to the war in Catalonia, and his plan was that Taragona should be attacked; if it fell, the warfare he said would be once more established on a good base in Catalonia; if it was succoured by the concentration of the French troops, Valencia would necessarily be weak, and the armament would then proceed to attack that place, and if unsuccessful, return to assail Taragona again.

This was an excellent plan no doubt, but Napoleon never lost sight of that great principle of war, so concisely expressed by Sertorius when he told Pompey that a good general should look behind him rather than before. The emperor, acting on the proverb that fortune favours the brave, often urged his lieutenants to dare desperately with a few men in the front, but he invariably covered their communications with heavy masses, and there is no instance of his plan of invasion being shaken by a flank or rear attack, except where his instructions were neglected. His armies made what are called points, in war, such as Massena's invasion of Portugal, Moncey's attack on Valencia, Dupont's on Andalusia; but the general plan of operation was invariably supported by heavy masses protecting the communications. Had his instructions, sent from Dresden, been strictly obeyed, the walls of Lerida and Taragona would have been destroyed, and only the citadels of each occupied with small garrisons easily provisioned for a long time. The field army would thus have been increased by at least three thousand men, the movable columns spared many harassing marches, and Catalonia would have offered little temptation for a descent.

But notwithstanding this error of Suchet, Maitland's troops were too few, and too ill-composed to venture the investment of Taragona. The imperial muster-rolls give more than eighty thousand men, including Reille's divisions at Zaragosa, for the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, and twenty-seven thousand of the first and thirty-seven thousand of the second, were actually under arms with the eagles; wherefore to say that Decaen could have brought at once ten thousand men to the succour of Taragona, and, by weakening his garrisons, as many more in a very short time, is not to over-rate his power; and this without counting Paris' brigade, three thousand strong, which belonged to Reille's division, and was disposable. Suchet had just before come to Reus with two thousand select men of all arms, and as O'Donel's army had since been defeated near Alicante, he could have returned with a still greater force to oppose Maitland.

Now the English fleet was descried by the French off Palamos on the evening of the 31st of July, although it did not anchor before the 1st of August;

Decaen and Maurice Mathieu with some eight thousand disposable men were then between Montserrat and Barcelona, that is to say, only two marches from Taragona; Lamarque, with from four to five thousand, was between Palamos and Mataro, five marches from Taragona; Quesnel, with a like number was in the Cerdaña, being about seven marches off; Suchet and Paris could have arrived in less than eight days, and from the garrisons, and minor posts, smaller succours might have been drawn; Tortosa alone could have furnished two thousand. But Lacy's division was at Vich, Sarzfield's at Villa Franca, Eroles' divided between Montserrat and Urgel, Milan's in the Grao D'Olot, and they required five days even to assemble; when united, they could not have exceeded seven thousand men, and with their disputing, captious generals, would have been unfit to act vigorously; nor could they have easily joined the allies without fighting a battle, in which their defeat would have been certain.

Sarzfield judged that ten days at least were necessary to reduce Taragona; and positively affirmed that the army must be entirely fed from the fleet, as the country could scarcely supply the Catalonian troops alone. Thus Maitland would have had to land his men, his battering train and stores, and to form his investment in the face of Decaen's power, or, following the rules of war, have defeated that general first. But Decaen's troops, numerically equal, without reckoning the garrison of Taragona, two thousand strong, were in composition vastly superior to the allies, seeing that only three thousand British and German troops in Maitland's army, were to be at all depended upon in battle; neither does it appear that the platforms, sand-bags, fascines, and other materials, necessary for a siege, were at this period prepared and on board the vessels.

It is true Maitland would, if he had been able to resist Decaen at first, which seems doubtful, have effected a great diversion, and Wellington's object would have been gained if a re-embarkation had been secure; but the naval officers, having reference to the nature of the coast, declared that a safe re-embarkation could not be depended upon. The soundness of this opinion has indeed been disputed by many seamen, well acquainted with the coast, who maintain, that even in winter, the Catalonian shore is remarkably safe and tranquil; and that Cape Salou, a place in other respects admirably adapted for a camp, affords a certain retreat, and facility of re-embarking on one or other of its sides in all weather. However, to Maitland the coast of Catalonia was represented as unsafe, and this view of the question is also supported by very able seamen likewise acquainted with that sea.

OPERATIONS IN MURCIA

The Anglo-Sicilian armament arrived at Alicante at a critical moment; the Spanish cause was there going to ruin. Joseph O'Donel, brother to the regent, had with great difficulty organized a new Murcian army, after Blake's surrender at Valencia, and this army, based upon Alicante and Carthagena, was independent of a division under general Frere, which always hung about Baza, and Lorca, on the frontier of Grenada, and communicated through the Alpuxaras with the sea-coast. Both Suchet and Soult were paralyzed in some degree by the neighbourhood of these armies, which, holding a central position, were supported by fortresses, supplied by sea from Gibraltar to Cadiz, and had their existence guaranteed by Wellington's march into Spain, by his victory of Salamanca, and by his general combinations. For the two French commanders were forced to watch

his movements, and to support at the same time, the one a blockade of the *Isla de Leon*, the other the fortresses in Catalonia; hence they were in no condition to follow up the prolonged operations necessary to destroy these Murcian armies, which were, moreover, supported by the arrival of general Ross with British troops at Carthagea.

O'Donel had been joined by Roche in July, and Suchet, after detaching Maupoint's brigade towards Madrid, departed himself with two thousand men for Catalonia, leaving general Harispe with not more than four thousand men beyond the Xucar. General Ross immediately advised O'Donel to attack him; and to distract his attention, a large fleet, with troops on board, which had originally sailed from Cadiz to succour Ballesteros at Malaga, now appeared off the Valencian coast. At the same time, Bassecour and Villa Campa, being free to act, in consequence of Palombini's and Maupoint's departure for Madrid, came down from their haunts in the mountains of Albaracyn, upon the right flank and rear of the French positions. Villa Campa penetrated to Liria, and Bassecour to Cofrentes, on the Xucar; but ere this attack could take place, Suchet, with his usual celerity, returned from Reus. At first he detached men against Villa Campa, but when he saw the fleet, fearing it was the Sicilian armament, he recalled them again, and sent for Paris' brigade from Zaragoza, to act by Teruel against Bassecour and Villa Campa. Then he concentrated his own forces at Valencia, but a storm drove the fleet off the coast, and meanwhile O'Donel's operations brought on the

FIRST BATTLE OF CASTALLA.

Harispe's posts were established at Biar, Castalla and Onil on the right; at Ibi and Alcoy on the left. This line was not more than one march from Alicante. Colonel Mesclop, with a regiment of infantry and some cuirassiers held Ibi, and was supported by Harispe himself with a reserve at Alcoy. General Delort, with another regiment of infantry, was at Castalla, having some cuirassiers at Onil on his left, and a regiment of dragoons, with three companies of foot, at Biar, on his right. In this exposed situation, the French awaited O'Donel, who directed his principal force, consisting of six thousand infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and eight guns, against Delort; meanwhile Roche, with three thousand men, was to move through the mountains of Xixona, so as to fall upon Ibi simultaneously with the attack at Castalla. O'Donel hoped thus to cut the French line, and during these operations, Bassecour, with two thousand men, was to come down from Cofrentes to Villena, on the right flank of Delort.

Roche, who marched in the night of the 19th, remained during the 20th in the mountains, but the next night he threaded a difficult pass, eight miles long, reached Ibi at day-break on the 21st, and sent notice of his arrival to O'Donel; and when that general appeared in front of Delort, the latter abandoned Castalla, which was situated in the same valley as Ibi, and about five miles distant from it. But he only retired, skirmishing, to a strong ridge behind that town, which also extended behind Ibi; this secured his communication with Mesclop, of whom he demanded succour, and at the same time he called in his own cavalry and infantry from Onil and Biar. Mesclop, leaving some infantry, two guns, and his cuirassiers, to defend Ibi and a small fort on the hill behind it, marched at once towards Delort, and thus Roche, finding only a few men before him, got possession of the town after a sharp skirmish, yet he could not take the fort.

At first, O'Donel, who had advanced beyond Castalla, only skirmished with and cannonaded the French in his front, for he had detached the Spanish cavalry to operate by the plains of Villena, to turn the enemy's right and communicate with Bassecour. While expecting the effects of this movement, he was astonished to see the French dragoons come trotting through the pass of Biar, on his left flank; they were followed by some companies of infantry, and only separated from him by a stream over which was a narrow bridge, without parapets, and at the same moment the cuirassiers appeared on the other side, coming from Onil. The Spanish cavalry had made no effort to interrupt this march from Biar, nor to follow the French through the defile, nor any effort whatever. In this difficulty, O'Donel turned two guns against the bridge, and supported them with a battalion of infantry; but the French dragoons, observing this battalion to be unsteady, braved the fire of the guns, and riding furiously over the bridge, seized the battery, and then dashed against and broke the infantry. Delort's line advanced at the same moment, the cuirassiers charged into the town of Castalla, and the whole Spanish army fled outright. Several hundred sought refuge in an old castle, and there surrendered; and of the others, three thousand were killed, wounded, or taken, and yet the victors had scarcely fifteen hundred men engaged, and did not lose two hundred. O'Donel attributed his defeat to the disobedience and inactivity of St. Estevan, who commanded his cavalry; but the great fault was, the placing that cavalry beyond the defile of Biar, instead of keeping it in hand for the battle.

This part of the action being over, Mesclop, who had not taken any share in it, was reinforced, and returned to succour Ibi, to which place, also, Harispe was now approaching, from Alcoy; but Roche, favoured by the strength of the passes, escaped, and reached Alicante with little hurt, while the remains of O'Donel's divisions, pursued by the cavalry on the road of Jumilla, fled to the city of Murcia. Bassecour, who had advanced to Almanza, was then driven back to his mountain-haunts, where Villa Campa rejoined him. It was at this moment that Maitland's armament disembarked, and the remnants of the Spanish force rallied. The king, then flying from Madrid, immediately changed the direction of his march from the Morena to Valencia, and one more proof was given, that it was England, and not Spain, which resisted the French; for Alicante would have fallen, if not as an immediate consequence of this defeat, yet surely, when the king's army had joined Suchet.

That general, who had heard of the battle of Salamanca, the evacuation of Madrid, and the approach of Joseph, and now saw a fresh army springing up in his front, hastened to concentrate his disposable force in the positions of San Felipe de Xativa and Moxente, which he entrenched, as well as the road to Almanza, with a view to secure his junction with the king. At the same time he established a new bridge and bridge-head, at Alberique, in addition to that at Alcira, on the Xucar; and having called up Paris from Teruel, and Maupoint from Cuenca, resolved to abide a battle, which the slowness and vacillation of his adversaries gave him full time to prepare for.

Maitland arrived the 7th, and though his force was not all landed before the 11th, the French were still scattered on various points, and a vigorous commander would have found the means to drive them over the Xucar, and perhaps from Valencia itself. However, the British general had scarcely set his foot on shore, when the usual Spanish vexations overwhelm-

ed him. Three principal roads led towards the enemy ; one on the left passed through Yecla and Fuente La Higuera, and by it the remnant of O'Donel's army was coming up from Murcia ; another passed through Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de La Higuera, and the third through Xixona, Alcoy, and Albayda. Now O'Donel, whose existence as a general was redeemed by the appearance of Maitland, instantly demanded from the latter a pledge, that he would draw nothing, either by purchase or requisition, save wine and straw, from any of these lines, nor from the country between them. The English general assented, and instantly sunk under the difficulties thus created. For his intention was to have attacked Harispe at Alcoy and Ibi on the 13th or 14th, but he was only able to get one march from Alicante as late as the 16th ; he could not attack before the 18th, and it was on that day that Suchet concentrated his army at Xativa. The delay had been a necessary consequence of the agreement with O'Donel.

Maitland was without any habitude of command, his commissariat was utterly inefficient, and his field-artillery had been so shamefully ill-prepared in Sicily that it was nearly useless. He had hired mules at a great expense for the transport of his guns, and of provisions, from Alicante ; but the owners of the mules soon declared they could not fulfil their contract, unless they were fed by the British ; and this O'Donel's restrictions as to the roads prevented. Many of the muleteers, also, after receiving their money, deserted with both mules and provisions ; and on the first day's march, a convoy, with six days' supply, was attacked by an armed banditti, called a guerilla, and the convoy was plundered or dispersed, and lost.

Maitland, suffering severely from illness, was disgusted at these things, and fearing for the safety of his troops, would have retired at once, and, perhaps, have re-embarked, if Suchet had not gone back to Xativa ; then, however, he advanced to Elda, while Roche entered Alcoy ; yet both apparently without an object, for there was no intention of fighting, and the next day Roche retired to Xixona, and Maitland retreated to Alicante. To cover this retreat, general Donkin pushed forward, with a detachment of Spanish and English cavalry, through Sax, Ibi, and Alcoy, and giving out that an advanced guard of five thousand British was close behind him, coasted all the French line, captured a convoy at Olleria, and then returned through Alcoy. Suchet kept close himself, in the camp of Xativa, but sent Harispe to meet the king, who was now near Almanza, and on the 25th, the junction of the two armies was effected ; at the same time, Maupoint, escaping Villa Campa's assault, arrived from Cuenca with the remnant of his brigade.

When the king's troops arrived, Suchet pushed his outposts again to Villena and Alcoy, but apparently occupied in providing for Joseph's army and court, he neglected to press the allies, which he might have done, to their serious detriment. Meanwhile, O'Donel, who had drawn off Frere's division from Lorca, came up to Yecla, with five or six thousand men, and Maitland, reinforced with some detachments from Sicily, commenced fortifying a camp outside Alicante ; but his health was quite broken, and he earnestly desired to resign, being filled with anxiety at the near approach of Soult. That marshal had abandoned Andalusia, and his manner of doing so shall be set forth in the next chapter ; for it was a great event, leading to great results, and worthy of deep consideration by those who desire to know upon what the fate of kingdoms may depend.

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Andalusia.—The king orders Soult to abandon that province—Soult urges the king to join him with the other armies—Joseph reiterates the order to abandon Andalusia—Soult sends a letter to the minister of war expressing his suspicions that Joseph was about to make a separate peace with the allies—The king intercepts this letter, and sends colonel Désprez to Moscow, to represent Soult's conduct to the emperor—Napoleon's magnanimity—Wellington anxiously watches Soult's movements—Orders Hill to fight Drouet, and directs general Cooke to attack the French lines in front of the Isla de Leon—Ballesteros, pursued by Leval and Villatte, skirmishes at Coin—Enters Malaga—Soult's preparations to abandon Andalusia—Lines before the Isla de Leon abandoned—Soult marches towards Grenada—Colonel Skeritt and Cruz Murgon land at Huelva—Attack the French rear-guard at Seville—Drouet marches upon Huescar—Soult, moving by the mountains, reaches Hellin, and effects his junction with the king and Suchet—Maitland desires to return to Sicily—Wellington prevents him—Wellington's general plans considered—State of affairs in Castile—Clauzel comes down to Valladolid with the French army—Santocildes retires to Torrelobaton, and Clinton falls back to Arevalo—Foy marches to carry off the French garrisons in Leon—Astorga surrenders before his arrival—He marches to Zamora and drives Silveira into Portugal—Menaces Salamanca—Is recalled by Clauzel—The partidas get possession of the French posts on the Biscay coast—Take the city of Bilbao—Reille abandons several posts in Aragon—The northern provinces become ripe for insurrection.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

SUCHET found resources in Valencia to support the king's court and army, without augmenting the pressure on the inhabitants, and a counter-stroke could have been made against the allies, if the French commanders had been of one mind, and had looked well to the state of affairs ; but Joseph, exasperated by the previous opposition of the generals, and troubled by the distresses of the numerous families attached to his court, was only intent upon recovering Madrid as soon as he could collect troops enough to give Wellington battle. He had demanded from the French minister of war, money, stores, and a reinforcement of forty thousand men, and he had imperatively commanded Soult to abandon Andalusia ; that clear-sighted commander could not, however, understand why the king, who had given him no accurate details of Marmont's misfortunes, or of his own operations, should yet order him to abandon, at once, all the results, and all the interests, springing from three years' possession of the south of Spain. He thought it a great question, not to be treated lightly ; and as his vast capacity enabled him to embrace the whole field of operations, he concluded that rumour had exaggerated the catastrophe at Salamanca, and that the abandoning of Andalusia would be the ruin of the French cause.

"To march on Madrid," he said, "would probably produce another pitched battle, which should be carefully avoided, seeing that the whole frame-work of the French invasion was disjoined, and no resource would remain after a defeat. On the other hand, Andalusia, which had hitherto been such a burthen to the invasion, now offered means to remedy the present disasters ; and to sacrifice that province, with all its resources, for the sake of regaining the capital of Spain, appeared a folly. It was purchasing a town at the price of a kingdom. Madrid was nothing in the emperor's policy, though it might be something for a king of Spain ; yet Philip the Vth had thrice lost it, and preserved his throne. Why then should Joseph set such a value upon that city ? The battle of the Arapiles was merely a grand duel, which might be fought again, with a different result ;

but to abandon Andalusia, with all its stores and establishments, to raise the blockade of Cadiz, to sacrifice the guns, the equipments, the hospitals and the magazines, and thus render null the labours of three years, would be to make the battle of the Arapiles a prodigious historical event, the effect of which would be felt all over Europe, and even in the new world. And how was this flight from Andalusia to be safely effected? The army of the south had been able to hold in check sixty thousand enemies, disposed on a circuit round it; but the moment it commenced its retreat towards Toledo, those sixty thousand men would unite to follow, and Wellington himself would be found on the Tagus, in its front. On that line, then, the army of the south could not march, and a retreat through Murcia would be long and difficult. But why retreat at all? Where," exclaimed this able warrior, "where is the harm, though the allies should possess the centre of Spain?"

"Your majesty," he continued, "should collect the army of the centre, the army of Aragon, and if possible, the army of Portugal, and you should march upon Andalusia, even though, to do so, should involve the abandonment of Valencia. If the army of Portugal comes with you, one hundred and twenty thousand men will be close to Portugal; if it cannot or will not come, let it remain; because, while Burgos defends itself, that army can keep on the right of the Ebro, and the emperor will take measures for its succour. Let Wellington then occupy Spain from Burgos to the Morena, it shall be my care to provide magazines, stores, and places of arms, in Andalusia; and the moment eighty thousand French are assembled in that province, the theatre of war is changed! The English general must fall back to save Lisbon, the army of Portugal may follow him to the Tagus, the line of communication with France will be established by the eastern coast, the final result of the campaign turns in our favour, and a decisive battle may be delivered, without fear, at the gates of Lisbon. March then with the army of the centre upon the Despenas Peros, unite all our forces in Andalusia, and all will be well! Abandon that province, and you lose Spain! you will retire behind the Ebro, and famine will drive you thence, before the emperor can, from the distant Russia, provide a remedy; his affairs, even in that country, will suffer by the blow, and America, dismayed by our misfortunes, will, perhaps, make peace with England."

Neither the king's genius nor his passions, would permit him to understand the grandeur and vigour of this conception. To change even simple lines of operation, suddenly, is at all times a nice affair; but thus to change the whole theatre of operations, and regain the initial movements, after a defeat, belongs only to master spirits in war. Now, the emperor had recommended a concentration of force, and Joseph would not understand this, save as applied to the recovery of Madrid; he was uneasy for the frontiers of France; as if Wellington could possibly have invaded that country while a great army menaced Lisbon; in fine, he could see nothing but his lost capital on one side, and a disobedient lieutenant on the other, and peremptorily repeated his orders. Then Soult, knowing that his plan could only be effected by union and rapidity, and dreading the responsibility of further delay, took immediate steps to abandon Andalusia; but mortified by this blighting of his fruitful genius, and stung with anger at such a termination to all his political and military labours, his feelings overmastered his judgment. Instead of tracing the king's rigid counteraction of his scheme to the narrowness of the monarch's military genius, he judged it part of a design to secure

his own fortune at the expense of his brother, an action quite foreign to Joseph's honest and passionate nature. Wherefore, making known this opinion to six generals, who were sworn to secrecy, unless interrogated by the emperor, he wrote to the French minister of war, expressing his doubts of the king's loyalty towards the emperor, and founding them on the following facts.

1st. That the extent of Marmont's defeat had been made known to him only by the reports of the enemy, and the king, after remaining for twenty-three days, without sending any detailed information of the operations in the north of Spain, although the armies were actively engaged, had peremptorily ordered him to abandon Andalusia, saying it was the only resource remaining for the French. To this opinion, Soult said he could not subscribe; yet, being unable absolutely to disobey the monarch, he was going to make a movement which must, finally, lead to the loss of all the French conquests in Spain, seeing that it would then be impossible to remain permanently on the Tagus, or even in the Castiles.

2nd. This operation, ruinous in itself, was insisted upon at a time, when the newspapers of Cadiz affirmed, that Joseph's ambassador at the court of Petersburg had joined the Prussian army in the field; that Joseph himself had made secret overtures to the government in the Isla de Leon; that Bernadotte, his brother-in-law, had made a treaty with England and had demanded of the cortes a guard of Spaniards, a fact confirmed by information obtained through an officer sent with a flag of truce to the English admiral; finally, that Moreau and Blucher were at Stockholm, and the aid-de-camp of the former was in London.

Reflecting upon all these circumstances, he feared that the object of the king's false movements might be, to force the French army over the Ebro, in the view of making an arrangement for Spain, separate from France; fears, said the duke of Dalmatia, which may be chimerical, but it is better, in such a crisis, to be too fearful, than too confident. This letter was sent by sea, and the vessel having touched at Valencia at the moment of Joseph's arrival there, the despatch was opened, and it was then, in the first burst of his anger, that the king despatched Désprez on that mission to Moscow, the result of which has been already related.

Soult's proceedings, though most offensive to the king, and founded in error, because Joseph's letters, containing the information required, were intercepted, not withheld, were prompted by zeal for his master's service, and cannot be justly condemned, yet Joseph's indignation was natural and becoming. But the admiration of reflecting men must ever be excited by the greatness of mind, and the calm sagacity, with which Napoleon treated this thorny affair. Neither the complaints of his brother, nor the hints of his minister of war (for the duke of Feltre, a man of mean capacity, and of an intriguing disposition, countenanced Joseph's expressed suspicions that the duke of Dalmatia designed to make himself king of Andalusia) could disturb the temper or judgment of the emperor; and it was then, struck with the vigour of the plan for concentrating the army in Andalusia, he called Soult the only military head in Spain. Nor was Wellington inattentive to that general's movements; he knew his talents, and could foresee and appreciate the importance of the project he had proposed. Anxiously he watched his reluctant motions, and while apparently enjoying his own triumph amidst the feasts and rejoicings of Madrid, his eye was fixed on Seville; the balls and bull-fights of the capital, cloaked both the skill and the apprehensions of the consummate general.

Before the allies had crossed the Guadarama, Hill had been directed to hold his army in hand, close to Drouet, and ready to move into the valley of the Tagus, if that general should hasten to the succour of the king. But when Joseph's retreat upon Valencia was known, Hill received orders to fight Drouet, and even to follow him into Andalusia; at the same time general Cooke was directed to prepare an attack, even though it should be an open assault, on the French lines before Cadiz, while Ballesteros operated on the flank from Gibraltar. By these means, Wellington hoped to keep Soult from sending any succour to the king, and even to force him out of Andalusia without the necessity of marching there himself; yet, if these measures failed, he was resolved to take twenty thousand men from Madrid and, uniting with Hill, drive the French from that province.

Previous to the sending of these instructions, Laval and Villatte had pursued Ballesteros to Malaga, which place, after a skirmish at Coin, he entered, and was in such danger of capture that the maritime expedition, already noticed, was detached from Cadiz, by sea, to carry him off. However the news of the battle of Salamanca having arrested the French movements, the Spanish general regained San Roque and the fleet went on to Valencia. Meanwhile Soult, hoping the king would transfer the seat of war to Andalusia, had caused Drouet to shew a bold front against Hill, extending from the Serena to Monasterio, and to send scouting parties towards Merida; and large magazines were formed at Cordoba, a central point, equally suited for an advance by Estremadura, a march to La Mancha, or a retreat by Grenada. Wherefore Hill, who had not then received his orders to advance, remained on the defensive; nor would Wellington stir from Madrid, although his presence was urgently called for on the Duero, until he was satisfied that the duke of Dalmatia meant to abandon Andalusia. The king, as we have seen, finally forced this measure upon the marshal; but the execution required very extensive arrangements, for the quarters were distant, the convoys immense, the enemies numerous, the line of march wild, and the journey long. And it was most important to present the imposing appearance of a great and regular military movement and not the disgraceful scene of a confused flight.

The distant minor posts, in the Condado de Niebla and other places, were first called in, and then the lines before the Isla were abandoned; for Soult, in obedience to the king's first order, designed to move upon La Mancha, and it was only by accident, and indirectly, that he heard of Joseph's retreat to Valencia. At the same time he discovered that Drouet, who had received direct orders from the king, was going to Toledo, and it was not without difficulty, and only through the medium of his brother, who commanded Drouet's cavalry, that he could prevent that destructive isolated movement. Murcia then became the line of retreat; but every thing was hurried, because the works of the Isla were already broken up in the view of retreating towards La Mancha, and the troops were in march for Seville, although the safe assembling of the army at Grenada required another arrangement.

On the 25th of August, a thousand guns, stores in proportion, and all the immense works of Chiclana, St. Maria, and the Trocadero, were destroyed. Thus the long blockade of the Isla de Leon was broken up at the moment when the bombardment of Cadiz had become very serious, when the opposition to English influence was taking a dangerous direction, when the French intrigues were nearly ripe, the cortes

becoming alienated from the cause of Ferdinand and the church; finally, when the executive government was weaker than ever, because the count of Abispa, the only active person in the regency, had resigned, disgusted that his brother had been superseded by Elio and censured in the cortes for the defeat at Castalla. This siege or rather defence of Cadiz, for it was never, strictly speaking, besieged, was a curious episode in the war. Whether the Spaniards would or would not have effectually defended it without the aid of British troops is a matter of speculation; but it is certain that notwithstanding Graham's glorious action at Barrosa, Cadiz was always a heavy burthen upon lord Wellington; the forces there employed would have done better service under his immediate command, and many severe financial difficulties, to say nothing of political crosses, would have been spared.

In the night of the 26th, Soult, quitting Seville, commenced his march, by Ossuna and Antequera, towards Grenada; but now Wellington's orders had set all the allied troops of Andalusia and Estremadura in motion. Hill advanced against Drouet; Ballesteros moved by the Ronda mountains to hang on the retiring enemy's flanks; the expedition sent by sea to succour him returned from Valencia; colonel Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon disembarked with four thousand English and Spanish troops, at Huelva, and marching upon St. Lucar Mayor, drove the enemy from thence, on the 24th. The 27th, they fell upon the French rear-guard at Seville, and the suburb of Triana, the bridge and the streets beyond were soon carried by the English guards and Downie's legion. Two hundred prisoners, several guns, and many stores were taken, but Downie himself was wounded and made prisoner and treated very harshly, because the populace rising in aid of the allies had mutilated the French soldiers who fell into their hands. Scarcely was Seville taken when seven thousand French infantry came up from Chiclana, but thinking all Hill's troops were before them, instead of attacking Skerrit, hastily followed their own army, leaving the allies masters of the city. But this attack, though successful, was isolated and contrary to lord Wellington's desire. A direct and vigorous assault upon the lines of Chiclana by the whole of the Anglo-Spanish garrison was his plan, and such an assault, when the French were abandoning their works there, would have been a far heavier blow to Soult.

The commander was now too strong to be meddled with. He issued eight days' bread to his army, marched very leisurely, picked up on his route the garrisons and troops who came into him at Antequera, from the Ronda and from the coast; and at Grenada he halted eleven days to give Drouet time to join him, for the latter quitting Estremadura the 25th, by the Cordova passes, was marching by Jaen to Huescar. Ballesteros had harassed the march, but the French general had, with an insignificant loss, united seventy-two guns and forty-five thousand soldiers under arms, of which six thousand were cavalry. He was, however, still in the midst of enemies. On his left flank was Hill, on his right flank was Ballesteros, Wellington himself might come down by the Despenas Perros, the Murcians were in his front, Skerrit and Cruz Murgeon behind him, and he was clogged with enormous convoys; his sick and maimed men alone amounted to nearly nine thousand; his Spanish soldiers were deserting daily, and it was necessary to provide for several hundreds of Spanish families who were attached to the French interests. To march upon the city of Murcia was the direct and the best route for Valencia, but the

yellow fever raged there and at Carthage; moreover, Don S. Bracco, the English consul at Murcia, a resolute man, declared his resolution to inundate the country if the French advanced. Wherefore, again issuing eight days' bread, Soult marched by the mountain ways leading from Huescar to Cehejin, and Calasparra, and then, moving by Hellin, gained Almanza on the great road to Madrid, his flank being covered by a detachment from Suchet's army, which skirmished with Maitland's advanced posts at San Vicente close to Alicante. At Hellin he met the advanced guard of the army of Aragon, and on the 3rd of October, the military junction of all the French forces was effected.

The task was thus completed, and in a manner worthy of so great a commander. For it must be recollected, that besides the drawing together of the different divisions, the march itself was three hundred miles, great part through mountain roads, and the population was every where hostile. General Hill had menaced him with twenty-five thousand men, including Morillo and Penne Villenur's forces; Ballesteros, reinforced from Cadiz and by the deserters, had nearly twenty thousand; there were fourteen thousand soldiers still in the Isla; Skerit and Cruz Murgeon had four thousand, and the partidas were in all parts numerous: yet from the midst of these multitudes the duke of Dalmatia carried off his army, his convoys, and his sick, without any disaster. In this manner Andalusia, which had once been saved by the indirect influence of a single march, made by Moore from Salamanca, was, such is the complexity of war, after three years' subjection, recovered by the indirect effect of a single battle delivered by Wellington close to the same city.

During these transactions, Maitland's proceedings had been anxiously watched by Wellington; for, though the recovery of Andalusia was, both politically and militarily, a great gain, the result, he saw, must necessarily be hurtful to the ultimate success of his campaign by bringing together such powerful forces. He still thought that regular operations would not so effectually occupy Suchet as a littoral warfare, yet he was contented that Maitland should try his own plan, and he advised that general to march by the coast and have constant communication with the fleet, referring to his own campaign against Junot in 1808 as an example to be followed. But the coast roads were difficult, the access for the fleet uncertain; and though the same obstacles, and the latter perhaps in a greater degree, had occurred in Portugal, the different constitution of the armies, and still more of the generals, was an insuperable bar to a like proceeding in Valencia.

General Maitland only desired to quit his command, and the more so that the time appointed by lord William Bentinck for the return of the troops to Sicily was approaching. The moment was critical, but Wellington without hesitation forbade their departure, and even asked the ministers to place them under his own command. Meanwhile, with the utmost gentleness and delicacy, he showed to Maitland, who was a man of high honour, courage, and feeling, although inexperienced in command, and now heavily oppressed with illness, that his situation was by no means dangerous;—that the entrenched camp of Alicante might be safely defended,—that he was comparatively better off than Wellington himself had been when in the lines of Torres Vedras, and that it was even desirable that the enemy should attack him on such strong ground, because the Spaniards when joined with English soldiers in a secure position would certainly fight. He also desired that Carthage should be well looked

to by general Ross, lest Soult should turn aside to surprise it. Then taking advantage of Elio's fear of Soult, he drew him with the army that had been O'Donel's towards Madrid, and so got some controul over his operations.

If the English general had been well furnished with money at this time, and if the yellow fever had not raged in Murcia, it is probable he would have followed Joseph rapidly, and rallying all the scattered Spanish forces and the Sicilian armament on his own army, have endeavoured to crush the king and Suchet before Soult could arrive; or he might have formed a junction with Hill at Despenas Perros, and so have fallen on Soult himself during his march, although such an operation would have endangered his line of communication on the Duero. But these obstacles induced him to avoid operations in the south, which would have involved him in new and immense combinations, until he had secured his northern line of operations by the capture of Burgos, meaning then with his whole army united to attack the enemy in the south.

However he could not stir from Madrid until he was certain that Soult would relinquish Andalusia, and this was not made clear before Cordoba was abandoned. Then Hill was ordered to advance on Zalamea de la Serena, where he commanded equally, the passes leading to Cordoba in front, those leading to La Mancha on the left, and those leading by Truxillo to the Tagus in the rear; so that he could at pleasure either join Wellington, follow Drouet towards Grenada, or interpose between Soult and Madrid, if he should turn towards the Despenas Perros: meanwhile Skerit's troops were marching to join him, and the rest of the Anglo-Portuguese garrison of Cadiz sailed to Lisbon, with intent to join Wellington by the regular line of operations.

During these transactions the affairs in Old Castile had become greatly deranged, for where Wellington was not, the French warfare generally assumed a severe and menacing aspect. Castaños had, in person, conducted the siege of Astorga, after the battle of Salamanca, yet with so little vigour, that it appeared rather a blockade than a siege. The forts at Toro and Zamora had also been invested, the first by the partidas, the second by Silveira's militia, who with great spirit had passed their own frontier, although well aware that they could not be legally compelled to do so. Thus all the French garrisons abandoned by Clauzel's retreat were endangered, and though the slow progress of the Spaniards before Astorga was infinitely disgraceful to their military prowess, final success seemed certain.

General H. Clinton was at Cuellar, Santocildes occupied Valladolid, Anson's cavalry was in the valley of the Esqueva, and the front looked fair enough. But in the rear, the line of communication, as far as the frontier of Portugal, was in great disorder; the discipline of the army was deteriorating rapidly, and excesses were committed on all the routes. A detachment of Portuguese, not more than a thousand strong, either instigated by want or by their hatred of the Spaniards, had perpetrated such enormities on their march from Pinhel to Salamanca, that as an example, five were executed and many others severely punished by stripes, yet even this did not check the growing evil, the origin of which may be partly traced to the license at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, but principally to the sufferings of the soldiers.

All the hospitals in the rear were crowded, and Salamanca itself, in which there were six thousand sick and wounded, besides French prisoners, was the

very abode of misery. The soldiers endured much during the first two or three days after the battle, and the inferior officers' sufferings were still more heavy and protracted. They had no money, and many sold their horses and other property to sustain life; some actually died of want, and though Wellington, hearing of this, gave orders that they should be supplied from the purveyor's stores in the same manner as the soldiers, the relief came late. It is a common, yet erroneous notion, that the English system of hospitals in the Peninsula was admirable, and that the French hospitals were neglected. Strenuous and unceasing exertions were made by lord Wellington and the chiefs of the medical staff to form good hospital establishments, but the want of money, and still more the want of previous institutions, foiled their utmost efforts. Now there was no point of warfare which more engaged Napoleon's attention than the care of his sick and wounded; and he being monarch as well as general, furnished his hospitals with all things requisite, even with luxuries. Under his fostering care also, baron Larrey, justly celebrated, were it for this alone, organized the establishment called the hospital "*Ambulance*;" that is to say, waggons of a peculiar construction, well horsed, served by men trained and incorporated as soldiers, and subject to a strict discipline. Rewarded for their courage and devotion like other soldiers, they were always at hand, and whether in action or on a march, ready to pick up, to save, and to carry off wounded men; and the astonishing rapidity with which the fallen French soldiers disappeared from a field of battle attested the excellence of the institution.

But in the British army, the carrying off the wounded, depended, partly upon the casual assistance of a weak wagon train, very badly disciplined, furnishing only three waggons to a division, and not originally appropriated to that service; partly upon the spare commissariat animals, but principally upon the resources of the country, whether of bullock carts, mules, or donkeys, and hence the most doleful scenes after a battle, or when an hospital was to be evacuated. The increasing numbers of the sick and wounded, as the war enlarged, also pressed on the limited number of regular medical officers, and Wellington complained, that when he demanded more, the military medical board in London neglected his demands, and thwarted his arrangements. Shoals of hospital mates and students were indeed sent out, and they arrived for the most part ignorant alike of war, and their own profession; while a heterogeneous mass of purveyors and their subordinates, acting without any military organization or effectual superintendence, continually bade defiance to the exertions of those medical officers, and they were many, whose experience, zeal, and talents would, with a good institution to work upon, have rendered this branch of the service most distinguished. Nay, many even of the well educated surgeons sent out, were for some time of little use, for superior professional skill is of little value in comparison of experience in military arrangement; where one soldier dies from the want of a delicate operation, hundreds perish from the absence of military arrangement. War tries the strength of the military frame-work; it is in peace that the frame-work itself must be formed, otherwise barbarians would be the leading soldiers of the world; a perfect army can only be made by civil institutions, and those, rightly considered, would tend to confine the horrors of war to the field of battle, which would be the next best thing to the perfection of civilization, that would prevent war altogether.

Such was the state of affairs on the allies' line of communication, when, on the 14th of August, Clauzel suddenly came down the Pisuerga. Anson's cavalry immediately recrossed the Duero at Tudela, Santocildes, following Wellington's instructions, fell back to Torrelobaton, and on the 18th the French assembled at Valladolid to the number of twenty thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and fifty guns well provided with ammunition. Five thousand stragglers, who in the confusion of defeat had fled to Burgos and Vittoria, were also collected and in march to join. Clauzel's design was to be at hand when Joseph, reinforced from the south, should drive Wellington from Madrid, for he thought the latter must then retire by Avila, and the Valle de Ambles, and he purposed to gain the mountains of Avila himself, and harass the English general's flank. Meanwhile Foy proposed with two divisions of infantry, and sixteen hundred cavalry, to succour the garrisons of Toro, Zamora, and Astorga, and Clauzel consented, though he appears to have been somewhat fearful of this dangerous experiment, and did not believe Astorga was so near its fall.

Foy wished to march on the 15th, by Placentia, yet he was not despatched until the evening of the 17th, and then by the line of Toro, the garrison of which place he carried off in passing. The 19th, he sabred some of the Spanish rear-guard at Castro Gonzalo, on the Esla; the 20th, at three o'clock in the evening, he reached La Baneza, but was mortified to learn, that Castaños, by an artful negotiation had, the day before, persuaded the garrison of Astorga, twelve hundred good troops, to surrender, although there was no breach, and the siege was actually being raised at the time. The Gallicians being safe in their mountains, the French general turned to the left, and marched upon Carvajales, hoping to enclose Silveira's militia between the Duero and the Esla, and sweep them off in his course; then relieving Zamora, he purposed to penetrate to Salamanca, and seize the trophies of the Arapiles. And this would infallibly have happened, but for the judicious activity of sir Howard Douglas, who, divining Foy's object, sent Silveira with timely notice into Portugal; yet so critical was the movement, that Foy's cavalry skirmished with the Portuguese rear-guard near Constantin at day-break on the 24th. The 25th, the French entered Zamora, but Wellington was now in movement upon Arevalo, and Clauzel recalled Foy at the moment when his infantry were actually in march upon Salamanca to seize the trophies, and his cavalry was moving by Ledesma, to break up the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

That Foy was thus able to disturb the line of communication was certainly Clinton's error. Wellington left eighteen thousand men, exclusive of the troops besieging Astorga, to protect his flank and rear, and he had a right to think it enough, because he momentarily expected Astorga to fall, and the French army, a beaten one, was then in full retreat. It is true none of the French garrisons yielded before Clauzel returned, but Clinton alone had eight thousand good troops, and might, with the aid of Santocildes and the partidas, have baffled the French; he might even have menaced Valladolid, after Foy's departure, which would have certainly brought that general back. And if he dared not venture so much, he should, following his instructions, have regulated his movements along the left of the Duero, so as to be always in a condition to protect Salamanca; that is, he should have gone to Olmedo when Clauzel first occupied Valladolid, but he retired to Arevalo, which enabled Foy to advance.

The mere escape of the garrisons, from Toro and

Zamora, was by the English general thought no misfortune. It would have cost him a long march and two sieges in the hottest season to have reduced them, which, in the actual state of affairs, was more than they were worth; yet, to use his own words, "*It was not very encouraging to find, that the best Spanish army was unable to stand before the remains of Marmont's beaten troops; that in more than two months, it had been unable even to breach Astorga, and that all important operations must still be performed by the British troops.*" The Spaniards, now in the fifth year of the war, were still in the state described by sir John Moore, "*without an army, without a government, without a general!*"

While these events were passing in Castile, Popham's armament remained on the Biscay coast, and the partidas thus encouraged became so active, that with exception of Santona and Gueteria, all the littoral posts were abandoned by Caffarelli; Porlier, Renovalles, and Mendizabel, the nominal commanders of all the bands, immediately took possession of Castro, Santander, and even of Bilbao, and though general Rouget came from Vittoria to recover the last, he was, after some sharp fighting, obliged to retire again to Durango. Meanwhile Reille, deluded by a rumour that Wellington was marching through the centre of Spain upon Zaragoza, abandoned several important outposts, Aragon, hitherto so tranquil, became unquiet, and all the northern provinces were ripe for insurrection.

CHAPTER III.

Wellington's combinations described—Foolish arrangements of the English ministers relative to Spanish clothing—Want of money—Political persecution in Madrid—Miserable state of that city—Character of the Madridenos—Wellington marches against Clauzel—Device of the Portuguese regency to avoid supplying their troops—Wellington enters Valladolid—Waits for Castanos—His opinion of the Spaniards—Clauzel retreats to Burgos—His able generalship—The allies enter Burgos, which is in danger of destruction from the partidas—Reflections upon the movements of the two armies—Siege of the castle of Burgos.

WHILE the various military combinations, described in the foregoing chapter, were thickening, Wellington, as we have seen, remained in Madrid, apparently inactive, but really watching the fitting moment to push his operations, and consolidate his success in the north, preparatory to the execution of his designs in the south. The result was involved in a mixed question, of time, and of combinations dependant upon his central position, and upon the activity of the partidas in cutting off all correspondence between the French armies. His mode of paralyzing Suchet's and Caffarelli's armies, by the Sicilian armament in the east and Popham's armament in the north, has been already described, but his internal combinations, to oppose the united forces of Soult and the king, were still more important and extensive.

When it was certain that Soult had actually abandoned Andalusia, Hill was directed upon Toledo, by the bridge of Almaraz, and colonel Sturgeon's genius had rendered that stupendous ruin, although more lofty than Alcantara, passable for artillery. Elio also was induced to bring the army of Murcia to the same quarter, and Ballesteros was desired to take post on the mountain of Alcaraz, and look to the fortress of Chinchilla, which, situated at the confines of Murcia and La Mancha, and perched on a rugged isolated hill in a vast plain, was peculiarly strong both from construction and site, and it was the knot of all the great lines of communication. The parti-

zan corps of Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, were desired to enter La Mancha, and thus, as Hill could bring up above twenty thousand men, and as the third, fourth, and light divisions, two brigades of cavalry, and Carlos D'España's troops, were to remain near Madrid, whilst the rest of the army marched into Old Castile, above sixty thousand men, thirty thousand being excellent troops and well commanded, would have been assembled, with the fortified post of Chinchilla in front, before Soult could unite with the king.

The British troops at Carthagená were directed, when Soult should have passed that city, to leave only small garrisons in the forts there, and join the army in Alicante, which, with the reinforcements from Sicily, would then be sixteen thousand strong, seven thousand being British troops. While this force was at Alicante, Wellington judged that the French could not bring more than fifty thousand against Madrid without risking the loss of Valencia itself. Not that he expected the heterogeneous mass he had collected could resist on a fair field the veteran and powerfully constituted army which would finally be opposed to them; but he calculated that ere the French generals could act seriously, the rivers would be full, and Hill could then hold his ground, sufficiently long to enable the army to come back from Burgos. Indeed he had little doubt of reducing that place and being again on the Tagus in time to take the initial movements himself.

Meanwhile the allies had several lines of operation.

Ballesteros from the mountains of Alcaraz, could harass the flanks of the advancing French, and when they passed, could unite with Maitland to overpower Suchet.

Hill could retire, if pressed, by Madrid, or by Toledo, and could either gain the passes of the Guadarama, or the valley of the Tagus.

Elio, Villa Campa, Bassecour, and the Empecinado could act by Cuenca and Requena against Suchet, or against Madrid if the French followed Hill obstinately; or they could join Ballesteros. And besides all these forces, there were ten or twelve thousand new Spanish levies in the Isla waiting for clothing and arms, which under the recent treaty were to come from England.

To lord Wellington, the English ministers had nominally confided the distribution of these succours, but following their usual vicious manner of doing business, they also gave Mr. Stuart a control over it, without Wellington's knowledge, and hence the stores, expected by the latter at Lisbon or Cadiz, were by Stuart unwittingly directed to Coruña, with which place the English general had no secure communication; moreover there were very few Spanish levies there, and no confidential person to superintend the delivery of them. Other political crosses, which shall be noticed in due time, he also met with, but it will suffice here to say, that the want of money was an evil now become intolerable. The army was many months in arrears; those officers who went to the rear sick, suffered the most cruel privations, and those who remained in Madrid, tempted by the pleasures of the capital, obtained some dollars at an exorbitant premium from a money broker, and it was grievously suspected that his means resulted from the nefarious proceedings of an under commissary; but the soldiers, equally tempted, having no such resource, plundered the stores of the Retiro. In fine, discipline became relaxed throughout the army, and the troops kept in the field were gloomy, envying those who remained in Madrid.

That city exhibited a sad mixture of luxury and

desolation. When it was first entered, a violent, cruel, and unjust persecution of those who were called "*Afrancesados*," was commenced, and continued, until the English general interfered, and as an example made no distinction in his invitations to the palace feasts. Truly it was not necessary to increase the sufferings of the miserable people, for though the markets were full of provisions, there was no money wherewith to buy; and though the houses were full of rich furniture, there were neither purchasers nor lenders; even noble families secretly sought charity that they might live. At night the groans and stifled cries of famishing people were heard, and every morning emaciated dead bodies, cast into the streets, shewed why those cries had ceased. The calm resignation with which these terrible sufferings were borne was a distinctive mark of the national character; not many begged, none complained, there was no violence, no reproaches, very few thefts; the allies lost a few animals, nothing more, and these were generally thought to be taken by robbers from the country. But with this patient endurance of calamity the "*Madridenos*" discovered a deep and unaffected gratitude for kindness received at the hands of the British officers, who contributed, not much for they had it not, but, enough of money to form soup charities, by which hundreds were succoured. It was the third division, and I believe the forty-fifth regiment which set the example, and surely this is not the least of the many honourable distinctions those brave men have earned.

Wellington, desirous of obtaining shelter from the extreme heat for his troops, had early sent four divisions and the cavalry, to the Escorial and St. Ildefonso, from whence they could join Hill by the valley of the Tagus, or Clinton by Arevalo; but when he knew that the king's retreat upon Valencia was decided, that Soult had abandoned Cordoba, and that Clinton was falling back before Clauzel, he ordered the first, fifth, and seventh divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese brigades, Ponsonby's light horsemen, and the heavy German cavalry, to move rapidly upon Arevalo, and on the 1st of September quitted Madrid himself to take the command. Yet his army had been so diminished by sickness that only twenty-one thousand men, including three thousand cavalry, were assembled in that town, and he had great difficulty to feed the Portuguese soldiers, who were also very ill equipped.

The regency, instead of transmitting money and stores to supply their troops, endeavoured to throw off the burthen entirely by an ingenious device; for having always had a running account with the Spanish government, they now made a treaty, by which the Spaniards were to feed the Portuguese troops, and check off the expense on the national account, which was then in favour of the Portuguese; that is, the soldiers were to starve under the sanction of this treaty, because the Spaniards could not feed their own men, and would not, if they could, have fed the Portuguese. Neither could the latter take provisions from the country, because Wellington demanded the resources of the valleys of the Duero and Pisuerga for the English soldiers, as a set-off against the money advanced by Sir Henry Wellesley to the Spanish regency at Cadiz. Wherefore to force the Portuguese regency from this shameful expedient, he stopped the payments of their subsidy from the chest of aids. Then the old discontents and disputes revived and acquired new force; the regency became more intractable than ever, and the whole military system of Portugal was like to fall to pieces.

On the 4th, the allies quitted Arevalo, the 6th,

they passed the Duero by the ford above Puente de Duero, the 7th, they entered Valladolid, and meanwhile the Gallicians, who had returned to the Esla, when Foy retreated, were ordered to join the Anglo-Portuguese army. Clauzel abandoned Valladolid in the night of the 6th, and though closely followed by Ponsonby's cavalry, crossed the Pisuerga and destroyed the bridge of Bercial on that river. The 8th, the allies halted, for rest, and to await the arrival of Castaños; but seldom during this war did a Spanish general deviate into activity; and Wellington observed that in his whole intercourse with that people, from the beginning of the revolution to that moment, he had not met with an able Spaniard, while amongst the Portuguese he had found several. The Gallicians came not, and the French retreated slowly up the beautiful Pisuerga and Arlanzan valleys, which, in denial of the stories about French devastation, were carefully cultivated, and filled to repletion with corn, wine, and oil.

Nor were they deficient in military strength. Off the high road, on both sides, ditches and rivulets impeded the troops, while cross ridges continually furnished strong parallel positions flanked by the lofty hills on either side. In these valleys Clauzel baffled his great adversary in the most surprising manner. Each day he offered battle, but on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, but chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy, yet each day darkness fell ere they were completed, and the morning's sun always saw Clauzel again in position. At Cigales and Dueñas, in the Pisuerga valley, at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzan, the French general thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th, by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino.

But eleven thousand Spanish infantry, three hundred cavalry, and eight guns, had now joined the allies, and Wellington would have attacked frankly on the 17th, had not Clauzel, alike wary and skilful, observed the increased numbers, and retired in the night to Frandovinez; his rear-guard was, however, next day pushed sharply back to the heights of Burgos, and in the following night he passed through that town, leaving behind him large stores of grain. Caffarelli, who had come down to place the castle of Burgos in a state of defence, now joined him, and the two generals retreated upon Briviesca, where they were immediately reinforced by that reserve which, with such extraordinary foresight, the emperor had directed to be assembled and exercised on the Pyrennees, in anticipation of Marmont's disaster. The allies entered Burgos amidst great confusion, for the garrison of the castle had set fire to some houses impeding the defence of the fortress; the conflagration spread widely, and the partidas, who were already gathered like wolves round a carcass, entered the town for mischief. Mr. Sydenham, an eye-witness, and not unused to scenes of war, thus describes their proceedings: "What with the flames, and the plundering of the Guerillas, who are as bad as Tartars and Cossacks of the Kischack or Zagatay hordes, I was afraid Burgos would be entirely destroyed; but order was at length restored by the manful exertions of Don Miguel Alava."

The series of beautiful movements executed by Clauzel, merit every praise; but it may be questioned if the English general's marches were in the

true direction, or made in good time; for though Clinton's retreat upon Arevalo influenced, it did not absolutely dictate, the line of operations. Wellington had expected Clauzel's advance to Valladolid; it was therefore no surprise; and on the 26th of August, Foy was still at Zamora. At that period, the English general might have had his army, Clinton's troops excepted, at Segovia; and as the distance from thence to Valladolid is rather less than from Valladolid to Zamora, a rapid march upon the former, Clinton advancing at the same time, might have separated Clauzel from Foy. Again, Wellington might have marched upon Burgos by Aranda de Duero and Lerma, that road being as short as by Valladolid; he might also have brought forward the third, or the light division, by the Somosierra, from Madrid, and directed Clinton and the Spaniards to close upon the French rear. He would thus have turned the valleys of the Pisuegra and the Arlanzan, and could from Aranda, or Lerma, have fallen upon Clauzel while in march. That general having Clinton and the Galicians on his rear, and Wellington, reinforced by the divisions from Madrid, on his front or flank, would then have had to fight a decisive battle under every disadvantage. In fine, the object was to crush Clauzel, and this should have been effected though Madrid had been entirely abandoned to secure success. It is, however, probable that want of money, and means of transport, decided the line of operations; for the route by the Somosierra was savage and barren, and the feeding of the troops, even by Valladolid, was from hand to mouth, or painfully supported by convoys from Portugal.

SIEGE OF THE CASTLE OF BURGOS.

Caffarelli had placed eighteen hundred infantry, besides artillery-men, in this place, and general Dubreton, the governor, was of such courage and skill that he surpassed even the hopes of his sanguine and warlike countryman. The castle and its works enclosed a rugged hill, between which and the river, the city of Burgos was situated. An old wall, with a new parapet and flanks constructed by the French, offered the first line of defence; the second line, which was within the other, was earthen, of the nature of a field retrenchment, and well palisaded; the third line was similarly constructed, and contained the two most elevated points of the hill, on one of which was an entrenched building called the White Church, and on the other the ancient keep of the castle; this last was the highest point, and was not only entrenched, but surmounted by a heavy casemated work called the Napoleon battery. Thus there were five separate enclosures.

The Napoleon battery commanded every thing around it, save to the north, where, at the distance of three hundred yards, there was a second height scarcely less elevated than that of the fortress. It was called the Hill of San Michael, and was defended by a large horn-work, with a hard sloping scarp twenty-five, and a counterscarp ten, feet high. This outwork was unfinished, and only closed by strong palisades; but it was under the fire of the Napoleon battery, was well flanked by the castle defences, and covered in front by slight entrenchments for the out picquets. The French had already mounted nine heavy guns, eleven field-pieces, and six mortars or howitzers in the fortress, and as the reserve artillery and stores of the army of Portugal were also deposited there, they could increase their armament.

FIRST ASSAULT.

The batteries so completely commanded all the bridges and fords over the Arlanzan that two days

elapsed ere the allies could cross; but on the 19th, the passage of the river being effected above the town, by the first division, major Somers Cocks, supported by Pack's Portuguese, drove in the French outposts on the hill of San Michael. In the night, the same troops, reinforced with the forty-second regiment, stormed the horn-work. The conflict was murderous; for though the ladders were fairly placed by the bearers of them, the storming column, which, covered by a firing party, marched against the front, was beaten with great loss, and the attack would have failed if the gallant leader of the seventy-ninth had not meanwhile forced an entrance by the gorge. The garrison was thus actually cut off; but Cocks, though followed by the second battalion of the forty-second regiment, was not closely supported, and the French being still five hundred strong, broke through his men and escaped. This assault gave room for censure; the troops complained of each other, and the loss was above four hundred, while that of the enemy was less than one hundred and fifty.

Wellington was now enabled to examine the defences of the castle. He found them feeble and incomplete; and yet his means were so scant that he had slender hopes of success, and relied more upon the enemy's weakness than upon his own power. It was, however, said that water was scarce with the garrison, and that their provision magazines could be burned; wherefore, encouraged by this information, he adopted the following plan of attack.

Twelve thousand men, composing the first and sixth divisions, and the two Portuguese brigades, were to undertake the works; the rest of the troops, about twenty thousand, exclusive of the partidas, were to form the covering army.

The trenches were to be opened from the suburb of San Pedro, and a parallel formed in the direction of the hill of San Michael.

A battery for five guns was to be established close to the right of the captured horn-work.

A sap was to be pushed from the parallel as near the first wall as possible, without being seen into from the upper works, and from thence the engineer was to proceed by gallery and mine.

When the first mine should be completed, the battery on the hill of San Michael was to open against the second line of defence, and the assault was to be given on the first line. If a lodgement was formed, the approaches were to be continued against the second line, and the battery on San Michael was to be turned against the third line, in front of the White Church, because the defences there were exceedingly weak. Meanwhile a trench for musketry was to be dug along the brow of San Michael, and a concealed battery was to be prepared within the horn-work itself, with a view to the final attack of the Napoleon battery.

The head-quarters were fixed at Villa Toro; colonel Burgoyne conducted the operations of the engineers, colonel Robe and colonel Dickson those of the artillery, which consisted of three eighteen-pounders, and the five iron twenty-four-pound howitzers used at the siege of the Salamanca forts; and it was with regard to these slender means, rather than the defects of the fortress, that the line of attack was chosen.

When the horn-work fell, a lodgement had been immediately commenced in the interior, and it was continued vigorously, although under a destructive fire from the Napoleon battery, because the besiegers feared the enemy would at day-light endeavour to retake the work by the gorge; good cover was, however, obtained in the night, and the first battery was also begun.

The 21st, the garrison mounted several fresh field-guns, and at night kept up a heavy fire of grape and shells on the workmen who were digging the musketry trench in front of the first battery.

The 22d, the fire of the besieged was redoubled; but the besiegers worked with little loss, and their musketeers galled the enemy. In the night, the first battery was armed with two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers, and the secret battery within the horn-work was commenced; but lord Wellington, deviating from his first plan, now resolved to try an escalade against the first line of defence. He selected a point half-way between the suburb of San Pedro and the horn-work, and at midnight four hundred men, provided with ladders, were secretly posted in a hollow road fifty yards from the wall, which was from twenty-three to twenty-five feet high, but had no flanks. This was the main column; a Portuguese battalion was also assembled in the town of Burgos, to make a combined flank attack on that side.

SECOND ASSAULT.

The storm was commenced by the Portuguese, but they were repelled by the fire of the common guard alone; and the principal escalading party, which was composed of detachments from different regiments, under major Lawrie, 79th regiment, though acting with more courage, had as little success. The ladders were indeed placed, and the troops entered the ditch, yet altogether, and confusedly; Lawrie was killed, and the bravest soldiers who first mounted the ladders were bayoneted; combustible missiles were then thrown down in great abundance, and, after a quarter of an hour's resistance, the men gave way, leaving half their number behind. The wounded were brought off the next day, under a truce. It is said that on the body of one of the officers killed, the French found a complete plan of the siege, and it is certain that this disastrous attempt, which delayed the regular progress of the siege for two days, increased the enemy's courage, and produced a bad effect upon the allied troops, some of whom were already dispirited by the attack on the horn-work.

The original plan being now resumed, the hollow way from whence the escaladers had advanced, and which, at only fifty yards' distance, run along the front of defence, was converted into a parallel, and connected with the suburb of San Pedro. The trenches were made deep and narrow, to secure them from the plunging shot of the castle, and musketeers were also planted to keep down the enemy's fire; but heavy rains incommoded the troops, and though the allied marksmen got the mastery over those of the French immediately in their front, the latter, having a raised and palisaded work on their own right, which in some measure flanked the approaches, killed so many of the besiegers that the latter were finally withdrawn.

In the night a flying sap was commenced from the right of the parallel, and was pushed within twenty yards of the enemy's first line of defence; but the directing engineer was killed, and with him many men, for the French plied their musketry sharply, and rolled large shells down the steep side of the hill. The head of the sap was indeed so commanded as it approached the wall, that a six-foot trench, added to the height of the gabion above, scarcely protected the workmen; wherefore the gallery of the mine was opened, and worked as rapidly as the inexperience of the miners, who were merely volunteers from the line, would permit.

The concealed battery within the horn-work of San Michael being now completed, two eighteen-

pounders were removed from the first battery to arm it, and they were replaced by two iron howitzers, which opened upon the advanced palisade below, to drive the French marksmen from that point; but after firing one hundred and forty rounds without success, this project was relinquished, and ammunition was so scarce that the soldiers were paid to collect the enemy's bullets.

This day also a zigzag was commenced in front of the first battery, and down the face of San Michael, to obtain footing for a musketry trench to overlook the enemy's defences below; and though the workmen were exposed to the whole fire of the castle, at the distance of two hundred yards, and were knocked down fast, the work went steadily on.

On the 26th, the gallery of the mine was advanced eighteen feet, and the soil was found favourable; but the men, in passing the sap, were hit fast by the French marksmen, and an assistant engineer was killed. In the night, the parallel was prolonged on the right within twenty yards of the enemy's ramparts, with a view to a second gallery and mine, and musketeers were planted there to oppose the enemy's marksmen, and to protect the sap; at the same time the zigzag on the hill of San Michael was continued, and the musket trench there was completed under cover of gabions, and with little loss, although the whole fire of the castle was concentrated on the spot.

The 27th, the French were seen strengthening their second line, and they had already cut a step along the edge of the counterscarp, for a covered way, and had palisaded the communication. Meanwhile the besiegers finished the musketry trench on the right of their parallel, and opened the gallery for the second mine; but the first mine went on slowly, the men in the sap were galled and disturbed by stones, grenades, and small shells, which the French threw into the trenches by hand; and the artillery fire also knocked over the gabions of the musketry trench on San Michael so fast that the troops were withdrawn during the day.

In the night, a trench of communication, forming a second parallel behind the first, was begun, and nearly completed, from the hill of San Michael towards the suburb of San Pedro, and the musketry trench on the hill was deepened.

The 28th, an attempt was made to perfect this new parallel of communication, but the French fire was heavy, and the shells, which passed over, came rolling down the hill again into the trench; so the work was deferred until night, and was then perfected. The back roll of the shells continued indeed to gall the troops, but the whole of this trench, that in front of the horn-work above, and that on the right of the parallel below, were filled with men whose fire was incessant. Moreover, the first mine was now completed and loaded with more than a thousand weight of powder, the gallery was strongly tamped for fifteen feet with bags of clay, and all being ready for the explosion, Wellington ordered the

THIRD ASSAULT.

At midnight the hollow road, fifty yards from the mine, was lined with troops to fire on the defences, and three hundred men, composing the storming party, were assembled there, attended by others who carried tools and materials to secure the lodgement when the breach should be carried. The mine was then exploded, the wall fell, and an officer with twenty men rushed forward to the assault. The effect of the explosion was not so great as it ought to have been, yet it brought the wall down, the enemy was stupified, and the forlorn hope, consisting of a

sergeant and four daring soldiers, gained the summit of the breach, and there stood until the French, recovering, drove them down pierced with bayonet wounds. Meanwhile, the officer and the twenty men, who were to have been followed by a party of fifty, and these by the remainder of the stormers, missed the breach in the dark, and finding the wall unbroken, returned, and reported that there was no breach. The main body immediately regained the trenches, and before the sergeant and his men returned with streaming wounds to tell their tale, the enemy was reinforced; and such was the scarcity of ammunition that no artillery practice could be directed against the breach, during the night; hence the French were enabled to raise a parapet behind it, and to place obstacles on the ascent, which deterred the besiegers from renewing the assault at daylight.

This failure arose from the darkness of the night, and the want of a conducting engineer; for out of four regular officers of that branch, engaged in the siege, one had been killed, one badly wounded, and one was sick, wherefore the remaining one was necessarily reserved for the conducting of the works. The aspect of affairs was gloomy. Twelve days had elapsed since the siege commenced, one assault had succeeded, two had failed, twelve hundred men had been killed or wounded, little progress had been made, and the troops generally showed symptoms of despondency, especially the Portuguese, who seemed to be losing their ancient spirit. Discipline was relaxed, the soldiers wasted ammunition, and the work in the trenches was avoided or neglected both by officers and men; insubordination was gaining ground, and reproachful orders were issued, the guards only being noticed as presenting an honourable exception.

In this state it was essential to make some change in the operations, and as the French marksmen, in the advanced palisadoed work below, were now become so expert that every thing which could be seen from thence was hit, the howitzer battery on San Michael was reinforced with a French eight-pounder, by the aid of which this mischievous post was at last demolished. At the same time, the gallery of the second mine was pushed forward, and a new breaching battery for three guns was constructed behind it, so close to the enemy's defences that the latter screened the work from the artillery fire of their upper fortress; but the parapet of the battery was only made musket-proof, because the besieged had no guns on the lower line of this front.

In the night, the three eighteen-pounders were brought from the hill of San Michael without being discovered, and at daylight, though a very galling fire of muskets thinned the workmen, they persevered until nine o'clock, when the battery was finished and armed. But at that moment the watchful Dubreton brought a howitzer down from the upper works, and with a low charge threw shells into the battery; then making a hole through a flank wall, he thrust out a light gun, which sent its bullets whizzing through the thin parapet at every round, and at the same time his marksmen plied their shot so sharply that the allies were driven from their pieces without firing a shot. More French cannon were now brought from the upper works, the defences of the battery were quite demolished, two of the gun-carriages were disabled, a trunnion was knocked off one of the eighteen-pounders, and the muzzle of another was split. It was in vain that the besiegers' marksmen, aided by some officers who considered themselves good shots, endeavoured to quell the enemy's fire; the French being on a height, were too well covered, and remained masters of the fight.

In the night, a second and more solid battery was formed, at a point a little to the left of the ruined one; but at daylight the French observed it, and their fire, plunging from above, made the parapet fly off so rapidly that the English general relinquished his intention, and returned to his galleries and mines, and to his breaching battery on the hill of San Michael. The two guns still serviceable were therefore removed towards the upper battery, to beat down a retrenchment formed by the French behind the old breach. It was intended to have placed them on this new position, in the night of the 3d; but the weather was very wet and stormy, and the workmen, those of the guards only excepted, abandoned the trenches; hence, at daylight, the guns were still short of their destination, and nothing more could be done until the following night.

On the 4th, at nine o'clock in the morning, the two eighteen pounders and three iron howitzers, again opened from San Michael's, and at four o'clock in the evening, the old breach being cleared of all incumbrances, and the second mine being strongly tamped for explosion, a double assault was ordered. The second battalion of the twenty-fourth British regiment, commanded by captain Hedderwick, was selected for this operation, and was formed in the hollow way, having one advanced party, under Mr. Holmes, pushed forward as close to the new mine as it was safe to be, and a second party, under Mr. Frazer, in like manner pushed towards the old breach.

FOURTH ASSAULT.

At five o'clock the mine was exploded with a terrific effect, sending many of the French up into the air and breaking down one hundred feet of the wall; the next instant Holmes and his brave men went rushing through the smoke and crumbling ruins, and Frazer, as quick and brave as his brother officer, was already fighting with the defenders on the summit of the old breach. The supports followed closely, and in a few minutes both points were carried with a loss to the assailants of thirty-seven killed and two-hundred wounded, seven of the latter being officers, and amongst them the conducting engineer. During the night lodgements were formed, in advance of the old, and on the ruins of the new breach, yet very imperfectly, and under a heavy destructive fire of the upper defences. But this happy attack revived the spirits of the army, vessels with powder were coming coastwise from Coruña, a convoy was expected by land from Ciudad Rodrigo, and as a supply of ammunition sent by sir Home Popham had already reached the camp, from Santander, the howitzers continued to knock away the palisades in the ditch, and the battery on San Michael's was directed to open a third breach at a point where the first French line of defence was joined to the second line.

This promising state of affairs was of short duration.

On the 5th, at five o'clock in the evening, while the working parties were extending the lodgements, three hundred French came swiftly down the hill, and sweeping away the labourers and guards from the trenches, killed or wounded a hundred and fifty men, got possession of the old breach, destroyed the works and carried off all the tools. However in the night the allies repaired the damage and pushed saps from each flank to meet in the centre near the second French line, and to serve as a parallel to check future sallies. Meanwhile the howitzers on the San Michael continued their fire, yet ineffectually, against the palisades; the breaching battery in the horn-work also opened, but it was badly con-

structed, and the guns being unable to see the wall sufficiently low, soon ceased to speak, the embrasures were therefore masked. On the other hand, the besieged were unable, from the steepness of the castle hill, to depress their guns sufficiently to bear on the lodgement at the breaches in the first line, but their musketry was destructive, and they rolled down large shells to retard the approaches towards the second line.

On the 7th, the besiegers had got so close to the wall below that the howitzers above could no longer play without danger to the workmen, wherefore two French field-pieces, taken in the horn-work, were substituted and did good service. The breaching battery on San Michael's being altered, also renewed its fire, and at five o'clock had beaten down fifty feet from the parapet of the second line; but the enemy's return was heavy, and another eighteen pounder lost a trunnion. However, in the night block-carriages with supports for the broken trunnions were provided, and the disabled guns were enabled to recommence their fire, yet with low charges. But a constant rain had now filled the trenches, the communications were injured, the workmen were negligent, the approaches to the second line went on slowly, and again Dubreton came thundering down from the upper ground, driving the guards and workmen from the new parallel at the lodgements, levelling all the works, carrying off all the tools, and killing or wounding two hundred men. Colonel Cocks, promoted for his gallant conduct at the storming of San Michael, restored the fight, and repulsed the French, but he fell dead on the ground he had recovered. He was a young man of a modest demeanour, brave, thoughtful, and enterprising, and he lived and died a good soldier.

After this severe check the approaches to the second line were abandoned, and the trenches were extended so as to embrace the whole of the fronts attacked; the battery on San Michael had meantime formed a practicable breach twenty-five feet wide, and the parallel, at the old breach of the first line, was prolonged by zigzags on the left towards this new breach, while a trench was opened to enable marksmen to fire upon the latter at thirty yards distance. Nevertheless another assault could not be risked, because the great expenditure of powder had again exhausted the magazines, and without a new supply the troops might have found themselves without ammunition in front of the French army, which was now gathering head near Briviesca. Heated shot were, however, thrown at the White Church with a view to burn the magazines; and the miners were directed to drive a gallery, on the other side of the castle, against the church of San Roman, a building pushed out a little beyond the French external line of defence on the side of the city.

On the 10th, when the besiegers' ammunition was nearly all gone, a fresh supply arrived from Santander, but no effect had been produced upon the White Church, and Dubreton had strengthened his works to meet the assault; he had also isolated the new breach on one flank by a strong stockade extending at right angles from the second to the third line of defence. The fire from the Napoleon battery had obliged the besiegers again to withdraw their battering guns within the horn-work, and the attempt to burn the White Church was relinquished, but the gallery against San Roman was continued. In this state things remained for several days with little change, save that the French, maugre the musketry from the nearest zigzag trench, had scarped eight feet at the top of the new breach and formed a small trench at the back.

On the 15th, the battery in the horn-work was again armed, and the guns pointed to breach the wall of the Napoleon battery; they were, however, overmatched and silenced in three quarters of an hour, and the embrasures were once more altered, that the guns might bear on the breach in the second line. Some slight works and counter-works were also made on different points, but the besiegers were principally occupied repairing the mischief done by the rain, and in pushing the gallery under San Roman, where the French were now distinctly heard talking in the church, wherefore the mine there was formed and loaded with nine hundred pounds of powder.

On the 17th, the battery of the horn-work being renewed, the fire of the eighteen-pounders cleared away the enemy's temporary defences at the breach, the howitzers damaged the rampart on each side, and a small mine was sprung on the extreme right of the lower parallel, with a view to take possession of a cavalier or mound which the French had raised there, and from which they had killed many men in the trenches; it was successful, and a lodgement was effected, but the enemy soon returned in force and obliged the besiegers to abandon it again. However, on the 18th, the new breach was rendered practicable, and Wellington ordered it to be stormed. The explosion of the mine under San Roman was to be the signal; that church was also to be assaulted; and at the same time a third detachment was to escalate the works in front of the ancient breach, and thus connect the attacks.

FIFTH ASSAULT.

At half-past four o'clock, the springing of the mine at San Roman broke down a terrace in front of that building, yet with little injury to the church itself; the latter was, however, resolutely attacked by colonel Browne, at the head of some Spanish and Portuguese troops, and though the enemy sprung a countermine, which brought the building down, the assailants lodged themselves in the ruins. Meanwhile two hundred of the foot-guards, with strong supports, poured through the old breach in the first line and escalated the second line, beyond which, in the open ground between the second and third lines, they were encountered by the French, and a sharp musketry fight commenced. At the same time a like number of the German legion, under major Wurmb, similarly supported, stormed the new breach on the left of the guards so vigorously that it was carried in a moment, and some men, mounting the hill above, actually gained the third line. Unhappily, at neither of these assaults did the supports follow closely, and the Germans being cramped on their left by the enemy's stockade, extended by their right towards the guards, and at that critical moment, Dubreton, who held his reserves well in hand, came dashing like a torrent from the upper ground, and in an instant cleared the breaches. Wurmb and many other brave men fell, and then the French, gathering round the guards, who were still unsupported, forced them beyond the outer line. More than two hundred men and officers were killed or wounded in this combat, and the next night the enemy recovered San Roman by a sally.

The siege was thus virtually terminated, for though the French were beaten out of St. Roman again, and a gallery was opened from that church against the second line; and though two twenty-four pounders, sent from Santander by sir Home Popham, had passed Reynosa on their way to Burgos, these were mere demonstrations. It is now time to narrate the different contemporary events

which obliged the English general, with a victorious army, to abandon the siege of a third-rate fortress, strong in nothing but the skill and bravery of the governor and his gallant soldiers.

CHAPTER IV.

State of the war in various parts of Spain—Joseph's distress for money—Massena declines the command of the army of Portugal—Caffarelli joins that army—Reinforcements come from France—Mischiefs occasioned by the English newspapers—Souham takes the command—Operations of the partidas—Hill reaches Toledo—Souham advances to relieve the castle of Burgos—Skirmish at Monasterio—Wellington takes a position of battle in front of Burgos—Second skirmish—Wellington weak in artillery—Negligence of the British government on that head—The relative situation of the belligerents—Wellington offered the chief command of the Spanish armies—His reasons for accepting it—Contumacious conduct of Ballesteros—He is arrested and sent to Ceuta—Suchet and Jourdan refuse the command of the army of the south—Soult reduces Chinchilla—The king communicates with Souham—Hill communicates with Wellington—Retreat from Burgos—Combat of Vente de Pozo—Drunkness at Torquemada—Combat on the Carion—Wellington retires behind the Pisuerga—Disorders in the rear of the army—Souham skirmishes at the bridge of Cabegon—Wellington orders Hill to retreat from the Tagus to the Adaja—Souham fails to force the bridges of Valladolid and Simancas—The French captain Guingret swims the Duero and surprises the bridge of Tordesillas—Wellington retires behind the Duero—Makes a rapid movement to gain a position in front of the bridge of Tordesillas, and destroys the bridges of Toro and Zamora, which arrests the march of the French.

WHEN king Joseph retreated to Valencia he earnestly demanded a reinforcement of forty thousand men from France, and, more earnestly, money. Three millions of francs he obtained from Suchet, yet his distress was greater even than that of the allies, and Wellington at one time supposed that this alone would drive the French from the Peninsula. The Anglo-Portuguese soldiers had not received pay for six months, but the French armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal, were a whole year behind-hand; and the salaries of the ministers and civil servants of the court were two years in arrears. Suchet's army, the only one which depended entirely on the country, was, by that marshal's excellent management, regularly paid, and the effect on its discipline was conformable; his troops refrained from plunder themselves, and repressed some excesses of Joseph's and Soult's soldiers so vigorously as to come to blows in defence of the inhabitants. And thus it will ever be, since paid soldiers only may be kept under discipline. Soldiers without money must become robbers. Napoleon knew the king's necessity to be extreme, but the war with Russia had so absorbed the resources of France that little money, and only twenty thousand men, principally conscripts, could be sent to Spain.

The army of Portugal, at the moment when the siege of the castle commenced, had been quartered between Vittoria and Burgos; that is to say, at Pancorbo and along the Ebro as far as Logroña, an advanced guard only remaining at Briviesca; on this line they were recruited and reorganized, and Massena was appointed with full powers to command in the northern provinces. A fine opportunity to revenge his own retreat from Torres Vedras was thus furnished to the old warrior; but whether he doubted the issue of affairs, or was really tamed by age, he pleaded illness, and sent general Souham to the army of Portugal. Then arose contentions, for Marmont had designated Clauzel as the fittest to lead, Massena insisted that Souham was the abler general, and the king desired to appoint Drouet. Clauzel's abilities were certainly not inferior to those of

any French general, and to more perfect acquaintance with the theatre of war, he added a better knowledge of the enemy he had to contend with; he was also more known to his own soldiers, and had gained their confidence by his recent operations, no mean considerations in such a matter. However, Souham was appointed.

Caffarelli anxious to succour the castle of Burgos, which belonged to his command, had united at Vittoria a thousand cavalry, sixteen guns, and eight thousand infantry, of which three thousand were of the young guard. The army of Portugal, reinforced from France with twelve thousand men, had thirty-five thousand present under arms, reorganized in six divisions, and, by Clauzel's care, its former excellent discipline had been restored. Thus forty-four thousand good troops were, in the beginning of October, ready to succour the castle of Burgos; but the generals, although anxious to effect that object, awaited first the arrival of Souham, and then news from the king, with whose operations it was essential to combine their own. They had no direct tidings from him, because the lines of correspondence were so circuitous, and so beset by the partidas, that the most speedy as well as certain mode of communication, was through the minister of war at Paris; and that functionary found the information, best suited to his purpose, in the English newspapers. For the latter, while deceiving the British public by accounts of battles which were never fought, victories which were never gained, enthusiasm and vigour which never existed, did, with most accurate assiduity, enlighten the enemy upon the numbers, situation, movements, and reinforcements of the allies.

Souham arrived the 3rd of October with the last of the reinforcements from France, but he imagined that lord Wellington had sixty thousand troops around Burgos, exclusive of the partidas, and that three divisions were marching from Madrid to his aid; whereas none were coming from that capital, and little more than thirty thousand were present under arms round Burgos, eleven thousand being Gallicians, scarcely so good as the partidas. Wellington's real strength was in his Anglo-Portuguese, then not twenty thousand, for besides those killed or wounded at the siege, the sick had gone to the rear faster than the recovered men came up. Some unattached regiments and descorts were, indeed, about Segovia, and other points north of the Guadarama, and a reinforcement of five thousand men had been sent from England in September; but the former belonged to Hill's army, and of the latter, the life-guards and blues had gone to Lisbon. Hence a regiment of foot guards, and some detachments for the line, in all about three thousand, were the only available force in the rear.

During the first part of the siege, the English general seeing the French scattered along the Ebro, and only reinforced by conscripts, did not fear any interruption, and the less so, that sir Home Popham was again menacing the coast line. Even now, when the French were beginning to concentrate their troops, he cared little for them, and was resolved to give battle; for he thought that Popham and the guerillas would keep Caffarelli employed, and he felt himself a match for the army of Portugal. Nor were the partidas inactive on any point, and their successes, though small in themselves, were exceedingly harassing to the enemy.

Mina having obtained two or three thousand stand of English arms had re-entered Aragon and dominated on the left bank of the Ebro, while Duran, with four thousand men, operated uncontrolled on the right bank. The Empecinado, Villa Campa, and

Bassecour descended from Cuenca, the first against Requeña, the others against Albacete. The Frayle interrupted the communications between Valencia and Tortosa. Saornil, Cuesta, Firmin, and others, were in La Mancha and Estremadura, Juan Palarea, called the Medico, was near Segovia, and though Marquinez had been murdered by one of his own men, his partida and that of Julian Sanchez acted as regular troops with Wellington's army. Meanwhile sir Home Popham, in conjunction with Mendizabel, Porlier, and Renovales, who had gathered all the minor partidas under their banners, assailed Gueteria, but unsuccessfully; for on the 30th of September, the Spanish chiefs were driven away, and Popham lost some guns which had been landed. About the same time the Empecinado being defeated at Requeña, retired to Cuenca, yet he failed not from thence to infest the French quarters.

Duran, when Soria was abandoned, fell upon Calatayud, but was defeated by Severoli, who withdrew the garrison. Then the Spanish chief attacked the castle of Almunia, which was only one march from Zaragoza, and when Severoli succoured this place also, and dismantled the castle, Duran attacked Borja, between Tudela and Zaragoza, and took it before Severoli could come up. Thus Zaragoza was gradually deprived of its out-posts, on the right of the Ebro; on the left, Mina hovered close to the gates, and his lieutenant, Chaplangara, meeting near Ayerbe, with three hundred Italians, killed forty, and would have destroyed the whole but for the timely succour of some mounted gens-d'armes. At last Reille being undeceived as to Wellington's march, restored the smaller posts which he had abandoned, and Suchet ordered the castle of Almunia to be refitted, but during these events, Bassecour and Villa Campa united to infest Joseph's quarters about Albacete.

Soult's march from Andalusia and his junction with the king, has been described; but while he was yet at Grenada, Hill, leaving three Portuguese regiments of infantry and one of cavalry at Almendralejo and Truxillo, to protect his line of supply, had marched to cross the Tagus at Almaraz, and Arzobispo. He entered Toledo the 28th of September, and the same day Elío took a small French garrison left in Consuegra. Hill soon after occupied a line from Toledo to Aranjuez, where he was joined by the fourth division, Victor Alten's cavalry, and the detachments quartered about Ildefonso and Segovia. On the 8th, hearing of Soult's arrival at Hellin, he pushed his cavalry to Belmonte on the San Clemente road, and here in La Mancha as in Old Castile, the stories of French devastation were belied by the abundance of provisions.

Bassecour, Villa Campa, and the Empecinado, now united on the road leading from Cuenca to Valencia, while the Medico and other chiefs gathered in the Toledo mountains. In this manner the allies extended from Toledo on the right, by Belmonte, Cuenca, and Calatayud to near Jacca on the left, and were in military communication with the coast; for Caffarelli's disposable force was now concentrated to relieve Burgos, and Mina had free intercourse with Mendizabel and Renovales, and with Popham's fleet. But the French line of correspondence between the armies in the eastern and northern provinces, was so interrupted that the English newspapers became their surest, quickest, and most accurate channels of intelligence.

Souham, who over-rated the force of his adversary, and feared a defeat as being himself the only barrier left between Wellington and France, was at first so far from meditating an advance, that he expected and dreaded an attack from the allies; and as the want

of provisions would not let him concentrate his army permanently near Monasterio, his dispositions were made to fight on the Ebro. The minister of war had even desired him to detach a division against the partidas. But when by the English newspapers, and other information sent from Paris, he learned that Soult was in march from Grenada,—that the king intended to move upon Madrid,—that no English troops had left that capital to join Wellington,—that the army of the latter was not very numerous, and that the castle of Burgos was sorely pressed, he called up Caffarelli's troops from Vittoria, concentrated his own at Briviesca, and resolved to raise the siege.

On the 13th, a skirmish took place on the stream beyond Monasterio, where captain Perse of the sixteenth dragoons was twice forced from the bridge and twice recovered it in the most gallant manner, maintaining his post until colonel F. Ponsonby, who commanded the reserves, arrived. Ponsonby and Perse were both wounded, and this demonstration was followed by various others until the evening of the 18th, when the whole French army was united, and the advanced guard captured a picquet of the Brunswickers which, contrary to orders, had remained in St. Olalla. This sudden movement apparently prevented Wellington from occupying the position of Monasterio, his out-posts fell back, on the 19th, to Quintanapala and Olmos, and on the ridges behind those places he drew up his army in order of battle. The right was at Ibeas on the Arlanzan; the centre at Riobena and Majarradas on the main road behind Olmos; the left was thrown back near Soto Pallacio, and rested on a small river.

The 20th, Maucune, with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, drove the allies from Quintanapala, but Olmos was successfully defended by the Chasseurs Britanniques, and Maucune, having no supports, was immediately outflanked on the right and forced back to Monasterio, by two divisions under sir Edward Paget. There were now in position, including Pack's Portuguese, which blockaded the castle, about thirty-three thousand men under arms, namely, twenty-one thousand Anglo-Portuguese infantry and cavalry, eleven thousand Gallicians, and the horsemen of Marquinez and Julian Sanchez. Thus, there were four thousand troopers, but only two thousand six hundred of these were British and German, and the Spanish horsemen, regular or irregular, could scarcely be counted in the line of battle. The number of guns and howitzers was only forty-two, including twelve Spanish pieces, extremely ill equipped and scant of ammunition.

Lord Wellington had long felt the want of artillery, and had sent a memoir upon the subject to the British government, in the beginning of the year, yet his ordnance establishment had not been augmented, hence his difficulties during the siege; and in the field, instead of ninety British and Portuguese cannon, which was the just complement for his army, he had now only fifty serviceable pieces, of which twenty-four were with general Hill; and all were British, for the Portuguese artillery had, from the abuses and the poverty of their government, entirely melted away. Now the French had, as I have before stated, forty-four thousand men, of which nearly five thousand were cavalry, and they had more than sixty guns, a matter of no small importance; for besides the actual power of artillery in an action, soldiers are excited when the noise is greatest on their side. Wellington stood, therefore, at disadvantage in numbers, composition, and real strength. In his rear was the castle, and the river Arlanzan, the fords and bridges of which were commanded by the guns

of the fortress; his generals of division, Paget excepted, were not of any marked ability, his troops were somewhat desponding, and deteriorated in discipline. His situation was therefore dangerous, and critical; a victory could scarcely be expected, and a defeat would have been destructive; he should not have provoked a battle, nor would he have done so, had he known that Caffarelli's troops were united to Souham's.

On the other hand, Souham should by all means have forced on an action, because his ground was strong, his retreat open, his army powerful and compact, his soldiers full of confidence, his lieutenants, Clauzel, Maucune, and Foy, men of distinguished talents, able to second, and able to succeed him in the chief command. The chances of victory and the profit to be derived were great, the chances of defeat, and the dangers to be incurred comparatively small. And it was thus indeed that he judged the matter himself, for Maucune's advance was intended to be the prelude to a great battle, and the English general, as we have seen, was willing to stand the trial. But generals are not absolute masters of events, and as the extraneous influence which restrained both sides, on this occasion, came from afar, it was fitting to show how, in war, movements, distant, and apparently unconnected with those immediately under a general's eye, will break his measures, and make him appear undecided or foolish, when in truth he is both wise and firm.

While Wellington was still engaged with the siege, the cortes made him commander of all the Spanish armies. He had before refused this responsible situation, but the circumstances were now changed, for the Spaniards, having lost nearly all their cavalry and guns in the course of the war, could not safely act, except in connexion with the Anglo-Portuguese forces, and it was absolutely necessary that one head should direct. The English general therefore demanded leave of his own government to accept the offer, although he observed, that the Spanish troops were not at all improved in their discipline, their equipments, or their military spirit; but he thought that conjoined with the British they might behave well, and so escape any more of those terrible disasters which had heretofore overwhelmed the country and nearly brought the war to a conclusion. He was willing to save the dignity of the Spanish government, by leaving it a certain body of men wherewith to operate after its own plans; but that he might exercise his own power efficiently, and to the profit of the troops under himself, he desired that the English government would vigorously insist upon the strict application of the subsidy to the payment of the Spanish soldiers acting with the British army, otherwise the care of the Spanish troops, he said, would only cramp his own operations.

In his reply to the cortes, his acceptance of the offer was rendered dependent upon the assent of his own government; and he was careful to guard himself from a danger, not unlikely to arise, namely, that the cortes, when he should finally accept the offer, in virtue of that acceptance assume the right of directing the whole operations of the war. The intermediate want of power to move the Spanish armies, he judged of little consequence, because hitherto his suggestions having been cheerfully attended to by the Spanish chiefs, he had no reason to expect any change in that particular, but there he was grievously mistaken.

Previous to this offer the Spanish government had, at his desire, directed Ballesteros to cross the Morena, and place himself at Alcaraz and in support

of the Chinchilla fort, where joined by Cruz Murgeon, by Elio, and by the partidas, he would have had a corps of thirty thousand men, would have been supported by Hill's army, and, having the mountains behind him for a retreat, could have safely menaced the enemy's flank, and delayed the march against Madrid, or at least have obliged the king to leave a strong corps of observation to watch him. But Ballesteros, swelling with arrogant folly, never moved from Grenada, and when he found that Wellington was created generalissimo, he published a manifesto appealing to the Spanish pride against the degradation of serving under a foreigner; he thus sacrificed to his own spleen the welfare of his country, and with a result he little expected; for while he judged himself a man to sway the destinies of Spain, he suddenly found himself a criminal and nothing more. The cortes caused him to be arrested in the midst of his soldiers, who, indifferent to his fate, suffered him to be sent a prisoner to Ceuta. The count of Abisbal was then declared captain general of Andalusia, and the duke del Parque was appointed to command Ballesteros' army, which general Verues immediately led by Jaen towards La Mancha, but Soult was then on the Tormes.

That marshal united with the king on the 3d of October. His troops required rest, his numerous sick were to be sent to the Valencian hospitals, and his first interview with Joseph was of a warm nature, for each had his griefs and passions to declare. Finally the monarch yielded to the superior mental power of his opponent and resolved to profit from his great military capacity, yet reluctantly and more from prudence than liking; for the duke of Feltre, minister of war at Paris, although secretly an enemy of Soult, and either believing, or pretending to believe in the foolish charges of disorderly ambition made against that commander, opposed any decided exercise of the king's authority until the emperor's will was known: yet this would not have restrained the king if the marshals Jourdan and Suchet had not each declined accepting the duke of Dalmatia's command when Joseph offered it to them.

Soult's first operation was to reduce Chinchilla, a well-constructed fort, which, being in the midst of his quarters, commanded the great roads so as to oblige his army to move under its fire or avoid it by circuitous routes. A vigorous defence was expected, but on the 6th it fell, after a few hours' attack; for a thunder-storm suddenly arising in a clear sky had discharged itself upon the fort, and killed the governor and many other persons, whereupon the garrison, influenced, it is said, by a superstitious fear, surrendered. This was the first bitter fruit of Ballesteros' disobedience, for neither could Soult have taken Chinchilla, nor scattered his troops, as he did, at Albacete, Almanza, Yecla, and Hellin, if thirty thousand Spaniards had been posted between Alcaraz and Chinchilla, and supported by thirty thousand Anglo-Portuguese at Toledo under Hill. These extended quarters were however essential for the feeding of the French general's numbers, and now, covered by the fort of Chinchilla, his troops were well lodged, his great convoys of sick and maimed men, his Spanish families, and other impediments, safely and leisurely sent to Valencia, while his cavalry, scouring the country of La Mancha in advance, obliged Bassecour and Villa Campa to fall back upon Cuenca.

The detail of the operations which followed, belongs to another place. It will suffice to say here, that the king, being at the head of more than seventy thousand men, was enabled without risking Valencia to advance towards the Tagus, having previously

sent Souham a specific order to combine his movements in co-operation, but strictly to avoid fighting. General Hill also finding himself threatened by such powerful forces, and reduced by Ballesteros' defection to a simple defence of the Tagus, at a moment when that river was becoming fordable in all places, gave notice of his situation to lord Wellington. Joseph's letter was dispatched on the 1st, and six others followed in succession day by day, yet the last carried by colonel Lucotte, an officer of the royal staff, first reached Souham; the advantages derived from the allies' central position, and from the partidas, were here made manifest; for Hill's letter, though only dispatched the 17th, reached Wellington at the same moment that Joseph's reached Souham. The latter general was thus forced to relinquish his design of fighting on the 20th; nevertheless having but four days' provisions left, he designed, when those should be consumed, to attack, notwithstanding the king's prohibition, if Wellington should still confront him. But the English general considering that his own army, already in a very critical situation, would be quite isolated if the king should, as was most probable, force the allies from the Tagus, now resolved, though with a bitter pang, to raise the siege and retreat so far as would enable him to secure his junction with Hill.

While the armies were in presence some fighting had taken place at Burgos, Dubreton had again obtained possession of the ruins of the church of San Roman and was driven away next morning; and now in pursuance of Wellington's determination to retreat, mines of destruction were formed in the horn-work by the besiegers, and the guns and stores were removed from the batteries to the parc at Villa Toro. But the greatest part of the draught animals had been sent to Reynosa, to meet the powder and artillery coming from Santander, and hence, the eighteen-pounders could not be carried off, nor, from some error, were the mines of destruction exploded. The rest of the stores and the howitzers were put in march by the road of Villaton and Frandovinez for Celada del Camino. Thus the siege was raised, after five assaults, several sallies and thirty-three days of investment, during which the besiegers lost more than two thousand men and the besieged six hundred in killed or wounded; the latter had also suffered severely, from continual labour, want of water, and bad weather, for the fortress was too small to afford shelter for the garrison, and the greater part bivouacked between the lines of defence.

RETREAT FROM BURGOS.

This operation was commenced on the night of the 21st, by a measure of great nicety and boldness, for the road, divaricating at Gamonal, led by Villatoro to the bridge of Villaton on the one hand, and the bridge of Burgos on the other, and Wellington chose the latter, which was the shortest, though it passed the Arlanzan river close under the guns of the castle. The army quitted the position after dark without being observed, and having the artillery-wheels muffled with straw, defiled over the bridge of Burgos with such silence and celerity, that Dubreton, watchful and suspicious as he was, knew nothing of their march until the partidas, failing in nerve, commenced galloping; then he poured a destructive fire down, but soon lost the range. By this delicate operation the infantry gained Cellada del Camino and Hormillas that night, but the light cavalry halted at Estepar and the bridge of Villa Baniel. Souham, who did not discover the retreat until late in the evening of the 22d, was therefore fain to follow, and by a forced march, to overtake the

allies, whereas, if Wellington, to avoid the fire of the castle, had gone by Villaton, and Frandovinez, the French might have forestalled him at Cellada del Camino.

The 23d, the infantry renewing their march, crossed the Pisuerga, at Cordovillas, and Torquemada, a little above and below its junction with the Arlanzan; but while the main body made this long march, the French having passed Burgos in the night of the 22d, vigorously attacked the allies' rear-guard. This was composed of the cavalry and some horse-artillery, commanded by Norman Ramsay and major Downman; of two battalions of Germans under Colin Halket; and of the partidas of Marquez and Sanchez, the latter being on the left of the Arlanzan, and the whole under the command of sir Stapleton Cotton. The piquets of light cavalry were vigorously driven from the bridge of Baniel as early as seven o'clock in the morning; but they rallied upon their reserves and gained the Hormaza stream, which was disputed for some time, and a charge made by captain Perse of the sixteenth dragoons, was of distinguished bravery. However, the French cavalry finally forced the passage, and the British retiring behind Cellada Camino, took post in a large plain. On their left was a range of hills, the summit of which was occupied by the partida of Marquez, and on their right was the Arlanzan, beyond which Julian Sanchez was posted. Across the middle of the plain run a marshy rivulet cutting the main road, and only passable by a little bridge near a house called the Venta de Pozo, and half way between this stream and Cellada there was a broad ditch with a second bridge in front of a small village. Cotton immediately retired over the marshy stream, leaving Anson's horsemen and Halket's infantry as a rear-guard beyond the ditch; and Anson, to cover his own passage of that obstacle, left the eleventh dragoons and the guns at Cellada Camino, which was situated on a gentle eminence.

COMBAT OF VENTA DE POZO.

When the French approached Cellada, major Money of the eleventh, who was in advance, galloping out from the left of the village at the head of two squadrons, overturned their leading horsemen, and the artillery plied them briskly with shot, but the main body advancing at a trot along the road soon outflanked the British, and obliged Money's squadrons to rejoin the rest of the regiment while the guns went on beyond the bridge of Venta de Pozo. Meanwhile the French general Curto with a brigade of hussars ascended the hills on the left, and being followed by Boyer's dragoons, put Marquez's partida to flight; but a deep ravine run along the foot of these hills, next the plain, it could only be passed at certain places, and towards the first of these the partidas galloped, closely chased by the hussars, at the moment when the leading French squadrons on the plain were forming in front of Cellada to attack the eleventh regiment. The latter charged and drove the first line upon the second, but then both lines coming forward together, the British were pushed precipitately to the ditch, and got over by the bridge with some difficulty, though with little loss, being covered by the fire of Halket's infantry which was in the little village behind the bridge.

The left flank of this new line was already turned by the hussars on the hills, wherefore Anson fell back covered by the sixteenth dragoons, and in good order, with design to cross the second bridge at Venta de Pozo; during this movement Marquez's partida came pouring down from the hills in full flight, closely pursued by the French hussars, who

mixed with the fugitives, and the whole mass fell upon the flank of the sixteenth dragoons; and at the same moment, these last were also charged by the enemy's dragoons, who had followed them over the ditch. The commander of the partida was wounded, colonel Pelly, with another officer, and thirty men of the sixteenth, fell into the enemy's hands, and all were driven in confusion upon the reserves. But while the French were reforming their scattered squadrons after this charge, Anson got his people over the bridge of Venta de Pozo, and drew up beyond the rivulet, and to the left of the road, on which Halket's battalions and the guns had already taken post, and the heavy German cavalry, an imposing mass, stood in line on the right, and farther in the rear than the artillery.

Hitherto the action had been sustained by the cavalry of the army of Portugal, but now Caffarelli's horsemen, consisting of the lancers of Berg, the fifteenth dragoons, and some squadrons of "*gens d'armes*," all fresh men, came down in line to the rivulet, and finding it impassable, with a quick and daring decision wheeled to their right, and despite of the heavy pounding of the artillery, trotted over the bridge, and again formed line in opposition to the German dragoons, having the stream in their rear. The position was dangerous, but they were full of mettle, and though the Germans, who had let too many come over, charged with a rough shock, and broke the right, the French left had the advantage, and the others rallied; then a close and furious sword contest had place, but the "*gens d'armes*" fought so fiercely that the Germans, maugre their size and courage, lost ground, and finally gave way in disorder. The French followed on the spur, with shrill and eager cries, and Anson's brigade, which was thus outflanked, and threatened on both sides, fell back also, but not happily, for Boyer's dragoons having continued their march by the hills to the village of Balbaces, there crossed the ravine, and came thundering in on the left. Then the British ranks were broken, the regiments got intermixed, and all went to the rear in confusion; finally, however, the Germans, having extricated themselves from their pursuers, turned and formed a fresh line on the left of the road, and the others rallied upon them.

The "*gens d'armes*" and lancers, who had suffered severely from the artillery, as well as in the sword-fight, now halted; but Boyer's dragoons, forming ten squadrons, again came to the charge, and with the more confidence that the allies' ranks appeared still confused and wavering. When within a hundred yards, the German officers rode gallantly out to fight, and their men followed a short way, but the enemy was too powerful, disorder and tumult again ensued, the swiftness of the English horses alone prevented a terrible catastrophe, and though some favourable ground enabled the line to reform once more, it was only to be again broken. However, Wellington, who was present, had placed Halket's infantry and the guns in a position to cover the cavalry, and they remained tranquil until the enemy, in full pursuit after the last charge, came galloping down, and lent their left flank to the infantry; then the power of this arm was made manifest; a tempest of bullets emptied the French saddles by scores, and their hitherto victorious horsemen, after three fruitless attempts to charge, each weaker than the other, reined up and drew off to the hills; the British cavalry, covered by the infantry, made good their retreat to Quintana la Puente, near the Pisuergra, and the bivouacs of the enemy were established at Villadriego. The loss in this combat was very considerable

on both sides; the French suffered most, but they took a colonel and seventy other prisoners, and they had, before the fight, also captured a small commissariat store near Burgos.

While the rear-guard was thus engaged, drunkenness and insubordination, the usual concomitants of an English retreat, were exhibited at Torquemada, where the well-stored wine-vaults became the prey of the soldiery: it is said that twelve thousand men were to be seen at one time in a state of helpless inebriety. This commencement was bad, and the English general, who had now retreated some fifty miles, seeing the enemy so hot and menacing in pursuit, judged it fitting to check his course; for though the arrangements were surprisingly well combined, the means of transport were so scanty, and the weather so bad, that the convoys of sick and wounded were still on the wrong side of the Duero. Wherefore, having with a short march crossed the Carion river on the 24th, at its confluence with the Pisuergra, he turned and halted behind it.

Here he was joined by a regiment of the guards, and by detachments coming from Coruña, and his position, extending from Villa Muriel to Dueñas, below the meeting of the waters, was strong. The troops occupied a range of hills, lofty, yet descending with an easy sweep to the Carion; that river covered the front, and the Pisuergra did the same by the right wing. A detachment had been left to destroy the bridge of Baños, on the Pisuergra; colonel Campbell, with a battalion of the royals, was sent to aid the Spaniards in destroying the bridges at Palencia; and in Wellington's immediate front, some houses and convents beyond the rivers furnished good posts to cover the destruction of the bridges of Muriel and San Isidro on the Carion, and that of Dueñas on the Pisuergra.

Souham, excited by his success on the 23d, followed from Villadriego early on the 24th, and having cannonaded the rear-guard at Torquemada, passed the Pisuergra. He immediately directed Foy's division upon Palencia, and ordered Maucune, with the advanced guard, to pursue the allies to the bridges of Baños, Isidro, and Muriel; but he halted himself at Magoz, and if fame does not lie, because the number of French drunkards at Torquemada were even more numerous than those of the British army.

COMBAT ON THE CARION.

Before the enemy appeared, the summits of the hills were crowned by the allies, all the bridges were mined, and that of San Isidro was strongly protected by a convent which was filled with troops. The left of the position was equally strong, yet general Oswald, who had just arrived from England and taken the command of the fifth division on the instant, overlooked the advantages to be derived from the dry bed of a canal with high banks, which, on his side, run parallel with the Carion, and he had not occupied the village of Muriel in sufficient strength. In this state of affairs Foy reached Palencia, where, according to some French writers, a treacherous attempt was made, under cover of a parley, to kill him; he, however, drove the allies with some loss from the town, and in such haste that all the bridges were abandoned in a perfect condition, and the French cavalry, crossing the river and spreading abroad, gathered up both baggage and prisoners.

This untoward event obliged Wellington to throw back his left, composed of the fifth division and the Spaniards, at Muriel, thus offering two fronts, the one facing Palencia, the other the Carion. Oswald's error then became manifest; for Maucune having dispersed the eighth *caçadores*, who were defending

a ford between Muriel and San Isidro, fell with a strong body of infantry and guns upon the allies at Muriel, and this at the moment when the mine having been exploded, the party covering the bridge were passing the broken arch by means of ladders. The play of the mine, which was effectual, checked the advance of the French for an instant, but suddenly a horseman, darting out at full speed from the column, rode down under a flight of bullets to the bridge, calling out that he was a deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm made by the explosion, and then violently checking his foaming horse, held up his hands, exclaiming that he was a lost man, and with hurried accents asked if there was no ford near. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one a little way off, and the gallant fellow, having looked earnestly for a few moments, as if to fix the exact point, wheeled his horse round, kissed his hand in derision, and, bending over his saddle-bow, dashed back to his own comrades, amidst showers of shot, and shouts of laughter from both sides. The next moment Maucune's column, covered by a concentrated fire of guns, passed the river at the ford thus discovered, made some prisoners in the village, and lined the dry bed of the canal.

Lord Wellington, who came up at this instant, immediately turned some guns upon the enemy, and desired that the village and canal might be retaken. Oswald thought that they could not be held; yet Wellington, whose retreat was endangered by the presence of the enemy on that side of the river, was peremptory; he ordered one brigade, under general Barnes, to attack the main body, while another brigade, under general Pringle, cleared the canal, and he strengthened the left with the Spanish troops and Brunswickers. A very sharp fire of artillery and musketry ensued, and the allies suffered some loss, especially by cannon-shot, which, from the other side of the river, plumped into the reserves. The Spaniards, unequal to any regular movement, got into confusion, and were falling back, when their fiery countryman, Miguel Alava, running to their head, with exhortation and example, for though wounded he would not retire, urged them forward to the fight; finally the enemy was driven over the river, the village was reoccupied in force, and the canal was lined by the allied troops. During these events at Villa Muriel, other troops attempted without success to seize the bridge of San Isidro, and the mine was exploded; but they were more fortunate at the bridge of Baños, on the Pisuerga, for the mine there failed, and the French cavalry, galloping over, made both the working and covering party prisoners.

The strength of the position was now sapped, for Souham could assemble his army on the allies' left, by Palencia, and force them to an action with their back upon the Pisuerga, or he could pass that river on his own left, and forestall them on the Duero, at Tudela. If Wellington pushed his army over the Pisuerga by the bridge of Dueñas, Souham, having the initial movement, might be first on the ground, and could attack the heads of the allied columns, while Foy's division came down on the rear. If Wellington, by a rapid movement along the right bank of the Pisuerga, endeavoured to cross at Cabezon, which was the next bridge in his rear, and so gain the Duero, Souham, by moving along the left bank, might fall upon him while in march to the Duero, and hampered between that river, the Pisuerga, and the Esquevilla. An action under such circumstances would have been formidable, and the English general once cut off from the Duero, must have retired through Valladolid and Simancas to

Tordesillas or Toro, giving up his communications with Hill. In this critical state of affairs Wellington made no delay. He kept good watch upon the left of the Pisuerga, and knowing that the ground there was rugged, and the roads narrow and bad, while on the right bank they were good and wide, sent his baggage in the night to Valladolid, and withdrawing the troops before day-break on the 26th, made a clean march of sixteen miles to Cabezon, where he passed to the left of the Pisuerga, and barricaded and mined the bridge. Then sending a detachment to hold the bridge of Tudela, on the Duero, behind him, he caused the seventh division, under lord Dalhousie, to secure the bridges of Valladolid, Simancas, and Tordesillas. His retreat behind the Duero, which river was now in full water, being thus assured, he again halted, partly because the ground was favourable, partly to give the commissary general Kennedy time for some indispensable arrangements.

This functionary, who had gone to England sick in the latter end of 1811, and had returned to the army only the day before the siege of Burgos was raised, in passing from Lisbon by Badajos to Madrid, and thence to Burgos, discovered that the inexperience of the gentleman who conducted the department during his absence, had been productive of some serious errors. The magazines established between Lisbon and Badajos, and from thence by Almaraz to the valley of the Tagus, for the supply of the army in Madrid, had not been removed again when the retreat commenced, and Soult would have found them full, if his march had been made rapidly on that side; on the other hand, the magazines on the line of operations, between Lisbon and Salamanca, were nearly empty. Kennedy had, therefore, the double task on hand to remove the magazines from the south side of the Tagus, and to bring up stores upon the line of the present retreat; and his dispositions were not yet completed when Wellington desired him to take measures for the removal of the sick and wounded, and every other incumbrance, from Salamanca, promising to hold his actual position on the Pisuerga until the operation was effected. Now, there was sufficient means of transport for the occasion, but the negligence of many medical and escorting officers conducting the convoys of sick to the rear, and the consequent bad conduct of the soldiers, for where the officers are careless the soldiers will be licentious, produced the worst effects. Such outrages were perpetrated on the inhabitants along the whole line of march, that terror was every where predominant, and the ill-used drivers and muleteers deserted, some with, some without their cattle, by hundreds. Hence Kennedy's operation in some measure failed, the greatest distress was incurred, and the commissariat lost nearly the whole of the animals and carriages employed; the villages were abandoned, and the under-commissaries were bewildered, or paralyzed, by the terrible disorder thus spread along the line of communication.

Souham having repaired the bridges on the Carion, resumed the pursuit on the 26th, by the right of the Pisuerga, being deterred, probably, from moving to the left bank, by the rugged nature of the ground, and by the king's orders not to risk a serious action. In the morning of the 27th, his whole army was collected in front of Cabezon, but he contented himself with a cannonade and a display of his force; the former cost the allies colonel Robe of the artillery, a practised officer and a worthy man; the latter enabled the English general, for the first time, to discover the numbers he had to contend with, and they convinced him that he could hold neither the Pisu-

erga nor the Duero permanently. However, his object being to gain time, he held his position, and when the French, leaving a division in front of Cabezon, extended their right, by Cigales and Valladolid, to Simancas, he caused the bridges at the two latter places to be destroyed in succession.

Congratulating himself that he had not fought in front of Burgos with so powerful an army, Wellington now resolved to retire behind the Duero and finally, if pressed, behind the Tormes. But as the troops on the Tagus would then be exposed to a flank attack, similar to that which the siege of Burgos had been raised to avoid on his own part; and as this would be more certain if any ill fortune befell the troops on the Duero, he ordered Hill to relinquish the defence of the Tagus at once and retreat, giving him a discretion as to the line, but desiring him, if possible, to come by the Guadarama passes; for he designed, if all went well, to unite on the Adaja river in a central position, intending to keep Souham in check with a part of his army, and with the remainder to fall upon Soult.

On the 28th, Souham, still extending his right, with a view to dislodge the allies by turning their left, endeavoured to force the bridges at Valladolid and Simancas on the Pisuerga, and that of Tordesillas on the Duero. The first was easily defended by the main body of the seventh division, but Halket, an able officer, finding the French strong and eager at the second, destroyed it, and detached the regiment of Brunswick Oels to ruin that of Tordesillas. It was done in time, and a tower behind the ruins was occupied by a detachment while the remainder of the Brunswickers took post in a pine-wood at some distance. The French arrived, and seemed for some time at a loss, but very soon sixty French officers and non-commissioned officers, headed by captain Guingret, a daring man, formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, and then plunged into the water, holding their swords with their teeth, and swimming and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a cannonade they thus crossed this great river, though it was in full and strong water and the weather very cold, and having reached the other side, naked as they were, stormed the tower. The Brunswick regiment then abandoned its position, and these gallant soldiers remained masters of the bridge.

Wellington having heard of the attack at Simancas, and having seen the whole French army in march to its right along the hill beyond the Pisuerga on the evening of the 28th, destroyed the bridges at Valladolid and Cabezon, and crossed the Duero at Tudela and Puente de Duero on the 29th, but scarcely had he effected this operation when intelligence of Guingret's splendid action at Tordesillas reached him. With the instant decision of a great captain he marched by his left, and having reached the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas on the 30th, fronted the enemy and forbade further progress on that point; the bridge was indeed already repaired by the French, but Souham's main body had not yet arrived, and Wellington's menacing position was too significant to be misunderstood. The bridges of Toro and Zamora were now destroyed by detachments, and though the French, spreading along the river bank, commenced repairing the former, the junction with Hill's army was ensured; and the English general, judging that the bridge of Toro could not be restored for several days, even hoped to maintain the line of the Duero permanently, because he expected that Hill, of whose operations it is now time to speak, would be on the Adaja by the 3rd of November.

CHAPTER V.

The king and Soult advance from Valencia to the Tagus—General Hill takes a position of battle—The French pass the Tagus—Skirmish at the Puente Largo—Hill blows up the Retiro and abandons Madrid—Riot in that city—Attachment of the Madrilenos towards the British troops—The hostile armies pass the Guadarama—Souham restores the bridge of Toro—Wellington retreats towards Salamanca and orders Hill to retreat upon Alba de Tormes—The allies take a position of battle behind the Tormes—The Spaniards at Salamanca display a hatred of the British—Instances of their ferocity—Soult cannonades the castle of Alba—The king reorganizes the French armies—Soult and Jourdan propose different plans—Soult's plan adopted—French pass the Tormes—Wellington by a remarkable movement gains the Valmusa river and retreats—Misconduct of the troops—Sir Edward Paget taken prisoner—Combat on the Huebra—Anecdote—Retreat from thence to Ciudad Rodrigo—the armies on both sides take winter cantonments.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TAGUS—RETREAT FROM MADRID.

KING Joseph's first intention was to unite a great part of Suchet's forces as well as Soult's with his own, and Soult, probably influenced by a false report that Ballesteros had actually reached La Mancha, urged this measure. Suchet resisted, observing that Valencia must be defended against the increasing power of the Anglo-Sicilian and Spanish armies at Alicante, and the more so, that until the French army could cross the Tagus and open a new line of communication with Zaragoza, Valencia, would be the only base for the king's operations. Joseph then resolved to incorporate a portion of the army of the south with the army of the centre, giving the command to Drouet, who was to move by the road of Cuenca and Tarancon towards the Tagus; but this arrangement, which seems to have been dictated by a desire to advance Drouet's authority, was displeasing to Soult. He urged that his army, so powerfully constituted, physically and morally, as to be the best in the Peninsula, owed its excellence to its peculiar organization, and it would be dangerous to break that up. Nor was there any good reason for this change; for if Joseph only wished to have a strong body of troops on the Cuenca road, the army of the centre could be reinforced with one or two divisions, and the whole could unite again on the Tagus without injury to the army of the south. It would, however, be better, he said, to incorporate the army of the centre with the army of the south, and march altogether by the road of San Clemente, leaving only a few troops on the Cuenca road, who might be reinforced by Suchet. But if the king's plan arose from a desire to march in person with a large body, he could do so with greater dignity by joining the army of the south, which was to act on the main line of operations. Joseph's reply was a peremptory order to obey or retire to France, and Drouet marched to Cuenca.

Soult's army furnished thirty-five thousand infantry, six thousand excellent cavalry under arms, with seventy-two guns, making with the artillerymen a total of forty-six thousand veteran combatants. The army of the centre, including the king's guards, furnished about twelve thousand, of which two thousand were good cavalry with twelve guns. Thus fifty-eight thousand fighting men, eight thousand being cavalry, with eighty-four pieces of artillery, were put in motion to drive Hill from the Tagus. Joseph's project was to pass that river and operate against Wellington's rear, if he should continue the siege of Burgos; but if he concentrated on the Tagus, Souham was in like manner to operate on his rear by Aranda de Duero, and the Somosierra, sending detachments towards Guadalajara to be met by other detachments coming from the king through Saceda.

don. Finally, if Wellington, as indeed happened, should abandon both Burgos and Madrid, the united French forces were to drive him into Portugal. The conveying of Soult's convoys of sick men to Valencia and other difficulties, retarded the commencement of operations to the king's great discontent, and meanwhile he became very uneasy for his supplies, because the people of La Mancha, still remembering Montbrun's devastations, were flying with their beasts and grain, and from frequent repetition were become exceedingly expert in evading the researches of the foragers. Such, however, is the advantage of discipline and order, that while La Mancha was thus desolated from fear, confidence and tranquillity reigned in Valencia.

However, on the 18th of October, Joseph marched from Requena upon Cuenca, where he found Drouet with a division of Soult's infantry and some cavalry. He then proceeded to Tarancon, which was the only artillery road on that side leading to the Tagus, and during this time Soult marched by San Clemente upon Ocaña and Aranjuez. General Hill immediately sent that notice to lord Wellington which caused the retreat from Burgos, but he was in no fear of the enemy, for he had withdrawn all his outposts and united his whole force behind the Tagus. His right was at Toledo, his left at Fuente Dueñas, and there were Spanish and Portuguese troops in the valley of the Tagus extending as far as Talavera. The Tagus was, however, fordable from its junction with the Jarama near Aranjuez, upwards; and moreover, this part of the line, weak from its extent, could not easily be supported, and the troops guarding it would have been too distant from the point of action if the French should operate against Toledo. Hill therefore drew his left behind the Tajuna, which is a branch of the Jarama, and running nearly parallel to the Tagus. His right occupied very strong ground from Añover to Toledo, he destroyed the bridges at Aranjuez, and securing that below the confluence of the Jarama and Henares, called the Puente Larga, threw one of boats over the former river a little above Bayona. The light division and Elio's troops, forming the extreme left, were directed to march upon Arganda, and the head-quarters were fixed at Cienpозuelos.

The bulk of the troops were thus held in hand, ready to move to any menaced point, and as Skerrit's brigade had just arrived from Cadiz, there was, including the Spanish regulars, forty thousand men in line, and a multitude of partidas were hovering about. The lateral communications were easy and the scouts passing over the bridge of Toledo covered all the country beyond the Tagus. In this state of affairs the bridges at each end of the line furnished the means of sallying upon the flanks of any force attacking the front; the French must have made several marches to force the right, and on the left the Jarama with its marshy banks, and its many confluents, offered several positions, to interpose between the enemy and Madrid.

Drouet passed the Tagus the 29th, at the abandoned fords of Fuente Dueñas and Villa Maurique, and the king, with his guards, repaired to Zara de la Cruz. Meanwhile Soult, whose divisions were coming fast up to Ocaña, restored the bridge of Aranjuez, and passed the Tagus also with his advanced guard. On the 30th, he attacked general Cole who commanded at the Puente Larga with several regiments and some guns, but though the mines failed, and the French attempted to carry the bridge with the bayonet, they were vigorously repulsed by the forty-seventh under colonel Skerrit. After a heavy cannonade and a sharp musketry which cost the al-

lies sixty men, Soult relinquished the attempt and awaited the arrival of his main body. Had the Puente Larga been forced, the fourth division which was at Añover would have been cut off from Madrid, but the weather being thick and rainy, Soult could not discover what supporting force was on the high land of Valdemoro behind the bridge, and was afraid to push forward too fast.

The king, discontented with this cautious mode of proceeding, now designed to operate by Toledo, but during the night the Puente Larga was abandoned, and Soult, being still in doubt of Hill's real object, advised Joseph to unite the army of the centre at Arganda and Chinchon, throwing bridges for retreat at Villa Maurique and Fuente Dueñas as a precaution in case a battle should take place. Hill's movement was however a decided retreat, which would have commenced twenty-four hours sooner but for the failure of the mines and the combat at the Puente Larga. Wellington's orders had reached him at the moment when Soult first appeared on the Tagus, and the affair was so sudden, that the light division, which had just come from Alcala to Arganda to close the left of the position, was obliged, without halting, to return again in the night, the total journey being nearly forty miles.

Wellington, foreseeing that it might be difficult for Hill to obey his instructions, had given him a discretionary power to retire either by the valley of the Tagus, or by the Guadarama; and a position taken up in the former, on the flank of the enemy, would have prevented the king from passing the Guadarama, and at the same time have covered Lisbon; whereas a retreat by the Guadarama exposed Lisbon. Hill, thinking the valley of the Tagus, in that advanced season, would not support the French army, and knowing Wellington to be pressed by superior forces in the north, chose the Guadarama. Wherefore, burning his pontoons, and causing La China and the stores remaining there to be destroyed in the night of the 30th, he retreated by different roads, and united his army on the 31st of October, near Majadahonda. Meanwhile the magazines along the line of communication to Badajos, were, as I have already noticed, in danger if the enemy had detached troops to seize them, neither were the removal and destruction of the stores in Madrid effected without disorders of a singular nature.

The municipality had demanded all the provision remaining there as if they wanted them for the enemy, and when this was refused, they excited a mob to attack the magazines; some firing even took place, and the assistance of the fourth division was required to restore order; a portion of wheat was finally given to the poorest of the people, and Madrid was abandoned. It was affecting to see the earnest and true friendship of the population. Men and women, and children, crowded around the troops bewailing their departure. They moved with them in one vast mass, for more than two miles, and left their houses empty at the very instant when the French cavalry scouts were at the gates on the other side. This emotion was distinct from political feeling, because there was a very strong French party in Madrid; and amongst the causes of wailing the return of the plundering and cruel partidas, unchecked by the presence of the British, was very loudly proclaimed. The "Madrileños" have been stigmatized as a savage and faithless people; the British army found them patient, gentle, generous, and loyal; nor is this fact to be disputed, because of the riot which occurred in the destruction of the magazines, for the provisions had been obtained by requisition from the country around Madrid, under an agreement with the

Spanish government to pay at the end of the war; and it was natural for the people, excited as they were by the authorities, to endeavour to get their own flour back, rather than have it destroyed when they were starving.

With the Anglo-Portuguese troops, marched Penne Villemur, Morillo, and Carlos D'España, and it was Wellington's wish that Elio, Bassecour, and Villa Campa should now throw themselves into the valley of the Tagus, and crossing the bridge of Arzobispo, join Ballesteros' army, now under Virues. A great body of men, including the Portuguese regiments left by Hill in Estremadura, would thus have been placed on the flank of any French army marching upon Lisbon, and if the enemy neglected this line, the Spaniards could operate against Madrid or against Suchet at pleasure. Elio, however, being cut off from Hill by the French advance, remained at the bridge of Auñon, near Sacedon, and was there joined by Villa Campa and the Empecinado.

Soult now brought up his army as quickly as possible to Valdemoro, and his information, as to Hill's real force, was becoming more distinct; but there was also a rumour that Wellington was close at hand with three British divisions, and the French general's movements were consequently cautious, lest he should find himself suddenly engaged in battle before his whole force was collected, for his rear was still at Ocaña, and the army of the centre had not yet passed the Tajüña. This disposition of his troops was probably intentional to prevent the king from fighting, for Soult did not think this a fitting time for a great battle unless upon great advantage. In the disjointed state of their affairs, a defeat would have been more injurious to the French than a victory would have been beneficial; the former would have lost Spain, the latter would not have gained Portugal.

On the 1st of November, the bulk of Soult's army being assembled at Getafé, he sent scouting parties in all directions to feel for the allies, and to ascertain the direction of their march; the next day the army of the centre and that of the south were reunited not far from Madrid, but Hill was then in full retreat for the Guadarama covered by a powerful rear-guard under general Cole.

The 3d, Soult pursued the allies, and the king entering Madrid, placed a garrison in the Retiro for the protection of his court and of the Spanish families attached to his cause; this was a sensible relief, for hitherto in one great convoy they had impeded the movements of the army of the centre. On the 4th, Joseph rejoined Soult at the Guadarama with his guards, which always moved as a separate body; but he had left Palombini beyond the Tagus near Tarancon to scour the roads on the side of Cuencá, and some dragoons being sent towards Huete, were surprised by the partidas, and lost forty men, whereupon Palombini rejoined the army.

General Hill was moving upon Arevalo, slowly followed by the French, when fresh orders from Wellington, founded on new combinations, changed the direction of his march. Souham had repaired the bridge of Toro on the 4th, several days sooner than the English general had expected, and thus when he was keenly watching for the arrival of Hill on the Adaja, that he might suddenly join him and attack Soult, his designs were again baffled; for he dared not make such a movement lest Souham, possessing both Toro and Tordesillas, should fall upon his rear; neither could he bring up Hill to the Duero and attack Souham, because he had no means to pass that river, and meanwhile Soult, moving by the Fontiveros, would reach the Tormes. Seeing then that his

combinations had failed, and his central position no longer available, either for offence or defence, he directed Hill to gain Alba de Tormes at once by the road of Fontiveros, and on the 6th, he fell back himself, from his position in front of the Tordesillas, by Naval del Rey and Pituega to the heights of San Christoval.

Joseph, thinking to prevent Hill's junction with Wellington, had gained Arevalo by the Segovia road on the 5th and 6th; the 8th, Souham's scouts were met with at Medina del Campo, and for the first time, since he had quitted Valencia, the king obtained news of the army of Portugal. One hundred thousand combatants, of which above twelve thousand were cavalry, with a hundred and thirty pieces of artillery, were thus assembled on those plains over which, three months before, Marmont had marched with so much confidence to his own destruction. Soult, then expelled from Andalusia by Marmont's defeat, was now, after having made half the circuit of the Peninsula, come to drive into Portugal, that very army whose victory had driven him from the south; and thus, as Wellington had foreseen and foretold, the acquisition of Andalusia, politically important and useful to the cause, proved injurious to himself at the moment, inasmuch as the French had concentrated a mighty power, from which it required both skill and fortune to escape. Meanwhile the Spanish armies, let loose by this union of all the French troops, kept aloof, or coming to aid, were found a burthen, rather than a help.

On the 7th, Hill's main body passed the Tormes, at Alba, and the bridge there was mined; the light division and Long's cavalry remained on the right bank during the night, but the next day the former also crossed the river. Wellington himself was in the position of San Christoval, and it is curious, that the king, even at this late period, was doubtful if Ballesteros' troops had or had not joined the allied army at Avila. Wellington also was still uncertain of the real numbers of the enemy, but he was desirous to maintain the line of the Tormes permanently, and to give his troops repose. He had made a retreat of two hundred miles; Hill had made one of the same distance besides his march from Estremadura; Skerrit's people had come from Cadiz, and the whole army required rest, for the soldiers, especially those who besieged Burgos, had been in the field, with scarcely an interval of repose, since January; they were bare-footed, and their equipments were spoiled, the cavalry were becoming weak, their horses were out of condition, and the discipline of all was failing.

The excesses committed on the retreat from Burgos have already been touched upon, and during the first day's march from the Tagus to Madrid, some of general Hill's men had not behaved better. Five hundred of the rear-guard under Cole, chiefly of one regiment, finding the inhabitants had fled according to their custom, whichever side was approaching, broke open the houses, plundered and got drunk. A multitude were left in the cellars of Valdemoro, and two hundred and fifty fell into the hands of the enemy. The rest of the retreat being unmolested, was made with more regularity, but the excesses still committed by some of the soldiers were glaring and furnished proof that the moral conduct of a general cannot be fairly judged by following in the wake of a retreating army. On this occasion there was no want of provisions, no hardships to exasperate the men, and yet I, the author of this history, counted on the first day's march from Madrid, seventeen bodies of murdered peasants; by whom killed, or for what, whether by English, or Germans, by Spaniards, or

Portuguese, whether in dispute, in robbery, or in wanton villany, I know not, but their bodies were in the ditches, and a shallow observer might thence have drawn the most false conclusions against the English general and nation.

Another notable thing was the discontent of the veteran troops with the arrangements of the staff officers. For the assembling of the sick men, at the place and time prescribed to form the convoys, was punctually attended to by the regimental officers; not so by the others, nor by the commissaries who had charge to provide the means of transport; hence delay and great suffering to the sick, and the wearing out of the healthy men's strength by waiting, with their packs on, for the negligent. And when the light division was left on the right bank of the Tormes to cover the passage at Alba, a prudent order that all baggage or other impediments, should pass rapidly over the narrow bridge at that place without halting at all on the enemy's side, was, by those charged with the execution, so rigorously interpreted, as to deprive the light division of their ration bullocks and flour mules, at the very moment of distribution; and the tired soldiers, thus absurdly denied their food, had the farther mortification to see a string of commissariat carts deliberately passing their post many hours afterwards. All regimental officers know that the anger and discontent thus created is one of the surest means of ruining the discipline of an army, and it is in these particulars that the value of a good and experienced staff is found.

Lord Wellington's position extended from Christoval to Aldea Lengua on the right bank of the Tormes, and on the left of that river, to the bridge of Alba, where the castle which was on the right bank was garrisoned by Howard's brigade of the second division. Hamilton's Portuguese were on the left bank as a reserve for Howard; the remainder of the second division watched the fords of Huerta and Enciña, and behind them in second line the third and fourth divisions occupied the heights of Calvariza de Ariba. The light division and the Spanish infantry entered Salamanca, the cavalry were disposed beyond the Tormes, covering all the front, and thus posted, the English general desired to bring affairs to the decision of a battle. For the heights of Christoval were strong and compact, the position of the Arapiles on the other side of the Tormes was glorious as well as strong, and the bridge of Salamanca and the fords furnished the power of concentrating on either side of that river by a shorter line than the enemy could move upon.

But while Wellington prepared for a battle, he also looked to a retreat. His sick were sent to the rear, small convoys of provisions were ordered up from Ciudad Rodrigo to certain halting places between that place and Salamanca; the overplus of ammunition in the latter town was destroyed daily by small explosions, and large stores of clothing, of arms and accoutrements, were delivered to the Spanish troops, who were thus completely furnished; one hour after, the English general had the mortification to see them selling their equipments even under his own windows. Indeed Salamanca presented an extraordinary scene, and the Spaniards, civil and military, began to evince hatred of the British. Daily did they attempt to perpetrate murder, and one act of peculiar atrocity merits notice. A horse, led by an English soldier, being frightened, backed against a Spanish officer commanding at a gate, he caused the soldier to be dragged into his guard-house and there bayoneted him in cold blood, and no redress could be had for this or other crimes, save by counter-violence, which was not long withheld. A Span-

ish officer, while wantonly stabbing at a rifleman, was shot dead by the latter; and a British volunteer slew a Spanish officer at the head of his own regiment in a sword fight, the troops of both nations looking on, but here there was nothing dishonourable on either side.

The civil authorities, not less savage, were more insolent than the military, treating every English person with an intolerable arrogance. Even the prince of Orange was like to have lost his life; for upon remonstrating about quarters with the sitting junta, they ordered one of their guards to kill him; and he would have been killed had not Mr. Steele of the forty-third, a bold athletic person, felled the man before he could stab; yet both the prince and his defender were obliged to fly instantly to avoid the soldier's comrades. The exasperation caused by these things was leading to serious mischief when the enemy's movements gave another direction to the soldiers' passions.

On the 9th Long's cavalry had been driven in upon Alba, and on the 10th Soult opened a concentrated fire of eighteen guns against that place. The castle, which crowned a bare and rocky knoll, had been hastily entrenched, and furnished scarcely any shelter from this tempest; for two hours the garrison could only reply with musketry, but finally it was aided by the fire of four pieces from the left bank of the river, and the post was defended until dark, with such vigour that the enemy dared not venture on an assault. During the night general Hamilton reinforced the garrison, repaired the damaged walls, and formed barricades, but the next morning, after a short cannonade and some musketry firing, the enemy withdrew. This combat cost the allies above a hundred men.

On the 11th, the king coming up from Medina del Campo, reorganized his army. That is, he united the army of the centre with the army of the south, placing the whole under Soult, and he removed Souham from the command of the army of Portugal to make way for Drouet. Caffarelli had before this returned to Burgos, with his divisions and guns, and as Souham, besides his losses and stragglers, had placed garrisons in Toro, Tordesillas, Zamora, and Valladolid; and as the king also, had left a garrison in the Retiro, scarcely ninety thousand combatants of all arms were assembled on the Tormes; but twelve thousand were cavalry, nearly all were veteran troops, and they had at least one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. Such a mighty power could not remain idle, for the country was exhausted of provisions, the soldiers were already wanting bread, and the king, eager enough for battle, for he was of a brave spirit and had something of his brother's greatness of soul, sought counsel how to deliver it with most advantage.

Jourdan, with a martial fire unquenched by age, was for bringing affairs to a crisis by the boldest and shortest mode. He had observed that Wellington's position was composed of three parts, namely, the right at Alba; the centre at Calvariza Ariba; the left, separated from the centre by the Tormes, at San Christoval; the whole distance being about fifteen miles. Now the Tormes was still fordable in many places above Salamanca, and hence he proposed to assemble the French army in the night, pass the river at day-break, by the fords between Villa Gonzalo and Huerta, and so make a concentrated attack upon Calvariza de Ariba, which would force Wellington to a decisive battle.

Soult opposed this project, he objected to attacking Wellington in a position which he was so well acquainted with, which he might have fortified, and

where the army must fight its way, even from the fords, to gain room for an order of battle. He proposed instead, to move by the left to certain fords, three in number, between Exême and Galisancho, some seven or eight miles above Alba de Tormes. They were easy in themselves, he said, and well suited, from the conformation of the banks, for forcing a passage if it should be disputed; and by making a slight circuit, the troops in march could not be seen by the enemy. Passing there, the French army would gain two marches upon the allies, would be placed upon their flank and rear, and could fight on ground chosen by its own generals, instead of delivering battle on ground chosen by the enemy; or it could force on an action in a new position whence the allies could with difficulty retire in the event of disaster. Wellington must then fight to disadvantage, or retire hastily, sacrificing part of his army to save the rest; and the effect, whether militarily or politically, would be the same as if he was beaten by a front attack. Jourdan replied, that this was prudent, and might be successful if Wellington accepted battle, but that general could not thereby be forced to fight, which was the great object; he would have time to retreat before the French could reach the line of his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, and it was even supposed by some generals that he would retreat to Almeida, at once, by San Felices and Barba de Puerco.

Neither Soult nor Jourdan knew the position of the Arapiles in detail, and the former, though he urged his own plan, offered to yield if the king was so inclined. Jourdan's proposition was supported by all the generals of the army of Portugal, except Clauzel, who leaned to Soult's opinion; but as that marshal commanded two-thirds of the army, while Jourdan had no ostensible command, the question was finally decided agreeably to his counsel. Nor is it easy to determine which was right, for though Jourdan's reasons were very strong, and the result did not bear out Soult's views, we shall find the failure was only in the execution. Nevertheless, it would seem so great an army and so confident, for the French soldiers eagerly demanded a battle, should have grappled in the shortest way; a just and rapid development of Jourdan's plan would probably have cut off Hamilton's Portuguese and the brigade in the castle of Alba, from Calvariza Ariba.

On the other hand, Wellington, who was so well acquainted with his ground, desired a battle on either side of the Tormes; his hope was indeed to prevent the passage of that river until the rains rendered it unfordable, and thus force the French to retire from want of provisions or engage him on the position of Christoval; yet he also courted a fight on the Arapiles, those rocky monuments of his former victory. He had sixty-eight thousand combatants under arms, fifty-two thousand of which, including four thousand British cavalry, were Anglo-Portuguese, and he had nearly seventy guns. This force he had so disposed, that besides Hamilton's Portuguese, three divisions guarded the fords, which were moreover defended by entrenchments, and the whole army might have been united in good time upon the strong ridges of Calvariza Ariba, and on the two Arapiles, where the superiority of fifteen thousand men would scarcely have availed the French. A defeat would only have sent the allies to Portugal, whereas a victory would have taken them once more to Madrid. To draw in Hamilton's Portuguese, and the troops from Alba, in time, would have been a vital point; but as the French, if they did not surprise the allies, must have fought their way up from the river, this danger might have proved less than could have been

supposed at first view. In fine, the general was Wellington, and he knew his ground.

FRENCH PASSAGE OF THE TORMES. RETREAT TO CIUDAD RODRIGO.

Soult's plan being adopted, the troops in the distant quarters were brought up; the army of Portugal was directed to make frequent demonstrations against Christoval, Aldea, Lengua, and the fords between Huerta and Alba; the road over the hills to the Galisancho fords was repaired, and two trestle-bridges were constructed for the passage of the artillery. The design was to push over the united armies of the centre and the south, by these fords; and if this operation should oblige the allies to withdraw from Alba de Tormes, the army of Portugal was to pass by the bridge at that place and by the fords, and assail Wellington's rear; but if the allies maintained Alba, Drouet was to follow Soult at Galisancho.

At daybreak on the 14th the bridges were thrown, the cavalry and infantry passed by the fords, the allies' outposts were driven back, and Soult took a position at Mozarbes, having the road from Alba to Tamames, under his left flank. Meanwhile Wellington remained too confidently in Salamanca, and when the first report informed him that the enemy were over the Tormes, made the caustic observation, that he would not recommend it to some of them. Soon, however, the concurrent testimony of many reports convinced him of his mistake, he galloped to the Arapiles, and having ascertained the direction of Soult's march, drew off the second division, the cavalry, and some guns to attack the head of the French column. The fourth division and Hamilton's Portuguese remained at Alba, to protect this movement; the third division secured the Arapiles rocks until the troops from San Christoval should arrive; and Wellington was still so confident to drive the French back over the Tormes, that the bulk of the troops did not quit San Christoval that day. Nevertheless, when he reached Mozarbes, he found the French, already assembled there, too strong to be seriously meddled with. However, under cover of a cannonade, which kept off their cavalry, he examined their position, which extended from Mozarbes to the heights of Neustra Señora de Utiero, and it was so good that the evil was without remedy; wherefore drawing off the troops from Alba, and destroying the bridge, he left three hundred Spaniards in the castle, with orders, if the army retired the next day, to abandon the place and save themselves as they best could.

During the night and the following morning the allied army was united in the position of the Arapiles, and Wellington still hoped the French would give battle there; yet he placed the first division at Aldea Tejada, on the Junguen stream, to secure that passage in case Soult should finally oblige him to choose between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. Meantime the army of Portugal finding the bridge of Alba broken, and the castle occupied, crossed the Tormes at Galisancho, and moved up to the ridge of Señora de Utiera; Soult, who had commenced fortifying Mozarbes, extended his left at the same time to the height of Señora de la Buena, near the Ciudad Rodrigo road, yet slowly, because the ground was heavy, deep, and the many sources of the Junguen and the Valmusa streams, were fast filling from the rain and impeding his march. This evolution was nearly the same as that practised by the duke of Ragusa at the battle of Salamanca; but it was made on a wider circle, by a second range of heights enclosing, as it were, those by which the duke of Ragusa

sa moved on that day, and consequently, beyond the reach of such a sudden attack and catastrophe. The result in each case was remarkable. Marmont closing with a short quick turn, a falcon striking at an eagle, received a buffet that broke his pinions, and spoiled his flight. Soult, a wary kite, sailing slowly and with a wide wheel to seize a helpless prey, lost it altogether.

About two o'clock lord Wellington, feeling himself too weak to attack, and seeing the French cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, judged the king's design was to establish a fortified head of cantonments at Mozarbes, and then operate against the allies' communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; wherefore suddenly casting his army into three columns, he crossed the Junguen, and then covering his left flank with his cavalry and guns, defiled, in order of battle, before the enemy at little more than cannon-shot. With a wonderful boldness and facility, and good fortune also, for there was a thick fog and a heavy rain which rendered the bye-ways and fields by which the enemy moved nearly impassable, while the allies had the use of the high-roads, he carried his whole army in one mass quite round the French left: thus he gained the Valmusa river, where he halted for the night, in the rear of those who had been threatening him in front only a few hours before. This exploit was certainly surprising, but it was not creditable to the generalship on either side; for first, it may be asked, why the English commander, having somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his position, waited so long on the Arapiles as to render this dangerous movement necessary, a movement which a combination of bad roads, bad weather, and want of vigour on the other side, rendered possible and no more.

It has been said, that the only drawback to the duke of Dalmatia's genius, is his want of promptness to strike at the decisive moment. It is certainly a great thing to fight a great battle; and against such a general as Wellington and such troops as the British, a man may well be excused if he thinks twice ere he puts his life and fame, and the lives and fame of thousands of his countrymen, the weal or woe of nations, upon the hazard of an event, which may be decided by the existence of a ditch five feet wide, or the single blunder of a single fool, or the confusion of a coward, or by any other circumstance however trivial. To make such a throw for such a stake is no light matter. It is no mean consideration, that the praise or the hatred of nations, universal glory or universal, perhaps eternal contempt, waits on an action, the object of which may be more safely gained by other means, for in war there is infinite variety. But in this case it is impossible not to perceive that the French general vacillated after the passage of the river, purposely, perhaps, to avoid an action, since, as I have before shown, he thought it unwise, in the disjointed state of the French affairs and without any fixed base or reserves, in case of defeat, to fight a decisive battle. Nor do I blame this prudence, for though it be certain that he who would be great in war must be daring, to set all upon one throw belongs only to an irresponsible chief, not to a lieutenant whose task is but a portion of the general plan; neither is it wise, in monarch or general, to fight when all may be lost by defeat, unless all may be won by victory. However, the king, more unfettered than Soult, desired a battle, and with an army so good and numerous, the latter's prudence seems misplaced; he should have grappled with his enemy, and, once engaged at any point, Wellington could not have continued

his retreat, especially with the Spaniards, who were incapable of dexterous movements.

On the 16th, the allies retired by the three roads which lead across the Matilla stream, through Tamames, San Munos, and Martin del Rio, to Ciudad Rodrigo; the light division and the cavalry closed the rear, and the country was a forest, penetrable in all directions. The army bivouacked in the evening behind the Matilla stream; but though this march was not more than twelve miles, the stragglers were numerous, for the soldiers, meeting with vast herds of swine, quitted their colours by hundreds to shoot them, and such a rolling musketry echoed through the forest that Wellington at first thought the enemy was upon him. It was in vain that the staff officers rode about to stop this disgraceful practice, which had indeed commenced the evening before; it was in vain that Wellington himself caused two offenders to be hanged, the hungry soldiers still broke from the columns, the property of whole districts was swept away in a few hours, and the army was in some degree placed at the mercy of the enemy; the latter, however, were contented to glean the stragglers, of whom they captured two thousand, and did not press the rear until evening near Matilla, where their lancers fell on, but were soon checked by the light companies of the twenty-eighth, and afterwards charged by the fourteenth dragoons.

The 17th, presented a different yet a not less curious scene. During the night the cavalry immediately in front of the light division had, for some unknown reason, filed off by the flanks to the rear without giving any intimation to the infantry, who, trusting to the horsemen, had thrown out their picquets at a very short distance in front. At day-break, while the soldiers were rolling their blankets and putting on their accoutrements, some strange horsemen were seen in the rear of the bivouac and were at first taken for Spaniards, but very soon their cautious movements and vivacity of gestures shewed them to be French; the troops stood to arms, and in good time, for five hundred yards in front the wood opened on to a large plain, on which, in place of the British cavalry, eight thousand French horsemen were discovered advancing in one solid mass, yet carelessly and without suspecting the vicinity of the British. The division was immediately formed in columns, a squadron of the fourteenth dragoons and one of the German hussars came hastily up from the rear, Julian Sanchez' cavalry appeared in small parties on the right flank, and every precaution was taken to secure the retreat. This checked the enemy, but as the infantry fell back, the French, though fearing to approach their heavy masses in the wood, sent many squadrons to the right and left, some of which rode on the flanks near enough to bandy wit, in the Spanish tongue, with the British soldiers, who marched without firing. Very soon, however, the signs of mischief became visible, the road was strewn with baggage, and the bat-men came running in for protection, some wounded, some without arms, and all breathless as just escaped from a surprise. The thickness of the forest had enabled the French horsemen to pass along unperceived on the flanks of the line of march, and, as opportunity offered, they galloped from side to side, sweeping away the baggage and sabreing the conductors and guards; they had even menaced one of the columns, but were checked by the fire of the artillery. In one of these charges general Paget was carried off, as it were from the midst of his own men, and it might have been Wellington's fortune, for he also was continually riding between the columns and without an escort. However, the main body of the

army soon passed the Huebra river and took post behind it, the right at Tamames, the left near Boadilla, the centre at San Munoz, Buena Barba, and Gallegro de Huebra.

When the light division arrived at the edge of the table-land, which overhangs the fords at the last named place, the French cavalry suddenly thickened, and the sharp whistle of musket bullets, with the splintering of branches on the left, showed that their infantry were also up. Soult, in the hope of forestalling the allies at Tamames, had pushed his columns towards that place by a road leading from Salamanca through Vecinos, but finding Hill's troops in his front turned short to his right in hopes to cut off the rear-guard, which led to the

COMBAT OF THE HUEBRA.

The English and German cavalry, warned by the musketry, crossed the fords in time, and the light division should have followed without delay; because the forest ended on the edge of the table-land, and the descent from thence to the river, about eight hundred yards, was open and smooth, and the fords of the Huebra were deep. Instead of taking the troops down quickly, an order, more respectful to the enemy's cavalry than to his infantry, was given to form squares. The officers looked at each other in amazement, but at that moment Wellington fortunately appeared, and under his directions the battalions instantly glided off to the fords, leaving four companies of the forty-third and one of the riflemen to cover the passage. These companies, spreading as skirmishers, were immediately assailed in front and on both flanks, and with such a fire that it was evident a large force was before them; moreover, a driving rain and mist prevented them from seeing their adversaries, and being pressed closer each moment they gathered by degrees at the edge of the wood, where they maintained their ground for a quarter of an hour, then, seeing the division was beyond the river, they swiftly cleared the open slope of the hill and passed the fords under a very sharp musketry. Only twenty-seven soldiers fell, for the tempest, beating in the Frenchmen's faces, baffled their aim, and Ross' guns, playing from the low ground with grape, checked the pursuit, but the deep bellowing of thirty pieces of heavy French artillery showed how critically timed was the passage.

The banks of the Huebra were steep and broken, but the enemy spread his infantry to the right and left along the edge of the forest, making demonstrations on every side, and there were several fords to be guarded; the fifty-second and the Portuguese defended those below, Ross' guns, supported by the riflemen and the forty-third defended those above, and behind the right of the light division, on higher ground, was the seventh division. The second division, Hamilton's Portuguese, and a brigade of cavalry were in front of Tamames, and thus the bulk of the army was massed on the right, hugging the Pena de Francia, and covering the roads leading to Ciudad, as well as those leading to the passes of the Gata hills.

In this situation one brisk attempt made to force the fords guarded by the fifty-second, was vigorously repulsed by that regiment, but the skirmishing, and the cannonade, which never slackened, continued until dark; and heavily the French artillery played upon the light and seventh divisions. The former, forced to keep near the fords, and in column, lest a sudden rush of cavalry should carry off the guns on the flat ground, were plunged into at every round, yet suffered little loss, because the clayey soil, saturated with rain, swallowed the shot and smothered

the shells; but it was a matter of astonishment to see the seventh division kept on open and harder ground by its commander, and in one huge mass, tempting the havoc of this fire for hours, when a hundred yards in its rear the rise of the hill, and the thick forest, would have entirely covered it without in any manner weakening the position.

On the 18th, the army was to have drawn off before daylight, and the English general was anxious about the result, because the position of the Huebra, though good for defence, was difficult to remove from at this season; the roads were hollow and narrow, and led up a steep bank to a table-land, which was open, flat, marshy, and scored with water gullies; and from the overflowing of one of the streams the principal road was impassable a mile in rear of the position; hence to bring the columns off in time, without jostling, and if possible without being attacked, required a nice management. All the baggage and stores had marched in the night, with orders not to halt until they reached the high lands near Ciudad Rodrigo, but if the preceding days had produced some strange occurrences, the 18th was not less fertile in them.

In a former part of this work it has been observed, that even the confirmed reputation of lord Wellington could not protect him from the vanity and presumption of subordinate officers. The allusion fixes here. Knowing that the most direct road was impassable, he had directed the divisions by another road, longer, and apparently more difficult; this seemed such an extraordinary proceeding to some general officers, that, after consulting together, they deemed their commander unfit to conduct the army, and led their troops by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! Meanwhile Wellington, who had, before daylight, placed himself at an important point on his own road, waited impatiently for the arrival of the leading division until dawn, and then suspecting something of what had happened, galloped to the other road and found the would-be commanders, stopped by that flood which his arrangements had been made to avoid. The insubordination, and the danger to the whole army, were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was so severe and well timed, the humiliation so complete and so deeply felt, that, with one proud sarcastic observation, indicating contempt more than anger, he led back the troops and drew off all his forces safely. However some confusion and great danger still attended the operation, for even on this road one water-gully was so deep that the light division, which covered the rear, could only pass it man by man over a felled tree, and it was fortunate that Soult, unable to feed his troops a day longer, stopped on the Huebra with his main body and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. Thus the allies retired unmolested, but whether from necessity, or from negligence in the subordinates, the means of transport were too scanty for the removal of the wounded men, most of whom were hurt by cannon-shot; many were left behind, and as the enemy never passed the Huebra at this point, those miserable creatures perished by a horrible and lingering death.

The marshy plains, over which the army was now marching, exhausted the strength of the wearied soldiers, thousands straggled, the depredations on the herds of swine were repeated, and the temper of the army, generally, prognosticated the greatest misfortunes if the retreat should be continued. This was, however, the last day of trial, for towards evening the weather cleared up, the hills near Ciudad Rodrigo afforded dry bivouacs and fuel, the distribution of good rations restored the strength and spirits of

the men, and the next day Ciudad Rodrigo and the neighbouring villages were occupied in tranquillity. The cavalry was then sent out to the forest, and being aided by Julian Sanchez' partidas, brought in from a thousand to fifteen hundred stragglers who must otherwise have perished. During these events Joseph occupied Salamanca, but colonel Miranda, the Spanish officer left at Alba de Tormes, held that place until the 27th, and then carried off his garrison in the night.

Thus ended the retreat from Burgos. The French gathered a good spoil of baggage; what the loss of the allies, in men, was, cannot be exactly determined, because no Spanish returns were ever seen. An approximation may, however, be easily made. According to the muster-rolls, the Anglo-Portuguese under Wellington, had about one thousand men killed, wounded and missing, between the 21st and 29th of October, which was the period of their crossing the Duero, but this only refers to loss in action; Hill's loss between the Tagus and the Tormes was, including stragglers, about four hundred, and the defence of the castle of Alba de Tormes cost one hundred. Now if the Spanish regulars, and partidas, marching with the two armies, be reckoned to have lost a thousand, which, considering their want of discipline, is not exaggerated, the whole loss, previous to the French passage of the Tormes, will amount perhaps to three thousand men. But the loss between the Tormes and the Agueda was certainly greater, for nearly three hundred were killed and wounded at the Huebra, many stragglers died in the woods, and we have marshal Jourdan's testimony, that the prisoners, Spanish, Portuguese and English, brought into Salamanca up to the 20th November, were three thousand five hundred and twenty. The whole loss of the double retreat cannot, therefore, be set down at less than nine thousand, including the cost of men in the siege of Burgos.

I have been the more precise on this point, because some French writers have spoken of ten thousand being taken between the Tormes and the Agueda, and general Souham estimated the previous loss, including the siege of Burgos, at seven thousand. But the king, in his despatches, called the whole loss twelve thousand, including therein the garrison of Chinchilla, and he observed that if the generals of cavalry, Soult and Tilley, had followed the allies vigorously from Salamanca, the loss would have been much greater. Certainly the army was so little pressed, that none would have supposed the French horsemen were numerous. On the other hand, English authors have most unaccountably reduced the British loss to as many hundreds.

Although the French halted on the Huebra, the English general kept his troops together behind the Agueda, because Soult retired with the troops under his immediate command to Los Santos on the Upper Tormes, thus pointing towards the pass of Baños, and it was rumoured he designed to march that way, with a view to invade Portugal by the valley of the Tagus. Wellington disbelieved this rumour, but he could not disregard it, because nearly all his channels of intelligence had been suddenly dried up by a tyrannical and foolish decree of the cortes, which obliged every man to justify himself for having remained in a district occupied by the enemy, and hence, to avoid persecution, those who used to transmit information, fled from their homes. Hill's division was, therefore, moved to the right as far as Robledo, to cover the pass of Perales, the rest of the troops were ready to follow, and Penne Villemur, leading the fifth Spanish army over the Gata mountains, occupied Coria.

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Joseph, after hesitating whether he should leave the army of the south, or the army of Portugal in Castile, finally ordered the head-quarters of the latter to be fixed at Valladolid, and of the former at Toledo; the one to maintain the country between the Tormes and the Esla, the other to occupy La Mancha with its left, the valley of the Tagus, as far as the Tietar, with its centre, and Avila with its right. The army of the centre went to Segovia, where the king joined it with his guards, and when these movements, which took place in December, were known, Wellington placed his army also in winter quarters.

The fifth Spanish army, crossing the Tagus at Alcantara, entered Estremadura,

Hill's division occupied Coria and Placentia, and held the town of Bejar by a detachment.

Two divisions were quartered on a second line behind Hill, about Castello Branco, and in the Upper Beira.

The light division remained on the Agueda, and the rest of the infantry were distributed along the Duero from Lamego downwards.

The Portuguese cavalry were placed in Moncorvo, and the British cavalry, with the exception of Victor Alten's brigade, which was attached to the light division, occupied the valley of the Mondego.

Carlos D'Espana's troops garrisoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and the Gallicians marched through the Trasmontes to their own country.

In these quarters the Anglo-Portuguese were easily fed, because the improved navigation of the Tagus, the Douro, and the Mondego, furnished water carriage close to all their cantonments; moreover, the army could be quickly collected on either frontier, for the front line of communication from Estremadura, passed by the bridge of Alcantara to Coria, and from thence through the pass of Perales to the Agueda. The second line run by Penamacor and Guinaldo, and both were direct; but the post of Bejar, although necessary to secure Hill's quarters from a surprise, was itself exposed.

The French also had double and direct communications across the Gredos mountains. On their first line they restored a Roman road leading from Horcajada, on the Upper Tormes, by the Puerto de Pico to Monbeltran, and from thence to Talavera. To ease their second line they finished a road, begun the year before by Marmont, leading from Avila, by the convent of Guisando and Escalona to Toledo. But these communications, though direct, were in winter so difficult, that general Laval, crossing the mountains from Avila, was forced to harness forty horses to a carriage; moreover, Wellington, having the interior and shorter lines, was in a more menacing position for offence, and a more easy position for defence; wherefore, though he had ordered all boats to be destroyed at Almaraz, Arzobispo, and other points where the great roads came down to the Tagus, the French, as anxious to prevent him from passing that river, as he was to prevent them, sent parties to destroy what had been overlooked. Each feared that the other would move, and yet neither wished to continue the campaign, Wellington, because his troops wanted rest, more than one-third being in the hospitals! the French, because they could not feed their men, and had to refix their general base of operations, broken up and deranged as it was by the guerillas.

The English general was, however, most at his ease. He knew that the best French officers thought it useless to continue the contest in Spain, unless the British army was first mastered, Soult's intercepted letters showed him how that general desired

to fix the war in Portugal, and there was now a most powerful force on the frontier of that kingdom. But on the other hand Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Almeida, blocked the principal entrances, and though the two former were very ill provided by the Spaniards, they were in little danger, because the last campaign had deprived the French of all their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines, in Andalusia, Almaraz, Madrid, Salamanca, and Valladolid; and it was nearly impossible for them to make any impression upon Portugal, until new establishments were formed. Wherefore Wellington did not fear to spread his troops in good and tranquil quarters, to receive reinforcements, restore their equipments, and recover their health and strength.

This advantage was not reciprocal. The secondary warfare which the French sustained, and which it is now time again to notice, would have been sufficient to establish the military reputation of any nation before Napoleon's exploits had raised the standard of military glory. For when disembarassed of their most formidable enemy, they were still obliged to chase the partidas, to form sieges, to recover and restore the posts they had lost by concentrating their armies, to send moveable columns by long winter marches over a vast extent of country for food, fighting for what they got, and living hard, because the magazines, filled from the fertile districts, were of necessity reserved for the field operations against Wellington. Certainly it was a great and terrible war they had in hand, and good and formidable soldiers they were to sustain it so long and so manfully amidst the many errors of their generals.

CHAPTER VI.

Continuation of the partizan warfare—General Lameth made governor of Santona—Reille takes the command of the army of Portugal—Drouet, count D'Erlon, commands that of the centre—Works of Astorga destroyed by the Spaniards—Mina's operations in Aragon—Villa Campa's operations—Empecinado and others enter Madrid—The duke Del Parque enters La Mancha—Elio and Bassecour march to Albacete and communicate with the Anglo-Sicilian army—The king enters Madrid—Soult's cavalry scour La Mancha—Suchet's operations—General Donkin menaces Denia—General W. Clinton takes the command of the Anglo-Sicilian army—Suchet entrenches a camp at Xativa—The Anglo-Sicilian army falls into disrepute—General Campbell takes the command—Inactivity of the army—The Frayle surprises a convoy of French artillery—Operations in Catalonia—Dissensions in that province—Eroles and Codrington menace Tarragona—Eroles surprises a French detachment at Arbaca—Lacy threatens Mataro, and Hostalrich returns to Vich—Manso defeats a French detachment near Molino del Rey—Decaen defeats the united Catalanian army, and penetrates to Vich—The Spanish divisions separate—Colonel Villamil attempts to surprise San Felipe de Belaguer—Attacks it a second time in concert with Codrington—The place succoured by the garrison of Tortosa—Lacy suffers a French convoy to reach Barcelona, is accused of treachery and displaced—The regular warfare in Catalonia ceases—The partizan warfare continues—England the real support of the war.

CONTINUATION OF THE PARTIZAN WARFARE.

In the north, while Souham was gathering in front of Wellington, some of Mendizabel's bands blockaded Santona by land, and Popham, after his failure at Gueteria, blockaded it by sea. It was not very well provisioned, but Napoleon, always watchful, had sent an especial governor, general Lameth, and a chosen engineer, general D'Abadie, from Paris to complete the works. By their activity, a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon were soon mounted, and they had, including the crew of a corvette, a garrison of eighteen hundred men. Lameth, who was obliged to fight his way into the place in Sep-

tember, also formed an armed flotilla, with which, when the English squadron was driven off the port by gales of wind, he made frequent captures. Meanwhile Mendizabel surprised the garrison of Briviesca, Longa captured a large convoy with its escort, near Burgos, and all the bands had visibly increased in numbers and boldness.

When Caffarelli returned from the Duero, Reille took the command of the army of Portugal, Drouet assumed that of the army of the centre, and Souham, being thus cast off, returned to France. The army of Portugal was then widely spread over the country. Avila was occupied, Sarrut took possession of Leon, the bands of Marquinez and Salazar were beaten, and Foy, marching to seize Astorga, surprised and captured ninety men employed to dismantle that fortress; but above twenty breaches had already been opened, and the place ceased to be of any importance. Meanwhile Caffarelli, troubled by the care of a number of convoys, one of which, under general Frimont, although strongly escorted, and having two pieces of cannon, fell into Longa's hands the 30th of November, was unable to commence active operations until the 29th of December. Then his detachments chased the bands from Bilbao, while he marched himself to succour and provision Santona and Gueteria, and to re-establish his other posts along the coasts: but while he was near Santona, the Spaniards attacked St. Domingo in Navarre, and invested Logroña.

Sir Home Popham had suddenly quitted the bay of Biscay with his squadron, leaving a few vessels to continue the littoral warfare, which enabled Caffarelli to succour Santona; important events followed, but the account of them must be deferred as belonging to the transactions of 1813. Meanwhile tracing the mere chain of guerilla operations from Biscay to the other parts, we find Abbé, who commanded in Pampeluna, Severoli, who guarded the right of the Ebro, and Paris, who had returned from Valencia to Zaragoza, continually, and at times successfully, attacked in the latter end of 1812; for after Chaplanguarra's exploit near Jacca, Mina intercepted all communication with France, and on the 22d of November surprised and drove back to Zaragoza, with loss, a very large convoy. Then he besieged the castle of Huesca, and when a considerable force, coming from Zaragoza, forced him to desist, he reappeared at Barbastro. Finally, in a severe action fought on the heights of Señora del Poya, towards the end of December, his troops were dispersed by colonel Colbert, yet the French lost seventy men, and in a few weeks Mina took the field again, with forces more numerous than he had ever before commanded.

About this time Villa Campa, who had entrenched himself near Segorbé, to harass Suchet's rear, was driven from thence by general Panetier, but being afterwards joined by Gayan, they invested the castle of Daroca with three thousand men. Severoli, marching from Zaragoza, succoured the place, yet Villa Campa reassembled his whole force near Carriena, behind Severoli, who was forced to fight his way home to Zaragoza. The Spaniards reappeared at Almunia, and on the 22nd of December, another battle was fought, when Villa Campa being defeated with considerable slaughter, retired to New Castile, and there soon repaired his losses. Meanwhile, in the centre of Spain, Elio, Bassecour, and Empecinado, having waited until the great French armies passed in pursuit of Hill, came down upon Madrid. Wellington, when at Salamanca, expected that this movement would call off some troops from the Tormes, but the only effect was to cause the garrison left by Joseph, to follow the great army, which it

rejoined, between the Duero and the Tormes, with a great encumbrance of civil servants and families. The partidas then entered the city, and committed great excesses, treating the people as enemies.

Soult and Joseph had been earnest with Suchet to send a strong division by Cuenca as a protection for Madrid, and that marshal did move in person with a considerable body of troops as far as Requena on the 28th of November, but being in fear for his line towards Alicante, soon returned to Valencia in a state of indecision, leaving only one brigade at Cequeña. He had been reinforced by three thousand fresh men from Catalonia, yet he would not undertake any operation until he knew something of the king's progress, and at Requena he had gained no intelligence even of the passage of the Tagus. The Spaniards being thus uncontrolled, gathered in all directions.

The duke Del Parque advanced with Ballesteros' army to Villa Nueva de los Infantes, on the La Mancha side of the Sierra Morena, his cavalry entered the plains, and some new levies from Grenada, came to Alcaraz on his right. Elio and Bassecour, leaving Madrid to the partidas, marched to Albacete, without hindrance from Suchet, and reopened the communication with Alicante; hence, exclusive of the Sicilian army, nearly thirty thousand regular Spanish troops were said to be assembled on the borders of Murcia, and six thousand new levies came to Cordoba as a reserve. However, on the 3d of December, Joseph, at the head of his guards, and the army of the centre, drove all the partidas from the capital, and reoccupied Guadalajara and the neighbouring posts; Soult entered Toledo, and his cavalry advanced towards Del Parque, who immediately recrossed the Morena, and then the French horsemen swept La Mancha to gather contributions and to fill the magazines at Toledo.

By these operations, Del Parque, now joined by the Grenadan troops from Alcaraz, was separated from Elio, and Suchet was relieved from a danger which he had dreaded too much, and by his own inaction contributed to increase. It is true he had all the sick men belonging to the king's and to Soult's army on his hands, but he had also many effective men of those armies; and though the yellow fever had shewn itself in some of his hospitals, and though he was also very uneasy for the security of his base in Aragon, where the partida warfare was reviving, yet, with a disposable force of fifteen thousand infantry, and a fine division of cavalry, he should not have permitted Elio to pass his flank in the manner he did. He was afraid of the Sicilian army, which had indeed a great influence on all the preceding operations, for it is certain that Suchet would otherwise have detached troops to Madrid by the Cuenca road, and then Soult would probably have sought a battle between the Tagus and the Guadarama mountains; but this influence arose entirely from the position of the Alicante army, not from its operations, which were feeble and vacillating.

Maitland had resigned in the beginning of October, and his successor, Mackenzie, immediately pushed out some troops to the front, and there was a slight descent upon Xabea by the navy, but the general remained without plan or object, the only signs of vitality being a fruitless demonstration against the castle of Denia, where general Donkin disembarked on the 4th of October with a detachment of the eighty-first regiment. The walls had been represented as weak, but they were found to be high and strong, and the garrison had been unexpectedly doubled that morning, hence no attack took place, and in the evening a second reinforcement arriv-

ed, whereupon the British re-embarked. However, the water was so full of pointed rocks that it was only by great exertions lieutenant Penruddocke, of the *Fame*, could pull in the boats, and the soldiers, wading and fighting, got on board with little loss indeed, but in confusion.

Soon after this, general William Clinton came from Sicily to take the command, and Wellington, who was then before Burgos, thinking Suchet would weaken his army to help the king, recommended an attempt upon the city of Valencia, either by a coast attack or by a land operation, warning Clinton, however, to avoid an action in a cavalry country. This was not very difficult, because the land was generally rocky and mountainous, but Clinton would not stir without first having possession of the citadel of Alicante, and thus all things fell into disorder and weakness. For the jealous Spanish governor would not suffer the British to hold even a gate of the town, nay, he sent Elio a large convoy of clothing and other stores with an escort of only twenty men, that he might retain two of that general's battalions to resist the attempt which he believed or pretended to believe Clinton would make on the citadel. Meanwhile that general, leaving Whittingham and Roche at Alcoy and Xixona, drew in his other troops from the posts previously occupied in front by Mackenzie; he feared Suchet's cavalry, but the marshal, estimating the allied armies at more than fifty thousand men, would undertake no serious enterprise while ignorant of the king's progress against lord Wellington. He, however, diligently strengthened his camp at St. Felipe de Xativa, threw another bridge over the Xucar, entrenched the passes in his front, covered Denia with a detachment, obliged Whittingham to abandon Alcoy, dismantled the extensive walls of Valencia, and fortified a citadel there.

It was in this state of affairs that Elio came down to Albacete, and priding himself upon the dexterity with which he had avoided the French armies, proposed to Clinton a combined attack upon Suchet. Elio greatly exaggerated his own numbers, and giving out that Del Parque's force was under his command, pretended that he could bring forty thousand men into the field, four thousand being cavalry. But the two Spanish armies, if united, would scarcely have produced twenty thousand really effective infantry; moreover, Del Parque, a sickly unwieldy person, was extremely incapable, his soldiers were discontented and mutinous, and he had no intention of moving beyond Alcaraz.

With such allies it was undoubtedly difficult for the English general to co-operate, yet it would seem something considerable might have been effected while Suchet was at Requena, even before Elio arrived, and more surely after that general had reached Albacete. Clinton had then twelve thousand men, of which five thousand were British: there was a fleet to aid his operations, and the Spanish infantry under Elio were certainly ten thousand. Nothing was done, and it was because nothing was attempted, that Napoleon, who watched this quarter closely, assured Suchet, that however difficult his position was from the extent of country he had to keep in tranquillity, the enemy in his front was not really formidable. Events justified this observation. The French works were soon completed, and the British army fell into such disrepute, that the Spaniards, with sarcastic malice, affirmed it was to be put under Elio to make it useful.

Meanwhile Roche's and Whittingham's division continued to excite the utmost jealousy in the other Spanish troops, who asked, very reasonably, what

they did to merit such advantages? England paid and clothed them, and the Spaniards were bound to feed them; they did not do so, and Canga Arguelles, the intendant of the province, asserted that he had twice provided magazines for them in Alicante, which were twice plundered by the governor; and yet it is certain that the other Spanish troops were far worse off than these divisions. But on every side intrigues, discontent, vacillation, and weakness were visible, and again it was shewn, that if England was the stay of the Peninsula, it was Wellington alone who supported the war.

On the 22nd of November, the obstinacy of the governor being at last overcome, he gave up the citadel of Alicante to the British, yet no offensive operations followed, though Suchet, on the 26th, drove Roche's troops out of Alcoy with loss, and defeated the Spanish cavalry at Yecla. However, on the 2nd of December, general Campbell, arriving from Sicily with four thousand men, principally British, assumed the command, making the fourth general-in-chief in the same number of months. His presence, the strong reinforcement he brought, and the intelligence that lord William Bentinck was to follow with another reinforcement, again raised the public expectation, and Elio immediately proposed that the British should occupy the enemy on the Lower Xucar, while the Spaniards, crossing that river, attacked Requena. However, general Campbell, after making some feeble demonstrations, declared he would await lord William Bentinck's arrival. Then the Spanish general, who had hitherto abstained from any disputes with the British, became extremely discontented, and dispersed his army for subsistence. On the other hand, the English general complained that Elio had abandoned him.

Suchet, expecting Campbell to advance, had withdrawn his outposts to concentrate at Xativa, but when he found him as inactive as his predecessors, and saw the Spanish troops scattered, he surprised one Spanish post at Onteniente, another in Ibi, and reoccupied all his former offensive positions in front of Alicante. Soult's detachments were now also felt in La Mancha, wherefore Elio retired into Murcia, and Del Parque, as we have seen, went over the Morena. Thus the storm which had menaced the French disappeared entirely, for Campbell, following his instructions, refused rations to Whittingham's corps, and desired it to separate for the sake of subsistence; and as the rest of the Spanish troops were actually starving, no danger was to be apprehended from them: nay, Habert marched up to Alicante, killed and wounded some men almost under the walls, and the Anglo-Italian soldiers deserted to him by whole companies when opportunity offered.

Suchet did as he pleased towards his front, but he was unquiet for his rear, for besides the operations of Villa Campa, Gayan, Duran and Mina in Aragon, the Frayle and other partida chiefs continually vexed his communications with Tortosa. Fifty men had been surprised and destroyed near Segorbe the 22nd of November, by Villa Campa; and general Panetier, who was sent against that chief, though he took and destroyed his entrenched camp, was unable to bring him to action or to prevent him from going to Aragon and attacking Daroca, as I have before shown. Meanwhile the Frayle surprised and destroyed an ordnance convoy, took several guns and four hundred horses, and killed in cold blood, after the action, above a hundred artillery-men and officers. A moveable column being immediately despatched against him, destroyed his depots and many of his men, but the Frayle himself escaped and soon reappeared upon the communications. The loss of this

convoy was the first disgrace of the kind which had befallen the army of Aragon, and to use Suchet's expression, a battle would have cost him less.

Nor were the Spaniards quite inactive in Catalonia, although the departure of general Maitland had so dispirited them that the regular warfare was upon the point of ceasing altogether. The active army was indeed stated to be twenty thousand strong, and the tercios of reserve forty-five thousand; yet a column of nine hundred French controlled the sea-line and cut off all supplies landed for the interior. Lacy, who remained about Vich with seven thousand men, affirmed that he could not feed his army on the coast, but captain Codrington says that nineteen feluccas, laden with flour, had, in two nights only, landed their cargoes between Mattaro and Barcelona for the supply of the latter city, and that these and many other ventures of the same kind might have been captured without difficulty; that Claros and Milans continued corruptly to connive at the passage of French convoys; that the rich merchants of Mattaro and Arens invited the enemy to protect their contraband convoys going to France, and yet accused him publicly of interrupting their lawful trade, when in fact he was only disturbing a reasonable commerce, carried on so openly that he was forced to declare a blockade of the whole coast. A plot to deliver up the Medas islands was also discovered, and when Lacy was pressed to call out the Somatenes, a favourite project with the English naval officers, he objected that he could scarcely feed and provide ammunition for the regular troops. He also observed that the general efforts of that nature hitherto made, and under more favourable circumstances, had produced only a waste of life, of treasure, of provisions, of ammunition and of arms, and now the French possessed all the strong places.

At this time so bitter were the party dissensions that sir Edward Pellew anticipated the ruin of the principality from that cause alone. Lacy, Sarzfield, Eroles, and captain Codrington, continued their old disputes, and Sarzfield, who was then in Aragon, had also quarrelled with Mina; Lacy made a formal requisition to have Codrington recalled, the junta of Catalonia made a like demand to the regency respecting Lacy, and meanwhile such was the misery of the soldiers, that the officers of one regiment actually begged at the doors of private houses to obtain old clothing for their men, and even this poor succour was denied. A few feeble isolated efforts by some of the partizan generals, were the only signs of war when Wellington's victory at Salamanca again raised the spirit of the province. Then also, for the first time, the new constitution adopted by the cortes was proclaimed in Catalonia, the junta of that province was suppressed, Eroles, the people's favourite, obtained greater powers, and was even flattered with the hope of becoming captain-general, for the regency had agreed at last to recall Lacy. In fine, the aspect of affairs changed, and many thousand English muskets and other weapons, were, by sir Edward Pellew, given to the partizans as well as to the regular troops, which enabled them to receive cartridges from the ships instead of the loose powder formerly demanded on account of the difference in the bore of the Spanish muskets. The effect of these happy coincidences was soon displayed. Eroles, who had raised a new division of three thousand men, contrived, in concert with Codrington, a combined movement in September against Taragona. Marching in the night of the 27th, from Reus to the mouth of the Francoli, he was met by the boats of the squadron, and having repulsed a sally from the fortress, drove some Catalans in the

French service from the ruins of the Olivo, while the boats swept the mole, taking five vessels. After this affair Eroles encamped on the hill separating Lerida, Taragona, and Tortoza, meaning to intercept the communication between those places and to keep up an intercourse with the fleet, now the more necessary because Lacy had lost this advantage eastward of Barcelona. While thus posted he heard that a French detachment had come from Lerida to Arbaca, wherefore making a forced march over the mountains he surprised and destroyed the greatest part on the 2nd of October, and then returned to his former quarters.

Meanwhile Lacy embarked scaling ladders and battering guns on board the English ships, and made a pompous movement against Mattaro with his whole force, yet at the moment of execution changed his plan and attempted to surprise Hostalrich, but he let this design be known, and as the enemy prepared to succour the place, he returned to Vich without doing any thing. During these operations Manso defeated two hundred French near Molino del Rey, gained some advantages over one Pelligri, a French miguelette partizan, and captured some French boats at Mattaro after Lacy's departure. However, Sarzfield's mission to raise an army in Aragon had failed, and Decaen, desiring to check the reviving spirit of the Catalans, made a combined movement against Vich in the latter end of October. Lacy immediately drew Eroles, Manso, and Milans towards that point, and thus the fertile country about Reus was again resigned to the French, the intercourse with the fleet totally lost, and the garrison of Taragona, which had been greatly straitened by the previous operations of Eroles, was relieved. Yet the defence of Vich was not secured, for on the 3rd of November, one division of the French forced the main body of the Spaniards, under Lacy and Milans, at the passes of Puig Gracioso and Congosto, and though the other divisions were less successful against Eroles and Manso, at St. Filieu de Codenas, Decaen reached Vich the 4th. The Catalans, who had lost altogether above five hundred men, then separated; Lacy went to the hills near Momblanch, Milans and Rovira towards Olot, and Manso to Montserrat.

Eroles returned to Reus, and was like to have surprised the Col de Balaguer, for he sent a detachment under colonel Villamil, dressed in Italian uniforms, which had been taken by Rovira in Figueras, and his men were actually admitted within the palisade of the fort before the garrison perceived the deceit. A lieutenant with sixteen men placed outside were taken, and this loss was magnified so much to Eroles that he ordered Villamil to make a more regular attack. To aid him Codrington brought up the Blake, and landed some marines, yet no impression was made on the garrison, and the allies retired on the 17th at the approach of two thousand men sent from Tortoza. Eroles and Manso then vainly united near Manresa to oppose Decaen, who, coming down from Vich, forced his way to Reus, seized a vast quantity of corn, supplied Taragona, and then marched to Barcelona.

These operations indisputably proved that there was no real power of resistance in the Catalan army, but as an absurd notion prevailed that Soult, Suchet, and Joseph were coming with their armies in one body to France, through Catalonia, Lacy endeavoured to cover his inactivity by pretending a design to raise a large force in Aragon, with which to watch this retreat, and to act as a flanking corps to lord Wellington, who was believed to be then approaching Zaragoza. Such rumours served to amuse

the Catalans for a short time, but the sense of their real weakness soon returned. In December, Bertolletti, the governor of Taragona, marched upon Reus, and defeated some hundred men who had reassembled there; and at the same time a French convoy for Barcelona, escorted by three thousand men, passed safely in the face of six thousand Catalan soldiers, who were desirous to attack, but were prevented by Lacy.

The anger of the people and of the troops also, on this occasion, was loudly expressed, Lacy was openly accused of treachery, and was soon after recalled. However, Eroles, who had come to Cape Salou to obtain succour from the squadron for his suffering soldiers, acknowledged that the resources of Catalonia were worn out, the spirit of the people broken by Lacy's misconduct, and the army, reduced to less than seven thousand men, naked and famishing. Affairs were so bad, that expecting to be made captain-general he was reluctant to accept that office, and the regular warfare was in fact extinguished, for Sarzfield was now acting as a partizan on the Ebro. Nevertheless, the French were greatly dismayed at the disasters in Russia; their force was weakened by the drafts made to fill up the ranks of Napoleon's new army; and the war of the partidas continued, especially along the banks of the Ebro, where Sarzfield, at the head of Eroles' ancient division, which he had carried with him out of Catalonia, acted in concert with Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Frayle, Pendencia, and other chiefs, who were busy upon Suchet's communication between Tortoza and Valencia.

Aragon being now unquiet, and Navarre and Biscay in a state of insurrection, the French forces in the interior of Spain were absolutely invested. Their front was opposed by regular armies, their flanks annoyed by the British squadrons, and their rear, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean, plagued and stung by this chain of partidas and insurrections. And England was the cause of all this. England was the real deliverer of the Peninsula. It was her succours thrown into Biscay that had excited the new insurrection in the northern provinces, and enabled Mina and the other chiefs to enter Aragon, while Wellington drew the great masses of the French towards Portugal. It was that insurrection, so forced on, which, notwithstanding the cessation of the regular warfare in Catalonia, gave life and activity to the partidas of the south. It was the army from Sicily which, though badly commanded, by occupying the attention of Suchet in front, obliged him to keep his forces together instead of hunting down the bands on his communications. In fine, it was the troops of England who had shocked the enemy's front of battle, the fleets of England which had menaced his flanks with disembarkations, the money and stores of England which had supported the partidas. Every part of the Peninsula was pervaded by her influence, or her warriors, and a trembling sense of insecurity was communicated to the French wherever their armies were not united in masses.

Such then were the various military events of the year 1812, and the English general, taking a view of the whole, judged that however anxious the French might be to invade Portugal, they would be content during the winter to gather provisions and wait for reinforcements from France wherewith to strike a decisive blow at his army. But those reinforcements never came. Napoleon, unconquered of man, had been vanquished by the elements. The fires and the snows of Moscow combined, had shattered his strength, and in confessed madness, nations

and rulers rejoiced, that an enterprise, at once the grandest, the most provident, the most beneficial, ever attempted by a warrior-statesman, had been foiled: they rejoiced that Napoleon had failed to re-establish unhappy Poland as a barrier against the most formidable and brutal, the most swinish tyranny, that has ever menaced and disgraced European civilization.

CHAPTER VII.

General observations—Wellington reproaches the army—His censures indiscriminate—Analysis of his campaign—Criticisms of Jomini and others examined—Errors of execution—The French operations analyzed—Sir John Moore's retreat compared with lord Wellington's.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

LORD Wellington, exasperated by the conduct of the army and by the many crossings he had experienced during the campaign, had no sooner taken his winter quarters, than he gave vent to his indignation in a circular letter addressed to the superior officers, which, being ill-received by the army at the time, has been frequently referred to since with angry denunciations of its injustice. In substance it declared, "that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign *in a greater degree than he had ever witnessed or ever read of in any army*, and this without any disaster, any unusual privation or hardship save that of inclement weather; that the officers had, from the first, lost all command over their men, and hence excesses, outrages of all kinds, and inexcusable losses had occurred; that no army had ever made shorter marches in retreat, or had longer rests; no army had ever been so little pressed by a pursuing enemy, and that the true cause of this unhappy state of affairs was to be found in the habitual neglect of duty by the regimental officers."

These severe reproaches were generally deserved, and only partially unjust; yet the statements on which they were founded, were in some particulars unintentionally inaccurate, especially as regarded the retreat from Salamanca. The marches, though short as to distance, after quitting the Tormes, were long as to time, and it is the time an English soldier bears his burthen, for like the ancient Roman he carries the load of an ass, that crushes his strength. Some regiments had come from Cadiz without halting, and as long garrison duty had weakened their bodies, both their constitutions and their inexperience were too heavily taxed. The line of march from Salamanca was through a flooded, and flat, and clayey country, not much easier to the allies than the marshes of the Arnus were to Hannibal's army; and mounted officers, as that great general well knew when he placed the Carthaginian cavalry to keep up the Gallic rear, never judge correctly of a foot-soldier's exertions; they measure his strength by their horses' powers. On this occasion the troops, stepping ankle deep in clay, mid-leg in water, lost their shoes, and with strained sinews heavily made their way, and withal they had but two rations in five days.

Wellington thought otherwise, for he knew not that the commissariat stores, which he had ordered up, did not arrive regularly because of the extreme fatigue of the animals who carried them; and those that did arrive were not available for the troops, because, as the rear of an army, and especially a retreating army, is at once the birth-place and the recipient of false reports, the subordinate commissaries and conductors of the temporary depots, alarmed with rumours that the enemy's cavalry had forestall-

ed the allies on the march, carried off or destroyed the field-stores; hence, the soldiers were actually feeding on acorns when their commander supposed them to be in the receipt of good rations. The destruction of the swine may be therefore, in some measure palliated; but there is neither palliation nor excuse to be offered for the excesses and outrages committed on the inhabitants, nor for many officers' habitual inattention to their duty, of which the general justly complained. Certainly the most intolerable disorders had marked the retreat, and great part of the sufferings of the army arose from these and previous disorders, for it is too common with soldiers, first to break up the arrangements of their general by want of discipline, and then to complain of the misery which those arrangements were designed to obviate. Nevertheless, Wellington's circular was not strictly just, because it excepted none from blame, though in conversation he admitted the reproach did not apply to the light division nor to the guards.

With respect to the former the proof of its discipline was easy, though Wellington had not said so much in its favour; for how could those troops be upbraided, who held together so closely with their colours, that, exclusive of those killed in action, they did not leave thirty men behind. Never did the extraordinary vigour and excellence of their discipline merit praise more than in this retreat. But it seems to be a drawback to the greatness of lord Wellington's character, that while capable of repressing insubordination, either by firmness or dexterity, as the case may require, capable also of magnanimously disregarding, or dangerously resenting injuries, his praises and his censures are bestowed indiscriminately, or so directed as to acquire partizans and personal friends rather than the attachment of the multitude. He did not make the hard-working military crowd feel that their honest unobtrusive exertions were appreciated. In this he differs not from many other great generals and statesmen, but he thereby fails to influence masses, and his genius falls short of that sublime flight by which Hannibal in ancient, and Napoleon in modern times, commanded the admiration of the world. Nevertheless, it is only by a comparison with such great men that he can be measured, nor will any slight examination of his exploits suffice to convey a true notion of his intellectual power and resources. Let this campaign be taken as an example.

It must be evident that it in no manner bears out the character of an easy and triumphant march, which English writers have given to it. Nothing happened according to the original plan. The general's operations were one continual struggle to overcome obstacles, occasioned by the enemy's numbers, the insubordination of his own troops, the slowness, incapacity, and unfaithful conduct of the Spanish commanders, the want of money, and the active folly of the different governments he served. For first, his design was to menace the French in Spain so as to bring their forces upon him from other parts, and then to retire into Portugal, again to issue forth when want should cause them to disperse. He was not without hopes, indeed, to strike a decisive blow, yet he was content, if the occasion came not, to wear out the French by continual marching, and he trusted that the frequent opportunities thus given to the Spaniards would finally urge them to a general effort. But he found his enemy, from the first, too powerful for him, even without drawing succour from distant parts, and he would have fallen back at once, were it not for Marmont's rashness. Nor would the victory of the

Arapiles itself have produced any proportionate effect but for the errors of the king, and his rejection of Soult's advice. Those errors caused the evacuation of Andalusia, yet it was only to concentrate an overwhelming force with which the French finally drove the victors back to Portugal.

Again, Wellington designed to finish his campaign in the southern provinces, and circumstances obliged him to remain in the northern provinces. He would have taken Burgos, and he could not; he would have rested longer on the Carion, and his flanks were turned by the bridges of Palencia and Banos; he would have rested behind the Douro, to profit of his central position, but the bridge at Tordesillas was ravished from him, and the sudden reparation of that at Toro, obliged him to retire. He would have united with Hill on the Adaja, and he could only unite with him behind the Tormes; and on this last river also he desired either to take his winter quarters, or to have delivered a great battle with a view to regain Madrid, and he could do neither. Finally, he endeavoured to make an orderly and an easy retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and his army was like to have dissolved altogether. And yet in all these varying circumstances, his sagacity as to the general course of the war, his promptness in taking advantage of particular opportunities, was conspicuous. These are the distinguishing characteristics of real genius.

Passing over, as already sufficiently illustrated, that master-stroke, the battle of Salamanca, the reader would do well to mark, how this great commander did, after that event, separate the king's army from Marmont's, forcing the one to retreat upon Burgos, and driving the other from Madrid; how he thus broke up the French combinations, so that many weeks were of necessity required to reunite a power capable of disturbing him in the field; how he posted Clinton's division and the Gallicians, to repress any light excursion by the beaten army of Portugal; how, foreseeing Soult's plan to establish a new base of operations in Andalusia, he was prepared, by a sudden descent from Madrid, to drive Soult himself from that province; how promptly, when the siege of Burgos failed, and his combinations were ruined by the fault of others, how promptly I say, he commenced his retreat, sacrificing all his high-wrought expectation of triumph in a campaign which he burned to finish, and otherwise would have finished, even with more splendour than it had commenced.

If Burgos, a mean fortress of the lowest order, had fallen early, the world would have seen a noble stroke. For the Gallicians, aided by a weak division of Wellington's army, and by the British reinforcements making up from Coruña, would, covered by Burgos, have sufficed to keep the army of Portugal in check, while Popham's armament would have fomented a general insurrection of the northern provinces. Meanwhile Wellington, gathering forty-five thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and fifteen thousand Spaniards, on the Tagus, would have marched towards Murcia; Ballesteros' army, and the sixteen thousand men composing the Alicante army, would there have joined him, and with a hundred thousand soldiers he would have delivered such a battle to the united French armies, if indeed they could have united, as would have shaken all Europe with its martial clangor. To exchange this glorious vision, for the cold desolate reality of a dangerous winter retreat was, for Wellington, but a momentary mental struggle, and it was simultaneous with that daring conception, the passage of the bridge of Burgos under the fire of the castle.

Let him be traced now in retreat. Pursued by a superior army, and seeing his cavalry defeated, he turned as a savage lion at the Carion, nor would he have removed so quickly from that lair, if the bridges at Palencia and Baños had been destroyed according to his order. Neither is his cool self-possession to be overlooked; for when both his flanks were thus exposed, instead of falling back in a hurried manner to the Duero, he judged exactly the value of the rugged ground on the left bank of the Pisuerga, in opposition to the double advantage obtained by the enemy at Palencia and Baños; nor did the difficulty which Souham and Caffarelli, independent commanders, and neither of them accustomed to move large armies, would find in suddenly changing their line of operations, escape him. His march to Cabeçon and his position on the left of the Pisuerga was not a retreat, it was the shift of a practised captain.

When forced to withdraw Hill from the Tagus, he, on the instant, formed a new combination to fight that great battle on the Adaja which he had intended to deliver near the Guadalaviar; and though the splendid exploit of captain Guingret, at Tordesillas, baffled this intent, he, in return, baffled Souham by that ready stroke of generalship, the posting of his whole army in front of Rueda, thus forbidding a passage by the restored bridge. Finally, if he could not maintain the line of the Duero, nor that of the Tormes, it was because rivers can never be permanently defended against superior forces, and yet he did not quit the last without a splendid tactical illustration. I mean that surprising movement from the Arapiles to the Valmusa, a movement made not in confusion and half flight, but in close order of battle, his columns ready for action, his artillery and cavalry skirmishing, passing the Junguen without disorder, filing along the front of and winding into the rear of a most powerful French army, the largest ever collected in one mass in the Peninsula, an army having twice as many guns as the allies, and twelve thousand able horsemen to boot. And all these great and skilful actions were executed by lord Wellington with an army composed of different nations; soldiers, fierce indeed, and valiant, terrible in battle, but characterised by himself, as more deficient in good discipline than any army of which he had ever read!

Men engaged only in civil affairs, and especially book-men, are apt to undervalue military genius, talking as if simple bravery were the highest qualification of a general; and they have another mode of appeasing an inward sense of inferiority, namely, to attribute the successes of a great captain to the prudence of some discreet adviser, who in secret rules the general, amends his errors, and leaves him all the glory. Thus Napoleon had Berthier, Wellington has sir George Murray! but in this, the most skilful, if not the most glorious of Wellington's campaigns, sir George Murray was not present, and the staff of the army was governed by three young lieutenant-colonels, namely, lord Fitzroy Somerset, Waters, and Delancey; for though sir Willoughby Gordon joined the army as quartermaster-general after the battle of Salamanca, he was inexperienced, and some bodily suffering impeded his personal exertions.

Such then were the principal points of skill displayed by Wellington; yet so vast and intricate an art is war, that the apophthegm of Turenne will always be found applicable: *he who has made no mistakes in war, has seldom made war.*" Some military writers, among them the celebrated Jomini, blame the English general, that with a conquering army,

and an insurgent nation at his back, he should in three months after his victory have attempted nothing more than the unsuccessful siege of Burgos. This censure is not entirely unfounded; the king certainly escaped very easily from Madrid; yet there are many points to be argued ere the question can be decided. The want of money, a want progressively increasing, had become almost intolerable. Wellington's army was partly fed from Ciudad Rodrigo, partly from the valley of the Pisuerga; Hill's troops were fed from Lisbon; the Portuguese in their own country, and the Spaniards everywhere lived as the French did, by requisition; but the British professed to avoid that mode of subsistence, and they made it a national boast to all Europe that they did so; the movements of the army were therefore always subservient to this principle, and must be judged accordingly, because want of money was with them want of motion.

Now four modes of operation were open to Wellington.

1st. *After the victory of Salamanca, to follow the king to Valencia, unite with the Alicant army, and, having thus separated Soult from Joseph and Suchet, to act according to events.*

To have thus moved at once, without money, into Valencia, or Murcia, new countries where he had no assured connexions, and which were scarcely able to feed the French armies, would have exposed him to great difficulties; and he must have made extensive arrangements with the fleet ere he could have acted vigorously, if, as was probable, the French concentrated all their forces behind the Guadalaviar. Meanwhile the distance between the main allied army and those troops necessarily left in the north, being considered, the latter must have been strengthened at the expense of those in the south, unless the army of Portugal joined the king, and then Wellington would have been quite overmatched in Valencia; that is, if Soult also joined the king, and if not, he would have placed the English general between two fires. If a force was not left in the north, the army of Portugal would have had open field, either to march to the king's assistance by Zaragoza, or to have relieved Astorga, seized Salamanca, recovered the prisoners and the trophies of the Arapiles, and destroyed all the great lines of magazines and depots even to the Tagus. Moreover, the yellow fever raged in Murcia, and this would have compelled the English general to depend upon the contracted base of operations offered by Alicant, because the advance of Clauzel would have rendered it impossible to keep it on the Tagus. Time, therefore, was required to arrange the means of operating in this manner, and meanwhile the army was not unwisely turned another way.

2d. *To march directly against Soult in Andalusia.*

This project Wellington was prepared to execute, when the king's orders rendered it unnecessary, but if Joseph had adopted Soult's plan, a grand field for the display of military art would have been opened. The king, going by the Despenas Peros, and having the advantage of time in the march, could have joined Soult, with the army of the centre, before the English general could have joined Hill. The sixty thousand combatants thus united could have kept the field until Suchet had also joined; but they could scarcely have maintained the blockade of Cadiz also, and hence the error of Wellington seems to have been, that he did not make an effort to overtake the king, either upon or beyond the Tagus; for the army of the centre would certainly have joined Soult by the Despenas Peros, if Maitland had not that moment landed at Alicant.

3d. *To follow the army of Portugal after the victory of Salamanca.*

The reasons for moving upon Madrid, instead of adopting this line of operations, having been already shewn in former observations, need not be here repeated, yet it may be added that the destruction of the great arsenal and depot of the Retiro was no small object with reference to the safety of Portugal.

4th. *The plan which was actually followed.*

The English general's stay in the capital was unavoidable, seeing that to observe the development of the French operations in the south, was of such importance. It only remains, therefore, to trace him after he quitted Madrid. Now the choice of his line of march by Valladolid certainly appears commonplace, and deficient in vigour, but it was probably decided by the want of money, and of means of transport; to which may be added the desire to bring the Gallicians forward, which he could only attain by putting himself in actual military communication with them, and covering their advance. Yet this will not excuse the feeble pursuit of Clauzel's retreating army up the valley of the Pisuerga. The Spaniards would not the less have come up if that general had been defeated, nor would the want of their assistance have been much felt in the action. Considerable loss would, no doubt, have been suffered by the Anglo-Portuguese, and they could ill bear it, but the result of the victory would have amply repaid the damage received; for the time gained by Clauzel was employed by Caffarelli to strengthen the castle of Burgos, which contained the greatest French depot in this part of Spain. A victory, therefore, would have entirely disarranged the enemy's means of defence in the north, and would have sent the twice broken and defeated army of Portugal behind the Ebro; then neither the conscript reinforcements, nor the junction of Caffarelli's troops, would have enabled Clauzel, with all his activity and talent, to reappear in the field before Burgos would have fallen. But that fortress would most probably have fallen at once, in which case the English general might have returned to the Tagus, and perhaps in time to have met Soult as he issued forth from the mountains in his march from Andalusia.

It may be objected, that as Burgos did not yield, it would not have yielded under any circumstances without a vigorous defence. This is not so certain, the effect of a defeat would have been very different from the effect of such a splendid operation as Clauzel's retreat; and it appears, also, that the prolonged defence of the castle may be traced to some errors of detail in the attack, as well as to want of sufficient artillery means. In respect of the great features of the campaign, it may be assumed that Wellington's judgment on the spot, and with a full knowledge both of his own and his adversaries' situation, is of more weight than that of critics, however able and acute, who knew nothing of his difficulties. But in the details there was something of error exceedingly strange. It is said, I believe truly, that sir Howard Douglas, being consulted, objected to the proceeding by gallery and mine against an outward, a middle, and an inward line of defence, as likely to involve a succession of tedious and difficult enterprises, which, even if successful, would still leave the White Church, and the upper castle or keep to be carried;—that this castle, besides other artillery armament, was surmounted by a powerful battery of heavy guns, bearing directly upon the face of the horn-work of San Michael, the only point from which it could be breached, and until it was breached, the governor, a gallant man, would certainly not surrender. It could not, however, be breached, without a

larger battering train than the allies possessed, and would not, as he supposed, be effected by mines; wherefore proposing to take the guns from two frigates, then lying at Santander, he proffered to bring them up in time.

In this reasoning lord Wellington partly acquiesced, but his hopes of success were principally founded on the scarcity of water in the castle and upon the facility of burning the provision magazines; nor was he without hope that his fortune would carry him through, even with the scanty means he possessed. Towards the end of the siege, however, he did resort, though too late, to the plan of getting guns up from Santander. But while sir Howard Douglas thus counselled him on the spot, sir Edward Pakenham, then in Madrid, assured the author of this history, at the time, that he also, foreseeing the artillery means were too scanty, had proposed to send by the Somosierra, twelve fine Russian battering guns, then in the Retiro; and he pledged himself to procure, by an appeal to the officers in the capital, animals sufficient to transport them and their ammunition to Burgos in a few days. The offer was not accepted.

Something also may be objected to the field operations, as connected with the siege; for it is the rule, although not an absolute one, that the enemy's active army should first be beaten, or driven beyond some strong line, such as a river, or chain of mountains, before a siege is commenced. Now if Wellington had masked the castle after the horn-work was carried on the 19th, and had then followed Clausel, the French generals, opposed to him, admit, that they would have gone over the Ebro, perhaps even to Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In that case all the minor depots must have been broken up, and the reorganization of the army of Portugal retarded at least a month; before that time the guns from Santander would have arrived and the castle of Burgos would have fallen. In Souham's secret despatches, it is said, of course on the authority of spies, that Castaños urged an advance beyond Burgos instead of a siege; of this I know nothing, but it is not unlikely, because to advance continually, and to surround an enemy, constituted, with Spanish generals, the whole art of war. Howbeit, on this occasion, the advice, if given, was not unreasonable; and it needed scarcely even to delay the siege while the covering army advanced, because one division of infantry might have come up from Madrid, still leaving two of the finest in the army, and a brigade of cavalry, at that capital, which was sufficient, seeing that Hill was coming up to Toledo, that Ballesteros' disobedience was then unknown, and that the king was in no condition to advance before Soult arrived.

The last point to which it is fitting to advert, was the stopping too long on the Tormes in hopes of fighting in the position of the Arapiles. It was a stirring thought, indeed, for a great mind, and the error was brilliantly redeemed, but the remedy does not efface the original fault; and this subject leads to a consideration, of some speculative interest, namely, why Wellington, desirous as he was to keep the line of the Tormes, and knowing with what difficulty the French fed their large army, did not order everything in his rear to take refuge in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, and entrench himself on St. Christoval and in Salamanca. Thus posted, with a bridge-head on the left bank, that he might operate on either side of the Tormes, he might have waited until famine obliged the enemy to separate, which would have been in a very few days; but perhaps the answer would be that the Spaniards had left Ciudad Rodrigo in a defenceless state

Turning now to the French side, we shall find that they also committed errors.

Souham's pursuit, after the cavalry combat at Vente de Pozo, was feeble. Wellington, speaking of his own army, said, "no troops were ever less pressed by an enemy." The king's orders were, however, positive not to fight, and as the English general continually offered Souham battle in strong positions, the man had no power to do mischief. Soult's pursuit of Hill, which was also remarkably cautious, arose from other motives. He was not desirous of a battle, and, until the Guadarama was passed, Hill had the larger force, for then only was the whole French army united. The duke of Dalmatia wished to have marched in one great mass through La Mancha, leaving only a small corps, or a detachment of Suchet's army, on the Cuenca road; but the king united the whole of the army of the centre, his own guards and seven thousand men of the army of the south, on the Cuenca line, and there were no good cross communications except by Tarazona. Soult, therefore, advanced towards the Tagus with only thirty-five thousand men, and, from commissariat difficulties and other obstacles, he was obliged to move by divisions, which followed each other at considerable distances; when his advanced guard was at Valdemoro, his rear-guard, not having reached Ocaña, was two marches distant. The danger of this movement is evident. Hill might have turned and driven him over the Tagus; or if his orders had permitted him to act offensively at first, he might, after leaving a small corps on the upper Tagus to watch the king, have passed that river at Toledo, and without abandoning his line of operations by the valley of the Tagus, have attacked Soult while on the march towards Ocaña. The latter, in despite of his numerous cavalry, must then have fallen back to concentrate his forces, and this would have deranged the whole campaign.

The duke of Dalmatia, who thought Ballesteros was with Hill, naturally feared to press his adversary under such a vicious disposition of the French army, neither could that disposition be changed during the operation, because of the want of good cross roads, and because Souham had been taught that the king would meet him on the side of Guadalaxara. In fine, Soult had learned to respect his adversaries, and with the prudence of a man whose mental grasp embraced the whole machinery of the war, he avoided a doubtful battle, where a defeat would, from the unsettled state of the French affairs, have lost the whole Peninsula. Wellington had Portugal to fall back upon, but the French armies must have gone behind the Ebro.

These seem to be the leading points of interest in this campaign, but it will not be uninteresting to mark the close affinities between Wellington's retreat and that of sir John Moore. This last-named general marched from Portugal into the north of Spain, with the political view of saving Andalusia, by drawing on himself the French power, having before-hand declared that he expected to be overwhelmed. In like manner, Wellington moved into the same country to deliver Andalusia, and thus drew on himself the whole power of the enemy; like Moore, declaring also before-hand, that the political object being gained, his own military position would be endangered. Both succeeded, and both were, as they had foretold, overwhelmed by superior forces. Moore was to have been aided by Romana's Spanish army, but he found it a burthen; so also Wellington was impeded, not assisted, by the Gallicians, and both generals were without money.

Moore, having approached Soult and menaced

Burgos, was forced to retreat, because Napoleon moved from Madrid on his right flank and towards his rear. Wellington having actually besieged Burgos was obliged to raise the siege and retire, lest the king, coming through Madrid, should pass his right flank and get into his rear. Moore was only followed by Souham to the Esla, Wellington was only followed by Souham to the Duero. The one general looked to the mountains of Galicia for positions which he could maintain, but the apathy of the Spanish people in the south, permitted Napoleon to bring up such an overwhelming force that this plan could not be sustained; the other general had the same notion with respect to the Duero, and the defection of Ballesteros enabled the king to bring up such a power that further retreat became necessary.

Moore's soldiers, at the commencement of the operation, evinced want of discipline; they committed great excesses at Valderas, and disgraced themselves by their inebriety at Bemibre and Villa Franca. In like manner Wellington's soldiers broke the bonds of discipline; disgraced themselves by drunkenness at Torquemada and on the retreat from the Puente Larga to Madrid; and they committed excesses every where. Moore stopped behind the Esla river to check the enemy, to restore order, and to enable his commissariat to remove the stores; Wellington stopped behind the Carion for exactly the same purposes. The one general was immediately turned on his left, because the bridge of Mancilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceschi; the other general was also turned on his left, because the bridge of Palencia was abandoned unbroken to Foy.

Moore's retreat was little short of three hundred miles; Wellington's was nearly as long, and both were in the winter season. The first halted at Benevente, at Villa Franca, and at Lugo; the last halted at Duenas, at Cabeçon, Tordesillas, and Salamanca. The principal loss sustained by the one, was in the last marches between Lugo and Coruña; so also the principal loss sustained by the other, was in the last marches between the Tormes and the Agueda. Some of Moore's generals murmured against his proceedings, some of Wellington's generals, as we have seen, went further; the first were checked by a reprimand, the second were humbled by a sarcasm. Finally, both generals reproached their armies with want of discipline; both attributed it to the negligence of the officers generally, and in both cases the justice of the reproaches was proved by the exceptions. The reserve and the foot guards in Moore's campaign, the light division and the foot guards in Wellington's, gave signal proof, that it was negligence of discipline, not hardships, though the latter were severe in both armies, that caused the losses. Not that I would be understood to say that those regiments only preserved order; it is certain that many others were eminently well conducted, but those were the troops named as exceptions at the time.

Such were the resemblances of these two retreats. The differences were, that Moore had only twenty-three thousand men in the first part of his retreat, and only nineteen thousand in the latter part, whereas Wellington had thirty-three thousand in the first part of his retreat, and sixty-eight thousand men in the latter part. Moore's army were all of one nation and young soldiers, Wellington's were of different nations, but they were veterans. The first marched through mountains, where the weather was infinitely more inclement than in the plains, over which the second moved; and until he reached the Esla, Moore's flank was quite exposed, whereas Wellington's flank was covered by Hill's army until he

gained the Tormes. Wellington, with veteran troops, was opposed to Souham, to Soult, to the king, and to Jourdan, men not according in their views; and their whole army, when united, did not exceed the allies by more than twenty thousand men. Moore, with young soldiers, was at first opposed to four times, and, latterly, to three times his own numbers; for it is remarkable, that the French army assembled at Astorga was above eighty thousand, including ten thousand cavalry, which is nearly the same as the number assembled against Wellington on the Tormes; but Moore had little more than twenty thousand men to oppose to this overwhelming mass, and Wellington had nearly seventy thousand. The partidas abounded at the time of Wellington's retreat; they were unknown at the time of Moore's retreat; and this general was confronted by Napoleon, who, despotic in command, was also unrivalled in skill, in genius, and in vigour. Wellington's army was not pressed by the enemy, and he made short marches; yet he lost more stragglers than Moore, who was vigorously pressed, made long marches, and could only secure an embarkation by delivering a battle, in which he died most honourably. His character was immediately vilified. Wellington was relieved from his pursuers by the operation of a famine, and had therefore no occasion to deliver a battle, but he also was vilified at the time, with equal injustice; and if he had then died, it would have been with equal malice. His subsequent successes, his great name and power, have imposed silence on his detractors, or converted censure into praise; for it is the nature of mankind, especially of the ignorant, to cling to fortune.

Moore attributed his difficulties to the apathy of the Spaniards; his friends charged them on the incapacity of the English government. Wellington attributed his ultimate failure to the defection of Ballesteros; his brother, in the House of Lords, charged it on the previous contracted policy of Perceval's government, which had crippled the general's means; and certainly Wellington's reasoning, relative to Ballesteros, was not quite sound. That general, he said, might either have forced Soult to take the circuitous route to Valencia, Requena, and Cuenca, or leave a strong corps in observation, and then Hill might have detached men to the north. He even calculated upon Ballesteros being able to stop both Soult and Souham, altogether; for, as the latter's operations were prescribed by the king, and dependent upon his proceedings, Wellington judged that he would have remained tranquil if Joseph had not advanced. This was the error. Souham's despatches clearly shew, that the king's instructions checked instead of forwarding his movements; and that it was his intention to have delivered battle at the end of four days, without regard to the king's orders; and such was his force, that Wellington admitted his own inability to keep the field. Ballesteros' defection, therefore, cannot be pleaded in bar of all further investigation; but whatever failures there were, and however imposing the height to which the English general's reputation has since attained, this campaign, including the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, the forts of Salamanca, and of Burgos, the assault of Almaraz, and the battle of Salamanca, will probably be considered his finest illustration of the art of war. Waterloo may be called a more glorious exploit, because of the great man who was there vanquished; Assye may be deemed a wonderful action, one indeed to be compared with the victory which Lucullus gained over Tygranes, but Salamanca will be always referred to as the most skilful of Wellington's battles.

BOOK XX.

CHAPTER V.

Political affairs—Their influence on the war—Napoleon's invasion of Russia—Its influence on the contests in the Peninsula—State of feeling in England—Lord Wellesley charges the ministers, and especially Mr. Perceval with imbecility—His proofs thereof—Ability and zeal of lord Wellington and Mr. Stewart shewn—Absurd plans of the count of Funchal—Mr. Villiers and Mr. Vansittart—The English ministers propose to sell the Portuguese crown and church lands—The folly and injustice of these, and other schemes exposed by lord Wellington—He goes to Cadiz—His reception there—New organization of the Spanish armies—Wellington goes to Lisbon, where he is enthusiastically received—His departure from Cadiz the signal for renewed dissensions—Carlotta's intrigues—Decree to abolish the Inquisition opposed by the clergy—The regency aid the clergy—Are displaced by the cortes—New regency appointed—The American party in the cortes adopt Carlotta's cause—Fail from fear of the people—Many bishops and church dignitaries are arrested, and others fly into Portugal—The Pope's nuncio, Gravina, opposes the cortes—His benefices sequestered—He flies to Portugal—His intrigues there—Secret overtures made to Joseph by some of the Spanish armies.

WHILE the armies were striving, the political affairs had become exceedingly complicated and unsteady. Their workings were little known or observed by the public; but the evils of bad government in England, Spain, and Portugal; the incongruous alliance of bigoted aristocracy with awakened democracy, and the inevitable growth of national jealousies, as external danger seemed to recede, were becoming so powerful, that if relief had not been obtained from extraneous events, even the vigour of Wellington must have sunk under the pressure. The secret causes of disturbance shall now be laid bare; and, it will then be seen, that the catastrophe of Napoleon's Russian campaign was absolutely necessary to the final success of the British arms in the Peninsula. I speak not of the physical power which, if his host had not withered on the snowy wastes of Muscovy, the emperor could have poured into Spain; but of those moral obstacles which, springing up on every side, corrupted the very life-blood of the war.

If Russia owed her safety in some degree to the contest in the Peninsula, it is undoubted that the fate of the Peninsula was, in return, decided on the plains of Russia; for had the French veterans, who there perished, returned victorious, the war could have been maintained for years in Spain, with all its waste of treasures and of blood, to the absolute ruin of England, even though her army might have been victorious in every battle. Yet who shall say with certainty what termination any war will ever have? Who will prophecy of an art always varying, and of such intricacy that its secrets seem beyond the reach of human intellect? What vast preparations; what astonishing combinations were involved in the plan, what vigour and ability displayed in the execution of Napoleon's march to Moscow! And yet, when the winter came, only four days sooner than he expected, the giant's scheme seemed a thing for children to laugh at!

Nevertheless, the political grandeur of that expedition will not be hereafter judged from the wild triumphs of his enemies; nor, its military merits,

from the declamation which has hitherto passed as the history of the wondrous, though unfortunate enterprise. It will not be the puerilities of La-baume, of Segur, and their imitators; nor even that splendid military and political essay of general Jomini, called the "*Life of Napoleon*," which posterity will accept as the measure of a general, who carried four hundred thousand men across the Niemen, and an hundred and sixty thousand men to Moscow. And with such a military providence; with such a vigilance, so disposing his reserves, so guarding his flanks, so guiding his masses; that while constantly victorious in front no post was lost in his rear; no convoy failed, no courier was stopped; not even a letter was missing: the communication with his capital was as regular and certain as if that immense march had been but a summer excursion of pleasure! However, it failed, and its failure was the safety of the Peninsula.

In England the retreat from Burgos was viewed with the alarm and anger which always accompanies the disappointment of high-raised public expectation; the people had been taught to believe the French weak and dispirited; they saw them so strong and daring, that even victory could not enable the allies to make a permanent stand beyond the frontiers of Portugal. Hence arose murmurs, and a growing distrust as to the ultimate result, which would not have failed to overturn the war faction, if the retreat of the French from Moscow, the defection of Prussia, and the strange unlooked-for spectacle of Napoleon vanquished, had not come in happy time as a counterpoise.

When the parliament met, lord Wellesley undertook, and did very clearly show, that if the successes in the early part of the year had not been, by his brother, pushed to the extent expected, and had been followed by important reverses, the causes were clearly to be traced to the imbecile administration of Mr. Perceval and his coadjutors, whose policy he truly characterized as having in it "*nothing regular but confusion*." With a very accurate knowledge of facts, he discussed the military question, and maintained that twelve thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, added to the army in the beginning of the year, would have rendered the campaign decisive, because the Russian contest, the incapacity of Joseph, and the dissensions of the French generals in Spain, had produced the most favourable crisis for striking a vital blow at the enemy's power. The cabinet were aware of this, and in good time, but though there were abundance of soldiers idling at home, when the welfare of the state required their presence in the Peninsula, nay, although the ministers had actually sent within five thousand as many men as were necessary, they had, with the imbecility which marked all their proceedings, so contrived, that few or none should reach the theatre of war until the time for success had passed away. Then touching upon the financial question, with a rude hand he tore to pieces the ministers' pitiful pretexes, that the want of specie had necessarily put bounds to their efforts, and that the general himself did not complain. "No!" ex-

claimed lord Wellesley, "he does not complain, because it is the sacred duty of a soldier not to complain. But he does not say that with greater means he could not do greater things, and his country will not be satisfied if these means are withheld by men, who, having assumed the direction of affairs in such a crisis, have only incapacity to plead in extenuation of their failures."

This stern accuser was himself fresh from the ministry, versed in state matters, and of unquestionable talents; he was well acquainted with the actual resources and difficulties of the moment; he was sincere in his opinions, because he had abandoned office rather than be a party to such a miserable mismanagement of England's power; he was, in fine, no mean authority against his former colleagues, even though the facts did not so clearly bear him out in his views.

That England possessed the troops, and that they were wanted by Wellington, is undeniable. Even in September there were still between fifty and sixty thousand soldiers present under arms at home, and that any additional force could have been fed in Portugal is equally beyond doubt, because the reserve magazines contained provisions for one hundred thousand men for nine months. The only question then, was the possibility of procuring enough of specie to purchase those supplies which could not be had on credit. Lord Wellington had, indeed, made the campaign almost without specie, and a small additional force would certainly not have overwhelmed his resources; but, setting this argument aside, what efforts, what ability, what order, what arrangements were made by the government to overcome the difficulties of the time? Was there less extravagance in the public offices, the public works, public salaries, public contracts? The very snuff-boxes and services of plate given to diplomatists, the gorgeous furniture of palaces, nay, the gaudy trappings wasted on Whittingham's, Roche's and Downie's divisions, would almost have furnished the wants of the additional troops demanded by lord Wellesley. Where were all the millions lavished in subsidies to the Spaniards; where the millions which South America had transmitted to Cadiz; where those sums spent by the soldiers during the war? Real money had, indeed, nearly disappeared from England, and a base paper had usurped its place; but gold had not disappeared from the world, and an able ministry would have found it. These men only knew how to squander.

The subsidy granted to Portugal was paid by the commercial speculation of lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, speculations which also fed the army, saved the whole population of Portugal from famine, and prevented the war from stopping in 1811; and yet, so little were the ministers capable even of understanding, much less of making such arrangements, that they now rebuked their general for having adopted them, and, after their own imbecile manner, insisted upon a new mode of providing supplies. Every movement they made proved their incapacity. They had permitted lord William Bentinck to engage in the scheme of invading Italy when additional troops were wanted in Portugal; and they suffered him to bid, in the money-market, against lord Wellington, and thus sweep away two millions of dollars at an exorbitant premium, for a chimera, when the war in the Peninsula was upon the point of stopping altogether, in default of that very money which Wellington could have otherwise procured—nay, had actually been promised at a reasonable cost. Nor was this the full measure of their folly.

Lord Wellesley affirmed, and they were unable to deny the fact, that dollars might have been obtained from South America to any amount, if the government would have consented to pay the market-price for them; they would not do it, and yet afterwards sought to purchase the same dollars at a higher rate in the European markets. He told them, and they could not deny it, that they had empowered five different agents, to purchase dollars for five different services, without any controlling head; that these independent agents were bidding against each other in every money-market, and the restrictions as to the price were exactly in the inverse proportion to the importance of the service: the agent for the troops in Malta was permitted to offer the highest price, lord Wellington was restricted to the lowest. And besides this folly, lord Wellesley shewed that they had, under their licensing system, permitted French vessels to bring French goods, silks and gloves, to England, and to carry bullion away in return. Napoleon thus paid his army in Spain with the very coin which should have subsisted the English troops.

Incapable, however, as the ministers were of making the simplest arrangements; neglecting, as they did, the most obvious means of supplying the wants of the army; incapable even, as we have seen, of sending out a few bales of clothing and arms for the Spaniards without producing the utmost confusion, they were heedless of the counsels of their general, prompt to listen to every intriguing adviser, and ready to plunge into the most absurd and complicated measures, to relieve that distress which their own want of ability had produced. When the war with the United States broke out, a war provoked by themselves, they suffered the Admiralty, contrary to the wishes of Mr. Stuart, to reduce the naval force at Lisbon, and to neglect Wellington's express recommendation as to the stationing of ships for the protection of the merchantmen bringing flour and stores to Portugal. Thus the American privateers, being unmolested, run down the coast of Africa, intercepted the provision trade from the Brazils, which was one of the principal resources of the army, and then, emboldened by impunity, infested the coast of Portugal, captured fourteen ships loaded with flour off the Douro, and a large vessel in the very mouth of the Tagus. These things happened also when the ministers were censuring and interfering with the general's commercial transactions, and seeking to throw the feeding of his soldiers into the hands of British speculators; as if the supply of an army was like that of a common market! never considering that they thus made it the merchant's interest to starve the troops with a view to increase profits; never considering that it was by that very commerce, which they were putting an end to, that the general had paid the Portuguese subsidy for them, and had furnished his own military chest with specie, when their administrative capacity was quite unequal to the task.

Never was a government better served than the British government was by lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart. With abilities, vigilance, and industry seldom equalled, they had made themselves masters of all that related to the Portuguese policy, whether foreign or domestic, military, or civil, or judicial. They knew all the causes of mischief, they had faithfully represented them both to the Portuguese and British governments, and had, moreover, devised effectual remedies. But the former met them with the most vexatious opposition, and the latter, neglecting their advice, lent themselves to those foolish financial schemes which I have be-

fore touched upon as emanating from Mr. Villiers, Mr. Vansittart, and the count of Funchal. The first had been deficient as an ambassador and statesman, the second was universally derided as a financier, and the third, from his long residence in London, knew very little of the state of Portugal, had derived that little from the information of his brother, the restless Principal Souza, and in all his schemes had reference only to his own intrigues in the Brazils. Their plans were necessarily absurd. Funchal revived the old project of an English loan, and, in concert with his coadjutors, desired to establish a bank after the manner of the English institution; and they likewise advanced a number of minor details and propositions, most of which had been before suggested by Principal Souza and rejected by lord Wellington, and all of which went to evade, not to remedy the evils. Finally, they devised, and the English cabinet actually entertained the plan, of selling the crown and church property of Portugal. This spoliation of the Catholic church was to be effected by commissioners, one of whom was to be Mr. Sydenham, an Englishman and a Protestant; and as it was judged that the pope would not readily yield his consent, they resolved to apply to his nuncio, who, being in their power, they expected to find more pliable.

Having thus provided for the financial difficulties of Portugal, the ministers turned their attention to the supply of the British army, and in the same spirit concocted what they called a modified system of requisitions, after the manner of the French armies! Their speeches, their manifestoes, their whole scheme of policy, which in the working had nearly crushed the liberties of England, and had plunged the whole world into war; that policy, whose aim and scope was, they said, to support established religion, the rights of monarchs, and the independence of nations, was now disregarded or forgotten. Yes, these men, to remove difficulties caused by their own incapacity and negligence, were ready to adopt all that they had before condemned and reviled in the French; they were eager to meddle, and in the most offensive manner, with the Catholic religion, by getting from the nuncio, who was in their power, what they could not get from the pope voluntarily; they were ready to interfere with the rights of the Portuguese crown by selling its property, and finally, they would have adopted that system of requisitions which they had so often denounced as rendering the very name of France abhorrent to the world.

All these schemes were duly transmitted to lord Wellington and to Mr. Stuart, and the former had, in the field, to unravel the intricacies, to detect the fallacies, and to combat the wild speculations of men, who, in profound ignorance of facts, were giving a loose to their imaginations on such complicated questions of state. It was while preparing to fight Marmont that he had to expose the futility of relying upon a loan; it was on the heights of San Christoval, on the field of battle itself, that he demonstrated the absurdity of attempting to establish a Portuguese bank; it was in the trenches of Burgos that he dissected Funchal's and Villiers' schemes of finance, and exposed the folly of attempting the sale of church property; it was at the termination of the retreat that, with a mixture of rebuke and reasoning, he quelled the proposal to live by forced requisitions; and, on each occasion, he shewed himself as well acquainted with these subjects as he was with the mechanism of armies.

Reform abuses, raise your actual taxes with vigour and impartiality, pay your present debt before

you contract a new one, was his constant reply to the propositions for loans, and when the English ministers pressed the other plans, which, besides the bank, included a recoinage of dollars into cruzados, in other words, the depreciation of the silver standard, he, with an unsparing hand, laid their folly bare. The military and political state of Portugal, he said, was such that no man in his senses, whether native or foreigner, would place his capital where he could not withdraw it at a moment's notice. When Massena invaded that country, unreasonable despondency had prevailed amongst the ministers, and now they seemed to have a confidence as wild as their former fear; but he who knew the real state of affairs; he who knew the persons that were expected to advance money; he who knew the relative forces of the contending armies, the advantages and disadvantages attending each; he who knew the absolute weakness of the Portuguese frontier as a line of defence, could only laugh at the notion, that the capitalists would take gold out of their own chests to lodge it in the chests of the bank, and eventually in those of the Portuguese treasury, a treasury deservedly without credit. The French armies opposed to him in the field (he was then on San Christoval) were, he said, just double his own strength, and a serious accident to Ballesteros, a rash general with a bad army, would oblige the Anglo-Portuguese force to retire into Portugal, and the prospects of the campaign would vanish; and this argument left out of the question any accident which might happen to himself or to general Hill. Portugal would, he hoped, be saved, but its security was not such as these visionaries would represent it.

But they had proposed, also, a British security, in jewels, for the capital of their bank, and their reasonings on this head were equally fallacious. This security was to be supported by collecting the duties on wines, exported from Portugal to England, and yet they had not even ascertained whether the existence of these duties was conformable to the treaty with England. Then came the former question, Would Great Britain guarantee the capital of the subscribers, whether Portugal was lost or saved? If the country should be lost, the new possessors would understand the levying the duties upon wines as well as the old; would England make her drinkers of port pay two duties, the one for the benefit of the bank capitalists, the other for the benefit of the French conquerors? If all these difficulties could be got over, a bank would be the most efficacious mode in which England could use her credit for the benefit of Portugal; but all the other plans proposed were mere spendthrift schemes to defray the expenses of the war, and if the English government could descend to entertain them, they would fail, because the real obstacle, scarcity of specie, would remain.

A nation desirous of establishing public credit should begin, he said, by acquiring a revenue equal to its fixed expenditure, and must manifest an inclination to be honest by performing its engagements with respect to public debts. This maxim he had constantly enforced to the Portuguese government, and if they had minded it, instead of trusting to the fallacious hope of getting loans in England, the deficiency of their revenue would have been made up, without imposing new taxes, and even with the repeal of many which were oppressive and unjust. The fair and honest collection of taxes, which ought to exist, would have been sufficient. For, after protracted and unsparing exertions, and by refusing to accept their paper money on any other condition in

his commissariat transactions, he had at last forced the Portuguese authorities to pay the interest of that paper and of their exchequer bills, called "*Ap-olocias grandes*," and the effect had been to increase the resources of the government, though the government had even, in the execution, evinced its corruption. Then, showing in detail how this benefit had been produced, he traced the mischief created by men whom he called the *sharks* of Lisbon and other great towns, meaning speculators, principally Englishmen, whose nefarious cupidity led them to cry down the credit of the army-bills and then purchase them, to the injury of the public and of the poor people who furnished the supplies.

A plan of reconing the Spanish dollars, and so gaining eight in the hundred of pure silver, which they contained above that of the Portuguese cruzado, he treated as a fraud, and a useless one. In Lisbon, where the cruzado was current, some gain might perhaps be made; but it was not even there certain, and foreigners, Englishmen and Americans, from whom the great supplies were purchased, would immediately add to their prices in proportion to the deterioration of the coin. Moreover, the operations and expenditure of the army were not confined to Lisbon, nor even to Portugal, and the cruzado would not pass for its nominal value in Spain; thus, instead of an advantage, the greatest inconvenience would result from a scheme, at the best unworthy of the British government. In fine, the reform of abuses, the discontinuance of useless expenses, economy, and energy, were the only remedies.

Such was his reasoning, but it had little effect on his persecutors; for when his best men were falling by hundreds, his brightest visions of glory fading on the smoky walls of Burgos, he was again forced to examine and refute anew, voluminous plans of Portuguese finance, concocted by Funchal and Villiers, with notes by Vansittart. All the old schemes of the Principal Souza, which had been so often before analyzed and rejected as impracticable, were revived, with the addition of a mixed Anglo-Portuguese commission for the sale of the crown and church lands. And these projects were accompanied with complaints that frauds had been practised on the custom-house, and violence used towards the inhabitants by the British commissaries, and it was insinuated such misconduct had been the real cause of the financial distresses of Portugal. The patient industry of genius was never more severely taxed.

Wellington began by repelling the charges of exactions and frauds, as applied to the army; he showed that to reform the custom-house so as to prevent frauds, had been his unceasing recommendation to the Portuguese government; that he had as repeatedly, and in detail, shewed the government how to remedy the evils they complained of, how to increase their customs, how to levy their taxes, how, in fine, to arrange their whole financial system in a manner that would have rendered their revenues equal to their expenses, and without that oppression and injustice which they were in the habit of practising; for the extortions and violence complained of, were not perpetrated by the English, but by the Portuguese commissariat, and yet the troops of that nation were starving. Having exposed Funchal's ignorance of financial facts in detail, and challenged him to the proof of the charges against the British army, he entered deeply into the consideration of the great question of the sale of the crown and church lands, which it had been proposed to substitute for that economy and reform of abuses which he so long, so often and so vainly had pressed

upon the regency. The proposal was not quite new. "I have already," he observed, "had before me a proposition for the sale, or rather transfer, to the creditors of the '*Junta de Viveres*' of crown lands; but these were the uncultivated lands in Alemtejo, and I pointed out to the government the great improbability that any body would take such lands in payment, and the injury that would be done to the public credit by making the scheme public, if not likely to be successful. My opinion is, that there is nobody in Portugal possessed of capital who entertains, or who ought to entertain, such an opinion of the state of affairs in the Peninsula, as to lay out his money in the purchase of crown lands. The loss of a battle, not in the Peninsula even, but elsewhere, would expose his estate to confiscation, or at all events to ruin, by a fresh incursion of the enemy. Even if any man could believe that Portugal is secure against the invasion of the enemy, and his estate and person against the '*violence, exactions, and frauds*' (these were Funchal's words respecting the allied army) of the enemy, he is not, during the existence of the war, according to the Conde de Funchal's notion, exempt from those evils from his own countrymen and their allies. Try this experiment, offer the estates of the crown for sale, and it will be seen whether I have formed a correct judgment on this subject." Then running with a rapid hand over many minor though intricate fallacies for raising the value of the Portuguese paper money, he thus treated the great question of the church lands.

First, as in the case of crown lands, there would be no purchasers, and, as nothing could render the measure palatable to the clergy, the influence of the church would be exerted against the allies, instead of being, as hitherto, strongly exerted in their favour. It would be useless, if the experiment of the crown lands succeeded, and if that failed the sale of church lands could not succeed; but the attempt would alienate the good wishes of a very powerful party in Spain, as well as in Portugal. Moreover, if it should succeed, and be honestly carried into execution, it would entail a burthen on the finances of five in the hundred, on the purchase-money, for the support of the ecclesiastical owners of the estates. The best mode of obtaining for the state eventually the benefit of the church property, would be to prevent the monasteries and nunneries from receiving novices, and thus, in the course of time, the pope might be brought to consent to the sale of the estates, or the nation might assume possession when the ecclesiastical corporations thus became extinct. He, however, thought that it was no disadvantage to Spain or Portugal, that large portions of land should be held by the church. The bishops and monks were the only proprietors who lived on their estates, and spent the revenues amongst the labourers by whom those revenues had been produced; and, until the habits of the new landed proprietors changed, the transfer of the property in land from the clergy to the laymen would be a misfortune.

This memoir, sent from the trenches of Burgos, quashed Funchal's projects; but that intriguer's object was not so much to remove financial difficulties as to get rid of his brother's opponents in the regency, by exciting powerful interests against them; wherefore, failing in this proposal, he ordered Redondo, now marquis of Borba, the minister of finance, to repair to the Brazils, intending to supply his place with one of his own faction. Wellington and Stuart were at this time doggedly opposed by Borba, but as the credit of the Portuguese treasury was supported by his character for probity, they forbade him to obey the order, and represented the matter

so forcibly to the prince regent, that Funchal was severely reprimanded for his audacity.

It was amidst these vexations that Wellington made his retreat, and in such destitution, that he declared all former distress for money had been slight in comparison of his present misery. So low were the resources, that British naval stores had been trucked for corn in Egypt; and the English ministers, finding that Russia, intent upon pushing her successes, was gathering specie from all quarters, desired Mr. Stuart to prevent the English and American captains of merchant vessels from carrying coin away from Lisbon; a remedial measure, indicating their total ignorance of the nature of commerce. It was not attempted to be enforced. Then, also, they transmitted their plan of supplying the English army by requisitions on the country, a plan, the particulars of which may be best gathered from the answers to it.

Mr. Stuart, firm in opposition, shortly observed, that it was by avoiding and reprobating such a system, although pursued alike by the natives and by the enemy, that the British character and credit had been established so firmly, as to be of the greatest use in the operations of the war. Wellington entered more deeply into the subject.

Nothing, he said, could be procured from the country in the mode proposed by the ministers' memoir, unless resort was also had to the French mode of enforcing their requisitions. The proceedings of the French armies were misunderstood. It was not true, as supposed in the memoir, that the French never paid for supplies. They levied contributions where money was to be had, and with this paid for provisions in other parts; and when requisitions for money or clothing were made, they were taken on account of the regular contributions due to the government. They were, indeed, heavier than even an usurping government was entitled to demand, still it was a regular government account, and it was obvious the British army could not have recourse to a similar plan without depriving its allies of their own legitimate resources.

The requisitions were enforced by a system of terror. A magistrate was ordered to provide for the troops, and was told that the latter would, in case of failure, take the provisions and punish the village or district in a variety of ways. Now, were it expedient to follow this mode of requisition, there must be two armies, one to fight the enemy, and one to enforce the requisitions, for the Spaniards would never submit to such proceedings without the use of force. The conscription gave the French armies a more moral description of soldiers, but even if this second army was provided, the British troops could not be trusted to inflict an exact measure of punishment on a disobedient village, they would plunder it as well as the others readily enough, but their principal object would be to get at and drink as much liquor as they could, and then to destroy as much valuable property as should fall in their way; meanwhile the objects of their mission, the bringing of supplies to the army, and the infliction of an exact measure of punishment on the magistrates or district would not be accomplished at all. Moreover, the holders of supplies in Spain, being unused to commercial habits, would regard payment for these requisitions by bills of any description, to be rather worse than the mode of contribution followed by the French, and would resist it as forcibly. And upon such a nice point did the war hang, that if they accepted the bills and were once to discover the mode of procuring cash for them by discounting high, it would be the most fatal blow possible to the credit

and resources of the British army in the Peninsula. The war would then soon cease.

The memoir asserted that sir John Moore had been well furnished with money, and that, nevertheless, the Spaniards would not give him provisions; and this fact was urged as an argument for enforcing requisitions. But the assertion that Moore was furnished with money, which was itself the index to the ministers' incapacity, Wellington told them was not true. "Moore," he said, "had been even worse furnished than himself; that general had borrowed a little, a very little money at Salamanca, but he had no regular supply for the military chest until the army had nearly reached Coruña; and the Spaniards were not very wrong in their reluctance to meet his wants, for the debts of his army were still unpaid in the latter end of 1812." In fine, there was no mode by which supplies could be procured from the country without payment on the spot, or soon after the transaction, except by prevailing on the Spanish government to give the English army a part of the government contributions, and a part of the revenues of the royal domains, to be received from the people in kind at a reasonable rate. This had been already done by himself in the province of Salamanca with success, and the same system might be extended to other provinces in proportion as the legitimate government was re-established. But this only met a part of the evil; it would, indeed, give some supplies, cheaper than they could otherwise be procured, yet they must afterwards be paid for at Cadiz in specie, and thus less money would come into the military chest, which, as before noticed, was only supported by the mercantile speculations of the general.

Such were the discussions forced upon Wellington, when all his faculties were demanded on the field of battle, and such was the hardness of his intellect to sustain the additional labour. Such, also, were the men calling themselves statesmen who then wielded the vast resources of Great Britain. The expenditure of that country for the year 1812, was above one hundred millions, the ministers who controlled it were yet so ignorant of the elementary principles of finance, as to throw upon their general, even amidst the clangor and tumult of battle, the task of exposing such fallacies. And to reduce these persons from the magnitude of statesmen to their natural smallness of intriguing debaters, is called political prejudice! But though power may enable men to trample upon reason for a time with impunity, they cannot escape her ultimate vengeance, she re-assumes her sway and history delivers them to the justice of posterity.

Perverse as the proceedings of the English ministers were, those of the Portuguese and Spanish governments were not less vexatious; and at this time, the temper of the Spanish rulers was of infinite importance, because of the misfortunes which had befallen the French emperor. The opportunity given to strike a decisive blow at his power in the Peninsula, demanded an early and vigorous campaign in Spain, and the experience of 1812 had taught Wellington, that no aid could be derived from the Spaniards, unless a change was made in their military system. Hence the moment he was assured that the French armies had taken winter-quarters, he resolved before all other matters, in person to urge upon the cortes the necessity of giving him the real as well as the nominal command of their troops, seeing that without an immediate reformation, the Spanish armies could not take the field in due season.

During the past campaign, and especially after the

conde de Abispal, indignant at the censure passed in the cortes on his brother's conduct at Castella, had resigned, the weakness of the Spanish government had become daily more deplorable; but nothing was done to ameliorate the military system; an extreme jealousy raged between the cortes and the regency; and when the former offered lord Wellington the command of their armies, Mr. Wellesley advised him to accept it, not so much in the hope of effecting any beneficial change, as to offer a point upon which the Spaniards, who were still true to the English alliance and to the aristocratic cause, might rally in case of reverse. The disobedience of Ballesteros had been indeed promptly punished; but the vigour of the cortes on that occasion, was more the result of offended pride than any consideration of sound policy, and the retreat of the allies into Portugal, was the signal for a renewal of those dangerous intrigues, which the battle of Salamanca had arrested without crushing.

Lord Wellington reached Cadiz on the 18th of December, he was received without enthusiasm, yet with due honour, and his presence seemed agreeable both to the cortes and to the people; the passions which actuated the different parties in the state subsided for the moment, and the ascendancy of his genius was so strongly felt, that he was heard with patience, even when in private he strongly urged the leading men to turn their attention entirely to the war, to place in obedience their factious disputes, and, above all things, not to put down the inquisition, lest they should drive the powerful church party into the arms of the enemy. His exhortation upon this last point, had indeed no effect save to encourage the serviles to look more to England, yet it did not prevent the cortes yielding to him the entire control of fifty thousand men which were to be paid from the English subsidy; they promised, also, that the commanders should not be removed, nor any change made in the organization or destination of such troops without his consent.

A fresh organization of the Spanish forces now had place. They were divided into four armies and two reserves.

The Catalans formed the first army.

Elio's troops, including the divisions of Duran, Bassecour, and Villa Campa, received the name of the second army.

The forces in the Morena, formerly under Ballesteros, were constituted the third army, under Del Parque.

The troops of Estremadura, Leon, Galicia, and the Asturias, including Morillo's, Penne Villemur's, Downie's, and Carlos d'Espana's separate divisions, were called the fourth army, and given to Castaños, whose appointment to Catalonia was cancelled, and his former dignity of captain-general in Estremadura and Galicia restored. The partidas of Longa, Mina, Porlier, and the other chiefs in the northern provinces, were afterwards united to this army as separate divisions.

The conde d'Abispal, made captain-general of Andalusia, commanded the first reserve, and Lacy, recalled from Catalonia, where he was replaced by Copons, was ordered to form a second reserve in the neighbourhood of San Roque. Such were the new dispositions, but when Wellington had completed this important negotiation with the Spanish government, some inactivity was for the first time discovered in his own proceedings. His stay was a little prolonged without apparent reason, and it was whispered, that if he resembled Cæsar, Cadiz could produce a Cleopatra; but whether true or not, he soon returned to the army, first, however, visiting

Lisbon, where he was greeted with extraordinary honours, and the most unbounded enthusiasm, especially by the people.

His departure from Cadiz, was the signal for all the political dissensions to break out with more violence than before; the dissensions of the liberals and serviles became more rancorous, and the executive was always on the side of the latter, the majority of the cortes on the side of the former; neither enjoyed the confidence of the people nor of the allies, and the intrigues of Carlotta, which never ceased, advanced towards their completion. A strong inclination to make her sole regent was manifested, and sir Henry Wellesley, tired of fruitless opposition, remained neuter, with the approbation of his brother. One of the principal causes of this feeling for Carlotta, was the violence she had shewn against the insurgents of Buenos Ayres, and another, was the disgust given to the merchants of Cadiz, by certain diplomatic measures which lord Strangford had held with that revolted state. The agents of the princess represented the policy of England toward the Spanish colonies, as a smuggling policy, and not without truth, for the advice of lord Wellington upon that subject had been unheeded. Lord Castlereagh had indeed offered a new mediation scheme, whereby the old commission was to proceed under the Spanish restriction of not touching at Mexico, to which country a new mission, composed of Spaniards, was to proceed, accompanied by an English agent, without any ostensible character. This proposal, however, ended as the others had done, and the Spanish jealousy of England increased.

In the beginning of the year 1813, Carlotta's cause, ably and diligently served by Pedro Souza, had gained a number of adherents even amongst the liberals in the cortes. She was ready to sacrifice even the rights of her posterity, and as she promised to maintain all ancient abuses, the clergy and the serviles were in no manner averse to her success. Meanwhile, the decree to abolish the inquisition, which was become the great test of political party, passed on the 7th of March, and the regency were ordered to have it read in the churches. The clergy of Cadiz resisted the order, and intimated their refusal through the medium of a public letter, and the regency encouraged them by removing the governor of Cadiz, admiral Valdez, a known liberal and opponent of the inquisition, appointing in his stead general Alos, a warm advocate for that horrid institution. But in the vindication of official power, the Spaniards are generally prompt and decided. On the 8th, Augustin Arguelles moved, and it was instantly carried, that the sessions of the extraordinary cortes should be declared permanent, with a view to measures worthy of the nation, and to prevent the evils with which the state was menaced by the opposition of the regency and the clergy to the cortes. A decree was then proposed for suppressing the actual regency, and replacing it with a provisional government, to be composed of the three eldest councillors of state. This being conformable to the constitution, was carried, by a majority of eighty-six to fifty-eight, while another proposition, that two members of the cortes, publicly elected, should be added to the regency, was rejected as an innovation, by seventy-two against sixty-six. The councillors, Pedro Agar, Gabriel Ciscar, and the cardinal Bourbon, archbishop of Toledo, were immediately installed as regents.

A committee, which had been appointed to consider of the best means of improving a system of government, felt by all parties to be imperfect, now recommended that the cardinal archbishop, who was

of the blood royal, should be president of the regency, leaving Carlotta's claims unnoticed, and as Cis-cay and Agar had been formerly removed from the regency for incapacity, it was generally supposed, that the intention was to make the archbishop in fact sole regent. Very soon, however, Carlotta's influence was again felt, for a dispute having arisen in the cortes between what were called the Americans and the liberals, about the annual Acapulco-ship, the former, to the number of twenty, joined the party of the princess, and it was resolved that Ruiez Pedron, a distinguished opponent of the inquisition, should propose her as the head of the regency. They were almost sure of a majority, when the scheme transpired, and the people, who liked her not, became so furious, that her partizans were afraid to speak. Then the opposite side, fearing her power, proposed on the instant, that the provisional regency should be made permanent, which was carried. Thus, chance rather than choice ruling, an old prelate and two imbecile councillors were entrusted with the government, and the intrigues and rancour of the different parties exploded more frequently as the pressure from above became slight.

More than all others, the clergy were, as might be expected, violent and daring, yet the cortes was not to be frightened. Four canons of the cathedrals were arrested in May, and orders were issued to arrest the archbishop of St. Jago, and many bishops, because of a pastoral letter they had published against the abolition of the inquisition; for, according to the habits of their craft of all sects, they deemed religion trampled under foot when the power of levying money and spilling blood was denied to ministers professing the faith of Christ. Nor amidst these broils did the English influence fail to suffer; the democratic spirit advanced hastily, the Cadiz press teemed with writings, intended to excite the people against the ultimate designs of the English cabinet, and every effort was made to raise a hatred of the British general and his troops. These efforts were not founded entirely on falsehoods, and were far from being unsuccessful, because the eager desire to preserve the inquisition, displayed by lord Wellington and his brother, although arising from military considerations, was too much in accord with the known tendency of the English cabinet's policy, not to excite the suspicions of the whole liberal party.

The bishops of Longroño, Mondonedo, Astorga, Lugo, and Salamanca, and the archbishop of St. Jago, were arrested, but several bishops escaped into Portugal, and were there protected as martyrs to the cause of legitimacy and despotism. The bishop of Orense, and the ex-regent Lardizabal had before fled, the latter to Algarve, the former to the *Tras os Montes*, from whence he kept up an active intercourse with Galicia, and the cortes were far from popular there; indeed the flight of the bishops created great irritation in every part of Spain, for the liberal party of the cortes was stronger in the *Isla* than in other parts, and, by a curious anomaly, the officers and soldiers all over Spain were generally their partizans, while the people were generally the partizans of the clergy. Nevertheless, the seeds of freedom, though carelessly sown by the French on one side, and by the cortes on the other, took deep root, and have since sprung up into strong plants, in due time to burgeon and bear fruit.

When the bishops fled from Spain, Gravina, the pope's nuncio, assumed such a tone of hostility, that notwithstanding the good offices of sir Henry Wellesley, which were for some time successful in screening him from the vengeance of the cortes, the latter,

encouraged by the English newspapers, finally dismissed him and sequestered his benefices. He also took refuge in Portugal, and like the rest of the expelled clergy, sought by all means to render the proceedings of the cortes odious in Spain. He formed a strict alliance with the Portuguese nuncio, Vicente Machiechi, and working together with great activity, they interfered, not with the concerns of Spain only, but with the Catholics in the British army, and even extended their intrigues to Ireland. Hence, as just and honest government had never formed any part of the English policy towards that country, alarm pervaded the cabinet, and the nuncio, protected when opposed to the cortes, was now considered a very troublesome and indiscreet person.

Such a state of feud could not last long without producing a crisis, and one of a most formidable and decisive nature was really at hand. Already many persons in the cortes held secret intercourse with Joseph, in a view of acknowledging his dynasty, on condition that he would accede to the general policy of the cortes in civil government; that monarch had, as we have seen, organized a large native force, and the coasts of Spain and Portugal swarmed with French privateers manned with Spanish seamen. The victory at Salamanca had withered these resources for the moment, but Wellington's failure at Burgos and retreat into Portugal, again revived them, and at the same time gave a heavy shock to public confidence in the power of England, a shock which nothing but the misfortunes of Napoleon in Russia could have prevented from being fatal.

The emperor, indeed, with that wonderful intellectual activity and energy, which made him the foremost man of the world, had raised a fresh army, and prepared once more to march into the heart of Germany, yet, to do this he was forced to withdraw such numbers of old soldiers from Spain, that the French army could no longer hope permanently to act on the offensive. This stayed the Peninsular cause upon the very brink of a precipice, for in that very curious, useful, and authentic work, called "*Bourrienne and his errors*," it appears that early in 1813, the ever factious conde de Montijo, then a general in Elio's army, had secretly made proposals to pass over, with the forces under his command, to the king; and soon afterwards the whole army of Del Parque, having advanced into La Mancha, made offers of the same nature.

They were actually in negotiation with Joseph, when the emperor's orders obliged the French army to abandon Madrid, and take up the line of the *Duero*. Then the Spaniards, advertised of the French weakness, feared to continue their negotiations. Wellington soon afterwards advanced, and as this feeling in favour of the intrusive monarch was certainly not general, the resistance to the invaders revived with the successes of the British general. But, if instead of diminishing his forces, Napoleon, victorious in Russia, had strengthened them, this defection would certainly have taken place, and would probably have been followed by others. The king, at the head of a Spanish army, would then have reconquered Andalusia, Wellington would have been confined to the defence of Portugal, and it is scarcely to be supposed that England would have purchased the independence of that country with her own permanent ruin.

This conspiracy is not related by me with entire confidence, because no trace of the transaction is to be found in the correspondence of the king, taken at Vittoria. Nevertheless, there are abundant proofs that the work called "*Bourrienne and his errors*," inasmuch as it relates to Joseph's transactions in

Spain, is accurately compiled from that monarch's correspondence. Many of his papers taken at Vittoria were lost or abstracted at the time, and as, in a case involving so many persons' lives, he would probably have destroyed the proofs of a conspiracy which had failed, there seems little reason to doubt that the general fact is correct. Napoleon, also, in his memoirs, speaks of secret negotiations with the cortes about this time, and his testimony is corroborated by the correspondence of the British embassy at Cadiz, and by the continued intrigues against the British influence. The next chapter will show that the policy of Spain was not the only source of uneasiness to lord Wellington.

CHAPTER II.

Political state of Portugal—Wellington's difficulties—Improper conduct of some English ships of war—Piratical violence of a Scotch merchantman—Disorders in the military system—Irritation of the people—Misconduct of the magistrates—Wellington and Stuart grapple with the disorders of the administration—The latter calls for the interference of the British government—Wellington writes a remarkable letter to the prince-regent, and requests him to return to Portugal—Partial amendment—The efficiency of the army restored; but the country remains in an unsettled state—The prince unable to quit the Brazils—Carlotta prepares to come alone—Is stopped by the interference of the British government—An auxiliary Russian force is offered to lord Wellington by admiral Greig—The Russian ambassador in London disavows the offer—The emperor Alexander proposes to mediate between England and America—The emperor of Austria offers to mediate for a general peace—Both offers are refused.

Nothing could be more complicated than the political state of Portugal with reference to the situation of the English general. His object, as I have repeatedly shown, was to bring the whole resources of the country to bear on the war; but to effect this he had to run counter to the habits and customs, both of the people and of the government; to detect the intrigues of the subordinate authorities, as well as those of the higher powers; to oppose the violence of factious men in the local government; and what is still more difficult, to stimulate the sluggish apathy, and to combat the often honest obstinacy of those who were not factious. These things he was to effect without the power of recompensing or chastising, and even while forced to support those who merited rebuke, against the still more formidable intriguers of the court of Brazil; for the best men of Portugal actually formed the local government; and he was not foiled so much by the men as by the sluggish system which was national; and although dull for good purposes, vivacious enough for mischief. The dread of ultimate personal consequences attached, not to neglect of the war, but to any vigorous exertions in support of it.

The proceedings of the court of Rio Janeiro were not less mischievous; for there the personal intrigues fostered by the peculiar disposition of the English envoy; by the weak, yet dogged habits of the prince; and by the meddling nature and violent passions of the princess Carlotta, stifled all great national views. There also the power of the Souza's, a family deficient neither in activity nor in talent; was predominant; and the object of all was, to stimulate the government in Portugal against the English general's military policy. To this he could, and had opposed, as we have seen, the power of the English government, with some effect at different times; but that resource was a dangerous one, and only to be resorted to in extreme circumstances. Hence, when to all these things is added a continual strug-

gle with the knavery of merchants of all nations, his difficulties must be admitted, his indomitable vigour, his patience, and his extraordinary mental resources admired; and the whole scene must be considered as one of the most curious and instructive lessons in the study of nations.

Wellington was not simply a general who with greater or less means, was to plan his military operations, leaving to others the care of settling the political difficulties which might arise. He had, coincident with his military duties, to regenerate a whole people; to force them against the current of their prejudices and usages on a dangerous and painful course; he had to teach at once the populace and the government; to infuse spirit and order without the aid of rewards or punishments; to excite enthusiasm through the medium of corrupt, oppressive institutions; and far from making any revolutionary appeal to suppress all tendency towards that resource of great minds on the like occasions. Thus only could he maintain an army at all; and as it was beyond the power of man to continue such a struggle for any length of time, he was more than ever anxious to gather strength for a decisive blow, which the enemy's situation now rendered possible, that he might free himself from the critical and anomalous relation in which he stood towards Portugal.

It may indeed be wondered, that he so long bore up against the increasing pressure of these distracting affairs; and certain it is, that more than once he was like to yield, and would have yielded if fortune had not offered him certain happy military chances; and yet such as few but himself could have profited from. In 1810, on the ridge of Busaco, and in the lines, the military success was rather over the Portuguese government than the enemy. At Santarem, in 1811, the glory of arms scarcely compensated for the destitution of the troops. At Fuentes Onoro, and on the Caya, after the second unsuccessful siege of Badajos, the Portuguese army had nearly dissolved; and the astonishing sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos in 1812, were necessary to save the cause from dying of inanition and despair. Even then, the early deliverance of Andalusia was frustrated; and time, more valuable than gold or life, in war, was lost; the enemy became the strongest in the field; and in despite of the victory of Salamanca, the bad effects of the English general's political situation were felt in the repulse from Burgos, and in the double retreat from that place and from Madrid. Accumulated mischiefs were now to be encountered in Portugal.

It has been shown how obstinately the regency opposed Wellington's plans of financial reform, how they disputed and complained upon every circumstance, whether serious or trivial, on which a complaint could be founded; for thinking Portugal no longer in danger they were tired of their British allies, and had no desire to aid, nor indeed any wish to see Spain delivered from her difficulties. They designed therefore to harass the English general, hoping either to drive him away altogether, or to force him, and, through him his government, to grant them loans or new subsidies. But Wellington knew that Portugal could, and he was resolved it should find resources within itself, wherefore, after the battle of Salamanca, when they demanded a fresh subsidy, he would not listen to them; and when they adopted that scheme, which I have already exposed, of feeding, or rather starving their troops, through the medium of a treaty with the Spanish government, he checked the shameful and absurd plan, by applying a part of the money in

the chest of aids, intended for the civil service, to the relief of the Portuguese troops. Yet the regency did not entirely fail in their object, inasmuch as many persons dependent upon the subsidy were thus deprived of their payments; and their complaints hurt the British credit, and reduced the British influence with the people, whose faithful attachment to the alliance no intrigues had hitherto been able to shake.

Into every branch of government, however minute, the regency now infused their own captious and discontented spirit. They complained falsely, that general Campbell had insulted the nation by turning some Portuguese residents publicly out of Gibraltar in company with Jews and Moors; they refused the wheat which was delivered to them by lord Wellington in lieu of their subsidy, saying, it was not fit for food, notwithstanding that the English troops were then living upon parcels of the same grain; that their own troops were glad to get it, and that no other was to be had. When a wooden jetty was to be thrown in the Tagus for the convenience of landing stores, they supported one Caldas, a rich proprietor, in his refusal to permit the trees wanted for the purpose to be felled, alledging the rights of property, although he was to be paid largely; and, although they had themselves then, and always, disregarded the rights of property, especially when poor men were concerned, seizing upon whatever was required, either for the public service or for the support of their own irregularities, without any payment at all, and in shameful violation both of law and humanity.

The commercial treaty, and the proceedings of the Oporto wine company, an oppressive corporation unfair in all its dealings, irresponsible, established in violation of that treaty, and supported without regard either to the interests of the prince-regent or his British allies, furnished them with continual subjects for disputes; and nothing was too absurd or too gross for their interference. Under the management of Mr. Stuart who had vigorously enforced Wellington's plans, their paper money had obtained a reasonable and increasing circulation, and their custom-house resources had increased, the expenses of their navy and of their arsenal had in some degree been reduced; and it was made evident that an extensive and vigorous application of the same principles would enable them to overcome all their financial difficulties; but there were too many personal interests; too much shameful profit made, under the abuses, to permit such a reform. The naval establishment, instead of being entirely transferred, as Wellington desired, to the Brazils, was continued in the Tagus; and with it the arsenal as its natural appendage. The infamous Junta de Viveres had been suppressed by the prince-regent, yet the government, under the false pretext of paying its debts, still disbursed above ten thousand pounds a month in salaries to men whose offices had been formally abolished.

About this time also, the opening of the Spanish ports in those provinces from whence the enemy had been driven, deprived Lisbon of a monopoly of trade enjoyed for the last three years; and the regency observing the consequent diminution of revenue, with inexpressible effrontery insisted that the grain, imported by Wellington, by which their army and their nation had been saved from famine, and by which their own subsidy had been provided, should enter the public warehouses under specific regulations, and pay duty for so doing. So tenaciously did they hold to this point, that Wellington was forced to menace a formal appeal to the English

cabinet, for he knew that the subordinate officers of the government, knavish in the extreme, would have sold the secrets of the army magazines to the speculators; and the latter, in whose hands the furnishing of the army would under the new plan of the English ministers be placed, being thus accurately instructed of its resources, would have regulated their supplies with great nicety, so as to have famished the soldiers, and paralyzed the operations at the greatest possible expense.

But the supply of the army, under any system, was now becoming extremely precarious, for besides the activity of the American privateers, English ships of war used, at times, to capture the vessels, secretly employed in bringing provision under licences from Mr. Stuart and Mr. Forster. Nay, the captain of a Scotch merchant vessel, engaged in the same trade, and having no letter of marque, had the piratical insolence, to seize in the very mouth of the Tagus, and under the Portuguese batteries, an American vessel sailing under a license from Mr. Forster, and to carry her into Greenock, thus violating, at once, the license of the English minister, the independence of Portugal, and the general law of nations. Alarm immediately spread far and wide amongst the American traders; the indignation of the Portuguese government was strongly and justly excited, and the matter became extremely embarrassing; because, no measure of punishment could be inflicted without exposing the secret of a system which had been the principal support of the army. However, the congress soon passed an act, forbidding neutrals to ship flour in the American ports; and this blow, chiefly aimed at the Portuguese ships, following upon the non-importation act, and being combined with the illegal violence of the English vessels, nearly dried up this source of supply, and threw the army principally upon the Brazil trade, which, by the negligence of the Admiralty was, as I have before noticed, exposed to the enterprise of the United States' privateers.

During Wellington's absence in Spain the military administration of Portugal was necessarily in the hands of the regency, and all the ancient abuses were fast reviving. The army in the field received no succours; the field artillery had entirely disappeared; the cavalry was in the worst condition; the infantry was reduced in numbers; the equipments of those who remained were scarcely fit for service, and the spirit of the men had waned from enthusiasm to despondency. There was no money in the military chest, no recruits in the depots, and the transport service was neglected altogether. Beresford's severity had failed to check desertion, because want, the parent of crimes, had proved too strong for fear; the country swarmed with robbers, and as no fault civil or military was punished by the regency, every where knaves triumphed over the welfare of the nation.

Meanwhile all persons whose indolence or timidity led them to fly from the active defence of their country to the Brazils, were there received and cherished as martyrs to their personal affections for the prince; they were lauded for their opposition to the regency, and were called victims to the injustice of Beresford, and to the encroachments of the English officers. This mischief was accompanied by another of greater moment, for the prince continually permitted officers possessing family interest to retire from active service, retaining their pay and rank, thus offering a premium for bad men to enter the army with the intent of quitting it in this disgraceful manner. Multitudes did so, promotion be-

came rapid; the nobility, whose influence over the poor classes was very great, and might have been beneficially employed in keeping up the zeal of the men, disappeared rapidly from the regiments, and the foul stream of knaves and cowards, thus continually pouring through the military ranks, destroyed all cohesion, and tainted every thing as it passed.

Interests of the same nature, prevailing with the regency, polluted the civil administration. The rich and powerful inhabitants, especially those of the great cities, were suffered to evade the taxes and to disobey the regulations for drawing forth the resources of the country in the military service; and during Wellington's absence in Spain, the English under-commissaries, and that retinue of villains which invariably gather on the rear of armies, being in some measure freed from the immediate dread of his vigilance and vigour, violated all the regulations in the most daring manner. The poor husbandmen were cruelly oppressed, their farming animals were constantly carried off to supply food for the army, and agriculture was thus stricken at the root; the breed of horned cattle and of horses had rapidly and alarmingly decreased, and butcher's meat was scarcely to be procured even for the troops who remained in Portugal.

These irregularities, joined to the gross misconduct of the military detachments and convoys of sick men, on all the lines of communication, not only produced great irritation in the country, but offered the means for malevolent and factious persons to assail the character and intentions of the English general; every where writings and stories were circulated against the troops, the real outrages were exaggerated, others were invented and the drift of all was to render Wellington, and the English, odious to the nation at large. Nor was this scheme confined to Portugal alone, agents were also busy to the same purpose in London, and when the enthusiasm, which Wellington's presence at Lisbon had created amongst the people, was known at Cadiz, the press there teemed with abuse. Divers agents of the democratic party in Spain came to Lisbon to aid the Portuguese malcontents, writings were circulated accusing Wellington of an intention to subjugate the Peninsula for his own ambitious views, and, as consistency is never regarded on such occasions, it was diligently insinuated that he encouraged the excesses of his troops out of personal hatred to the Portuguese people; the old baseness of sending virulent anonymous letters to the English general was also revived. In fine the republican spirit was extending beyond the bounds of Spain, and the Portuguese regency, terrified at its approach, appealed to Mr. Stuart for the assistance of England to check its formidable progress. Neither were they wanting to themselves. They forbade the Portuguese newspapers to admit any observations on the political events in Spain, they checked the introduction of Spanish democratic publications, they ordered their diplomatists at Cadiz to encourage writings of an opposite tendency, and to support the election of deputies who were known for their love of despotism. This last measure was however baffled by the motion of Arguelles, already mentioned, which rendered the old cortes permanent; and Mr. Stuart, judging the time unfavourable, advised the Portuguese government to reserve the exertion of its power against the democrats, until the military success which the state of the continent, and the weakness of the French troops in Spain, promised, should enable the victors to put down such doctrines with effect; advice which was

not unmeaning, as I shall have occasion hereafter to show.

All these malignant efforts Wellington viewed with indifference. "Every leading man," he said, "was sure to be accused of criminal personal ambition, and, if he was conscious of the charge being false, the accusation did no harm." Nevertheless his position was thereby rendered more difficult, and these intrigues were accompanied by other mischiefs of long standing and springing from a different source, but even of a more serious character, for the spirit of captious discontent had reached the inferior magistracy, who endeavoured to excite the people against the military generally. Complaints came in from all quarters of outrages on the part of the troops, some too true, but many of them false, or frivolous; and when the English general ordered court-martials for the trial of the accused, the magistrates refused to attend as witnesses, because Portuguese custom rendered such an attendance degrading, and by Portuguese law a magistrate's written testimony was efficient in courts-martial. Wellington in vain assured them that English law would not suffer him to punish men upon such testimony; in vain he pointed out the mischief which must infallibly overwhelm the country if the soldiers discovered they might thus do evil with impunity. He offered to send in each case, lists of Portuguese witnesses required, that they might be summoned by the native authorities, but nothing could overcome the obstinacy of the magistrates; they answered that his method was insolent; and with a sullen malignity they continued to accumulate charges against the troops, to refuse attendance in the courts, and to call the soldiers, their own as well as the British, "licensed spoliators of the community."

For a time the generous nature of the poor people, resisted all these combining causes of discontent; neither real injuries, nor the exaggerations, nor the falsehoods of those who attempted to stir up wrath, produced any visible effect upon the great bulk of the population; yet by degrees affection for the British cooled, and Wellington expressed his fears that a civil war would commence between the Portuguese people on the one hand, and the troops of both nations on the other. Wherefore his activity was redoubled to draw, while he could still control affairs, all the military strength to a head, and to make such an irruption into Spain as would establish a new base of operations beyond the power of such fatal dissensions.

These matters were sufficiently vexatious and alarming, but what made him tremble, was, the course which the misconduct of the Portuguese government, and the incapacity of the English cabinet, had forced upon the native furnishers of the supplies. Those persons, coming in the winter to Lisbon to have their bills on the military chest paid, could get no money, and in their distresses had sold the bills to speculators, the Portuguese holders, at a discount of fifteen, the Spanish holders at a discount of forty in the hundred. The credit of the chest immediately fell, prices rose in proportion, and as no military enterprise could carry the army beyond the flight of this harpy, and no revenues could satisfy its craving, the contest must have ceased, if Mr. Stuart had not found a momentary and partial remedy, by publicly guaranteeing the payment of the bills and granting interest until they could be taken up. The expense was thus augmented, but the increase fell far short of the enhanced cost of the supplies which had already resulted even from this restricted practice of the bill-holders, and of

two evils the least was chosen. It may seem strange that such transactions should belong to the history of the military operations in the Peninsula, that it should be the general's instead of the ministers' task, to encounter such evils, and to find the remedy. Such however was the nature of the war, and no adequate notion of lord Wellington's vigorous capacity and Herculean labours can be formed, without an intimate knowledge of the financial and political difficulties which oppressed him, and of which this work has necessarily only given an outline.

The disorders of the Portuguese military system had brought Beresford back to Lisbon while the siege of Burgos was still in progress, and now, under Wellington's direction, he strained every nerve to restore the army to its former efficient state. To recruit the regiments of the line he disbanded all the militia-men fit for service, replacing them with fathers of families; to restore the field-artillery, he embodied all the garrison artillery-men, calling out the *ordenança* gunners to man the fortresses and coast-batteries; the worst cavalry regiments he reduced to render the best more efficient, but several circumstances prevented this arm from attaining any excellence in Portugal. Meanwhile lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart strenuously grappled with the disorders of the civil administration, and their efforts produced an immediate and considerable increase of revenue. But though the regency could not deny this beneficial effect, though they could not deny the existence of the evils which they were urged to remedy, though they admitted that the reform of their custom-house system was still incomplete, that their useless navy consumed large sums which were wanted for the army, and that the taxes, especially the "*Decima*," were partially collected, and unproductive, because the rich people in the great towns, who had benefitted largely by the war, escaped the imposts which the poor people in the country, who had suffered most from the war, paid; though they acknowledged that while the soldiers' hire was in arrears, the transport service neglected, and all persons, having just claims upon the government, suffering severe privations, the tax-gatherers were allowed to keep a month's tribute in their hands even in the districts close to the enemy; though all these things were admitted, the regency would not alter their system, and Borba, the minister of finance, combatted Wellington's plans in detail with such unusual obstinacy, that it became evident nothing could be obtained save by external pressure. Wherefore as the season for military operations approached, Mr. Stuart called upon lord Castlereagh to bring the power of England to bear at once upon the court of Rio Janeiro; and Wellington, driven to extremity, sent the Portuguese prince-regent one of those clear, powerful, and nervous statements, which left those to whom they were addressed, no alternative but submission, or an acknowledgment that sense and justice were to be disregarded.

"I call your highness' attention," he said, "to the state of your troops and of all your establishments; the army of operations has been unpaid since September, the garrisons since June, the militia since February 1812. The transport service has never been regularly paid, and has received nothing since June. To these evils I have in vain called the attention of the local government, and I am now going to open a new campaign, with troops to whom greater arrears of pay are due than when the last campaign terminated, although the subsidy from Great Britain, granted especially for the maintenance of those troops, has been regularly and exactly

furnished; and although it has been proved that the revenue for the last three months has exceeded, by a third, any former quarter. The honour of your highness' arms, the cause of your allies, is thus seriously affected, and the uniform refusal of the governors of the kingdom to attend to any one of the measures which I have recommended, either for permanent or temporal relief, has at last obliged me to go as a complainant into your royal highness' presence, for here I cannot prevail against the influence of the chief of the treasury.

"I have recommended the entire reform of the customs system, but it has only been partially carried into effect. I have advised a method of actually and really collecting the taxes, and of making the rich merchants, and capitalists, pay the tenth of their annual profits as an extraordinary contribution for the war. I declare that no person knows better than I do, the sacrifices and the sufferings of your people, for there is no one for the last four years has lived so much amongst those people; but it is a fact, sir, that the great cities, and even some of the smallest places, have gained by the war, and the mercantile class has enriched itself; there are divers persons in Lisbon and Oporto who have amassed immense sums. Now your government is, both from remote and recent circumstances, unable to draw resources from the capitalists by loans; it can only draw upon them by taxes. It is not denied that the regular tributes nor the extraordinary imposts on the mercantile profits are evaded; it is not denied that the measures I have proposed, vigorously carried into execution, would furnish the government with pecuniary resources, and it remains for that government to inform your highness, why they have neither enforced my plans, nor any others which the necessity of the times calls for. They fear to become unpopular, but such is the knowledge I have of the people's good sense and loyalty, such my zeal for the cause, that I have offered to become responsible for the happy issue, and to take upon myself all the odium of enforcing my own measures. I have offered in vain!

"Never was a sovereign in the world so ill served as your highness has been by the '*Junta de Viveres*,' and I zealously forwarded your interests when I obtained its abolition; and yet, under a false pretext of debt, the government still disburse fifty millions of reis monthly on account of that board. It has left a debt undoubtedly, and it is of importance to pay it, although not at this moment; but let the government state in detail how these fifty millions, granted monthly, have been applied; let them say if all the accounts have been called in and liquidated? who has enforced the operation? to what does the debt amount? has it been classified? how much is really still due to those who have received instalments? finally, have these millions been applied to the payment of salaries instead of debt? But were it convenient now to pay the debt, it cannot be denied that to pay the army which is to defend the country, to protect it from the sweeping destructive hand of the enemy, is of more pressing importance; the troops will be neither able nor willing to fight if they are not paid."

Then touching upon the abuse of permitting the tax-gatherers to hold a month's taxes in their hands, and upon the opposition he met with from the regency, he continued.

"I assure your royal highness that I give my advice to the governor of the kingdom actuated solely by an earnest zeal for your service, without any personal interest. I can have none relative to Portugal, and none with regard to individuals, for I have

no private relation with, and scarcely am acquainted with those who direct, or would wish to direct your affairs. Those reforms recommended by me, and which have at last been partially effected in the custom-house, in the arsenal, in the navy, in the payment of the interest of the national debt, in the formation of a military chest, have succeeded, and I may therefore say that the other measures I propose would have similar results. I am ready to allow that I may deceive myself on this point, but certainly they are suggested by a desire for the good of your service; hence, in the most earnest and decided manner, I express my ardent wish, and it is common to all your faithful servants, that you will return to the kingdom and take charge yourself of the government."

These vigorous measures to bring the regency to terms, succeeded only partially. In May they promulgated a new system for the collection of taxes, which relieved the financial pressure on the army for the moment, but which did not at all content Wellington, because it was made to square with old habits and prejudices, and thus left the roots of all the evils alive and vigorous. Every moment furnished new proofs of the hopelessness of regenerating a nation through the medium of a corrupted government; and a variety of circumstances, more or less serious, continued to embarrass the march of public affairs.

In the Madeiras the authorities vexatiously prevented the English money-agents from exporting specie, and their conduct was approved of at Rio Janeiro. At Bisao, in Africa, the troops had mutinied for want of pay, and in the Cape de Verde Islands disturbances arose from the over-exaction of taxes; for when the people were weak, the regency were vigorous; pliant only to the powerful. These commotions were trifling and soon ended of themselves, yet expeditions were sent against the offenders in both places, and the troops thus employed immediately committed far worse excesses, and did more mischief than that which they were sent to suppress. At the same time several French frigates, finding the coast of Africa unguarded, cruized successfully against the Brazil trade, and aided the American privateers to contract the already too straitened resources of the army.

Amidst all these difficulties, however, the extraordinary exertions of the British officers had restored the numbers, discipline, and spirit of the Portuguese army. Twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers were again under arms and ready to commence the campaign, although the national discontent was daily increasing; and indeed the very feeling of security, created by the appearance of such an army, rendered the citizens at large less willing to bear the inconveniences of the war. Distant danger never affects the multitude, and the billeting of troops, who, from long habits of war, little regarded the rights of the citizens in comparison with their own necessities, being combined with requisitions, and with a recruiting system becoming every year more irksome, formed an aggregate of inconveniences intolerable to men who desired ease and no longer dreaded to find an enemy on their hearthstones. The powerful classes were naturally more affected than the poorer classes, because of their indolent habits; but their impatience was aggravated, because they had generally been debarred of the highest situations, or supplanted, by the British interference in the affairs of the country, and unlike those of Spain, the nobles of Portugal had lost little or none of their hereditary influence. Discontent was thus extended widely, and, moreover, the old

dread of French power was entirely gone; unlimited confidence in the strength and resources of England had succeeded, and this confidence, to use the words of Mr. Stuart, "being opposed to the irregularities which had been practised by individuals, and to the difference of manners, and of religion, placed the British in the singular position of a class whose exertions were necessary for the country, but who, for the above reasons, were in every other respect as distinct from the natives as persons with whom, from some criminal cause, it was necessary to suspend communication." Hence he judged that the return of the prince-regent would be a proper epoch for the British to retire from all situations in Portugal not strictly military, for if any thing should delay that event, the time was approaching when the success of the army and the tranquillity of the country would render it necessary to yield to the first manifestations of national feeling. In fine, notwithstanding the great benefits conferred upon the Portuguese by the British, the latter were, and it will always be so on the like occasions, regarded by the upper classes as a captain regards galley-slaves, their strength was required to speed the vessel, but they were feared and hated.

The prince-regent did not return to Portugal according to Wellington's advice, but Carlotta immediately prepared to come alone; orders were given to furnish her apartments in the different palaces, and her valuable effects had actually arrived. Ill health was the pretext for the voyage, but the real object was to be near Spain to forward her views upon the government there; for intent upon mischief, indefatigable and of a violence approaching insanity, she had sold even her plate and jewels to raise money wherewith to corrupt the leading members of the cortes, and was resolved, if that should not promise success, to distribute the money amongst the Spanish partidas, and so create a powerful military support for her schemes. Fortunately, the prince, dreading the intriguing advisers of his wife, would not suffer her to quit Rio Janeiro until the wish of the British cabinet upon the subject was known, and that was so decidedly adverse, that it was thought better to do without the prince himself than to have him accompanied by Carlotta; so they both remained in the Brazils, and this formidable cloud passed away, yet left no sunshine on the land.

It was at this period that the offer of a Russian auxiliary force, before alluded to, being made to Wellington, by admiral Greig, was accepted by him to the amount of fifteen thousand men, and yet was not fulfilled because the Russian ambassador in London declared that the emperor knew nothing of it! Alexander however proposed to mediate in the dispute between Great Britain and America, but the English ministers, while lauding him as a paragon of magnanimity and justice, in regard to the war against Napoleon, remembered the armed neutrality and quadruple alliance, and wisely declined trusting England's maritime pretensions to his faithless grasping policy. Neither would they listen to Austria, who at this time, whether with good faith or merely as a cloak I know not, desired to mediate a general peace. However, amidst this political confusion, the progress of the military preparations was visible; and contemporary with the Portuguese, the Spanish troops under Wellington's influence and providence acquired more consistence than they had ever before possessed; a mighty power was in arms, but the flood of war with which the English general finally poured into Spain, and the channels by which he directed the overwhelming torrent, must

be reserved for another place. It is now time to treat of the political situation of king Joseph, and to resume the narrative of that secondary warfare which occupied the French armies while Wellington was uninterruptedly, as far as the enemy were concerned, reorganizing his power.

CHAPTER III.

Napoleon's embarrassed position--His wonderful activity--His designs explained--The war in Spain becomes secondary--Many thousand old soldiers withdrawn from the armies--The partidas become more disciplined and dangerous--New bands are raised in Biscay and Guipuscoa, and the insurrection of the northern provinces creeps on--Napoleon orders the king to fix his quarters at Valladolid, to menace Portugal, and to reinforce the army of the north--Joseph complains of his generals, and especially of Soult--Napoleon's magnanimity--Joseph's complaints not altogether without foundation.

In war it is not so much the positive strength as the relative situations of the hostile parties, which gives the victory. Joseph's position, thus judged, was one of great weakness, principally because he was incapable of combining the materials at his disposal, or of wielding them when combined by others. France had been suddenly thrown, by her failure in Russia, into a new and embarrassing attitude, more embarrassing even than it appeared to her enemies, or than her robust warlike proportions, nourished by twelve years of victory, indicated. Napoleon, the most indefatigable and active of mankind, turned his enemy's ignorance on this head to profit; for scarcely was it known that he had reached Paris by that wise, that rapid journey, from Smorghoni, which, baffling all his enemies' hopes, left them only the power of foolish abuse; scarcely, I say, was his arrival at Paris known to the world, than a new and enormous army, the constituent parts of which he had, with his usual foresight, created while yet in the midst of victory, was in march from all parts to unite in the heart of Germany.

On this magical rapidity he rested his hopes to support the tottering fabric of his empire; but well aware of the critical state of his affairs, his design was, while presenting a menacing front on every side, so to conduct his operations that if he failed in his first stroke he might still contract his system gradually and without any violent concussion. And good reason for hope he had. His military power was rather broken and divided than lessened, for it is certain, that the number of men employed in 1813 was infinitely greater than in 1812; in the latter four hundred thousand, but in the former more than seven hundred thousand men and twelve hundred field-pieces were engaged on different points, exclusive of the armies in Spain. Then on the Vistula, on the Oder, on the Elbe, he had powerful fortresses and numerous garrisons, or rather armies of strength and goodness to re-establish his ascendancy in Europe, if he could reunite them in one system by placing a new host victoriously in the centre of Germany. And thus also he could renew the adhesive qualities of those allies who still clung to him, though evidently feeling the attraction of his enemies' success.

But this was a gigantic contest, for his enemies, by deceiving their subjects with false promises of liberty, had brought whole nations against him. More than eight hundred thousand men were in arms in Germany alone; secret societies were in full activity all over the continent; and in France a conspiracy was commenced by men who desired

rather to see their country a prey to foreigners and degraded with a Bourbon king, than have it independent and glorious under Napoleon. Wherefore, that great monarch had now to make application, on an immense scale, of the maxim which prescribes a skilful offensive as the best defence, and he had to sustain two systems of operation, not always compatible; the one depending upon moral force, to hold the vast fabric of his former policy together, the other to meet the actual exigencies of the war. The first was infinitely more important than the last, and as Germany and France were the proper theatres for its display, the Spanish contest sunk at once from a principal into an accessory war. Yet this delicate conjuncture of affairs made it of vital importance that Napoleon should have constant and rapid intelligence from Spain, because the ascendancy, which he yet maintained over the world, by his astounding genius, might have been broken down in a moment, if Wellington, overstepping the ordinary rules of military art, had suddenly abandoned the Peninsula, and thrown his army, or a part of it, into France. For then would have been deranged all the emperor's calculation; then would the defection of all his allies have ensued; then would he have been obliged to concentrate both his new forces and his Spanish troops for the defence of his own country, abandoning all his fortresses and his still vast, though scattered, veteran armies in Germany and Poland, to the unrestrained efforts of his enemies beyond the Rhine. Nothing could have been more destructive to Napoleon's moral power, than to have an insult offered and commotions raised on his own threshold at the moment when he was assuming the front of a conqueror in Germany.

To obviate this danger, or to meet it, alike required that the armies in the Peninsula should adopt a new and vigorous system, under which, relinquishing all real permanent offensive movements, they should yet appear to be daring and enterprising, even while they prepared to abandon their former conquests. But the emperor wanted old officers and non-commissioned officers and experienced soldiers, to give consistency to the young levies with which he was preparing to take the field, and he could only supply this want by drawing from the veterans of the Peninsula: wherefore he resolved to recal the division of the young guard, and with it many thousand men and officers of the line most remarkable for courage and conduct. In lieu he sent the reserve at Bayonne into Spain, replacing it with another, which was again to be replaced in May by further levies; and, besides this succour, twenty thousand conscripts were appropriated for the Peninsula.

The armies thus weakened in numbers, and considerably so during the transit of the troops, were also in quality greatly deteriorated, and at a very critical time, for not only was Wellington being powerfully reinforced, but the audacity, the spirit, the organization, the discipline, and the numbers of the partidas, were greatly increased by English supplies, liberally, and now usefully dealt out. And the guerilla operations in the northern parts, being combined with the British naval squadrons, had during the absence of the French armies, employed to drive the allies back to Portugal, aroused anew the spirit of insurrection in Navarre and Biscay; a spirit exacerbated by some recent gross abuses of military authority perpetrated by some of the French local commanders.

The position of the invading armies was indeed become more complicated than ever. They had only been relieved from the crushing pressure of lord

Wellington's grand operations to struggle in the meshes of the guerilla and insurrectional warfare of the Spaniards. Nor was the importance of these now to be measured by former efforts. The partida chiefs had become more experienced, and more docile to the suggestions of the British chief; they had free communication with, and were constantly supplied with arms, ammunition, and money from the squadrons on the coast; they possessed several fortified posts and harbours, their bands were swelling to the size of armies, and their military knowledge of the country and of the French system of invasion was more matured; their own depots were better hidden, and they could, and at times did, bear the shock of battle on nearly equal terms. Finally, new and large bands of another and far more respectable and influential nature, were formed or forming both in Navarre and Biscay, where insurrectional juntas were organized, and where men of the best families had enrolled numerous volunteers from the villages and towns.

These volunteers were well and willingly supplied by the country, and of course not obnoxious, like the partidas, from their rapine and violence. In Biscay alone, several battalions of this description, each mustering a thousand men, were in the field, and the communication with France was so completely interrupted, that the French minister of war only heard that Joseph had received his dispatches of the 4th of January, on the 18th of March, and then through the medium of Suchet! The contributions could no longer be collected, the magazines could not be filled, the fortresses were endangered, the armies had no base of operations, the insurrection was spreading to Aragon, and the bands of the interior were also increasing in numbers and activity. The French armies, sorely pressed for provisions, were widely disseminated, and every where occupied, and each general was averse either to concentrate his own forces or to aid his neighbour. In fine, the problem of operations was become extremely complicated, and Napoleon only seems to have seized the true solution.

When informed by Caffarelli of the state of affairs in the north, he thus wrote to the king, "hold Madrid only as a point of observation; fix your quarters, not as monarch, but as general of the French forces at Valladolid; concentrate the armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal around you; the allies will not and indeed cannot make any serious offensive movement for several months; wherefore it is your business to profit from their forced inactivity, to put down the insurrection in the northern provinces, to free the communication with France, and to re-establish a good base of operations before the commencement of another campaign, that the French army may be in condition to fight the allies if the latter advance towards France." Very important indeed did Napoleon deem this object, and so earnest was he to have constant and rapid intelligence from his armies in the Peninsula, that the couriers and their escorts were directed to be despatched twice a week, travelling day and night at the rate of a league an hour. He commanded also, that the army of the north should be reinforced even by the whole army of Portugal, if it was necessary to effect the immediate pacification of Biscay and Navarre; and while this pacification was in progress, Joseph was to hold the rest of his forces in a position offensive towards Portugal, making Wellington feel that his whole power was required on the frontier, and that neither his main body nor even any considerable detachment could safely embark to disturb France. In short that he must cover Lisbon strongly, and on the frontier, or

expect to see the French army menacing that capital. These instructions, well understood, and vigorously executed, would certainly have put down the insurrection in the rear of the king's position, and the spring would have seen that monarch at the head of ninety thousand men, having their retreat upon France clear of all impediments, and consequently free to fight the allies on the Tormes, the Duero, the Pisuerga, and the Ebro; and with several supporting fortresses in good state.

Joseph was quite unable to view the matter in this common-sense point of view. He could not make his kingly notions subservient to military science, nor his military movements subservient to an enlarged policy. Neither did he perceive that his beneficent notions of government were misplaced amidst the din of arms. Napoleon's orders were imperative, but the principle of them, Joseph could not previously conceive himself nor execute the details after his brother's conception. He was not even acquainted with the true state of the northern provinces, nor would he at first credit it when told to him. Hence while his thoughts were intent upon his Spanish political projects, and the secret negotiations with Del Parque's army, the northern partidas and insurgents became masters of all his lines of communication in the north; the emperor's orders, despatched early in January, and reiterated week after week, only reached the king in the end of February; their execution did not take place until the end of March, and then imperfectly. The time thus lost was irreparable; and yet as the emperor reproachfully observed, the bulletin which revealed the extent of his disasters in Russia might alone have taught the king what to do.

Joseph was nearly as immovable in his resolutions as his brother, the firmness of the one being however founded upon extraordinary sagacity, and of the other upon the want of that quality. Regarding opposition to his views as the result of a disloyal malevolence, he judged the refractory generals to be enemies to the emperor, as well as to himself. Relille, Caffarelli, Suchet, alike incurred his displeasure, and the duke of Feltre, French minister of war also, because of a letter in which, evidently by the orders of the emperor, he rebuked the king for having removed Souham from the command of the army of Portugal.

Feltre's style, addressed to a monarch, was very offensive, and Joseph attributed it to the influence of Soult, for his hatred of the latter was violent and implacable even to absurdity. "The duke of Dalmatia or himself," he wrote to the emperor, "must quit Spain. At Valencia he had forgotten his own injuries, he had suppressed his just indignation, and instead of sending marshal Soult to France, had given him the direction of the operations against the allies, but it was in the hope that shame for the past, combined with his avidity for glory, would urge him to extraordinary exertions; nothing of the kind had happened; Soult was a man not to be trusted. Restless, intriguing, ambitious, he would sacrifice every thing to his own advancement, and possessed just that sort of talent which would lead him to mount a scaffold when he thought he was ascending the steps of a throne, because he would want the courage to strike when the crisis arrived." He acquitted him, he said, with a coarse sarcasm, "of treachery at the passage of the Tormes, because there fear alone operated to prevent him from bringing the allies to a decisive action, but he was nevertheless treacherous to the emperor, and his proceedings in Spain were probably connected with the conspiracy of Malet at Paris."

Such was the language with which Joseph in his anger assailed one of the greatest commanders and most faithful servants of his brother; and such the greetings which awaited Napoleon on his arrival at Paris after the disasters of Russia. In the most calm and prosperous state of affairs, coming from this source, the charges might well have excited the jealous wrath of the strongest mind; but in the actual crisis, when the emperor had just lost his great army, and found the smoking embers of a suppressed conspiracy at his very palace gates, when his friends were failing, and his enemies accumulating, it seemed scarcely possible that these accusations should not have proved the ruin of Soult. Yet they did not even ruffle the temper of Napoleon. Magnanimous as he was sagacious, he smiled at the weakness of Joseph, and though he removed Soult from Spain, because the feud between him and the king would not permit them to serve beneficially together, it was only to make him the commander of the imperial guard; and that no mark of his confidence might be wanting, he afterwards chose him, from amongst all his generals, to retrieve the affairs of the Peninsula when Joseph was driven from that country, an event, the immediate causes of which were now being laid.

It has been already shown, that when Wellington took his winter-quarters, the French armies occupied a line stretching from the sea-coast at Valencia to the foot of the Gallician mountains. In these positions Suchet on the extreme left was opposed by the allies at Alicante. Soult, commanding the centre, had his head-quarters at Toledo, with one detachment at the foot of the Sierra Morena to watch the army of Del Parque, and two others in the valley of the Tagus. Of these last one was at Talavera and one on the Tietar. The first observed Morillo and Penne Villemur, who from Estremadura were constantly advancing towards the bridges on the Tagus, and menacing the rear of the French detachment which was on the Tietar in observation of general Hill, then at Coria. Soult's advanced post in the valley of the Tagus communicated by the Gredos mountains with Avila, where Foy's division of the army of Portugal was posted partly for the sake of food, partly to watch Bejar and the Upper Tormes, because the allies, possessing the pass of Bejar, might have suddenly united north of the mountains, and breaking the French line have fallen on Madrid.

On the right of Foy, the remainder of the army of Portugal occupied Salamanca, Ledesma, and Alba on the Lower Tormes; Valladolid, Toro, and Tordesillas on the Duero; Benevente, Leon, and other points on the Esla, Astorga being, as I have before observed, dismantled by the Spaniards. Behind the right of this great line, the army of the north had retaken its old positions, and the army of the centre was fixed as before, in and around Madrid, its operations being bounded on the right bank of the Tagus by the mountains which invest that capital, and on the left bank of the Tagus by the districts of Aranjuez, Tarançon, and Cuenca.

Joseph, while disposing his troops in this manner, issued a royal regulation marking the extent of country which each army was to forage, requiring at the same time a certain and considerable revenue to be collected by his Spanish civil authorities for the support of his court. The subsistence of the French armies was thus made secondary to the revenue of the crown, and he would have had the soldiers in a time of war, of insurrectional war, yield to the authority of the Spanish civilians; an absurdity heightened by the peculiarly active, vigorous, and prompt military method of the French, as contrasted with

the dilatory, improvident, promise breaking and visionary system of the Spaniards. Hence, scarcely was the royal regulation issued, when the generals broke through it in a variety of ways, and the king was, as usual, involved in the most acrimonious disputes with all the emperor's lieutenants. If he ordered one commander to detach troops to the assistance of another commander, he was told that he should rather send additional troops to the first. If he reprimanded a general for raising contributions contrary to the regulations, he was answered that the soldiers were starving and must be fed. At all times also, the authority of the prefects and intendants was disregarded by all the generals; and this was in pursuance of Napoleon's order; for that monarch continually reminded his brother, that as the war was carried on by the French armies, their interests were paramount; that the king of Spain could have no authority over them, and must never use his military authority as lieutenant of the empire, in aid of his kingly views, for with those the French soldiers could have nothing to do; their welfare could not be confided to Spanish ministers whose capacity was by no means apparent, and of whose fidelity the emperor had no security.

Nothing could be clearer or wiser than these instructions, but Joseph would not see this distinction between his military and his monarchical duties, and continually defended his conduct by reference to what he owed his subjects as king of Spain. His sentiments, explained with great force of feeling and great beneficence of design, were worthy of all praise if viewed abstractedly, but totally inapplicable to the real state of affairs, because the Spaniards were not his faithful and attached subjects, they were his inveterate enemies; and it was quite impossible to unite the vigour of a war of conquest with the soft and benevolent government of a paternal monarch. Thus one constant error vitiated all the king's political proceedings, an error apparently arising from an inability to view his situation as a whole instead of by parts, for his military operations were vitiated in the same manner.

As a man of state and of war he seems to have been acute, courageous, and industrious, with respect to any single feature presented for his consideration, but always unable to look steadily on the whole, and consequently always working in the dark. Men of his character, being conscious of the merit of labour and good intentions, are commonly obstinate; and those qualities, which render them so useful under the direction of an able chief, lead only to mischief when they become chiefs themselves. For in matters of great moment, and in war especially, it is not the actual importance, but the comparative importance of the operations, which should determine the choice of measures; and when all are very important this choice demands judgment of the highest kind, judgment which no man ever possessed more largely than Napoleon, and which Joseph did not possess at all.

He was never able to comprehend the instructions of his brother, and never would accept the advice of those commanders whose capacity approached in some degree to that of the emperor. When he found that every general complained of insufficient means, instead of combining their forces so as to press with the principal mass against the most important point, he disputed with each, and turned to demand from the emperor additional succours for all; at the same time unwisely repeating and urging his own schemes upon a man so infinitely his superior in intellect. The insurrection in the northern provinces he treated, not as a military, but a political

cal question, attributing it to the anger of the people at seeing the ancient supreme council of Navarre unceremoniously dismissed and some of the members imprisoned by a French general, a cause very inadequate to the effect. Neither was his judgment truer with respect to the fitness of time. He proposed, if a continuation of the Russian war should prevent the emperor from sending more men to Spain, to make Burgos the royal residence, to transport there the archives and all that constituted a capital; then to have all the provinces behind the Ebro, Catalonia excepted, governed by himself, through the medium of his Spanish ministers, and as a country at peace, while those beyond the Ebro should be given up to the generals as a country at war.

In this state his civil administration would, he said, remedy the evils inflicted by the armies, would conciliate the people, by keeping all the Spanish families and authorities in safety and comfort, would draw all those who favoured his cause from all parts of Spain, and would encourage the display of that attachment to his person which he believed so many Spaniards to entertain. And while he declared the violence and injustice of the French armies to be the sole cause of the protracted resistance of the Spaniards, a declaration, false in fact, that violence being only one of many causes, he was continually urging the propriety of beating the English first and then pacifying the people by just and benevolent measures. As if it were possible, off-hand, to beat Wellington and his veterans, embedded as they were in the strong country of Portugal, and having British fleets with troops and succours of all kinds, hovering on the flanks of the French, and feeding and sustaining the insurrection of the Spaniards in their rear.

Napoleon was quite as willing and anxious as Joseph could be to drive the English from the Peninsula, and to tranquillize the people by a regular government; but with a more profound knowledge of war, of politics, and of human nature, he judged that the first could only be done by a methodical combination, in unison with that rule of art which prescribes the establishment and security of the base of operations, security which could not be obtained if the benevolent, but weak and visionary, schemes of the king were to supersede military vigour in the field. The emperor laughed in scorn when his brother assured him that the Peninsulars, with all their fiery passions, their fanaticism, and their ignorance, would receive an equable government as a benefit from the hands of an intrusive monarch before they had lost all hope of resistance by arms.

Yet it is not to be concluded that Joseph was totally devoid of grounds for his opinions; he was surrounded by difficulties and deeply affected by the misery which he witnessed, his Spanish ministers were earnest and importunate, and many of the French generals gave him but too much reason to complain of their violence. The length and mutations of the war had certainly created a large party willing enough to obtain tranquillity at the price of submission, while others were, as we have seen, not indisposed, if he would hold the crown on their terms, to accept his dynasty as one essentially springing from democracy, in preference to the despotic, base, and superstitious family which the nation was called upon to uphold. It was not unnatural, therefore, for Joseph to desire to retain his capital while the negotiations with Del Parque's army were still in existence, it was not strange that he should be displeased with Soult after reading that marshal's honest but offensive letter, and certainly it was highly creditable to his character as a man

and as a king that he would not silently suffer his subjects to be oppressed by the generals.

"I am in distress for money," he often exclaimed to Napoleon, "such distress as no king ever endured before, my plate is sold, and on state occasions the appearance of magnificence is supported by false metal. My ministers and household are actually starving, misery is on every face, and men, otherwise willing, are thus deterred from joining a king so little able to support them. My revenue is seized by the generals for the supply of their troops, and I cannot as a king of Spain, without dishonour, partake of the resources thus torn by rapine from my subjects whom I have sworn to protect; I cannot, in fine, be at once king of Spain and general of the French; let me resign both and live peaceably in France. Your majesty does not know what scenes are enacted, you will shudder to hear that men formerly rich and devoted to our cause have been driven out of Zaragoza and denied even a ration of food. The marquis Caballero, a councillor of state, minister of justice, and known personally to your majesty, has been thus used. He has been seen actually begging for a piece of bread!"

If this Caballero was the old minister to Charles the IVth, no misery was too great a punishment for his tyrannical rule under that monarch, yet it was not from the hands of the French it should have come; and Joseph's distress for money must certainly have been great, since that brave and honest man Jourdan, a marshal of France, major-general of the armies, and a personal favourite of the king's, complained that the non-payment of his appointments had reduced him to absolute penury, and after borrowing, until his credit was exhausted, he could with difficulty procure subsistence. It is now time to describe the secondary operations of the war, but as these were spread over two-thirds of Spain, and were simultaneous, to avoid complexity it will be necessary to class them under two great heads, namely, those which took place north and those which took place south of the Tagus.

CHAPTER IV.

Operations south of the Tagus—Eroles and Codrington seek to entrap the governor of Taragona—They fail—Sarfield and Villa Campa unite, but disperse at the approach of Panetier and Severoli—Suchet's position—Great force of the allies in his front—The younger Soult engages the Spanish cavalry in La Mancha—General Daricau marches with a column towards Valencia—Receives a large convoy and returns to La Mancha—Absurd rumours about the English army rise in the French camp—Some of lord Wellington's spies detected—Soult is recalled—Gazan assumes the command of the army of the south—Suchet's position described—Sir John Murray takes the command of the Anglo-Sicilian troops at Alicant—Attacks the French posts at Alcoy—His want of vigour—He projects a maritime attack on the city of Valencia, but drops the design because lord William Bentinck recalls some of his troops—Remarks upon his proceedings—Suchet surprises a Spanish division at Yecla, and then advances against Murray—Takes a thousand Spanish prisoners in Villena—Murray takes a position at Castalla—His advanced guard driven from Biar—Second battle of Castalla—Remarks.

OPERATIONS SOUTH OF THE TAGUS.

In December, 1812, general Copons had been appointed captain-general of Catalonia instead of Eroles, but his arrival was delayed, and the province was not relieved from Lacy's mischievous sway until February 1813, when Eroles, taking the temporary command, re-established the head-quarters at Vich. The French, being then unmolested, save by the English ships, passed an enormous convoy to France, but Eroles was not long idle. Through the

medium of a double spy, he sent a forged letter to the governor of Taragona, desiring him to detach men to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, with carts to transport some stores; at the same time he gave out that he was himself going to the Cerdaña, which brought the French moveable column to that quarter, and then Eroles, Manso, and Villamil, making forced marches from different points, reached Torre dem Barra, where they met the British squadron. The intention was to cut off the French detachment on its march to Villa Nueva and then to attack Taragona; but fortune rules in war; the governor received a letter from Maurice Mathieu of a different tenor from the forged letter, and with all haste regaining his fortress balked this well contrived plan.

Sarzfild, at enmity with Eroles, was now combining his operations with Villa Campa, and they menaced Alcanitz in Aragon; but general Pannetier, who had remained at Teruel to watch Villa Campa, and to protect Suchet's communications, immediately marched to Daroca, Severoli came from Zaragoza, to the same point, and the Spaniards, alarmed by their junction, dispersed. Sarzfild returned to Catalonia, Bassecour and the Empecinado remained near Cuenca, and Villa Campa, as usual, hung upon the southern skirts of the Albaracyn mountain, ready to pounce down on the Ebro or on the the Guadalquivir side, as advantage might offer. Meanwhile Suchet was by no means at ease. The successes in Catalonia did not enable him to draw reinforcements from thence, because Napoleon, true to his principle of securing the base of operations, forbade him to weaken the army there, and Montmarie's brigade was detached from Valencia to preserve the communication between Saguntum and Tortosa. But Aragon, which was Suchet's place of arms and principal magazine, being infested by Mina, Duran, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, and Sarzfild, was becoming daily more unquiet, wherefore Pannetier's brigade remained between Segorbé and Daroca to aid Severoli. Thus, although the two armies of Aragon and Catalonia mustered more than seventy thousand men, that of Aragon alone having forty thousand with fifty field pieces, Suchet could not fight with more than sixteen thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and perhaps thirty guns, beyond the Xucar. His right flank was always liable to be turned by Requeña, his left by the sea, which was entirely at his adversary's command, and his front was menaced by fifty thousand men, of which three thousand might be cavalry with fifty pieces of artillery.

The component parts of the allied force were the Anglo-Sicilians, which, including Whittingham's and Roche's divisions, furnished eighteen thousand soldiers. Elio's army furnishing twelve thousand exclusive of the divisions of Bassecour, Villa Campa and the Empecinado, which, though detached, belonged to him. Del Parque's army reinforced by new levies from Andalusia, and on paper twenty thousand. Numerically this was a formidable power if it had been directed in mass against Suchet; but on his right the duke of Dalmatia, whose headquarters were at Toledo, sent forward detachments which occupied the army of Del Parque; moreover, the secret negotiations for the defection of the latter were now in full activity, and from the army of the centre a column was sent towards Cuenca, to draw Bassecour and the Empecinado from Suchet's right flank; but those chiefs had five thousand men, and in return continually harrassed the army of the centre.

On the side of the Morena and Murcia, Soult's operations were confined to skirmishes and foraging parties. Early in January, his brother, seeking to

open a communication with Suchet by Albacete, defeated some of Elio's cavalry, with the loss of fifty men, and pursued them until they rallied on their main body, under Freyre; the latter offered battle with nine hundred horsemen in front of the defile leading to Albacete; but Soult, disliking his appearance, turned off to the right, and, passing through Villa Nueva de los Infantes joined a French post established in Valdepeña at the foot of the Morena, where some skirmishes had also taken place with Del Parque's cavalry. The elder Soult thus learned that Freyre, with two thousand five hundred horsemen, covered all the roads leading from La Mancha to Valencia and Murcia; that Elio's infantry was at Tobará and Hellín, Del Parque's head-quarters at Jaén; that the passes of the Morena were guarded, and magazines formed at Andujar, Linares, and Córdoba, while on the other side of La Mancha, the Empecinado had come to Hinojoso with fifteen hundred horsemen, and the column sent from the army of the centre was afraid to encounter him.

These dispositions, and the strength of the Spaniards, not only prevented the younger Soult from penetrating into Murcia, but delayed the march of a column, under general Daricau, destined to communicate with Suchet, and bring up the detachments, baggage, and stores, which the armies of the south and centre had left at Valencia. The scouting parties of both sides now met at different points, and on the 27th of January, a sharp cavalry fight happened at El Corral, in which the French commander was killed, and the Spaniards, though far the most numerous, defeated. Meanwhile, Daricau, whose column had been reinforced, reached Utiel, opened the communication with Suchet by Requeña, cut off some small parties of the enemy, and then continuing his march received a great convoy, consisting of two thousand fighting men, six hundred travellers, and the stores and baggage belonging to Soult's and the king's armies. This convoy had marched from Madrid by the way of Zaragoza, but was recalled when Daricau arrived; and, under his escort, aided by a detachment of Suchet's army, placed at Yniesta, it reached Todelo in the latter end of February, safely, though Villa Campa came down to the Cabriel river, to trouble the march.

During these different operations numerous absurd and contradictory reports, principally originating in the Spanish and English newspapers, obtained credit in the French armies, such as, that sir Henry Wellesley and Infantado had seized the government at Cadiz; that Clinton, by an intrigue, had got possession of Alicante; that Ballesteros had shewn Wellington secret orders from the cortes not to acknowledge him as generalissimo, or even as a grandee; that the cortes had removed the regency because the latter permitted Wellington to appoint intendants and other officers of the Spanish provinces; that Hill had devastated the frontier, and retired to Lisbon, though forcibly opposed by Morillo; that a nephew of Ballesteros had raised the standard of revolt; that Wellington was advancing, and that troops had been embarked at Lisbon for a maritime expedition, with other stories of a like nature, which seem to have disturbed all the French generals, save Soult, whose information as to the real state of affairs continued to be sure and accurate. He also at this time detected four or five of Wellington's emissaries; amongst them, was a Portuguese officer on his own staff; a man called Piloti, who served and betrayed both sides; and an amazon called Francisca de la Fuerte, who, though only twenty-two years old, had already commanded

a partida of sixty men with some success, and was now a spy. But in the latter end of February the duke of Dalmatia was recalled, and the command of his army fell to Gazan, whose movements belong rather to the operations north of the Tagus. Wherefore turning to Suchet, I shall proceed to give an exact notion of his resources, and of the nature of the country where his operations were conducted.

The city of Valencia, though nominally the seat of his power, was not so. He had razed all the defences constructed by the Spaniards, confining his hold to the old walls, and to a small fortified post within the town sufficient to resist a sudden attack, and capable of keeping the population in awe; his real place of arms was Saguntum, and between that and Tortosa he had two fortresses, namely, Oropesa and Peniscola; he had also another line of communication, but for infantry only, through Morella, a fortified post, to Mequinenza. Besides these lines there were roads both from Valencia and Saguntum, leading through Segorbé to Teruel a fortified post, and from thence to Zaragoza by Daroca, another fortified post. These roads were eastward of the Guadalaviar, and westward of that river Suchet had a line of retreat from Valencia to Madrid, by Requena, which was also a fortified post. Now if the whole of the French general's command be looked to, his forces were very numerous, but that command was wide, and in the field his army was, as I have before shewn, not very numerous. Valencia was, in fact, a point made on hostile ground which, now that the French were generally on the defensive, was only maintained with a view of imposing upon the allies, and drawing forth the resources of the country, as long as circumstances would permit. The proper line for covering Valencia and the rich country immediately around it was on the Xucar, or rather beyond it, at San Felipe de Xativa and Moxente, where a double range of mountains afforded strong defensive positions, barring the principal roads leading to Valencia. On this position Suchet had formed his entrenched camp, much talked of at the time, but slighter than fame represented it; the real strength was in the natural formation of the ground.

Beyond his left flank the coast road was blocked by the castle of Denia, but his right could be turned from Yecla and Almanza, through Cofrentes and Requena, and he was forced to keep strict watch and strong detachments always towards the defile of Almanza, lest Elio's army and Del Parque's should march that way. This entrenched camp was Suchet's permanent position of defence, but there were reasons why he should endeavour to keep his troops generally more advanced; the country in his front was full of fertile plains, or rather coves, within the hill, which run in nearly parallel ranges, and are remarkably rocky and precipitous, enclosing the plains like walls, and it was of great importance who should command their resources. Hence, as the principal point in Suchet's front was the large and flourishing town of Alcoy, he occupied it, and from thence threw off smaller bodies to Biar, Castalla, Ibi, and Onil, which were of the same strong ridge as the position covering the cove of Alcoy. On his right there was another plain in which Fuente La Higuera, Villena, and Yecla were delineated at opposite points of a triangle, and as this plain, and the smaller valleys ministered to Suchet's wants because of his superior cavalry, the subsistence of the French troops was eased, while the cantonments and foraging districts of the Sicilian army were contracted: the outposts of the allied army were in fact

confined to a fourth and fifth parallel range of mountains, covering the towns of Elda, Tibi, Xixona, and Villa Joyosa, which was on the sea-coast.

Suchet thus assumed an insulting superiority over an army more numerous than his own; but outward appearances are deceitful in war: the French general was really the strongest, because want, ignorance, dissension and even treachery, were in his adversary's camps. Del Parque's army remained behind the Morena, Elio's was at Tobarra and Hellin, and of the Anglo-Sicilian army, the British only were available in the hour of danger, and they were few. When general Campbell quarrelled with Elio, the latter retired for a time towards Murcia; but, after Wellington's journey to Cadiz, he again came forward, and his cavalry entering La Mancha, skirmished with general Soult's, and communicating with Bassecour and the Empecinado delayed the progress of Daricaux towards Valencia. Meanwhile general Campbell remained quiet, in expectation that lord William Bentinck would come with more troops to Alicante, but in February fresh troubles broke out in Sicily, and in the latter end of that month, sir John Murray arriving, assumed the command. Thus, in a few months, five chiefs with different views and prejudices, successively came to the command, and the army was still unorganized and unequipped for vigorous service. The Sicilians, Calabrese, and French belonging to it were eager to desert; one Italian regiment had been broken for misconduct by general Maitland, the British and Germans were humiliated in spirit by the part they were made to enact, and the Spaniards under Whittingham and Roche were starving; for Wellington, knowing by experience how the Spanish government, though receiving a subsidy, would, if permitted, throw the feeding of their troops entirely upon the British, forbade their being supplied from the British stores, and the Spanish intendants neglected them.

Murray's first care was to improve the equipment of his troops, and with the aid of Elio he soon put them in a better condition. The two armies together furnished thirty thousand effective men, of which about three thousand were cavalry, and they had thirty-seven guns, yet very inadequately horsed, and Whittingham's and Elio's cavalry were, from want of forage, nearly unfit for duty. The transport mules were hired at an enormous price, the expense, being at the rate of one hundred and thirty thousand pounds annually, and yet the supply was bad, for here, as in all other parts of Spain, corruption and misuse of authority prevailed. The rich sent their fine animals to Alicante for sanctuary, and bribed the alcaldes; the mules of the poor alone were pressed, the army was ill provided, and yet the country was harassed. In this state it was necessary to do something, and as the distress of Whittingham and Roche's troops could not be removed, save by enlarging their cantonments, Murray, after some hesitation, resolved to drive the French from the mountains in his front, and he designed, as the first step, to surprise fifteen hundred men which they had placed in Alcoy. Now five roads led towards the French positions. 1st. On the left, the great road from Alicante, passing through Monforte, Elda, Sax, Villena, and Fuente de la Higuera, where it joins the great road from Valencia to Madrid, which runs through Almanza. This way turned both the ridges occupied by the armies. 2d. A good road leading by Tibi to Castalla, from whence it sent off two branches on the left hand; one leading to Sax, the other through the pass to Villena; two other branches on the right hand went, the one through Ibi to Al-

coy, the other through Onil to the same place. 3d. The road from Alicant to Xixona, a bad road, leading over the very steep, rugged ridge of that name to Alcoy. At Xixona also there was a narrow way on the right hand, through the mountains to Alcoy, which was followed by Roche when he attacked that place in the first battle of Castalla. 4th. A carriage-road running along the sea-coast, as far as Villa Joyosa, from whence a narrow mountain-way leads to the village of Consentayna, situated in the cove of Alcoy, and behind that town.

On the 6th of March the allied troops moved in four columns, one on the left by Elda, to watch the great Madrid road; one on the right composed of Spanish troops under colonel Campbell, from Villa Joyosa, to get to Consentayna behind Alcoy; a third, under lord Frederick Bentinck, issuing by Ibi, was to turn the French right; the fourth was to march from Xixona straight against Alcoy, and to pursue the remainder of Habert's division, which was behind that town. Lord Frederick Bentinck attacked in due time, but as colonel Campbell did not appear the surprise failed; and when the French saw the main body winding down the Sierra, in front of Alcoy, they retired, pursued by general Donkin with the second battalion of the twenty-seventh regiment. The head of lord Frederick Bentinck's column was already engaged, but the rear had not arrived, and the whole of Habert's division was soon concentrated a mile beyond Alcoy, and there offered battle; yet sir John Murray, instead of pushing briskly forward, halted; and it was not until several demands for support had reached him, that he detached the fifty-eighth to the assistance of the troops engaged, who had lost about forty men, chiefly of the twenty-seventh. Habert, fearing to be cut off by Consentayna, and seeing the fifty-eighth coming on, retreated, and the allies occupied Alcoy, which greatly relieved their quarters; but the want of vigour displayed by sir John Murray when he had gained Alcoy did not escape the notice of the troops.

After this affair the armies remained quiet until the 15th, when Whittingham forced the French posts with some loss from Albayda, and general Donkin taking two battalions and some dragoons from Ibi, drove back their outposts from Rocayrente and Alsafara, villages situated beyond the range bounding the plain of Alcoy. He repassed the hills higher up with the dragoons and a company of the grenadiers of the twenty-seventh, under captain Waldron, and returned by the main road to Alcoy, having in his course met a French battalion, through which the gallant Waldron broke with his grenadiers. Meanwhile, sir John Murray, after much vacillation, at one time resolving to advance, at another to retreat, thinking it impossible first to force Suchet's entrenched camp, and then his second line behind the Xucar, a difficult river with muddy banks, believing also that the French general had his principal magazines at Valencia, conceived the idea of seizing the latter by a maritime expedition. He judged that the garrison, which he estimated at eight hundred infantry, and one thousand cavalry, would be unable to resist, and that the town once taken, the inhabitants would rise; Suchet could not then detach men enough to quell them without exposing himself to defeat on the Xucar, and if he moved with all his force he could be closely followed by the allies, and driven upon Requeña. In this view he made fresh dispositions.

On the 18th, Roche's division, reinforced by some troops from Elio's army and by a British grenadier battalion, was selected for the maritime attack, and

the rest of the army was concentrated on the left at Castalla with the exception of Whittingham's troops, which remained at Alcoy, for Suchet was said to be advancing, and Murray resolved to fight him. But to form a plan and to execute it vigorously, were with sir John Murray very different things. Although far from an incapable officer in the cabinet, he shewed none of the qualities of a commander in the field. His indecision was remarkable. On the morning of the 18th he resolved to fight in front of Castalla, and in the evening he assumed a weaker position behind that town, abandoning the command of a road, running from Ibi in rear of Alcoy, by which Whittingham might have been cut off. And when the strong remonstrances of his quarter-master general induced him to relinquish this ground, he adopted a third position, neither so strong as the first nor so defective as the last.

In this manner affairs wore on until the 26th, when Roche's division and the grenadier battalion marched to Alicant to embark, with orders, if they failed at Valencia, to seize and fortify Cullera at the mouth of the Xucar; and if this also failed to besiege Denia. But now the foolish ministerial arrangements about the Sicilian army worked out their natural result. Lord Wellington, though he was permitted to retain the Anglo-Sicilian army in Spain beyond the period lord William Bentinck had assigned for its stay, had not the full command given to him; he was clogged with reference to the state of Sicily, until the middle of March, and this new arrangement was still unknown to lord William Bentinck and to sir John Murray. Thus there were at this time, in fact, three commanding officers; Wellington for the general operations, Murray for the particular operations, and lord William Bentinck still empowered to increase or diminish the troops, and even upon emergency to withdraw the whole. And now in consequence of the continued dissensions in Sicily, the king of that country having suddenly resumed the government, lord William did recal two thousand of Murray's best troops, and amongst them the grenadier battalion intended to attack Valencia. That enterprise instantly fell to the ground.

Upon this event sir John Murray, or some person writing under his authority, makes the following observations. "The most careful combination could not have selected a moment when the danger of such authority was more clearly demonstrated, more severely felt. Had these orders been received a very short time before, the allied army would not have been committed in active operations; had they reached sir John Murray a week later, there is every reason to believe that the whole country from Alicant to Valencia would have passed under the authority of the allied army, and that marshal Suchet, cut off from his magazines in that province, and in Aragon, would have been compelled to retire through a mountainous and barren country on Madrid. But the order of lord William Bentinck was peremptory, and the allied army, which even before was scarcely balanced, was now so inferior to the enemy that it became an indispensable necessity to adopt a system strongly defensive, and all hope of a brilliant commencement of the campaign vanished."

Upon this curious passage it is necessary to remark, 1st, that Suchet's great magazines were not at Valencia but at Saguntum; 2nd, that from the castle of Denia the fleet would have been descried, and the strong garrison of Saguntum could have reinforced the troops in Valencia; Montmarie's brigade also would soon have come up from Oropesa. These were doubtless contingencies not much to be

regarded in bar of such an enterprise, but Suchet would by no means have been forced to retire by Requena upon Madrid, he would have retired to Liria, the road to which steered more than five miles clear of Valencia. He could have kept that city in check while passing, in despite of sir John Murray, and at Liria he would have been again in his natural position, that is to say, in full command of his principal lines of communication. Moreover, however disagreeable to Suchet personally it might have been to be forced back upon Madrid, that event would have been extremely detrimental to the general cause, as tending to reinforce the king against Wellington. But the singular part of the passage quoted, is the assertion that the delay of a week in lord William Bentinck's order would have ensured such a noble stroke against the French army. Now lord William Bentinck only required the troops to proceed in the first instance to Mahon; what a dull flagging spirit then was his, who dared not delay obedience to such an order even for a week!

The recalled troops embarked for Sicily on the 5th of April, and Suchet, alarmed at the offensive position of the allies, which he attributed to the general state of affairs, because the king's march to Castile permitted all the Spanish armies of Andalusia to reinforce Elio, resolved to strike first, and with the greater avidity because Elio had pushed general Mijares with an advanced guard of three or four thousand men to Yecla, where they were quite unsupported. This movement had been concerted in March, with Murray, who was to occupy Villena, and be prepared to fall upon the French left, if the Spaniards were attacked at Yecla; and in return the Spaniards were to fall on the French right if Murray was attacked. Elio however neglected to strengthen his division at Yecla with cavalry, which he had promised to do, nor did Murray occupy Villena in force; nevertheless Mijares remained at Yecla, Elio with the main body occupied Hellin, and the cavalry were posted on the side of Albacete, until the departure of the troops for Sicily. Roche then joined the army at Castalla, and Elio's main body occupied Elda and Sax to cover the main road from Madrid to Alicante.

On the night of the 11th Suchet, having by a forced march assembled sixteen battalions of infantry, ten squadrons of cavalry, and twelve pieces of artillery at Fuente la Higuera, marched straight upon Caudete, while Harispe's division by a cross road endeavoured to surprise the Spaniards at Yecla. The latter retired fighting towards Jumilla by the hills, but the French artillery and skirmishers followed close, and at last the Spaniards being pierced in the centre, one part broke and fled, and the other part after some farther resistance surrendered. Two hundred were killed, and fifteen hundred prisoners, including wounded, fell into the hands of the victors, who lost about eighty men and officers.

Suchet's movement on Fuente la Higuera was known in the night of the 10th at Castalla, where all the Anglo-Sicilian army was in position, because Whittingham had come from Alcoy, leaving only a detachment on that side. Hence while Harispe was defeating Mijares at Yecla, Suchet in person remained at Caudete with two divisions and the heavy cavalry in order of battle, lest Murray should advance by Biar and Villena. The latter town, possessing an old wall and a castle, was occupied by the regiment of Velez-Malaga, a thousand strong, and in the course of the day Murray also came up with the allied cavalry and a brigade of infantry. Here he was joined by Elio, without troops, and when towards evening Harispe's fight being over

and the prisoners secured, Suchet advanced, Murray retired with the cavalry through the pass of Biar leaving his infantry, under colonel Adam, in front of that defile. He wished also to draw the Spanish garrison from Villena, but Elio would not suffer it, and yet during the night, repenting of his obstinacy, came to Castalla entreating Murray to carry off that battalion. It was too late, Suchet had broken the gates of the town the evening before, and the castle with the best equipped and finest regiment in the Spanish army had already surrendered.

Murray's final position was about three miles from the pass of Biar. His left, composed of Whittingham's Spaniards, was entrenched on a rugged sierra ending abruptly above Castalla, which, with its old castle crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, closed the right of that wing and was occupied in strength by Mackenzie's division.

A space between Whittingham's troops and the town was left on the sierra for the advanced guard, then in the pass of Biar; Castalla itself, covered by the castle, was prepared for defence, and the principal approaches were commanded by strong batteries, for Murray had concentrated nearly all his guns at this point. The cavalry was partly behind, partly in front of the town, on an extensive plain which was interspersed with olive plantations.

The right wing, composed of Clinton's division and Roche's Spaniards, was on comparatively low ground, and extended to the rear at right angles with the centre, but well covered by a "*barranco*" or bed of a torrent, the precipitous sides of which were, in some places, one hundred feet deep.

Suchet could approach this position, either through the pass of Biar, or turning that defile, by the way of Sax; but the last road was supposed to be occupied by Elio's army, and as troops coming by it must make a flank march along the front of the position, it was not a favourable line of attack; moreover the allies, being in possession of the defiles of Biar, and of Alcoy, might have gained the Xucar, either by Fuentes de la Higuera or by Alcoy, seeing that Alicante, which was their base, was safe, and the remnants of Elio's army could easily have got away. Murray's army was however scarcely active enough for such an operation, and Suchet advanced very cautiously, as it behoved him to do, for the ground between Castalla and Biar was just such as a prompt opponent would desire for a decisive blow.

The advanced guard, in the pass of Biar, about two thousand five hundred men, was composed of two Italian regiments and a battalion of the twenty-seventh British; two companies of German riflemen, a troop of foreign hussars and six guns, four of which were mountain-pieces. The ground was very strong and difficult, but at two o'clock in the afternoon the French, having concentrated in front of the pass, their skirmishers swarmed up the steep rocks on either flank, with a surprising vigour and agility, and when they had gained the summit, the supporting columns advanced. Then the allies, who had fought with resolution for about two hours, abandoned the pass with the loss of two guns and about thirty prisoners, retreating however in good order to the main position, for they were not followed beyond the mouth of the defile. The next day, that is the 13th, about one o'clock, the French cavalry, issuing cautiously from the pass, extended to the left in the plain as far as Onil, and they were followed by the infantry who immediately occupied a low ridge about a mile in front of the allies' left; the cavalry then gained ground to the front, and closing towards the right of the allies menaced the road to Ibi and Alcoy.

Murray had only occupied his ground the night before, but he had studied it and entrenched it in parts. His right wing was quite refused, and so well covered by the barranco that nearly all the troops could have been employed as a reserve to the left wing, which was also very strongly posted and presented a front about two miles in extent. But notwithstanding the impregnable strength of the ground the English general shrunk from the contest, and while the head of the French column was advancing from the defile of Biar, thrice he gave his quarter-master general orders to put the army in retreat, and the last time so peremptorily, that obedience must have ensued if at that moment the firing between the picquets and the French light troops had not begun.

BATTLE OF CASTALLA.

Suchet's dispositions were made slowly and as if he also had not made up his mind to fight, but a crooked jut of the sierra, springing from about the middle of the ridge, hid from him all the British troops, and two-thirds of the whole army, hence his first movement was to send a column towards Castalla, to turn this jut of the sierra and discover the conditions of the position. Meanwhile he formed two strong columns immediately opposite the left wing, and his cavalry, displaying a formidable line in the plain closed gradually towards the barranco. The French general however soon discovered that the right of the allies was unattackable. Wherefore retaining his reserve on the low ridge in front of the left wing, and still holding the exploring column of infantry near Castalla, to protect his flank against any sally from that point, he opened his artillery against the centre and right wing of the allies, and forming several columns of attack commenced the action against the allies' left on both sides of the jut before spoken of.

The ascent in front of Whittingham's post, being very rugged and steep, and the upper parts entrenched, the battle there resolved itself at once into a fight of light troops, in which the Spaniards maintained their ground with resolution; but on the other side of the jut, the French mounted the heights, slowly indeed and with many skirmishers, yet so firmly, that it was evident nothing but good fighting would send them down again. Their light troops spread over the whole face of the sierra, and here and there attaining the summit were partially driven down again by the Anglo-Italian troops; but where the main body came upon the second battalion of the twenty-seventh, there was a terrible crash. For the ground having an abrupt declivity near the top enabled the French to form a line under cover, close to the British, who were lying down waiting for orders to charge; and while the former were unfolding their masses a grenadier officer, advancing alone, challenged the captain of the twenty-seventh grenadiers to single combat. Waldron, an agile vigorous Irishman and of boiling courage, instantly sprung forward, the hostile lines looked on without firing a shot, the swords of the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman's head was cleft in twain, and the next instant the twenty-seventh, jumping up with a deafening shout, fired a deadly volley, at half pistol-shot distance, and then charged with such a shock that, maugre their bravery and numbers, the enemy's soldiers were overthrown and the side of the sierra was covered with the killed and wounded. In Murray's despatch this exploit was erroneously attributed to colonel Adam, but it was ordered and conducted by colonel Reeves alone.

The French general seeing his principal column thus overthrown, and at every other point having the worst of the fight, made two secondary attacks to cover the rallying of the defeated columns, but these also failing, his army was separated in three parts, namely, the beaten troops which were in great confusion, the reserve on the minor heights from whence the attacking columns had advanced, and the cavalry, which being far on the left in the plain, was also separated from the point of action by the bed of the torrent, a bridge over which was commanded by the allies. A vigorous sally from Castalla, and a general advance would have obliged the French reserves to fall back upon Biar in confusion, before the cavalry could come to their assistance, and the victory might have been thus completed; but Murray, who had remained during the whole action behind Castalla, gave the French full time to rally all their forces and retire in order towards the pass of Biar. Then gradually passing out by the right of the town, with a tedious pedantic movement, he changed his front, forming two lines across the valley, keeping his left at the foot of the heights, and extending his right, covered by the cavalry, towards the sierra of Onil. Meanwhile, Mackenzie moving out by the left of Castalla with three British, and one German battalion, and eight guns, followed the enemy more rapidly.

Suchet had by this time plunged into the pass with his infantry, cavalry and tumbrils, in one mass, leaving a rear-guard of three battalions with eight guns to cover the passage; but these being pressed by Mackenzie, and heavily cannonaded, were soon forced to form lines and offer battle, answering gun for gun. The French soldiers were heavily crushed by the English shot, the clatter of musketry was beginning, and one well-directed vigorous charge would have overturned and driven the French in a confused mass upon the other troops then wedged in the narrow defile; but Mackenzie's movement had been made by order of the quarter-master general Donkin, without Murray's knowledge, and the latter, instead of supporting it strongly, sent repeated orders to withdraw the troops already engaged, and in despite of all remonstrance caused them to fall back on the main body, when victory was in their grasp. Suchet thus relieved at a most critical moment immediately occupied a position across the defile with his flanks on the heights, and though Murray finally sent some light companies to attack his left, the effort was feeble and produced no result; he retained his position and in the night retired to Fuente de la Higuera.

On the 14th, Murray marched to Alcoy, where a small part of Whittingham's forces had remained in observation of a French detachment left to hold the pass of Albayda, and through this pass he proposed to intercept the retreat of Suchet, but his movements were slow, his arrangements bad, and the army became so disordered, that he halted the 15th at Alcoy. A feeble demonstration on the following days towards Albayda terminated his operations.

In this battle of Castalla, the allies had, including Roche's division, about seventeen thousand of all arms, and the French about fifteen thousand. Suchet says that the action was brought on, against his wish, by the impetuosity of his light troops, and that he lost only eight hundred men; his statement is confirmed by Vacani, the Italian historian. Sir John Murray affirms that it was a pitched battle and that the French lost above three thousand men. The reader may choose between these accounts. In favour of Suchet's version it may be remarked that neither the place, nor the time, nor the mode of attack, was such as might be expected from his talents

and experience in war, if he had really intended a pitched battle; and though the action was strongly contested on the principal point, it is scarcely possible that so many as three thousand men could have been killed and wounded. And yet eight hundred seems too few, because the loss of the victorious troops with all advantages of ground was more than six hundred. One thing is, however, certain, that if Suchet lost three thousand men, which would have been at least a fourth of his infantry, he must have been so disabled, so crippled, that what with the narrow defile of Biar in the rear, and the distance of his cavalry in the plain, to have escaped at all was extremely discreditable to Murray's generalship. An able commander, having a superior force, and the allies were certainly the most numerous, would never have suffered the pass of Biar to be forced on the 12th, or if it were forced, he would have had his army well in hand behind it, ready to fall upon the head of the French column as it issued into the low ground.

Suchet violated several of the most important maxims of art. For without an adequate object, he fought a battle, having a defile in his rear, and on ground where his cavalry, in which he was superior, could not act. Neither the general state of the French affairs, nor the particular circumstances, invited a decisive offensive movement at the time, wherefore the French general should have been contented with his first successes against the Spaniards, and against colonel Adam, unless some palpable advantage had been offered to him by Murray. But the latter's position was very strong indeed, and the French army was in imminent danger, cooped up between the pass of Biar and the allied troops; and this danger would have been increased if Elío had executed a movement which Murray had proposed to him on the night of the 12th, namely, to push troops into the mountains from Sax, which would have strengthened Whittingham's left and menaced the right flank of the enemy. Elío disregarded this request, and during the whole of the operations the two armies were unconnected, and acting without concert, although only a few miles distant from each other. This might have been avoided if they had previously put the castle and town of Villena in a good state of defence, and occupied the pass of Biar in force behind it. The two armies would then have been secure of a junction in advance, and the plain of Villena would have been commanded. To the courage of the troops belongs all the merit of the success obtained; there was no generalship, and hence, though much blood was spilt, no profit was derived from victory.

CHAPTER V.

Operations north of the Tagus—Position of the French armies—Palombini marches from Madrid to join the army of the north—Various combats take place with the partidas—Foy fails to surprise the British post at Bejar—Caffarelli demands reinforcements—Joseph misconceives the emperor's plans—Wellington's plans vindicated against French writers—Soult advises Joseph to hold Madrid and the mountains of Avila—Indecision of the king—He goes to Valladolid—Concentrates the French armies in Old Castile—A division under Leval remains at Madrid—Reille sends reinforcements to the army of the north—Various skirmishes with the partidas—Leval deceived by false rumours at Madrid—Joseph wishes to abandon that capital—Northern insurrection—Operations of Caffarelli, Palombini, Mendizabel, Longa, and Mina—Napoleon recalls Caffarelli—Clauzel takes the command of the army of the north—assaults Castro but fails—Palombini skirmishes with Mendizabel—Introduces a convoy into Santona—Marches to succour Bilbao—His operations in Guipuscoa—

The insurrection gains strength—Clauzel marches into Navarre—Defeats Mina in the valley of Roncal and pursues him into Aragon—Foy acts on the coast—Takes Castro—Returns to Bilbao—Defeats the Biscayan volunteers under Mugartegui at Villaro, and those of Guipuscoa under Artola at Lequitio—The insurrectional junta flies—Bermeo and Isaro are taken—Operations of the partidas on the great line of communication.

OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE TAGUS.

On this side as in the south, one part of the French fronted lord Wellington's forces, while the rest warred with the partidas, watched the English fleets on the coast, and endeavoured to maintain a free intercourse with France; but the extent of country was greater, the lines of communication longer, the war altogether more difficult, and the various operations more dissevered.

Four distinct bodies acted north of the Tagus.

1st. The army of Portugal, composed of six divisions under Reille, observing the allies from behind the Tormes; the Gallicians from behind the Esla.

2nd. That part of the army of the south, which, posted in the valley of the Tagus, observed Hill from behind the Tietar, and the Spaniards of Estremadura from behind the Tagus.

3d. The army of the north, under Caffarelli, whose business was to watch the English squadrons in the Bay of Biscay, to scour the great line of communication with France, and to protect the fortresses of Navarre and Biscay.

4th. The army of the centre, under count D'Erlon, whose task was to fight the partidas in the central part of Spain, to cover Madrid and to connect the other armies by means of movable columns radiating from that capital. Now if the reader will follow the operations of these armies in the order of their importance, and will mark their bearing on the main action of the campaign, he will be led gradually to understand how it was, that in 1813, the French, although apparently in their full strength, were suddenly, irremediably, and as it were by a whirlwind, swept from the Peninsula.

The army of the centre was composed of Darmagnac's and Barrois' French divisions, of Palombini's Italians, Casa Palacio's Spaniards, Trielhard's cavalry, and the king's French guards. It has been already shewn how, marching from the Tormes, it drove the Empecinado and Bassecour from the capital; but in passing the Guadarama one hundred and fifty men were frozen to death, a catastrophe produced by the rash use of ardent spirits. Palombini immediately occupied Alcala, and, having foraged the country towards Guadalaxara, brought in a large convoy of provisions to that capital. He would then have gone to Zaragoza to receive the recruits and stores which had arrived from Italy for his division, but Caffarelli was at this time so pressed that the Italian division finally marched to his succour, not by the direct road, such was the state of the northern provinces, but by the circuitous route of Valladolid and Burgos. The king's guards then replaced the Italians at Alcala, and excursions were commenced on every side against the partidas, which being now recruited and taught by French deserters, were become exceedingly wary and fought obstinately.

On the 8th of January, Espert, governor of Segovia, beat Saornil not far from Cuellar.

On the 3d of February, general Vichery, marching upon Medina Celi, routed a regiment of horse called the volunteers of Madrid, and took six hundred prisoners. The Empecinado with two thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry intercepted him on his return, but Vichery beat him with considerable slaughter, and made the retreat good with a loss of

only seventy men. However, the guerilla chief being reinforced by Saornil, and Abril, still kept the hills about Guadalajara, and when D'Erlon sent fresh troops against him, he attacked a detachment under colonel Prieur, killed twenty men, took the baggage and recovered a heavy contribution.

During these operations, the troops in the valley of the Tagus were continually harassed, especially by a chief called Cuesta, who was sometimes in the Guadalupe mountains, sometimes on the Tietar, sometimes in the Vera de Placentia, and he was supported at times on the side of the Guadalupe by Morillo and Penne Villemur. The French were, however, most troubled by Hill's vicinity, for that general's successful enterprises had made a profound impression, and the slightest change of his quarters, or even the appearance of an English uniform beyond the line of cantonments caused a concentration of French troops as expecting one of his sudden blows.

Nor was the army of Portugal tranquil. The Gallicians menaced it from Puebla Senabria and the gorges of the Bierzo; Silveira from the Tras os Montes; the mountains separating Leon from the Asturias, were full of bands; Wellington was on the Agueda; and Hill, moving from Coria by the pass of Bejar, might make a sudden incursion towards Avila. Finally, the communication with the army of the north was to be kept up, and on every side the partidas were enterprising, especially the horsemen in the plains of Leon. Reille, however, did not fail to war down these last.

Early in January, Foy, returning from Astorga to relieve general Leval, then at Avila, killed some of Marquinez's cavalry in San Pedro, and more of them at Mota la Toro; and on the 15th of that month the French captain Mathis killed or took four hundred of the same partida at Valderas. A convoy of guerilla stores coming from the Asturias was intercepted by general Boyer's detachments, and one Florian, a celebrated Spanish partizan in the French service, destroyed the band of Garido, in the Avila district. The same Florian on the 1st of February defeated the Medico and another inferior chief, and soon after, passing the Tormes, captured some Spanish dragoons who had come out of Ciudad Rodrigo. On the 1st of March he crushed the band of Tonto, and at the same time captain Mathis, acting on the side of the Carion river, again surprised Marquinez' band at Melgar Abaxo, and that partida, reduced to two hundred men under two inferior chiefs called Tobar and Marcos, ceased to be formidable.

Previous to this some Gallician troops having advanced to Castro Gonzalo on the Esla, were attacked by Boyer, who beat them through Benevente with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and then driving the Spanish garrison from Puebla Senabria, raised contributions with a rigour and ferocity said to be habitual to him. His detachments afterwards penetrating into the Asturias, menaced Oviedo, and vexed the country in despite of Porlier and Barceña, who were in that province. General Foy also having fixed his quarters at Avila, feeling uneasy as to Hill's intentions, had endeavoured on the 20th of February to surprise Bejar with the view of ascertaining if any large body was collected behind it, but he was vigorously repulsed by the fiftieth regiment and sixth caçadores under the command of colonel Harrison. However, this attack and the movements of Florian beyond the Tormes, induced lord Wellington to bring up another division to the Agueda, which, by a reaction, caused the French to believe the allies were ready to advance.

During these events, Caffarelli vainly urged Reille

to send him reinforcements, the insurrection in the north gained strength, and the communications were entirely intercepted until Palombini, driving away Mendizabel and Longa from Burgos, enabled the great convoy and all Napoleon's despatches, which had been long accumulating there, to reach Madrid in the latter end of February. Joseph then reluctantly prepared to abandon his capital and concentrate the armies in Castile, but he neglected those essential ingredients of the emperor's plan, rapidity and boldness. By the first, Napoleon proposed to gain time for the suppression of the insurrection in the northern provinces. By the second to impose upon lord Wellington and keep him on the defensive. Joseph did neither; he was slow and assumed the defensive himself, and he and the other French generals expected to be attacked, for they had not fathomed the English general's political difficulties; and French writers since, misconceiving the character of his warfare, have attributed to slowness in the man what was really the long-reaching policy of a great commander. The allied army was not so lithe as the French army; the latter carried on occasion ten days' provisions on the soldiers' backs, or it lived upon the country, and was in respect of its organization and customs a superior military machine; the former never carried more than three days' provisions, never lived upon the country, avoided the principle of making the war support the war, payed or promised to pay for every thing, and often carried in its marches even the corn for its cavalry. The difference of this organization resulting from the difference of policy between the two nations, was a complete bar to any great and sudden excursion on the part of the British general, and must always be considered in judging his operations.

It is true that if Wellington had then passed the Upper Tormes with a considerable force, drawing Hill to him through Bejar, and moving rapidly by Avila, he might have broken in upon the defensive system of the king and beat his armies in detail, and much the French feared such a blow, which would have been quite in the manner of Napoleon. But Wellington's views were directed by other than mere military principles. Thus striking, he was not certain that his blow would be decisive, his Portuguese forces would have been ruined, his British soldiers seriously injured by the attempt, and the resources of France would have repaired the loss of the enemy, sooner than he could have recovered the weakness which must necessarily have followed such an unseasonable exertion. His plan was to bring a great and enduring power early into the field, for like Phocion, he desired to have an army fitted for a long race and would not start on the short course.

Joseph, though he conceived the probability and dreaded the effect of such a sudden attack, could by no means conceive the spirit of his brother's plans. It was in vain that Napoleon, while admitting the bad moral effect of abandoning the capital, pointed out the difference between flying from it and making a forward movement at the head of an army; the king even maintained that Madrid was a better military centre of operations than Valladolid, because it had lines of communication by Segovia, Aranda de Duero, and Zaragoza; nothing could be more un military, unless he was prepared to march direct upon Lisbon if the allies marched upon the Duero. His extreme reluctance to quit Madrid induced slowness, but the actual position of his troops at the moment, likewise presented obstacles to the immediate execution of the emperor's orders; for as Daricau's division had not returned from Valencia, the French outposts towards the Morena could not be withdrawn,

nor could the army of the centre march upon Valladolid until the army of the south relieved it at Madrid. Moreover, Soult's counsels had troubled the king's judgment; for that marshal, agreeing that to abandon Madrid at that time was to abandon Spain, offered a project for reconciling the possession of the capital with the emperor's views. This was to place the army of Portugal, and the army of the south, in position along the slopes of the Avila mountains, and on the Upper Tormes, menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, while the king with the army of the centre remained at Madrid in reserve. In this situation he said they would be an over-match for any force the allies could bring into the field, and the latter could not move either by the valley of the Tagus or upon the Duero without exposing themselves to a flank attack.

The king objected that such a force could only be fed in that country by the utter ruin of the people, which he would not consent to; but he was deceived by his ministers; the comfortable state of the houses, the immense plains of standing corn seen by the allies in their march from the Esla to the Carion, proved that the people were not much impoverished. Soult, well acquainted with the resources of the country, and a better and more practised master of such operations, looked to the military question rather than to the king's conciliatory policy, and positively affirmed that the armies could be subsisted; yet it does not appear that he had taken into his consideration how the insurrection in the northern provinces was to be suppressed, which was the principal object of Napoleon's plan. He no doubt expected that the emperor would, from France send troops for that purpose, but Napoleon, knowing the true state of his affairs, foresaw that all the resources of France would be required in another quarter.

Hatred and suspicion would have made Joseph reject any plan suggested by Soult, and the more so, that the latter now declared the armies could exist without assistance in money from France; yet his mind was evidently unsettled by that marshal's proposal, and by the coincidence of his ideas as to holding Madrid, for even when the armies were in movement towards the northern parts, he vacillated in his resolutions, at one time thinking to stay at Madrid, at another to march with the army of the centre to Burgos, instead of Valladolid. However, upon the 18th of March he quitted the capital, leaving the Spanish ministers Angulo and Almenara to govern there in conjunction with Gazan. The army of the south then moved in two columns, one under Couroux across the Gredos mountains to Avila, the other under Gazan upon Madrid to relieve the army of the centre, which immediately marched to Aranda de Duero and Lerma, with orders to settle at Burgos. Meanwhile Villatte's division and all the outposts withdrawn from La Mancha remained on the Alberche, and the army of the south was thus concentrated between that river, Madrid and Avila.

North of the Tagus the troops were unmolested, save by the bands during these movements, which were not completed before April, but in La Mancha, the retiring French posts had been followed by Del Parque's advanced guard under Cruz Murgeon as far as Yebenes, and at the bridge of Algobar the French cavalry checked the Spanish horsemen so roughly, that Cruz Murgeon retired again towards the Morena. At the same time on the Cuenca side, the Empecinado having attempted to cut off a party of French cavalry, escorting the marquis of Salices to collect his rents previous to quitting Madrid, was defeated with the loss of seventy troopers. Meanwhile the great depot at Madrid being partly re-

moved, general Villatte marched upon Salamanca, and Gazan fixed his head-quarters at Arevalo. The army of the south was thus cantoned between the Tormes, the Duero, and the Adaja, with exception of six chosen regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, in all about ten thousand men; these remained at Madrid under Leval, who was ordered to push advanced guards to Toledo and the Alberche, lest the allies should suddenly march that way and turn the left of the French army. But beyond the Alberche there were roads leading from the valley of the Tagus over the Gredos mountains in the rear of the advanced positions which the French had on the Upper Tormes, wherefore these last were now withdrawn from Pedrahita and Puente Congosto.

In proportion as the troops arrived in Castile, Reille sent men to the army of the north, and contracting his cantonments, concentrated his remaining forces about Medina de Rio Seco, with his cavalry on the Esla. But the men, recalled by the emperor, were now in full march, the French were in a state of great confusion, the people, urged by Wellington's emissaries, and expecting great events, every where showed their dislike by withholding provisions, and the partida warfare became as lively in the interior as on the coast, yet with worse fortune. Captain Giordano, a Spaniard of Joseph's guard, killed one hundred and fifty of Saornil's people near Arevalo, and the indefatigable Florian defeated Morales' band, seized a depot in the valley of the Tietar, beat the Medico there, and then crossing the Gredos mountains, destroyed near Segovia on the 28th, the band of Purchas; the king's Spanish guards also crushed some smaller partidas, and Renovaes with his whole staff was captured at Carvajales and carried to Valladolid. Meanwhile the Empecinado gained the hills above Sepulveda and, joining with Merino, obliged the people of the Ségovia district, to abandon their houses and refuse the supplies demanded by the army of the centre. When D'Armagnac and Cassagne marched against them, Merino returned to his northern haunts, the Empecinado to the Tagus, and D'Erlon then removed his head-quarters to Cuellar.

During April, Leval was very much disturbed, and gave false alarms, which, extending to Valladolid, caused an unseasonable concentration of the troops, and D'Erlon abandoned Cuellar and Sepulveda. Del Parque and the Empecinado were said to have established the bridge of Aranjuez, Elío to be advancing in La Mancha, Hill to be in the valley of the Tagus and moving by Mombeltran with the intention of seizing the passes of the Guadarama. All of this was false. It was the Empecinado and Abuelo who were at Aranjuez, the partidas of Firmin, Cuesta, Rivero, and El Medico who were collecting at Arzobispo, to mask the march of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura, and of the reserve from Andalusia; it was the prince of Anglona who was advancing in La Mancha to cover the movement of Del Parque upon Murcia. When disabused of his error, Leval easily drove away the Empecinado who had advanced to Alcala; afterwards chasing Firmin from Valdemoro into the valley of the Tagus, he re-established his advanced posts of Toledo and on the Alberche, and scoured the whole country around. But Joseph himself was anxious to abandon Madrid altogether, and was only restrained by the emperor's orders and by the hope of still gathering some contributions there to support his court at Valladolid. With reluctance also he had obeyed his brother's reiterated orders to bring the army of the centre over the Duero to replace the detached divisions of the army of Portugal. He wished D'Erlon rather than

Reille, to reinforce the north, and nothing could more clearly show how entirely the subtle spirit of Napoleon's instructions had escaped his perception. It was necessary that Madrid should be held to watch the valley of the Tagus, and, if necessary, to enable the French armies to fall back on Zaragoza, but principally to give force to the moral effect of the offensive movement towards Portugal. It was equally important, and for the same reason, that the army of Portugal, instead of the army of the centre, should furnish reinforcements for the north.

In the contracted positions which the armies now occupied, the difficulty of subsisting was increased, and each general was dissatisfied with his district, disputes multiplied, and the court clashed with the army at every turn. Leval also inveighed against the conduct of the Spanish ministers and minor authorities left at Madrid, as being hurtful to both troops and people, and no doubt justly, since it appears to have been precisely like that of the Portuguese and Spanish authorities on the other side towards the allies. Joseph's letters to his brother became daily more bitter. Napoleon's regulations for the support of the troops were at variance with his, and when the king's budget shewed a deficit of many millions, the emperor so little regarded it that he reduced the French subsidy to two millions per month, and strictly forbade the application of the money to any other purpose than the pay of the soldiers. When Joseph asked, how he was to find resources? his brother, with a just sarcasm on his political and military blindness, desired him to seek what was necessary in those provinces of the north which were rich enough to nourish the partidas and the insurrectional juntas. The king thus pushed to the wall prevailed upon Gazan, secretly, to lend him fifty thousand francs for the support of his court from the chest of the army of the south; but with the other generals he could by no means agree, and instead of the vigour and vigilance necessary to meet the coming campaign there was weakness, disunion and ill-blood.

All the movements and arrangements for concentrating the French forces, as made by Joseph, displeased Napoleon. The manner in which the army of the centre stole away from Madrid, by the road of Lerma, was, he said, only calculated to expose his real views, and draw the allies upon the French before the communication with France was restored. But more than all, his indignation was aroused by the conduct of the king after the concentration. The French armies were held on the defensive and the allies might, without fear for Portugal, embark troops to invade France, whereas a bold and confident offensive movement sustained by the formation of a battering train at Burgos, as if to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo, would have imposed upon the English general, secured France from the danger of such an insult, and would at the same time have masked the necessary measures for suppressing the insurrection in the northern provinces. To quell that insurrection was of vital importance, but from the various circumstances, already noticed, it had now existed for seven months, five of which the king, although at the head of ninety thousand men, and uninterrupted by Wellington, had wasted unprofitably, having done no more than chase a few inferior bands of the interior, while this formidable warfare was consolidating in his rear; and while his great adversary was organizing the most powerful army which had yet taken the field, in his front. It is thus kingdoms are lost. I shall now trace the progress of the northern insurrection, so unaccountably neglected by the king, and to the last misunderstood by him; for

when Wellington was actually in movement, when the dispersed French corps were rushing and crowding to the rear to avoid the ponderous mass which the English general was pushing forward; even then, the king, who had done every thing possible to render defeat certain, was urging upon Napoleon the propriety of first beating the allies and afterwards reducing the insurrection by the establishment of a Spanish civil government beyond the Ebro!

NORTHERN INSURRECTION.

It has been already shewn how the old partidas had been strengthened, and new corps organized on a better footing in Biscay and Navarre; how in the latter end of 1812, Caffarelli marched to succour Santona, and how Longa, taking advantage of his absence, captured a convoy near Burgos, while other bands menaced Logroño. All the littoral posts, with the exception of Santona and Gueteria, were then in the possession of the Spaniards, and Mendizabel made an attempt on Bilbao, the 6th of January. Repulsed by general Rouget he rejoined Longa, and together they captured the little fort of Salinas de Anara, near the Ebro, and that of Cuba in the Bureba, while the bands of Logroña invested Domingo Calçada in the Rioja. On the 26th of January, Caffarelli, having returned from Santona, detached Fandermassen and Dubreton to drive the Spaniards from Santander, and they seized many stores there, but neglected to make any movement to aid Santona, which was again blockaded by the partidas; meanwhile the convoy with all the emperor's despatches was stopped at Burgos. Palombini reopened the communications and enabled the convoy to reach Madrid, but his division did not muster more than three thousand men, and various detachments belonging to the other armies were now in march to the interior of Spain. The regiments recalled to France from all parts were also in full movement, together with many convoys and escorts for the marshals and generals quitting the Peninsula; thus the army of the north was reduced as its duties increased, and the young French soldiers died fast of a peculiar malady which especially attacked them in small garrisons. Meanwhile the Spaniards' forces increased. In February Mendizabel and Longa were again in the Bureba intercepting the communication between Burgos and Bilbao, and they menaced Pancorbo and Briviesca. This brought Caffarelli from Vittoria and Palombini from Burgos. The latter, surprised by Longa, lost many men near Poza de Sal, and only saved himself by his courage and firmness, yet he finally drove the Spaniards away. But now Mina, returning from Aragon after his unsuccessful action near Huesca, surprised and burned the castle of Fuenterrabia in a most daring manner, on the 11th of March, after which, having assembled five thousand men in Guipuscoa, he obtained guns from the English fleet at Motrico, invested Villa Real within a few leagues of Vittoria, and repulsed six hundred men who came to relieve the fort. This brought Caffarelli back from Pancorbo. Mina then raised the siege, and Palombini marching into the Rioja, succoured the garrison of San Domingo Calçada and drove the partidas towards Soria. The communication with Logroño was thus reopened, and the Italians, passing the Ebro, marched by Vittoria towards Bilbao, where they arrived the 21st of February; but the gens-d'armes and imperial guards immediately moved from Bilbao to France, Caffarelli went with them, and the Spanish chiefs remained masters of Navarre and Biscay. The people now refused war contributions

both in money and kind, the harvest was not ripe, and the distress of the French increased in an alarming manner, because the weather enabled the English fleets to keep upon the coast and intercept all supplies from France by sea. The communications were all broken; in front by Longa, who was again at the defile of Pancorbo; in the rear by Mina, who was in the hills of Arlaban; on the left by a collection of bands at Caroncal in Navarre. Abbé, governor of Pampeluna, severely checked these last, but Mina soon restored affairs; for, leaving the volunteers of Guipuscoa to watch the defiles of Arlaban, he assembled all the bands in Navarre, destroyed the bridges leading to Taffalla from Fambeluna and from Puente la Reyna, and, though Abbé twice attacked him, he got stronger, and bringing up two English guns from the coast besieged Taffalla.

Napoleon, discontented with Caffarelli's mode of conducting the war, now gave Clauzel the command in the north, with discretionary power to draw as many troops from the army of Portugal as he judged necessary. He was to correspond directly with the emperor to avoid loss of time, but was to obey the king in all things not clashing with Napoleon's orders, which contained a complete review of what had passed and what was necessary to be done. "The partidas," the emperor said, "were strong, organized, exercised, and seconded by the exaltation of spirit which the battle of Salamanca had produced. The insurreccional juntas had been revived, the posts on the coasts, abandoned by the French and seized by the Spaniards, gave free intercourse with the English; the bands enjoyed all the resources of the country, and the system of warfare hitherto followed had favoured their progress. Instead of forestalling their enterprises the French had waited for their attacks, and contrived to be always behind the event; they obeyed the enemy's impulsion, and the troops were fatigued without gaining their object. Clauzel was to adopt a contrary system; he was to attack suddenly, pursue rapidly, and combine his movements with reference to the features of the country. A few good strokes against the Spaniards' magazines, hospitals, or depots of arms would inevitably trouble their operations, and after one or two military successes some political measures would suffice to disperse the authorities, disorganize the insurrection, and bring the young men who had been enrolled by force back to their homes. All the generals recommended, and the emperor approved of the construction of block-houses on well-chosen points, especially where many roads met; the forests would furnish the materials cheaply, and these posts should support each other and form chains of communication. With respect to the greater fortresses, Pampeluna and Santona were the most important, and the enemy knew it, for Mina was intent to famish the first, and the English squadron to get hold of the second. To supply Pampeluna it was only necessary to clear the communications, the country around being rich and fertile. Santona required combinations. The emperor wished to supply it by sea from Bayonne and St. Sebastian, but the French marine officers would never attempt the passage, even with favourable winds and when the English squadron were away, unless all the intermediate ports were occupied by the land forces.

"Six months before, these ports had been in the hands of the French, but Caffarelli had lightly abandoned them, leaving the field open to the insurgents in his rear, while he marched with Souham against Wellington. Since that period the English and Spaniards held them. For four months the emperor

had unceasingly ordered the retaking of Bermeo and Castro, but whether from the difficulty of the operations or the necessity of answering more pressing calls, no effort had been made to obey, and the fine season now permitted the English ships to aid in the defence. Castro was said to be strongly fortified by the English; no wonder, Caffarelli had given them sufficient time and they knew its value. In one month every post on the coast from the mouth of the Bidassao to St. Ander should be again reoccupied by the French, and St. Ander itself should be garrisoned strongly. And simultaneous with the coast operations should be Clauzel's attack on Mina in Navarre, and the chasing of the partidas in the interior of Biscay. The administration of the country also demanded reform, and still more the organization and discipline of the army of the north should be attended to. It was the pith and marrow of the French power in Spain, all would fail if that failed, whereas if the north was strong, its administration sound, its fortresses well provided, and its state tranquil, no irreparable misfortune could happen in any other part."

Clauzel assumed the command on the 22nd of February, Abbé was then confined to Pampeluna; Mina, master of Navarre, was besieging Taffalla; Pastor, Longa, Campillo, Merino, and others ranged through Biscay and Castile unmolested; and the spirit of the country was so changed that fathers now sent their sons to join partidas which had hitherto been composed of robbers and deserters. Clauzel demanded a reinforcement of twenty thousand men from the army of Portugal, but Joseph was still in Madrid, and proposed to send D'Erlon with the army of the centre instead, an arrangement to which Clauzel would not accede. Twenty thousand troops were, he said, wanted beyond the Ebro. Two independent chiefs, himself and D'Erlon, could not act together; and if the latter was only to remain quiet at Burgos, his army would devour the resources without aiding the operations of the army of the north. The king might choose another commander, but the troops required must be sent. Joseph changed his plan, yet it was the end of March before Reille's divisions moved, three upon Navarre, and one upon Burgos. Meanwhile Clauzel repaired with some troops to Bilbao, where general Rouget had eight hundred men in garrison besides Palombini's Italians.

This place was, in a manner, blockaded by the partidas. The Pastor, with three thousand men, was on the right of the Durango river in the hills of Guernica, and Navarnis between Bilbao and the fort of Bermeo. Mendizabel, with from eight to ten thousand men, was on the left of the Durango in the mountains, menacing at once Santona and Bilbao, and protecting Castro. However, the French had a strong garrison in the town of Durango, the construction of new works round Bilbao was in progress, and on the 22d of March, Clauzel moved with the Italians and a French regiment to assault Castro. Campillo and Mendizabel immediately appeared from different sides, and the garrison made a sally; the Spaniards, after some sharp fighting, regained the high valleys in disorder, and the design of escalading Castro was resumed, but again interrupted by the return of Mendizabel to Trucios, only seven miles from the French camp, and by intelligence that the Pastor, with the volunteers of Biscay and Guipuscoa, was menacing Bilbao. Clauzel immediately marched with the French regiments to the latter place, leaving Palombini to oppose Mendizabel. Finding all safe at Bilbao, he sent Rouget with two French battalions to reinforce the Ital-

ians, who then drove Mendizabel from Trucios into the hills about Valmaceda. It being now necessary to attack Castro in form, Palombini occupied the heights of Ojeba and Ramales, from whence he communicated with the garrison of Santana, introduced a convoy of money and fresh provisions there, received ammunition in return, and directed the governor Lameth to prepare a battering train of six pieces for the siege. This done, the Italians, who had lost many men, returned hastily to Bilbao, for the Pastor was again menacing that city.

On the evening of the 31st, Palombini marched against this new enemy, and finding him too strong retreated, but being promised a reinforcement of two regiments from Durango he returned; Pastor was then with three thousand men in position at Navarnis, Palombini gave him battle on the 3d, and was defeated with the loss of eighty men, but on the 5th, being joined by the French regiments from Durango, he beat the Spaniards. They dispersed, and while some collected in the same positions behind him, and others under Pastor gained the interior, one column retired by the coast towards the Deba on the side of St. Sebastian. Palombini eagerly pursued these last, because he expected troops from that fortress to line the Deba, and hoped thus to surround the Spaniards, but the English squadron was at Lequitio and carried them off. Pastor meanwhile descending the Deba drove the French from that river to the very walls of St. Sebastian, and Palombini was forced to make for Bergara on the road to Vittoria.

At Bergara he left his wounded men with a garrison to protect them, and returning on the 9th of April attacked the volunteers of Guipuscoa at Ascotyia; repulsed in this attempt he retired again towards Bergara, and soon after took charge of a convoy of artillery going from St. Sebastian for the siege of Castro. Meanwhile Bilbao was in great danger, for the volunteers of Biscay coming from the Arlabán, made on the 10th a false attack at a bridge two miles above the entrenched camp, while Tapia, Dos Pelos, and Campillo fell on seriously from the side of Valmaceda. Mendizabel, who commanded, did not combine his movements well and was repulsed by Rouget, although with difficulty; the noise of the action reached Palombini, who hastened his march, and having deposited his convoy, followed the volunteers of Biscay to Guernica and drove them upon Bermeo, where they got on board the English vessels.

During these events Clauzel was at Vittoria arranging the general plan of operations. Mina had on the 1st of April defeated one of his columns near Lerin with the loss of five or six hundred men. The four divisions sent from the army of Portugal, together with some unattached regiments, furnished, according to Reille, the twenty thousand men demanded, yet only seventeen thousand reached Clauzel; and as the unattached regiments merely replaced a like number belonging to the other armies, and now recalled from the north, the French general found his expected reinforcements dwindled to thirteen thousand. Hence notwithstanding Palombini's activity, the insurrection was in the beginning of April more formidable than ever; the line of correspondence from Torquemada to Burgos was quite unprotected for want of troops, neither was the line from Burgos to Irun so well guarded that couriers could pass without powerful escorts, nor always then. The fortifications of the castle of Burgos were to have been improved, but there was no money to pay for the works, the French, in default of transport, could not collect provisions for the

magazines ordered to be formed there by the king, and two generals, La Martiniere and Rey, were disputing for the command. Nearly forty thousand irregular Spanish troops were in the field. The garrison of Taffalla, five hundred strong, had yielded to Mina, and that chief, in concert with Duran, Amor, Tabueca, the militia men of Logroña, and some minor guerillas, occupied both sides of the Ebro, between Calahorra, Logroña, Santa Cruz de Campero, and Guardia. They could in one day unite eighteen thousand infantry and a thousand horsemen. Mendizabel, Longa, Campillo, Herrera, El Pastor, and the volunteers of Biscay, Guipuscoa, and Alava, in all about sixteen thousand, were on the coast acting in conjunction with the English squadrons; Santander, Castro, and Bermeo were still in their hands, and maritime expeditions were preparing at Coruña and in the Asturias.

This partizan war thus presented three distinct branches, that of Navarre, that of the coast, and that on the lines of communication. The last alone required above fifteen thousand men; namely, ten thousand from Irun to Burgos, and the line between Tolosa and Pampeluna, which was destroyed, required fifteen hundred to restore it, while four thousand were necessary between Mondragon and Bilbao, comprising the garrison of the latter place; even then no post would be safe from a sudden attack. Nearly all the army of the north was appropriated to the garrisons and lines of communication, but the divisions of Abbé and Vandermaesen could be used on the side of Pampeluna, and there were besides, disposable, Palombini's Italians and the divisions sent by Reille. But one of these, Sarrut's, was still in march, and all the sick of the armies in Castile were now pouring into Navarre, when, from the loss of the contributions, there was no money to provide assistance for them. Clauzel had however ameliorated both the civil and the military administrations, improved the works of Gueteria, commenced the construction of block-houses between Irun and Vittoria, and as we have seen had shaken the bands about Bilbao. Now dividing his forces he destined Palombini to besiege Castro, ordering Foy and Sarrut's divisions, when the latter should arrive, to cover the operation and to oppose any disembarkation.

The field force thus appropriated, together with the troops in Bilbao under Rouget, was about ten thousand men, and in the middle of April, Clauzel, beating Mina from Taffalla and Estella, assembled the remainder of the active army, composed of Taupin's and Barbout's divisions of the army of Portugal, Vandermaesen's and Abbé's divisions of the army of the north, in all about thirteen thousand men, at Puente la Reyna in Navarre. He urged general L'Huillier, who commanded the reserve at Bayonne, to reinforce St. Sebastian and Gueteria and to push forward his troops of observation into the valley of Bastan, and he also gave the commandant of Zaragoza notice of his arrival, that he might watch Mina on that side. From Puente la Reyna he made some excursions, but he lost men uselessly, for the Spaniards would only fight at advantage, and to hunt Mina without first barring all his passages of flight, was to destroy the French soldiers by fatigue. And here the king's delay was most seriously felt, because the winter season, when the tops of the mountains being covered with snow, the partidas could only move along the ordinary roads, was most favourable for the French operations, and it had passed away. Clauzel, despairing to effect any thing with so few troops, was even going to separate his forces and march to the coast, when in May

Mina, who had taken post in the valley of Ronçal, furnished an occasion which did not escape the French general.

On the 13th, Abbé's and Vandermaesen's divisions, and the cavalry, entered that valley at once by the upper and lower parts, and suddenly closing upon the guerilla chief, killed and wounded a thousand of his men and dispersed the rest; one part fled by the mountains to Navarquez, on the side of Sanguessa, with the wounded, whom they dropped at different places in care of the country people. Chaplangarra, Cruchaga, and Carena, Mina's lieutenants, went off, each with a column, in the opposite direction and by different routes to the valley of the Aragon; they passed that river at St. Gilla, and made their way towards the sacred mountain of La Pena, near Jacca. The French cavalry following them by Villa Real, entered that town the 14th on one side, while Mina, with twelve men, entered it on the other, but he escaped to Martes, where another ineffectual attempt was made to surprise him. Abbé's columns then descended the smaller valleys leading towards the upper valley of the Aragon, while Vandermaesen's infantry and the cavalry entered the lower part of the same valley, and the former approaching Jacca sent his wounded men there and got fresh ammunition.

Meanwhile Mina and the insurgent junta, making a push to regain Navarre by the left of the Aragon river, were like to have been taken, but again escaped towards the valley of the Gallego, whither also the greater part of their troops now sought refuge. Clauzel was careful not to force them over that river, lest they should remain there and intercept the communication from Zaragoza by Jacca, which was the only free line the French now possessed, and too far removed from Clauzel's true theatre of operations to be watched. Abbé therefore returned to Ronçal in search of the Spanish depots, and Vandermaesen entered Sos at one end, just as Mina, who had now one hundred and fifty horsemen and was always intent upon regaining Navarre, passed out at the other; the light cavalry pursuing overtook him at Sos Fuentes and he fled to Carcastillo, but there unexpectedly meeting some of his own squadrons, which had wandered over the mountains after the action at Ronçal, he gave battle, was defeated with the loss of fifty men, and fled once more to Aragon, whereupon the insurrectional junta dispersed, and dissensions arose between Mina and the minor chiefs under his command. Clauzel, anxious to increase this discord, sent troops into all the valleys to seek out the Spanish depots and to attack their scattered men, and he was well served by the Aragonese, for Suchet's wise administration was still proof against the insurrectional juntas.

During these events four battalions left by Mina at Santa Cruz de Campero, in the Amescoas, were chased by Taupin, who had remained at Estella when the other divisions marched up the valley of Ronçal. Mina, however, reassembled at Barbastro, in Aragon, a strong column, crowds of deserters from the other Spanish armies were daily increasing his power, and so completely had he organized Navarre, that the presence of a single soldier of his in a village sufficed to have any courier without a strong escort stopped. Many bands also were still in the Rioja, and two French regiments rashly foraging towards Lerim were nearly all destroyed. In fine the losses were well balanced, and Clauzel demanded more troops, especially cavalry, to scour the Rioja. Nevertheless the dispersion of Mina's troops lowered the reputation of that chief, and the French general, taking up his quarters in Pampeluna, so

improved this advantage by address that many townships withdrew from the insurrection, and recalling their young men from the bands, commenced the formation of eight free Spanish companies to serve on the French side. Corps of this sort were raised with so much facility in every part of Spain, that it would seem nations, as well as individuals, have an idiosyncrasy, and in these changeable warriors we again see the Mandonius and Indibilis of ancient days.

Joseph, urged by Clauzel, now sent Maucune's division and some light cavalry of the army of Portugal, to occupy Pampleiga, Burgos, and Briviesca, and to protect the great communication, which the diverging direction of Clauzel's double operations had again exposed to the partidas. Meanwhile the French troops had not been less successful in Biscay than in Navarre. Foy reached Bilbao the 24th of April, and finding all things there ready for the siege of Castro, marched to Santona to hasten the preparations at that place, and he attempted also to surprise the chiefs Campillo and Herrera, in the hills above Santona, but was worsted in the combat. The two battering trains then endeavoured to proceed from Bilbao and Santona by sea to Castro, but the English vessels, coming to the mouth of the Durango, stopped those at Bilbao, and obliged them to proceed by land, but thus gave an opportunity for those at Santona to make the sea-run in safety.

SIEGE OF CASTRO.

This place, situated on a promontory, was garrisoned by twelve hundred men, under the command of Don Pedro Alvarez; three English sloops of war, commanded by the captains Bloye, Bremen, and Tayler, were at hand, some gun-boats were in the harbour, and twenty-seven guns were mounted on the works. An outward wall, with towers, extended from sea to sea on the low neck which connected the promontory with the main land; this line of defence was strengthened by some fortified convents, behind it came the town, and behind the town, at the extremity of the promontory, stood the castle.

On the 4th of May, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, took post at different points to cover the siege; the Italian general St. Paul invested the place; the engineer Vacani conducted the works, having twelve guns at his disposal. The defence was lively and vigorous, and captain Tayler, with great labour, landed a heavy ship-gun on a rocky island to the right of the town, looking from the sea, which he worked with effect against the French counter-batteries. On the 11th, a second gun was mounted on this island; but that day the breaching batteries opened, and in a few hours broke the wall, while the counter-batteries set fire to some houses with shells, wherefore the English guns were removed from the island. The assault was then ordered, but delayed by a sudden accident, for a foraging party having been sent into the hills, came flying back pursued by a column of Spaniards, which had passed unperceived through the positions of the French; and the besiegers were for some time in confusion, as thinking the covering army had been beaten; however, they soon recovered, and the assault and escalade took place in the night.

The attack was rapid and fierce; the walls were carried, and the garrison driven through the town to the castle, which was maintained by two companies, while the flying troops got on board the English vessels; finally the Italians stormed the castle, but every gun had been destroyed, and the two companies safely rejoined their countrymen on board the ships. The English had ten seamen wounded, the

Spaniards lost about a hundred and eighty, and the remainder were immediately conveyed to Bermeo, from whence they marched inland to join Longa. The besiegers lost only fifty men killed and wounded, and the Italian soldiers committed great excesses, setting fire to the town in many places. Foy and Sarrut, separating after the siege, marched, the former through the district of Incartaciones to Bilbao, defeating a battalion of Biscay volunteers on his route; the latter to Orduña, with the design of destroying Longa; but that chief crossed the Ebro at Puente Lara, and finding the additional troops sent by Joseph were beginning to arrive in the vicinity of Burgos, recrossed the river, and after a long chase, escaped in the mountains of Espinosa. Sarrut, having captured a few gun-carriages and one of Longa's forest depots of ammunition, returned towards Bilbao, and Foy immediately marched from that place against the two remaining battalions of Biscay volunteers, which, under the chiefs Mugartegui and Artola, were now at Villaro and Guernica.

These battalions, each a thousand strong, raised by conscription, and officered from the best families, were the champions of Biscay; but though brave and well-equipped, the difficulty of crushing them and the volunteers of Guipuscoa, was not great, because neither would leave their own peculiar provinces. The third battalion had been already dispersed in the district of Incartaciones, and Foy, having in the night of the 29th, combined the march of several columns to surround Villaro, fell at day-break upon Mugartegui's battalion, and dispersed it with the loss of all its baggage. Two hundred of the volunteers immediately returned to their homes, and the French general marched rapidly, through Durango, against Artola, who was at Guernica. The Italians, who were still at Bilbao, immediately turned Guernica on the west by Mungia, while a French column turned it eastward by Marquinez; then Artola fled to Lequito, but the column from Marquinez coming over the mountain, fell upon his right flank just as he was defiling by a narrow way along the sea-coast. Artola himself escaped, but two hundred Biscayens were killed or drowned; more than three hundred, with twenty-seven officers, were taken, and two companies, which formed his rear-guard, dispersed in the mountains, and some men, finding a few boats, rowed to an English vessel. The perfect success of this action, which did not cost the French a man killed or wounded, was attributed to the talents and vigour of captain Guingret, the daring officer who won the passage of the Douro at Tordesillas, in Wellington's retreat from Burgos.

When the three battalions of Biscay were thus disposed of, all their magazines, hospitals, and depots fell into Foy's hands; the junta dispersed, the privateers quitted the coast for Santander, Pastor abandoned Guipuscoa, and the Italians recovered Bermeo, from which the garrison fled to the English ships. They also destroyed the works of the little island of Isaro, which, being situated three thousand yards from the shore, and having no access to the summit, save by a staircase cut in the rock, was deemed impregnable, and used as a depot for the English stores; but this was the last memorable exploit of Palombini's division in the north. That general himself had already gone to Italy to join Napoleon's reserves, and his troops being ordered to march by Aragon to join Suchet, were in movement when new events caused them to remain in Guipuscoa, with the reputation of being brave and active but ferocious soldiers, barbarous and devastating, differing little from their Roman ancestors.

It has been already observed that, during these

double operations of the French on the coast and in Navarre, the partidas had fallen upon the line of communication with France, thus working out the third branch of the insurrectional warfare. Their success went nigh to balance all their losses on each flank. For Mendizabel settled with Longa's partida upon the line between Burgos and Miranda de Ebro; the volunteers of Alava and Biscay, and part of Pastor's bands, concentrated on the mountains of Arlaban above the defiles of Salinas and Descarga; Merino and Salazar came up from the country between the Ebro and the Duero; and the three battalions left by Mina in the Amescua, after escaping from Taupin, reassembled close to Vittoria. Every convoy and every courier's escort was attacked at one or other of these points, without hindering Mendizabel from making sudden descents towards the coast when occasion offered. Thus, on the 11th of April, as we have seen, he attacked Bilbao. On the 25th of April, Longa, who had four thousand men and several guns, was repulsed at Armiñon, between Miranda and Trevino, by some of the drafted men going to France; but on the third of May, at the same place, Longa met and obliged a large convoy, coming from Castile with an escort of eight hundred men, to return to Miranda, and even cannonaded that place on the 5th. Thouvenot, the commandant of the government, immediately detached twelve hundred men and three guns from Vittoria to relieve the convoy; but then Mina's battalions endeavoured to escalade Salvatierra, and they were repulsed with difficulty. Meanwhile the volunteers of Alava gathered above the pass of Salinas to intercept the rescued convoy, and finding that the latter would not stir from Vittoria, they went on the 10th to aid in a fresh attack on Salvatierra; being again repulsed, they returned to the Arlaban, where they captured a courier with a strong escort, in the pass of Descarga, near Villa Real. A French regiment, sent to succour Salvatierra, finally drove these volunteers towards Bilbao, where, as we have seen, Foy routed them; but Longa continued to infest the post of Armiñon, until Sarrut, arriving from the siege of Castro, chased him also.

Notwithstanding these successes, Clauzel, whose troops were worn down with fatigue, declared that it would require fifty thousand men and three months time to quell the insurrection entirely. And Napoleon, more discontented than ever with the king, complained that the happy enterprises of Clauzel, Foy, Sarrut, and Palombini, had brought no safety to his couriers and convoys; that his orders about the posts and the infantry escorts had been neglected; that the reinforcements sent to the north from Castile had gone slowly and in succession, instead of at once; finally, that the cautious movement of concentration by the other armies, was inexcusable, since the inaction of the allies, their distance, their want of transport, their ordinary and even timid circumspection in any operation out of the ordinary course, enabled the French to act in the most convenient manner. The growing dissensions between the English and the Spaniards, the journey of Wellington to Cadiz, and the changes in his army, were, he said, all favourable circumstances for the French, but the king had taken no advantage of them; the insurrection continued, and the object of interest was now changed. Joseph defended himself with more vehemence than reason against these charges, but Wellington soon vindicated Napoleon's judgment, and the voice of controversy was smothered by the din of battle, for the English general was again abroad in his strength, and the clang of his arms resounded through the Peninsula.

CHAPTER VI.

Wellington restores the discipline of the allied army—Relative strength of the belligerent forces—Wellington's plans described—Lord W. Bentinck again proposes to invade Italy—Wellington opposes it—The opening of the campaign delayed by the weather—State of the French army—Its movements previous to the opening of the campaign.

WHILE the French power in Spain was being disorganized by the various circumstances related in the former chapter, lord Wellington's diligence and energy had reorganized the allied army with greater strength than before. Large reinforcements, especially of cavalry, had come out from England. The efficiency and the spirit of the Portuguese had been restored in a surprising manner, and discipline had been vindicated, in both services, with a rough but salutary hand; rank had not screened offenders; some had been arrested, some tried, some dismissed for breach of duty; the negligent were terrified, the zealous encouraged; in short, every department was reformed with vigour, and it was full time. Confidential officers, commissioned to detect abuses in the general hospitals and depots, those asylums for malingerers, discovered and drove so many skulkers to their duty, that the second division alone, recovered six hundred bayonets in one month; and this salutary scouring was rendered more efficient by the establishment of both permanent and ambulant regimental hospitals, a wise measure, and founded on a principle which cannot be too widely extended; for it is certain, that as the character of a battalion depends on its fitness for service, a moral force will always be brought to bear upon the execution of orders under regimental control, which it is in vain to look for elsewhere.

The Douro had been rendered navigable as high up as Castillo de Alva, above the confluence of the Agueda; a pontoon train of thirty-five pieces had been formed; carts of a peculiar construction had been built to repair the great loss of mules during the retreat from Burgos, and a recruit of these animals was also obtained by emissaries, who purchased them with English merchandise, even at Madrid, under the beards of the enemy, and at the very time when Clauzel was unable, for want of transport to fill the magazines of Burgos. The ponderous iron camp-kettles of the soldiers had been laid aside for lighter vessels carried by men, the mules being destined to carry tents instead; it is, however, doubtful if these tents were really useful on a march in wet weather, because when soaked they became too heavy for the animal, and seldom arrived in time for use at the end of a march. Their greatest advantage was found when the soldiers halted for a few days. Besides these amendments many other changes and improvements had taken place, and the Anglo-Portuguese troops, conscious of a superior organization, were more proudly confident than ever, while the French were again depressed by intelligence of the defection of the Prussians, following on the disasters in Russia. Nor had the English general failed to amend the condition of those Spanish troops which the cortes had placed at his disposal. By a strict and jealous watch over the application of the subsidy, he had kept them clothed and fed during the winter, and now reaped the benefit, by having several powerful bodies fit to act in conjunction with his own forces. Wherefore, being thus prepared, he was anxious to strike, anxious to forestall the effects of his Portuguese political difficulties, as well as to keep pace with Napoleon's efforts in Germany, and his army was ready to take the field in April; but he could not concentrate before the green forage was fit for use, and deferred the

execution of his plan until May. What that plan was, and what the means for executing it, shall now be shewn.

The relative strength of the contending armies in the Peninsula was no longer in favour of the French. Their force, which, at the termination of Wellington's retreat into Portugal, was above two hundred and sixty thousand men and thirty-two thousand horses, two hundred and sixteen thousand being present with the eagles, was, by the loss in subsequent operations, and by drafts for the army in Germany, reduced in March, 1813, to two hundred and thirty-one thousand men and twenty-nine thousand horses. Thirty thousand of these were in hospital, and only one hundred and ninety-seven thousand men, including the reserve at Bayonne, were present with the eagles. Of this number sixty-eight thousand, including sick, were in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. The remainder, with the exception of the ten thousand left at Madrid, were distributed on the northern line of communication, from the Tormes to Bayonne, and it has been already shewn how scattered and how occupied.

But Wellington had so well used the five months' cessation of active operations, that nearly two hundred thousand allied troops were ready to take the field, and on each flank there was a British fleet, now a more effective aid than before, because the French lines of retreat run parallel to, and near the sea-coast on each side of Spain, and every part opened by the advance of the allies would furnish a fresh depot for the subsistence of their armies. This mass of troops was composed in the following manner.

The first army, under Copons, nominally ten thousand, really about six thousand strong, was in Catalonia.

The second army, under Elio, was in Murcia, about twenty thousand, including the divisions of Villa Campa, Bassecour, Duran, and Empecinado.

The Anglo-Sicilian army, under Murray, near Alicant, about sixteen thousand.

The third army, under Del Parque, in the Morena, about twelve thousand.

The first army of reserve, under the conde d'Abispa, in Andalusia, about fifteen thousand.

The fourth army, under Castaños, which included the Spanish divisions in Estremadura, Julian Sanchez' partida, and the Gallicians under Giron, the Asturians under Porlier and Barceña, together with the partidas of Longa and Mina, likewise belonged to this army and were mustered amongst its divisions. This army was computed at forty thousand men, to which may be added the minor bands and volunteers in various parts.

Lastly, there was the noble Anglo-Portuguese army, which now furnished more than seventy thousand fighting men, with ninety pieces of artillery; and the real difference between the French and the allies was greater than the apparent difference. The French returns included officers, sergeants, drummers, artillery-men, engineers, and waggoners, whereas the allies' numbers were all sabres and bayonets. Moreover, this statement of the French number was on the 15th of March, and as there were drafts made by Napoleon after that period, and as Clauzel and Foy's losses, and the reserves at Bayonne, must be deducted, it would be probably more correct to assume that the whole number of sabres and bayonets in June, was not more than one hundred and sixty thousand, of which one hundred and ten thousand were on the northern line of invasion.

The campaign of 1812 had taught the English general the strength of the French lines of defence,

especially on the Duero, which they had since entrenched in different parts, and most of the bridges over it he had himself destroyed in his retreat. But for many reasons, it was not advisable to operate in the central provinces of Spain. The country there was exhausted, the lines of supply would be longer and more exposed, the army further removed from the sea, the Gallicians could not be easily brought down to co-operate, the services of the northern partidas would not be so advantageous, and the ultimate result would be less decisive than operations against the great line of communication with France; wherefore, against the northern provinces he had early resolved to direct his attack, and had well considered how to evade those lines which he could scarcely hope to force.

All the enemy's defences on the Lower Duero could be turned, by a movement on the right, across the Upper Tormes, and from thence, skirting the mountains towards the Upper Duero; but that line, although most consonant to the rules of art, because the army would thus be kept in one mass, led through a very difficult and wasted country; the direct aid of the Gallicians must have been dispensed with, and, moreover, it was there the French looked for the allies. Hence, Wellington resolved not to operate by his right, and with great skill and dexterity he had, by the disposition of his troops in winter-quarters, by false reports and false movements, masked his real intentions. For the gathering of the partidas in the valley of the Tagus, the demonstrations made in Estremadura and La Mancha by Penne Villemur, Morillo and Del Parque's army, together with the presence of Hill at Coria, that general's hold of the passes of Bejar, and the magazines formed there, all intimated a design of moving either by the valley of the Tagus or by the district of Avila; and the great magazines collected at Celerico, Viseu, Penamacor, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo, in no manner belied the other indications. But half the army, widely cantoned in the interior of Portugal, apparently for the sake of subsistence or health, was really so placed as to be in the direction of the true line of operations, which was by the left through the *Tras os Montes*.

Wellington's plan was to pass the Duero, within the Portuguese frontier, with a part of his army; to ascend the right bank of that river towards Zamora, and then, crossing the *Esla*, to unite with the Gallician forces, while the remainder of the army, advancing from the *Agueda*, forced the passage of the *Tormes*. By this great movement, which he hoped to effect so suddenly that the king would not have time to concentrate the French armies in opposition, the front of the allies would be changed to their right, the Duero and the *Pisuerga* would be turned, and the enemy forced in confusion over the *Carion*. Then, with his powerful army well in hand, the English general could march in advance without fear, strong enough to fight and strong enough to turn the right flank of any position which the French might take up; and with this advantage also, that at each step he would gain additional help by the junction of the irregular Spanish forces, until he gave his hand to the insurgents in Biscay, and every port opened would furnish him a new depot and magazines.

But in executing this movement the army would necessarily be divided into three separate divisions, each too weak to beat the whole French force singly; the march of the centre division, by the *Tras os Montes*, upon the nice execution of which the concentration of the whole depended, would be through an extremely difficult and mountainous country, and

there were three great rivers to pass. The operation was, therefore, one of extreme delicacy, requiring nice and extensive arrangements; yet there was not much danger to be apprehended from failure; because, as each separate corps had a strong country to retire upon, the probable extent of the mischief would only be the loss of time, and the disadvantage of pursuing other operations when the harvest, being ripe, the French could easily keep in masses. The secret, then, was to hide the true plan as long as possible, to gain some marches for the centre corps, and by all means to keep the French so scattered and occupied by minor combinations, that they should be unable to assemble in time to profit from their central positions. Now the bridge equipage, being prepared at *Abrantes* in the interior of Portugal, was unknown, and gave no intimation of the real design, for the bullocks which drew it came with cars from Spain to *Lamego*, and from thence went down to *Abrantes*; the free navigation of the *Douro* up to the *Agueda* was more conducive to a movement by the right, and it furnished abundance of large boats wherewith to pass that river, without creating any suspicion from their presence; the wide cantonments of the allies permitted various changes of quarters under the pretence of sickness, and the troops thus gradually closed upon the *Douro*, within the Portuguese frontier, unobserved of the enemy, who was likewise deceived by many reports purposely spread abroad. The menacing head which Hill, and the Spaniards in southern *Estremadura* and *Andalusia*, carried towards the valley of the *Tagus*, and towards the *Avila* district, also contributed to draw the enemy's attention away from the true point of danger; but more than all other things, the vigorous excitement of the insurrection in the north occupied the French, scattered their forces, and rendered the success of the English general's plan nearly certain.

Neither did lord Wellington fail to give ample employment to Suchet's forces, for his wings were spread for a long flight, even to the *Pyrennees*, and he had no desire to find that marshal's army joined with the other French forces on the *Ebro*. The lynx eyes of Napoleon had scanned this point of war also, and both the king and *Clauzel* had received orders to establish the shortest and most certain line of correspondence possible with Suchet, because the emperor's plan contemplated the arrival of the army of *Aragon* in the north, but Wellington furnished a task for it elsewhere. Sir John Murray, as we have seen, had just repulsed the French at *Castalla*, and general *Frere's* cavalry had joined the *Andalusian* reserve under *Abispa*, but *Elio*, with the third army, remained near *Alicant*, and Wellington destined *Del Parque's* army to join him. This, with the *Anglo-Sicilian* army, made more than fifty thousand men, including the divisions of *Duran*, *Villa Campa*, the *Empecinado*, and other partizans, always lying on Suchet's right flank and rear. Now, with such a force, or even half this number of good troops, the simplest plan would have been to turn Suchet's right flank and bring him to action with his back to the sea; but the Spanish armies were not efficient for such work, and Wellington's instructions were adapted to the actual circumstances. To win the open part of the kingdom, to obtain a permanent footing on the coast beyond the *Ebro*, and to force the enemy from the lower line of that river, by acting in conjunction with the Catalans, these were the three objects which Wellington proposed to reach, and in the following manner. Murray was to sail against *Taragona*; to save it Suchet would have to weaken his army in *Valencia*; *Elio*

and Del Parque might then seize that kingdom. If Taragona fell, good. If the French proved too strong Murray could return instantly by sea, and secure possession of the country gained by the Spanish generals. These last were, however, to remain strictly on the defensive until Murray's operations drew Suchet away, for they were not able to fight alone, and above all things, it was necessary to avoid a defeat, which would leave the French general free to move to the aid of the king.

The force necessary to attack Taragona, Wellington judged at ten thousand, and if Murray could not embark that number there was another mode of operating. Some Spanish divisions, to go by sea, were then to reinforce Copons in Catalonia, and enable him to hold the country between Taragona, Tortosa, and Lerida; meanwhile Murray and Elio were to advance against Suchet in front, and Del Parque, in conjunction with the Portuguese troops, to turn his right flank by Requeña; and this operation was to be repeated until the allies communicated with Copons by their left, the partizans advancing in proportion and cutting off all communication with the northern parts of Spain. Thus, in either case, Suchet would be kept away from the Upper Ebro, and there was no reason to expect any interruption from that quarter.

But Wellington was not aware that the infantry of the army of Portugal were beyond the Ebro; the spies, deceived by the multitude of detachments passing in and out of the Peninsula, supposed the divisions which reinforced Clauzel to be fresh conscripts from France; the arrangements for the opening of the campaign were, therefore, made in the expectation of meeting a very powerful force in Leon. Hence Freire's cavalry, and the Andalusian reserve under the conde de Abispa, received orders to march upon Almaraz, to pass the Tagus there by a pontoon bridge which was established for them, and then, crossing the Gredos by Bejar or Mombeltran, to march upon Valladolid, while the partidas of that quarter should harass the march of Leval from Madrid. Meanwhile the Spanish troops in Estremadura were to join those forces on the Agueda which were destined to force the passage of the Tormes. The Galicians, under Giron, were to come down to the Esla, and unite with the corps destined to pass that river and turn the line of the Duero. Thus seventy thousand Portuguese and British, eight thousand Spaniards from Estremadura, and twelve thousand Galicians, that is to say, ninety thousand fighting men would be suddenly placed on a new front, and marching abreast against the surprised and separated masses of the enemy, would drive them reflux to the Pyrennees. A grand design, and grandly it was executed! For high in heart, and strong of hand, Wellington's veterans marched to the encounter; the glories of twelve victories played about their bayonets, and he, the leader so proud and confident, that in passing the stream which marks the frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups, and, waving his hand, cried out "Farewell, Portugal!"

But while straining every nerve, and eager to strike, as well to escape from the Portuguese politics as to keep pace with Napoleon's efforts in Germany, the English general was mortified by having again to discuss the question of a descent on Italy. Lord William Bentinck had relinquished his views upon that country with great reluctance, and now, thinking affairs more favourable than ever, again proposed to land at Naples, and put forward the duke of Orleans or the arch-duke Francis. He urged in favour of this project the weak state of Murat's

kingdom, the favourable disposition of the inhabitants, the offer of fifteen thousand auxiliary Russians made by admiral Greig, the shock which would be given to Napoleon's power, and the more effectual diversion in favour of Spain. He supported his opinion by an intercepted letter of the queen of Naples to Napoleon, and by other authentic documents, and thus, at the moment of execution, Wellington's vast plans were to be disarranged to meet a new scheme of war which he had already discussed and disapproved of, and which, however promising in itself, would inevitably divide the power of England and weaken the operations in both countries.

His reply was decisive. His opinion on the state of affairs in Sicily was, he said, not changed, by the intercepted letters, as Murat evidently thought himself strong enough to attack the allies. Lord William Bentinck should not land in Italy with less than forty thousand men, of all arms, perfectly equipped, since that army would have to depend upon its own means and to overcome all opposition before it could expect the people to aid or even to cease to oppose it. The information stated that the people looked for protection from the French, and they preferred England to Austria. There could be no doubt of this; the Austrians would demand provisions and money, and would insist upon governing them in return, whereas the English would, as elsewhere, defray their own expenses and probably give a subsidy in addition. The south of Italy was possibly, for many reasons, the best place next to the Spanish Peninsula, for the operations of a British army, and it remained for the government to choose whether they would adopt an attack on the former upon such a scale as he had alluded to. But of one thing they might be certain, that if it were commenced on a smaller scale, or with any other intention than to persevere to the last, and by raising, feeding, and clothing armies of the natives, the plan would fail and the troops would re-embark with loss and disgrace.

This remonstrance at last fixed the wavering judgment of the ministers, and Wellington was enabled to proceed with his own plans. He designed to open the campaign in the beginning of May, and as the green forage was well advanced, on the 21st of April, he directed Murray, Del Parque, Elio, and Copons to commence their operations on the eastern coast; Abispa and Freire were already in march and expected at Almaraz on the 24th; the Spanish divisions of Estremadura had come up to the Coa, and the divisions of the Anglo-Portuguese force were gradually closing to the front. But heavy rains broke up the roads, and the cumbrous pontoon train being damaged, on its way from the interior, did not reach Sabugal before the 13th, and was not repaired before the 15th. Thus the opening of the campaign was delayed; yet the check proved of little consequence, for on the French side nothing was prepared to meet the danger.

Napoleon had urged the king to send his heavy baggage and stores to the rear and to fix his hospitals and depots at Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, Tolosa and San Sebastian. In neglect of this the impediments remained with the armies, the sick were poured along the communications, and in disorder thrown upon Clauzel at the moment when that general was scarcely able to make head against the northern insurrection.

Napoleon had early and clearly fixed the king's authority as generalissimo, and forbade him to exercise his monarchical authority towards the French armies. Joseph was at this moment in high dispute with all his generals upon those very points.

Napoleon had directed the king to enlarge and strengthen the works of Burgos castle, and to form magazines in that place and at Santona, for the use of the armies in the field. At this time no magazines had been formed at either place, and although a commencement had been made to strengthen the castle of Burgos, it was not yet capable of sustaining four hours' bombardment, and offered no support for the armies.

Napoleon had desired that a more secure and shorter line of correspondence than that by Zaragoza should be established with Suchet; for his plan embraced, though it did not prescribe, the march of that general upon Zaragoza, and he had warned the king repeatedly how dangerous it would be to have Suchet isolated and unconnected with the northern operations. Nevertheless, the line of correspondence remained the same, and the allies possessed the means of excising Suchet's army from the operations in the north.

Napoleon had long and earnestly urged the king to put down the northern insurrection in time to make head against the allies on the Tormes. Now, when the English general was ready to act, that insurrection was in full activity, and all the army of the north and the greatest part of the army of Portugal was employed to suppress it instead of being on the lower Duero.

Napoleon had clearly explained to the king the necessity of keeping his troops concentrated towards the Tormes in an offensive position, and he had desired that Madrid might be held in such a manner that it could be abandoned in a moment. The campaign was now being opened; the French armies were scattered; Leval was encumbered at Madrid, with a part of the civil administration, with large stores and parks of artillery, and with the care of families attached to Joseph's court, while the other generals were stretching their imaginations to devise which of the several projects open to him Wellington would adopt. Would he force the passage of the Tormes and the Duero with his whole army, and thus turn the French right? Would he march straight upon Madrid, either by the district of Avila or by the valley of the Tagus, or by both; and would he then operate against the north, or upon Zaragoza, or towards the south in co-operation with the Anglo-Sicilians? Every thing was vague, uncertain, confused.

The generals complained that the king's conduct was not military, and Napoleon told him, if he would command an army he must give himself up entirely to it, thinking of nothing else; but Joseph was always demanding gold when he should have trusted to iron. His skill was unequal to the arrangements and combinations for taking an initiatory and offensive position, and he could neither discover nor force his adversary to show his real design. Hence the French armies were thrown upon a timid defensive system, and every movement of the allies necessarily produced alarm, and the dislocation of troops without an object. The march of Del Parque's army towards Alcaraz, and that of the Spanish divisions from Estremadura towards the Agueda, in the latter end of April, were judged to be the commencement of a general movement against Madrid, because the first was covered by the advance of some cavalry into La Mancha, and the second by the concentration of the partidas, in the valley of the Tagus. Thus the whole French army was shaken by the demonstration of a few horsemen; for when Leval took the alarm, Gazan marched towards the Guadarama with three divisions, and D'Erlon gathered the army of the centre around Segovia.

Early in May, a fifth division of the army of Portugal was employed on the line of communication at Pampliega, Burgos and Briviesca, and Reille remained at Valladolid with only one division of infantry and his guns, his cavalry being on the Esla. D'Erlon was then at Segovia and Gazan at Arevalo, Conroux's division was at Avila, and Leval still at Madrid with outposts at Toledo. The king, who was at Valladolid, could not, therefore, concentrate more than thirty-five thousand infantry on the Duero. He had, indeed, nine thousand excellent cavalry and one hundred pieces of artillery; but with such dispositions to concentrate for a battle in advance, was not to be thought of, and the first decided movement of the allies was sure to roll his scattered forces back in confusion. The lines of the Tormes and the Duero were effaced from the system of operations.

About the middle of May, D'Armagnac's division of the army of the centre came to Valladolid, Villatte's division of the army of the south, reinforced by some cavalry, occupied the line of the Tormes from Alba to Ledesma. Daricau's, Digeon's, and D'Armagnac's divisions were at Zamora, Toro, and other places, on both sides of the Duero, and Reille's cavalry was still on the Esla. The front of the French was thus defined by these rivers, for the left was covered by the Tormes, the centre by the Duero, the right by the Esla. Gazan's head-quarters were at Arevalo, D'Erlon's at Segovia, and the point of concentration was at Valladolid; but Conroux was at Avila, and Leval being still at Madrid, was thrown entirely out of the circle of operations. At this moment Wellington entered upon what has been in England called, not very appropriately, the march to Vittoria. That march was but one portion of the action. The concentration of the army on the banks of the Duero was the commencement, the movement towards the Ebro and the passage of that river was the middle, the battle of Vittoria was the catastrophe, and the crowning of the Pyrennees the end of the splendid drama.

CHAPTER VII.

Dangerous discontent of the Portuguese army—Allayed by Wellington—Noble conduct of the soldiers—The left wing of the allies under general Graham marches through the Trassos Montes to the Esla—The right wing under Wellington advances against Salamanca—Combat there—The allies pass the Tormes—Wellington goes in person to the Esla—Passage of that river—Cavalry combat at Morales—The two wings of the allied army unite at Toro on the Duero—Remarks on that event—Wellington marches in advance—Previous movements of the French described—They pass the Carion and Pisuergra in retreat—The allies pass the Carion in pursuit—Joseph takes post in front of Burgos—Wellington turns the Pisuergra with his left wing and attacks the enemy with his right wing—Combat on the Hormaza—The French retreat behind Pancorbo and blow up the castle of Burgos—Wellington crosses the Upper Ebro and turns the French line of defence—Santander is adopted as a depot station and the military establishments in Portugal are broken up—Joseph changes his dispositions of defence—The allies advance—Combat of Osma—Combat of St. Millan—Combat of Subijana Morillas—The French armies concentrate in the basin of Vittoria behind the Zadora.

In the latter part of April the Spanish troops from Estremadura being assembled on the Tormes near Almada, Carlos d'España's division moved to Miranda del Castanar, and every thing was ready to open the campaign, when an unexpected and formidable danger, menacing ruin, arose. Some specie sent from England had enabled the general to pay up the British soldiers' arrears to November, 1812; but the Portuguese troops were still neglected by

their government; a whole year's pay was due to them; a suspicion that a systematic difference in this respect was to be established, pervaded their minds, and at the same time many regiments, which had been raised for a limited period and whose term of service was now expired, murmured for their discharge, which could not be legally refused. The moment was critical; but Wellington applied suitable remedies. He immediately threatened to intercept the British subsidy for the payment of the troops, which brought the Portuguese regency to its senses, and he then made an appeal to the honour and patriotism of the Portuguese soldiers, whose time had expired. Such an appeal is never made in vain to the poorer classes of any nation; one and all those brave men remained in the service, notwithstanding the shameful treatment they had endured from their government. This noble emotion would seem to prove that Beresford, whose system of military reform was chiefly founded upon severity, might have better attained his object in another manner; but harshness is the essence of the aristocratic principle of government, and the marshal only moved in the straight path marked out for him by the policy of the day.

When this dangerous affair was terminated, Castaños returned to Galicia, and the British cavalry, of the left wing, which had wintered about the Mondego, crossed the Duero, some at Oporto, some near Lamego, and entered the Tras os Montes. The Portuguese cavalry had been already quartered all the winter in that province, and the enemy supposed that Silveira would, as formerly, advance from Braganza to connect the Gallicians with the allies. But Silveira was then commanding an infantry division on the Agueda; and a very different power was menacing the French on the side of Braganza. For about the middle of May, the cavalry were followed by many divisions of infantry, and by the pontoon equipage, thus forming, with the horsemen and artillery, a mass of more than forty thousand men, under general Graham. The infantry and guns, being rapidly placed on the right of the Duero by means of large boats assembled between Lamego and Castello de Alva, near the mouth of the Agueda, marched in several columns towards the lower Esla; the cavalry moved down to the same point by Braganza.

On the 20th, Hill came to Bejar with the second division, and on the 22d of May, Graham, being well advanced, Wellington quitted his head-quarters at Freneda, and put his right wing in motion towards the Tormes. It consisted of five divisions of Anglo-Portuguese and Spanish infantry, and five brigades of cavalry, including Julian Sanchez' horsemen, the whole forming, with the artillery, a mass of from twenty-five to thirty thousand men. The right, under general Hill, moved from Bejar upon Alba de Tormes; the left, under Wellington himself, by Matilla upon Salamanca.

On the 24th, Villatte withdrew his detachment from Ledesma, and on the 26th, at ten o'clock in the morning, the heads of the allied columns, with admirable concert, appeared on all the different routes leading to the Tormes. Morillo's and Long's cavalry menaced Alba; Hill, coming from Tamames, bent towards the fords above Salamanca, and Wellington, coming from Matilla, marched straight against that city.

Villatte, a good officer, barricaded the bridge and the streets, sent his baggage to the rear, called in his detachment from Alba, and being resolved to discover the real force of his enemy, waited for their approaching masses on the heights above the ford of

Santa Marta. Too long he waited, for the ground on the left side of the river had enabled Wellington to conceal his movements, and already Fane's horsemen, with six guns, were passing the ford at Santa Marta in Villatte's rear, while Victor Alten's cavalry removed the barricades on the bridge and pushed through the town to attack him in front. The French general being thus suddenly pressed, gained the heights of Cabrerizos, marching towards Babila Fuente, before Fane got over the river; but he had still to pass the defiles of Aldea Lengua, and was overtaken by both columns of cavalry.

The guns, opening upon the French squares, killed thirty or forty men, and the English horsemen charged; but horsemen are no match for such infantry, whose courage and discipline nothing could quell; they fell before the round shot, and nearly one hundred died in the ranks without a wound, from the intolerable heat; yet the cavalry made no impression on those dauntless soldiers, and in the face of thirty thousand enemies, they made their way to Babila Fuente, where they were joined by general Lefol with the troops from Alba; and, finally, the whole disappeared from the sight of their admiring and applauding opponents. Nevertheless, two hundred had sunk dead in the ranks, a like number, unable to keep up, were made prisoners, and a leading gun, having been overturned in the defile of Aldea Lengua, six others were retarded, and the whole fell in the allies' hands, together with their tumbrils.

The line of the Tormes being thus gained, the allied troops were, on the 27th and 28th, pushed forward with their left towards Miranda and Zamora, and their right towards Toro; so placed, the latter covered the communications with Ciudad Rodrigo, while the former approached the point on the Duero, where it was proposed to throw the bridge for communication with Graham's corps. This done, Wellington left general Hill in command, and went off suddenly, for he was uneasy about his combinations on the Esla. On the 29th, he passed the Duero at Miranda, by means of a basket slung on a rope, which was stretched from rock to rock, the river foaming several hundred feet below. The 30th, he reached Carvajales.

Graham had met with many difficulties in his march through the rugged Tras os Montes; and though the troops were now close to the Esla, stretching from Carvajales to Tabara, and their left was in communication with the Gallicians, who were coming down to Benevente, the combination had been in some measure thwarted by the difficulty of crossing the Esla. The general combination required that river to be passed on the 29th, at which time the right wing, continuing its march from the Tormes without halting, could have been close to Zamora, and the passage of the Duero would have been insured. The French armies would then have been entirely surprised and separated, and some of their divisions overtaken and beaten. They were, indeed, still ignorant that a whole army was on the Esla; but the opposite bank of that river was watched by picquets of cavalry and infantry; the stream was full and rapid, the banks steep, the fords hard to find, difficult and deep, with stony beds, and the alarm had spread from the Tormes through all the cantonments.

At daybreak on the 31st, some squadrons of hussars, with infantry holding by their stirrups, entered the stream at the ford of Almendra, and at the same time Graham approached the right bank with all his forces. A French picquet of thirty men was surprised in the village of Villa Perdrices, by the hussars, the pontoons were immediately laid down,

and the columns commenced passing, but several men, even of the cavalry, had been drowned at the fords.

On the 1st of June, while the rear was still on the Esla, the head of the allies entered Zamora, which the French evacuated after destroying the bridge. They retired upon Toro, and the next day, having destroyed the bridge there also, they again fell back; but their rear-guard was overtaken near the village of Morales by the hussar brigade, under colonel Grant. Their horsemen immediately passed a bridge and swamp under a cannonade, and then facing about in two lines, gave battle, whereupon major Roberts, with the tenth regiment, supported by the fifteenth, broke both the lines with one charge, and pursued them for two miles, and they lost above two hundred men; but finally rallied on the infantry reserves.

The junction of the allies' wings on the Duero, was now secure, for that river was fordable; and Wellington had also, in anticipation of failure on one point, made arrangements for forming a boat-bridge below the confluence of the Esla; and he could also throw his pontoons without difficulty at Toro, and even in advance, because Julian Sanchez had surprised a cavalry picquet at Castronuño, on the left bank, and driven the French outposts from the fords of Pollos. But the enemy's columns were concentrating, it might be for a battle, wherefore the English general halted the 3d, to bring the Galicians in conjunction on his left, and to close up his own rear, which had been retarded by the difficulty of passing the Esla. The two divisions of his right wing, namely, the second and light division, passed the Duero on the morning of the 3rd; the artillery and baggage by a ford, the infantry at the bridge of Toro, which was ingeniously repaired by the lieutenant of engineers, Pringle, who dropped ladders at each side of the broken arch, and then laid planks from one to the other just above the water level. Thus the English general mastered the line of the Duero, and those who understand war may say whether it was an effort worthy of the man and his army.

Let them trace all the combinations, follow the movement of Graham's columns, some of which marched one hundred and fifty, some more than two hundred and fifty miles, through the wild districts of the Trás os Montes. Through those regions, held to be nearly impracticable even for small corps, forty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and pontoons, had been carried and placed, as if by a supernatural power, upon the Esla, before the enemy knew even that they were in movement! Was it fortune or skill that presided? Not fortune, for the difficulties were such that Graham arrived later on the Esla than Wellington intended, and yet so soon, that the enemy could make no advantage of the delay. For had the king even concentrated his troops behind the Esla on the 31st, the Galicians would still have been at Benevente and reinforced by Penne Villemur's cavalry, which had marched with Graham's corps; and the Asturians would have been at Leon on the Upper Esla, which was fordable. Then the final passage of that river could have been effected by a repetition of the same combinations on a smaller scale, because the king's army would not have been numerous enough to defend the Duero against Hill, the Lower Esla against Wellington, and the Upper Esla against the Spaniards at the same time. Wellington had, also, as we have seen, prepared the means of bringing Hill's corps, or any part of it, over the Duero below the confluence of the Esla, and all these combinations, these surpris-

ing exertions had been made merely to gain a fair field of battle.

But if Napoleon's instructions had been ably worked out by the king during the winter, this great movement could not have succeeded, for the insurrection in the north would have been crushed in time, or at least so far quelled, that sixty thousand French infantry, ten thousand cavalry, and one hundred pieces of artillery, would have been disposable; and such a force held in an offensive position on the Tormes, would probably have obliged Wellington to adopt a different plan of campaign. If concentrated between the Duero and the Esla it would have baffled him on that river, because operations, which would have been effectual against thirty-five thousand infantry, would have been powerless against sixty thousand. Joseph, indeed, complained that he could not put down the insurrection in the north, that he could not feed such large armies, that a thousand obstacles arose on every side which he could not overcome; in fine, that he could not execute his brother's instructions. They could have been executed notwithstanding. Activity, the taking time by the forelock, would have quelled the insurrection; and for the feeding of the troops, the boundless plains called the "*Tierras de Campos*," where the armies were now operating, were covered with the ripening harvest; the only difficulty was to subsist that part of the French army not engaged in the northern provinces during the winter. Joseph could not find the means, though Soult told him they were at hand, because the difficulties of his situation overpowered him: they would not have overpowered Napoleon; but the difference between a common general and a great captain is immense, the one is victorious when the other is defeated.

The field was now clear for the shock of battle, but the forces on either side were unequally matched. Wellington had ninety thousand men, with more than one hundred pieces of artillery. Twelve thousand were cavalry, and the British and Portuguese present with the colours, were, including sergeants and drummers, above seventy thousand sabres and bayonets; the rest of the army was Spanish. Besides this mass, there were the irregulars on the wings, Sanchez' horsemen, a thousand strong, on the right beyond the Duero; Porlier, Barcena, Salazar, and Manzo on the left between the Upper Esla and the Carion. Saornil had moved upon Avila; the Empecinado was hovering about Leval. Finally, the reserve of Andalusia had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 30th, and numerous minor bands were swarming round as it advanced. On the other hand, though the French could collect nine or ten thousand horsemen and one hundred guns, their infantry was less than half the number of the allies, being only thirty-five thousand strong, exclusive of Leval. Hence the way to victory was open, and on the 4th, Wellington marched forward with a conquering violence.

The intrusive monarch was in no condition to stem or to evade a torrent of war, the depth and violence of which he was even now ignorant of; and a slight sketch of his previous operations will shew that all his dispositions were made in the dark, and only calculated to bring him into trouble. Early in May, he would have marched the army of the centre to the Upper Duero, when Leval's reports checked the movement. On the 15th of that month, a spy, sent to Bejar by D'Erlon, brought intelligence that a great number of country carts had been collected there and at Placentia, to follow the troops in a march upon Talavera, but after two days were sent

back to their villages; that fifty mules had been purchased at Bejar and sent to Ciudad Rodrigo; that about the same time the first and fourth divisions and the German cavalry had moved from the interior towards the frontier, saying they were going, the first to Zamora, and the last to Fuente Guinaldo; that many troops were already gathered at Ciudad Rodrigo under Wellington and Castaños; that the divisions at Coria and Placentia were expected there, the reserves of Andalusia were in movement, and the pass of Baños, which had been before retrenched and broken up, was now repaired; that the English soldiers were paid their arrears, and every body said a grand movement would commence on the 12th. All this was extremely accurate; but with the exception of the march to Zamora, which seemed to be only a blind, the information obtained indicated the principal movement as against the Tormes, and threw no light upon the English general's real design.

On the other flank, Reille's cavalry, under Boyer, having made an exploring sweep round by Astorga, La Baneza and Benevente, brought intelligence that a Gallician expedition was embarking for America, that another was to follow, and that several English divisions were also embarking in Portugal. The 23d of May, a report from the same quarter gave notice that Salazar and Manzo were, with seven hundred horsemen, on the Upper Esla, that Porlier was coming from the Asturias to join them with two thousand five hundred men, and Giron, with six thousand Gallicians, had reached Astorga; but it was uncertain if Silveira's cavalry would come from Braganza to connect the left of the English with the Gallicians, as it had done the year before.

Thus, on the 24th of May, the French were still entirely in the dark with respect to Graham's movement; and although it was known the 26th, at Valladolid, that Wellington had troops in the country beyond the Esla, it was not considered a decisive movement, because the head-quarters were still at Freneda. However, on the 29th, Reille united his cavalry at Valderas, passed the Esla, entered Benevente and sent patrols towards Tobarra and Carvajales; from their reports, and other sources, he understood the whole allied army was on the Esla; and as his detachments were closely followed by the British scouting parties, he recrossed the Esla and broke the bridge of Castro Gonzalo, leaving his light horsemen to watch it. But the delay in the passage of the Esla, after Graham had reached Carvajales, made Reille doubt both the strength of the allies and their inclination to cross that river. He expected the main attack on the Tormes, and proposed, in conjunction with Daricau's infantry, and Digeon's dragoons, then at Toro and Zamora, to defend the Duero and the Lower Esla, leaving the Gallicians, whose force he despised, to pass the Upper Esla at their peril.

D'Armagnac's division was now at Rio Seco, and Maucune's division, which had been spread along the road to Burgos, was ordered to concentrate at Palencia on the Carion; but meanwhile Gazan, on the other flank of the French position, was equally deceived by the movements of the English general. The 7th of May he heard from the Tormes that the allies' preparations indicated a movement towards that river. Leval wrote from Madrid that he had abandoned Toledo, because fifteen thousand English and ten thousand Spaniards were to advance by the valley of the Tagus, that rations had been ordered at Escalona for Long's English cavalry, and that magazines were formed at Bejar. At the same time, from a third quarter, came news that three divisions

would pass the Duero, to join the Gallicians and march upon Valladolid.

Gazan rightly judging that the magazines at Bejar were to supply Hill and the Spaniards, in their movement to join Wellington, expected at first, that the whole would operate by the Esla: but on the 14th, fresh reports changed this opinion; he then judged Hill would advance by the Puente Congosto upon Avila, to cut Leval off from the army, while Wellington attacked Salamanca. On the 24th, however, his doubts vanished. Villatte told him that Wellington was over the Agueda, Graham over the Lower Douro; and at the same time, Daricau writing from Zamora, told him that Graham's cavalry had already reached Alcanizas, only one march from the Esla. Conroux was instantly directed to march from Avila to Arevalo, Tilly to move with the cavalry of the army of the south, from Madrigal towards the Trabancos, Daricau to send a brigade to Toro, and Leval to come over the Guadarama pass and join D'Erlon at Segovia.

On the 26th, Gazan, thinking Wellington slow, and crediting a report that he was sick and travelling in a carriage, relapsed into doubt. He now judged the passage of the Agueda a feint, thought the allies' operations would be in mass towards the Esla, and was positively assured by his emissaries that Hill would move by the Puente Congosto against Segovia. However, on the 27th, he heard of the passage of the Tormes and of Villatte's retreat; whereupon, evacuating Arevalo, he fixed his head-quarters at Rueda, and directing Conroux, who was marching upon Arevalo, and so hastily that he left a movable column behind him on the Upper Tormes to come to the Trabancos.

Gazan at first designed to take post behind that river; but there was no good position there, and the 28th he rallied Conroux's, Rey's, and Villatte's infantry and Tilly's cavalry behind the Zapardiel. Daricau's division was, meanwhile, concentrated at Toro, and Digeon's at Zamora; a bridge-head was commenced at Tordesillas, which was the point of retreat, and guards were placed at Pollos, where the fords of the Duero were very low, though as yet impracticable. These movements were made in tranquillity, for Hill had no desire, by driving the French over the Duero, to increase the number of their troops on the Esla. However, on the 30th, Gazan, hearing that Hill was advancing, and that the troops on the Esla were likely to attempt the passage of that river, crossed the Duero in the night, and took post at Tordesillas, intending to concentrate the whole army of the south on the right of that river, but Leval, though he had quitted Madrid on the 27th, was not yet arrived, and a large artillery convoy, the ministers and Spanish families, and the pictures from the palace of Madrid, were likewise on the road from that capital by the Segovia passes.

At this time, the army of Portugal and D'Armagnac's division was extended from the Esla to the Carion; the king's guards were at Valladolid, and D'Erlon was in march to the Puente Duero, from Segovia and Sepulveda, yet slowly and apparently not aware of the crisis. Meanwhile, the passage of the Esla had been effected, and hence, if that river had been crossed at the time fore-calculated by Wellington, and a rapid push made upon Placentia and Valladolid, while Hill marched upon Rueda, the whole French army might have been caught in what Napoleon calls "*flagrante delicto*" and destroyed. And even now it would seem that Wellington could have profited more by marching, than by halting at Toro on the 3d, for though Leval's troops and part of the army of the centre were then between

the Puente Duero and Valladolid, D'Erlon had left a large division at Tudela de Duero to protect the arrival of the convoy from Madrid, which had not yet crossed the Duero; another great convoy was still on the left bank of the lower Pisuerga, and the parts of the armies of Portugal, and of the south, were waiting on the right bank of that river, until the first convoy had passed over the Carion. Nevertheless, it was prudent to gather well to a head first, and the general combinations had been so profoundly made, that the evil day for the French was only deferred.

On the 30th, Joseph's design was to oppose Wellington's principal force with the army of the south, while the army of the centre held the rest in check, the army of Portugal to aid either as the case might be; and such was his infatuation as to his real position, that even now, from the Duero, he was pressing upon his brother the immediate establishment of a civil Spanish administration for the provinces behind the Ebro, as the only remedy for the insurrection, and for the rendering of the army of the north disposable. He even demanded an order from the emperor to draw Clauzel's troops away from the Ebro, that he might drive the allies back to the Coa, and take the long-urged offensive position towards Portugal, Napoleon being then at Dresden, and Wellington on the Duero!

On the 2d, when the allies had passed the Esla, the king, who expected them at Toro the 1st, became disturbed to find his front unmolested, and concluded, as he had received no letter from Reille, that Wellington had cut his communication, turned his right, and was marching towards the Carion. His alarm was considerable, and with reason; but in the evening of the 2d he heard from Reille, who had retired unmolested to Rio Seco and there rallied D'Armagnac's troops; but Maucune's division was still in march from different parts to concentrate at Palencia. The halt of the 3d was therefore to the profit of the French, for during that time they received the Madrid convoy and insured the concentration of all their troops, recovering even Conroux's movable column, which joined Leval near Olmedo. They also destroyed the bridges of Tudela and Puente Duero on the Duero, and that of Simancas and Cabeçon on the Pisuerga, and they passed their convoys over the Carion, directing them, under escort of Casa Palacios' Spanish division, upon Burgos.

The army of the south now moved upon Torrelabaton and Penaflor, the army of the centre upon Duenas, the army of Portugal upon Palencia; and the spirits of all were raised by intelligence of the emperor's victory at Lutzen, and by a report that the Toulon fleet had made a successful descent on Sicily. It would appear that Napoleon certainly contemplated an attack upon that island, and Lord William Bentinck thought it would be successful; but it was prevented by Murat's discontent, who instead of attacking, fell off from Napoleon, and opened a negotiation with the British.

The 4th, Wellington moved in advance, his bridge of communication was established at Pollos, and considerable stores of ammunition were formed at Valladolid; some had also been taken at Zamora, and the cavalry flankers captured large magazines of grain at Arevalo. Towards the Carion the allies marched rapidly by parallel roads, and in compact order, the Gallicians on the extreme left, Morillo and Julian Sanchez on the extreme right, and the English general expected the enemy would make a stand behind that river; but the report of the prisoners and the hasty movement of the French col-

umns soon convinced him that they were in full retreat for Burgos. On the 6th, all the French armies were over the Carion; Reille had even reached Palencia on the 4th, and there rallied Maucune's division and a brigade of light cavalry which had been employed on the communications.

Although the king's force was now about fifty-five thousand fighting men, exclusive of his Spanish division, which was escorting the convoys and baggage, he did not judge the Carion a good position, and retired behind the upper Pisuerga, desiring, if possible, to give battle there. He sent Jourdan to examine the state of Burgos castle, and expedited fresh letters, for he had already written from Valladolid on the 27th and 30th of May, to Foy, Sarrut, and Clauzel, calling them towards the plains of Burgos; and others to Suchet, directing him to march immediately upon Zaragoza, and hoping he was already on his way there; but Suchet was then engaged in Catalonia, Clauzel's troops were on the borders of Aragon, Foy and Palombini's Italians were on the coast of Guipuscoa, and Sarrut's division was pursuing Longa in the Montaña.

Joseph was still unacquainted with his enemy. Higher than seventy or eighty thousand he did not estimate the allied forces, and he was desirous of fighting them on the elevated plains of Burgos. But more than one hundred thousand men were before and around him. For all the partidas of the Asturias and the Montaña were drawing together on his right, Julian Sanchez and the partidas of Castile were closing on his left, and Abispa with the reserve and Frere's cavalry had already passed the Gredos mountains and were in full march for Valladolid. Nevertheless the king was sanguine of success if he could rally Clauzel's and Foy's divisions in time, and his despatches to the former were frequent and urgent. Come with the infantry of the army of Portugal! Come with the army of the north and we shall drive the allies over the Duero! Such was his cry to Clauzel, and again he urged his political schemes upon his brother; but he was not a statesman to advise Napoleon, nor a general to contend with Wellington; his was not the military genius, nor were his the arrangements that could recover the initiatory movement at such a crisis and against such an adversary.

While the king was on the Pisuerga he received Jourdan's report. The castle of Burgos was untenable; there were no magazines of provisions; the new works were quite unfinished, and they commanded the old, which were unable to hold out a day; of Clauzel's and Foy's divisions nothing had been heard. It was resolved to retire behind the Ebro. All the French outposts in the Bureba and Montaña were immediately withdrawn, and the great depot of Burgos was evacuated upon Vittoria, which was thus encumbered with the artillery depots of Madrid, of Valladolid, and of Burgos, and with the baggage and stores of so many armies and so many fugitive families; and at this moment, also, arrived from France a convoy of treasure which had long waited for an escort at Bayonne.

Meanwhile the tide of war flowed onwards with terrible power. The allies had crossed the Carion on the 7th, and Joseph, quitting Torquemada, had retired by the high road to Burgos with his left wing, composed of the army of the south and centre, while Reille, with that of Portugal, forming the right wing, moved by Castro Xerez. But Wellington, following hard, and conducting his operations continually on the same principle, pushed his left wing and the Gallicians along bye-roads, and passed the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th, and 10th. Hav-

ing thus turned the line of the Pisuergra entirely, and outflanked Reille, he made a short journey the 11th, and halted the 12th, with his left wing, for he had outmarched his supplies, and had to arrange the farther feeding of his troops in a country wide of his line of communication. Nevertheless, he pushed his right wing, under general Hill, along the main road to Burgos, resolved to make the French yield the castle or fight for the possession; and, meanwhile, Julian Sanchez, acting beyond the Arlanzan, cut off small posts and straggling detachments.

Reille had regained the great road to Burgos on the 9th, and was strongly posted behind the Hormaza stream, his right near Hormillas, his left on the Arlanzan, barring the way to Burgos; the other two armies were in reserve behind Estepar, and in this situation they had remained for three days, and were again cheered by intelligence of Napoleon's victory at Bautzen and the consequent armistice. But on the 12th, Wellington's columns came up and the light division, preceded by Grant's hussars and Ponsonby's dragoons, immediately turned the French right, while the rest of the troops attacked the whole range of heights from Hormillas to Estepar. Reille, whose object was to make the allies shew their force, seeing their horsemen in rear of his right flank while his front was so strongly menaced, made for the bridge of Baniel on the Arlanzan; then Gardiner's horse-artillery raked his columns, and captain Milles of the fourteenth dragoons charging, took some prisoners and one of his guns, which had been disabled. Meanwhile the right of the allies, pressing forward towards the bridge of Baniel, endeavored to cut off the retreat; but the French repelled the minor attacks with the utmost firmness, bore the fire of the artillery without shrinking, and evading the serious attacks by their rapid yet orderly movement, finally passed the river with a loss of only thirty men killed and a few taken.

The three French armies being now covered by the Urbel and Arlanzan rivers, which were swelled by the rain, could not be easily attacked, and the stores of Burgos were removed; but in the night Joseph again retreated along the high road by Briviesca to Pancorbo, into which place he threw a garrison of six hundred men. The castle of Burgos was prepared also for destruction, and whether from hurry, or negligence, or want of skill, the mines exploded outwards, and at the very moment when a column of infantry was defiling under the castle. Several streets were laid in ruins, thousands of shells and other combustibles, which had been left in the place, were ignited and driven upwards with a horrible crash, the hills rocked above the dovoted column, and a shower of iron, timber and stony fragments, falling on it, in an instant destroyed more than three hundred men! Fewer deaths might have sufficed to determine the crisis of a great battle!

But such an art is war! So fearful is the consequence of error, so terrible the responsibility of a general. Strongly and wisely did Napoleon speak when he told Joseph, that if he would command, he must give himself up entirely to the business, labouring day and night, thinking of nothing else. Here was a noble army driven like sheep before prowling wolves; yet in every action the inferior generals had been prompt and skilful, the soldiers brave, ready and daring, firm and obedient in the most trying circumstances of battle. Infantry, artillery, and cavalry, all were excellent and numerous, and the country strong and favourable for defence; but that soul of armies, the mind of a great commander, was wanting, and the Esla, the Tormes, the Duero, the Carion, the Pisuergra, the Ar-

lanzan, seemed to be dried up—the rocks, the mountains, the deep ravines to be levelled. Clauzel's strong positions, Dubreton's thundering castle, had disappeared like a dream, and sixty thousand veteran soldiers, though willing to fight at every step, were hurried with all the tumult and confusion of defeat across the Ebro. Nor was that barrier found of more avail to mitigate the rushing violence of their formidable enemy.

Joseph, having possession of the impregnable rocks, and the defile and forts of Pancorbo, now thought he could safely await for his reinforcements, and extended his wings for the sake of subsistence. On the 16th, D'Erlon marched to Aro on the left, leaving small posts of communication between that place and Miranda, and sending detachments towards Domingo Calçada to watch the road leading from Burgos to Logroño. Gazan remained in the centre with a strong advanced guard beyond Pancorbo; for as the king's hope was to retake the offensive, he retained the power of issuing beyond the defiles, and his scouting parties were pushed forward towards Briviesca in front, to Zerezo on the left and to Poya do Sal on the right. The rest of the army of the south was cantoned by divisions as far as Armñion behind the Ebro; and Reille, who had occupied Busto, marched to Espejo, also behind the Ebro and on the great road to Bilbao. There being joined by Sarrut's division from Orduña he took post, placing Maucune at Frias, Sarrut at Osma, and La Martiniere at Espejo; guarding also the Puente Lara, and sending strong scouting parties towards Medina de Pomar and Villarcayo on one side, and towards Orduña on the other.

While these movements were in progress, all the encumbrances of the armies were assembled in the basin of Vittoria, and many small garrisons of the army of the north came in; for Clauzel, having received the king's first letter on the 15th of June, had stopped the pursuit of Mina, and proceeded to gather up his scattered columns, intending to move by the way of Logroño to the Ebro. He had with him Taupin's and Barbout's divisions of the army of Portugal; but after providing for his garrisons only five thousand men of the army of the north were disposable, so that he could not bring more than fourteen thousand men to aid the king; nevertheless, the latter, confident in the strength of his front, was still buoyant with the hope of assembling an army powerful enough to retake the offensive. His dream was short-lived.

The 13th, while the echoes of the explosion at Burgos were still ringing in the hills, Wellington's whole army was in motion by its left towards the country about the sources of the Ebro. The Gallicians moved from Aguilar de Campo high up on the Pisuergra; Graham, with the British left wing, moved from Villa Diego, and in one march, reaching the river, passed it on the 14th at the bridges of Rocamunde and San Martin. The centre of the army followed on the 15th, and the same day the right wing under Hill marched through the Bureba and crossed at the Puente Arenas. This general movement was masked by the cavalry and by the Spanish irregulars, who infested the rear of the French on the roads to Briviesca and Domingo Calçada; and the allies, being thus suddenly placed between the sources of the Ebro and the great mountains of Reynosa, cut the French entirely off from the sea-coast. All the ports except Santona and Bilbao, were immediately evacuated by the enemy; Santona was invested by Mendizabel, Porlier, Barcelona, and Campillo, and the English vessels entered Sant Andero, where a depot and hospital station was

established, because the royal road from thence through Reynosa to Burgos furnished a free communication with the army. This single blow severed the connection of the English force with Portugal. That country was cast off by the army as a heavy tender is cast from its towing rope, and all the British military establishments were broken up and transferred by sea to the coast of Biscay.

The English general had now his choice of two modes of action. The one to march boldly down the left bank of the Ebro, and fall upon the enemy wherever he could meet with them; the other to advance, still turning the king's right, and by entering Guipuscoa, to place the army on the great communication with France, while the fleet, keeping pace with this movement, furnished fresh depots at Bilbao and other ports. The first plan was a delicate and uncertain operation, because of the many narrow and dangerous defiles which were to be passed; but the second, which could scarcely be contravened, was secure even if the first should fail; both were compatible to a certain point, inasmuch as to gain the great road leading from Burgos by Orduña to Bilbao, was a good step for either, and failing in that, the road leading by Valmaceda to Bilbao was still in reserve. Wherefore, with an eagle's sweep, Wellington brought his left wing round, and pouring his numerous columns through all the deep narrow valleys and rugged defiles, descended towards the great road of Bilbao between Frias and Orduña. At Modina de Pomar, a central point, he left the sixth division to guard his stores and supplies, but the march of the other divisions was unmitigated; neither the winter gullies nor the ravines, nor the precipitate passes amongst the rocks, retarded the march even of the artillery; where horses could not draw, men hauled, and when the wheels would not roll, the guns were let down or lifted up with ropes; and strongly did the rough veteran infantry work their way through those wild but beautiful regions; six days they toiled unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by the junction of Longa's division and all the smaller bands which came trickling from the mountains, they burst like raging streams from every defile, and went foaming into the basin at Vittoria.

During this time many reports reached the French, some absurdly exaggerated, as that Wellington had one hundred and ninety thousand men; but all indicating more or less distinctly the true line and direction of his march. As early as the 15th, Jourdan had warned Joseph that the allies would probably turn his right; and as the reports of Maucune's scouts told of the presence of English troops, that day, on the side of Puente Arenas, he pressed the king to send the army of Portugal to Valmaceda, and to close the other armies towards the same quarter. Joseph yielded so far, that Reille was ordered to concentrate his troops at Osma on the morning of the 18th, with the view of gaining Valmaceda by Orduña, if it was still possible; if not he was to descend rapidly from Lodio upon Bilbao, and to rally Foy's division and the garrisons of Biscay upon the army of Portugal. At the same time Gazan was directed to send a division of infantry and a regiment of dragoons from the army of the south to relieve Reille's troops at Puente Lara and Espejo, but no general and decided dispositions were made.

Reille immediately ordered Maucune to quit Frias and join him at Osma with his division; yet having some fears for his safety, gave him the choice of coming by the direct road across the hills, or by the circuitous route of Puente Lara. Maucune started late in the night of the 17th by the direct road, and

when Reille himself reached Osma, with La Martiniere's and Sarrut's divisions, on the morning of the 18th, he found a strong English column issuing from the defiles in his front, and the head of it was already at Barbarena in possession of the high road to Orduña. This was general Graham with the first, third, and fifth divisions, and a considerable body of cavalry. The French general, who had about eight thousand infantry and fourteen guns, at first made a demonstration with Sarrut's division in the view of forcing the British to shew their whole force, and a sharp skirmish and heavy cannonade ensued, wherein fifty men fell on the side of the allies, above a hundred on that of the enemy. But at half past two o'clock, Maucune had not arrived, and beyond the mountains, on the left of the French, the sound of a battle arose, which seemed to advance along the valley of Boveda into the rear of Osma; Reille, suspecting what had happened, instantly retired, fighting, towards Espejo, where the mouths of the valleys opened on each other; and from that of Boveda, and the hills on the left, Maucune's troops rushed forth begrimed with dust and powder, breathless, and broken into confused masses.

That general, proverbially daring, marched over the Araçena ridge instead of going by the Puente Lara; and his leading brigade, after clearing the defiles, had halted on the bank of a rivulet near the village of San Millan, in the valley of Boveda. In this situation, without planting picquets, they were waiting for their other brigade and the baggage, when suddenly the light division which had been moving by a line parallel with Graham's march, appeared on some rising ground in their front; the surprise was equal on both sides, but the British riflemen instantly dashed down the hill with loud cries and a bickering fire; the fifty-second followed in support, and the French retreated fighting as they best could. The rest of the English regiments having remained in reserve, were watching this combat and thinking all their enemies were before them, when the second French brigade, followed by the baggage, came hastily out from a narrow cleft in some perpendicular rocks on the right hand. A very confused action now commenced, for the reserve scrambled over some rough intervening ground to attack this new enemy, and the French, to avoid them, made for a hill a little way in their front, whereupon the fifty-second, whose rear was thus menaced, wheeled round, and running at full speed up the hill, met them on the summit. However, the French soldiers, without losing their presence of mind, threw off their packs, and half flying, half fighting, escaped along the side of the mountains towards Miranda, while the first brigade, still retreating on the road towards Espejo, were pursued by the riflemen. Meanwhile the sumpter animals, being affrighted, run wildly about the rocks with a wonderful clamour; and though the escort, huddled together, fought desperately, all the baggage became the spoil of the victors, and four hundred of the French fell or were taken; the rest, thanks to their unyielding resolution and activity, escaped, though pursued through the mountains by some Spanish irregulars; and Reille, being still pressed by Graham, then retreated behind Salinas de Añara.

A knowledge of these events reached the king that night; yet neither Reille nor the few prisoners he had made, could account for more than six Anglo-Portuguese divisions at the defiles; hence, as no troops had been felt on the great road from Burgos, it was judged that Hill was marching with the others by Valmaceda into Guipuscoa, to menace the great communication with France. However, it

was clear that six divisions were concentrated on the right and rear of the French armies, and no time was to be lost in extricating the latter from its critical situation; wherefore Gazan and D'Erlon marched in the night to unite at Armiñon, a central point behind the Zadora river, up the left bank of which it was necessary to file in order to gain the basin of Vittoria. But the latter could only be entered, at that side, through the pass of Puebla de Arganzan, which was two miles long, and so narrow as scarcely to furnish room for the great road; Reille therefore, to cover this dangerous movement, fell back during the night to Subijana Morillas, on the Bayas river. His orders were to dispute the ground vigorously; for by that route Wellington could enter the basin before Gazan, and D'Erlon could thread the pass of Puebla; he could also send a corps from Frias to attack their rear on the Miranda side, while they were engaged in the defile. One of these things, by all means, he should have endeavoured to accomplish; but the troops had made very long marches on the 18th, and it was dark before the fourth division had reached Espejo. D'Erlon and Gazan, therefore, united at Armiñon without difficulty, about ten o'clock in the morning of the 19th, and immediately commenced the passage of the defile of Puebla, and the head of their column appeared on the other side at the moment when Wellington was driving Reille back upon the Zadora.

The allies had reached Bayas before mid-day of the 19th, and if they could have forced the passage at once, the armies of the centre and of the south would have been cut off from Vittoria and destroyed; but the army of Portugal was strongly posted, the front covered by the river, the right by the village of Subijana de Morillas, which was occupied as a bridge-head, and the left secured by some very rugged heights opposite the village of Pobes. This position was turned by the light division, while the fourth division attacked it in front; and after a skirmish, in which about eighty of the French fell, Reille was forced over the Zadora; but the army of the centre had then passed the defile of Puebla, and was in position behind that river; the army of the south was coming rapidly into second line; the crisis had passed, the combat ceased, and the allies pitched their tents on the Bayas. The French armies now formed three lines behind the Zadora, and the king hearing that Clauzel was at Logroño, eleven leagues distant, expedited orders to him to march upon Vittoria; general Foy also, who was in march for Bilbao, was directed to halt at Durango, to rally all the garrisons of Biscay and Guipuscoa there, and then to come down on Vittoria. These orders were received too late.

CHAPTER VIII.

Confused state of the French in the basin of Vittoria—Two convoys are sent to the rear—The king takes up a new order of battle—The Galicians march to seize Orduna but are recalled—Graham marches across the hills to Murguia—Relative strength and position of the hostile armies—Battle of Vittoria—Joseph retreats by Salvatierra—Wellington pursues him up the Borundia and Araquil valleys—Sends Longa and Giron into Guipuscoa—Joseph halts at Yrursun—Detaches the army of Portugal to the Bidassoa—Retreats with the army of the centre and the army of the south to Pampeluna—Wellington detaches Graham through the mountains by the pass of St. Adrian into Guipuscoa and marches himself to Pampeluna—Combat with the French rear-guard—Joseph retreats up the valley of Roncevalles—General Foy rallies the French troops in Guipuscoa and fights the Spaniards at Montdragon—Retreats to Bergara and Villa Franca—Graham enters Guipuscoa—Combat on the Orrio river—Foy retires to Tolosa—Combat there—The French posts on

the sea-coast abandoned with exception of Santona and St. Sebastian—Foy retires behind the Bidassoa—Clauzel advances towards Vittoria—Retires to Logroño—Wellington endeavours to surround him—He makes a forced march to Tudela—is in great danger—Escapes to Zaragoza—Halts there—is deceived by Mina and finally marches to Jacca—Gazan re-enters Spain and occupies the valley of Bastan—O'Donel reduces the forts of Pancorbo—Hill drives Gazan from the valley of Bastan—Observations.

THE basin into which the king had now poured all his troops, his parcs, convoys, and encumbrances of every kind, was about eight miles broad by ten in length, Vittoria being at the further end. The river Zadora, narrow and with rugged banks, after passing very near that town, runs towards the Ebro with many windings, and divides the basin unequally, the largest portion being on the right bank. A traveller coming from Miranda by the royal Madrid road, would enter the basin by the pass of Puebla, through which the Zadora flows between two very high and rough mountain ridges, the one on his right hand being called the heights of Puebla, that on his left hand the heights of Morillas. The road leads up the left bank of the river, and on emerging from the pass, on the left hand at the distance of about six miles would be seen the village of Subijana de Morillas, furnishing that opening into the basin which Reille defended while the other armies passed the defile of Puebla. The spires of Vittoria would appear about eight miles distant, and from that town the road to Logroño goes off on the right hand, the road to Bilbao, by Murgia and Orduña, on the left hand, crossing the Zadora at a bridge near the village of Ariaga; further on, the roads to Estella and to Pampeluna branch off on the right, a road to Durango on the left, and between them the royal causeway leads over the great Arlaban ridge into the mountains of Guipuscoa by the formidable defiles of Salinas. But of all these roads, though several were practicable for guns, especially that to Pampeluna, the royal causeway alone could suffice for the retreat of such an encumbered army. And as the allies were behind the hills forming the basin on the right bank of the Zadora, their line being parallel to the great causeway, it followed, that by prolonging their left they would infallibly cut off the French from that route.

Joseph felt the danger, and his first thought was to march by Salinas to Durango, with a view to cover his communications with France, and to rally Foy's troops and the garrisons of Guipuscoa and Biscay. But in that rough country, neither his artillery nor his cavalry, on which he greatly depended, though the cavalry and artillery of the allies were scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist, and he would have to send them into France; and if pressed by Wellington in front, and surrounded by all the bands in a mountainous region, favourable for those irregulars, he could not long remain in Spain. It was then proposed, if forced from the basin of Vittoria, to retire by Salvatierra to Pampeluna and bring Suchet's army up to Zaragoza; but Joseph feared thus to lose the great communication with France, because the Spanish regular army, aided by all the bands, could seize Tolosa, while Wellington operated against him on the side of Navarre. It was replied, that troops detached from the army of the north and from that of Portugal might oppose them; still the king hesitated, for though the road to Pampeluna was called practicable for wheels, it required something more for the enormous mass of guns and carriages of all kinds now heaped around Vittoria.

One large convoy had already marched on the 19th, by the royal causeway, for France; another,

still larger, was to move on the 21st, under escort of Maucune's division; the fighting men in front of the enemy were thus diminished, and yet the plain was still covered with artillery parcs and equipages of all kinds; and Joseph, shut up in the basin of Vittoria, vacillating and infirm of purpose, continued to waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary's movements. Hence, on the 19th, nothing was done, but the 20th, some infantry and cavalry of the army of Portugal passed the Zadora to feel for the allies towards Murguia; and being encountered by Longa's Spaniards at the distance of six miles, after some successful skirmishing, recrossed the Zadora with the loss of twenty men. On the 21st, at three o'clock in the morning, Maucune's division, more than three thousand good soldiers, marched with the second convoy, and the king took up a new line of battle.

Reille's army, reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry, and by Digeon's division of dragoons from the army of the south, now formed the extreme right, having to defend the passage of the Zadora, where the Bilbao and Durango roads crossed it by the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga. The French division defended the bridge; the Franco-Spanish brigade was pushed forward to Durana on the royal road, and was supported by a French battalion and a brigade of light horsemen; Digeon's dragoons and a second brigade of light cavalry were in reserve behind the Zadora, near Zuazo de Alava and Hermandad. The centre of the king's army, distant six or eight miles from Gamara, following the course of the Zadora, was on another front, because the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the heights of Margarita, descends to the defile of Puebla, nearly at right angles with its previous course. Here, covered by the river and on an easy open range of heights, for the basin of Vittoria is broken by a variety of ground, Gazan's right extended from the royal road to an isolated hill in front of the village of Margarita. His centre was astride the royal road, in front of the village of Arinez; his left occupied more rugged ground, being placed behind Subijana de Alava on the roots of the Puebla mountain, facing the defile of that name; and to cover this wing, a brigade under general Maransin was posted on the Puebla mountain. D'Erlon's army was in second line. The principal mass of the cavalry with many guns, and the king's guards, formed a reserve, behind the centre, about the village of Gomecha, and fifty pieces of artillery were massed in the front, pointing to the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and Nanclares.

While the king was making conjectures, Wellington was making various dispositions for the different operations which might occur. He knew that the Andalusian reserve would be at Burgos in a few days, and thinking that Joseph would not fight on the Zadora, detached Giron with the Gallicians on the 19th, to seize Orduña. Graham's corps was at first destined to follow Giron, but finally penetrated through difficult mountain ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from Bilbao and menacing his communications with France. However, the rear of the army had been so much scattered in the previous marches, that Wellington halted on the 20th to rally his columns; and taking that opportunity to examine the position of the French armies, observed that they seemed steadfast to fight; whereupon, immediately changing his own dispositions, he gave Graham fresh orders, and hastily recalled Giron from Orduña.

The long expected battle was now at hand, and on neither side were the numbers and courage of the

troops of mean account. The allies had lost about two hundred killed and wounded in the previous operations, and the sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, was left at Medina de Pomar; hence, only sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese sabres and bayonets, with ninety pieces of cannon, were actually in the field; but the Spanish auxiliaries were above twenty thousand, and the whole army, including sergeants and artillery-men, exceeded eighty thousand combatants. For the French side, as the regular muster-roll of their troops was lost with the battle, an approximation to their strength must suffice. The number killed and taken in different combats, from the Esla and Tormes to the Zadora, was about two thousand men, and some five thousand had marched to France with the two convoys. On the other hand, Sarrut's division, the garrison of Vittoria, and the many smaller posts relinquished by the army of the north, had increased the king's forces; and hence, by a comparison with former returns, it would appear, that in the gross, about seventy thousand men were present. Wherefore, deducting the officers, the artillery-men, sappers, miners, and non-combatants, which are always borne on the French muster-rolls, the sabres and bayonets would scarcely reach sixty thousand; but in the number and size of their guns the French had the advantage.

The defects of the king's position were apparent both in the general arrangement and in the details. His best line of retreat was on the prolongation of his right flank, which, being at Gamara Mayor, close to Vittoria, was too distant to be supported by the main body of the army; and yet the safety of the latter depended upon the preservation of Reille's position. Instead of having the rear clear, and the field of battle free, many thousand carriages and impediments of all kinds were heaped about Vittoria, blocking all the roads, and creating confusion amongst the artillery parcs. Maransin's brigade, placed on the heights above Puebla, was isolated and too weak to hold that ground. The centre, indeed, occupied an easy range of hills; its front was open, with a slope to the river, and powerful batteries seemed to bar all access by the bridges; nevertheless, many of the guns being pushed with an advanced post into a deep loop of the Zadora, were within musket-shot of a wood on the right bank, which was steep and rugged, so that the allies found good cover close to the river.

There were seven bridges within the scheme of the operations, namely, the bridge of La Puebla, on the French left beyond the defile; the bridge of Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava, and the French end of the defile of Puebla; then three bridges which, placed around the deep loop of the river before mentioned, opened altogether upon the right of the French centre, that of Mendoza being highest up the stream, that of Villodas lowest down the stream, and that of Tres Puentes in the centre; lastly, the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga on the Upper Zadora, opposite Vittoria, which were guarded by Reille, completed the number, and none of the seven were either broken or entrenched.

Wellington, having well observed these things, formed his army for three distinct battles.

Sir Thomas Graham, moving from Murguia by the Bilbao road, was to fall on Reille, and, if possible, to force the passage of the river at Gamara Mayor and Ariaga; by this movement the French would be completely turned, and the greatest part of their forces shut up between the Puebla mountains on one side and the Zadora on the other. The first and fifth Anglo-Portuguese divisions, Brad-

ford's and Pack's independent Portuguese brigades, Longa's Spanish division, and Anson's and Bock's cavalry, in all, nearly twenty thousand men with eighteen pieces of cannon, were destined for this attack; and Giron's Gallicians, recalled from Orduña, came up by a forced march in support.

Sir Rowland Hill was to attack the enemy's left; and his corps, also about twenty thousand strong, was composed of Morillo's Spaniards, Silveira's Portuguese, and the second British division, together with some cavalry and guns. It was collected on the southern slope of the ridge of Morillas, between the Bayas and the Lower Zadora, pointing to the village of Puebla, and was destined to force the passage of the river at that point; to assail the French troops on the heights beyond; to thread the defile of La Puebla, and to enter the basin of Vittoria; thus turning and menacing all the French left, and securing the passage of the Zadora at the bridge of Nanclares.

The centre attack, directed by Wellington in person, consisted of the third, fourth, seventh and light divisions of infantry, the great mass of the artillery, the heavy cavalry, and D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, in all, nearly thirty thousand combatants. They were encamped along the Bayas from Subijana Morillas to Ulivarre, and had only to march across the ridges which formed the basin of Vittoria on that side, to come down to their different points of attack on the Zadora; that is to say, the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas and Nanclares. But so rugged was the country, and the communications between the different columns so difficult, that no exact concert could be expected, and each general of division was in some degree master of his movements.

BATTLE OF VITTORIA.

At day-break on the 21st, the weather being rainy, with a thick vapour, the troops moved from their camps on the Bayas; and the centre of the army, advancing by columns from the right and left of the line, passed the ridges in front, and entering the basin of Vittoria, slowly approached the Zadora. The left-hand column pointed to Mendoza, the right-hand column skirted the ridge of Morillas, on the other side of which Hill was marching; and that general having seized the village of Puebla about ten o'clock, commenced passing the river there. Morillo's Spaniards led, and their first brigade, moving on a bye-way, assailed the mountain to the right of the great road; the ascent was so steep that the soldiers appeared to climb rather than to walk up, and the second Spanish brigade, being to connect the first with the British troops below, ascended only half way; little or no opposition was made until the first brigade was near the summit, when a sharp skirmishing commenced, and Morillo was wounded, but would not quit the field; his second brigade joined him, and the French, feeling the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin with a fresh regiment. Then Hill succoured Morillo with the seventy-first regiment, and a battalion of light infantry, both under colonel Cadogan; yet the fight was doubtful, for though the British secured the summit, and gained ground along the side of the mountain, Cadogan, a brave officer and of high promise, fell, and Gazan, calling Villatte's division from behind Ariñez, sent it to the succour of his side; and so strongly did these troops fight, that the battle remained stationary, the allies being scarcely able to hold their ground. Hill, however, again sent fresh troops to their assistance, and with the remainder of his corps passing the Zadora, thread-

ed the long defile of Puebla, and fiercely issuing forth on the other side, won the village of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan's line; he thus connected his own right with the troops on the mountain, and maintained this forward position in despite of the enemy's vigorous efforts to dislodge him.

Meanwhile Wellington had brought the fourth and light divisions, the heavy cavalry, the hussars and D'Urban's Portuguese horsemen, from Subijana Morillas, and Montevite, down by Olabarre to the Zadora. The fourth division was placed opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the light division opposite the bridge of Villodas, both well covered by rugged ground and woods; and the light division was so close to the water, that their skirmishers could with ease have killed the French gunners of the advanced post in the loop of the river at Villodas. The weather had cleared up, and when Hill's battle began, the riflemen of the light division, spreading along the bank, exchanged a biting fire with the enemy's skirmishers; but no serious effort was made, because the third and seventh divisions, meeting with rough ground, had not reached their point of attack; and it would have been imprudent to push the fourth division and the cavalry over the bridge of Nanclares, and thus crowd a great body of troops in front of the Puebla defile, before the other divisions were ready to attack the right and centre of the enemy.

While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington that the bridge of Tres Puentes on the left of the light division, was unguarded, and offered to guide the troops over it. Kempt's brigade of the light division was instantly directed towards this point; and being concealed by some rocks from the French, and well led by the brave peasant, they passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a steep curving rise of ground, and halted close under the crest on the enemy's side of the river, being then actually behind the king's advanced post, and within a few hundred yards of his line of battle. Some French cavalry immediately approached, and two round shots were fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted; but as no movement of attack was made, Kempt called the fifteenth hussars over the river, and they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge one by one, horseman after horseman, and still the French remained torpid, shewing that there was an army there but no general.

It was now one o'clock; Hill's assault on the village of Subijana de Alava was developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up the Zadora on the enemy's extreme right, being followed by the dull sound of distant guns, shewed that Graham's attack had also commenced. Then the king, finding both his flanks in danger, caused his reserve about Gomecha to file off towards Vittoria, and gave Gazan orders to retire by successive masses with the army of the south. But at that moment the third and seventh divisions, having reached their ground, were seen moving rapidly down to the bridge of Mendoza; the enemy's artillery opened upon them; a body of cavalry drew near the bridge, and the French light troops, which were very strong there, commenced a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the French cannon from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt's forward position was instantly made manifest; for colonel Andrew Barnard, springing forward, led the riflemen of the light division, in the most daring manner, between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely that

the English artillery-men, thinking his darkly clothed troops were enemies, played upon both alike.

This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass the bridge of Mendoza without opposition; the other brigade forded the river higher up, and the seventh division and Vandeleur's brigade of the light division followed. The French advanced post immediately abandoned the ground in front of Villodas, and the battle, which had before somewhat slackened, revived with extreme violence. Hill pressed the enemy harder; the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares; the smoke and sound of Graham's attack became more distinct, and the banks of the Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. However, the French, weakened in the centre by the draft made of Villatte's division, and having their confidence shaken by the king's order to retreat, were in evident perplexity, and no regular retrograde movement could be made, the allies were too close.

The seventh division, and Colville's brigade of the third division, which had forded the river, formed the left of the British, and they were immediately engaged with the French right in front of Margarita and Hermadad. Almost at the same time lord Wellington, seeing the hill in front of Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal of Villatte's troops, carried Picton and the rest of the third division in close columns of regiments, at a running pace, diagonally across the front of both armies towards that central point; this attack was headed by Barnard's riflemen, and followed by the remainder of Kempt's brigade and the hussars; but the other brigade of the light division acted in support of the seventh division. At the same time general Cole advanced with the fourth division from the bridge of Nanclares, and the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, also passing the river, galloped up, squadron after squadron, into the plain ground between Cole's right and Hill's left.

The French thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for retreat, threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, and fifty pieces of artillery played with astonishing activity. To answer this fire, Wellington brought over several brigades of British guns, and both sides were shrouded by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under cover of which the French retired by degrees to the second range of heights, in front of Gomecha, on which their reserve had been posted; but they still held the village of Arinez on the main road. Picton's troops, headed by the riflemen, plunged into that village amidst a heavy fire of muskets and artillery, and in an instant three guns were captured; but the post was important; fresh French troops came down, and for some time the smoke and dust and clamour, the flashing of the firearms, and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed with the thundering of the guns were terrible, yet finally the British troops issued forth victorious on the other side. During this conflict the seventh division, reinforced by Vandeleur's brigade of the light division, was heavily raked by a battery at the village of Margarita, until the fifty-second regiment, led by colonel Gibbs, with an impetuous charge drove the French guns away and carried the village, and at the same time the eighty-seventh, under colonel Gough, won the village of Hermadad. Then the whole advanced fighting on the left of Picton's attack, and on the right hand of that general the fourth division also made way, though more slowly, because of the rugged ground.

When Picton and Kempt's brigades had carried the village of Arinez, and gained the main road, the French troops near Subijana de Alava were turned,

and being hard-pressed on their front, and on their left flank by the troops on the summit of the mountain, fell back for two miles in a disordered mass, striving to regain the great line of retreat to Vittoria. It was thought that some cavalry, launched against them at the moment, would have totally disorganized the whole French battle and secured several thousand prisoners, but this was not done; the confused multitude, shooting ahead of the advancing British lines, recovered order, and as the ground was exceedingly diversified, being in some places wooded, in others open, here covered with high corn, there broken by ditches, vineyards and hamlets, the action for six miles resolved itself into a running fight and cannonade, the dust and smoke and tumult of which filled all the basin, passing onwards towards Vittoria.

Many guns were taken as the army advanced, and at six o'clock the French reached the last defensible height, one mile in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the city stood, and beyond the city, thousands of carriages and animals, and non-combatants, men, women and children, were crowding together, in all the madness of terror; and as the English shot went booming over head, the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid sound of distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay for army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation. However, the courage of the French soldier was not yet quelled, Reille, on whom every thing now depended, maintained his post on the Upper Zadora, and the armies of the south and centre drawing up on their last heights, between the villages of Ali and Armentia, made their muskets flash like lightning, while more than eighty pieces of artillery, massed together, pealed with such a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook, and streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the French gunners were seen, bounding with a frantic energy.

This terrible cannonade and musketry kept the allies in check, and scarcely could the third division, which was still the foremost, and bore the brunt of this storm, maintain its advanced position. Again the battle became stationary, and the French generals had commenced drawing off their infantry in succession from the right wing, when suddenly the fourth division, rushing forward, carried the hill on the French left, and the heights were at once abandoned. It was at this very moment that Joseph, finding the royal road so completely blocked by carriages that the artillery could not pass, indicated the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat; and the army went off in a confused yet compact body on that side, leaving Vittoria on its left. The British infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped through the town to intercept the new line of retreat, which was through a marsh; but this road also was choked with carriages and fugitive people, while on each side there were deep drains. Thus all became disorder and mischief; the guns were left on the edge of the marsh; the artillerymen and drivers fled with the horses, and, breaking through the miserable multitude, the vanquished troops went off by Metauco towards Salvatierra; however, their cavalry still covered the retreat with some vigour, and many of those generous horsemen were seen taking up children and women to carry off from the dreadful scene.

The result of the last attack had placed Reille, of whose battle it is now time to treat, in great danger. His advanced troops, under Sarrut, had been placed at the village of Aranguisi, and they also oc-

cupied some heights on their right, which covered both the bridges of Ariaga and Gamara Mayor; but they had been driven from both the village and the height a little after twelve o'clock, by general Oswald, who commanded the head of Graham's column, consisting of the fifth division, Longa's Spaniards, and Pack's Portuguese. Longa then seized Gamara Menor on the Durango road, while another detachment gained the royal road still further on the left, and forced the Franco-Spaniards to retire from Durana. Thus the first blow on this side had deprived the king of his best line of retreat, and confined him to the road of Pampeluna. However, Sarrut recrossed the river in good order, and a new disposition was made by Reille. One of Sarrut's brigades defended the bridge of Ariaga and the village of Abechuco beyond it; the other was in reserve, equally supporting Sarrut and La Martiniere, who defended the bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village of that name beyond the river. Digeon's dragoons were formed behind the village of Ariaga, and Reille's own dragoons being called up from Hermandad and Zuazo, took post behind the bridge of Gamara; a brigade of light cavalry was placed on the extreme right to sustain the Franco-Spanish troops, which were now on the Upper Zadora in front of Betonio, and the remainder of the light cavalry, under general Curto, was on the French left, extending down the Zadora between Ariaga and Govea.

Oswald commenced the attack at Gamara with some guns and Robinson's brigade of the fifth division. Longa's Spaniards were to have led, and at an early hour, when Gamara was feebly occupied, but they did not stir, and the village was meanwhile reinforced. However, Robinson's brigade being formed in three columns, made the assault at a running pace. At first the fire of artillery and musketry was so heavy that the British troops stopped and commenced firing also, and the three columns got intermixed; yet encouraged by their officers, and especially by the example of general Robinson an inexperienced man but of a high and daring spirit, they renewed the charge, broke through the village and even crossed the bridge. One gun was captured, and the passage seemed to be won, when Reille suddenly turned twelve pieces upon the village, and La Martiniere, rallying his division under cover of this cannonade, retook the bridge; it was with difficulty the allied troops could even hold the village until they were reinforced. Then a second British brigade came down, and the royals leading, the bridge was again carried, but again these new troops were driven back in the same manner as the others had been. Thus the bridge remained forbidden ground. Graham had, meanwhile, attacked the village of Abechuco which covered the bridge of Ariaga, and it was carried at once by colonel Halkett's Germans, who were supported by Bradford's Portuguese and by the fire of twelve guns; yet here, as at Gamara, the French maintained the bridge, and at both places the troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal fire of artillery and small arms.

Reille, though considerably inferior in numbers, continued to interdict the passage of the river, until the tumult of Wellington's battle, coming up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut's rear. Digeon's dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment; and some time before, Reille, seeing the retrograde movement of the king, had formed a reserve of infantry under general Fririon at Betonio, which now proved his safety. For Sarrut was

killed at the bridge of Ariaga, and general Menne, the next in command, could scarcely draw off his troops, while Digeon's dragoons held the British cavalry at point; but with the aid of Fririon's reserve, Reille covered the movement and rallied all his troops at Betonio. He had now to make head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from Ariaga, from Durana, and from Vittoria; yet he fought his way to Metauco on the Salvatierra road, covering the general retreat with some degree of order. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue; and neither the resolute demeanour of the French cavalry, which was covered on the flanks by some light troops, and made several vigorous charges, nor the night, which now fell, could stop their victorious career until the flying masses of the enemy had cleared all obstacles, and passing Metauco, got beyond the reach of further injury. Thus ended the battle of Vittoria; the French escaped indeed with comparatively little loss of men, but to use Gazan's words, "they lost all their equipages, all their guns, all their treasure, all their stores, all their papers, so that no man could prove how much pay was due to him; generals and subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs, and most of them were barefooted."

Never was an army more hardly used by its commander, for the soldiers were not half beaten, and never was a victory more complete. The trophies were innumerable. The French carried off but two pieces of artillery from the battle. Jourdan's baton of command, a stand of colours, one hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred of which had been used in the fight; all the parcs and depots from Madrid, Valladolid, and Burgos; carriages, ammunition, treasure; every thing fell into the hands of the victors. The loss in men did not, however, exceed six thousand, exclusive of some hundreds of prisoners; the loss of the allies was nearly as great, the gross numbers being five thousand one hundred and seventy-six, killed, wounded and missing. Of these, one thousand and forty-nine were Portuguese, and five hundred and fifty-three were Spanish; hence the loss of the English was more than double that of the Portuguese and Spaniards together; and yet both fought well, and especially the Portuguese; but British troops are the soldiers of battle. Marshal Jourdan's baton was taken by the eighty-seventh regiment, and the spoil was immense; but to such extent was plunder carried, principally by the followers and non-combatants, for with some exceptions the fighting troops may be said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up, that of five millions and a half of dollars indicated by the French accounts to be in the money chests, not one dollar came to the public; and Wellington sent fifteen officers with power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing the Ebro and the Duero, in hopes to recover the sums so shamefully carried off. Neither was this disgraceful conduct confined to ignorant and vulgar people. Some officers were seen mixed up with the mob and contending for the disgraceful gain.

On the 22d, the allies followed the retreating enemy, and Giron and Longa entered Guipuscoa, by the royal road, in pursuit of the convoy which had moved under Maucune on the morning of the battle; the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese remained at Vittoria, and general Pakenham, with the sixth division, came up from Medina Pomar; the remainder of the army pursued Joseph towards Pampeluna, for he had continued his retreat up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. The weather was rainy, the roads heavy, and the French rear-guard,

having neither time nor materials to destroy the bridges, set fire to the villages behind them to delay the pursuit. At five o'clock in the morning of the 22d, Reille had rallied his two divisions and all his cavalry in front of Salvatierra, where he halted until he was assured that all the French had passed; and then continued his march to Huerta, in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles from the field of battle. Joseph was that day at Yrursun, a town situated behind one of the sources of the Arga, and from which roads branched off to Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa and St. Estevan on the other. At this place he remained all the 23d, sending orders to different points on the French frontier to prepare provisions and succours for his suffering army; and he directed Reille to proceed rapidly by St. Estevan to the Bidassor with the infantry, six hundred select cavalry, the artillery-men and horses of the army of Portugal; meanwhile, Gazan's and D'Erlon's army marched upon Pampeluna, intending to cross the frontier at St. Jean Pied de Port. Joseph reached Pampeluna the 24th, but the army bivouacked on the glacis of the fortress, and in such a state of destitution and insubordination, that the governor would not suffer them to enter the town. The magazines were, indeed, reduced very low by Mina's long blockade, and some writers assert that it was even proposed to blow up the works and abandon the place; however, by great exertions additional provisions were obtained from the vicinity; the garrison was increased to three thousand men, and the army marched towards France, leaving a rear-guard at a strong pass about two leagues off.

The 23d, Wellington having detached Graham's corps to Guipuscoa by the pass of Adrian, left the fifth division at Salvatierra, and pursued the king with the rest of the army.

On the 24th, the light division and Victor Alten's cavalry came up with the French rear-guard; two battalions of the riflemen immediately pushed the infantry back through the pass, and then Ross's horse artillery, galloping forward, killed several men and dismounted one of the only two pieces of cannon carried off from Vittoria.

The 25th, the enemy, covered by the fortress of Pampeluna, went up the valley of Roncesvalles. He was followed by the light division, which turned the town as far as Vilalba; and he was harassed by the Spanish irregular troops, now swarming on every side.

Meanwhile Foy and Clauzel were placed in very difficult positions. The former had reached Bergara the 21st, and the garrison of Bilbao and the Italian division of St. Paul, formerly Palombini's, had reached Durango; the first convoy from Vittoria was that day at Bergara, and Maucune was with the second at Montdragon. The 22d, the garrison of Castro went off to Santona; the same day the fugitives from the battle spread such an alarm through the country that the forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, which commanded the passes into Guipuscoa were abandoned, and Longa and Giron penetrated them without hindrance.

Foy, who had only one battalion of his division in hand, immediately rallied the fugitive garrisons, and marching upon Montdragon, made some prisoners and acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he ordered the convoy to move day and night, towards France; the troops at Durango to march upon Bergara, and the troops from all the other posts to unite at Tolosa, to which place the artillery, baggage, and sick men were now hastening from every side; and to cover their concentration, Foy, reinforcing himself with Maucune's troops, gave battle

to Giron and Longa, though three times his numbers, at Montdragon; the Spaniards had the advantage and the French fell back, yet slowly and fighting, to Bergara; but they lost two hundred and fifty men and six guns.

On the 23d, Foy marched to Villa Real de Guipuscoa; and that evening the head of Graham's column, having crossed the Mutiol mountain by the pass of Adrian, descended upon Segura. It was then as near to Tolosa as Foy was, and the latter's situation became critical; yet such were the difficulties of passing the mountain, that it was late on the 24th, ere Graham, who had then only collected Anson's light cavalry, two Portuguese brigades of infantry, and Halket's Germans, could move towards Villa Franca. The Italians and Maucune's divisions, which composed the French rear, were just entering Villa Franca, as Graham came in sight; and to cover that town they took post at the village of Veasaya on the right bank of the Orio river. Halket's Germans, aided by Pack's Portuguese, immediately drove Maucune's people from the village with the loss of two hundred men, and Bradford's brigade, having engaged the Italians on the French right, killed or wounded eighty, yet the Italians claimed the advantage; and the whole position was so strong, that Graham had recourse to flank operations, whereupon Foy retired to Tolosa. Giron and Longa now came up by the great road, and Mendizabel, having quitted the blockade of Santona, arrived at Aspeytia on the Deba.

The 25th, Foy again offered battle in front of Tolosa; but Graham turned his left with Longa's division, and Mendizabel turned his right from Aspeytia; while they were in march, colonel Williams, with the grenadiers of the first regiment and three companies of Pack's Portuguese, dislodged him from an advantageous hill in front, and the fight was then purposely prolonged by skirmishing, until six o'clock in the evening, when the Spaniards, having reached their destination on the flanks, a general attack was made on all sides. The French, being cannonaded on the causeway, and strongly pushed by the infantry in front, while Longa, with equal vigour drove their left from the heights, were soon forced beyond Tolosa on the flanks; but that town was strongly entrenched as a field-post, and they maintained it until Graham brought up his guns, and bursting one of the gates, opened a passage for his troops; nevertheless, Foy, profiting from the darkness, made his retreat good with a loss of only four hundred men killed and wounded, and some prisoners, who were taken by Mendizabel and Longa. These actions were very severe; the loss of the Spaniards was not known, but the Anglo-Portuguese had more than four hundred killed and wounded in the two days' operations, and Graham himself was hurt.

The 26th and 27th, the allies halted to hear of lord Wellington's progress; the enemy's convoy's entered France in safety, and Foy occupied a position between Tolosa and Ernani behind the Anezo. His force was now increased by the successive arrival of the smaller garrisons to sixteen thousand bayonets, four hundred sabres, and ten pieces of artillery; and the 28th, he threw a garrison of two thousand six hundred good troops into St. Sebastian and passed the Urumia. The 29th he passed the Oyarsun, and halted the 30th, leaving a small garrison at Passages, which, however, surrendered the next day to Longa.

On the 1st of July, the garrison of Gueteria escaped by sea to St. Sebastian, and Foy passed the Bidassoa, his rear-guard fighting with Giron's Gal-

licians; but Reille's troops were now at Vera and Viriatu; they had received ammunition and artillery from Bayonne, and thus twenty-five thousand men of the army of Portugal occupied a defensive line from Vera to the bridge of Behobie, the approaches to which last were defended by a block-house. Graham immediately invested St. Sebastian, and Giron, concentrating the fire of his own artillery and that of a British battery upon the block-house of Behobie, obliged the French to blow it up and destroy the bridge.

While these events were passing in Guipuscoa, Clauzel was in more imminent danger. On the evening of the 22d, he had approached the field of battle at the head of fourteen thousand men, by a way which falls into the Estella road, at Aracete, and not far from Salvatierra. Pakenham, with the sixth division, was then at Vittoria, and the French general, learning the state of affairs, soon retired to Logroño, where he halted until the evening of the 25th. This delay was like to have proved fatal; for on that day, Wellington, who before thought he was at Tudela, discovered his real position, and leaving general Hill with the second division to form the siege of Pampeluna, marched himself by Tafalla with two brigades of light cavalry and the third, fourth, seventh, and light divisions of infantry. The fifth and sixth divisions and the heavy cavalry and D'Urban's Portuguese marched at the same time from Salvatierra and Vittoria upon Logroño; and Mina also, who had now collected all his scattered battalions near Estella, and was there joined by Julian Sanchez' cavalry, followed hard on Clauzel's rear.

The French general, moving by Calahorra, reached Tudela on the evening of the 27th, and thinking that by this forced march of sixty miles in forty hours with scarcely a halt, he had outstripped all pursuers, would have made for France by Olite and Tafalla. Wellington was already in possession of those places expecting him; but an alcalde gave Clauzel notice of the danger, whereupon recrossing the Ebro, he marched upon Zaragoza in all haste, and arriving the 1st of July, took post on the Gallego, gave out that he would there wait until Suchet, or the king, if the latter retook the offensive, should come up. Wellington immediately made a flank movement to his own left as far as Casada, and could still, with an exertion, have intercepted Clauzel by the route of Jacca; but he feared to drive him back upon Suchet, and contented himself with letting Mina press the French general. That chief acted with great ability; for he took three hundred prisoners, and having every where declared that the whole allied army were close at hand in pursuit, he imposed upon Clauzel, who, being thus deceived, destroyed some of his artillery and heavy baggage, and leaving the rest at Zaragoza retired to Jacca.

During this time Joseph, not being pressed, had sent the army of the south again into Spain to take possession of the valley of Bastan, which was very fertile and full of strong positions. But O'Donel, count of Abispal, had now reduced the forts at Pancorbo, partly by capitulation, partly by force, and was marching towards Pampeluna; wherefore general Hill, without abandoning the siege of that place, moved two British and two Portuguese brigades into the valley of Bastan, and on the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, vigorously driving Gazan from all his positions, cleared the valley with a loss of only one hundred and twenty men. The whole line of the Spanish frontier from Roncesvalles to the mouth of the Bidasoa river was thus occupied by the victorious allies, and Pampeluna and St. Sebastian were invest-

ed. Joseph's reign was over; the crown had fallen from his head, and after years of toil, and combats which had been rather admired than understood, the English general, emerging from the chaos of the Peninsular struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrennees, a recognised conqueror. On those lofty pinnacles the clangor of his trumpets pealed clear and loud, and the splendour of his genius appeared as a flaming beacon to warring nations.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. In this campaign of six weeks, Wellington, with one hundred thousand men, marched six hundred miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove a hundred and twenty thousand veteran troops from Spain. This immense result could not have been attained if Joseph had followed Napoleon's instructions; Wellington could not then have turned the line of the Duero. It could not have been attained if Joseph had acted with ordinary skill after the line of the Duero was passed. Time was to him most precious; yet when contrary to his expectations he had concentrated his scattered armies behind the Carion, he made no effort to delay his enemy on that river. He judged it an unfit position, that is, unfit for a great battle; but he could have obliged Wellington to lose a day there, perhaps two or three, and behind the Upper Pisuergra he might have saved a day or two more. Reille, who was with the army of Portugal, on the right of the king's line, complained that he could find no officers of that army who knew the Pisuergra sufficiently to place the troops in position; the king then had cause to remember Napoleon's dictum, namely, that "to command an army well, a general must think of nothing else." For why was the course of the Pisuergra unknown when the king's head-quarters had been for several months within a day's journey of it?

2nd. The Carion and the Pisuergra being given up, the country about the Hormaza was occupied, and the three French armies were in mass between that stream and Burgos; yet Wellington's right wing only, that is to say, only twenty-three thousand infantry and three brigades of cavalry, drove Reille's troops over the Arlanzan, and the castle of Burgos was abandoned. This was on the 12th; the three French armies, not less than fifty thousand fighting men, had been in position since the 9th, and the king's letters prove that he desired to fight in that country, which was favourable for all arms. Nothing then could be more opportune than Wellington's advance on the 12th, because a retrograde defensive system is unsuited to French soldiers, whose impatient courage leads them always to attack, and the news of Napoleon's victory at Bautzen had just arrived to excite their ardour. Wherefore Joseph should have retaken the offensive on the 12th, at the moment when Wellington approached the Hormaza; and as the left and centre of the allies were at Villa Diego and Castroxerez, the greatest part at the former, that is to say, one march distant, the twenty-six thousand men immediately under Wellington, would probably have been forced back over the Pisuergra, and the king would have gained time for Sarrut, Foy and Clauzel to join him. Did the English general then owe his success to fortune, to his adversary's fault rather than to his own skill? Not so. He had judged the king's military capacity; he had seen the haste, the confusion, the trouble of the enemy, and knowing well the moral power of rapidity and boldness in such circumstances, had acted, daringly indeed, but wisely; for such daring is admirable, it is the highest part of war.

3rd. The manner in which Wellington turned the line of the Ebro was a fine strategic illustration. It was by no means certain of success yet failure would have still left great advantages. He was certain of gaining Santander and fixing a new base of operations on the coast, and he would still have had the power of continually turning the king's right by operating between him and the coast; the errors of his adversary only gave him additional advantages, which he expected, and seized with promptness. But if Joseph, instead of spreading his army from Espejo on his right to the Logroño road on his left, had kept only cavalry on the latter route and on the main road in front of Pancorbo; if he had massed his army to his right, pivoting upon Miranda, or Frias, and had scoured all the roads towards the sources of the Ebro with the utmost diligence, the allies could never have passed the defiles and descended upon Vittoria. They would have marched then by Valmaceda upon Bilbao; but Joseph could by the road of Orduña have met them there, and with his force, increased by Foy's and Sarrut's divisions and the Italians. Meanwhile Clauzel would have come down to Vittoria, and the heaped convoys could have made their way to France in safety.

4th. Having finally resolved to fight at Vittoria, the king should, on the 19th and 20th, have broken some of the bridges on the Zadora, and covered others with field-works to enable him to sally forth upon the attacking army; he should have entrenched the defile of Puebla, and occupied the heights above in strength; his position on the Lower Zadora would then have been formidable. But his greatest fault was in the choice of his line of operation. His reasons for avoiding Guipuscoa were valid; his true line was on the other side, down the Ebro. Zaragoza should have been his base, since Aragon was fertile and more friendly than any other province of Spain. It is true, that by taking this new line of operations he would have abandoned Foy; but that general, reinforced with the reserve from Bayonne, would have had twenty thousand men and the fortress of St. Sebastian as a support, and Wellington must have left a strong corps of observation to watch him. The king's army would have been immediately increased by Clauzel's troops, and ultimately by Suchet's, which would have given him one hundred thousand men to oppose the allied army, weakened as that would have been by the detachment left to watch Foy. And there were political reasons, to be told hereafter; for the reader must not imagine Wellington had got thus far without such trammels, which would have probably rendered this plan so efficacious as to oblige the British army to abandon Spain altogether. Then new combinations would have been made all over Europe, which it is useless to speculate upon.

5th. In the battle the operations of the French, with the exception of Reille's defence of the bridges of Gamara and Ariaga, were a series of errors, the most extraordinary being the suffering Kempt's brigade of the light division, and the hussars, to pass the bridge of Tres Puentes and establish themselves close to the king's line of battle, and upon the flank of his advanced posts at the bridges of Mendoza and Villodas. It is quite clear from this alone, that he decided upon retreating the moment Graham's attack commenced against his right flank, and his position was therefore in his own view untenable. The fitting thing, then, was to have occupied the heights of Puebla strongly, but to have placed the bulk of his infantry by corps, in succession, the right refused, towards Vittoria, while his

cavalry and guns watched the bridges and the mouth of the Puebla defile; in this situation he could have succoured Reille, or marched to his front, according to circumstances, and his retreat would have been secure.

6th. The enormous fault of heaping up the baggage and convoys and parcs behind Vittoria requires no comment; but the king added another and more extraordinary error, namely, the remaining to the last moment undecided as to his line of retreat. Nothing but misfortunes could attend upon such bad dispositions; and that the catastrophe was not more terrible is owing entirely to an error which Wellington and Graham seem alike to have fallen into, namely, that Reille had two divisions in reserve behind the bridges on the Upper Zadora. They knew not that Maucune's division had marched with the convoy, and thought Clauzel had only one division of the army of Portugal with him, whereas he had two, Taupin's and Barbout's. Reille's reserves were composed, not of divisions, but of brigades drawn from La Martiniere's and Sarrut's divisions, which were defending the bridges; and his whole force, including the French-Spaniards, who were driven back from Durana, did not exceed ten thousand infantry and two thousand five-hundred cavalry. Now Graham had, exclusive of Giron's Gallicians, nearly twenty thousand of all arms, and it is said that the river might have been passed both above and below the points of attack; it is certain also that Longa's delay gave the French time to occupy Gamara Mayor in force, which was not the case at first. Had the passage been won in time, very few of the French army could have escaped from the field; but the truth is, Reille fought most vigorously.

7th. As the third and seventh divisions did not come to the point of attack at the time calculated upon, the battle was probably not fought after the original conception of lord Wellington; it is likely that his first project was to force the passage of the bridges, to break the right centre of the enemy from Arinez to Margarita, and then to envelope the left centre with the second, fourth, and light divisions and the cavalry, while the third and seventh divisions pursued the others. But notwithstanding the unavoidable delay, which gave the French time to commence their retreat, it is not easy to understand how Gazan's left escaped from Subijana de Alava, seeing that when Picton broke the centre at Arinez, he was considerably nearer to Vittoria than the French left, which was cut off from the main road and assailed in front by Hill and Cole. The having no cavalry in hand to launch at this time and point of the battle has been already noticed; lord Wellington says, that the country was generally unfavourable for the action of that arm, and it is certain that neither side used it with much effect at any period of the battle; nevertheless, there are always some suitable openings, some happy moments to make a charge, and this seems to have been one which was neglected.

8th. Picton's sudden rush from the bridge of Tres Puentes to the village of Arinez, with one brigade, has been much praised, and certainly nothing could be more prompt and daring; but the merit of the conception belongs to the general in chief, who directed it in person. It was suggested to him by the denuded state of the hill in front of that village, and viewed as a stroke for the occasion, it is to be admired. Yet it had its disadvantages. For the brigade which thus crossed a part of the front of both armies to place itself in advance, not only drew a flank fire from the enemy, but was exposed, if the

French cavalry had been prompt and daring, to a charge in flank; it also prevented the advance of the other troops in their proper arrangement, and thus crowded the centre for the rest of the action. However, these sudden movements cannot be judged by rules; they are bad or good according to the result. This was entirely successful, and the hill thus carried was called the Englishmen's hill, not, as some recent writers have supposed, in commemoration of a victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of a disaster which there befel a part of his army. His battle was fought between Navarrette and Najera, many leagues from Vittoria, and beyond the Ebro; but on this hill the two gallant knights, sir Thomas and sir William Felton, took post with two hundred companions, and being surrounded by Don Tello, with six thousand, all died or were taken after a long, desperate, and heroic resistance.

9th. It has been observed by French writers, and the opinion has been also entertained by many English officers, that after the battle Wellington should

have passed the frontier in mass, and marched upon Bayonne instead of chasing Clauzel and Foy on the right and left; and if, as the same authors assert, Bayonne was not in a state of defence and must have fallen, there can be little question that the criticism is just, because the fugitive French army, having lost all its guns, and being without musket ammunition, could not have faced its pursuers for a moment. But if Bayonne had resisted, and it was impossible for Wellington to suspect its real condition, much mischief might have accrued from such a hasty advance. Foy and Clauzel coming down upon the field of Vittoria, would have driven away if they did not destroy the sixth division; they would have recovered all the trophies; the king's army, returning by Jacca into Aragon, would have reorganized itself from Suchet's depots, and that marshal was actually coming up with his army from Valencia; little would then have been gained by the battle. This question can, however, be more profitably discussed when the great events which followed the battle of Vittoria have been described.

BOOK XXI.

CHAPTER I.

Lord Wellington blockades Pampeluna, besieges San Sebastian—Operations on the eastern coast of Spain—General Elio's misconduct—Sir John Murray sails to attack Tarragona—Colonel Prevot takes St. Felipe de Balaguer—Second siege of Tarragona—Suchet and Maurice Mathieu endeavour to relieve the place—Sir John Murray raises the siege—Embarks with the loss of his guns—Disembarks again at St. Felipe de Balaguer—Lord William Bentinck arrives—Sir John Murray's trial—Observations.

THE fate of Spain was decided at Vittoria, but on the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen Napoleon's genius restored the general balance, and the negotiations which followed those victories affected the war in the Peninsula.

Lord Wellington's first intention was to reduce Pampeluna by force, and the sudden fall of the Pancorbo forts, which opened the great Madrid road, was a favourable event; but Portugal being relinquished as a place of arms, a new base of operations was required, lest a change of fortune should force the allies to return to that country when all the great military establishments were broken up, when the opposition of the native government to British influence was become rancorous, and the public sentiment quite averse to English supremacy. The western Pyrenees, in conjunction with the ocean, offered such a base; yet the harbours were few, and the English general desired to secure a convenient one, near the new positions of the army; wherefore, to reduce San Sebastian was of more immediate importance than to reduce Pampeluna; and it was essential to effect this during the fine season, because the coast was iron-bound and very dangerous in winter.

Pampeluna was strong. A regular attack required three weeks for the bringing up of ordnance and stores, five or six weeks more for the attack, and from fifteen to twenty thousand of the best men, be-

cause British soldiers were wanted for the assault; but an investment could be maintained by fewer and inferior troops, Spaniards and Portuguese, and the enemy's magazines were likely to fail under blockade sooner than his ramparts would crumble under fire. Moreover, on the eastern coast misfortune and disgrace had befallen the English arms. Sir John Murray had failed at Tarragona. He had lost the honoured battering-train intrusted to his charge, and his artillery equipage was supposed to be ruined. The French fortresses in Catalonia and Valencia were numerous, the Anglo-Sicilian army could neither undertake an important siege, nor seriously menace the enemy without obtaining some strong place as a base. Suchet was therefore free to march on Zaragoza, and uniting with Clauzel and Paris, to operate with a powerful mass against the right flank of the allies. For these reasons Wellington finally concluded to blockade Pampeluna and besiege San Sebastian, and the troops, as they returned from the pursuit of Clauzel, marched to form a covering army in the mountains. The peasantry of the vicinity were then employed on the works of the blockade, which was ultimately intrusted to O'Donel's Andalusian reserve.

Confidently did the English general expect the immediate fall of San Sebastian, and he was intent to have it before the negotiations for the armistice in Germany should terminate; but mighty pains and difficulties awaited him, and ere these can be treated of, the progress of the war in other parts, during his victorious march from Portugal to the Pyrenees, must be treated of.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS ON THE EASTERN COAST.

It will be remembered that the duke del Parque was to move from the Sierra Morena, by Almanza,

to join Elio, whose army had been reinforced from Minorca; the united troops were then to act against Suchet, on the Xucar, while sir John Murray sailed to attack Tarragona. Del Parque received his orders the 24th of April, he had long known of the project, and the march was one of twelve days, yet he did not reach his destination until the end of May.

This delay resulted, partly from the bad state of his army, partly from the usual procrastination of Spaniards, partly from the conduct of Elio, whose proceedings, though probably springing from a dislike to serve under Del Parque, created doubts of his own fidelity.

It has been already shown, how, contrary to his agreement with Murray, Elio withdrew his cavalry when Mijares was at Yecla, whence sprung that general's misfortune; how he placed the regiment of Velez Malaga in Villena, a helpless prey for Suchet: how he left the Anglo-Sicilian army to fight the battle of Castalla unaided. He now persuaded Del Parque to move towards Utiel instead of Almanza, and to send a detachment under Mijares to Requena, thereby threatening Suchet's right, but exposing the Spanish army to a sudden blow, and disobeying his instructions, which prescribed a march by Almanza.

This false movement Elio represented as Del Parque's own; but the latter, when Murray remonstrated, quickly approached Catalla by Jumilla, declaring his earnest desire to obey Wellington's orders. The divergence of his former march had, however, already placed him in danger; his left flank was so exposed, while coming by Jumilla, that Murray postponed his own embarkation to concert with Elio a combined operation, from Biar and Sax, against Fuente de la Higuera, where Suchet's troops were lying in wait. Previous to this epoch Elio had earnestly urged the English general to disregard Del Parque altogether and embark at once for Tarragona, and undertaking himself to secure the junction with his fellow-commander. And now, after agreeing to co-operate with Murray, he secretly withdrew his cavalry from Sax, sent Whittingham in a false direction, placed Roche without support at Alcoy, retired himself to the city of Murcia, and at the same time one of his regiments quartered at Alicante fired upon a British guard. Roche was attacked and lost eighty men, and Del Parque's flank was menaced from Fuente de la Higuera; but the British cavalry, assembling at Biar, secured his communication with Murray on the 25th, and the 27th the Anglo-Sicilians broke up from their quarters to embark at Alicante.

The French were now very strong. Suchet, unmolested for forty days after the battle of Castalla, had improved his defensive works, chased the bands from his rear, called up his reinforcements, rehoused his cavalry and artillery, and prepared for new operations, without losing the advantage of foraging the fertile districts immediately in front of Xucar. On the other hand lord William Bentinck, alarmed by intelligence of an intended descent upon Sicily, had recalled more British troops; and as Whittingham's cavalry, and Roche's division, were left at Alicante, the force actually embarked to attack Tarragona, including a fresh English regiment from Carthagena, scarcely exceeded fourteen thousand present under arms. Of these, less than eight thousand were British or German, and the horsemen were only seven hundred. Yet the armament was formidable, for the battering train was complete and powerful, the materials for gabions and fascines previously collected at Yvica, and the naval squadron, under admiral Hallowel, consisted of several line-of-battle ships, frigates, bomb-vessels and gun-boats, besides the transports. There was, however, no cordiality between

general Clinton and Murray, nor between the latter and his quartermaster-general, Donkin, nor between Donkin and the admiral; subordinate officers, also, in both services, adopting false notions, some from vanity, some from hearsay, added to the uneasy feeling which prevailed amongst the chiefs. Neither admiral nor general seem to have had sanguine hopes of success even at the moment of embarkation, and there was in no quarter a clear understanding of lord Wellington's able plan for the operations.

While Del Parque's army was yet in march, Suchet, if he had no secret understanding with Elio or any of his officers, must have been doubtful of the allies' intentions, although the strength of the battering train at Alicante indicated some siege of importance. He, however, recalled Pannetier's brigade from the frontier of Aragon, and placed it on the road to Tortosa; and at the same time, knowing Clauzel was then warring down the partidas in Navarre, he judged Aragon safe, and drew Severoli's Italian brigade from thence, leaving only the garrisons, and a few thousand men under general Paris as a reserve at Zaragoza: and this was the reason the army of Aragon did not co-operate to crush Mina after his defeat by Clauzel in the valley of Roncal. Decaen also sent some reinforcements; wherefore, after completing his garrisons, Suchet could furnish the drafts required by Napoleon, and yet bring twenty thousand men into the field. He was, however, very unquiet, and notwithstanding Clauzel's operations, in fear for his troops in Aragon, where Paris had been attacked by Goyan, even in Zaragoza; moreover, now, for the first time since its subjugation, an unfriendly feeling was perceptible in Valencia.

On the 31st of May, Murray sailed from Alicante. Suchet immediately ordered Pannetier's brigade to close towards Tortosa, but kept his own positions in front of Valencia until the fleet was seen to pass the Grao with a fair wind. Then, feeling assured the expedition aimed at Catalonia, he prepared to aid that principality; but the column of succour being drawn principally from the camp of Xativa, forty miles from Valencia, he could not quit the latter before the 7th of June. He took with him nine thousand men of all arms, leaving Harispe on the Xucar, with seven thousand infantry and cavalry, exclusive of Severoli's troops, which were in full march from Teruel. Meanwhile sir John Murray's armament, having very favourable weather, anchored on the evening of the 2nd, in the bay of Tarragona, whence five ships of war under captain Adam, and two battalions of infantry with some guns under colonel Prevot, were detached to attack San Felipe de Balaguer.

The strength and value of this fort arose from its peculiar position. The works, garrisoned by a hundred men, were only sixty feet square, but the site was a steep isolated rock, standing in the very gorge of a pass, and blocking the only carriage-way from Tortosa to Tarragona. The mountains on either hand, although commanding the fort, were nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labour was required to form the batteries.

Prevot, landing on the 3rd, was joined by a Spanish brigade of Copon's army, and in concert with the navy immediately commenced operations by placing two six-pounders on the heights south of the pass, from whence at six or seven hundred yards' distance they threw shrapnel-shells; but this projectile is, when used with guns of small calibre, insignificant save as a round shot.

On the 4th, two twelve-pounders and a howitzer, being brought to the same point by the sailors, open-

ed their fire, and at night the seamen with extraordinary exertions dragged up five twenty-four-pounders and their stores. The troops then constructed one battery, for two howitzers, on the slope of the grand ridge to the northward of the pass, and a second, for four heavy guns, on the rock where the fort stood at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. To form these batteries, earth was carried from below, and every thing else, even water, brought from the ships, though the landing-place was more than a mile and a half off. Hence, as the time was valuable, favourable terms were offered to the garrison, but the offer was refused. The 5th, the fire was continued, but with slight success, the howitzer battery on the great ridge was relinquished, and at night a very violent storm retarded the construction of the breaching batteries. Previous to this, colonel Prevot had warned Murray, that his means were insufficient, and a second Spanish brigade was sent to him. Yet the breaching batteries were still incomplete on the 6th, so severe was the labour of carrying up the guns, and out of three, already mounted, one was disabled by a shot from the fort.

Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortosa, had ordered the governor of that place to succour San Felipe. He tried, and would undoubtedly have succeeded, if captain Peyton of the Thames frigate, had not previously obtained from admiral Hallowell two eight-inch mortars, which being placed just under the fort and worked by Mr. James of the marine artillery, commencing at daybreak on the 7th, soon exploded a small magazine in the fort, whereupon the garrison surrendered. The besiegers, who had lost about fifty men and officers, then occupied the place, and, meanwhile, sir John Murray had commenced the

SECOND SIEGE OF TARRAGONA.

Although the fleet cast anchor in the bay on the evening of the 2d, the surf prevented the disembarkation of the troops until the next day. The rampart of the lower town had been destroyed by Suchet, but Fort Royal remained, and though in bad condition, served, together with the ruins of the San Carlos bastion, to cover the western front, which was the weakest line of defence. The governor, Bertolotti, an Italian, was supposed by Murray to be disaffected, but he proved himself a loyal and energetic officer; and his garrison, sixteen hundred strong, five hundred being privateer seamen and Franco-Spaniards, served him well.

The Olivo and Loretto heights were occupied the first day by Clinton's and Whittingham's divisions, the other troops remained on the low ground about the Francoli river; the town was then bombarded during the night by the navy, but the fire was sharply returned, and the flotilla suffered the most. The next day two batteries were commenced six hundred yards from San Carlos, and nine hundred yards from Fort Royal. They opened the 6th, but being too distant to produce much effect, a third was commenced six hundred yards from Fort Royal. The 8th, a practicable breach was made in that outwork, yet the assault was deferred, and some pieces removed to play from the Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. The subsequent proceedings cannot be understood without an accurate knowledge of the relative positions of the French and allied armies.

Tarragona, though situated on one of a cluster of heights which terminate a range descending from the northward to the sea, is, with the exception of that range, surrounded by an open country called the

Campo de Tarragona, which is again environed by very rugged mountains, through which the several roads descend into the plain.

Westward there were only two carriage ways, one direct, by the Col de Balaguer to Tarragona; the other circuitous, leading by Mora, Falcet, Monblanc and Reus. The first was blocked by the taking of San Felipe; the second, although used by Suchet for his convoys during the French siege of Tarragona, was now in bad order, and at best only available for small mountain guns.

Northward there was a carriage way, leading from Lerida, which united with that from Falcet at Monblanc.

Eastward there was the royal causeway, coming from Barcelona, through Villa Franca, Arbos, Vendrils, and Torredembarra; this road, after passing Villa Franca, sends off two branches to the right, one passing through the Col de Cristina, the other through Masarbones and Col de Leibra, leading upon Braffin and Valls. It was by the latter branch that Macdonald passed to Reus in 1810; he had, however, no guns or carriages, and his whole army laboured to make the way practicable.

Between these various roads the mountains were too rugged to permit any direct cross communications; and troops, coming from different sides, could only unite in the Campo de Tarragona, now occupied by the allies. Wherefore, as Murray had, including sergeants, above fifteen thousand fighting men, and Copons, reinforced with two regiments sent by sea from Coruña, was at Reus with six thousand regulars besides the irregular division of Manso, twenty-five thousand combatants were in possession of the French point of junction.

The Catalans, after Lacy's departure, had, with the aid of captain Adam's ship, destroyed two small forts at Perillo and Ampolla, and Eroles had blockaded San Felipe de Balaguer for thirty-six days; but it was then succoured by Maurice Mathieu; and the success at Perillo was more than balanced by a check which Sarsfield received on the 3rd of April, from some of Pannetier's troops. The partida warfare had, however, been more active in Upper Catalonia, and Copons claimed two considerable victories, one gained by himself on the 17th of May, at La Bispal, near the Col de Cristina, where he boasted to have beaten six thousand French with half their numbers, destroying six hundred, as they returned from succouring San Felipe de Balaguer. In the other, won by colonel Lander near Olot on the 7th of May, it was said twelve hundred of Lamarque's men fell.

These exploits are by French writers called skirmishes, and the following description of the Catalan army, given to sir John Murray by Cabanes, the chief of Copons' staff, renders the French version the most credible.

"We do not," said that officer, "exceed nine or ten thousand men, extended on different points of a line running from the neighbourhood of Reus along the high mountains to the vicinity of Olot. The soldiers are brave, but without discipline, without subordination, without clothing, without artillery, without ammunition, without magazines, without money, and without means of transport!"

Copons himself, when he came down to the Campo, very frankly told Murray, that as his troops could only fight in position, he would not join in any operation which endangered his retreat into the high mountains. However, with the exception of twelve hundred men left at Vich under Eroles, all his forces, the best perhaps in Spain, were now at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to intercept the communications of the different French corps, and to har-

ass their marches if they should descend into the Campo. Murray could also calculate upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to aid him in pushing on the works of the siege, or in a battle near the shore; and he expected three thousand additional troops from Sicily. Sir Edward Pellew, commanding the great Mediterranean fleet, had promised to divert the attention of the French troops by a descent eastward of Barcelona, and the armies of Del Parque and Elio were to make a like diversion westward of Tortosa. Finally, a general raising of the somatenes might have been effected, and those mountaineers were all at Murray's disposal, to procure intelligence, to give timely notice of the enemy's approach, or to impede his march by breaking up the roads.

On the French side there was greater but more scattered power. Suchet had marched with nine thousand men from Valencia, and what with Panne-tier's brigade and some spare troops from Tortosa, eleven or twelve thousand men with artillery might have come to the succour of Tarragona from that side, if the sudden fall of San Felipe de Balaguer had not barred the only carriage way on the westward. A movement by Mora, Falcet, and Monblanc, remained open, yet it would have been tedious, and the disposable troops at Lerida were few. To the eastward, therefore, the garrison looked for the first succour. Maurice Mathieu, reinforced with a brigade from Upper Catalonia, could bring seven thousand men with artillery from Barcelona, and Decaen could move from the Ampurdan with an equal number; hence twenty-five thousand men might finally bear upon the allied army.

But Suchet, measuring from the Xucar, had more than one hundred and sixty miles to march; Maurice Mathieu was to collect his forces from various places and march seventy miles after Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at all, until Tarragona was actually besieged, lest the allies should reembark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had in like manner to look to the security of the Ampurdan, and he was one hundred and thirty miles distant. Wherefore, however active the French generals might be, the English general could calculate upon ten days' clear operations, after investment, before even the heads of the enemy's columns, coming from different quarters, could issue from the hills bordering the Campo. Some expectation also he might have, that Suchet would endeavour to cripple Del Parque, before he marched to the succour of Tarragona; and it was in his favour, that eastward and westward, the royal causeway was in places exposed to the fire of the naval squadron. The experience of captain Codrington during the first siege of Tarragona; had proved indeed, that an army could not be stopped by this fire, yet it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation. Thus the advantage of a central position; the possession of the enemy's point of junction, the initial movement, the good will of the people, and the aid of powerful flank diversions, belonged to Murray; superior numbers and a better army to the French, since the allies, brave and formidable to fight in a position, were not well constituted for general operations.

Tarragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, was a weak place. A simple revêtement three feet and a half thick, without ditch or counterscarps, covered it on the west; the two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, were not armed, nor even repaired until after the investment, and the garrison, too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed with labour. Here then, time being precious to both sides, ordin-

ary rules should have been set aside and daring operations adopted. Lord Wellington had judged ten thousand men sufficient to take Tarragona. Murray brought seventeen thousand, of which fourteen thousand were effective. To do this he had, he said, so reduced his equipments, stores, and means of land transport, that his army could not move from the shipping; he was yet so unready for the siege, that Fort Royal was not stormed on the 8th, because the engineer was unprepared to profit from a successful assault.

This excuse, founded on the scarcity of stores, was not, however, borne out by facts. The equipments left behind, were only draft animals and commissariat field-stores; the thing wanting was vigour in the general, and this was made manifest in various ways. Copons, like all regular Spanish officers, was averse to calling out the somatenes, and Murray did not press the matter. Suchet took San Felipe de Balaguer by escalade. Murray attacked in form, and without sufficient means; for if captain Peyton had not brought up the mortars, which was an after-thought extraneous to the general's arrangements, the fort could not have been reduced before succour arrived from Tortosa. Indeed the surrender was scarcely creditable to the French commandant, for his works were uninjured, and only a small part of his powder destroyed. It is also said, I believe truly, that one of the officers employed to regulate the capitulation had in his pocket, an order from Murray to raise the siege and embark, spiking the guns! At Tarragona, the troops on the low ground, did not approach so near, by three hundred yards, as they might have done; and the outworks should have been stormed at once, as Wellington stormed Fort Francisco at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. Fort Francisco was a good outwork, and complete. The outworks of Tarragona were incomplete, ill-flanked, without palisades or casements, and their fall would have enabled the besiegers to form a parallel against the body of the place, as Suchet had done in the former siege; a few hours' firing would then have brought down the wall, and a general assault might have been delivered. The French had stormed a similar breach in that front, although defended by eight thousand Spanish troops, and the allies, opposed by only sixteen hundred French and Italians, soldiers and seamen, were in some measure bound by honour to follow that example, since colonel Skerrett, at the former siege, refused to commit twelve hundred British troops in the place on the special ground that it was indefensible, though so strongly garrisoned. Murray's troops were brave, they had been acting together for nearly a year; and after the fight at Castalla had become so eager, that an Italian regiment, which at Alicante, was ready to go over bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal. This confidence was not shared by their general. Even at the moment of victory, he had resolved, if Suchet advanced a second time, to relinquish the position of Castalla and retire to Alicante!

It is clear, that, up to the 8th, sir John Murray's proceedings were ill-judged, and his after-operations were more injudicious.

As early as the 5th, false reports had made Suchet reach Tortosa, and had put two thousand French in movement from Lerida. Murray then openly avowed his alarm and his regret at having left Alicante; yet he proceeded to construct two heavy counter-batteries near the Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls in observation of the Lerida road, and desired Manso to watch that of Barcelona.

On the 9th, his emissaries said the French were

coming from the east, and from the west; and would when united, exceed twenty thousand. Murray immediately sought an interview with the admiral, declaring his intention to raise the siege; his views were changed during the conference, but he was discontented; and the two commanders were now evidently at variance, for Hallowel refused to join in a summons to the governor, and his flotilla again bombarded the place.

The 10th, the spies in Barcelona gave notice that eight or ten thousand French with fourteen guns, would march from that city the next day. Copons immediately joined Manso and Murray, as if he now disdained his enemy, continued to disembark stores, landed several mortars, armed the batteries at the Olivo, and on the 11th opened their fire, in concert with that from the ships of war.

This was the first serious attack, and the English general, professing a wish to fight the column coming from Barcelona, sent the cavalry under lord Frederick Bentinck to Altafalla, and in person sought a position of battle to the eastward. He left orders to storm the outworks that night, but returned, before the hour appointed, extremely disturbed by intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at Villa Franca with eight thousand combatants, and Suchet closing upon the Col De Balaguer. The infirmity of his mind was now apparent to the whole army. At eight o'clock he repeated his order to assault the outworks; at ten o'clock the storming party was in the dry bed of the Francoli, awaiting the signal, when a countermand arrived; the siege was then to be raised and the guns removed immediately from the Olivo; the commander of the artillery remonstrated, and the general then promised to hold the batteries until the next night. Meanwhile, the detachment at Valls and the cavalry at Altafalla were called in without any notice to general Copons, though he depended on their support.

The park and all the heavy guns of the batteries on the low grounds were removed to the beach for embarkation on the morning of the 12th, and at twelve o'clock lord Frederick Bentinck arrived from Altafalla with the cavalry. It is said he was ordered to shoot his horses; but refused to obey, and moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The detachment from Valls arrived next, and the infantry marched to Cape Salou to embark, but the horsemen followed lord Frederick, and were themselves followed by fourteen pieces of artillery; each body moved independently, and all was confused, incoherent, afflicting, and dishonourable to the British arms.

While the seamen were embarking the guns, the quartermaster-general came down to the beach, with orders to abandon that business and collect boats for the reception of troops, the enemy being supposed close at hand; and notwithstanding Murray's promise to hold the Olivo until nightfall, fresh directions were given to spike the guns there, and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose on every side, and from both services; army and navy were alike indignant, and so excited, that it is said personal insult was offered to the general. Three staff-officers repaired in a body to Murray's quarters, to offer plans and opinions, and the admiral, who it would appear did not object to raising the siege, but to the manner of doing it, would not suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation of artillery. He even urged an attack upon the column coming from Barcelona, and opposed the order to spike the guns at the Olivo, offering to be responsible for carrying all clear off during the night.

Thus pressed, Murray again wavered. Denying that he had ordered the battering pieces to be spiked,

he sent counter-orders, and directed a part of Clinton's troops to advance towards the Gaya river. Yet a few hours afterwards he reverted to his former resolution, and peremptorily renewed the order for the artillery to spike the guns on the Olivo, and burn the carriages. Nor was even this unhappy action performed without confusion. The different orders received by Clinton in the course of the day had indicated the extraordinary vacillation of the commander-in-chief, and Clinton himself, forgetful of his own arrangements, with an obsolete courtesy, took off his hat to salute an enemy's battery which had fired upon him; but this waving of his hat from that particular spot was also the conventional signal for the artillery to spike the guns, and they were thus spiked prematurely. The troops were, however, all embarked in the night of the 12th, and many of the stores and horses were shipped on the 13th, without the slightest interruption from the enemy; but eighteen or nineteen battering pieces, whose carriages had been burned, were, with all the platforms, fascines, gabions, and small ammunition, in view of the fleet and army, triumphantly carried into the fortress. Sir J. Murray, meanwhile, seemingly unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on the evening of the 12th, and took his usual repose in bed.

While the English general was thus precipitately abandoning the siege, the French generals, unable to surmount the obstacles opposed to their junction, unable even to communicate by their emissaries, were despairing of the safety of Tarragona. Suchet did not reach Tortosa before the 10th, but a detachment from the garrison, had on the 8th, attempted to succour San Felipe, and nearly captured the naval captain Adam, colonel Prevot, and other officers, who were examining the country. On the other side Maurice Mathieu, having gathered troops from various places, reached Villa Franca early on the 10th, and deceiving even his own people as to his numbers, gave out that Decaen, whom he really expected, was close behind with a powerful force. To give effect to this policy, he drove Copons from Arbos on the 11th, and his scouting parties entered Vendrils, as if he was resolved singly to attack Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had, however, landed his marines at Rosas, which arrested Decaen's march; and Maurice Mathieu, alarmed at the cessation of fire about Tarragona, knowing nothing of Suchet's movements, and too weak to fight the allies alone, fell back in the night of the 12th to the Llobregat, his main body never having passed Villa Franca.

Suchet's operations to the westward were even less decisive. His advanced guard under Pannetier, reached Perillo the 10th. The 11th, not hearing from his spies, he caused Pannetier to pass by his left over the mountains through Valdillos to some heights which terminate abruptly on the Campo, above Monroig. The 12th, that officer reached the extreme verge of the hills, being then about twenty-five miles from Tarragona. His patrols descending into the plains, met with lord Frederick Bentinck's troopers, reported that Murray's whole army was at hand, wherefore he would not enter the Campo, but at night he kindled large fires to encourage the garrison of Tarragona. These signals were however unobserved, the country people had disappeared, no intelligence could be procured, and Suchet could not follow him with a large force into those wild desert hills, where there was no water. Thus on both sides of Tarragona the succouring armies were quite baffled at the moment chosen by Murray for flight.

Suchet now received alarming intelligence from Valencia; yet still anxious for Tarragona, he pushed,

on the 14th, along the coast-road towards San Felipe de Balaguer, thinking to find Prevot's division alone; but the head of his column was suddenly cannonaded by the Thames frigate, and he was wonderfully surprised to see the whole British fleet anchored off San Felipe, and disembarking troops. Murray's operations were indeed as irregular as those of a partisan, yet without partisan vigour. He had heard in the night of the 12th, from colonel Prevot, of Pannetier's march to Monroig, and to protect the cavalry and guns under lord Frederick Bentinck, sent M'Kenzie's division by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with the whole army on the 14th. M'Kenzie drove back the French posts on both sides of the pass, the embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then commenced, and Suchet, still uncertain if Tarragona had fallen, moved towards Valldillos to bring off Pannetier.

At this precise period, Murray heard that Maurice Mathieu's column, which he always erroneously supposed to be under Decaen, had retired to the Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and that Tarragona had not been reinforced. Elated by this information, he revolved various projects in his mind, at one time thinking to fall upon Suchet, at another to cut off Pannetier, now resolving to march upon Cambrils, and even to menace Tarragona again by land; then he was for sending a detachment by sea to surprise the latter, but finally he disembarked his whole force on the 15th, and being ignorant of Suchet's last movement, decided to strike at Pannetier. In this view, he detached M'Kenzie, by a rugged valley leading from the eastward, to Valldillos, and that officer reached it on the 16th; but Suchet had already carried off Pannetier's brigade, and the next day the British detachment was recalled by Murray, who now only thought of reembarking.

This determination was caused by a fresh alarm from the eastward; for Maurice Mathieu, whose whole proceedings evinced both skill and vigour, nearing that the siege of Tarragona was raised, and the allies relanded at the Col de Balaguer, retraced his steps and boldly entered Cambrils the 17th. On that day, however, M'Kenzie returned, and Murray's whole army was thus concentrated in the pass. Suchet was then behind Perillo, Copons at Reus, having come there at Murray's desire to attack Maurice Mathieu, and the latter would have suffered, if the English general had been capable of a vigorous stroke. On the other hand, it was fortunate for M'Kenzie that Suchet, too anxious for Valencia, disregarded his movement upon Valldillos; but taught, by the disembarkation of the whole English army, that the fate of Tarragona, whether for good or evil, was decided, he had sent an emissary to Maurice Mathieu on the 16th, and then retired to Perillo and Amposta. He reached the latter place the 17th, attentive only to the movement of the fleet, and, meanwhile, Maurice Mathieu endeavoured to surprise the Catalans at Reus.

Copons was led into this danger by sir John Murray, who had desired him to harass Maurice Mathieu's rear, with a view to a general attack, and then changed his plan without giving the Spanish general any notice. However, he escaped. The French moved upon Tarragona, and Murray was left free to embark or to remain at the Col de Balaguer. He called a council of war, and it was concluded to reembark, but at that moment, the great Mediterranean fleet appeared in the offing, and admiral Hallowell, observing a signal announcing lord William Bentinck's arrival, answered with more promptitude than propriety, "*We are all delighted.*"

Sir John Murray's command having thus termina-

ted, the general discontent rendered it impossible to avoid a public investigation, yet the difficulty of holding a court in Spain, and some disposition at home to shield him, caused great delay. He was at last tried in England. Acquitted of two charges, on the third he was declared guilty of an error in judgment, and sentenced to be admonished; but even that slight mortification was not inflicted.

This decision does not preclude the judgment of history, nor will it sway that of posterity. The court-martial was assembled twenty months after the event, when the war being happily terminated, men's minds were little disposed to treat past failures with severity. There were two distinct prosecutors, having different views; the proceedings were conducted at a distance from the scene of action, defects of memory could not be remedied by references to localities, and a door was opened for contradiction and doubt upon important points. There was no indication that the members of the court were unanimous in their verdict; they were confined to specific charges, restricted by legal rules of evidence, and deprived of the testimony of all the Spanish officers, who were certainly discontented with Murray's conduct, and whose absence caused the serious charge of abandoning Copons' army to be suppressed. Moreover, the warmth of temper displayed by the principal prosecutor, admiral Hallowell, together with his signal on lord William Bentinck's arrival, whereby, to the detriment of discipline, he manifested his contempt for the general with whom he was acting, gave Murray an advantage which he improved skilfully, for he was a man sufficiently acute and prompt when not at the head of an army. He charged the admiral with deceit, factious dealings, and disregard of the service; described him as a man of a passionate, overweening, busy disposition, troubled with excess of vanity, meddling with every thing, and thinking himself competent to manage both troops and ships.

Nevertheless, sir John Murray had signally failed, both as an independent general, and as a lieutenant acting under superior orders. On his trial, blending these different capacities together, with expert sophistry he pleaded his instructions in excuse for his errors as a free commander, and his discretionary power in mitigation of his disobedience as a lieutenant; but his operations were indefensible in both capacities. Lord Wellington's instructions, precise, and founded upon the advantages offered by a command of the sea, prescribed an attack upon Tarragona, with a definite object, namely, to deliver Valencia.

"You tell me," said he, "that the line of the Xucar, which covers Valencia, is too strong to force; turn it then by the ocean, assail the rear of the enemy, and he will weaken his strong line to protect his communication; or, he will give you an opportunity to establish a new base of operations behind him."

This plan, however, demanded promptness and energy, and Murray possessed neither. The weather was so favourable, that a voyage which might have consumed nine or ten days, was performed in two, the Spanish troops punctually effected their junction, the initial operations were secured, Fort Balaguer fell, the French moved from all sides to the succour of Tarragona, the line of the Xucar was weakened, the diversion was complete. In the night of the 12th, the bulk of Murray's army was again afloat, a few hours would have sufficed to embark the cavalry at the Col de Balaguer, and the whole might have sailed for the city of Valencia, while Suchet's advanced guard was still on the hills above Monroig, and he, still uncertain as to the fate of Tarragona,

one hundred and fifty miles from the Xucar. In fine, Murray had failed to attain the first object pointed out by Wellington's instructions, but the second was within his reach; instead of grasping it, he loitered about the Col de Balaguer, and gave Suchet, as we shall find, time to reach Valencia again.

Now whether the letter or the spirit of Wellington's instructions be considered, there was here a manifest dereliction on the part of Murray. What was that officer's defence? That no specific period being named for his return to Valencia, he was entitled to exercise his discretion! Did he then as an independent general perform any useful or brilliant action to justify his delay? No! his tale was one of loss and dishonour! The improvident arrangements for the siege of San Felipe de Balaguer, and the unexpected fortune which saved him from the shame of abandoning his guns there also have been noted; and it has been shown, that when the gain of time was the great element of success, he neither urged Copons to break up the roads, or pushed the siege of Tarragona with vigour. The feeble formality of this latter operation has indeed been imputed to the engineer Major Thackary, yet unjustly so. It was the part of that officer to form a plan of attack agreeable to the rules of art, it might be a bold or a cautious plan, and many persons did think Tarragona was treated by him with too much respect; but it was the part of the commander-in-chief to decide if the general scheme of operations required a deviation from the regular course. The untrammelled engineer could then have displayed his genius. Sir John Murray made no sign. His instructions and his ultimate views were withheld alike, from his naval colleague, from his second in command, and from his quartermaster-general; and while the last-named functionary was quite shut out from the confidence of his commander, the admiral, and many others, both of the army and navy, imagined him to be the secret author of the proceedings which were hourly exciting their indignation. Murray, however, declared on his trial, that he had rejected general Donkin's advice, an avowal consonant to facts, since that officer urged him to raise the siege on the 9th, and had even told him where four hundred draught bullocks were to be had, to transport his heavy artillery. On the 12th, he opposed the spiking of the guns, and urged Murray to drag them to Cape Salou, of which place he had given as early as the third day of the siege, a military plan, marking a position, strong in itself, covering several landing places, and capable of being flanked on both sides by the ships of war: it had no drawback save a scarcity of water, yet there were some springs, and the fleet would have supplied the deficiency.

It is true that Donkin, unacquainted with Wellington's instructions, and having at Castalla seen no reason to rely on sir John Murray's military vigour, was averse to the enterprise against Tarragona. He thought the allies should have worked Suchet out of Valencia by operating on his right flank. And so Wellington would have thought, if he had only looked at their numbers and not at their quality; he had even sketched such a plan for Murray, if the attack upon Tarragona should be found impracticable. But he knew the Spaniards too well, to like such combinations for an army, two-thirds of which were of that nation, and not even under one head; an army, ill-equipped, and with the exception of Del Parque's troops, unused to active field operations. Wherefore calculating their power with remarkable nicety, he preferred the sea-flank, and the aid of an English fleet.

Here it may be observed, that Napoleon's plan of

invasion did not embrace the coast-lines where they could be avoided. It was an obvious disadvantage to give the British navy opportunities of acting against his communications. The French, indeed, seized Santona and St. Ander in the Bay of Biscay, because, these being the only good ports on that coast, the English ships were thus in a manner shut out from the north of Spain. They likewise worked their invasion by the Catalanian and Valencian coast, because the only roads practicable for artillery run along that sea-line; but their general scheme was to hold, with large masses, the interior of the country, and keep their communications aloof from the danger of combined operations by sea and land. The providence of the plan was proved by Suchet's peril on this occasion.

Sir John Murray, when tried, grounded his justification on the following points:—1st. That he did not know with any certainty until the night of the 11th, that Suchet was near;—2d. That the fall of Tarragona being the principal object, and the drawing of the French from Valencia the accessory, he persisted in the siege because he expected reinforcements from Sicily, and desired to profit from the accidents of war;—3d. That looking only to the second object, the diversion would have been incomplete, if the siege had been raised sooner, or even relaxed; hence the landing of guns and stores after he despaired of success;—4th. That he dared not risk a battle to save his battering train, because Wellington would not pardon a defeat. Now had he adopted a vigorous plan, or persisted until the danger of losing his army was apparent, and then made a quick return to Valencia, this defence would have been plausible, though inconclusive. But when every order, every movement, every expression, discovered his infirmity of purpose, his pleading can only be regarded as the subtle tale of an advocate.

The fault was not so much in the raising of the siege as in the manner of doing it, and in the feebleness of the attack. For, first, however numerous the chances of war are, fortresses expecting succour do not surrender without being vigorously assailed. The arrival of reinforcements from Sicily was too uncertain for reasonable calculation; and it was scarcely possible for the governor of Tarragona, while closely invested, to discover that no fresh stores or guns were being landed; still less could he judge so timeously of Murray's final intention by that fact, so to advertise Suchet that Tarragona was in no danger. Neither were the spies, if any were in the allies' camp, more capable of drawing such conclusions, seeing that sufficient artillery and stores for the siege were landed the first week. And the landing of more guns could not have deceived them, when the feeble operations of the general, and the universal discontent, furnished surer guides for their reports.

Murray designed to raise the siege as early as the 9th, and only deferred it, after seeing the admiral, from his natural vacillation. It was therefore mere casuistry to say, that he first obtained certain information of Suchet's advance on the night of the 11th. On the 8th and 10th, through various channels, he knew the French marshal was in march for Tortosa, and that his advanced guard menaced the Col de Balaguer. The approach of Maurice Mathieu on the other side was also known; he should, therefore, have been prepared to raise the siege without the loss of his guns on the 12th. Why were they lost at all? They could not be saved, he said, without risking a battle in a bad position, and Wellington had declared he would not pardon a defeat! This was the after-thought of a sophister, and not warranted

by Wellington's instructions, which on that head, referred only to the duke del Parque and Elío.

But was it necessary to fight a battle in a bad position to save the guns? all persons admitted that they could have been embarked before mid-day on the 13th. Pannetier was then at Monroig, Suchet still behind Perillo, Maurice Mathieu falling back from Villa Franca. The French on each side were therefore respectively thirty-six and thirty-four miles distant on the night of the 12th, and their point of junction was Reus. Yet how form that junction? The road from Villa Franca by the Col de Cristina was partially broken up by Copons, the road from Perillo to Reus was always impracticable for artillery, and from the latter place to Tarragona was six miles of very rugged country. The allies were in possession of the point of junction, Maurice Mathieu was retiring, not advancing. And if the French could have marched thirty-four and thirty-six miles, through the mountains, in one night, and been disposed to attack in the morning without artillery, they must still have ascertained the situation of Murray's army; they must have made arrangements to watch Copons, Manso, and Prevot, who would have been on their rear and flanks; they must have formed an order of battle and decided upon the mode of attack before they advanced. It is true that their junction at Reus would have forced Murray to suspend his embarkation to fight; but not, as he said, in a bad position, with his back to the beach, where the ships' guns could not aid him, and where he might expect a dangerous surf for days. The naval officers denied the danger from surf at that season of the year; and it was not right to destroy the guns and stores when the enemy was not even in march for Reus. Coolness and consideration would have enabled Murray to see that there was no danger. In fact no emissaries escaped from the town, and the enemy had no spies in the camp, since no communication took place between the French columns until the 17th. On the 15th, Suchet knew nothing of the fate of Tarragona.

The above reasoning leaves out the possibility of profiting from a central position to fall with superior forces upon one of the French columns. It supposes, however, that accurate information was possessed by the French generals; that Maurice Mathieu was as strong as he pretended to be, Suchet eager and resolute to form a junction with him. But in truth Suchet knew not what to do after the fall of Fort Balaguer, Maurice Mathieu had less than seven thousand men of all arms, he was not followed by Decaen, and he imagined the allies to have twenty thousand men, exclusive of the Catalans. Besides which the position at Cape Salou was only six miles distant, and Murray might, with the aid of the draft bullocks discovered by Donkin, have dragged all his heavy guns there, still maintaining the investment; he might have shipped his battering train, and when the enemy approached Reus, have marched to the Col de Balaguer, where he could, as he afterwards did, embark or disembark in the presence of the enemy. The danger of a flank march, Suchet being at Reus, could not have deterred him, because he did send his cavalry and field artillery by that very road on the 12th, when the French advanced guard was at Monroig, and actually skirmished with lord Frederick Bentinck. Finally, he could have embarked his main body, leaving a small corps with some cavalry to keep the garrison in check and bring off his guns. Such a detachment, together with the heavy guns, would have been afloat in a couple of hours, and on board the ships in four hours; it could have embarked on

the open beach, or, if fearful of being molested by the garrison, might have marched to Cape Salou, or to the Col de Balaguer; and if the guns had thus been lost, the necessity would have been apparent, and the dishonour lessened. It is clear therefore that there was no military need to sacrifice the battering pieces. And those were the guns that shook the bloody ramparts of Badajos!

Wellington felt their loss keenly; sir John Murray spoke of them lightly: "They were of small value, old iron! he attached little importance to the sacrifice of artillery, it was his principle, he had approved of colonel Adam losing his guns at Biar, and he had also desired colonel Prevot, if pressed, to abandon his battering train before the fort of Balaguer . . . Such doctrine might appear strange to a British army, but it was the rule with the continental armies, and the French owed much of their successes to the adoption of it."

Strange indeed! Great commanders have risked their own lives, and sacrificed their bravest men, charging desperately in person, to retrieve even a single piece of cannon in a battle. They knew the value of moral force in war, and that of all the various springs and levers on which it depends military honour is the most powerful. No! it was not to the adoption of such a doctrine, that the French owed their great successes. It was to the care with which Napoleon fostered and cherished a contrary feeling. Sir John Murray's argument would have been more pungent, more complete, if he had lost his colours, and pleaded that they were only wooden staves, bearing old pieces of silk!

CHAPTER II.

Danger of Sicily—Averted by Murat's secret defection from the emperor—Lord William Bentinck reembarks—His design of attacking the city of Valencia frustrated—Del Parque is defeated on the Xucar—The Anglo-Sicilians disembark at Alicante—Suchet prepares to attack the allies—Prevented by the battle of Vittoria—Abandons Valencia—Marches towards Zaragoza—Clauzel retreats to France—Paris evacuates Zaragoza—Suchet retires to Tarragona—Miner the walls—Lord William Bentinck passes the Ebro—Secures the Col de Balaguer—Invests Tarragona—Partial insurrection in Upper Catalonia—Combat of Salud—Del Parque joins lord William Bentinck who projects an attack upon Suchet's cantonnements—Suchet concentrates his army—Is joined by Decaen—Advances—The allies retreat to the mountains—Del Parque invests Tortosa—His rear-guard attacked by the garrison while passing the Ebro—Suchet blows up the walls of Tarragona—Lord William desires to besiege Tortosa—Hears that Suchet has detached troops—Sends Del Parque's army to join lord Wellington—Advances to Villa Franca—Combat of Ordal—The allies retreat—Lord Frederick Bentinck fights with the French general Myers and wounds him—Lord William returns to Sicily—Observations.

LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK arrived without troops, for, having removed the queen from Sicily, he feared internal dissension, and Napoleon had directed Murat to invade the island with twenty thousand men, the Toulon squadron being to act in concert. Sir Edward Pellew admitted that the latter might easily gain twenty-four hours' start of his fleet, and lord William judged that ten thousand invaders would suffice to conquer. Murat, however, opened a secret negotiation, and thus that monarch, Bernadotte, and the emperor Francis, endeavoured to destroy a hero connected with them by marriage, and to whom they all owed their crowns either by gift or clemency!

This early defection of Murat is certain, and his declaration that he had instructions to invade Sicily was corroborated by a rumour, rife in the French

camps before the battle of Vittoria, that the Toulon fleet had sailed and the descent actually been made. Nevertheless, there is some obscurity about the matter. The negotiation was never completed, Murat left Italy to command Napoleon's cavalry, and at the battle of Dresden contributed much to the success of that day. Now it is conceivable that he should mask his plans by joining the grand army, and that his fiery spirit should in the battle forget every thing except victory. But to disobey Napoleon's orders as to the invasion of Sicily and dare to face that monarch immediately after, was so unlikely as to indicate rather a paper demonstration to alarm lord Wellington than a real attack. And it would seem from the short observation of the latter in answer to lord William Bentinck's detailed communication on this subject, namely, "*Sicily is in no danger*," that he viewed it so, or thought it put forward by Murat to give more value to his defection. However, it sufficed to hinder reinforcements going to Murray.

Lord William Bentinck on landing was informed that Suchet was at Tortosa with from eight to twelve thousand men, Maurice Mathieu with seven thousand at Cambrils. To drive the latter back and reinvest Tarragona was easy, and the place would have fallen, because the garrison had exhausted all their power in the first siege; but this lord William did not know, and to renew the attack vigorously was impossible, because all the howitzers and platforms and fascines had been lost, and the animals and general equipment of the army were too much deteriorated by continual embarkations, and disembarkations, to keep the field in Catalonia. Wherefore he resolved to return to Alicante, not without hope still to fulfil Wellington's instructions by landing at Valencia between Suchet and Harispe. The reembarkation was unmolested, the fort of Balaguer was destroyed, and one regiment of Whittingham's division, destined to reinforce Copons' army, being detached to effect a landing northward of Barcelona, the fleet put to sea; but misfortune continued to pursue this unhappy armament. A violent tempest impeded the voyage, fourteen sail of transports struck upon the sands off the mouth of the Ebro, and the army was not entirely disembarked at Alicante before the 27th. Meanwhile marshal Suchet, seeing the English fleet under sail, and taught by the destruction of the fort of Balaguer that the allies had relinquished operations in Lower Catalonia, marched with such extraordinary diligence as to reach Valencia in forty-eight hours after quitting Tortosa, thus frustrating lord William's project of landing at Valencia.

During his absence Harispe had again proved the weakness of the Spanish armies, and demonstrated the sagacity and prudence of lord Wellington. That great man's warning about defeat was distinctly addressed to the Spanish generals, because the chief object of the operations was not to defeat Suchet, but to keep him from aiding the French armies in the north. Pitched battles were, therefore, to be avoided, their issue being always doubtful, and the presence of a numerous and increasing force on the front and flank of the French was more sure to obtain the end in view. But all Spanish generals desired to fight great battles, soothing their national pride by attributing defeats to want of cavalry. It was at first doubtful if Murray could transport his horsemen to Tarragona, and if left behind they would have been under Elio and Del Parque, whereby those officers would have been encouraged to fight. Hence the English general's menacing intimation. And he also considered that as the army of Del Parque

had been for three years in continued activity under Ballesteros without being actually dispersed, it must be more capable than Elio's in the dodging warfare suitable for Spaniards. Moreover, Elio was best acquainted with the country between the Xucar and Alicante. Wherefore Del Parque was directed to turn the enemy's right flank by Requeña, Elio to menace the front, which, adverting to the support and protection furnished by Alicante and the mountains behind Castalla, was the least dangerous operation.

But to trust Spanish generals was to trust the winds and the clouds. General Elio persuaded the duke Del Parque to adopt the front attack, took the flank line himself, and detached general Mijares to fall upon Requeña. And though Suchet had weakened his line on the 2d of June, Del Parque was not ready until the 9th, thus giving the French a week for the relief of Tarragona, and for the arrival of Severoli at Liria.

At this time Harispe had about eight thousand men of all arms in front of the Xucar. The Spaniards, including Roche's and Mijares' divisions and Whittingham's cavalry, were twenty-five thousand strong; and the Empecinado, Villa Campa, and the Frayle Nebot, waited in the Cuenca and Albarazin mountains to operate on the French rear. Notwithstanding this disproportion, the contest was short, and for the Spaniards, disastrous. They advanced in three columns: Elio, by the pass of Almanza; Del Parque by Villena and Fuente de la Higuera, menacing Moxente; Roche and the prince of Anglona from Alcoy, by Onteniente and the pass of Albayda, menacing San Felipe de Xativa and turning Moxente.

Harispe abandoned those camps on the 11th, and took the line of the Xucar, occupying the intrenchments in front of his bridges at Alcira and Barca del Rey, near Alberique; and during this retrograde movement general Mesclap, commanding the rear-guard, being pressed by the Spanish horsemen, wheeled round and drove them in great confusion upon the infantry.

On the 15th, Mijares took the fort of Requeña, thus turning the line of the Xucar, and securing the defiles of Cabrillas through which the Cuenca road leads to Valencia. Villa Campa immediately joined him, thereby preventing Severoli from uniting with Harispe; and meanwhile Del Parque, after razing the French works at Moxente and San Felipe, advanced towards Alcira in two columns, the one moving by the road of Cargagente, the other by the road of Gandia. General Habert overthrew the first with one shock, took five hundred prisoners, and marched to attack the other, but it was already routed by general Gudin. After this contest Del Parque and Harispe maintained their respective positions, while Elio joined Mijares at Requeña. Villa Campa then descended to Chiva, and Harispe's position was becoming critical, when on the 23d the head of Suchet's column coming from the Ebro entered Valencia, and on the 24th Del Parque resumed the position of Castalla.

Thus, in despite of Wellington's precautions, every thing turned contrary to his designs. Elio had operated by the flank, Del Parque by the front, and the latter was defeated because he attacked the enemy in an intrenched position. Murray had failed entirely. His precipitancy at Tarragona and his delays at Balaguer were alike hurtful, and would have caused the destruction of one or both of the Spanish armies but for the battle of Vittoria. For Suchet, having first detached general Meusnier to recover the fort of Requeña and drive back Villa Campa, had assembled the bulk of his forces in his old

positions, of San Felipe and Moxente, before the return of the Anglo-Sicilian troops; and as Elio, unable to subsist at Utiel, had then returned towards his former quarters, the French marshal was upon the point of striking a fatal blow against him, or Del Parque, or both, when the news of Wellington's victory averted the danger.

Here the firmness, the activity and coolness of Suchet, may be contrasted with the infirmity of purpose displayed by Murray. Slow in attack, precipitate in retreat, the English commander always mistimed his movements; the French marshal doubled his force by rapidity. The latter was insulated by the operations of lord Wellington; his communication with Aragon was interrupted, and that province placed in imminent danger; the communication between Valencia and Catalonia was exposed to the attacks of the Anglo-Sicilian army and the fleet; nearly thirty thousand Spaniards menaced him on the Xucar in front; Villa Campa, the Frayle and the Empecinado could bring ten thousand men on his right flank; yet he did not hesitate to leave Harispe with only seven or eight thousand men to oppose the Spaniards, while with the remainder of his army he relieved Tarragona, and yet returned in time to save Valencia.

Such was the state of affairs when lord William Bentinck brought the Anglo-Sicilian troops once more to Alicante. His first care was to reorganize the means of transport for the commissariat and artillery, but this was a matter of difficulty. Sir John Murray, with a mischievous economy, and strange disregard of that part of Wellington's instructions which prescribed active field operations in Valencia if he should be forced to return from Catalonia, had discharged six hundred mules, and two hundred country carts, that is to say five-sixths of the whole field equipment, before he sailed for Tarragona. The army was thus crippled, while Suchet gathered strong in front, and Meusnier's division, retaking Requena, forced the Spaniards to retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del Parque to advance meanwhile from Castalla, but he had not means of carrying even one day's biscuit, and at the same time Elio, pressed by famine, went off towards Cuenca. It was not until the 1st of July that the Anglo-Sicilian troops could even advance towards Alcoy.

Lord William Bentinck commanded the Spanish armies as well as his own, and letters passed between him and lord Wellington relative to further operations. The latter, keeping to his original views, advised a renewed attack on Tarragona or on Tortosa, if the ordnance still in possession of the army would admit of such a measure; but supposing this could not be, he recommended a general advance to seize the open country of Valencia, the British keeping close to the sea and in constant communication with the fleet.

Lord William's views were different. He found the Spanish soldiers robust and active, but their regimental officers bad, and their organization generally so deficient that they could not stand against even a small French force, as proved by their recent defeat at Alcira. The generals, however, pleased him at first, especially Del Parque, that is, like all Spaniards, they had fair words at command, and lord William Bentinck, without scanning very nicely their deeds, thought he could safely undertake a grand strategic operation in conjunction with them.

To force the line of the Xucar he deemed unavoidable, inasmuch as there were only two carriage roads, both of which led to Suchet's intrenched bridges; and though the river was fordable, the enemy's

bank was so favourable for defence as to render the passage by force dangerous. The Anglo-Sicilians were unaccustomed to great tactical movements, the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore, relinquishing an attack in front, lord William proposed to move the allied armies in one mass and turn the enemy's right flank either by Utiel and Requena, or by a wider march, to reach Cuenca, and from thence gaining the Madrid road to Zaragoza, communicate with Wellington's army and operate down the Ebro. In either case it was necessary to cross the Albarazin mountains, and there were no carriage roads, save those of Utiel and Cuenca. But the passes near Utiel were strongly fortified by the French, and a movement on that line would necessarily lead to an attack upon Suchet, which was to be avoided. The line of Cuenca was preferable, though longer, and being in the harvest season, provisions, he said, would not fail. The allies would thus force Suchet to cross the Ebro, or attack him in a chosen position, where Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and in the event of a defeat they could retire for shelter upon his army.

Wellington, better acquainted with Spanish warfare, and the nature of Spanish co-operation, told him, provisions would fail on the march to Cuenca, even in harvest time, and without money he would get nothing; moreover, by separating himself from the fleet, he would be unable to return suddenly to Sicily if that island should be really exposed to any imminent danger.

While these letters were being exchanged, the Anglo-Sicilians marched towards Villena, on Del Parque's left, and Suchet was preparing to attack, when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching both parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs. The French general instantly abandoned Valencia, and lord William entered that city.

Suchet knew that Clauzel was at Zaragoza, and desirous of maintaining himself there to secure a point of junction for the army of Aragon with the king's army, if the latter should re-enter Spain. It was possible, therefore, by abandoning all the fortresses in Valencia and some of those in Catalonia, to have concentrated more than thirty thousand men with which to join Clauzel, and the latter having carried off several small garrisons during his retreat, had fifteen thousand. Lord Wellington's position would then have been critical, since forty-five thousand good troops, having many supporting fortresses, would have menaced his right flank at the moment when his front was assailed by a new general and a powerful army. But if this junction with Clauzel invited Suchet on the one hand, on the other, with a view of influencing the general negotiations during the armistice in Germany, it was important to appear strong in Spain. On such occasions men generally endeavour to reconcile both objects, and obtain neither. Suchet resolved to march upon Zaragoza, and at the same time retain his grasp upon Valencia by keeping large garrisons in the fortresses. This reduced his field force, a great error: it was so proved by the result. But if the war in the north of Spain and in Germany had taken a different turn, his foresight and prudence would have been applauded.

The army of Aragon now counted thirty-two thousand effective men. Four thousand were in Zaragoza, two thousand in Mequinenza, Venasque, Monzon, Ayerbe, Jaca, and some smaller posts. Twenty-six thousand remained. Of these one hundred and ten were left in Denia, with provisions for eight months; twelve hundred and fifty in Saguntum, where there

were immense stores, eight months' provisions for the garrison, and two months' subsistence for the whole army; four hundred with provisions for a year, were in Peniscola, and in Morella one hundred and twenty with magazines for six months. Into Tortosa, where there was a large artillery park, Suchet threw a garrison of nearly five thousand men, and then destroying the bridges on the Xucar, marched from Valencia on the 5th of July, taking the coast road for Tortosa.

The inhabitants, grateful for the discipline he had maintained, were even friendly, and while the main body thus moved, Meusnier retreated from Requena across the mountains towards Caspe, the point of concentration for the whole army; but ere it could reach that point, Clauzel's flight to Jaca, unnecessary, for he was only pursued from Tudela by Mina, became known, and the effect was fatal. All the partidas immediately united and menaced Zaragoza, whereupon Suchet ordered Paris to retire upon Caspe, and pressed forward himself to Favara. Meusnier, meanwhile, reached the former town, having on the march picked up Severoli's brigade and the garrisons of Teruel and Alcaniz. Thus on the 12th, the whole army was in military communication, but extended along the Ebro from Tortosa to Caspe. Mina had, however, seized the Monte Torrero on the 8th, and general Paris evacuated Zaragoza in the night of the 9th, leaving five hundred men in the castle with much ordnance. Encumbered with a great train of carriages he got entangled in the defiles of Alcubierre, and being attacked lost many men and all his baggage and artillery. Instead of joining Suchet he fled to Huesca, where he rallied the garrison of Ayerbe and then made for Jaca, reaching it on the 14th at the moment when Clauzel, after another ineffectual attempt to join the king, had returned to that place. Duran then invested the castle of Zaragoza, and the fort of Daroca. The first surrendered on the 30th, but Daroca did not fall until the 11th of August.

This sudden and total loss of Aragon made Suchet think it no longer possible to fix a base in that province, nor to rally Clauzel's troops on his own. He could not remain on the right bank of the Ebro, neither could he feed his army permanently in the sterile country about Tortosa while Aragon was in possession of the enemy. Moreover, the allies having the command of the sea, might land troops, and seize the passes of the hills behind him; wherefore fixing upon the fertile country about Tarragona for his position, he passed the Ebro at Tortosa, Mora, and Mequinenza, on the 14th and 15th, detaching Isidore Lamarque to fetch off the garrisons of Belchite, Fuentes, Pina, and Bujarola, and bring the whole to Lerida. Meanwhile the bulk of the army moving on the road from Tortosa to Tarragona, although cannonaded by the English fleet, reached Tarragona with little hurt, and the walls were mined for destruction, but the place was still held with a view to field operations.

The general state of the war seems to have been too little considered by Suchet at this time, or he would have made a more vigorous effort to establish himself in Aragon. Had he persisted to march on Zaragoza he would have raised the siege of the castle, perchance have given a blow to Mina whose orders were to retire upon Tudela where Wellington designed to offer battle; but Suchet might have avoided this, and to have appeared upon Wellington's flank, were it only for a fortnight, would, as shall be hereafter shown, have changed the aspect of the campaign. Suchet's previous rapidity and excellent arrangements had left the allies in Valen-

cia far behind, they could not have gathered in force soon enough to meddle with him, and their pursuit, now to be described, was not so cautiously conducted but that he might have turned and defeated them.

The 9th of July, four days after the French abandoned Valencia, lord William Bentinck entered that city and made it his place of arms instead of Alicante. On the 16th, marching by the coast-road, in communication with the fleet, and masking Peniscola, a fortress now of little importance, he followed the enemy; but Suchet had on that day completed the passage of the Ebro, he might have been close to Zaragoza, and Del Parque's army was still near Alicante in a very disorderly condition. And though Elio and Roche were at Valencia, the occupation of that town, and the blockades of Denia and Murviedro, proved more than a sufficient task for them: the garrison of the latter place received provisions continually, and were so confident as to assemble in order of battle, on the glacis, when the allies marched past.

The 20th, lord William entered Vinaroz and remained there until the 26th. Suchet might then have been at Tudela or Sanguesa, and it shall be shown that Wellington could not have met him at the former place as he designed.

During this period various reports were received: "The French had vainly endeavoured to regain France by Zaragoza;" "Tarragona was destroyed;" "The evacuation of Spain was certain;" "A large detachment had already quitted Catalonia." The English general, who had little time to spare from the pressure of Sicilian affairs, became eager to advance. He threw a flying bridge over the Ebro at Amposta, and having before embarked Clinton's division with a view to seize the Col de Balaguer, resolved to follow Suchet with the remainder of his army, which now included Whittingham's cavalry. A detachment from Tortosa menaced his bridge on the 25th, but the troops were reinforced and the passage of the Ebro completed on the 27th. The next day Villa Campa arrived with four thousand men, and meanwhile the Col de Balaguer was secured.

On the 29th, the cavalry being in march was threatened by infantry from Tortosa, near the Col de Alba, but the movements generally were unopposed, and the army got possession of the mountains beyond the Ebro.

Suchet was at this time inspecting the defences of Lerida and Mequinenza, and his escort was necessarily large, because Copons was hanging on his flanks in the mountains about Manresa; but his position about Villa Franca was exceedingly strong. Tarragona and Tortosa covered the front; Barcelona, the rear; the communication with Decaen was secure, and on the right flank stood Lerida, to which the small forts of Mequinenza and Monzon served as outposts.

The Anglo-Sicilian troops, reinforced with Whittingham's cavalry, did not exceed ten thousand effective men, of which one division was on board ship from the 22d to the 26th. Elio and Roche were at Valencia in a destitute condition. Del Parque's army, thirteen thousand strong, including Whittingham's infantry, was several marches in the rear, it was paid from the British subsidy, but very ill-provided, and the duke himself disinclined to obedience. Villa Campa did not join until the 28th, and Copons was in the mountains above Vich. Lord William therefore remained with ten thousand men and a large train of carriages, for ten days, without any position of battle behind him nearer than the hills about Saguntum. His bridge over the Ebro was thrown within ten miles of Tortosa, where there

was a garrison of five thousand men, detachments from which could approach unperceived through the rugged mountains near the fortress; and Suchet's well-organized experienced army was within two marches. That marshal, however, expecting a sharp warfare, was visiting his fortresses in person, and his troops quartered for the facility of feeding were unprepared to strike a sudden blow; moreover, judging his enemy's strength in offence what it might have been rather than what it was, he awaited the arrival of Decaen's force from Upper Catalonia before he offered battle.

But Decaen was himself pressed. The great English fleet menacing Rosas and Palamos had encouraged a partial insurrection of the somatenes, which was supported by the divisions of Eroles, Manso, and Villamil. Several minor combats took place on the side of Besala and Olot, Eroles invested Bañolas, and though beaten there in a sharp action by Lamarque on the 23d of June, the insurrection spread. To quell it Decaen combined a double operation from the side of Gerona upon Vich, which was generally the Catalan head-quarters. Designing to attack by the south himself, he sent Maximilian Lamarque, with fifteen hundred French troops and some migueletes, by the mountain paths of San Felice de Pallarols and Amias. On the 8th of July, that officer gained the heights of Salud, seized the road from Olot and descended from the north upon Roda and Manlieu, in the expectation of seeing Decaen attacking from the other side. He perceived below him a heavy body in march, and at the same time heard the sound of cannon and musketry about Vich. Concluding this was Decaen, he advanced confidently against the troops in his front, although very numerous, thinking they were in retreat, but they fought him until dark without advantage on either side.

In the night an officer came with intelligence, that Decaen's attack had been relinquished in consequence of Suchet's orders to move to the Llobregat, and it then appeared that a previous despatch had been intercepted, that the whole Catalan force to the amount of six or seven thousand combatants was upon Lamarque's hands, and the firing heard at Vich was a rejoicing for lord Wellington's victories in Navarre. A retreat was imperative. The Spaniards followed at daylight, and Lamarque getting entangled in difficult ground near Salud, was forced to deliver battle. The fight lasted many hours, all his ammunition was expended, he lost four hundred men and was upon the point of destruction, when general Beurmann came to his succour with four fresh battalions, and the Catalans were finally defeated with great loss. After this vigorous action, Decaen marched to join Suchet, and the Catalans, moving by the mountains in separate divisions, approached lord William Bentinck.

The allies having thus passed the Ebro, several officers of both nations conceived the siege of Tortosa would be the best operation. Nearly forty thousand men, that is to say, Villa Campa's, Copons', Del Parque's, Whittingham's, some of Elio's forces and the Anglo-Sicilians, could be united for the siege, and the defiles of the mountains on the left bank of the Ebro would enable them to resist Suchet's attempts to succour the place on that side, and force him to move by the circuitous route of Lerida. Wellington also leaned towards this operation, but lord William Bentinck resolved to push at once for Tarragona, and even looked to an attack upon Barcelona; certainly a rash proceeding, inasmuch as Suchet awaited his approach with an army every way superior. It does not however follow

that to besiege Tortosa would have been advisable, for though the battering train, much larger than Murray's losses gave reason at first to expect, was equal to the reduction of the place, the formal siege of such a fortress was a great undertaking. The vicinity was unhealthy, and it would have been difficult to feed the Spanish troops. They were quite inexperienced in sieges, this was sure to be long, not sure to be successful, and Suchet seeing the allies engaged in such a difficult operation might have marched at once to Aragon.

It would seem lord William Bentinck was at this time misled, partly by the reports of the Catalans, partly by lord Wellington's great successes, into a belief that the French were going to abandon Catalonia. His mind also ran upon Italian affairs; and he did not perceive that Suchet, judiciously posted and able to draw reinforcements from Decaen, was in fact much stronger than all the allies united. The two armies of Aragon and Catalonia numbered sixty-seven thousand men. Of these, about twenty-seven thousand, including Paris' division, then at Jaca, were in garrison, five thousand were sick, the remainder in the field. In Catalonia the allies were not principals, they were accessories. They were to keep Suchet from operating on the flank of the allies in Navarre, and their defeat would have been a great disaster. So entirely was this lord Wellington's views, that the duke del Parque's army was to make forced marches on Tudela if Suchet should either move himself or detach largely towards Aragon. Lord William, after passing the Ebro, could have secured the defiles of the mountains with his own and Villa Campa's troops, that is to say, with twenty thousand men, including Whittingham's division. He could have insulted the garrison of Tortosa, and commenced the making of gabions and fascines, which would have placed Suchet in doubt as to his ulterior objects, while he awaited the junction of Del Parque's, Copons', and the rest of Elio's troops. Thus forty thousand men, three thousand being cavalry and attended by a fleet, could have descended into the Campo, still leaving a detachment to watch Tortosa. If Suchet then came to the succour of Tarragona, the allies, superior in numbers, could have fought in a position chosen beforehand. Still it is very doubtful if all these corps would, or could have kept together.

Lord William Bentinck's operations were headlong. He had prepared platforms and fascines for a siege in the island of Yvica, and on the 30th, quitting the mountains, suddenly invested Tarragona with less than six thousand men, occupying ground three hundred yards nearer to the walls the first day, than Murray had ever done. He thus prevented the garrison from abandoning the place, if, as was supposed, they had that intention; yet the fortress could not be besieged because of Suchet's vicinity and the dissemination of the allies. The 31st, the bridge at Amposta was accidentally broken, three hundred bullocks were drowned, and the head of Del Parque's army, being on the left of the Ebro, fell back a day's march. However, Whittingham's division and the cavalry came up, and on the 3d of August, the bridge being restored, Del Parque also joined the investing army. Copons then promised to bring up his Catalans, Sarsfield's division, now belonging to the second army, arrived, and Elio had been ordered to reinforce it with three additional battalions, while Villa Campa observed Tortosa. Meanwhile lord William, seeing that Suchet's troops were scattered and the marshal himself at Barcelona, thought of surprising his posts and seizing the mountain line of Llobregat; but Elio sent

no battalions, Copons, jealous of some communications between the English general and Eroles, was slow, the garrison of Tortosa burned the bridge at Amposta, and Suchet, taking alarm, suddenly returned from Bcelona, and concentrated his army.

Up to this time the Spaniards, giving copious but false information to lord William, and no information at all to Suchet, had induced a series of faults on both sides, balancing each other, a circumstance not uncommon in war, which demands all the faculties of the greatest minds. The Englishman, thinking his enemy retreating, had pressed rashly forward. The Frenchman, deeming from the other's boldness the whole of the allies were at hand, thought himself too weak, and awaited the arrival of Decaen, whose junction was retarded, as we have seen, by the combined operations of the Catalan army and the English fleet.

In this state of affairs, Suchet heard of new and important successes gained in Navarre by lord Wellington, one of his Italian battalions was at the same time cut off at San Sadurn by Manso, and lord William Bentinck took a position of battle beyond the Gaya. His left, composed of Whittingham's division, occupied Braffin, the Col de Liebra, and Col de Cristina, his right covered the great coast-road. These were the only carriage ways by which the enemy could approach, but they were ten miles apart, Copons held aloof, and Whittingham thought himself too weak to defend the passes alone; hence, when Suchet, reinforced by Decaen with eight thousand sabres and bayonets, finally advanced, lord William, who had landed neither guns nor stores, decided to refuse battle. For such a resolute officer, this must have been a painful decision. He had now nearly thirty thousand fighting men, including a thousand marines which had been landed to join the advanced guard at Altafalla; he had assumed the offensive, invested Tarragona, where the military honour of England had suffered twice before, in fine, provoked the action which he now declined. But Suchet had equal numbers of a better quality; the banks of the Gaya were rugged to pass in retreat if the fight should be lost; much must have been left to general officers at different points; Del Parque was an uneasy coadjutor, and if any part was forced the whole line would have been irretrievably lost. His reluctance was however manifest, for, though he expected the enemy on the 9th, he did not send his field artillery and baggage to the rear until the 11th, the day on which Decaen reached Villa Franca.

The French general, dreading the fire of the fleet, endeavoured by false attacks on the coast-road to draw the allies from the defiles beyond Braffin, towards which he finally carried his whole army, and those defiles were indeed abandoned, not as his Memoirs state, because of these demonstrations, but because lord William had previously determined to retreat. On the 16th, finding the passes unguarded, he poured through and advanced upon Valls, thus turning the allies; but he had lost time, and the latter were in full retreat towards the mountains, the left wing by Reus, the right wing by Cambrils. The march of the former was covered by lord Frederick Bentinck, who leading the British and German cavalry, defeated the fourth French hussars with a loss of forty or fifty men; and it is said that either general Haber or Harispe was taken, but escaped in the confusion.

The Anglo-Sicilians and Whittingham's division now entrenched themselves near the Col de Balaguer, and Del Parque marched with his own and Sarsfield's troops to invest Tortosa, but the garri-

son fell upon his rear while passing the Ebro and some loss was sustained. Meanwhile Suchet, more swayed by the remembrance of Castalla than by his recent success, would not again prove the courage of the British troops on a mountain position. Contrary to the wishes of his army, he returned to Tarragona and destroyed the ancient walls, which from the extreme hardness of the Roman cement proved a tedious and difficult matter; then resuming his old position about Villa Franca and on the Llobregat, he sent Decaen to Upper Catalonia. This terminated lord William Bentinck's first effort, and the general result was favourable. He had risked much on insufficient grounds; yet his enemy made no profit, and lost Tarragona with its fertile Campo, Tortosa was invested and Suchet was kept away from Navarre.

It is strange that this renowned French general suffered his large force to be thus paralysed at such a crisis. Above twenty-seven thousand of his soldiers, if we include the isolated division of Paris, were shut up in garrison, but thirty-two thousand remained with which he marched to and fro in Catalonia while the war was being decided in Navarre. Had he moved to that province by Aragon before the end of July, lord Wellington would have been overpowered. What was to be feared? That lord William Bentinck would follow, or attack one of his fortresses? If the French were successful in Navarre the loss of a fortress in Catalonia would have been a trifle, it was not certain that any would have fallen, and lord William could not abandon the coast. Suchet pleaded danger to France if he abandoned Catalonia; but to invade France, guarded as she was by her great military reputation, and to do so by land, leaving behind the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, the latter barring all the carriage roads, was chimerical. Success in Navarre would have made an invasion by sea pass as a partisan descent, and, moreover, France, wanting Suchet's troops to defend her in Navarre, was ultimately invaded by Wellington and in a far more formidable manner. This question shall however be treated more largely in another place; it is sufficient to observe here, that Clarke, the minister of war, a man without genius or attachment to the emperor's cause, discouraged any great combined plan of action, and Napoleon, absorbed by his own immense operations, did not interpose.

Lord William, now intent upon the siege of Tortosa, wished lord Wellington to attack Mequinenza with a detachment of his army; but this the situation of affairs in Navarre and Guipuscoa did not admit of, and he soon discovered that to assail Tortosa was an undertaking beyond his own means. Elio, when desired to gather provisions and assist in the operations, demanded three weeks for preparation; all the Spanish troops were in want, Roche's division, blockading Murviedro, although so close to Valencia, was on half rations; and the siege of Tortosa was necessarily relinquished, because no great or sustained operation could be conducted in concert with such generals and such armies. Suchet's fear of them was an illustration of Napoleon's maxim, that war is an affair of discrimination. It is more essential to know the quality than the quantity of enemies.

It was difficult for lord William Bentinck to apply his mind vigorously to the campaign he was conducting, because fresh changes, injurious to the British policy, in Sicily, called him to that island, and his thoughts were running upon the invasion of Italy; but as the Spaniards, deceived by the movements of escorts and convoys, reported that Suchet

had marched with twelve thousand men to join Soult, he once more fixed his head-quarters at Tarragona, and following lord Wellington's instructions, detached Del Parque's troops by forced marches upon Tudela.

On the 5th of September, the army entered Villa Franca, and the 12th, detachments of Calabrese, Swiss, German, and British infantry, a squadron of cavalry and one battery, in all about twelve hundred men, under colonel Adam, occupied the heights of Ordal. At this place, ten miles in advance of Villa Franca, being joined by three of Sarsfield's battalions and a Spanish squadron, they took a position; but it now appeared that very few French troops had been detached; that Suchet had concentrated his whole force on the Llobregat; and that his army was very superior in numbers, because the allies, reduced by the loss of Del Parque's troops, had also left Whittingham's division at Reus and Valls, to procure food. Sarsfield's division was feeding on the British supplies, and lord William again looked to a retreat; yet, thinking the enemy disinclined to advance, desired to preserve his forward position as long as possible.

He had only two lines of operation to watch: the one menacing his front from Molino del Rey by the main road, which colonel Adam blocked by his position at Ordal; the other from Martorel, by San Sadurni, menacing his left; but on this route, a difficult one, he had pushed the Catalans under Eroles and Manso, reinforcing them with some Calabrese; there was indeed a third line by Avionet on his right, but it was little better than a goat-path. He had designed to place his main body close up to the Ordal on the evening of the 12th, yet from some slight cause delayed it until the next day. Meanwhile he viewed the country in advance of that defile without discovering an enemy. His confidential emissaries assured him the French were not going to advance, and he returned, satisfied that Adam's detachment was safe, and so expressed himself to that officer. A report of a contrary tendency was indeed made by colonel Reeves of the twenty-seventh, on the authority of a Spanish woman who had before proved her accuracy and ability as a spy; she was now however disbelieved, and this incredulity was unfortunate. For Suchet thus braved, and his communication with Lerida threatened by Manso on the side of Martorel, was already in march to attack Ordal with the army of Aragon, while Decaen and Maurice Mathieu, moving with the army of Catalonia from Martorel by San Sadurni, turned the left of the allies.

COMBAT OF ORDAL.

The heights occupied by colonel Adam, although rugged, rose gradually from a magnificent bridge, by which the main road was carried over a very deep and impracticable ravine. The second battalion of the twenty-seventh British regiment was posted on the right; the Germans and De Roll's Swiss, with the artillery, defended an old Spanish fort commanding the main road; the Spaniards were in the centre, the Calabrese on the left; and the cavalry were in reserve. A bright moonlight facilitated the movements of the French, and a little before midnight, their leading column under general Mesclap passing the bridge without let or hinderance, mounted the heights with a rapid pace, and driving back the piquets gave the first alarm. The allied troops lying on their arms in order of battle were ready instantly, and the fight commenced. The first effort was against the twenty-seventh, then the Germans and the Spanish battalions were vigorous-

ly assailed in succession as the French columns got free of the bridge, but the Calabrese were too far on the left to take a share in the action. The combat was fierce and obstinate. Harispe, who commanded the French, constantly outflanked the right of the allies, and at the same time pressed their centre, where the Spaniards fought gallantly.

Colonel Adam was wounded very early, the command devolved upon colonel Reeves, and that officer seeing his flank turned and his men falling fast, in short, finding himself engaged with a whole army on a position of which colonel Adam had lost the key by neglecting the bridge, resolved to retreat. In this view he first ordered the guns to fall back, and to cover the movement charged a column of the enemy which was pressing forward on the high road; but he was severely wounded in this attack, and there was no recognised commander on the spot to succeed him. Then the affair became confused. For though the order to retreat was given, the Spaniards were fighting desperately, and the twenty-seventh thought it shame to abandon them; wherefore the Germans and Del Roll's regiment still held the old fort, and the guns came back. The action was thus continued with great fury. Colonel Carey now brought the Calabrese into line from the left, and menaced the right flank of the French, but he was too late; the Spaniards overwhelmed in the centre were broken, the right was completely turned, the old fort was lost, the enemy's skirmishers got into the allies' rear, and at three o'clock the whole dispersed, the most part in flight; the Spanish cavalry were then overthrown on the main road by the French hussars, and four guns were taken in the tumult.

Captain Waldron, with the twenty-seventh, reduced to eighty men, and captain Muller with about the same number of Germans and Swiss, breaking through several small parties of the enemy, effected their retreat in good order by the hills on each side of the road. Colonel Carey endeavoured at first to gain the road of San Sadurni on the left, but meeting with Decaen's people on that side he retraced his steps, and crossing the field of battle in the rear of Suchet's columns made for Villa Nueva de Sitjes. There he finally embarked without loss, save a few stragglers who fell into the hands of a flanking battalion of French infantry which had moved through the mountains by Begas and Avionet. The overthrow was complete, and the prisoners were at first very numerous, but the darkness enabled many to escape, and two thousand men reached Manso and Eroles.

Suchet, pursuing his march, came up with lord William about eight o'clock. The latter retired skirmishing and with excellent order beyond Villa Franca, followed by the French horsemen, some of which assailed his rear-guard while others edged to their right to secure the communication with Decaen. The latter was looked for by both parties with great anxiety, but he had been delayed by the resistance of Manso and Eroles in the rugged country between Martorel and San Sadurni. Suchet's cavalry and artillery continued however to infest the rear of the retreating army until it reached a deep baranco, near the Venta de Monjos, where the passage being dangerous and the French horsemen importunate, that brave and honest soldier, lord Frederick Bentinck, charged their right, and fighting hand to hand with the enemy's general Myers, wounded him and overthrew his light cavalry; they rallied upon their dragoons and advanced again, endeavouring to turn the flank, but were stopped by the fire of two guns which general Clinton opened

upon them. Meanwhile the cuirassiers, on the left, pressed the Brunswick hussars and menaced the infantry, yet they were finally checked by the fire of the 10th regiment. This cavalry action was vigorous; the twentieth and the Germans, although few in numbers, lost more than ninety men. The baranco was, however, safely passed, and about three o'clock the army, having reached Arbos, the pursuit ceased. The Catalans, meanwhile, had retreated towards Igualada, and the Anglo-Sicilians retired to Tarragona.

It was now thought Suchet would make a movement to carry off the garrisons of Lerida and Tortosa, but this did not happen, and lord William went to Sicily, leaving the command of the army to sir William Clinton.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. Lord William Bentinck committed errors; yet he has been censured without discrimination. "He advanced rashly;" "He was undecided;" "He exposed his advanced guard without support:" such were the opinions expressed at the time. Their justness may be disputed. His first object was to retain all the French force in Catalonia; his second, to profit from Suchet's weakness if he detached largely. He could do neither by remaining inactive on the barren hills behind Hospitalet, because the Spaniards would have dispersed for want of provisions, and the siege of Tortosa was found to be impracticable. It was therefore the part of a bold and skilful general to menace his enemy, if he could be sure of retreating again without danger or dishonour. The position at Villa Franca fulfilled this condition. It was strong in itself and offensive; sir Edward Pellew's fleet was in movement to create diversions in Upper Catalonia, and all the emissaries and Spanish correspondents concurred in declaring, though falsely, that the French general had detached twelve thousand men.

It is indeed one of the tests of a sagacious general to detect false intelligence, yet the greatest are at times deceived, and all must act, if they act at all, upon what appears at the time to be true. Lord William's advance was founded on erroneous data, but his position in front of Villa Franca was well chosen. It enabled him to feed Whittingham's division in the fertile country about Reus and Valls, and there were short and easy communications from Villa Franca to the sea-coast. The army could only be seriously assailed on two lines. In front, by the main road, which, though broad, was from Molino del Rey to the heights of Ordal, one continued defile. On the left, by San Sadurni, a road still more rugged and difficult than the other. And the Catalans were launched on this side as their natural line of operations, because, without losing their hold of the mountains they protected the left of the allies, menacing at the same time the right of the enemy and his communications with Lerida. Half a march to the rear would bring the army to Vendrils, beyond which the enemy could not follow without getting under the fire of the ships; neither could he forestall this movement by a march through the Liebra and Cristina defiles, because the Catalans, falling back on Whittingham's division, could hold him in check.

2nd. Ordal and San Sadurni were the keys of the position. The last was well secured, the first not so, and there was the real error of lord William Bentinck. It was none, however, to push an advanced guard of three thousand five hundred men, with cavalry and artillery, to a distance of ten miles for a few hours. He had a right to expect the com-

mander of such a force would maintain his post until supported, or at least retreat without disaster. An officer of capacity would have done so. But whoever relies upon the capacity of sir Frederick Adam, either in peace or war, will be disappointed.

In 1810, lord Wellington detached general Robert Crawford with two or three thousand men to a much greater distance, not for one night, but for many weeks. And that excellent officer, though close to Massena's immense army, the cavalry of which was double his whole numbers; though he had the long line of the Agueda, a fordable river, to guard; though he was in an open country and continually skirmishing, never lost so much as a patrol, and always remained master of his movements, for his combat on the Coa was a studied and wilful error. It was no fault therefore to push colonel Adam's detachment to Ordal, but it was a fault that lord William, having determined to follow him with his whole force, should have delayed doing so for one night, or that delaying, he did not send some supporting troops forward. It was a fault not to do so, because there was good reason to do so, and to delay was to tempt fortune. There was good reason to do so as well to profit of the advantage of the position as to support Adam. Had lord William Bentinck been at hand with his main body when the attack on Ordal commenced, the head of Suchet's force, which was kept at bay for three hours by a detachment so ill commanded, would have been driven into the ravine behind, and the victorious allies would still have had time to march against Decaen by the road along which colonel Carey endeavoured to join Manso. In fine Suchet's dispositions were vicious in principle and ought not to have succeeded. He operated on two distinct lines, having no cross communications, and before an enemy in possession of a central position with good communications.

3rd. It was another fault that lord William Bentinck disregarded the Spanish woman's report to colonel Reeves; his observations made in front of the bridge of Ordal on the evening of the 12th, accorded indeed with the reports of his own emissaries, but the safe side should always be the rule of precaution. He also, although on the spot, overlooked the unmilitary dispositions of colonel Adam on the heights of the Ordal. The summit could not be defended against superior numbers with a small corps, and that officer had nevertheless extended the Calabrese so far on the left that they could take no share in the action, and yet could not retreat without great difficulty. A commander who understood his business, would have blocked up the bridge in front of the heights, and defended it by a strong detachment, supporting that detachment by others placed in succession on the heights, but keeping his main body always in hand, ready either to fall on the head of the enemy's column of attack, or to rally the advanced detachments and retreat in order. There were plenty of trees and stone to block the bridge, its own parapet would have supplied materials, and the ravine was so deep and rugged, that the enemy could not have crossed it on the flanks in the dark.

It is no defence to say colonel Adam only took his ground in the evening after a march; that he expected the main body up the next morning, and that lord William assured him he was safe from attack. Every officer is responsible for the security of his troops, and the precaution prescribed by the rules of war should never be dispensed with or delayed at any outpost. Now it does not appear that colonel Adam ever placed an infantry picket on the bridge, or sent a cavalry patrol beyond it; and I have been inform-

ed by a French soldier, one of a party sent to explore the position, that they reached the crest of the heights without opposition and returned safely, whereupon Mesclop's brigade instantly crossed the bridge and attacked.

4th. Ordal might be called a surprise with respect to the general-in-chief, yet the troops engaged were not surprised: they were beaten and dispersed because colonel Adam was unskilful. The French general's victory was complete; but he has in his Memoirs exaggerated his difficulties and the importance of his success; his private report to the emperor was more accurate. The Memoirs state, that the English grenadiers defended certain works which commanded the ascent of the main road, and in the accompanying atlas a perspective view of well-conditioned redoubts with colours flying, is given. The reader is thus led to imagine these were regular forts of a fresh construction, defended by select troops; but in the private report they are correctly designated as ancient retrenchments, being in fact the ruins of some old Spanish field-works, and of no more advantage to the allies than any natural inequality of ground. Again, in the Memoirs, the attack of the French cavalry near Villa Franca is represented as quite successful; but the private report only says the rear was harassed by repeated charges, which is true, and moreover, those charges were vigorously repulsed. The whole French loss was about three hundred men; that of the allies, heavy at Ordal, was lightened by escape of prisoners during the night, and ultimately did not exceed a thousand men, including Spaniards.

CHAPTER III.

Siege of San Sebastian—Convent of San Bartolomeo stormed—Assault on the place fails—Causes thereof—Siege turned into a blockade, and the guns embarked at Passages—French make a successful sally.

TURNING from the war in Catalonia to the operations in Navarre and Guipuscoa, we shall find lord Wellington's indomitable energy overcoming every difficulty. It has been already shown how, changing his first views, he disposed the Anglo-Portuguese divisions to cover the siege of San Sebastian and the blockade of Pampeluna, at the same time attacking with the Spanish divisions Santono on the coast, and the castles of Daroca, Morella, Zaragoza, and the forts of Pancorbo in the interior. These operations required many men, but the early fall of Pancorbo enabled O'Donel's reserve to blockade Pampeluna, and Don Carlos d'España's division, four thousand strong, which remained at Miranda del Castanar, to improve its organization when lord Wellington advanced to the Ebro, was approaching to reinforce him.

The harbour of Passages was the only port near the scene of operations suited for the supply of the army. Yet it had this defect, that being situated between the covering and the besieging army, the stores and guns once landed were in danger from every movement of the enemy. The Deba river, between San Sebastian and Bilbao, was unfit for large vessels, and hence no permanent depot could be established nearer than Bilbao. At that port therefore and at St. Ander and Coruña, the great depots of the army were fixed, the stores being transported to them from the establishments in Portugal; but the French held Santona, and their privateers interrupted the communication along the coast of Spain, while American privateers did the

same between Lisbon and Coruña. On the other hand, the intercourse between San Sebastian and the ports of France was scarcely molested, and the most urgent remonstrances failed to procure a sufficient naval force on the coast of Biscay. It was in these circumstances Wellington commenced

THE SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN.

This place was built on a low sandy isthmus, formed by the harbour on one side and the river Urumea on the other. Behind it rose the Monte Orgullo, a rugged cone, nearly four hundred feet high, washed by the ocean, and crowned with the small castle of La Mota. Its southern face, overlooking the town, was yet cut off from it by a line of defensive works, and covered with batteries; but La Mota itself was commanded, at a distance of thirteen hundred yards, by the Monte Olia, on the other side of the Urumea.

The land front of San Sebastian was three hundred and fifty yards wide, stretching quite across the isthmus. It consisted of a high curtain or rampart, very solid, strengthened by a lofty casemated flat bastion, or cavalier, placed in the centre, and by half bastions at either end. A regular hornwork was pushed out from this front, and six hundred yards beyond the hornwork the isthmus was closed by the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the foot of which stood the suburb of San Martin.

On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain sandy hills, called the Chofres, through which the road from Passages passed to the wooden bridge over the river, and thence, by the suburb of Santa Catalina, along the top of a sea-wall, which formed a *fausse-braye* for the hornwork.

The flanks of the town were protected by simple ramparts. The one was washed by the water of the harbour, the other by the Urumea, which, at high tide, covered four of the twenty-seven feet comprised in its elevation. This was the weak side of the fortress; for though covered by the river, there was only a single wall, ill-flanked by two old towers and by the half bastion of St. Elmo, which was situated at the extremity of the rampart, close under the Monte Orgullo. There was no ditch, no counterscarp, or glacis; the wall could be seen to its base from the Chofre hills, at distances varying from five hundred to a thousand yards, and when the tide was out the Urumea left a dry strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo. However, the guns from the batteries at Monte Orgullo, especially that called the Mirador, could see this strand.

The other flank of the town was secured by the harbour, in the mouth of which was a rocky island, called Santa Clara, where the French had established a post of twenty-five men.

When the battle of Vittoria happened, San Sebastian was nearly dismantled; many of the guns had been removed to form battering-trains, or to arm smaller ports on the coast; there were no bomb-proofs nor palisades nor outworks; the wells were foul, and the place was supplied with water by a single aqueduct. Joseph's defeat restored its importance as a fortress. General Emanuel Rey entered it the 22d of June, bringing with him the escort of the convoy which had quitted Vittoria the day before the battle. The town was thus filled with emigrant Spanish families, with the ministers and other persons attached to the court; the population, ordinarily eight thousand, was increased to sixteen thousand, and disorder and confusion were predominant. Rey, pushed by necessity, immediately forced all persons, not residents, to march at once to France, granting them a guard of only one hundred men.

The people of quality went by sea, the others by land, and fortunately all arrived safely; for the partidas would have given them no quarter.

On the 27th, general Foy, while retreating before sir Thomas Graham, threw a reinforcement into the place. The next day, Mendizabal's Spaniards appeared on the hills behind the ridge of San Bartolomeo and on the Chofres, whereupon general Rey burned the wooden bridge and both the suburbs, and commenced fortifying the heights of San Bartolomeo. The 29th, the Spaniards slightly attacked San Bartolomeo, and were repulsed.

The 1st of July the governor of Guetaria abandoned that place, and, with detestable ferocity, secretly left a lighted train, which exploded the magazine, and destroyed many of the inhabitants. His troops, three hundred in number, entered San Sebastian, and at the same time a vessel from St. Jean de Luz arrived with fifty-six cannoners and some workmen; the garrison was thus increased to three thousand men, and all persons not able to provide subsistence for themselves in advance, were ordered to quit the place. Meanwhile Mendizabal, having cut off the aqueduct, made some approaches towards the head of the burned bridge, on the right of the Urumea, and molested the workmen on the heights of San Bartolomeo.

On the 3d, the Surveillante frigate and a sloop, with some small craft, arrived to blockade the harbour, yet the French vessels from St. Jean de Luz continued to enter by night. The same day the governor made a sally with eleven hundred men, in three columns, to obtain news, and after some hours' skirmishing, returned with a few prisoners.

The 6th, some French vessels, with a detachment of troops and a considerable convoy of provisions, came from St. Jean de Luz.

The 7th, Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set fire to the convent of San Bartolomeo.

On the 9th, sir Thomas Graham arrived with a corps of British and Portuguese troops, and on the 13th the Spaniards marched, some to reinforce the force blockading Santana, the remainder to rejoin the fourth army on the Bidassoa.

At this time general Reille held the entrances to the Bastan by Vera and Echallar; but Wellington drove him thence on the 15th, and established the seventh and light divisions there, thus covering the passes over the Peña de Haya, by which the siege might have been interrupted.

Before general Graham arrived, the French had constructed a redoubt on the heights of San Bartolomeo, and connected it with the convent of that name which they also fortified. These outworks were supported by posts in the ruined houses of the suburb of San Martin, behind, and by a low circular redoubt, formed of casks, on the main road, half-way between the convent and the horn-work. Hence to reduce the place, working along the isthmus, it was necessary to carry in succession three lines of defence covering the town, and a fourth at the foot of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota could be assailed. Seventy-six pieces of artillery were mounted upon these works, and others were afterwards obtained from France by sea.

The besieging army consisted of the fifth division, under general Oswald, and the independent Portuguese brigades of J. Wilson, and Bradford, reinforced by detachments from the first division. Thus, including the artillery-men, some seamen commanded by lieutenant O'Reilly of the Surveillante, and one hundred regular sappers and miners, now for the first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula, nearly ten thousand men were employed.

The guns available for the attack, in the first instance, were a new-battering train originally prepared for the siege of Burgos, consisting of fourteen iron twenty-four-pounders, six eight-inch brass howitzers, four sixty-eight-pound iron carronades, and four iron ten-inch mortars. To these were added six twenty-four-pounders lent by the ships of war, and six eighteen-pounders which had moved with the army from Portugal, making altogether forty pieces, commanded by colonel Dickson. The distance from the depot of siege at Passages to the Chofre sand-hills was one mile and a half of good road, and a pontoon bridge was laid over the Urumea river above the Chofres, but from thence to the height of San Bartolomeo was more than five miles of very bad road.

Early in July, the fortress had been twice closely examined by major Smith, the engineer who had so ably defended Tarifa. He proposed a plan of siege founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofre hills to destroy the flanks, rake the principal front and form a breach with the same batteries, the works being at the same time secured, except at low water, by the Urumea. Counter-batteries, to be constructed on the left of that river, were to rake the line of defence in which the breach was to be formed; and against the castle and its outworks he relied principally upon a vertical fire, instancing the reduction of Fort Bourbon in the West Indies in proof of its efficacy. This plan would probably have reduced San Sebastian in a reasonable time without any remarkable loss of men, and lord Wellington approving of it, though he doubted the efficacy of the vertical fire, ordered the siege to be commenced. He renewed his approval afterwards when he had examined the works in person, and all his orders were in the same spirit; but neither the plan nor his orders were followed; the siege, which should have been an ordinary event of war, has obtained a mournful celebrity, and lord Wellington has been unjustly charged with a contempt for the maxims of the great masters of the art. Anxious he was no doubt to save time, yet he did not for that urge the engineer beyond the rules. *Take the place in the quickest manner, yet do not from overspeed fail to take it*, was the sense of his instructions; but sir Thomas Graham, one of England's best soldiers, appears to have been endowed with a genius for war intuitive rather than reflective; and this joined to his natural modesty and a certain easiness of temper, caused him at times to abandon his own correct conceptions, for the less judicious counsels of those about him who advised deviations from the original plan.

Active operations were commenced on the night of the 10th, by the construction of two batteries against the convent and redoubt of San Bartolomeo. And on the night of the 13th, four batteries, to contain twenty of the heaviest guns and four eight-inch howitzers, were marked out on the Chofre sand-hills, at distances varying from six hundred to thirteen hundred yards from the eastern rampart of the town. The river was supposed to be unfordable, wherefore no parallel of support was made, yet good trenches of communications, and subsequently regular approaches were formed. Two attacks were thus established. One on the right bank of the Urumea, intrusted to the unattached Portuguese brigades; one on the left bank, to the fifth division; but most of the troops were at first encamped on the right bank, to facilitate a junction with the covering army in the event of a general battle.

On the 14th, a French sloop entered the harbour with supplies, and the batteries of the left attack,

under the direction of the German major Hartman, opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing hot shot into that building. The besieged responded with musketry from the redoubt, with heavy guns from the town, and with a field-piece, which they had mounted on the belfry of the convent itself.

The 15th of July, sir Richard Fletcher took the chief command of the engineers, but major Smith retained the direction of the attack from the Chofre hills, and lord Wellington's orders continued to pass through his hands. This day the batteries of the left attack, aided by some howitzers from the right of the Urumea, set the convent on fire, silenced the musketry of the besieged, and so damaged the defences that the Portuguese troops attached to the fifth division were ordered to feel the enemy's post. They were however repulsed with great loss, the French sallied, and the firing did not cease until nightfall.

A battery for seven additional guns to play against San Bartolomeo was now commenced on the right of the Urumea, and the original batteries set fire to the convent several times, but the flames were extinguished by the garrison.

In the night of the 16th, general Rey sounded the Urumea as high as Santa Catalina, designing to pass over and storm the batteries on the Chofres; but the fords discovered were shifting, and the difficulty of execution deterred him from this project.

The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, the assault was ordered without waiting for the effect of the new battery raised on the other side of the Urumea. The storming party was formed in two columns. Detachments from Wilson's Portuguese, supported by the light company of the ninth British regiment and three companies of the Royals, composed the right, which under the direction of general Hay was destined to assail the redoubt. General Bradford directed the left, which being composed of Portuguese, supported by three companies of the ninth British regiment under colonel Cameron, was ordered to assail the convent.

ASSAULT OF SAN BARTOLOMEO.

At ten o'clock in the morning two heavy six-pounders opened against the redoubt; and a sharp fire of musketry in return from the French, who had been reinforced and occupied the suburb of San Martin, announced their resolution to fight. The allied troops were assembled behind the crest of the hill overlooking the convent, and the first signal was given, but the Portuguese advanced slowly at both attacks, and the supporting companies of the ninth regiment on each side, passing through them, fell upon the enemy with the usual impetuosity of British soldiers. Colonel Cameron, while leading his grenadiers down the face of the hill was exposed to a heavy cannonade from the hornwork, but he soon gained the cover of a wall fifty yards from the convent and there awaited the second signal. However, his rapid advance, which threatened to cut off the garrison from the suburb, joined to the fire of the two six-pounders and that of some other field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea, caused the French to abandon the redoubt. Seeing this, Cameron jumped over the wall and assaulted both the convent and the houses of the suburb. At the latter a fierce struggle ensued, and captain Woodman of the ninth was killed in the upper room of a house after fighting his way from below; but the grenadiers carried the convent with such rapidity that the French, unable to explode some small mines they had prepared, hastily joined the troops in the suburb. There, however, the fighting continued, and colonel Cameron's force being very much reduced, the affair

was becoming doubtful, when the remaining companies of his regiment, which he had sent for after the attack commenced, arrived, and the suburb was with much fighting entirely won. At the right attack, the company of the ninth, although retarded by a ravine, by a thick hedge, by the slowness of the Portuguese and by a heavy fire, entered the abandoned redoubt with little loss, but the troops were then rashly led against the cask-redoubt, contrary to general Oswald's orders, and were beaten back by the enemy.

The loss of the French was two hundred and forty men, that of the allies considerable; the companies of the ninth under colonel Cameron, alone, had seven officers and sixty men killed or wounded, and the operation although successful was an error. The battery erected on the right bank of the Urumea was not opened, wherefore, either the assault was precipitated or the battery not necessary; but the loss justified the conception of the battery.

When the action ceased, the engineers made a lodgment in the redoubt, and commenced two batteries for eight pieces to rake the hornwork and the eastern rampart of the place. Two other batteries, to contain four sixty-eight-pound carronades and four ten-inch mortars, were also commenced on the right bank of the Urumea.

The 18th, the besieged threw up traverses on the land front to meet the raking fire of the besiegers, and the latter dragged four pieces up the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and other batteries on the Monte Orgullo. In the night, a lodgment was made on the ruins of San Martin, the two batteries at the right attack were armed, and two additional mortars dragged up the Monte Olia.

The 19th, all the batteries at both attacks were armed, and in the night two approaches being commenced from the suburb of San Martin towards the cask-redoubt, the French were driven from that small work.

On the 20th, the whole of the batteries opened their fire, the greatest part being directed to form the breach.

Major Smith's plan was similar to that followed by marshal Berwick a century before. He proposed a lodgment on the hornwork, before the breach should be assailed, but he had not then read the description of that siege, and therefore unknowingly fixed the breaching-point precisely where the wall had been most strongly rebuilt after Berwick's attack. This was the first fault, yet a slight one, because the wall did not resist the batteries very long, but it was a serious matter that sir Thomas Graham, at the suggestion of the commander of the artillery, began his operations by breaching. Major Smith objected to it, and sir R. Fletcher acquiesced reluctantly on the understanding that the ruining of the defences was only postponed, an understanding afterwards unhappily forgotten.

The result of the first day's attack was not satisfactory, the weather proved bad, the guns mounted on ship-carriages failed, one twenty-four-pounder was rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another became useless from an accident, a captain of engineers was killed, and the besiegers' shot had little effect upon the solid wall. In the night, however, the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages, and a parallel across the isthmus was projected; but the greatest part of the workmen, to avoid a tempest, sought shelter in the suburbs of San Martin, and when day broke only one third of the work was performed.

The 21st, the besiegers' batteries ceased firing to allow of a summons, but the governor refused to re-

ceive the letter, and the firing was resumed. The main wall still resisted, yet the parapets and embrasures crumbled away fast, and the batteries on Monte Olia plunged into the hornwork, although at sixteen hundred yards' distance, with such effect, that the besieged, having no bomb-proofs, were forced to dig trenches to protect themselves. The counter-fire directed solely against the breaching batteries was feeble, but at midnight a shell thrown from the castle into the bay gave the signal for a sally, and during the firing which ensued several French vessels with supplies entered the harbour. This night also the besieged isolated the breach by cuts in the rampart and other defences. On the other hand the besiegers' parallel across the isthmus was completed, and in its progress laid bare the mouth of a drain, four feet high and three feet wide, containing the pipe of the aqueduct cut off by the Spaniards. Through this dangerous opening lieutenant Reid of the engineers, a young and zealous officer, crept even to the counterscarp of the hornwork, and finding the passage there closed by a door, returned without an accident. Thirty barrels of powder were placed in this drain, and eight feet was stopped with sand-bags, thus forming a globe of compression designed to blow, as through a tube, so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill the narrow ditch of the hornwork.

On the 22d, the fire from the batteries, unexampled from its rapidity and accuracy, opened what appeared a practicable breach in the eastern flank wall, between the towers of Los Hornos and Las Mesquitas. The counter-fire of the besieged now slackened, but the descent into the town behind the breach was more than twelve feet perpendicular, and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently working at the interior defences to receive the assault: they added also another gun to the battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador battery, to flank the front attack. On the other hand the besiegers had placed four sixty-eight-pound carronades in battery to play on the defences of the breach; but the fire on both sides slackened, because the guns were greatly enlarged at the vents with constant practice.

On the 23d, the sea blockade being null, the French vessels returned to France with the badly wounded men. This day the besiegers, judging the breach between the towers quite practicable, turned the guns, at the suggestion of general Oswald, to break the wall on the right of the main breach. Major Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage would be gained by making a second opening, to get at which the troops must first pass the great breach; that time would be thus uselessly lost to the besiegers, and that there was a manifest objection on account of the tide and depth of water at the new point attacked. His counsel was overruled, and in the course of the day, the wall being thin, the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach thirty feet wide was rendered practicable.

The defensive fire of the besieged being now much diminished, the ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight-pound carronades were turned upon the defence of the great breach, and upon a stockade which separated the high curtain on the land front, from the lower works of the flank against which the attack was conducted. The houses near the breach were soon in flames which spread rapidly, destroyed some of the defences of the besieged and menaced the whole town with destruction. The assault was ordered for the next morning. But when the troops assembled in the trenches, the burning houses appeared so formidable that the attack was deferred and the

batteries again opened, partly against the second breach, partly against the defences, partly to break the wall in a third place between the half bastion of St. John on the land front and the main breach.

During the night, the vigilant governor, expecting the assault, mounted two field-pieces on the cavalier, in the centre of the land front, which being fifteen feet above the other defences commanded the high curtain, and they still had on the hornwork a little piece, and two casemated guns on the flank of the cavalier. Two other field-pieces were mounted on an intrenchment, which crossing the ditch of the land front, bore on the approaches to the main breach; a twenty-four pounder looked from the tower of Las Mesquitas, between the main breach and where the third opening was being made, and consequently flanking both; two four-pounders were in the tower of Hornos; two heavy guns were on the flank of St. Elmo, and two others, placed on the right of the Mirador, could play upon the breaches from within the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus fourteen pieces were still available for defence, the retaining sea-wall, or *fausse-braye*, which strengthened the flank of the hornwork, and between which and the river the storming parties must necessarily advance, was covered with live shells, to roll over on the columns, and behind the flaming houses, near the breach, other edifices were loopholed and filled with musketeers. However, the fire extending rapidly and fiercely, greatly injured the defences; the French, to save their guns, withdrew them until the moment of attack, and the British artillery officers were confident that in daylight they could silence the enemy's guns, and keep the parapet clear of men; wherefore sir Thomas Graham renewed the order for

THE ASSAULT.

In the night of the 24th, two thousand men of the fifth division filed into the trenches on the isthmus. This force was composed of the third battalion of the Royals, under major Frazer, destined to storm the great breach; the thirty-eighth regiment, under colonel Greville, designed to assail the lesser and most distant breach; the ninth regiment under colonel Cameron, appointed to support the Royals; finally, a detachment, selected from the light companies of all those battalions, was placed in the centre of the Royals, under the command of lieutenant Campbell, of the ninth regiment. This chosen detachment, accompanied by the engineer Machel, with a ladder party, was intended to sweep the high curtain, after the breach should be won.

The distance from the trenches to the points of attack was more than three hundred yards, along the contracted space lying between the retaining wall of the hornwork and the river; the ground was strewn with rocks covered by slippery seaweeds; the tide had left large and deep pools of water; the parapet of the hornwork was entire, as well as the retaining wall; the parapets of the other works and the two towers, which closely flanked the breach, although injured, were far from being ruined, and every place was thickly garnished with musketeers. The difficulties of the attack were obvious, and a detachment of Portuguese, placed in a trench, opened beyond the parallel on the isthmus, within sixty yards of the ramparts, was ordered to quell, if possible, the fire of the hornwork.

While it was still dark, the storming columns moved out of the trenches, and the globe of compression in the drain, was exploded with great effect against the counterscarp and glacis of the hornwork. The garrison, astonished by the unlooked-for event,

abandoned the flanking parapet; and the troops rushed onwards, the stormers for the main breach leading, and suffering more from the fire of their own batteries on the right of the Urumea than from the enemy. Major Frazer and the engineer Harry Jones first reached the breach. The enemy had fallen back in confusion behind the ruins of the still burning houses, and those brave officers rushed up, expecting that their troops would follow; but not many followed, for it was extremely dark, the natural difficulties of the way had contracted the front and disordered the column in its whole length, and the soldiers, straggling and out of wind, arrived in small disconnected parties at the foot of the breach. The foremost gathered near their gallant leaders; but the depth of the descent into the town and the volumes of flame and smoke which still issued from the burning houses behind awed the stoutest; and more than two-thirds of the storming column, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had broken off at the demi-bastion, to commence a musketry battle with the enemy on the rampart. Meanwhile the shells from the Monte Orgullo fell rapidly, the defenders of the breach rallied, and with a smashing musketry from the ruins and loopholed houses smote the head of the column, while the men in the towers smote them on the flanks, and from every quarter came showers of grape and hand-grenades, tearing the ranks in a dreadful manner.

Major Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the intrepid Jones stood there awhile longer, amidst a few heroic soldiers, hoping for aid; but none came, and he and those with him were struck down. The engineer Machel had been killed early, and the men bearing ladders fell, or were dispersed. Thus the rear of the column was in absolute confusion before the head was beaten. It was in vain that colonel Grenville of the thirty-eighth, colonel Cameron of the ninth, captain Archimbeau of the Royals, and many other regimental officers, exerted themselves to rally their discomfited troops and refill the breach; it was in vain that lieutenant Campbell, breaking through the tumultuous crowd, with the survivors of his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins; twice he ascended, twice he was wounded, and all around him died. The Royals endeavouring to retire, got intermixed with the thirty-eighth and with some companies of the ninth, which had unsuccessfully endeavoured to pass them, and get to the lesser breach. Then swayed by different impulses, and pent up in the narrow way between the hornwork and the river, the mass reeling to and fro, could neither advance nor go back, until the shells and musketry, constantly plied both in front and flank, had thinned the concourse, and the trenches were regained in confusion. At daylight a truce was agreed to for an hour, during which the French, who had already humanely removed the gallant Jones and the other wounded men from the breach, now carried off the more distant sufferers, lest they should be drowned by the rising of the tide.

Five officers of engineers, including sir Richard Fletcher, and forty-four officers of the line, with five hundred and twenty men, had been killed, wounded, or made prisoners in this assault, the failure of which was signal, yet the causes were obvious, and may be classed thus:

- 1st. Deviation from the original project of siege, and from lord Wellington's instructions;
- 2nd. Bad arrangements of detail;
- 3rd. Want of vigour in the execution.

In respect of the first, lord Wellington, having visited the Chofre trenches on the 22d, confirmed his former approval of Smith's plan, and gave that

officer final directions for the attack, finishing thus, "*Fair daylight must be taken for the assault.*" These instructions and their emphatic termination were repeated by major Smith in the proper quarter; but they were not followed; no lodgment was made on the hornwork, the defences were nearly entire both in front and flank, and the assault was made in darkness. Major Smith had also, by calculation and by consultations with the fishermen, ascertained that the ebb of tide would serve exactly at daybreak on the 24th; but the assault was made on the 25th, and then before daylight, when the water being too high, contracted the ground, increased the obstacles, and forced the assaulting column to march on a narrow front and a long line, making an uneasy progress, and trickling onwards, instead of dashing with a broad surge against the breach. In fine, the rules of art being neglected, and no extraordinary resource substituted, the operation failed.

The troops filed out of the long narrow trenches in the night, a tedious operation, and were immediately exposed to a fire of grape from their own batteries on the Chofres. This fire, intended to keep down that of the enemy, should have ceased when the globe of compression was sprung in the drain; but, owing to the darkness and the noise, the explosion could neither be seen nor heard. The effect of it, however, drove the enemy from the hornwork, the Portuguese on that side advanced to the ditch, and a vigorous escalade would probably have succeeded, but they had no ladders. Again the stormers of the great breach marched first, filling up the way, and rendering the second breach, as major Smith had foretold, useless, and the ladder-bearers never got to their destination. The attack was certainly ill-digested, and there was a neglect of moral influence, followed by its natural consequence, want of vigour in execution.

The deferring of the assault from the 24th to the 25th, expressly because the breach was too difficult, rendered the troops uneasy; they suspected some hidden danger, and in this mood emerging from the trenches, they were struck by the fire of their own batteries; then wading through deep pools of water, or staggering in the dark over slippery rocks, and close under the enemy's flanking works, whence every shot told with fatal effect, how could they manifest their natural conquering energy? It is possible that a second and more vigorous assault on the great breach might have been effected by a recognized leader; but no general or staff-officer went out of the trenches with the troops, and the isolated exertions of the regimental officers were unavailing. Nor were there wanting other sinister influences. General Oswald had in the councils earnestly and justly urged the dangers arising from the irregular mode of attack; but this anticipation of ill-success, in which other officers of rank joined, was freely expressed out of council, and it is said even in the hearing of the troops, abating that daring confidence which victory loves.

Lord Wellington repaired immediately to San Sebastian. The causes of the failure were apparent, and he would have renewed the attack, but wanting ammunition, deferred it until the powder and additional ordnance, which he had written for to England, as early as the 26th of June, should arrive. The next day other events caused him to resort to a blockade, and the battering train was transported to Passages, two guns and two howitzers only being retained on the Chofres and the Monte Olia. This operation was completed in the night of the 26th; but at daybreak the garrison made a sally from the hornwork, surprised the trenches, and swept off two

hundred Portuguese and thirty British soldiers. To avoid a repetition of this disaster, the guards of the trenches were concentrated in the left parallel, and patrols only were sent out, yet one of those also was cut off on the 1st of August. Thus terminated the first part of the siege of San Sebastian, in which the allies lost thirteen hundred soldiers and seamen, exclusive of Spaniards during Mendizabel's blockade.

CHAPTER IV.

Soult appointed the emperor's lieutenant—Arrives at Bayonne—Joseph goes to Paris—Sketch of Napoleon's political and military situation—His greatness of mind—Soult's activity—Theatre of operations described—Soult resolves to succour Pampeluna—Relative positions and numbers of the contending armies described.

THE battle of Vittoria was fought on the 21st of June.

The 1st of July, marshal Soult, under a decree issued at Dresden, succeeded Joseph as lieutenant to the emperor, who thus showed how little his mind had been affected by his brother's accusations.

The 12th, Soult, travelling with surprising expedition, assumed the command of the armies of the "north," the "centre" and the "south," now reorganized in one body, called "the army of Spain." And he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside if necessary; but that monarch voluntarily retired from the army.

At this period, general Paris remained at Jaca, as belonging to Suchet's command; but Clauzel had entered France, and the "army of Spain," reinforced from the interior, was composed of nine divisions of infantry, a reserve, and two regular divisions of cavalry, besides the light horsemen attached to the infantry. Following the imperial muster-rolls, this army, including the garrisons and thirteen German, Italian, and Spanish battalions not belonging to the organization, amounted to one hundred and fourteen thousand men; and as the armies of Catalonia and of Aragon numbered, at the same period, above sixty-six thousand, the whole force still employed against Spain exceeded one hundred and eighty thousand men with twenty thousand horses; and of this number one hundred and fifty-six thousand were present under arms; while in Germany and Poland above seven hundred thousand French soldiers were in activity.

Such great forces, guided by Napoleon, seemed sufficient to defy the world, but moral power, which he has himself described as constituting three-fourths of military strength, that power which puny essayists, declaiming for their hour against the genius of warriors, are unable to comprehend, although by far the most important part of the art which they decry, was wanting. One-half of this force, organized in peace and setting forth in hope at the beginning of a war, would have enabled Napoleon to conquer; but now near the close of a terrible struggle, with a declining fate and the national confidence in his fortune and genius shaken, although that genius was never more surpassingly displayed, his military power was a vast but unsound machine. The public mind was bewildered by the intricacy and greatness of combinations, the full scope of which he alone could see clearly; and generals and ministers doubted and feared when they should have supported him, neglecting their duty or coldly executing his orders when their zeal should have redoubled. The unity of impulse so essential to success was thus lost, and his numer-

ous armies carried not with them proportionate strength. To have struggled with hope under such astounding difficulties, was scarcely to be expected from the greatest minds, but like the emperor, to calculate and combine the most stupendous efforts with calmness and accuracy, to seize every favourable chance with unerring rapidity, to sustain every reverse with undisturbed constancy, never urged to rashness by despair, yet enterprising to the utmost verge of daring consistent with reason, was a display of intellectual greatness so surpassing, that it is not without justice Napoleon has been called, in reference as well to past ages as to the present, the foremost of mankind.

The suddenness, as well as the completeness, of the destruction caused by the snows of Russia, had shattered the emperor's military and political system, and the broken parts of the former, scattered widely, were useless until he could again bind them together. To effect this he rushed with a raw army into the midst of Germany, for his hope was to obtain by celerity a rallying point for his veterans, who having survived the Russian winter and the succeeding pestilence, were widely dispersed. His first effort was successful, but without good cavalry victory cannot be pushed far, and the practised horsemen of France had nearly disappeared; their successors, badly mounted and less skilful, were too few and too weak, and thus extraordinary exertion was required from soldiers whose youth and inexperience rendered them unfit even for the ordinary hardships of war.

The measure of value for Wellington's campaign is thus attained, for if Joseph had opposed him with only moderate ability and had avoided a great battle, not less than fifty thousand veterans could have been drawn off to reinforce and give stability to the young soldiers in Germany. On the side of Spain those veterans were indeed still numerous, but the spirit of the French people behind them, almost worn out by victory, was now abashed by defeat, and even the military men who had acquired grandeur and riches beyond their hopes, were with few exceptions averse to further toil. Napoleon's astonishing firmness of mind was understood by few in high stations, shared by fewer; and many were the traitors to him and to France and to the glories of both. However, his power was still enormous, and wherever he led in person his brave and faithful soldiers, fighting with the true instinct of patriotism, conquered. Where he was not their iron hardihood abated.

Marshal Soult was one of the few men whose indefatigable energy rendered them worthy lieutenants of the emperor; and with singular zeal, vigour and ability, he now served. His troops, nominally above one hundred thousand men, ninety-seven thousand being present under arms, with eighty-six pieces of artillery, were not all available for field operations. The garrisons of Pampeluna, San Sebastian, Santona, and Bayonne, together with the foreign battalions, absorbed seventeen thousand; and most of the latter had orders to regain their own countries with a view to form the new levies. The permanent "army of Spain" furnished therefore only seventy-seven thousand five hundred men present under arms, seven thousand of which were cavalry, and its condition was not satisfactory. The people on the frontier were flying from the allies, the military administration was disorganized, and the recent disasters had discouraged the soldiers and deteriorated their discipline. Under these circumstances Soult was desirous of some delay to secure his base and restore order ere he attempted to regain the offensive, but his instructions on that point were imperative.

Napoleon's system was perfectly adapted for great efforts, civil or military; but so rapid had been lord Wellington's advance from Portugal, so decisive his operations, that the resources of France were in a certain degree paralysed, and the army still reeled and rocked from the blows it had received. Bayonne, a fortress of no great strength in itself, had been entirely neglected, and the arming and provisioning that and other places was indispensable. The restoration of an intrenched camp originally traced by Vauban to cover Bayonne followed, and the enforcement of discipline, the removal of the immense train of Spanish families, civil administrators, and other wasteful followers of Joseph's court, the arrangement of a general system for supply of money and provisions, aided by judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities and excite the national spirit, were amongst the first indications that a great commander was in the field. The soldiers' confidence soon revived, and some leading merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded the general; but the people of the south were generally more inclined to avoid the burden of defending their country than to answer appeals to their patriotism.

On the 14th, Soult examined the line of military positions, and ordered Reille, who then occupied the passes of Vera and Echallar, to prepare pontoons for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at Biri-atu. That general, as we have seen, was driven from those passes the next day, but he prepared his bridges; and such was Soult's activity that on the 16th all the combinations for a gigantic offensive movement were digested, the means of executing it rapidly advancing, and orders were issued for the preliminary dispositions.

At this time the French army was divided into three corps of battle, and a reserve. Clauzel, commanding the left wing, was at St. Jean Pied de Port and in communication, by the French frontier, with general Paris at Jaca. Drouet, count d'Erlon, commanding the centre, occupied the heights near Espelette and Ainhoa, with an advanced guard behind Urdax. General Reille, commanding the right wing, was in position on the mountains overlooking Vera from the side of France. The reserve, under Villatte, comprising a separate body of light horsemen and the foreign battalions, guarded the banks of the Bidassoa from the mouth upwards to Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed. The division of heavy cavalry under Treillard, and that of light cavalry under Pierre Soult, the marshal's brother, were on the banks of the Nive and Adour.

The counter-disposition of the allies was as follows:

Byng's brigade of British infantry, detached from the second division and reinforced by Morillo's Spaniards, was on the extreme right. These troops had early in the month driven the French from the village of Val Carlos in the valley of that name, and had foraged the French territory, but finding no good permanent position, retreated again to the rocks in front of the passes of Roncevalles and Ibañeta.

On the left of Byng, Campbell's brigade, detached from Hamilton's Portuguese division, was posted in the Aldudes and supported by general Cole, who was with the fourth division at Viscayret in the valley of Urroz.

On the left of Campbell, general Hill defended the Bastan with the remainder of the second division, and with Hamilton's Portuguese, now commanded by Sylveira, conde d'Amarante. Picton, with the third division, was stationed at Olague as a reserve to those troops and to Cole.

On the left of Hill, the seventh and light division

occupied a chain of mountains running by Echallar to Vera, and behind them at the town of St. Estevan was posted the sixth division.

Longa's Spaniards continued the line of defence from Vera to general Giron's position, which extending along the mountains bordering the Bidassoa to the sea, crossed the great road of Irun. Behind Giron was the besieging army under sir Thomas Graham.

Thirty-six pieces of field artillery, and some regiments of British and Portuguese cavalry, were with the right wing and centre, but the bulk of the horsemen and the heavy guns were behind the mountains, chiefly about Tañalla. The great hospitals were in Vittoria, the commissariat depots were principally on the coast, and to supply the troops in the mountains was exceedingly difficult and onerous.

Henry O'Donel, conde de l'Abispal, blockaded Pampeluna with the Andalusian army of reserve, and Carlos d'Espana's division was on the march to join him. Mina, Julian Sanchez, Duran, Empecinado, Goyan and some smaller bands, were on the side of Zaragoza and Daroca, cutting the communication between Soult and Suchet, and the latter, thinking Aragon lost, was, as we have seen, falling back upon Catalonia.

The whole force under lord Wellington's immediate command, that is to say in Navarre and Guipuscoa, was certainly above one hundred thousand men, of which the Anglo-Portuguese furnished fifty-seven thousand present under arms, seven thousand being cavalry; but the Spanish regulars under Giron, L'Abispal and Carlos d'Espana, including Longa's division and some of Mendizabal's army, scarcely amounted to twenty-five thousand. According to the respective muster-rolls, the troops in line actually under arms and facing each other were, of the allies about eighty-two thousand, of the French about seventy-eight thousand; but as the rolls of the latter include every man and officer of all arms belonging to the organization, and the British and Portuguese rolls so quoted, would furnish between ten and twelve thousand additional combatants, the French force must be reduced, or the allies augmented in that proportion. This surplus was however now compensated by the foreign battalions temporarily attached to Soult's army, and by the numerous national guards, all mountaineers, fierce, warlike and very useful as guides. In other respects lord Wellington stood at a disadvantage.

The theatre of operation was a trapezoid, with sides from forty to sixty miles in length, and having Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, San Sebastian and Pampeluna, all fortresses, in possession of the French at the angles. The interior, broken and tormented by dreadful mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep water-courses, precipices and forests, would at first sight appear a wilderness which no military combinations could embrace, and susceptible only of irregular and partisan operations. But the great spinal ridge of the Pyrenees furnishes a clue to the labyrinth of hills and valleys. Running diagonally across the quadrilateral, it separated Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port and San Sebastian from Pampeluna, and thus the portion of the allied army which more especially belonged to the blockade of Pampeluna, was in a manner cut off from that which belonged to the siege of San Sebastian. They were distinct armies, each having its particular object, and the only direct communication between them was the great road running behind the mountains from Tolosa, by Yrurzun, to Pampeluna. The centre of the allies was indeed an army of succour and connexion, but of necessity very much scattered, and

with lateral communications so few, difficult and indirect, as to prevent any unity of movement; nor could general Hill's corps move at all until an attack was decidedly pronounced against one of the extremities, lest the most direct gun-road to Pampeluna which it covered should be unwarily opened to the enemy. In short, the French general, taking the offensive, could by beaten roads concentrate against any part of the English general's line, which, necessarily a passively defensive one, followed an irregular trace of more than fifty miles of mountains.

Wellington having his battering train and stores about San Sebastian, which was also nearer and more accessible to the enemy than Pampeluna, made his army lean towards that side. His left wing, including the army of siege, was twenty-one thousand strong, with singularly strong positions of defence, and the centre, about twenty-four thousand strong, could in two marches unite with the left wing to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of an enemy advancing by the high road of Irun; but three days or more were required by those troops to concentrate for the security of the blockade on the right. Soult however judged that no decisive result would attend a direct movement upon San Sebastian; because Guipuscoa was exhausted of provisions, and the centre of the allies could fall on his flank before he reached Ernani, which, his attack in front failing, would place him in a dangerous position. Moreover by means of his sea communications he knew that San Sebastian was not in extremity; but he had no communication with Pampeluna, and feared its fall. Wherefore he resolved to operate by his left.

Profiting by the roads leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, and covering his movement by the Nivelle and Nive rivers and by the positions of his centre, he hoped to gather on Wellington's right quicker than that general could gather to oppose him, and thus compensating by numbers the disadvantage of assailing mountain positions force a way to Pampeluna. That fortress once succoured, he designed to seize the road of Yrurzun, and keeping in mass either fall upon the separated divisions of the centre in detail as they descended from the hills, or operate on the rear of the force besieging San Sebastian, while a corps of observation, which he proposed to leave on the lower Bidassoa, menaced it in front and followed it in retreat. The siege of San Sebastian, the blockade of Pampeluna, and probably that of Santona, would be thus raised, and the French army, united in an abundant country, and its communication with Suchet secured, would be free either to co-operate with that marshal or to press its own attack.

In this view, and to mislead lord Wellington by vexing his right simultaneously with the construction of the bridges against his left, Soult wrote to general Paris, desiring him to march when time suited from Jaca by the higher valleys towards Aviz or Sanguesa, to drive the partisans from that side and join the left of the army when it should have reached Pampeluna. Meanwhile Clauzel was directed to repair the roads in his own front, to push the heads of his columns towards the passes of Roncevalles, and by sending a strong detachment into the Val de Baigorri, towards the lateral pass of Yspegui, to menace Hill's flank which was at that pass, and the front of Campbell's brigade in the Alduides.

On the 20th, Reille's troops on the heights above Vera and Sarre, being cautiously relieved by Villatte, marched through Cambo towards St. Jean Pied de Port. They were to reach the latter early on the 22d, and on that day also the two divisions of cavalry and the park of artillery were to be concentrated

at the same place. D'Erlon with the centre meanwhile still held his positions at Espelette, Ainhoë or Ainhoa, and Urdax, thus covering and masking the great movements taking place behind.

Villatte, who including the foreign battalions had eighteen thousand troops on the rolls, furnishing about fifteen thousand sabres and bayonets, remained in observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened by superior forces he was to retire slowly and in mass upon the intrenched camp commenced at Bayonne, yet halting successively on the positions of Bordegain in front of St. Jean de Luz, and on the heights of Bidart in rear of that town. He was especially directed to show only French troops at the advanced posts, and if the assailants made a point with a small corps, to drive them vigorously over the Bidassoa again. But if the allies should, in consequence of Soult's operations against their right, retire, Villatte was to relieve San Sebastian and to follow them briskly by Tolosa.

Rapidity was of vital importance to the French general, but heavy and continued rains swelled the streams, and ruined the roads in the deep country between Bayonne and the hills; the head-quarters, which should have arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port on the 20th, only reached Olhonce, a few miles short of that place, the 21st; and Reille's troops, unable to make way at all by Cambo, took the longer road of Bayonne. The cavalry was retarded in like manner, and the whole army, men and horses, were worn down by the severity of the marches. Two days were thus lost, but on the 24th, more than sixty thousand fighting men, including cavalry, national guards and gendarmes, with sixty-six pieces of artillery, were assembled to force the passes of Roncevalles and Maya. The main road leading to the former was repaired, three hundred sets of bullocks were provided to draw the guns up the mountain, and the national guards of the frontier on the left were ordered to assemble in the night on the heights of Yropil to be reinforced on the morning of the 25th, by detachments of regular troops, with a view to vex and turn the right of the allies, which extended to the foundry of Orbaiceta.

Such were Soult's first dispositions, but as mountain warfare is complicated in the extreme, it will be well to consider more in detail the relative positions and objects of the hostile forces and the nature of the country.

It has been already stated that the great spine of the hills, trending westward, ran diagonally across the theatre of operations. From this spine huge ridges shot out on either hand, and the communications between the valleys thus formed on both sides of the main chain passed over certain comparatively low places, called "*cols*," by the French, and *puertos* by the Spaniards. The Bastan, the Val Carlos, and the Val de Baigorri, the upper part of which is divided into the Alduides and the Val de Ayra, were on the French side of the great chain; on the Spanish side were the valleys of the Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, the valley of Iscua or Roncevalles, the valley of Urroz, the Val de Zubiri, and the valley of Lanz, the two latter leading down directly upon Pampeluna, which stands within two miles of the junction of their waters. Such being the relative situations of the valleys, the disposition and force of the armies shall now be traced from left to right of the French, and from right to left of the allies. But first it must be observed that the main chain, throwing as it were a shoulder forward from Roncevalles towards St. Jean Pied de Port, placed the entrance to the Spanish valley of Ahescoa or Orbaiceta, in the power of Soult, who could thus, by Yropil,

turn the extreme right of his adversary with detachments, although not with an army

Val Carlos.—Two issues led from this valley over the main chain, namely, the Ibañeta and Mendichuri passes; and there was also the lateral pass of Atalosti leading into the Alduides, all comprised within a space of two or three miles.

The high road from St. Jean Pied de Port to Pampeluna, ascending the left-hand ridge or boundary of Val Carlos, runs along the crest until it joins the superior chain of mountains, and then along the summit of that also until it reaches the pass of Ibañeta, whence it descends to Roncevalles. Ibañeta may therefore be called the Spanish end of the pass: but it is also a pass in itself, because a narrow road, leading through Arnegui and the village of Val Carlos, ascends directly to Ibañeta and falls into the main road behind it.

Clauzel's three divisions of infantry, all the artillery and the cavalry, were formed in two columns in front of St. Jean Pied de Port. The head of one was placed on some heights above Arnegui about two miles from the village of Val Carlos; the head of the other at the Venta de Orrisson, on the main road and within two miles of the remarkable rocks of Chateau Piñon, a little beyond which one narrow way descended on the right to the village of Val Carlos, and another on the left to the foundry of Orbaiceta.

On the right-hand boundary of Val Carlos, near the rock of Ayrola, Reille's divisions were concentrated, with orders to ascend that rock at daylight, and march by the crest of the ridge towards a culminant point of the great chain called the Lindouz, which gained, Reille was to push detachments through the passes of Ibañeta and Mendichuri to the villages of Roncevalles and Espinal. He was at the same time, to seize the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga immediately on his right, and even approach the more distant passes of Renecabal and Bellate, thus closing the issues from the Alduides, and menacing those from the Bastan.

Val de Ayra; the Alduides; Val de Baigorri.—The ridge of Ayrola, at the foot of which Reille's troops were posted, separates Val Carlos from these valleys, which must be designated by the general name of the Alduides for the upper part, and the Val de Baigorri for the lower. The issues from the Alduides over the great chain towards Spain were the passes of Sahorgain and Urtiaga; and there was also a road running from the village of Alduides through the Atalosti pass to the Ibañeta, a distance of eight miles, by which general Campbell's brigade communicated with and could join Byng and Morillo.

Bastan.—This district, including the valley of Lerins and the Cinco Villas, is separated from the Alduides and Val de Baigorri by the lofty mountain of La Houssa, on which the national guards of the Val de Baigorri and the Alduides were ordered to assemble on the night of the 24th, and to light fires so as to make it appear a great body was menacing the Bastan by that flank. The Bastan however does not belong to the same geographical system as the other valleys. Instead of opening to the French territory, it is entirely enclosed with high mountains, and while the waters of the Val Carlos, the Alduides, and Val de Baigorri run off northward by the Nive, those of the Bassan run off westward by the Bidassoa, from which they are separated by the Mandale, Commissari, La Rhune, Santa Barbara, Ivantelly, Atchiola and other mountains.

The entrances to the Bastan, with reference to the position of the French army, were by the passes

of Vera and Echellar on its right; by the Col de Maya and Arietta passes in the centre; and on the left by the lateral passes of Yspegui, Lorrietta, and Berderez, which led from the Val de Baigorri and the Alduides. The issues over the principal chain of the Pyreness in the direct line from the Maya entrances, were the passes of Renecabal and Bellate; the first leading into the valley of Zubiri, the second into the valley of Lanz. There was also the pass of Artesiaga leading into the Val de Zubiri, but it was nearly impracticable, and all the roads through the Bastan were crossed by strong positions dangerous to assail.

The Col de Maya comprised several passages in a space of four miles, all of which were menaced by D'Erlon from Espelette and Urdax; and he had twenty-one thousand men, furnishing about eighteen thousand bayonets. His communications with Soult were maintained by cavalry posts through the Val de Baigorri, and his orders were to attack the allies when the combinations in the Val Carlos and on the Houssa mountain should cause them to abandon the passes at Maya; but he was especially directed to operate by his left, so to secure the passes leading towards Reille with a view to the concentration of the whole army. Thus if Hill retreated by the pass of Bellate, D'Erlon was to move by Berderez and the Alduides; but if Hill retired upon St. Estevan, D'Erlon was to move by the pass of Bellate. Such being the dispositions of the French general, those of the allies shall now be traced.

General Byng and Morillo guarded the passes in front of Roncevalles. Their combined force consisted of sixteen hundred British and from three to four thousand Spaniards. Byng's brigade and two Spanish battalions occupied the rocks of Altobiscar on the high road facing Chateau Piñon; one Spanish battalion was at the foundry in the valley of Orbaiceta on their right; Morillo, with the remainder of the Spaniards, occupied the heights of Iroulepe, on the left of the road leading to the village of Val Carlos and overlooking the nearest houses of that straggling place.

These positions, distant only four and five miles from the French columns assembled at Venta de Orrisson and Arnegui, were insecure. The ground was indeed steep and difficult of access, but too extensive; moreover, although the passes led into the Roncevalles, that valley did not lead direct to Pampeluna; the high road after descending a few miles turned to the right, and crossing two ridges and the intervening valley of Urroz entered the valley of Zubiri, down which it was conducted to Pampeluna: wherefore, after passing Ibañeta in retreat, the allied troops could not avoid lending their right flank to Reille's divisions as far as Viscayret, in the valley of Urroz. It was partly to obviate this danger, partly to support O'Donel, while Clauzel's force was in the vicinity of Jaca, that the fourth division, about six thousand strong, occupied Viscayret, six miles from the pass of Ibañeta, ten miles from Morillo's position, and twelve miles from Byng's position. But when Clauzel retired to France, general Cole was directed to observe the roads leading over the main chain from the Alduides district, and to form a rallying point and reserve for Campbell, Byng, and Morillo, his instructions being to maintain the Roncevalles passes against a front attack, but not to commit his troops in a desperate battle if the flanks were insecure.

On the left of Byng and Morillo, Campbell's Portuguese, about two thousand strong, were encamped above the village of Alduides on a mountain called Mizpira. They observed the national guards of the

Val de Baigorri, preserved the communication between Byng and Hill, and in some measure covered the right flank of the latter. From the Alduides, Campbell could retreat through the pass of Sahorgain upon Viscayret in the valley of Urroz, and through the passes of Urtiaga and Renacabal upon Eugui in the Val de Zubiri; finally, by the lateral pass of Atalosti he could join Byng and the fourth division. The communication between all these posts was maintained by Long's cavalry.

Continuing the line of positions to the left, general Hill occupied the Bastan with the second British division, Sylveira's Portuguese, and some squadron's of horse; but Byng's and Campbell's brigades being detached, he had not more than nine thousand sabres and bayonets. His two British brigades under general William Stewart guarded the Col de Maya; Sylveira's Portuguese were at Erazu, on the right of Stewart, observing the passes of Arietta, Yspegui and Elliorita; of which the two former were occupied by major Brotherton's cavalry and by the sixth caçadores. The direct line of retreat and point of concentration for all these troops was Elisondo.

From Elisondo the route of Pampeluna over the great chain was by the pass of Bellate and the valley of Lanz. The latter running nearly parallel with the valley of Zubiri is separated from it by a wooded and rugged ridge, and between them there were but three communications: the one high up, leading from Lanz to Eugui, and prolonged from thence to Viscayret, in the valley of Urroz; the other two lower down, leading from Ostiz and Olague to the village of Zubiri. At Olague the third division, furnishing four thousand three hundred bayonets under Picton, was posted, ready to support Cole or Hill as occasion required.

Continuing the front line from the left of Stewart's position at the Col de Maya, the trace ran along the mountains forming the French boundary of the Bastan. It comprised the passes of Echallar and Vera, guarded by the seventh division under lord Dalhousie, and by the light division under general Charles Alten. The former, furnishing four thousand seven hundred bayonets, communicated with general Stewart by a narrow road over the Atchiola mountain, and the eighty-second regiment was encamped at this junction with the Elisondo road, about three miles behind the pass of Maya. The light division, four thousand strong, was at Vera, guarding the roads which led behind the mountains through Sumbilla and St. Estevan to Elisondo.

These two divisions being only observed by the left wing of Villatte's reserve were available for the succour of either wing, and behind them, at the town of St. Estevan, was the sixth division of six thousand bayonets, now under general Pack. Placed at equal distances from Vera and Maya, having free communication with both and a direct line of march to Pampeluna, over the main chain of the Pyrenees by the *Puerto de Arraiz*, sometimes called the pass of *Dona Maria*, this division was available for any object, and could not have been better posted.

Around Pampeluna, the point to which all the lines of march converged, the Spanish troops under O'Donel maintained the blockade, and they were afterwards joined by Carlos d'España's division at a very critical moment. Thus reinforced they amounted to eleven thousand, of which seven thousand could be brought into action without abandoning the works of blockade.

Head-quarters were at Lesaca, and the line of correspondence with the left wing was over the

Peña de Haya, that with the right wing by St. Estevan, Elisondo and the Alduides. The line of correspondence between sir Thomas Graham and Pampeluna was by Goizueta and the high road of Yrurzun.

As the French were almost in contact with the allies' positions at Roncevalles, which was also the point of defence nearest to Pampeluna, it followed that on the rapidity or slowness with which Soult overcame resistance in that quarter depended his success; and a comparative estimate of numbers and distances will give the measure of his chances.

Clauzel's three divisions furnished about sixteen thousand bayonets, besides the cavalry, the artillery, and the national guards menacing the valley of Orbaiceta. Byng and Morillo were therefore with five thousand infantry, to sustain the assault of sixteen thousand until Cole could reinforce them; but Cole being twelve miles distant could not come up in fighting order under four or five hours. And as Reille's divisions, of equal strength with Clauzel's, could before that time seize the Lindouz and turn the left, it was clear the allied troops, although increased to eleven thousand by the junction of the fourth division, must finally abandon their ground to seek a new field of battle where the third division could join them from the valley of Lanz, and Campbell's brigade from the Alduides. Thus raised to seventeen or eighteen thousand bayonets, with some guns, they might on strong ground oppose Clauzel and Reille's thirty thousand; but as Picton's position at Olague was more than a day's march from Byng's position at Altobiscar, their junction could only be made in the valley of the Zubiri and not very distant from Pampeluna. And when seven thousand Spaniards from the blockade, and two or three thousand cavalry from the side of the Ebro are added, we have the full measure of the allies' strength in this quarter.

General Hill, menaced by D'Erlon with a very superior force, and having the pass of Maya, half a day's march farther from Pampeluna than the passes of Roncevalles, to defend, could not give ready help. If he retreated rapidly, D'Erlon could follow as rapidly, and though Picton and Cole would thus be reinforced with ten thousand men, Soult would gain eighteen thousand. Hill could not, however, move until he knew that Byng and Cole were driven from the Roncevalles passes; in fine, he could not avoid a dilemma. For if he maintained the passes at Maya and affairs went wrong near Pampeluna, his own situation would be imminently dangerous; if he maintained Irueta, his next position, the same danger was to be dreaded; and the passes of Maya, once abandoned, D'Erlon moving by his own left towards the Alduides, could join Soult in the valley of Zubiri before Hill could join Cole and Picton by the valley of Lanz. But if Hill did not maintain the position of Irueta, D'Erlon could follow and cut the sixth and seventh divisions off from the valley of Lanz. The extent and power of Soult's combinations are thus evinced. Hill, forced to await orders, and hampered by the operations of D'Erlon, required it might be three days to get into line near Pampeluna; but D'Erlon, after gaining Maya, could in one day and a half, by the passes of Berderez and Urtiaga, join Soult in the Val de Zubiri. Meanwhile Byng, Morillo, Cole, Campbell, and Picton would be exposed to the operations of double their own numbers; and however firm and able, individually, those generals might be, they could not, when suddenly brought together, be expected to seize the whole system of operations and act with that decision and nicety of judgment which the occasion de-

manded. It was clear, therefore, that Hill's force must be in some measure paralysed at first, and finally thrown with the sixth, seventh, and light divisions, upon an external line of operations, while the French moved upon internal lines.

On the other hand it is also clear that the corps of Byng, Morillo, Campbell, Cole, Picton, and Hill were only pieces of resistance on lord Wellington's board, and that the sixth, seventh, and light divisions were those with which he meant to win his game. There was however a great difference in their value. The light division and the seventh, especially the former, being at the greatest distance from Pampeluna, having enemies close in front and certain points to guard, were, the seventh division a day, the light division two days, behind the sixth division, which was quite free to move at an instant's notice, and was, the drag of D'Erlon's corps considered, a day nearer to Pampeluna than Hill. Wherefore upon the rapid handling of this well-placed body the fate of the allies depended. If it arrived in time, nearly thirty thousand infantry with sufficient cavalry and artillery would be established, under the immediate command of the general-in-chief, on a position of strength to check the enemy until the rest of the army arrived. Where that position was and how the troops were there gathered and fought shall now be shown.

CHAPTER V.

Soult attacks the right of the allies—Combat of Roncesvalles—Combat of Linzoin—Count d'Erlon attacks the allies' right centre—Combat of Maya—General Hill takes a position at Irueta—General Picton and Cole retreat down the Val de Zubiri—They turn at Huarte and offer battle—Lord Wellington arrives—Combat of the 27th—First battle of Sauroren—Various movements—D'Erlon joins Soult who attacks general Hill—Second battle of Sauroren—Foy is cut off from the main army—Night march of the light division—Soult retreats—Combat of Dona Maria—Dangerous position of the French at St. Estevan—Soult marches down the Bidassoa—Forced march of the light division—Terrible scene near the bridge of Yanzi—Combats of Echallar and Ivañtelly—Narrow escape of lord Wellington—Observations.

BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES—COMBAT OF RONCESVALLES.

On the 23d, Soult issued an order of the day remarkable for its force and frankness. Tracing with a rapid pen the leading events of the past campaign, he showed that the disasters sprung from the incapacity of the king, not from the weakness of the soldiers, whose military virtue he justly extolled, and whose haughty courage he inflamed by allusions to former glories. He has been, by writers who disgrace English literature with unfounded aspersions of a courageous enemy, accused of unseemly boasting as to his ultimate operations at this time, but the calumny is refuted by the following passage from his despatch to the minister at war.

"I shall move directly upon Pampeluna, and if I succeed in relieving it I will operate towards my right to embarrass the enemy's troops in Guipuscoa, Biscay, and Alava, and to enable the reserve to join me, which will relieve San Sebastian and Santona. If this should happen, I will then consider what is to be done, either to push my own attack or to help the army of Aragon, but to look so far ahead would now be temerity."

It is true, that conscious of superior abilities, he did not suppress the sentiment of his own worth as a commander, but he was too proud to depreciate brave adversaries on the eve of battle.

"Let us not," he said, "defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions of the general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive, the valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy."

Having thus stimulated the ardour of his troops, he put himself at the head of Clauzel's divisions, and on the 25th at daylight led them up against the rocks of Altobiscar.

General Byng, warned the evening before that danger was near, and jealous of some hostile indications towards the village of Val Carlos, had sent the fifty-seventh regiment down there, but kept the rest of his men well in hand and gave notice to general Cole, who had made a new disposition of his troops. Ross's brigade was now at Espinal two miles in advance of Viscayret, six miles from the pass of Ibañeta, and eleven from Byng's position, but somewhat nearer to Morillo. Anson's brigade was close behind Ross, Stubb's Portuguese behind Anson, and the artillery was at Linzoin.

Such was the exact state of affairs when Soult, throwing out a multitude of skirmishers and pushing forward his supporting columns and guns as fast as the steepness of the road and difficult nature of the ground would permit, endeavoured to force Byng's position; but the British general, undismayed at the multitude of assailants, fought strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and the rolling musketry pealed in vain for hours along that cloudy field of battle elevated five thousand feet above the level of the plains. Their numbers however continually increased in front, and the national guards from Yropil, reinforced by Clauzel's detachments, skirmished with the Spanish battalions at the foundry of Orbaiceta and threatened to turn the right. The Val Carlos was at the same time menaced from Arnegui, and Reille's divisions, ascending the rock of Ayrola, turned Morillo's left.

About mid-day general Cole arrived at Altobiscar, but his brigades were still distant, and the French, renewing their attack, neglected the Val Carlos to gather more thickly on the front of Byng. He resisted all their efforts, but Reille made progress along the summit of the Ayrola ridge. Morillo then fell back towards Ibañeta, and the French were already nearer to that pass than the troops at Altobiscar were, when Ross's brigade, coming up the pass of Mendichuri, suddenly appeared on the Lindouz, at the instant when the head of Reille's column, being close to Atalosti, was upon the point of cutting the communication with Campbell. This officer's picquets had been attacked early in the morning by the national guards of the Val de Baignorri, but he soon discovered that it was only a feint, and therefore moved by his right towards Atalosti when he heard the firing on that side. His march was secured by the Val d'Ayra which separated him from the ridge of Ayrola along which Reille was advancing; but noting that general's strength, and at the same time seeing Ross's brigade labouring up the steep ridge of Mendichuri, Campbell judged that the latter was ignorant of what was going on above. Wherefore sending advice of the enemy's proximity and strength to Cole, he offered to pass the Atalosti and join in the battle if he could be furnished with transport for his sick, and provisions on the new line of operations.

Before this message could reach Cole, the head of Ross's column, composed of a wing of the twentieth regiment and a company of Brunswickers, was on the summit of the Lindouz, where most unexpectedly it encountered Reille's advanced guard. The moment was critical; but Ross, an eager hardy soldier, call-

ed aloud to charge, and captain Tovey of the twentieth, running forward with his company, crossed a slight wooded hollow and full against the front of the sixth French light infantry dashed with the bayonet. Brave men fell by that weapon on both sides; but numbers prevailing, these daring soldiers were pushed back again by the French. Ross however gained his object, the remainder of his brigade had come up and the pass of Atalosti was secured, yet with a loss of one hundred and forty men of the twentieth regiment and forty-one of the Brunswickers.

Previous to this vigorous action, general Cole, seeing the French in the Val Carlos and in the valley of Orbaiceta, that is to say, on both flanks of Byng, whose front was not the less pressed, had ordered Anson to reinforce the Spaniards at the foundry, and Stubbs to enter the Val Carlos in support of the fifty-seventh. He now recalled Anson to assist in defence of the Lindouz, and learning from Campbell how strong Reille was, caused Byng, with a view to a final retreat, to relinquish his advanced position at Altobiscar and take a second nearer the Ibañeta. This movement uncovered the road leading down to the foundry of Orbaiceta, but it concentrated all the troops, and at the same time general Campbell, although he could not enter the line of battle, because Cole was unable to supply his demands, made so skilful a display of his Portuguese as to impress Reille with the notion that their numbers were considerable.

During these movements the skirmishing of the light troops continued, but a thick fog coming up the valley, prevented Soult from making dispositions for a general attack with his six divisions, and when night fell, general Cole still held the great chain of the mountains with a loss of only three hundred and eighty men killed and wounded. His right was, however, turned by Orbaiceta, he had but ten or eleven thousand bayonets to oppose to thirty thousand, and his line of retreat being for four or five miles down hill and flanked all the way by the Lindouz, was uneasy and unfavourable. Wherefore putting the troops silently in march after dark, he threaded the passes and gained the valley of Urroz. His rear-guard composed of Anson's brigade followed in the morning, general Campbell retired from the Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga to Eugui in the valley of Zubiri, and the Spanish battalion, retreating from the foundry of Orbaiceta by the narrow way of Navala, rejoined Morillo near Espinal. The great chain was thus abandoned, but the result of the day's operation was unsatisfactory to the French general; he acknowledged a loss of four hundred men, he had not gained ten miles, and from the passes now abandoned, to Pampeluna, the distance was not less than twenty-two miles, with strong defensive positions in the way where increasing numbers of intrepid enemies were to be expected.

Soult's combinations, contrived for greater success, had been thwarted, partly by fortune, partly by errors of execution, the like of which all generals must expect, and the most experienced are the most resigned as knowing them to be inevitable. The interference of fortune was felt in the fog which rose at the moment when he was ready to thrust forward his heavy masses of troops entire. The failure in execution was Reille's tardy movement. His orders were to gain with all expedition the Lindouz, that is to say, the knot tying the heads of the Alduides, the Val Carlos, the Roncevalles, and the valley of Urroz. From that position he would have commanded the Mendichuri, Atalosti, Ibañeta

and Sahorgain passes, and by moving along the crest of the hills could menace the Urtiaga, Renacabal, and Bellate passes, thus endangering Campbell's and Hill's lines of retreat. But when he should have ascended the rocks of Ayrola, he halted to incorporate two newly arrived conscript battalions and to issue provisions, and the hours thus lost would have sufficed to seize the Lindouz before general Ross got through the pass of Mendichuri. The fog would still have stopped the spread of the French columns to the extent designed by Soult, but fifteen or sixteen thousand men, placed on the flank and rear of Byng and Morillo, would have separated them from the fourth division, and forced the latter to retreat beyond Viscayret.

Soult however overrated the forces opposed to him, supposing it to consist of two British divisions besides Byng's brigade and Morillo's Spaniards. He was probably deceived by the wounded men, who hastily questioned on the field would declare they belonged to the second and fourth divisions, because Byng's brigade was part of the former; but that general and the Spaniards had without aid sustained Soult's first efforts, and even when the fourth division came up, less than eleven thousand men, exclusive of sergeants and officers, were present in the fight. Campbell's Portuguese never entered the line at all, the remainder of the second division was in the Bastan, and the third division was at Olague in the valley of Lanz.

On the 26th, the French general put Clauzel's wing on the track of Cole, and ordered Reille to follow the crest of the mountains and seize the passes leading from the Bastan in Hill's rear while D'Erlon pressed him in front. That general would thus, Soult hoped, be crushed or thrown on the side of St. Estevan; D'Erlon could then reach his proper place in the valley of Zubiri, while the right descended the valley of Lanz and prevented Picton quitting it to aid Cole. A retreat by those generals and on separate lines would thus be inevitable, and the French army could issue forth in a compact order of battle from the mouths of the two valleys against Pampeluna.

COMBAT OF LINZOAIN.

All the columns were in movement at day-break, but every hour brought its obstacle. The fog still hung heavy on the mountain-tops, Reille's guides, bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the crests, and at ten o'clock, having no other resource, he marched down the pass of Mendichuri upon Espinal, and fell into the rear of the cavalry and artillery following Clauzel's divisions. Meanwhile Soult, although retarded also by the fog and the difficulties of the ground, overtook Cole's rear-guard in front of Viscayret. The leading troops struck hotly upon some British light companies incorporated under the command of colonel Wilson of the forty-eighth, and a French squadron passing round their flank fell on the rear; but Wilson, facing about, drove off these horsemen, and thus fighting, Cole, about two o'clock, reached the heights of Linzoain a mile beyond Viscayret, where general Picton met him with intelligence that Campbell had reached Eugui from the Alduides, and that the third division having crossed the hills from Olague was at Zubiri. The junction of all these troops was thus secured, the loss of the day was less than two hundred, and neither wounded men nor baggage had been left behind. However the French gathered in front, and at four o'clock seized some heights on the allies' left, which endangered their position, wherefore again falling back a mile, Cole offered battle on

the ridge separating the valley of Urroz from that of Zubiri. During this skirmish Campbell, coming from Eugui, showed his Portuguese on the ridges above the right flank of the French, but they were distant, Picton's troops were still at Zubiri, and there was light for an action. Soult, however, disturbed with intelligence received from D'Erlon, and perhaps doubtful what Campbell's troops might be, put off the attack until next morning, and after dark the junction of all the allies was effected.

This delay on the part of the French general seems injudicious. Cole was alone for five hours. Every action, by increasing the number of wounded men and creating confusion in the rear, would have augmented the difficulties of the retreat; and the troops were fatigued with incessant fighting and marching for two days and one night. Moreover, the alteration of Reille's march, occasioned by the fog, had reduced the chances dependent on the primary combinations to the operations of D'Erlon's corps; but the evening reports brought the mortifying conviction that he also had gone wrong, and by rough fighting only could Soult now attain his object. It is said that his expressions discovered a secret anticipation of failure; if so, his temper was too steadfast to yield, for he gave the signal to march the next day, and more strongly renewed his orders to D'Erlon, whose operations must now be noticed.

That general had three divisions of infantry, furnishing twenty-one thousand men, of which about eighteen thousand were combatants. Early on the morning of the 25th, he assembled two of them behind some heights near the passes of Maya, having caused the national guards of Baigorri to make previous demonstrations towards the passes of Arietta, Yspeguay, and Lorient. No change had been made in the disposition of general Hill's force, but general Stewart, deceived by the movements of the national guards, looked towards Sylveira's posts on the right rather than to his own front; his division, consisting of two British brigades, was consequently neither posted as it should be, nor otherwise prepared for an attack. The ground to be defended was indeed very strong; but however rugged a mountain position may be, if it is too extensive for the troops, or those troops are not disposed with judgment, the very inequalities constituting its defensive strength become advantageous to an assailant.

There were three passes to defend. Aretesque on the right, Lessessa in the centre, Maya on the left, and from these entrances two ways led to Elisondo in parallel directions; one down the valley through the town of Maya, receiving in its course the Erazu road; the other along the Atchiola mountain. General Pringle's brigade was charged to defend the Aretesque, and colonel Cameron's brigade the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col itself was broad on the summit, about three miles long, and on each flank lofty rocks and ridges rose one above another; those on the right blending with the Gora-mendi mountains, those on the left with the Atchiola, near the summit of which the eighty-second regiment belonging to the seventh division was posted.

Cameron's brigade, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops coming from Urdax; but at Aretesque a great round hill, one mile in front, masked the movements of an enemy coming from Espelette. This hill was not occupied at night, nor in the daytime save by some Portuguese cavalry vedettes, and the next guard was an infantry piquet posted on that slope of the Col which fronted the

great hill. Behind this piquet of eighty men there was no immediate support, but four light companies were encamped one mile down the reverse slope which was more rugged and difficult of access than that towards the enemy. The rest of general Pringle's brigade was disposed at various distances from two to three miles in the rear, and the signal for assembling on the position was to be the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks above the Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments furnishing more than three thousand fighting men, half only were in line of battle, and those chiefly massed on the left of a position, wide, open, and of an easy ascent from the Aretesque side, and their general, Stewart, quite deceived as to the real state of affairs, was at Elisondo, when about mid-day D'Erlon commenced the battle.

COMBAT OF MAYA.

Captain Moyle Sherer, the officer commanding the piquet at the Aretesque pass, was told by his predecessor, that at dawn a glimpse had been obtained of cavalry and infantry in movement along the hills in front, some peasants also announced the approach of the French, and at nine o'clock major Thorne, a staff-officer, having patrolled round the great hill in front of the pass, discovered sufficient to make him order up the light companies to support the piquet. These companies had just formed on the ridge with their left at the rock of Aretesque, when D'Armagnac's division coming from Espelette mounted the great hill in front, Abbé followed, and general Maransin with a third division advanced from Ainhoa and Urdax against the Maya pass, meaning also to turn it by a narrow way leading up the Atchiola mountain.

D'Armagnac's men pushed forward at once in several columns, and forced the piquet back with great loss upon the light companies, who sustained his vehement assault with infinite difficulty. The alarm guns were now heard from the Maya pass, and general Pringle hastened to the front, but his regiments moving hurriedly from different camps were necessarily brought into action one after the other. The thirty-fourth came up first at a running pace, yet by companies, not in mass, and breathless from the length and ruggedness of the ascent; the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth followed, but not immediately nor together, and meanwhile D'Armagnac, closely supported by Abbé, with domineering numbers and valour combined, maugre the desperate fighting of the piquet, of the light companies and of the thirty-fourth, had established his columns on the broad ridge of the position.

Colonel Cameron then sent the fiftieth from the left to the assistance of the overmatched troops, and that fierce and formidable old regiment charging the head of an advancing column drove it clear out of the pass of Lessessa in the centre. Yet the French were so many that, checked at one point, they assembled with increased force at another; nor could general Pringle restore the battle with the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments, which, cut off from the others, were, though fighting desperately, forced back to a second and lower ridge crossing the main road to Elisondo. They were followed by D'Armagnac; but Abbé continued to press the fiftieth and thirty-fourth, whose natural line of retreat was towards the Atchiola road on the left, because the position trended backward from Aretesque towards that point, and because Cameron's brigade was there. And that officer, still holding the pass of Maya with the left wings of the seventy-first and ninety-second regiments, brought

their right wings and the Portuguese guns into action and thus maintained the fight; but so dreadful was the slaughter, especially of the ninety-second, that it is said the advancing enemy was actually stopped by the heaped mass of dead and dying; and then the left wing of that noble regiment coming down from the higher ground smote wounded friends and exulting foes alike, as mingled together they stood or crawled before its fire.

It was in this state of affairs that general Stewart returning from Elisondo by the mountain road, reached the field of battle. The passes of Lessessa and Aretesque were lost, that of Maya was still held by the left wing of the seventy-first; but Stewart, seeing Maransin's men gathered thickly on one side and Abbé's men on the other, abandoned it to take a new position on the first rocky ridge covering the road over the Atchiola; and he called down the eighty-second regiment from the highest part of that mountain, and sent messengers to demand further aid from the seventh division. Meanwhile, although wounded himself, he made a strenuous resistance, for he was a very gallant man; but during the retrograde movement, Maransin no longer seeking to turn the position, suddenly thrust the head of his division across the front of the British line and connected his left with Abbé, throwing as he passed a destructive fire into the wasted remnant of the ninety-second, which even then sullenly gave way, for the men fell until two-thirds of the whole had gone to the ground. Still the survivors fought, and the left wing of the seventy-first came into action; but one after the other all the regiments were forced back, and the first position was lost together with the Portuguese guns.

Abbé's division now followed D'Armagnac on the road to the town of Maya, leaving Maransin to deal with Stewart's new position, and notwithstanding its extreme strength the French gained ground until six o'clock, for the British, shrunk in numbers, also wanted ammunition, and a part of the eighty-second under major Fitzgerald were forced to roll down stones to defend the rocks on which they were posted. In this desperate condition Stewart was upon the point of abandoning the mountain entirely, when a brigade of the seventh division, commanded by general Barnes, arrived from Echallar, and that officer charging at the head of the sixth regiment drove the French back to the Maya ridge. Stewart thus remained master of the Atchiola; and the count D'Erlon, who probably thought greater reinforcements had come up, recalled his other divisions from the Maya road and reunited his whole corps on the Col. He had lost fifteen hundred men and a general; but he took four guns, and fourteen hundred British soldiers were killed or wounded.

Such was the fight of Maya, a disaster, yet one much exaggerated by French writers, and by an English author misrepresented as a surprise caused by the negligence of the cavalry. General Stewart was surprised, his troops were not, and never did soldiers fight better, seldom so well. The stern valour of the ninety-second, principally composed of Irishmen, would have graced Thermopylæ. The Portuguese cavalry patrols, if any went out, which is uncertain, might have neglected their duty, and doubtless the front should have been scoured in a more military manner; but the infantry piquets, and the light companies so happily ordered up by major Thorne, were ready, and no man wondered to see the French columns crown the great hill in front of the pass. Stewart expecting no attack at Maya, had gone to Elisondo, leaving orders for the soldiers to cook: from his erroneous views therefore the

misfortune sprung and from no other source. Having deceived himself as to the true point of attack, he did not take proper military precautions on his own front; his position was only half occupied, his troops brought into action wildly, and finally he caused the loss of his guns by a misdirection as to the road. General Stewart was a brave, energetic, zealous, indefatigable man, and of a magnanimous spirit, but he possessed neither the calm reflective judgment nor the intuitive genius which belongs to nature's generals.

It is difficult to understand count d'Erlon's operations. Why, when he had carried the right of the position, did he follow two weak regiments with two divisions, and leave only one division to attack five regiments, posted on the strongest ground and having hopes of succour from Echallar? Certainly if Abbé's division had acted with Maransin's, Stewart, who was so hardly pressed by the latter alone, must have passed the road from Echallar in retreat before general Barnes's brigade arrived. On the other hand, Soult's orders directed D'Erlon to operate by his left, with the view of connecting the whole army on the summit of the Pyrenees. He should therefore either have used his whole force to crush the troops on the Atchiola before they could be succoured from Echallar; or, leaving Maransin there, have marched by the Maya road upon Ariscun to cut Sylveira's line of retreat; instead of this he remained inactive upon the Col de Maya for twenty hours after the battle! And general Hill concentrating his whole force, now augmented by Barnes's brigade, would probably have fallen upon him from the commanding rocks of Atchiola the next day, if intelligence of Cole's retreat from the Roncevalles passes had not come through the Alduïdes. This rendered the recovery of the Col de Maya useless, and Hill withdrawing all his troops during the night, posted the British brigades which had been engaged, together with one Portuguese brigade of infantry and a Portuguese battery, on the heights in rear of Irueta, fifteen miles from the scene of action. The other Portuguese brigade he left in front of Elisondo, thus covering the road of St. Estevan on his left, that of Berderez on his right, and the pass of Vellate in his rear.

Such was the commencement of Soult's operations to restore the fortunes of France. Three considerable actions fought on the same day had each been favourable. At San Sebastian the allies were repulsed, at Roncevalles they abandoned the passes; at Maya they were defeated, but the decisive blow had not yet been struck.

Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on his way back from San Sebastian, but with the false addition that D'Erlon was beaten. As early as the 22d he had known that Soult was preparing a great offensive movement, but the immovable attitude of the French centre, the skilful disposition of their reserve which was twice as strong as he at first supposed, together with the preparations made to throw bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriātu, were all calculated to mislead and did mislead him.

Soult's complicated combinations to bring D'Erlon's divisions finally into line on the crest of the great chain were impenetrable, and the English general could not believe his adversary would throw himself with only thirty thousand men into the valley of the Ebro unless sure of aid from Suchet, and that general's movements indicated a determination to remain in Catalonia; moreover Wellington, in contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna was not in extremity, and before the failure of the assault thought that San Sebastian was. Hence the opera

tions against his right, their full extent not known, appeared a feint, and he judged the real effort would be to throw bridges over the Bidassoa and raise the siege of San Sebastian. But in the night correct intelligence of the Maya and Roncevalles affairs arrived, Soult's object was then scarcely doubtful, and sir T. Graham was ordered to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark his guns and stores, and hold his spare troops in hand to join Giron, on a position of battle marked out near the Bidassoa. General Cotton was ordered to move the cavalry up to Pampeluna, and O'Donel was instructed to hold some of his Spanish troops ready to act in advance. This done, Wellington arranged his line of correspondence and proceeded to St. Estevan, which he reached early in the morning.

While the embarkation of the guns and stores was going on, it was essential to hold the posts at Vera and Echallar, because D'Erlon's object was not pronounced, and an enemy in possession of those places could approach San Sebastian by the roads leading over the Peña de Haya, a rocky mountain behind Lesaca, or by the defiles of Zubietta leading round that mountain from the valley of Lerins. Wherefore in passing through St. Estevan on the morning of the 26th, Wellington merely directed general Pack to guard the bridges over the Bidassoa. But when he reached Irueta, saw the reduced state of Stewart's division, and heard that Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all the troops within his power upon Pampeluna; and to prevent mistakes, indicated the valley of Lanz as the general line of movement. Of Picton's exact position or of his intentions nothing positive was known, but supposing him to have joined Cole at Linzoain, as indeed he had, Wellington judged that their combined forces would be sufficient to check the enemy until assistance could reach them from the centre or from Pampeluna, and he so advised Picton on the evening of the 26th.

In consequence of these orders, the seventh division abandoned Echallar in the night of the 26th, the sixth division quitted St. Estevan at daylight on the 27th, and general Hill concentrating his own troops and Barnes's brigade on the heights of Irueta, halted until the evening of the 27th, but marched during the night through the pass of Vellate upon the town of Lanz. Meanwhile the light division, quitting Vera also on the 27th, retired by Lesaca to the summit of the Santa Cruz mountain, overlooking the valley of Lerins, and there halted, apparently to cover the pass of Zubietta until Longa's Spaniards should take post to block the roads leading over the Peña de Haya and protect the embarkation of the guns on that flank. That object being effected, it was to thread the passes and descend upon Lecumberri on the great road of Yrurzun, thus securing sir Thomas Graham's communication with the army round Pampeluna. These various movements spread fear and confusion far and wide. All the narrow valleys and roads were crowded with baggage, commissariat stores, artillery and fugitive families; reports of the most alarming nature were as usual rife; each division, ignorant of what had really happened to the other, dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes related might be true; none knew what to expect or where they were to meet the enemy, and one universal hubbub filled the wild regions through which the French army was now working its fiery path towards Pampeluna.

D'Erlon's inactivity gave great uneasiness to Soult, who repeated the order to push forward by his left whatever might be the force opposed, and thus stimulated he advanced to Elisondo on the

27th, but thinking the sixth division was still at St. Estevan, again halted, and it was not until the morning of the 28th, when general Hill's retreat had opened the way, that he followed through the pass of Vellate. His further progress belongs to other combinations arising from Soult's direct operations, which are now to be continued.

General Picton, having assumed the command of all the troops in the valley of Zubiri on the evening of the 26th, recommended the retreat before dawn on the 27th, and without the hope or intention of covering Pampeluna. Soult followed in the morning, having first sent scouts towards the ridges where Campbell's troops had appeared the evening before. Reille marched by the left bank of the Guy river, Clauzel by the right bank, the cavalry and artillery closed the rear, and as the whole moved in compact order the narrow valley was overgorged with troops, a hasty bicker of musketry alone marking the separation of the hostile forces. Meanwhile the garrison of Pampeluna made a sally, and O'Donel in great alarm spiked some of his guns, destroyed his magazines, and would have suffered a disaster, if Carlos d'España had not fortunately arrived with his division and checked the garrison. Nevertheless the danger was imminent, for general Cole, first emerging from the valley of Zubiri, had passed Villalba, only three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat; Picton, following close, was at Huarte, and O'Donel's Spaniards were in confusion; in fine, Soult was all but successful when Picton, feeling the importance of the crisis, suddenly turned on some steep ridges, which, stretching under the names of San Miguel, Mont Escava and San Cristoval quite across the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys, screen Pampeluna.

Posting the third division on the right of Huarte, he prolonged his line to the left with Morillo's Spaniards, called upon O'Donel to support him, and directed Cole to occupy some heights between Oricain and Arletta. But that general having with a surer eye observed a salient hill near Zabaldica, one mile in advance and commanding the road to Huarte, demanded and obtained permission to occupy it instead of the heights first appointed. Two Spanish regiments belonging to the blockading troops were still posted there, and towards them Cole directed his course. Soult had also marked this hill, a French detachment issuing from the mouth of the Val de Zubiri was in full career to seize it, and the hostile masses were rapidly approaching the summit on either side when the Spaniards, seeing the British so close, vindicated their own post by a sudden charge. This was for Soult the stroke of fate. His double columns just then emerging, exultant, from the narrow valley, were arrested at the sight of ten thousand men which under Cole crowned the summit of the mountain in opposition; and two miles further back stood Picton with a greater number, for O'Donel had now taken post on Morillo's left. To advance by the Huarte road was impossible, and to stand still was dangerous, because the French army, contracted to a span in front, was cleft in its whole length by the river Guy, and compressed on each side by the mountains which in that part narrowed the valley to a quarter of a mile. Soult, however, like a great and ready commander, at once shot the head of Clauzel's columns to his right across the mountain which separated the Val de Zubiri from the Val de Lanz, and at the same time threw one of Reille's divisions of infantry and a body of cavalry across the mountains on his left, beyond the Guy river, as far as the village of Elcano, to menace the front and right flank of Picton's position at

Huarte. The other two divisions of infantry he established at the village of Zabaldica in the Val de Zubiri, close under Cole's right, and meanwhile Clauzel seized the village of Sauroren close under that general's left.

While the French general thus formed his line of battle, lord Wellington, who had quitted sir Rowland Hill's quarters in the Bastan very early on the 27th, crossed the main ridge and descended the valley of Lanz without having been able to learn anything of Picton's movements or position, and in this state of uncertainty reached Ostiz, a few miles from Sauroren, where he found general Long with the brigade of light cavalry which had furnished the posts of correspondence in the mountains. Here learning that Picton having abandoned the heights of Linzain was moving on Huarte, he left his quartermaster-general with instructions to stop all the troops coming down the valley of Lanz until the state of affairs at Huarte should be ascertained. Then at racing speed he made for Sauroren. As he entered that village he saw Clauzel's divisions moving from Zabaldica along the crest of the mountain, and it was clear that the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were intercepted, wherefore pulling up his horse he wrote on the parapet of the bridge of Sauroren fresh instructions to turn every thing from that valley to the right, by a road which led through Lizasso and Marcalain behind the hills to the village of Oricain, that is to say, in rear of the position now occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the only staff-officer who had kept up with him, galloped with these orders out of Sauroren by one road, the French light cavalry dashed in by another, and the English general rode alone up the mountain to reach his troops. One of Campbell's Portuguese battalions first descried him and raised a cry of joy, and the shrill clamour caught up by the next regiments swelled as it ran along the line into that stern and appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give upon the edge of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. Lord Wellington suddenly stopped in a conspicuous place, he desired that both armies should know he was there, and a double spy who was present pointed out Soult, then so near that his features could be plainly distinguished. The English general, it is said, fixed his eyes attentively upon this formidable man, and speaking as if to himself, said, "Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious one and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause of these cheers; that will give time for the sixth division to arrive and I shall beat him." And certain it is that the French general made no serious attack that day.

The position adopted by Cole was the summit of a mountain mass which filled all the space between the Guy and the Lanz rivers as far back as Huarte and Villalba. It was highest in the centre, and boldly defined towards the enemy, but the trace was irregular, the right being thrown back towards the village of Arletta so as to flank the high road to Huarte. This road was also swept by some guns placed on a lower range, or neck, connecting the right of Cole with Picton and Morillo.

Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river was the bulging hill vindicated by the Spaniards; it was a distinct point on the right of the fourth division, dependent upon the centre of the position, but considerably lower. The left of the position also abating in height was yet extremely rugged and steep, overlooking the Lanz river and the road to Villalba. General Ross's brigade of the fourth division was posted on that side, having a Portuguese battalion,

whose flank rested on a small chapel, in his front. General Campbell was on the right of Ross. General Anson was on the highest ground, partly behind, and partly on the right of Campbell. General Byng's brigade was on a second mass of hills in reserve, and the Spanish hill was reinforced by a battalion of the fourth Portuguese regiment.

The front of battle being less than two miles was well filled, and the Lanz and Guy river washed the flanks. Those torrents, continuing their course, break by narrow passages through the steep ridges of San Miguel and San Cristoval, and then flowing past Huarte and Villalba meet behind those plains to form the Argo river. On the ridges thus cleft by the waters the second line was posted, that is to say, at the distance of two miles from, and nearly parallel to the first position, but on a more extended front. Picton's left was at Huarte, his right, strengthened with a battery, stretched to the village of Goraitz, covering more than a mile of ground on that flank. Morillo prolonged Picton's left along the crest of San Miguel to Villalba, and O'Donel continued the line to San Cristoval; Carlos d'España's division maintained the blockade behind these ridges, and the British cavalry under general Cotton, coming up from Tafalla and Olite, took post, the heavy brigades on some open ground behind Picton, the hussar brigade on his right. This second line being on a wider trace than the first and equally well filled with troops, entirely barred the openings of the two valleys leading down to Pampeluna.

Soult's position was also a mountain filling the space between the two rivers. It was even more rugged than the allies' mountain, and they were only separated by a deep narrow valley. Clauzel's three divisions leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren, which was quite down in the valley of Lanz, and close under the chapel height where the left of the fourth division was posted. His left was prolonged by two of Reille's divisions, which also occupied the village of Zabaldica quite down in the valley of Zubiri under the right of the allies. The remaining division of this wing and a division of cavalry were, as I have before stated, thrown forward on the mountains on the other side of the Guy river, menacing Picton and seeking for an opportunity to communicate with the garrison of Pampeluna. Some guns were pushed in front of Zabaldica, but the elevation required to send the shot upward rendered their fire ineffectual, and the greatest part of the artillery remained therefore in the narrow valley of Zubiri.

COMBAT OF THE 27TH.

Soult's first effort was to gain the Spaniards' hill and establish himself near the centre of the allies' line of battle. The attack was vigorous, but the French were valiantly repulsed about the time lord Wellington arrived, and he immediately reinforced that post with the fortieth British regiment. There was then a general skirmish along the front, under cover of which Soult carefully examined the whole position, and the firing continued on the mountain-side until evening, when a terrible storm, the usual precursor of English battles in the Peninsula, brought on premature darkness and terminated the dispute. This was the state of affairs at daybreak on the 28th, but a signal alteration had place before the great battle of that day commenced, and the movements of the wandering divisions by which this change was effected must now be traced.

It has been shown that the Lanz covered the left of the allies and the right of the French. Never-

theless the heights occupied by either army were prolonged beyond that river, the continuation of the allies' ridge sweeping forward so as to look into the rear of Sauroren, while the continuation of the French heights fell back in a direction nearly parallel to the forward inclination of the opposing ridge. They were both steep and high, yet lower and less rugged than the heights on which the armies stood opposed, for the latter were mountains where rocks piled on rocks stood out like castles, difficult to approach and so dangerous to assail that the hardened veterans of the Peninsula only would have dared the trial. Now the road by which the sixth division marched on the 27th, after clearing the pass of Dona Maria, sends one branch to Lanz, another to Ostiz, a third through Lizasso, and Marcalain: the first and second fall into the road from Bellate and descend the valley of Lanz to Sauroren; the third passing behind the ridges just described as prolonging the positions of the armies, also falls into the valley of Lanz, but at the village of Oricain, that is to say, one mile behind the ground occupied by general Cole's left.

It was by this road of Marcalain that Wellington now expected the sixth and seventh divisions, but the rapidity with which Soult seized Sauroren caused a delay of eighteen hours. For the sixth division having reached Olague in the valley of Lanz about one o'clock on the 27th, halted there until four, and then following the orders brought by lord Fitzroy Somerset marched by Lizasso to gain the Marcalain road; but the great length of these mountain marches, and the heavy storm which had terminated the action at Zabaldica sweeping with equal violence in this direction, prevented the division from passing Lizasso that night. However the march was renewed at daylight on the 28th, and meanwhile general Hill, having quitted the Bastan on the evening of the 27th, reached the town of Lanz on the morning of the 28th, and rallying general Long's cavalry and his own artillery, which were in that valley, moved likewise upon Lizasso. At that place he met the seventh division coming from St. Estevan, and having restored general Barnes's brigade to lord Dalhousie, took a position on a ridge covering the road to Marcalain. The seventh division being on his right was in military communication with the sixth division, and thus lord Wellington's left was prolonged, and covered the great road leading from Pampeluna by Yrurzun to Tolosa. And during these important movements, which were not completed until the evening of the 28th, which brought six thousand men into the allies' line of battle, and fifteen thousand more into military communication with their left, D'Erlon remained planted in his position of observation near Elisondo!

The near approach of the sixth division early on the morning of the 28th and the certainty of Hill's junction, made Wellington imagine that Soult would not venture an attack, and certainly that marshal, disquieted about D'Erlon, of whom he only knew that he had not followed his instructions, viewed the strong position of his adversary with uneasy anticipations. Again with anxious eyes he took cognizance of all its rugged strength, and seemed dubious and distrustful of his fortune. He could not operate with advantage by his own left beyond the Guy river, because the mountains there were rough, and Wellington having shorter lines of movement could meet him with all arms combined; and meanwhile the French artillery, unable to emerge from the Val de Zubiri except by the Huarte road, would have been exposed to a counter at-

tack. He crossed the Lanz river and ascended the prolongation of the allies' ridge, which, as he had possession of the bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own ground. From this height he could see all the left and rear of Cole's position, looking down the valley of Lanz as far as Villalba, but the country beyond the ridge towards Marcalain was so broken that he could not discern the march of the sixth division; he knew, however, from the deserters, that Wellington expected four fresh divisions from that side, that is to say, the second, sixth, and seventh British, and Sylveira's Portuguese division, which always marched with Hill. This information and the nature of the ground decided the plan of attack. The valley of Lanz growing wider as it descended, offered the means of assailing the allies' left in front and rear at one moment, and the same combination would cut off the reinforcements expected from the side of Marcalain.

One of Clauzel's divisions already occupied Sauroren, and the other two coming from the mountain took post upon each side of that village. The division on the right hand was ordered to throw some flankers on the ridge from whence Soult was taking his observations, and upon a signal given to move in one body to a convenient distance down the valley, and then wheeling to its left, assail the rear of the allies' left flank while the other two divisions advancing from their respective positions near Sauroren assailed the front. Cole's left, which did not exceed five thousand men, would thus be enveloped by sixteen thousand, and Soult expected to crush it notwithstanding the strength of the ground. Meanwhile Reille's two divisions advancing from the mountain on the side of Zabaldica, were each to send a brigade against the hill occupied by the fortieth regiment; the right of this attack was to be connected with the left of Clauzel, the remaining brigades were closely to support the assailing masses, the divisions beyond the Guy were to keep Picton in check, and Soult, who had no time to lose, ordered his lieutenants to throw their troops frankly and at once into action.

FIRST BATTLE OF SAUOREN.

It was on the fourth anniversary of the battle of Talavera.

About mid-day the French gathered at the foot of the position, and their skirmishers, rushing forward, spread over the face of the mountain, working upward like a conflagration; but the columns of attack were not all prepared, when Clauzel's division in the valley of Lanz, too impatient to await the general signal of battle, threw out its flankers on the ridge beyond the river and pushed down the valley in one mass. With a rapid pace it turned Cole's left and was preparing to wheel up on his rear, when a Portuguese brigade of the sixth division, suddenly appearing on the crest of the ridge beyond the river, drove the French flankers back and instantly descended with a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the column in the valley. And almost at the same instant, the main body of the sixth division emerging from behind the same ridge, near the village of Oricain, formed in order of battle across the front. It was the counter-stroke of Salamanca! The French, striving to encompass the left of the allies, were themselves encompassed, for two brigades of the fourth division turned and smote them from the left, the Portuguese smote them from the right; and while thus scathed on both flanks with fire, they were violently shocked and pushed back with a mighty force by the sixth division, yet not in flight, but fighting fiercely and

strewn the ground with their enemies' bodies as well as with their own.

Clauzel's second division, seeing this dire conflict, with a hurried movement assailed the chapel height to draw off the fire from the troops in the valley, and gallantly did the French soldiers throng up the craggy steep, but the general unity of the attack was ruined; neither their third division nor Reille's brigades had yet received the signal, and their attacks, instead of being simultaneous, were made in succession, running from right to left as the necessity of aiding the others became apparent. It was, however, a terrible battle and well fought. One column darting out of the village of Sauroren, silently, sternly, without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel under a tempest of bullets which swept away whole ranks without abating the speed and power of the mass. The seventh *caçadores* shrunk abashed, and that part of the position was won. Soon, however, they rallied upon general Ross's British brigade, and the whole running forward charged the French with a loud shout and dashed them down the hill. Heavily stricken they were, yet undismayed, and recovering their ranks again, they ascended in the same manner to be again broken and overturned. But the other columns of attack were now bearing upwards through the smoke and flame with which the skirmishers had covered the face of the mountain, and the tenth Portuguese regiment, fighting on the right of Ross's brigade, yielded to their fury; a heavy body crowned the heights, and wheeling against the exposed flank of Ross forced that gallant officer also to go back. His ground was instantly occupied by the enemies with whom he had been engaged in front, and the fight raged close and desperate on the crest of the position; charge succeeded charge, and each side yielded and recovered by turns; yet this astounding effort of French valour was of little avail. Lord Wellington brought Byng's brigade forward at a running pace, and sent the twenty-seventh and forty-eighth British regiments, belonging to Anson's brigade, down from the higher ground in the centre against the crowded masses, rolling them backward in disorder and throwing them one after the other violently down the mountain-side; and with no child's play; the two British regiments fell upon the enemy three separate times with the bayonet, and lost more than half their own numbers.

During this battle on the mountain-top, the British brigades of the sixth division, strengthened by a battery of guns, gained ground in the valley of Lanz and arrived on the same front with the left of the victorious troops about the chapel. Lord Wellington then seeing the momentary disorder of the enemy, ordered Madden's Portuguese brigade, which had never ceased its fire against the right flank of the French column, to assail the village of Sauroren in the rear, but the state of the action in other parts and the exhaustion of the troops soon induced him to countermand this movement. Meanwhile Reille's brigades, connecting their right with the left of Clauzel's third division, had envired the Spanish hill, ascended it unchecked, and at the moment when the fourth division was so hardly pressed made the regiment of El Pravia give way on the left of the fortieth. A Portuguese battalion rushing forward covered the flank of that invincible regiment, which waited in stern silence until the French set their feet upon the broad summit; but when their glittering arms appeared over the brow of the mountain, the charging cry was heard, the crowded mass was broken to pieces, and a tempest of bullets followed its flight. Four times this as-

sault was renewed, and the French officers were seen to pull up their tired men by the belts, so fierce and resolute they were to win. It was, however, the labour of Sisyphus. The vehement shout and shock of the British soldier always prevailed, and at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, hearts fainting, and hopeless from repeated failures, they were so abashed that three British companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade.

While the battle was thus being fought on the height, the French cavalry beyond the Guy river, passed a rivulet, and with a fire of carbines forced the tenth hussars to yield some rocky ground on Picton's right, but the eighteenth hussars having better fire-arms than the tenth, renewed the combat, killed two officers, and finally drove the French over the rivulet again.

Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, which lord Wellington, fresh from the fight, with homely emphasis called "*bludgeon work.*" Two generals and eighteen hundred men had been killed or wounded on the French side, following their official reports, a number far below the estimate made at the time by the allies, whose loss amounted to two thousand six hundred. These discrepancies between hostile calculations ever occur, and there is little wisdom in disputing where proof is unattainable; but the numbers actually engaged were, of French, twenty-five thousand, of the allies twelve thousand, and if the strength of the latter's position did not save them from the greater loss, their steadfast courage is to be the more admired.

The 29th, the armies rested in position without firing a shot, but the wandering divisions on both sides were now entering the line.

General Hill, having sent all his baggage, artillery and wounded men to Berioplano, behind the Cristoval ridge, still occupied his strong ground between Lizasso and Arestegui, covering the Marcalain and Yurzun roads, and menacing that leading from Lizasso to Olague in the rear of Soult's right. His communication with Orcaín was maintained by the seventh division, and the light division was approaching his left. Thus on Wellington's side the crisis was over. He had vindicated his position with only sixteen thousand combatants, and now, including the troops still maintaining the blockade, he had fifty thousand, twenty thousand being British, in close military combination. Thirty thousand, flushed with recent success, were in hand, and Hill's troops were well placed for retaking the offensive.

Soult's situation was proportionably difficult. Finding that he could not force the allies' position in front, he had sent his artillery, part of his cavalry and his wounded men back to France immediately after the battle, ordering the two former to join Villatte on the lower Bidassoa and there await further instructions. Having shaken off this burden, he awaited D'Erlon's arrival by the valley of Lanz, and that general reached Ostiz a few miles above Sauroren at mid-day on the 29th, bringing intelligence, obtained indirectly during his march, that general Graham had retired from the Bidassoa and Villatte had crossed that river. This gave Soult a hope that his first movements had disengaged San Sebastian, and he instantly conceived a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed, yet conformable to the critical state of his affairs.

No success was to be expected from another attack, yet he could not at the moment of being reinforced with eighteen thousand men, retire by the road he came without some dishonour; nor could he

remain where he was, because his supplies of provisions and ammunition, derived from distant magazines by slow and small convoys, was unequal to the consumption. Two-thirds of the British troops, the greatest part of the Portuguese, and all the Spaniards were, as he supposed, assembled in his front under Wellington, or on his right flank under Hill, and it was probable that other reinforcements were on the march; wherefore he resolved to prolong his right with D'Erlon's corps, and then cautiously drawing off the rest of his army place himself between the allies and the Bastan, in military connexion with his reserve and closer to his frontier magazines. Thus posted and able to combine all his troops in one operation, he expected to relieve San Sebastian entirely and profit from the new state of affairs.

In the evening of the 29th, the second division of cavalry, which was in the valley of Zubiri, passed over the position to the valley of Lanz, and joined D'Erlon, who was ordered to march early on the 30th by Etulain upon Lizasso, sending out strong scouting parties to his left on all the roads leading upon Pampeluna, and also towards Letassa and Yrurzun. During the night the first division of cavalry and La Martinière's division of infantry, both at Elcano on the extreme left of the French army, retired over the mountains by Illurdos to Engui, in the upper part of the valley of the Zubiri, having orders to cross the separating ridge, enter the valley of Lanz and join D'Erlon. The remainder of Reille's wing was, at the same time, to march by the crest of the position from Zabaldica to the village of Sauroren, and gradually relieve Clauzel's troops, which were then to assemble behind Sauroren, that is to say, towards Ostiz, and thus following the march of D'Erlon were to be themselves followed in like manner by Reille's troops. To cover these last movements, Clauzel detached two regiments to occupy the French heights beyond the Lanz river, and they were also to maintain his connexion with D'Erlon, whose line of operations was just beyond those heights. He was, however, to hold by Reille rather than by D'Erlon, until the former had perfected his dangerous march across Wellington's front.

In the night of the 29th, Soult heard from the deserters that three divisions were to make an offensive movement towards Lizasso on the 30th, and when daylight came he was convinced the men spoke truly, because from a point beyond Sauroren he discerned certain columns descending the ridge of Cristoval and the heights above Oricain, while others were in march on a wide sweep apparently to turn Clauzel's right flank. These columns were Morillo's Spaniards, Campbell's Portuguese, and the seventh division, the former rejoining Hill, to whose corps they properly belonged, the others adapting themselves to a new disposition of Wellington's line of battle, which shall be presently explained.

At six o'clock in the morning, Foy's division of Reille's wing was in march along the crest of the mountain from Zabaldica towards Sauroren, where Maucune's division had already relieved Conroux's; the latter, belonging to Clauzel's wing, was moving up the valley of Lanz to rejoin that general, who had, with exception of the two flanking regiments before mentioned, concentrated his remaining divisions between Olabe and Ostiz. In this state of affairs Wellington opened his batteries from the chapel height, sent skirmishers against Sauroren, and the fire spreading to the allies' right became brisk between Cole and Foy. It subsided, however, at Sauroren, and Soult, relying on the strength of

the position, ordered Reille to maintain it until nightfall unless hardly pressed, and went off himself at a gallop to join D'Erlon, for his design was to fall upon the divisions attempting to turn his right and crush them with superior numbers: a daring project, well and quickly conceived, but he had to deal with a man whose rapid perception and rough stroke rendered sleight of hand dangerous. The marshal overtook D'Erlon at the moment when that general, having entered the valley of Ulzema with three divisions of infantry and two divisions of heavy cavalry, was making dispositions to assail Hill, who was between Buenza and Arestegui.

COMBAT OF BUENZA.

The allies, who were about ten thousand fighting men, including Long's brigade of light cavalry, occupied a very extensive mountain ridge. Their right was strongly posted on rugged ground, but the left prolonged towards Buenza was insecure, and D'Erlon who, including his two divisions of heavy cavalry, had not less than twenty thousand sabres and bayonets, was followed by La Martinière's division of infantry now coming from Lanz. Soult's combination was therefore extremely powerful. The light troops were already engaged when he arrived, and the same soldiers on both sides who had so strenuously combated at Maya on the 25th were again opposed to each other.

D'Armagnac's division was directed to make a false attack upon Hill's right; Abbé's division, emerging by Lizasso, endeavoured to turn the allies' left, and gain the summit of the ridge in the direction of Buenza; Maransin followed Abbé, and the divisions of cavalry, entering the line, supported and connected the two attacks. The action was brisk at both points; but D'Armagnac, pushing his feint too far, became seriously engaged, and was beaten by Da Costa and Ashworth's Portuguese, aided by a part of the twenty-eighth British regiment. Nor were the French at first more successful on the other flank, being repeatedly repulsed, until Abbé, turning that wing, gained the summit of the mountain and rendered the position untenable. General Hill, who had lost about four hundred men, then retired to the heights of Eguaros behind Arestegui and Berasin, thus drawing towards Marcalain with his right and throwing back his left. Here being joined by Campbell and Morillo he again offered battle; but Soult, whose principal loss was in D'Armagnac's division, had now gained his main object: he had turned Hill's left, secured a fresh line of retreat, a shorter communication with Villatte by the pass of Dono Maria, and withal, the great Yrurzun road to Toloso, distant only one league and a half, was in his power. His first thought, was to seize it and march through Lecumberri either upon Tolosa, or Andoain and Ernani. There was nothing to oppose except the light division, whose movements shall be noticed hereafter; but neither the French marshal nor general Hill knew of its presence, and the former thought himself strong enough to force his way to San Sebastian and there unite with Villatte and his artillery, which, following his previous orders, was now on the lower Bidassoa.

This project was feasible. La Martinière's division of Reille's wing, coming from Lanz, was not far off. Clauzel's three divisions were momentarily expected, and Reille's during the night. On the 31st, therefore, Soult, with at least fifty thousand men, would have broken into Guipuscoa, thrusting aside the light division in his march, and menacing sir Thomas Graham's position in reverse, while

Villatte's reserve attacked it in front. The country about Lecumberri was, however, very strong for defence, and lord Wellington would have followed, yet scarcely in time, for he did not suspect his views, and was ignorant of his strength, thinking D'Erlon's force to be originally two divisions of infantry, and now only reinforced with a third division, whereas, that general had three divisions originally, and was now reinforced by a fourth division of infantry and two of cavalry. This error, however, did not prevent him from seizing with the rapidity of a great commander, the decisive point of operation, and giving a counter-stroke which Soult, trusting to the strength of Reille's position, little expected.

When Wellington saw that La Martinière's division and the cavalry had abandoned the mountains above Elcano, and that Zabaldica was evacuated, he ordered Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of cavalry and a battery of artillery, to enter the valley of Zubiri and turn the French left; the seventh division was directed to sweep over the hills beyond the Lanz river upon the French right; the march of Campbell and Morillo ensured the communication with Hill; and that general was to point his columns upon Olague and Lanz, threatening the French rear; but meeting, as we have seen, with D'Erlon, was forced back to Eguaros. The fourth division was to assail Foy's position, but respecting its great strength the attack was to be measured according to the effect produced on the flanks. Meanwhile Byng's brigade and the sixth division, the latter having a battery of guns and some squadrons of cavalry, were combined to assault Sauroren. L'Abispa's Spaniards followed the sixth division. Fane's horsemen were stationed at Berioplano with a detachment pushed to Yrurzun, the heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte, and Carlos d'España maintained the blockade.

SECOND BATTLE OF SAUOREN.

These movements began at daylight. Picton's advance was rapid. He gained the valley of Zubiri and threw his skirmishers at once on Foy's flank, and about the same time general Inglis, one of those veterans who purchase every step of promotion with their blood, advancing with only five hundred men of the seventh division, broke at one shock the two French regiments covering Clauzel's right, and drove them down into the valley of Lanz. He lost, indeed, one-third of his own men, but instantly spreading the remainder in skirmishing order along the descent, opened a biting fire upon the flank of Conroux's division, which was then moving up the valley from Sauroren, sorely amazed and disordered by this sudden fall of two regiments from the top of the mountain into the midst of the column.

Foy's division, marching to support Conroux and Maucune, was on the crest of the mountains between Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of attack, but too far off to give aid, and his own light troops were engaged with the skirmishers of the fourth division; and Inglis had been so sudden and vigorous, that before the evil could be well perceived it was past remedy. For Wellington instantly pushed the sixth division, now commanded by general Pakenham, Pack having been wounded on the 28th, to the left of Sauroren, and shoved Byng's brigade headlong down from the chapel height against that village, which was defended by Maucune's division. Byng's vigorous assault was simultaneously enforced from the opposite direction by Madden's Portuguese of the sixth division, and at the same time the battery near the chapel sent its bullets crashing through the houses and booming up the valley towards Conroux's

column, which Inglis never ceased to vex, and he was closely supported by the remainder of the seventh division.

The village and bridge of Sauroren and the straits beyond were now covered with a pall of smoke, the musketry pealed frequent and loud, and the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to mountain, filled all the valley. Byng, with hard fighting, carried the village of Sauroren, and fourteen hundred prisoners were made, for the two French divisions thus vehemently assailed in the front and flank were entirely broken. Part retreated along the valley towards Clauzel's other divisions, which were now beyond Ostiz; part fled up the mountain-side to seek a refuge with Foy, who had remained on the summit a helpless spectator of this rout; but though he rallied the fugitives in great numbers, he had soon to look to himself, for by this time his skirmishers had been driven up the mountain by those of the fourth division, and his left was infested by Picton's detachments. Thus pressed, he abandoned his strong position, and fell back along the summit of the mountain between the valley of Zubiri and the valley of Lanz, and the woods enabled him to effect his retreat without much loss; but he dared not descend into either valley, and thinking himself entirely cut off, sent advice of his situation to Soult, and then retired into the Aldudes by the pass of Urtiaga. Meanwhile Wellington, pressing up the valley of Lanz, drove Clauzel as far as Olague, and the latter, now joined by La Martinière's division, took a position in the evening covering the roads of Lanz and Lizasso. The English general, whose pursuit had been damped by hearing of Hill's action, also halted near Ostiz.

The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed and wounded, or taken, in the two battles of this day, and of these nearly twelve hundred were Portuguese, the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt of both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous. Conroux's and Maucune's divisions were completely disorganized; Foy with eight thousand men, including the fugitives he had rallied, was entirely separated from the main body; two thousand men at the lowest computation had been killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the woods and ravines, and three thousand prisoners were taken. This blow, joined to former losses, reduced Soult's fighting men to thirty-five thousand, of which the fifteen thousand under Clauzel and Reille were dispirited by defeat, and the whole were placed in a most critical situation. Hill's force, now increased to fifteen thousand men by the junction of Morillo and Campbell, was in front, and thirty thousand were on the rear in the valley of Lanz, or on the hills at each side, for the third division finding no more enemies in the valley of Zubiri, had crowned the heights in conjunction with the fourth division.

Lord Wellington had detached some of L'Abispa's Spaniards to Marcalain when he heard of Hill's action, but he was not yet aware of the true state of affairs on that side. His operations were founded upon the notion that Soult was in retreat towards the Bastan. He designed to follow closely, pushing his own left forward to support sir Thomas Graham on the Bidassoa, but always underrating D'Erlon's troops he thought La Martinière's division had retreated by the Roncevalles road; and as Foy's column was numerous and two divisions had been broken at Sauroren, he judged the force immediately under Soult to be weak, and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth division and the thirteenth light dragoons were to march by Eugui to join the third division, which was directed upon Linzoain and Ron-

cevalles. The fourth division was to descend into the valley of Lanz. General Hill, supported by the Spaniards at Marcalain, was to press Soult closely, always turning his right but directing his own march upon Lanz, from whence he was to send Campbell's brigade to the Alduides. The seventh division, which had halted on the ridges between Hill and Wellington, was to suffer the former to cross its front and then march for the pass of Dona Maria.

It appears from these arrangements, that Wellington expecting Soult would rejoin Clauzel and make for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate, intended to confine and press him closely in that district. But the French marshal was in a worse position than his adversary imagined, being too far advanced towards Buenza to return to Lanz; in fine he was between two fires and without a retreat save by the pass of Dona Maria upon St. Estevan. Wherefore calling in Clauzel, and giving D'Erlon, whose divisions hitherto successful were in good order and undismayed, the rear-guard, he commenced his march soon after midnight towards the pass. But mischief was thickening around him.

Sir Thomas Graham, having only the blockade of San Sebastian to maintain, was at the head of twenty thousand men ready to make a forward movement, and there remained besides the division under Charles Alten, of whose operations it is time to speak. That general, as we have seen, took post on the mountains of Santa Cruz the 27th. From thence on the evening of the 28th, he marched to gain Lecumberri on the great road of Yrurzun; but whether by orders from sir Thomas Graham or in default of orders, the difficulty of communication being extreme in those wild regions, I know not, he commenced his descent into the valley of Lerins very late. His leading brigade, getting down with some difficulty, reached Leyza beyond the great chain by the pass of Goriti or Zubieta, but darkness caught the other brigade, and the troops dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and precipices. Many made fagot torches, waving them as signals, and thus moving about, the lights served indeed to assist those who carried them, but misled and bewildered others who saw them at a distance. The heights and the ravines were alike studded with these small fires, and the soldiers calling to each other for directions filled the whole region with their clamour. Thus they continued to rove and shout until morning showed the face of the mountain covered with tired and scattered men and animals who had not gained half a league of ground beyond their starting place, and it was many hours ere they could be collected to join the other brigade at Leyza.

General Alten, who had now been separated for three days from the army, sent mounted officers in various directions to obtain tidings, and at six o'clock in the evening renewed his march. At Areysa he halted for some time without suffering fires to be lighted, for he knew nothing of the enemy and was fearful of discovering his situation, but at night he again moved and finally established his bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th. The noise of Hill's battle at Buenza was clearly heard in the course of the day, and the light division was thus again comprised in the immediate system of operations directed by Wellington in person. Had Soult continued his march upon Guipuscoa, Alten would have been in great danger, but the French general being forced to retreat, the light division was a new power thrown into his opponent's hands, the value of which will be seen by a reference to the peculiarity of the country through which the French general was now to move.

It has been shown that Foy, cut off from the main army, was driven towards the Alduides; that the French artillery and part of the cavalry were again on the Bidassoa, whence Villatte, contrary to the intelligence received by Soult, had not advanced, though he had skirmished with Longa, leaving the latter however in possession of the heights above Lesaca. The troops under Soult's immediate command were therefore completely isolated, and had no resources save what his ability and their own courage could supply. His single line of retreat by the pass of Dona Maria was secure as far as St. Estevan, and from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to Elisondo, and so gain France by the Col de Maya, or down the same river towards Vera by Sumbilla and Yanzi, from both of which places roads branching off to the right lead over the mountains to the passes of Echallar. There was also a third mountain road leading direct from St. Estevan to Zugaramurdi and Urdax, but it was too steep and rugged for his wounded men and baggage.

The road to Elisondo was very good, but that down the Bidassoa was a long and terrible defile, and so contracted about the bridges of Yanzi and Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast. This then Soult had to dread: that Wellington, who by the pass of Vellate could reach Elisondo before him, would block his passage on that side; that Graham would occupy the rocks about Yanzi, blocking the passage there, and by detachments cut off his line of march upon Echallar. Then confined to the narrow mountain-way from St. Estevan to Zugaramurdi, he would be followed hard by general Hill, exposed to attacks in rear and flank during his march, and perhaps be headed at Urdax by the allied troops moving through Vellate, Elisondo and the Col de Maya. In this state, his first object being to get through the pass of Dona Maria, he commenced his retreat, as we have seen, in the night of the 30th, and Wellington, still deceived as to the real state of affairs, did not take the most fitting measures to stop his march; that is to say, he continued in his first design, halting in the valley of Lanz, while Hill passed his front to enter the Bastan, into which district he sent Byng's brigade as belonging to the second division. But early on the 31st, when Soult's real strength became known, he directed the seventh division to aid Hill, followed Byng through the pass of Vellate with the remainder of his forces, and thinking the light division might be at Zubieta in the valley of Lerins, sent Alten orders to head the French if possible at St. Estevan, or at Sumbilla, in fine to cut in upon their line of march somewhere; Longa also was ordered to come down to the defiles at Yanza, thus aiding the light division to block the way on that side, and sir Thomas Graham was advertised to hold his army in readiness to move in the same view, and it would appear that the route of the sixth and third divisions were also changed for a time.

COMBAT OF DONA MARIA.

At ten o'clock in the morning of the 31st, general Hill overtook Soult's rear-guard between Lizasso and the Puerto. The seventh division, coming from the hills above Olague, was already ascending the mountain on his right, and the French only gained a wood on the summit of the pass under the fire of Hill's guns. There, however, they turned, and throwing out their skirmishers, made strong battle. General Stewart, leading the attack of the second division, now for the third time engaged with D'Erlon's troops, was again wounded, and his first brigade was repulsed; but general Pringle, who succeeded to the command, renewed the attack with the second bri-

gade, and the thirty-fourth regiment leading, broke the enemy at the moment that the seventh division did the same on the right. Some prisoners were taken, but a thick fog prevented further pursuit, and the loss of the French in the action is unknown, probably less than that of the allies, which was something short of four hundred men.

The seventh division remained on the mountain, but Hill fell back to Lizasso, and then, following his orders, moved by a short but rugged way, leading between the passes of Dona Maria and Vellate over the great chain to Almandoz, to join Wellington, who had, during the combat, descended into the Bastan by the pass of Vellate. Meanwhile Byng reached Elisondo, and captured a large convoy of provisions and ammunition left under guard of a battalion by D'Erlon on the 29th; he made several hundred prisoners also after a sharp skirmish, and then pushed forward to the pass of Maya. Wellington now occupied the hills through which the road leads from Elisondo to St. Estevan, and full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow; for Soult, not being pursued after passing Dona Maria, had halted in St. Estevan, although by his scouts he knew that the convoy had been taken at Elisondo. He was in a deep narrow valley, and three British divisions with one of Spaniards were behind the mountains overlooking the town; the seventh division was on the mountain of Dona Maria; the light division and sir Thomas Graham's Spaniards were marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits from the valley; Byng was already at Maya, and Hill was moving by Almandoz just behind Wellington's own position. A few hours gained and the French must surrender or disperse. Wellington gave strict orders to prevent the lighting of fires, the straggling of soldiers, or any other indication of the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst some rocks at a commanding point, from whence he could observe every movement of the enemy. Soult seemed tranquil, and four of his *gendarmes* were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. Some of the staff proposed to cut them off; the English general, whose object was to hide his own presence, would not suffer it, but the next moment three marauding English soldiers entered the valley and were instantly carried off by the horsemen. Half an hour afterwards the French drums beat to arms and their columns began to move out of St. Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander of the most splendid success, and saved another from the most terrible disaster.

The captives walked from their prison, but their chains hung upon them. The way was narrow, the multitude great, and the baggage, and wounded men borne on their comrades' shoulders, filed with such long procession, that Clauzel's divisions, forming the rear-guard, were still about St. Estevan on the morning of the first of August, and scarcely had they marched a league of ground, when the skirmishers of the fourth division and the Spaniards thronging along the heights on the right flank, opened a fire to which little reply could be made. The troops and baggage then got mixed with an extreme disorder, numbers of the former fled up the hills, and the commanding energy of Soult, whose personal exertions were conspicuous, could scarcely prevent a general dispersion. However, prisoners and baggage fell at every step into the hands of the pursuers, the boldest were dismayed at the peril, and worse would have awaited them in front, if Wellington had been on other points well seconded by his subordinate generals.

The head of the French column, instead of taking the first road leading from Sumbilla to Echallar, had passed onward towards that leading from the bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere cleft in the rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa was on their left, and there was a tributary torrent to cross, the bridge of which was defended by a battalion of Spanish *caçadores*, detached to that point from the heights of Vera by general Barceñas. The front was now as much disordered as the rear, and had Longa or Barceñas reinforced the *caçadores*, those only of the French who, being near Sumbilla, could take the road from that place to Echallar, would have escaped; but the Spanish generals kept aloof, and D'Erlon won the defile. However, Reille's divisions were still to pass, and when they came up a new enemy had appeared.

It will be remembered that the light division was directed to head the French army at St. Estevan or Sumbilla. This order was received on the evening of the 31st, and the division, repassing the defiles of the Zubieta, descended the deep valley of Lerins and reached Elgoriaga about mid-day on the 1st of August, having then marched twenty-four miles, and being little more than a league from St. Estevan and about the same distance from Sumbilla. The movement of the French along the Bidassoa was soon discovered, but the division, instead of moving on Sumbilla, turned to the left, clambered up the great mountain of Santa Cruz, and made for the bridge of Yanzi. The weather was exceedingly sultry, the mountain steep and hard to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while others, whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled, leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time.

Towards evening, after marching for nineteen consecutive hours over forty miles of mountain roads, the head of the exhausted column reached the edge of a precipice near the bridge of Yanzi. Below, within pistol-shot, Reille's divisions were seen hurrying forward along the horrid defile in which they were pent up, and a fire of musketry commenced, slightly from the British on the high rock, more vigorously from some low ground near the bridge of Yanzi, where the riflemen had ensconced themselves in the brushwood. The scene which followed is thus described by an eye-witness.

"We overlooked the enemy at stone's throw, and from the summit of a tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were wedged in a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side and the river on the other. Confusion impossible to describe followed, the wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echallar, but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded called out for quarter, while others pointed to them supported as they were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different habitations to aid the sufferers."

On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire, and so piteous was the spectacle that it was with averted or doubtful aim they shot at the others, although the latter rapidly plied their muskets in passing, and some in their veteran hardihood even dashed across the bridge of Yanzi to make a counter-attack. It was a soldier-like but a vain effort! the night found the British in possession of the bridge, and though the great body of the enemy es-

caped by the road to Echallar, the baggage was cut off and fell, together with many prisoners, into the hands of the light troops which were still hanging on the rear in pursuit from St. Estevan.

The loss of the French this day was very great, that of the allies about a hundred men, of which sixty-five were British, principally of the fourth division. Nevertheless, lord Wellington was justly discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor general Alten had fulfilled their mission. The former excused himself as being too feeble to oppose the mass Soult led down the valley; but the rocks were so precipitous that the French could not have reached him, and the resistance made by the Spanish *caçadores* was Longa's condemnation. A lamentable fatuity prevailed in many quarters. If Barceñas had sent his whole brigade instead of a weak battalion, the small torrent could not have been forced by D'Erlon; and if Longa had been near the bridge of Yanzi the French must have surrendered, for the perpendicular rocks on their right forbade even an escape by dispersion. Finally, if the light division, instead of marching down the valley of Lerins as far as Elgoriaga, had crossed the Santa Cruz mountain by the road used the night of the 28th, it would have arrived much earlier at the bridge of Yanzi, and then belike Longa and Barceñas would also have come down. Alten's instructions indeed prescribed Sumbilla and St. Estevan as the first points to head the French army, but judging them too strong at Sumbilla he marched as we have seen upon Yanzi; and if he had passed the bridge there and seized the road to Echallar with one brigade, while the other plied the flank with fire from the left of the Bidassoa, he would have struck a great blow. It was for that the soldiers had made such a prodigious exertion, yet the prize was thrown away.

During the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar, and on the morning of the 2d occupied the "*Puerto*" of that name. His left was placed at the rocks of Zugamurdi; his right at the rock of Ivantelly communicating with the left of Villatte's reserve, which was in position on the ridges between Soult's right and the head of the great Rhune mountain. Meanwhile Clauzel's three divisions, now reduced to six thousand men, took post on a strong hill between the *Puerto* and town of Echallar. This position was momentarily adopted by Soult to save time, to examine the country, and to make Wellington discover his final object, but that general would not suffer the affront. He had sent the third and sixth divisions to reoccupy the passes of Roncevalles and the Alduides; Hill had reached the Col de Maya, and Byng was at Urdax; the fourth, seventh, and light divisions remained in hand, and with these he resolved to fall upon Clauzel, whose position was dangerously advanced.

COMBATS OF ECHALLAR AND IVANTELLY.

The light division held the road running from the bridge of Yanzi to Echallar until relieved by the fourth division, and then marched by Lesaca to Santa Barbara, thus turning Clauzel's right. The fourth division marched from Yanzi upon Echallar to attack his front, and the seventh moved from Sumbilla against his left; but Barnes's brigade, contrary to lord Wellington's intention, arrived unsupported before the fourth and light divisions were either seen or felt, and without awaiting the arrival of more troops assailed Clauzel's strong position. The fire became vehement, but neither the steepness of the mountain nor the overshadowing multitude of the enemy clustering above in support of their skirmishers could arrest the assailants, and then was seen

the astonishing spectacle of fifteen hundred men driving, by sheer valour and force of arms, six thousand good troops from a position, so rugged that there would have been little to boast of if the numbers had been reversed and the defence made good. It is true that the fourth division arrived towards the end of the action, that the French had fulfilled their mission as a rear-guard, that they were worn with fatigue and ill-provided with ammunition, having exhausted all their reserve stores during the retreat, but the real cause of their inferiority belongs to the highest part of war.

The British soldiers, their natural fierceness stimulated by the remarkable personal daring of their general, Barnes, were excited by the pride of success; and the French divisions were those which had failed in the attack on the 28th, which had been utterly defeated on the 30th, and which had suffered so severely the day before about Sumbilla. Such then is the preponderance of moral power. The men who had assailed the terrible rocks above Saureren, with a force and energy that all the valour of the hardest British veterans scarcely sufficed to repel, were now, only five days afterwards, although posted so strongly, unable to sustain the shock of one-fourth of their own numbers. And at this very time eighty British soldiers, the comrades and equals of those who achieved this wonderful exploit, having wandered to plunder, surrendered to some French peasants, whom lord Wellington truly observed, "they would under other circumstances have eat up!" What gross ignorance of human nature, then, do those writers display, who assert that the employing of brute force is the highest qualification of a general!

Clauzel, thus dispossessed of the mountain, fell back fighting to a strong ridge beyond the pass of Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly mountain, which was strongly occupied. Meanwhile the light division emerging by Lesaca from the narrow valley of the Bidassoa, ascended the broad heights of Santa Barbara without opposition, and halted there until the operations of the fourth and seventh divisions were far enough advanced to render it advisable to attack the Ivantelly. This lofty mountain lifted its head on the right, rising as it were out of the Santa Barbara heights, and separating them from the ridges through which the French troops, beaten at Echallar, were now retiring. Evening was coming on, a thick mist capped the crowning rocks which contained a strong French regiment, the British soldiers, besides their long and terrible march the previous day, had been for two days without sustenance, and were leaning, weak and fainting, on their arms, when the advancing fire of Barnes's action about Echallar indicated the necessity of dislodging the enemy from Ivantelly. Colonel Andrew Barnard instantly led five companies of his riflemen to the attack, and four companies of the forty-third followed in support. The misty cloud had descended, and the riflemen were soon lost to the view, but the sharp clang of their weapons, heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous rolling musketry of the French, told what work was going on. For some time the echoes rendered it doubtful how the action went, but the following companies of the forty-third could find no trace of an enemy save the killed and wounded. Barnard had fought his way unaided and without a check to the summit, where his dark-clothed swarthy veterans raised their victorious shout from the highest peak, just as the coming night showed the long ridges of the mountains beyond sparkling with the last musket flashes from Clauzel's troops retiring in disorder from Echallar.

This day's fighting cost the British four hundred men, and lord Wellington narrowly escaped the enemy's hands. He had carried with him towards Echallar half a company of the forty-third as an escort, and placed a sergeant named Blood with a party to watch in front while he examined his maps. The French, who were close at hand, sent a detachment to cut the party off; and such was the nature of the ground that their troops, rushing on at speed, would infallibly have fallen unawares upon lord Wellington, if Blood, a young intelligent man, seeing the danger, had not with surprising activity, leaping rather than running down the precipitous rocks he was posted on, given the general notice, and as it was, the French arrived in time to send a volley of shot after him as he galloped away.

Soult now caused count d'Erlon to reoccupy the hills about Ainhoa, Clauzel to take post on the heights in advance of Sarre, and Reille to carry his two divisions to St. Jean de Luz in second line behind Villatte's reserve. Foy, who had rashly uncovered St. Jean Pied de Port by descending upon Cambo, was ordered to return and reinforce his troops with all that he could collect of national guards and detachments.

Wellington had, on the 1st, directed general Graham to collect forces and bring up pontoons for crossing the Bidassoa, but he finally abandoned this design, and the two armies therefore rested quiet in their respective positions, after nine days of continual movement, during which they had fought ten serious actions. Of the allies, including the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred officers and soldiers had been killed, wounded or taken, and many were dispersed from fatigue or to plunder. On the French side the loss was terrible, and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate. Nevertheless, a close approximation may be made. Lord Wellington at first called it twelve thousand, but hearing that the French officers admitted more, he raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. The engineer, *Belmas*, in his *Journals of Sieges*, compiled from official documents by order of the French government, sets down above thirteen thousand. Soult, in his despatches at the time, stated fifteen hundred as the loss at Maya, four hundred at Roncevalles, two hundred on the 27th, and eighteen hundred on the 28th, after which he speaks no more of losses by battle. There remains therefore to be added the killed and wounded at the combats of Linzoain on the 26th, the double battles of Sauroren and Buena on the 30th, the combats on the 31st, and those of the 1st and 2d of August; finally, four thousand unwounded prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to sound the stream of blood in all its horrid depths.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. The allies' line of defence was weak. Was it therefore injudiciously adopted?

The French, beaten at Vittoria, were disorganized, and retreated without artillery or baggage on eccentric lines; Foy by Guipuscoa, Clauzel by Zaragoza, Reille by St. Estevan, the king by Pampeluna. There was no reserve to rally upon, the people fled from the frontier, Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, if not defenceless, were certainly in a very neglected state, and the English general might have undertaken any operation, assumed any position, offensive or defensive, which seemed good to him. Why then did he not establish the Anglo-Portuguese beyond the mountains, leaving the Spaniards to blockade the fortresses behind him? The answer to this question involves the differences between the practice and the theory of war.

"The soldiers, instead of preparing food and resting themselves after the battle, dispersed in the night to plunder, and were so fatigued, that when the rain came on the next day they were incapable of marching, and had more stragglers than the beaten enemy. Eighteen days after the victory twelve thousand five hundred men, chiefly British, were absent, most of them marauding in the mountains."

Such were the reasons assigned by the English general for his slack pursuit after the battle of Vittoria, yet he had commanded that army for six years! Was he then deficient in the first qualification of a general, the art of disciplining and inspiring troops, or was the English military system defective? It is certain that he always exacted the confidence of his soldiers as a leader. It is not so certain that he ever gained their affections. The barbarity of the English military code excited public horror, the inequality of promotion created public discontent; yet the general complained he had no adequate power to reward or punish, and he condemned alike the system and the soldiers it produced. The latter "were detestable for every thing but fighting, and the officers as culpable as the men." The vehemence of these censures is inconsistent with his celebrated observation, subsequently made, namely, "that he thought he could go any where and do any thing with the army that fought on the Pyrenees," and although it cannot be denied that his complaints were generally too well founded, there were thousands of true and noble soldiers, and zealous worthy officers, who served their country honestly and merited no reproaches. It is enough that they have been since neglected, exactly in proportion to their want of that corrupt aristocratic influence which produced the evils complained of.

2nd. When the misconduct of the troops had thus weakened the effect of victory, the question of following Joseph at once into France assumed a new aspect. Wellington's system of warfare had never varied after the battle of Talavera. Rejecting dangerous enterprise, it rested on profound calculation, both as to time and resources, for the accomplishment of a particular object, namely, the gradual liberation of Spain by the Anglo-Portuguese army. Not that he held it impossible to attain that object suddenly, and his battles in India, the passage of the Duero, the advance to Talavera, prove that by nature he was inclined to daring operations; but such efforts, however glorious, could not be adopted by a commander who feared even the loss of a brigade, lest the government he served should put an end to the war. Neither was it suitable to the state of his relations with the Portuguese and Spaniards; their ignorance, jealousy and passionate pride, fierce in proportion to their weakness and improvidence, would have enhanced every danger.

No man could have anticipated the extraordinary errors of the French in 1813. Wellington did not expect to cross the Ebro before the end of the campaign, and his battering train was prepared for the siege of Burgos, not for that of Bayonne. A sudden invasion of France, her military reputation considered, was therefore quite out of the pale of his methodized system of warfare, which was founded upon political as well as military considerations; and of the most complicated nature, seeing that he had at all times to deal with the personal and factious interests and passions, as well as the great state interests of three distinct nations, two of which abhorred each other. At this moment, also, the uncertain state of affairs in Germany strongly influenced his views. An armistice which might end in a separate peace, excluding England, would have brought Napoleon's whole force

to the Pyrenees, and Wellington held cheap both the military and political proceedings of the coalesced powers. "*I would not move a corporal's guard in reliance upon such a system,*" was the significant phrase he employed to express his contempt.

These considerations justified his caution as to invading France, but there were local military reasons equally cogent. 1st. He could not dispense with a secure harbour, because the fortresses still in possession of the French, namely, Santona, Pancorbo, Pampeluna, and San Sebastian, interrupted his communications with the interior of Spain; hence the siege of the latter place. 2nd. He had to guard against the union of Suchet and Clauzel on his right flank; hence his efforts to cut off the last named general; hence also the blockade of Pampeluna in preference to siege, and the launching of Mina and the bands on the side of Zaragoza.

3rd. After Vittoria, the nature of the campaign depended upon Suchet's operations, which were rendered more important by Murray's misconduct. The allied force on the eastern coast was badly organized, it did not advance from Valencia, as we have seen, until the 16th, and then only partially and by the coast, whereas Suchet had assembled more than twenty thousand excellent troops on the Ebro as early as the 12th of July; and had he continued his march upon Zaragoza he would have saved the castle of that place with its stores. Then rallying Paris's division he could have menaced Wellington's flank with twenty-five thousand men, exclusive of Clauzel's force, and if that general joined him, with forty thousand.

On the 16th, the day lord William Bentinck quitted Valencia, Suchet might have marched from Zaragoza on Tudela, or Sanguesa, and Soult's preparations, originally made as we have seen to attack on the 23d instead of the 25th, would have naturally been hastened. How difficult it would then have been for the allies to maintain themselves beyond the Ebro is evident, much more so to hold a forward position in France. That Wellington feared an operation of this nature is clear from his instructions to lord William Bentinck and to Mina; and because Picton's and Cole's divisions, instead of occupying the passes, were kept behind the mountains solely to watch Clauzel; when the latter had regained the frontier of France, Cole was permitted to join Byng and Morillo. It follows that the operations after the battle of Vittoria were well considered and consonant to lord Wellington's general system. Their wisdom would have been proved if Suchet had seized the advantages within his reach.

4th. A general's capacity is sometimes more taxed to profit from a victory than to gain one. Wellington, master of all Spain, Catalonia excepted, desired to establish himself solidly in the Pyrenees, lest a separate peace in Germany should enable Napoleon to turn his whole force against the allies. In this expectation, with astonishing exertion of body and mind, he had in three days achieved a rigorous examination of the whole mass of the western Pyrenees, and concluded that if Pampeluna and San Sebastian fell, a defensive position as strong as that of Portugal, and a much stronger one than could be found behind the Ebro, might be established. But to invest those places and maintain so difficult a covering line was a greater task than to win the battle of Vittoria. However, the early fall of San Sebastian he expected, because the errors of execution in that siege could not be foreseen, and also for gain of time he counted upon the disorganized state of the French army, upon Joseph's want of military capacity, and upon the moral ascendancy which his own troops

had acquired over the enemy by their victories. He could not anticipate the expeditious journey, the sudden arrival of Soult, whose rapid reorganization of the French army, and whose vigorous operations, contrasted with Joseph's abandonment of Spain, illustrated the old Greek saying, that a herd of deer led by a lion are more dangerous than a herd of lions led by a deer.

5th. The duke of Dalmatia was little beholden to fortune at the commencement of his movements. Her first contradiction was the bad weather, which, breaking up the roads, delayed the concentration of his army at St. Jean Pied de Port for two days; all officers know the effect which heavy rain and hard marches have upon the vigour and confidence of soldiers who are going to attack. If Soult had commenced on the 23d instead of the 25th, the surprise would have been more complete, his army more brisk; and as no conscript battalions would have arrived to delay Reille, that general would probably have been more ready in his attack, and might possibly have escaped the fog which, on the 26th, stopped his march along the superior crest of the mountain towards Vellate. On the other hand, the allies would have been spared the unsuccessful assault on San Sebastian; and the pass of Maya might have been better furnished with troops. However, Soult's combinations were so well knit that more than one error in execution, and more than one accident of fortune, were necessary to baffle him. Had count D'Erlon followed his instructions even on the 25th, general Hill would probably have been shouldered off the valley of Lanz, and Soult would have had twenty thousand additional troops in the combats of the 27th and 28th. Such failures, however, generally attend extensively combined movements, and it is by no means certain that the count would have been able to carry the position of the Col de Maya on the 25th, if all general Stewart's forces had been posted there. It would, therefore, perhaps have been more strictly within the rules of art, if D'Erlon had been directed to leave one of his three divisions to menace the Col de Maya, while he marched with the other two by St. Etienne de Baigorri up the Alduides. This movement, covered by the national guards, who occupied the mountain of La Houssa, could not have been stopped by Campbell's Portuguese brigade, and would have dislodged Hill from the Bastan, while it secured the junction of D'Erlon with Soult on the crest of the superior chain.

6th. The intrepid constancy with which Byng and Ross defended their several positions on the 25th, the able and clean retreat made by general Cole as far as the heights of Linzoain, gave full effect to the errors of Reille and D'Erlon, and would probably have baffled Soult at an early period if general Picton had truly comprehended the importance of his position. Lord Wellington says, that the concentration of the army would have been effected on the 27th, if that officer and general Cole had not agreed in thinking it impossible to make a stand behind Linzoain; and surely the necessity of retreating on that day may be questioned. For if Cole with ten thousand men maintained the position in front of Altobiscar, Ibañeta, and Atalosti, Picton might have maintained the more contracted one behind Linzoain and Erro with twenty thousand. And that number he could have assembled, because Campbell's Portuguese reached Eugui long before the evening of the 26th, and lord Wellington had directed O'Donel to keep three thousand five hundred of the blockading troops in readiness to act in advance, of which Picton could not have been ignorant. It was impossi-

ble to turn him by the valley of Urroz, that line being too rugged for the march of an army and not leading directly upon Pampeluna. The only roads into the Val de Zubiri were by Erro and Linzoain, lying close together, and both leading upon the village of Zubiri over the ridges which Picton occupied, and the strength of which was evident from Soult's declining an attack on the evening of the 26th, when Cole only was before him. To abandon this ground so hastily, when the concentration of the army depended upon keeping it, appears therefore an error, aggravated by the neglect of sending timely information to the commander-in-chief, for lord Wellington did not know of the retreat until the morning of the 27th, and then only from general Long. It might be that Picton's messenger failed, but many should have been sent, when a retrograde movement involving the fate of Pampeluna was contemplated.

It has been said that general Cole was the adviser of this retreat, which, if completed, would have ruined lord Wellington's campaign. This is incorrect; Picton was not a man to be guided by others. General Cole indeed gave him a report, drawn up by colonel Bell, one of the ablest staff-officers of the army, which stated that no position suitable for a very inferior force existed between Zubiri and Pampeluna, and this was true in the sense of the report, which had reference only to a division, not to an army; moreover, although the actual battle of Sauren was fought by inferior numbers, the whole position, including the ridges of the second line occupied by Picton and the Spaniards, was only maintained by equal numbers; and if Soult had made the attack of the 28th on the evening of the 27th, before the sixth division arrived, the position would have been carried. However, there is no doubt that colonel Bell's report influenced Picton, and it was only when his troops had reached Huarte and Vilalba that he suddenly resolved on battle. That was a military resolution, vigorous and prompt; and not the less worthy of praise that he so readily adopted Cole's saving proposition to regain the more forward heights above Zabaldica.

7th. Marshal Soult appeared unwilling to attack on the evenings of the 26th and 27th. Yet success depended upon forestalling the allies at their point of concentration; and it is somewhat inexplicable that on the 28th, having possession of the bridge beyond the Lanz river and plenty of cavalry, he should have known so little of the sixth division's movements. The general conception of his scheme on the 30th has also been blamed by some of his own countrymen, apparently from ignorance of the facts and because it failed. Crowned with success, it would have been cited as a fine illustration of the art of war. To have retired at once by the two valleys of Zubiri and Lanz after being reinforced with twenty thousand men would have given great importance to his repulse on the 28th; his reputation as a general capable of restoring the French affairs would have vanished, and mischief only have accrued, even though he should have effected his retreat safely, which, regard being had to the narrowness of the valleys, the position of general Hill on his right, and the boldness of his adversary, was not certain. To abandon the valley of Zubiri and secure that of Lanz; to obtain another and shorter line of retreat by the Dona Maria pass; to crush general Hill with superior numbers, and thus gaining the Yrurzun road to succour San Sebastian, or, failing of that, to secure the union of the whole army and give to his retreat the appearance of an able offensive movement; to combine all these chances

by one operation immediately after a severe check, was Soult's plan: it was not impracticable, and was surely the conception of a great commander.

To succeed, however, it was essential either to beat general Hill off-hand and thus draw Wellington to that side by the way of Marcalain, or to secure the defence of the French left in such a solid manner that no efforts against it should prevail to the detriment of the offensive movement on the right: neither was effected. The French general indeed brought an overwhelming force to bear upon Hill, and drove him from the road of Yrurzun; but he did not crush him, because that general fought so strongly and retired with such good order, that beyond the loss of the position no injury was sustained. Meanwhile the left wing of the French was completely beaten, and thus the advantage gained on the right was more than nullified. Soult trusted to the remarkable defensive strength of the ground occupied by his left, and he had reason to do so, for it was nearly impregnable. Lord Wellington turned it on both flanks at the same time, but neither Picton's advance into the valley of Zubiri on Foy's left, nor Cole's front attack on that general, nor Byng's assault upon the village of Sauren, would have seriously damaged the French without the sudden and complete success of general Inglis beyond the Lanz. The other attacks would indeed have forced the French to retire somewhat hastily up the valley of the Lanz, yet they could have held together in mass secure of their junction with Soult. But when the ridges running between them and the right wing of the French army were carried by Inglis, and the whole of the seventh division was thrown upon their flank and rear, the front attack became decisive. It is clear therefore that the key of the defence was on the ridge beyond the Lanz, and instead of two regiments, Clauzel should have placed two divisions there.

8th. Lord Wellington's quick perception and vigorous stroke on the 30th were to be expected from such a consummate commander, yet he certainly was not master of all the bearings of the French general's operations; he knew neither the extent of Hill's danger nor the difficulties of Soult, otherwise it is probable that he would have put stronger columns in motion, and at an earlier hour, towards the pass of Dona Maria on the morning of the 31st. Hill did not commence his march that day until 8 o'clock, and it has been shown that even with the help of the seventh division he was too weak against the heavy mass of the retreating French army. The faults and accidents which baffled Wellington's after-operations have been sufficiently touched upon in the narrative, but he halted in the midst of his victorious career, when Soult's army was broken and flying, when Suchet had retired into Catalonia, and all things seemed favourable for the invasion of France.

His motives for this were strong. He knew the armistice in Germany had been renewed with a view to peace, and he had therefore reason to expect Soult would be reinforced. A forward position in France would have lent his right to the enemy, who, pivoting upon St. Jean Pied de Port, could operate against his flank. His arrangements for supply, and intercourse with his depots and hospitals, would have been more difficult and complicated; and as the enemy possessed all the French and Spanish fortresses commanding the great roads, his need to gain one, at least, before the season closed, was absolute, if he would not resign his communications with the interior of Spain. Then long marches and frequent combats had fatigued his troops, destroyed their shoes and used up their musket ammunition;

and the loss of men had been great, especially of British in the second division, where their proportion to foreign troops was become too small. The difficulty of re-equipping the troops would have been increased by entering an enemy's state, because the English system did not make war support war, and his communications would have been lengthened. Finally, it was France that was to be invaded, France in which every person was a soldier, where the whole population was armed and organized under men, not as in other countries inexperienced in war, but who had all served more or less. Beyond the Adour the army could not advance, and if a separate peace was made by the northern powers, if any misfortune befell the allies in Catalonia, so as to leave Suchet at liberty to operate towards Pampeuna, or if Soult, profiting from the possession of St. Jean Pied de Port, should turn the right flank of the new position, a retreat into Spain would become necessary, and however short would be dangerous from the hostility and warlike disposition of the people directed in a military manner.

These reasons, joined to the fact that a forward position, although offering better communications from right to left, would have given the enemy greater facilities for operating against an army which must, until the fortresses fell, hold a defensive and somewhat extended line, were conclusive as to the rashness of an invasion; but they do not appear so conclusive as to the necessity of stopping short after the action of the 2d of August. The questions were distinct. The one was a great measure involving vast political and military conditions, the other was simply whether Wellington should profit of his own victory and the enemy's distress; and in this view the objections above mentioned, save the want of shoes, the scarcity of ammunition, and the fatigue of the troops, are inapplicable. But in the two last particulars the allies were not

so badly off as the enemy, and in the first not so deficient as to cripple the army; wherefore if the advantage to be gained was worth the effort, it was an error to halt.

The solution of this problem is to be found in the comparative condition of the armies. Soult had recovered his reserve, his cavalry and artillery, but Wellington was reinforced by general Graham's corps, which was more numerous and powerful than Villatte's reserve. The new chances then were for the allies, and the action of the second of August demonstrated that their opponents, however strongly posted, could not stand before them; one more victory would have gone nigh to destroy the French force altogether; for such was the disorder, that Maucune's division had on the 2d only one thousand men left out of more than five thousand, and on the 6th it had still a thousand stragglers, besides killed and wounded. Conroux's and La Martinière's divisions were scarcely in better plight, and the losses of the other divisions, although less remarkable, were great. It must also be remembered that general Foy, with eight thousand men, was cut off from the main body; and the Nivelle, the sources of which were in the allies' power, was behind the French. With their left pressed from the pass of Maya, and their front vigorously assailed by the main body of the allies, they could hardly have kept together, since more than twenty-one thousand men, exclusive of Foy's troops, were then absent from their colours. And as late as the 12th of August, Soult warned the minister of war that he was indeed preparing to assail his enemy again, but he had not the means of resisting a counter-attack, although he held a different language to his army and to the people of the country.

Had Cæsar halted because his soldiers were fatigued, Pharsalia would have been but a common battle.

BOOK XXII.

CHAPTER I.

New positions of the army—Lord Melville's mismanagement of the naval co-operation—Siege of San Sebastian—Progress of the second attack.

AFTER the combat of Echallar, Soult adopted a permanent position and reorganized his army. The left wing under D'Erlon occupied the hills of Ainhoa, with an advanced guard on the heights overlooking Urdax and Zugamurdi. The centre under Clauzel was in advance of Sarre, guarding the issues from Vera and Echallar, his right resting on the greatest of the Rhune mountains. The right wing under Reille, composed of Maucune's and La Martinière's divisions, extended along the lower Bidassoa to the sea. Villatte's reserve was encamped behind the Nivelle near Serres; and Reille's third division, under Foy, covered in conjunction with the national guards St. Jean Pied de Port and the roads leading into France on that side. The cavalry for the convenience of forage were quartered, one division between the Nive and the Nivelle rivers, the other as far back as Dax.

Lord Wellington occupied his old position from the pass of Roncevalles to the mouth of the Bidassoa, but the disposition of his troops was different. Sir Rowland Hill, reinforced by Morillo, held the Roncevalles and Alduides, throwing up field-works at the former. The third and sixth divisions were in the Bastan guarding the Puerto de Maya, and the seventh division, reinforced by O'Donel's army of reserve, occupied the passes at Echallar and Zugamurdi. The light division was posted on the Santa Barbara heights, having piquets in the town of Vera; their left rested on the Bidassoa, their right on the Ivantelly rock, round which a bridle communication with Echallar was now made by the labour of the soldiers. Longa's troops were beyond the Bidassoa on the left of the light division; the fourth division was in reserve behind him, near Lesaca; the fourth Spanish army, now commanded by general Freyre, prolonged the line from the left of Longa to the sea; it crossed the royal causeway, occupied Irun and Fontarabia and guarded the Jaizquibel mountain. The first division was in reserve behind these Spaniards; the fifth division was destined to resume the siege of San Sebastian; the blockade of Pampeluna was maintained by Carlos d'España's troops.

This disposition, made with increased means, was more powerful for defence than the former occupation of the same ground. A strong corps under a single command was well intrenched at Roncevalles; and in the Bastan two British divisions, admonished by Stewart's error, were more than sufficient to defend the Puerto de Maya. The Echallar mountains were, with the aid of O'Donel's Spaniards, equally secure; and the reserve, instead of occupying St. Estevan, was posted near Lesaca in support of the left, now become the most important part of the line.

The castles of Zaragoza and Daroca had fallen, the Empecinado was directed upon Alcaniz, and he maintained the communication between the Catalan army and Mina. The latter, now joined by Duran,

was gathering near Jaca, from whence his line of retreat was by Sanguesa upon Pampeluna; in this position he menaced general Paris, who marched after a slight engagement on the 11th into France, leaving eight hundred men in the town and castle. At this time lord William Bentinck, having crossed the Ebro, was investing Tarragona; and thus the allies, acting on the offensive, were in direct military communication from the Mediterranean to the bay of Biscay, while Suchet, though holding the fortresses, could only communicate with Soult through France,

This last named marshal, being strongly posted, did not much expect a front attack, but the augmentation of the allies on the side of Roncevalles and Maya gave him uneasiness, lest they should force him to abandon his position by operating along the Nive river. To meet this danger, general Paris took post at Oloron in second line to Foy, and the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navarreins were put in a state of defence as pivots of operation on that side, while Bayonne served a like purpose on the other flank of the army. But with great diligence the French general fortified his line from the mouth of the Bidassoa to the rocks of Mondarain and the Nive.

Lord Wellington, whose reasons for not invading France at this period have been already noticed, and who had now little to fear from any renewal of the French operations against his right wing, turned his whole attention to the reduction of San Sebastian. In this object he was, however, crossed in a manner to prove that the English ministers were the very counterparts of the Spanish and Portuguese statesmen. Lord Melville was at the head of the board of admiralty; under his rule the navy of England for the first time met with disasters in battle, and his neglect of the general's demands for maritime aid went nigh to fasten the like misfortunes upon the army. This neglect, combined with the cabinet scheme of employing lord Wellington in Germany, would seem to prove that experience had taught the English ministers nothing as to the nature of the Peninsular war, or that, elated with the array of sovereigns against Napoleon, they were now careless of a cause so mixed up with democracy. Still it would be incredible that lord Melville, a man of ordinary capacity, should have been suffered to retard the great designs and endanger the final success of a general, whose sure judgment and extraordinary merit were authenticated by exploits unparalleled in English warfare, if lord Wellington's correspondence and that of Mr. Stuart did not establish the following facts:

1st. Desertion from the enemy was stopped, chiefly because the admiralty, of which lord Melville was the head, refused to let the ships of war carry deserters or prisoners to England: they were thus heaped up by hundreds at Lisbon and maltreated by the Portuguese government, which checked all desire in the French troops to come over.

2nd. When the disputes with America commenced, Mr. Stuart's efforts to obtain flour for the army were most vexatiously thwarted by the board

of admiralty, which permitted, if it did not encourage the English ships of war to capture American vessels trading under the secret licenses.

3rd. The refusal of the admiralty to establish certain cruisers along the coast, as recommended by lord Wellington, caused the loss of many store-ships and merchantmen, to the great detriment of the army before it quitted Portugal. Fifteen were taken off Oporto, and one close to the bar of Lisbon in May. And afterwards the Mediterranean packet bearing despatches from lord William Bentinck was captured, which led to lamentable consequences; for the papers were not in cipher, and contained detailed accounts of plots against the French in Italy, with the names of the principal persons engaged.

4th. A like neglect of the coast of Spain caused ships containing money, shoes, and other indispensable stores to delay in port, or risk the being taken on the passage by cruisers issuing from Santona, Bayonne and Bordeaux. And while the communications of the allies were thus intercepted, the French coasting vessels supplied their army and fortresses without difficulty.

5th. After the battle of Vittoria lord Wellington was forced to use French ammunition, though too small for the English muskets, because the ordnance store-ships which he had ordered from Lisbon to St. Ander could not sail for want of convoy. When the troops were in the Pyrenees, a reinforcement of five thousand men was kept at Gibraltar and Lisbon waiting for ships of war, and the transports employed to convey them were thus withdrawn from the service of carrying home wounded men, at a time when the Spanish authorities at Bilbao refused even for payment to concede public buildings for hospitals.

6th. When snow was falling on the Pyrenees the soldiers were without proper clothing, because the ship containing their great coats, though ready to sail in August, was detained at Oporto until November waiting for convoy. When the victories of July were to be turned to profit ere the fitting season for the siege of San Sebastian should pass away, the attack of that fortress was retarded sixteen days because a battering train and ammunition, demanded several months before by lord Wellington, had not yet arrived from England.

7th. During the siege the sea communication with Bayonne was free. "Any thing in the shape of a naval force," said lord Wellington, "would drive away sir George Collier's squadron." The garrison received reinforcements, artillery, ammunition and all necessary stores for its defence, sending away the sick and wounded men in empty vessels. The Spanish general blockading Santona complained at the same time that the exertions of his troops were useless, because the French succoured the place by sea when they pleased; and after the battle of Vittoria not less than five vessels laden with stores and provisions, and one transport having British soldiers and clothing on board, were taken by cruisers issuing out of that port. The great advantage of attacking San Sebastian by water as well as by land was foregone for want of naval means, and from the same cause British soldiers were withdrawn from their own service to unload store-ships; the gun-boats employed in the blockade were Spanish vessels manned by Spanish soldiers withdrawn from the army, and the store-boats were navigated by Spanish women.

8th. The coasting trade between Bordeaux and Bayonne being quite free, the French, whose military means of transport had been so crippled by their losses at Vittoria that they could scarcely

have collected magazines with land carriage only, received their supplies by water, and were thus saved trouble and expense and the unpopularity attending forced requisitions.

Between April and August, more than twenty applications and remonstrances were addressed by lord Wellington to the government upon these points, without producing the slightest attention to his demands. Mr. Croker, the under-secretary of the admiralty, of whose conduct he particularly complained, was indeed permitted to write an offensive official letter to him; but his demands and the dangers to be apprehended from neglecting them were disregarded, and to use his own words, "Since Great Britain had been a naval power, a British army had never before been left in such a situation at a most important moment."

Nor is it easy to determine whether negligence and incapacity, or a grovelling sense of national honour, prevailed most in the cabinet, when we find this renowned general complaining that the government, ignorant even to ridicule of military operations, seemed to know nothing of the nature of the element with which England was surrounded, and lord Melville so insensible to the glorious toils of the Peninsula as to tell him that his army was the last thing to be attended to.

RENEWED SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN.

Vilatte's demonstration against Longa, on the 28th of July, had caused the ships laden with the battering train to put to sea, but on the 5th of August the guns were relanded, and the works against the fortress resumed. On the 8th, a notion having spread that the enemy was mining under the casematedoubt, the engineers siezed the occasion to exercise the inexperienced miners by sinking a shaft and driving a gallery. The men soon acquired expertness, and as the water rose in the shaft at twelve feet, the work was discontinued when the gallery had attained eighty feet. Meanwhile the old trenches were repaired, the heights of San Bartolomeo were strengthened, and the convent of Antigua, built on a rock on the left of those heights, was fortified and armed with two guns to scour the open beach and sweep the bay. The siege, however, languished for want of ammunition; and during this forced inactivity the garrison received supplies and reinforcements by sea, their damaged works were repaired, new defences constructed, the magazines filled, and sixty-seven pieces of artillery put in a condition to play. Eight hundred and fifty men had been killed and wounded since the commencement of the attack in July, but as fresh men came by sea, more than two thousand six hundred good soldiers were still present under arms. And to show that their confidence was unabated, they celebrated the emperor's birthday by crowning the castle with a splendid illumination; encircling it with a fiery legend to his honour in characters so large as to be distinctly read by the besiegers.

On the 19th of August, that is to say, after a delay of sixteen days, the battering train arrived from England, and in the night of the 22d fifteen heavy pieces were placed in battery, eight at the right attack and seven at the left. A second battery train came on the 23d, augmenting the number of pieces of various kinds to a hundred and seventeen, including a large Spanish mortar; but with characteristic negligence, this enormous armament had been sent out from England with no more shot and shells than would suffice for one day's consumption!

In the night of the 23d, the batteries on the Cho fre sand-hills were reinforced with four long pieces

and four sixty-eight-pound carronades, and the left attack with six additional guns. Ninety sappers and miners had come with the train from England, the seamen under Mr. O'Reilly were again attached to the batteries, and part of the field artillery-men were brought to the siege.

On the 24th, the attack was recommenced with activity. The Chofre batteries were enlarged to contain forty-eight pieces, and two batteries for thirteen pieces were begun on the heights of San Bartolomeo, designed to breach at seven hundred yards distance the faces of the left demi-bastion, of the hornwork, that of St. John on the main front, and the end of the high curtain, for these works rising in gradation one above another, were in the same line of shot. The approaches on the isthmus were now also pushed forward by the sap, but the old trenches were still imperfect, and before daylight on the 25th the French coming from the hornwork swept the left of the parallel, injured the sap, and made some prisoners before they were repulsed.

On the night of the 25th, the batteries were all armed on both sides of the Urumea, and on the 26th fifty-seven pieces opened with a general salvo, and continued to play with astounding noise and rapidity until evening. The firing from the Chofre hills destroyed the revêtement of the demi-bastion of St. John, and nearly ruined the towers near the old breach together with the wall connecting them; but at the isthmus, the batteries, although they injured the hornwork, made little impression on the main front, from which they were too distant.

Lord Wellington, present at this attack and discontented with the operation, now ordered a battery for six guns to be constructed amongst some ruined houses on the right of the parallel, only three hundred yards from the main front, and two shafts were sunk with a view to drive galleries for the protection of this new battery against the enemy's mines, but the work was slow because of the sandy nature of the soil.

At three o'clock in the morning of the 27th, the boats of the squadron, commanded by lieutenant Arbuthnot of the *Surveillante*, and carrying a hundred soldiers of the ninth regiment under captain Cameron, pulled to attack the island of Santa Clara. A heavy fire was opened on them, and the troops landed with some difficulty, but the island was then easily taken and a lodgment made with the loss of only twenty-eight men and officers, of which eighteen were seamen.

In the night of the 27th, about three o'clock, the French sallied against the new battery on the isthmus; but as colonel Cameron of the ninth regiment met them on the very edge of the trenches with the bayonet, the attempt failed, yet it delayed the arming of the battery. At daybreak the renewed fire of the besiegers, especially that from the Chofre sand-hills, was extremely heavy, and the shrapnel shells were supposed to be very destructive; nevertheless the practice with that missile was very uncertain, the bullets frequently flew amongst the guards in the parallel, and one struck the field officer. In the course of the day another sally was commenced, but the enemy being discovered and fired upon did not persist. The trenches were now furnished with banquettes and parapets as fast as the quantity of gabions and fascines would permit; yet the work was slow, because the Spanish authorities of Guisuscoa, like those in every other part of Spain, neglected to provide carts to convey the materials from the woods, and this hard labour was performed by the Portuguese soldiers. It would seem, how-

ever, an error not to have prepared all the materials of this nature during the blockade.

Lord Wellington again visited the works this day, and in the night the advanced battery, which at the desire of sir Richard Fletcher had been constructed for only four guns, was armed. The 29th it opened; but an accident had prevented the arrival of one gun, and the fire of the enemy soon dismounted another, so that only two instead of six guns, as lord Wellington had designed, smote at short range the face of the demi-bastion of St. John and the end of the high curtain; however, the general firing was severe both upon the castle and the town-works, and great damage was done to the defences. By this time the French guns were nearly silenced, and as additional mortars were mounted on the Chofre batteries, making in all sixty-three pieces, of which twenty-nine threw shells or spherical case-shot, the superiority of the besiegers was established.

The Urumea was now discovered to be fordable. Captain Alexander McDonald of the artillery, without orders, waded across in the night, passed close under the works to the breach and returned safely. Wherefore as a few minutes would suffice to bring the enemy into the Chofre batteries, to save the guns from being spiked, their vents were covered with iron plates fastened by chains; and this was also done at the advanced battery on the isthmus.

This day the materials and ordnance for a battery of six pieces, to take the defences of the Monte Orgullo in reverse, were sent to the island of Santa Clara; and several guns in the Chofre batteries were turned upon the retaining wall of the hornwork, in the hope of shaking down any mines the enemy might have prepared there, without destroying the wall itself, which offered cover for the troops advancing to the assault.

The trenches leading from the parallel on the isthmus were now very wide and good, the sap was pushed on the right close to the demi-bastion of the hornwork, and the sea-wall supporting the high road into the town, which had increased the march and cramped the formation of the columns in the first assault, was broken through to give access to the strand and shorten the approach to the breaches. The crisis was at hand, and in the night of the 29th a false attack was ordered to make the enemy spring his mines; a desperate service, and bravely executed by lieutenant M'Adam of the ninth regiment. The order was sudden, no volunteers were demanded, no rewards offered, no means of excitement resorted to; yet such is the inherent bravery of British soldiers, that seventeen men of the Royals, the nearest at hand, immediately leaped forth ready and willing to encounter what seemed certain death. With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries playing hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach unperceived, and then mounted in extended order shouting and firing; but the French were too steady to be imposed upon, and their musketry laid the whole party low with the exception of their commander, who returned alone to the trenches.

On the 30th, the sea-flank of the place being opened from the half-bastion of St. John, on the right to the most distant of the old breaches, that is to say, for five hundred feet, the batteries on the Chofres were turned against the castle and other defences of the Monte Orgullo, while the advanced battery on the isthmus, now containing three guns, demolished, in conjunction with the fire from the Chofres, the face of the half-bastion of St. John's and the end of the high curtain above it. The whole of that quarter was in ruins, and at the same time the batteries on San Bartolomeo broke the face of

the demi-bastion of the hornwork and cut away the palisades.

The 30th, the batteries continued their fire, and about three o'clock lord Wellington, after examining the enemy's defence, resolved to make a lodgment on the breach, and in that view ordered the assault to be made the next day at eleven o'clock, when the ebb of tide would leave full space between the hornwork and the water.

The galleries in front of the advanced battery on the isthmus were now pushed close up to the sea-wall, under which three mines were formed with the double view of opening a short and easy way for the troops to reach the strand, and rendering useless any subterranean works the enemy might have made in that part. At two o'clock in the morning of the 31st, they were sprung, and opened three wide passages which were immediately connected, and a traverse of gabions, six feet high, was run across the mouth of the main trench on the left, to screen the opening from the grape-shot of the castle. Every thing was now ready for the assault, but before describing that terrible event it will be fitting to show the exact state of the besieged in defence.

Sir Thomas Graham had been before the place for fifty-two days, during thirty of which the attack was suspended. All this time the garrison had laboured incessantly, and though the heavy fire of the besiegers since the 26th appeared to have ruined the defences of the enormous breach in the sea-flank, it was not so. A perpendicular fall behind of more than twenty feet barred progress, and beyond that, amongst the ruins of the burned houses, was a strong counter-wall fifteen feet high, loopholed for musketry, and extending in a parallel direction with the breaches, which were also cut off from the sound part of the rampart by traverses at the extremities. The only really practicable road into the town was by the narrow end of the high curtain above the half-bastion of St. John.

In front of the counter-wall, about the middle of the great breach, stood the tower of Los Hornos, still capable of some defence, and beneath it a mine charged with twelve hundred-weight of powder. The streets were all trenched, and furnished with traverses to dispute the passage and to cover a retreat to the Monte Orgullo; but before the assailants could reach the main breach it was necessary either to form a lodgment in the hornwork, or to pass as in the former assault under a flanking fire of musketry for a distance of nearly two hundred yards. And the first step was close under the sea-wall covering the salient angle of the covert-way, where two mines charged with eight hundred pounds of powder were prepared to overwhelm the advancing columns.

To support this system of retrenchments and mines, the French had still some artillery in reserve. One sixteen-pounder mounted at St. Elmo flanked the left of the breaches on the river face; a twelve and an eight-pounder preserved in the casemates of the cavalier were ready to flank the land face of the half-bastion of St. John; many guns from the Monte Orgullo, especially those of the Mirador, could play upon the columns, and there was a four-pounder hidden on the hornwork to be brought into action when the assault commenced. Neither the resolution of the governor nor the courage of the garrison were abated, but the overwhelming fire of the last few days had reduced the number of fighting men; general Rey had only two hundred and fifty men in reserve, and he demanded of Soult whether his brave garrison should be exposed to an-

other assault. "The army would endeavour to succour him," was the reply, and he abided his fate.

Napoleon's ordinance, which forbade the surrender of a fortress without having stood at least one assault, has been strongly censured by English writers upon slender grounds. The obstinate defences made by French governors in the Peninsula were the results, and to condemn an enemy's system from which we have ourselves suffered, will scarcely bring it into disrepute. But the argument runs, that the besiegers working by the rules of art must make a way into the place, and to risk an assault for the sake of military glory or to augment the loss of the enemy is to sacrifice brave men uselessly; that capitulation always followed a certain advance of the besiegers in Louis the Fourteenth's time, and to suppose Napoleon's upstart generals possessed of superior courage or sense of military honour to the high-minded nobility of that age was quite inadmissible; and it has been rather whimsically added that obedience to the emperor's order might suit a predestinarian Turk, but could not be tolerated by a reflecting Christian. From this it would seem, that certain nice distinctions as to the extent and manner reconcile human slaughter with Christianity, and that the true standard of military honour was fixed by the intriguing, depraved and insolent court of Louis the Fourteenth. It may however be reasonably supposed, that as the achievements of Napoleon's soldiers far exceeded the exploits of Louis's cringing courtiers, they possessed greater military virtues.

But the whole argument seems to rest upon false grounds. To inflict loss upon an enemy is the very essence of war, and as the bravest men and officers will always be foremost in an assault, the loss thus occasioned may be of the utmost importance. To resist when nothing can be gained or saved is an act of barbarous courage which reason spurns at; but how seldom does that crisis happen in war? Napoleon wisely insisted upon a resistance which should make it dangerous for the besiegers to hasten a siege beyond the rules of art; he would not have a weak governor yield to a simulation of force not really existing; he desired that military honour should rest upon the courage and resources of men rather than upon the strength of walls; in fine, he made a practical application of the proverb that "necessity is the mother of invention."

Granted that a siege artfully conducted and with sufficient means must reduce the fortress attacked; still there will be some opportunity for a governor to display his resources of mind. Vauban admits of one assault and several retrenchments, after a lodgment is made on the body of the place; Napoleon only insisted that every effort which courage and genius could dictate should be exhausted before a surrender, and those efforts can never be defined or bounded beforehand. Tarifa is a happy example. To be consistent, any attack which deviates from the rules of art must also be denounced as barbarous; yet how seldom has a general all the necessary means at his disposal. In Spain not one siege could be conducted by the British army according to the rules. And there is a manifest weakness in praising the Spanish defence of Zaragoza, and condemning Napoleon because he demanded from regular troops a devotion similar to that displayed by peasants and artisans. What governor was ever in a more desperate situation than general Bizanet at Bergen-op-Zoom, when sir Thomas Graham, with a hardihood and daring which would alone place him amongst the foremost men of enterprise which Europe can boast of, threw more than two thousand

men upon the ramparts of that almost impregnable fortress. The young soldiers of the garrison, frightened by a surprise in the night, were dispersed, were flying. The assailants had possession of the walls for several hours; yet some cool and brave officers, rallying the men towards morning, charged up the narrow ramps and drove the assailants over the parapets into the ditch. They who could not at first defend their works were now able to retake them, and so completely successful and illustrative of Napoleon's principle was this counter-attack that the number of prisoners equalled that of the garrison. There are no rules to limit energy and genius, and no man knew better than Napoleon how to call those qualities forth; he possessed them himself in the utmost perfection, and created them in others

CHAPTER II.

Storming of San Sebastian—Lord Wellington calls for volunteers from the first, fourth and light divisions—The place is assaulted and taken—The town burned—The castle is bombarded and surrenders—Observations.

STORMING OF SAN SEBASTIAN.

To assault the breaches without having destroyed the enemy's defences or established a lodgment on the hornwork, was, notwithstanding the increased fire and great facilities of the besiegers, obviously a repetition of the former fatal error. And the same generals who had before so indiscreetly made their disapproval of such operations public, now even more freely and imprudently dealt out censures, which not ill-founded in themselves were most ill-timed, since there is much danger when doubts come down from the commanders to the soldiers. Lord Wellington thought the fifth division had been thus discouraged, and incensed at the cause, demanded fifty volunteers from each of the fifteen regiments composing the first, fourth and light divisions, "men who could show other troops how to mount a breach." This was the phrase employed, and seven hundred and fifty gallant soldiers instantly marched to San Sebastian in answer to the appeal. Colonel Cooke and major Robertson led the guards and Germans of the first division, major Rose commanded the men of the fourth division, and colonel Hunt, a daring officer who had already won his promotion at former assaults, was at the head of the fierce rugged veterans of the light division; yet there were good officers and brave soldiers in the fifth division.

It being at first supposed that lord Wellington merely designed a simple lodgment on the great breach, the volunteers and one brigade of the fifth division only were ordered to be ready; but in a council held at night major Smith maintained that the orders were misunderstood, as no lodgment could be formed unless the high curtain was gained. General Oswald being called to the council was of the same opinion, whereupon the remainder of the fifth division was brought to the trenches, and general Bradford having offered the services of his Portuguese brigade, was told he might ford the Urumea and assail the farthest breach if he judged it advisable.

Sir James Leith had resumed the command of the fifth division, and being assisted by general Oswald directed the attack from the isthmus. He was extremely offended by the arrival of the volunteers and would not suffer them to lead the assault; some he spread along the trenches to keep down the fire of the hornwork, the remainder were held as

a reserve along with general Hay's British and Sprye's Portuguese brigades of the fifth division. To general Robinson's brigade the assault was confided. It was formed in two columns, one to assault the old breach between the towers, the other to storm the bastion of St. John and the end of the high curtain. The small breach on the extreme right was left for general Bradford's Portuguese, who were drawn up on the Chofre hills; some large boats filled with troops were directed to make a demonstration against the sea-line of the Monte Orgullo, and sir Thomas Graham overlooked the whole operations from the right bank of the river.

The morning of the 31st broke heavily, a thick fog hid every object, and the besiegers' batteries could not open until eight o'clock. From that hour a constant shower of heavy missiles was poured upon the besieged until eleven, when Robinson's brigade getting out of the trenches passed through the openings in the sea-wall and was launched boldly against the breaches. While the head of the column was still gathering on the strand, about thirty yards from the salient angle of the hornwork, twelve men, commanded by a sergeant, whose heroic death has not sufficed to preserve his name, running violently forward leaped upon the covert-way with intent to cut the sausage of the enemy's mines. The French, startled by this sudden assault, fired the train prematurely, and though the sergeant and his brave followers were all destroyed and the high sea-wall was thrown with a dreadful crash upon the head of the advancing column, not more than forty men were crushed by the ruins, and the rush of the troops was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope had already passed beyond the play of the mine, and now speeded along the strand amidst a shower of grape and shells; the leader, lieutenant M'Guire of the fourth regiment, conspicuous from his long white plume, his fine figure and his swiftness, bounded far ahead of his men in all the pride of youthful strength and courage, but at the foot of the great breach he fell dead, and the stormers went sweeping like a dark surge over his body; many died, however, with him, and the trickling of wounded men to the rear was incessant.

This time there was a broad strand left by the retreating tide and the sun had dried the rocks, yet they disturbed the order and closeness of the formation, the distance to the main breach was still nearly two hundred yards, and the French, seeing the first mass of assailants pass the hornwork regardless of its broken bastion, immediately abandoned the front, and crowding on the river face of that work, poured their musketry into the flank of the second column as it rushed along a few yards below them; but the soldiers, still running forward towards the breach, returned this fire without slackening their speed. The batteries of the Monte Orgullo and the St. Elmo now sent their showers of shot and shells, the two pieces on the cavalier swept the face of the breach in the bastion of St. John, and the four-pounder in the hornwork being suddenly mounted on the broken bastion poured grape-shot into their rear.

Thus scourged with fire from all sides, the stormers, their array broken alike by the shot and by the rocks they passed over, reached their destinations, and the head of the first column gained the top of the great breach; but the unexpected gulf below could only be passed at a few places where meagre parcels of the burned houses were still attached to the rampart, and the deadly clatter of the French muskets from the loopholed wall beyond soon

strewn the narrow crest of the ruins with dead. In vain the following multitude covered the ascent, seeking an entrance at every part; to advance was impossible, and the mass of assailants, slowly sinking downwards, remained stubborn and immovable on the lower part of the breach. Here they were covered from the musketry in front, but from several isolated points, especially the tower of Los Hornos, under which the great mine was placed, the French still smote them with small arms, and the artillery from the Monte Orgullo poured shells and grape without intermission.

Such was the state of affairs at the great breach, and at the half-bastion of St. John it was even worse. The access to the top of the high curtain being quite practicable, the efforts to force a way were more persevering and constant, and the slaughter was in proportion; for the traverse on the flank, cutting it off from the cavalier, was defended by French grenadiers who would not yield; the two pieces on the cavalier itself swept along the front face of the opening, and the four-pounder and the musketry from the hornwork swept in like manner along the river face. In the midst of this destruction some sappers and a working party attached to the assaulting columns endeavoured to form a lodgment, but no artificial materials had been provided, and most of the labourers were killed before they could raise the loose rocky fragments into cover.

During this time the besiegers' artillery kept up a constant counter-fire which killed many of the French, and the reserve brigades of the fifth division were pushed on by degrees to feed the attack until the left wing of the ninth regiment only remained in the trenches. The volunteers also who had been with difficulty restrained in the trenches, "calling out to know why they had been brought there if they were not to lead the assault," these men, whose presence had given such offence to general Leith that he would have kept them altogether from the assault, being now let loose, went like a whirlwind to the breaches, and again the crowded masses swarmed up the face of the ruins, but reaching the crest line they came down like a falling wall; crowd after crowd were seen to mount, to totter, and to sink, the deadly French fire was unabated, the smoke floated away, and the crest of the breach bore no living man.

Sir Thomas Graham, standing on the nearest of the Chofre batteries, beheld this frightful destruction with a stern resolution to win at any cost; and he was a man to have put himself at the head of the last company and died sword in hand upon the breach rather than sustain a second defeat, but neither his confidence nor his resources were yet exhausted. He directed an attempt to be made on the hornwork, and turned all the Chofre batteries and one on the isthmus, that is to say, the concentrated fire of fifty heavy pieces, upon the high curtain. The shot ranged over the heads of the troops, who now were gathered at the foot of the breach, and the stream of missiles thus poured along the upper surface of the high curtain broke down the traverses, and in its fearful course shattering all things strewn the rampart with the mangled limbs of the defenders. When this flight of bullets first swept over the heads of the soldiers, a cry arose, from some inexperienced people, "to retire, because the batteries were firing on the stormers;" but the veterans of the light division under Hunt being at that point were not to be so disturbed, and in the very heat and fury of the cannonade effected a solid lodgment in some ruins of houses actually within the rampart, on the right of the great breach.

For half an hour this horrid tempest smote upon the works and the houses behind, and then suddenly ceasing the small clatter of the French muskets showed that the assailants were again in activity; and at the same time the thirteenth Portuguese regiment, led by major Snodgrass, and followed by a detachment of the twenty-fourth under colonel M'Bean, entered the river from the Chofres. The ford was deep, the water rose above the waist, and when the soldiers reached the middle of the stream, which was two hundred yards wide, a heavy gun struck on the head of the column with a shower of grape; the havoc was fearful, but the survivors closed and moved on. A second discharge from the same piece tore the ranks from front to rear, still the regiment moved on, and amidst a confused fire of musketry from the ramparts, and of artillery from St. Elmo, from the castle, and from the Mirador, landed on the left bank and rushed against the third breach. M'Bean's men, who had followed with equal bravery, then reinforced the great breach, about eighty yards to the left of the other, although the line of ruins seemed to extend the whole way. The fighting now became fierce and obstinate again at all the breaches, but the French musketry still rolled with deadly effect, the heaps of slain increased, and once more the great mass of stormers sunk to the foot of the ruins unable to win; the living sheltered themselves as they could, but the dead and wounded lay so thickly that hardly could it be judged whether the hurt or unhurt were most numerous.

It was now evident that the assault must fail unless some accident intervened, for the tide was rising, the reserves all engaged, and no greater effort could be expected from men whose courage had been already pushed to the verge of madness. In this crisis fortune interfered. A number of powder barrels, live shells, and combustible materials which the French had accumulated behind the traverses for their defence, caught fire, a bright consuming flame wrapped the whole of the high curtain, a succession of loud explosions were heard, hundreds of the French grenadiers were destroyed, the rest were thrown into confusion, and while the ramparts were still involved with suffocating eddies of smoke the British soldiers broke in at the first traverse. The defenders bewildered by this terrible disaster yielded for a moment, yet soon rallied, and a close desperate struggle took place along the summit of the high curtain; but the fury of the stormers whose numbers increased every moment could not be stemmed. The French colours on the cavalier were torn away by lieutenant Gethin of the eleventh regiment. The hornwork and the land front below the curtain, and the loop-holed wall behind the great breach, were all abandoned; the light division soldiers, who had already established themselves in the ruins on the French left, immediately penetrated to the streets; and at the same moment the Portuguese at the small breach, mixed with British who had wandered to that point seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side.

Five hours the dreadful battle had lasted at the walls, and now the stream of war went pouring into the town. The undaunted governor still disputed the victory for a short time with the aid of his barricades, but several hundreds of his men being cut off and taken in the hornwork, his garrison was so reduced that even to effect a retreat behind the line of defences which separated the town from the Monte Orgullo was difficult. Many of his troops, flying from the hornwork along the harbour flank of the town, broke through a body of the British who

had reached the vicinity of the fortified convent of Santa Theresa before them, and this post was the only one retained by the French in the town. It was thought by some distinguished officers engaged in the action that Monte Orgullo might have been carried on this day, if a commander of sufficient rank to direct the troops had been at hand; but whether from wounds or accident no general entered the place until long after the breach had been won, the commanders of battalions were embarrassed for want of orders, and a thunder-storm, which came down from the mountains with unbounded fury immediately after the place was carried, added to the confusion of the fight.

This storm seemed to be the signal of hell for the perpetration of villany which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the principal object; at Badajoz lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes. One atrocity, of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity. Some order was at first maintained, but the resolution of the troops to throw off discipline was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer was pursued with a volley of small arms, and escaped with difficulty from men who mistook him for the provost-martial of the fifth division; a Portuguese adjutant, who endeavoured to prevent some atrocity, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately by a number of English soldiers. Many officers exerted themselves to preserve order, many men were well conducted, but the rapine and violence commenced by villains soon spread, the camp-followers crowded into the place, and the disorder continued until the flames following the steps of the plunderer put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town.

Three generals, Leith, Oswald and Robinson, had been hurt in the trenches; sir Richard Fletcher, the chief engineer, a brave man who had served his country honourably, was killed, and colonel Burgoyne the next in command of that arm was wounded.

The carnage at the breaches was appalling. The volunteers, although brought late into the action, had nearly half their number struck down, most of the regiments of the fifth division suffered in the same proportion, and the whole loss since the renewal of the siege exceeded two thousand five hundred men and officers.

The town being thus taken, the Monte Orgullo was to be attacked, but it was very steep and difficult to assail. The castle served as a citadel, and just below it four batteries connected with masonry stretched across the face of the hill. From the Mirador and Queen's batteries at the extremities of this line, ramps, protected by redans, led to the convent of Santa Theresa, which was the most salient part of the defence. On the side of Santa Clara and behind the mountain were some sea batteries, and if all these works had been of good construction, the troops fresh and well supplied, the siege would have been long and difficult; but the garrison was shattered by the recent assault, most of the engineers and leaders killed, the governor and many others wounded, five hundred men were sick or hurt, the soldiers fit for duty did not exceed thirteen hundred, and they had four hundred prisoners to guard. The castle was small, the bomb-proofs scarcely sufficed to protect the ammunition and provisions, and only ten guns remained in a condition for service, three

of which were on the sea-line. There was very little water, and the troops were forced to lie out on the naked rock, exposed to the fire of the besiegers, or only covered by the asperities of ground. General Rey and his brave garrison were, however, still resolute to fight; and they received nightly by sea supplies of ammunition, though in small quantities.

Lord Wellington arrived the day after the assault. Regular approaches could not be carried up the steep naked rock, he doubted the power of vertical fire, and ordered batteries to be formed on the captured works of the town, intending to breach the enemy's remaining lines of defence and then storm the Orgullo. And as the convent of Santa Theresa would enable the French to sally by the rampart on the left of the allies' position in the town, he composed his first line with a few troops strongly barricaded, placing a supporting body in the market-place, and strong reserves on the high curtain and flank ramparts. Meanwhile from the convent, which being actually in the town might have been easily taken at first, the enemy killed many of the besiegers; and when after several days it was assaulted, they set the lower parts on fire, and retired by a communication made from the roof to a ramp on the hill behind. All this time the flames were destroying the town, and the Orgullo was overwhelmed with shells shot upward from the besiegers' batteries.

On the 3d of September, the governor being summoned to surrender demanded terms inadmissible, his resolution was not to be shaken, and the vertical fire was therefore continued day and night, though the British prisoners suffered as well as the enemy; for the officer commanding in the castle, irritated by the misery of the garrison, cruelly refused to let the unfortunate captives make trenches to cover themselves. The French, on the other hand, complain that their wounded and sick men, although placed in an empty magazine with a black flag flying, were fired upon by the besiegers, although the English prisoners in their red uniforms were placed around it to strengthen the claim of humanity.

The new breaching batteries were now commenced, one for three pieces on the isthmus, the other for seventeen pieces on the land front of the hornwork. These guns were brought from the Chofres at low water across the Urumea, at first in the night, but the difficulty of labouring in the water during darkness induced the artillery officers to transport the remainder in daylight, and within reach of the enemy's batteries, which did not fire a shot. In the town the besiegers' labours were impeded by the flaming houses, but near the foot of the hill the ruins furnished shelter for the musketeers employed to gall the garrison, and the guns on the island of Santa Clara being reinforced were actively worked by the seamen. The besieged replied but little, their ammunition was scarce, and the horrible vertical fire subdued their energy. In this manner the action was prolonged until the 8th of September, when fifty-nine heavy battering pieces opened at once from the island, the isthmus, the hornwork and the Chofres. In two hours both the Mirador and the Queen battery were broken, the fire of the besieged was entirely extinguished, and the summit and face of the hill torn and furrowed in a frightful manner; the bread-ovens were destroyed, a magazine exploded, and the castle, small and crowded with men, was overlaid with the descending shells. Then the governor, proudly bending to his fate, surrendered. On the 9th, this brave man and his heroic garrison, reduced to one-third of their

original number and leaving five hundred wounded behind them in the hospital, marched out with the honours of war. The Spanish flag was hoisted under a salute of twenty-one guns, and the siege terminated after sixty-three days open trenches, precisely when the tempestuous season, beginning to vex the coast, would have rendered a continuance of the sea blockade impossible.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. San Sebastian, a third-rate fortress and in bad condition when first invested, resisted a besieging army, possessing an enormous battering train, for sixty-three days. This is to be attributed partly to the errors of the besiegers, principally to obstructions extraneous to the military operations. Amongst the last are to be reckoned the misconduct of the admiralty, and the negligence of the government relative to the battering train and supply of ammunition; the latter retarded the second siege for sixteen days; the former enabled the garrison to keep up and even increase its means as the siege proceeded.

Next, in order and importance, was the failure of the Spanish authorities, who neglected to supply carts and boats from the country, and even refused the use of their public buildings for hospitals. Thus between the sea and the shore, receiving aid from neither, lord Wellington had to conduct an operation of war, which more than any other depends for success upon labour and provident care. It was probably the first time that an important siege was maintained by women's exertions; the stores of the besiegers were landed from boats rowed by Spanish girls!

Another impediment was Soult's advance towards Pampeluna; but the positive effect of this was slight, since the want of ammunition would have equally delayed the attack. The true measure of the English government's negligence is thus obtained. It was more mischievous than the operations of sixty thousand men under a great general.

2nd. The errors of execution, having been before touched upon, need no further illustration. The greatest difference between the first and second part of the siege preceding the assaults, was that in the latter, the approaches near the isthmus being carried further on and openings made in the sea-wall, the troops more easily and rapidly extricated themselves from the trenches, the distance to the breach was shortened, and the French fire bearing on the fronts of attack was somewhat less powerful. These advantages were considerable, but not proportionate to the enormous increase of the besiegers' means; and it is quite clear from the terrible effects of the cannonade during the assault, that the whole of the defences might have been ruined, even those of the castle, if this overwhelming fire, had in compliance with the rules of art been first employed to silence the enemy's fire. A lodgment in the hornwork could then have been made with little difficulty, and the breach attacked without much danger.

3rd. As the faults leading to failure in the first part of the siege were repeated in the second, while the enemy's resources had increased by the gain of time, and because his intercourse with France by sea never was cut off, it follows that there was no reasonable security for success; not even to make a lodgment on the breach, since no artificial materials were prepared, and the workmen failed to effect that object. But the first arrangement and the change adopted in the council of war, the option given to general Bradford, the remarkable fact, that the simultaneous attack on the hornwork was only thought

of when the first efforts against the breach had failed, all prove that the enemy's defensive means were underrated, and the extent of the success exceeded the preparations to obtain it.

The place was won by accident. For first, the explosion of the great mine under the tower of Los Hornos was only prevented by a happy shot which cut the sausage of the train during the fight, and this was followed by the ignition of the French powder-barrels and shells along the high curtain, which alone opened the way into the town. Sir Thomas Graham's firmness and perseverance in the assault, and the judicious usage of his artillery against the high curtain during the action, an operation, however, which only belonged to daylight, were no mean helps to the victory. It was on such sudden occasions that his prompt genius shone conspicuously; yet it was nothing wonderful that heavy guns at short distances, the range being perfectly known, should strike with certainty along a line of rampart more than twenty-seven feet above the heads of the troops. Such practice was to be expected from British artillery, and Graham's genius was more evinced by the promptness of the thought and the trust he put in the valour of his soldiers. It was far more extraordinary that the stormers did not relinquish their attack when thus exposed to their own guns, for it is a mistake to say that no mischief occurred; a sergeant of the ninth regiment was killed by the batteries close to his commanding officer, and it is probable that other casualties also had place.

4th. The explosion on the ramparts is generally supposed to have been caused by the cannonade from the Chofre batteries; yet a cool and careful observer, whose account I have adopted, because he was a spectator in perfect safety and undisturbed by having to give or receive orders, affirms that the cannonade ceased before colonel Snodgrass forded the river, whereas the great explosion did not happen until half an hour after that event. By some persons that intrepid exploit of the Portuguese was thought one of the principal causes of success, and it appears certain that an entrance was made at the small breach by several soldiers, British and Portuguese, many of the former having wandered from the great breach and got mixed with the latter, before the explosion happened on the high curtain. Whether those men would have been followed by greater numbers is doubtful, but the lodgment made by the light division volunteers within the great breach was solid and could have been maintained. The French call the Portuguese attack a feint. Sir Thomas Graham certainly did not found much upon it. He gave general Bradford the option to attack or remain tranquil, and colonel M'Bean actually received counter-orders when his column was already in the river and too far advanced to be withdrawn.

5th. When the destruction of San Sebastian became known, it was used by the anti-British party at Cadiz to excite the people against England. The political chief of Guipuscoa publicly accused sir Thomas Graham, "that he sacked and burned the place because it had formerly traded entirely with France;" his generals were said to have excited the furious soldiers to the horrid work, and his inferior officers to have boasted of it afterwards. A newspaper edited by an agent of the Spanish government, repeating these accusations, called upon the people to avenge the injury upon the British army, and the Spanish minister of war, designated by lord Wellington as the abettor and even the writer of this and other malignant libels published at Cadiz, officially demanded explanations.

Lord Wellington addressed a letter of indignant denial and remonstrance to sir Henry Wellesley. "It was absurd," he said, "to suppose the officers of the army would have risked the loss of all their labours and gallantry, by encouraging the dispersion of the men while the enemy still held the castle. To him the town was of the utmost value as a secure place for magazines and hospitals. He had refused to bombard it when advised to do so, as he had previously refused to bombard Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, because the injury would fall on the inhabitants and not upon the enemy; yet nothing could have been more easy or less suspicious than this method of destroying the town, if he had been so minded. It was the enemy who set fire to the houses, it was part of the defence; the British officers strove to extinguish the flames, some in doing so lost their lives by the French musketry from the castle, and the difficulty of communicating and working through the fire was so great, that he had been on the point of withdrawing the troops altogether. He admitted the plunder, observing, that he knew not whether that or the libels made him most angry; he had taken measures to stop it, but when two-thirds of the officers had been killed or wounded in the action, and when many of the inhabitants taking part with the enemy fired upon the troops, to prevent it was impossible. Moreover, he was for several days unable from other circumstances to send fresh men to replace the stormers."

This was a solid reply to the scandalous libels circulated, but the broad facts remained. San Sebastian was a heap of smoking ruins, and atrocities degrading to human nature had been perpetrated by the troops. Of these crimes, the municipal and ecclesiastic bodies, the consuls and principal persons of San Sebastian, afterwards published a detailed statement, solemnly affirming the truth of each case; and if Spanish declarations on this occasion are not to be heeded, four-fifths of the excesses attributed to the French armies must be effaced as resting on a like foundation. That the town was first set on fire behind the breaches during the operations, and that it spread in the tumult following the assault, is undoubted; yet it is not improbable that plunderers, to forward their own views, increased it, and certainly the great destruction did not befall until long after the town was in possession of the allies. I have been assured by a surgeon, that he was lodged the third day after the assault at a house well furnished, and in a street then untouched by fire or plunderers, but house and street were afterwards plundered and burned. The inhabitants could only have fired upon the allies the first day, and it might well have been in self-defence, for they were barbarously treated. The abhorrent case alluded to was notorious, so were many others. I have myself heard around the piquet fires, when soldiers, as every experienced officer knows, speak without reserve of their past deeds and feelings, the abominable actions mentioned by the municipality related with little variation, long before that narrative was published; told, however, with sorrow for the sufferers and indignation against the perpetrators, for these last were not so numerous as might be supposed from the extent of the calamities they inflicted.

It is a common, but shallow and mischievous notion, that a villain makes never the worse soldier for an assault, because the appetite for plunder supplies the place of honour; as if the compatibility of vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and courage unnecessary in warlike matters. In all the host which stormed San Sebastian, there was not a

man who being sane would for plunder only have encountered the danger of that assault, yet under the spell of discipline all rushed eagerly to meet it. Discipline, however, has its root in patriotism, or how could armed men be controlled at all? and it would be wise and far from difficult to graft moderation and humanity upon such a noble stock. The modern soldier is not necessarily the stern bloody-handed man the ancient soldier was; there is as much difference between them as between the sportsman and the butcher; the ancient warrior, fighting with the sword and reaping his harvest of death when the enemy was in flight, became habituated to the act of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his bayonet, sees not his peculiar victim fall, and exults not over mangled limbs as proofs of personal prowess. Hence, preserving his original feelings, his natural abhorrence of murder and crimes of violence, he differs not from other men unless often engaged in the assault of towns, where rapacity, lust, and inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said that no soldier can be restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least of all, because he is brutish and insensible to honour! Shame on such calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as no other soldier ever fights? His pay? Soldiers of all nations receive pay. At the period of this assault, a sergeant of the twenty-eighth regiment, named Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from Roncesvalles, to make purchases for his officers: He placed the money he was intrusted with, two thousand dollars, in the hands of a commissary, and having secured a receipt persuaded his party to join in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the money, made his purchases, and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these the spirits, who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear. It is precisely fear to which they are most insensible.

Undoubtedly if soldiers hear and read that it is impossible to restrain their violence, they will not be restrained. But let the plunder of a town after an assault be expressly made criminal by the articles of war, with a due punishment attached; let it be constantly impressed upon the troops that such conduct is as much opposed to military honour and discipline as it is to morality; let a select permanent body of men receiving higher pay form a part of the army, and be charged to follow storming columns to aid in preserving order, and with power to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary valour should keep pace with chastisement for crimes committed under such temptation, it would be fitting that money, apportioned to the danger and importance of the service, should be insured to the successful troops and always paid without delay. This money might be taken as a ransom from enemies, but if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor, government should furnish the amount. With such regulations, the storming of towns would not produce more military disorders than the gaining of battles in the field.

CHAPTER III.

Soult's views and positions during the siege described—He endeavours to succour the place—Attacks lord Wellington—Combats of San Marcial and Vera—The French are repulsed the same day that San Sebastian is stormed—Soult resolves to adopt a defensive system—Observations.

WHILE San Sebastian was being stormed, Soult fought a battle with the covering force, not willing-

ly nor with much hope of success, but he was averse to let San Sebastian fall without another effort, and thought a bold demeanour would best hide his real weakness. Guided, however, by the progress of the siege, which he knew perfectly through his sea communication, he awaited the last moment of action, striving meanwhile to improve his resources and to revive the confidence of the army and of the people. Of his dispersed soldiers eight thousand had rejoined their regiments by the 12th of August, and he was promised a reinforcement of thirty thousand conscripts: these last were, however, yet to be enrolled, and neither the progress of the siege, nor the general panic along the frontier which recurred with increased violence after the late battles, would suffer him to remain inactive.

He was in no manner deceived as to his enemy's superior strength of position, number and military confidence; but his former efforts on the side of Pampeluna had interrupted the attack of San Sebastian, and another offensive movement would necessarily produce a like effect; wherefore he hoped by repeating the disturbance, as long as a free intercourse by sea enabled him to reinforce and supply the garrison, to render the siege a wasting operation for the allies. To renew the movement against Pampeluna was most advantageous, but it required fifty thousand infantry for the attack, and twenty thousand as a corps of observation on the lower Bidassoa, and he had not such numbers to dispose of. The subsistence of his troops also was uncertain, because the loss of all the military carriages at Vittoria was still felt, and the resources of the country were reluctantly yielded by the people. To act on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port was, therefore, impracticable. And to attack the allies' centre, at Vera, Echallar, and the Bastan, was unpromising, seeing that two mountain-chains were to be forced before the movement could seriously affect lord Wellington: moreover, the ways being impracticable for artillery, success, if such should befall, would lead to no decisive result. It only remained to attack the left of the allies by the great road of Irun.

Against that quarter Soult could bring more than forty thousand infantry, but the positions were of perilous strength. The upper Bidassoa was in Wellington's power, because the light division, occupying Vera and the heights of Santa Barbara on the right bank, covered all the bridges; but the lower Bidassoa, flowing from Vera with a bend to the left, separated the hostile armies, and against this front, about nine miles wide, Soult's operations were necessarily directed. On his right, that is to say, from the broken bridge of Behobia in front of Irun to the sea, the river, broad and tidal, offered no apparent facility for a passage; and between the fords of Biriatu and those of Vera, a distance of three miles, there was only the one passage of Andarlasa about two miles below Vera; along this space also the banks of the river, steep craggy mountain ridges without roads, forbade any great operations. Thus the points of attack were restricted to Vera and the fords between Biriatu and the broken bridge of Behobia.

To raise the siege it was only necessary to force a way to Oyarzun, a small town about seven or eight miles beyond the Bidassoa, from thence the assailants could march at once upon Passages and upon the Urumea. To gain Oyarzun was therefore the object of the French marshal's combinations. The royal road led directly to it by the broad valley which separates the Peña de Haya from the Jaizquibel mountain. The latter was on the sea-coast, but the Peña de Haya, commonly called the four-crowned

mountain, filled with its dependent ridges all the space between Vera, Lesaca, Irun and Oyarzun. Its staring head bound with a rocky diadem was impassable, but from the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, several roads, one of them not absolutely impracticable for guns, passed over its enormous flanks to Irun at one side and to Oyarzun on the other, falling into the royal road at both places. Soult's first design was to unite Clauzel's and D'Erlon's troops, drive the light division from the heights of Santa Barbara, and then using the bridges of Lesaca and Vera force a passage over the Peña de Haya on the left of its summit, and push the heads of columns towards Oyarzun and the upper Urumea; meanwhile Reille and Villatte, passing the Bidassoa at Biriatu, were to fight their way also to Oyarzun by the royal road. He foresaw that Wellington might during this time collect his right wing and seek to envelope the French army, or march upon Bayonne; but he thought the general state of his affairs required bold measures, and the progress of the besiegers at San Sebastian soon drove him into action.

On the 29th, Foy, marching by the road of La Houssou, crossed the Nive at Cambo and reached Espelette, leaving behind him six hundred men, and the national guards, who were very numerous, with orders to watch the roads and valleys leading upon St. Jean Pied de Port. If pressed by superior forces, this corps of observation was to fall back upon that fortress, and it was supported with a brigade of light cavalry stationed at St. Palais.

In the night, two of D'Erlon's divisions were secretly drawn from Ainhoa, Foy continued his march through Espelette, by the bridges of Amotz and Serres to St. Jean de Luz, from whence the reserve moved forward, and thus in the morning of the 30th two strong French columns of attack were assembled on the lower Bidassoa.

The first, under Clauzel, consisted of four divisions, furnishing twenty thousand men with twenty pieces of artillery. It was concentrated in the woods behind the Commissari and Bayonnette mountains, above Vera.

The second, commanded by general Reille, was composed of two divisions and Villatte's reserve, in all above eighteen thousand men; but Foy's division and some light cavalry were in rear, ready to augment this column to about twenty-five thousand, and there were thirty-six pieces of artillery and two bridge equipages collected behind the camp of Urogne on the royal road.

Reille's troops were secreted, partly behind the Croix des Bouquets mountain, partly behind that of Louis XIV. and the lower ridges of the Mandale near Biriatu. Meanwhile D'Erlon, having Conroux's and Abbé's divisions and twenty pieces of artillery under his command, held the camps in advance of Sarre and Ainhoa. If the allies in his front marched to reinforce their left on the crowned mountain, he was to vex and retard their movements, always however avoiding a serious engagement, and feeling to his right to secure his connexion with Clauzel's column; that is to say, he was with Abbé's division, moving from Ainhoa, to menace the allies towards Zugaramurdi and the Puerto de Echallar; and with Conroux's division, then in front of Sarre, to menace the light division, to seize the rock of Ivantely if it was abandoned, and be ready to join Clauzel if occasion offered. On the other hand, should the allies assemble a large force and operate offensively by the Nive and Nivelle rivers, D'Erlon, without losing his connexion with the main army, was to concentrate on the slopes descending from the Rhune mountains towards St.

Pé. Finally, if the attack on the lower Bidassoa succeeded, he was to join Clauzel, either by Vera, or by the heights of Echallar and the bridge of Lesaca. Soult also desired to support D'Erlon with the two divisions of heavy cavalry, but forage could only be obtained for the artillery horses, two regiments of light horsemen, six chosen troops of dragoons and two or three hundred gendarmes, which were all assembled on the royal road behind Reille's column.

It was the French marshal's intention to attack at daybreak on the 30th, but his preparations being incomplete he deferred it until the 31st, and took rigorous precautions to prevent intelligence passing over to the allies' camps. Nevertheless Wellington's emissaries advised him of the movements in the night of the 29th, the augmentation of troops in front of Irun was observed in the morning of the 30th, and in the evening the bridge equipage and the artillery were descried on the royal road beyond the Bidassoa. Thus warned, he prepared for battle with little anxiety. For the brigade of English foot-guards, left at Oporto when the campaign commenced, was now come up; most of the marauders and men wounded at Vittoria had rejoined; and three regiments just arrived from England formed a new brigade under lord Aylmer, making the total augmentation of British troops in this quarter little less than five thousand men.

The extreme left was on the Jaizquibel. This narrow mountain ridge, seventeen hundred feet high, runs along the coast, abutting at one end upon the Passages harbour and at the other upon the navigable mouth of the Bidassoa. Offering no mark for an attack, it was only guarded by a flanking detachment of Spaniards, and at its foot the small fort of Figueras commanding the entrance of the river was garrisoned by seamen from the naval squadron. Fontarabia, a walled place, also at its base, was occupied, and the low ground between that town and Irun defended by a chain of eight large field redoubts, which connected the position of Jaizquibel with the heights covering the royal road to Oyarzun.

On the right of Irun, between Biriatu and the burned bridge of Behobia, there was a sudden bend in the river, the concave towards the French, and their positions commanded the passage of the fords below; but opposed to them was the exceedingly stiff and lofty ridge, called San Marcial, terminating one of the great flanks of the Peña de Haya. The water flowed round the left of this ridge, confining the road leading from the bridge of Behobia to Irun, a distance of one mile, to the narrow space between its channel and the foot of the height, and Irun itself, strongly occupied and defended by a field-work, blocked this way. It followed that the French, after forcing the passage of the river, must of necessity win San Marcial before their army could use the great road.

About six thousand men of the fourth Spanish army now under general Freyre, were established on the crest of San Marcial, which was strengthened by abatis and temporary field-works.

Behind Irun the first British division, under general Howard, was posted, and lord Aylmer's brigade was pushed somewhat in advance of Howard's right to support the left of the Spaniards.

The right of San Marcial falling back from the river was, although distinct as a position, connected with the Peña de Haya, and in some degree exposed to an enemy passing the river above Biriatu; wherefore Longa's Spaniards were drawn off from those slopes of the Peña de Haya which descended

towards Vera, to be posted on those descending towards Biriatu. In this situation he protected and supported the right of San Marcial.

Eighteen thousand fighting men were thus directly opposed to the progress of the enemy, and the fourth division quartered near Lesaca was still disposable. From this body a Portuguese brigade had been detached, to replace Longa on the heights opposite Vera, and to cover the roads leading from the bridge and fords of that place over the flanks of the Peña de Haya. Meanwhile the British brigades of the division were stationed up the mountain, close under the foundry of St. Antonio, and commanding the intersection of the roads coming from Vera and Lesaca; thus furnishing a reserve to the Portuguese brigade, to Longa and to Freyre, they tied the whole together. The Portuguese brigade was, however, somewhat exposed, and too weak to guard the enormous slopes on which it was placed; wherefore Wellington drew general Inglis's brigade of the seventh division from Echallar to reinforce it, and even then the flanks of the Peña de Haya were so rough and vast that the troops seemed sprinkled here and there with little coherence. The English general, aware that his positions were too extensive, had commenced the construction of several large redoubts on commanding points of the mountain, and had traced out a second fortified camp on a strong range of heights, which immediately in front of Oyarzun connected the Haya with the Jaizquibel, but these works were unfinished.

During the night of the 30th, Soult garnished with artillery all the points commanding the fords of Biriatu, the descent to the broken bridge and the banks below it, called the "Bas de Behobia." This was partly to cover the passage of the fords and the formation of the bridges, partly to stop gunboats coming up to molest the troops in crossing; and in this view also he spread Casa Palacio's brigade of Joseph's Spanish guards along the river as far down as Andaie, fronting Fontarabia.

General Reille, commanding La Martinière's, Maucune's, and Villatte's divisions, directed the attack. His orders were to storm the camp of San Marcial, and leaving there a strong reserve to keep in check any reinforcement coming from the side of Vera or descending from the Peña de Haya, to drive the allies with the remainder of his force from ridge to ridge, until he gained that flank of the great mountain which descends upon Oyarzun. The royal road being thus opened, Foy's division with the cavalry and artillery in one column, was to cross by bridges to be laid during the attack on San Marcial. And it was Soult's intention under any circumstances to retain this last-named ridge, and to fortify it as a bridge-head with a view to subsequent operations.

To aid Reille's progress and to provide for the concentration of the whole army at Oyarzun, Clauzel was directed to make a simultaneous attack from Vera, not as at first designed by driving the allies from Santa Barbara and seizing the bridges, but leaving one division and his guns on the ridges above Vera to keep the light division in check, to cross the river by two fords just below the town of Vera with the rest of his troops, and assail that slope of the Peña de Haya where the Portuguese brigade and the troops under general Inglis were posted. Then forcing his way upwards to the forge of St. Antonio, which commanded the intersection of the roads leading round the head of the mountain, he could aid Reille directly by falling on the rear of San Marcial, or meet him at Oyarzun by turning the rocky summit of the Peña de Haya.

COMBAT OF SAN MARCIAL.

At daylight on the 31st of August, Reille, under protection of the French guns, forded the river above Biriātu with two divisions and two pieces of artillery. He quickly seized a detached ridge of inferior heights just under San Marcial, and leaving there one brigade as a reserve, detached another to attack the Spanish left by a slope which descended in that quarter to the river. Meanwhile with La Martinière's division he assailed their right. But the side of the mountain was covered with brushwood and remarkably steep, the French troops being ill-managed preserved no order, the supports and the skirmishers mixing in one mass got into confusion, and when two thirds of the height were gained the Spaniards charged in columns and drove the assailants headlong down.

During this action two bridges were thrown, partly on trestles, partly on boats, below the fords, and the head of Villatte's reserve crossing ascended the ridge and renewed the fight more vigorously; one brigade even reached the chapel of San Marcial, and the left of the Spanish line was shaken; but the eighty-fifth regiment, belonging to lord Aylmer's brigade, advanced a little way to support it, and at that moment lord Wellington rode up with his staff. Then the Spaniards, who cared so little for their own officers, with that noble instinct which never abandons the poor people of any country, acknowledged real greatness without reference to nation, and shouting aloud dashed their adversaries down with so much violence that many were driven into the river, and some of the French pontoon boats coming to their succour were overloaded and sunk. It was several hours before the broken and confused masses could be rallied, and the bridges, which had been broken up to let the boats save the drowning men, repaired. When this was effected, Soult who overlooked the action from the summit of the mountain Louis XIV., sent the remainder of Villatte's reserve over the river, and calling up Foy's division prepared a more formidable and better arranged attack; and he expected greater success, inasmuch as the operation from the side of Vera, of which it is time to treat, was now making considerable progress up the Peña de Haya on the allies' right.

COMBAT OF VERA.

General Clauzel had descended the Bayonnette and Commissari mountains immediately after daybreak, under cover of a thick fog, but at seven o'clock the weather cleared, and three divisions formed in heavy columns were seen, by the troops on Santa Barbara, making for the fords below Vera in the direction of two hamlets called the Salinas and the Bario de Lesaca. A fourth division and the guns remained stationary on the slopes of the mountain, and the artillery opened now and then upon the little town of Vera, from which the piquets of the light division were recalled with exception of one post in a fortified house commanding the bridge.

About eight o'clock, the enemy's columns began to pass the fords, covered by the fire of their artillery; but the first shells thrown fell into the midst of their own ranks, and the British troops on Santa Barbara cheered the French battery with a derisive shout. Their march was, however, sure, and a battalion of chosen light troops, without knapsacks, quickly commenced the battle on the left bank of the river, with the Portuguese brigade, and by their extreme activity and rapid fire forced the latter to retire up the slopes of the mountain. General Inglis then reinforced the line of skirmishers, and the

whole of his brigade was soon afterwards engaged; but Clauzel menaced his left flank from the lower ford, and the French troops still forced their way upwards in front without a check, until the whole mass disappeared fighting amidst the asperities of the Peña de Haya. Inglis lost two hundred and seventy men and twenty-two officers, but he finally halted on a ridge commanding the intersection of the roads leading from Vera and Lesaca to Irun and Oyarzun; that is to say, somewhat below the foundry of St. Antonio, where the fourth division, having now recovered its Portuguese brigade, was, in conjunction with Longa's Spaniards, so placed as to support and protect equally the left of Inglis and the right of Freyre on San Marcial.

These operations, from the great height and asperity of the mountain, occupied many hours, and it was past two o'clock before even the head of Clauzel's columns reached this point. Meanwhile as the French troops left in front of Santa Barbara made no movement, and lord Wellington had before directed the light division to aid general Inglis, a wing of the forty-third and three companies of the riflemen from general Kempt's brigade, with three weak Spanish battalions drawn from O'Donel's Andalusians at Echallar, crossed the Bidassoa by the Lesaca bridge, and marched towards some lower slopes on the right of Inglis, where they covered another knot of minor communications coming from Lesaca and Vera. They were followed by the remainder of Kempt's brigade which occupied Lesaca itself, and thus the chain of connexion and defence between Santa Barbara and the positions of the fourth division on the Peña de Haya was completed.

Clauzel, seeing these movements, and thinking the allies at Echallar and Santa Barbara were only awaiting the proper moment to take him in flank and rear, by the bridges of Vera and Lesaca, if he engaged farther up the mountain, now abated his battle and sent notice of his situation and views to Soult. This opinion was well founded; lord Wellington was not a general to let half his army be paralysed by D'Erlon's divisions. On the 30th, when he observed Soult's first preparations in front of San Marcial, he had ordered attacks to be made upon D'Erlon from the Puerto of Echallar, Zugaramurdi and Maya; general Hill was also directed to show the heads of columns towards St. Jean Pied de Port. And on the 31st, when the force and direction of Clauzel's columns were known, he ordered lord Dalhousie to bring the remainder of the seventh division by Lesaca to aid Inglis.

Following these orders Giron, who commanded the Spaniards, O'Donel being sick, slightly skirmished on the 30th with Conroux's advanced posts in front of Sarre, and on the 31st at daybreak the whole of the French line was assailed. That is to say Giron again fought with Conroux, feebly as before; but two Portuguese brigades of the sixth and seventh divisions, directed by lord Dalhousie and general Colville from the passes of Zugaramurdi and Maya, drove the French from their camp behind Urdax and burned it. Abbé, who commanded there, being thus pressed, collected his whole force in front of Ainhoa on an intrenched position, and making strong battle, repulsed the allies with some loss of men by the sixth division. Thus five combats were fought in one day at different points of the general line, and D'Erlon, who had lost three or four hundred men, seeing a fresh column coming from Maya as if to turn his left, judged that a great movement against Bayonne was in progress, and sent notice to Soult. He was mistaken. Lord Wel-

lington being entirely on the defensive, only sought by these demonstrations to disturb the plan of attack, and the seventh division, following the second order sent to lord Dalhousie, marched towards Lesaca; but the fighting at Urdax having lasted until mid-day, the movement was not completed that evening.

D'Erlon's despatch reached Soult at the same time that Clauzel's report arrived. All his arrangements for a final attack on San Marcial were then completed; but these reports and the ominous cannonade at San Sebastian, plainly heard during the morning, induced him to abandon this object and hold his army ready for a general battle on the Nivelle. In this view he sent Foy's division which had not yet crossed the Bidassoa to the heights of Serres, behind the Nivelle, as a support to D'Erlon, and caused six chosen troops of dragoons to march upon St. Pé higher up on that river. Clauzel received orders to arrest his retreat and repass the Bidassoa in the night. He was to leave Maransin's division upon the Bayonnette mountain and the Col de Bera, and with the other three divisions to march by Ascain and join Foy on the heights of Serres.

Notwithstanding these movements, Soult kept Reille's troops beyond the Bidassao, and the battle went on sharply, for the Spaniards continually detached men from the ridge, endeavouring to drive the French from the lower positions into the river, until about four o'clock, when their hardihood abating they desired to be relieved; but Wellington, careful of their glory, seeing the French attacks were exhausted and thinking it a good opportunity to fix the military spirit of his allies, refused to relieve or to aid them; yet it would not be just to measure their valour by this fact. The English general blushed while he called upon them to fight, knowing that they had been previously famished by their vile government, and that there were no hospitals to receive, no care for them when wounded. The battle was, however, arrested by a tempest which commencing in the mountains about three o'clock, raged for several hours with wonderful violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees and whirled through the air like feathers on the howling winds, while the thinnest streams swelling into torrents dashed down the mountains, rolling innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. Amidst this turmoil and under cover of the night the French recrossed the river, and the head-quarters were fixed at St. Jean de Luz.

Clauzel's retreat was more unhappy. Having received the order to retire early in the evening when the storm had already put an end to all fighting, he repassed the fords in person and before dark at the head of two brigades, ordering general Vandermæsen to follow with the remainder of his divisions. It would appear that he expected no difficulty, since he did not take possession of the bridge of Vera nor of the fortified house covering it; and apparently ignorant of the state of his own troops on the other bank of the river, occupied himself with suggesting new projects displeasing to Soult. Meanwhile Vandermæsen's situation became critical. Many of his soldiers, attempting to cross, were drowned by the rising waters, and finally, unable to effect a passage at the fords, that general marched up the stream to seize the bridge of Vera. His advanced guard surprising a corporal's piquet rushed over, but was driven back by a rifle company posted in the fortified house. This happened about three o'clock in the morning, and the riflemen defended the passage until daylight, when a second company and some

Portuguese caçadores came to their aid. But the French reserve left at Vera, seeing how matters stood, opened a fire of guns against the fortified house from a high rock just above the town, and their skirmishers approached it on the right bank, while Vandermæsen plied his musketry from the left bank. The two rifle captains and many men fell under this cross fire, and the passage was forced; but Vandermæsen urging the attack in person was killed, and more than two hundred of his soldiers were hurt.

Soult now learning from D'Erlon that all offensive movements on the side of Maya had ceased at twelve o'clock on the 31st, contemplated another attack on San Marcial; but in the course of the day general Rey's report of the assault on San Sebastian reached him, and at the same time he heard that general Hill was in movement on the side of St. Jean Pied de Port. This state of affairs brought reflection. San Sebastian was lost, a fresh attempt to carry off the wasted garrison from the castle would cost five or six thousand good soldiers, and the safety of the whole army would be endangered by pushing headlong amongst the terrible asperities of the crowned mountain. For Wellington could throw his right wing and centre, forming a mass of at least thirty-five thousand men, upon the French left during the action, and he would be nearer to Bayonne than the French right when once the battle was engaged beyond the lower Bidassoa. The army had lost in the recent actions three thousand six hundred men. General Vandermæsen had been killed, and four others, La Martinière, Meune, Remond, and Guy, wounded, the first mortally; all the superior officers agreed that a fresh attempt would be most dangerous, and serious losses might draw on an immediate invasion of France before the necessary defensive measures were completed.

Yielding to these reasons, he resolved to recover his former positions and thenceforward remain entirely on the defensive, for which his vast knowledge of war, his foresight, his talent for methodical arrangement, and his firmness of character, peculiarly fitted him. Twelve battles or combats, fought in seven weeks, bore testimony that he had striven hard to gain the offensive for the French army, and willing still to strive if it might be so, he had called upon Suchet to aid him and demanded fresh orders from the emperor; but Suchet helped him not, and Napoleon's answer indicated at once his own difficulties and his reliance upon the duke of Dalmatia's capacity and fidelity.

"I have given you my confidence, and can add neither to your means nor to your instructions."

The loss of the allies was one thousand Anglo-Portuguese and sixteen hundred Spaniards. Wherefore the cost of men on this day, including the storming of San Sebastian, exceeded five thousand, but the battle in no manner disturbed the siege. The French army was powerless against such strong positions. Soult had brought forty-five thousand men to bear in two columns upon a square of less than five miles, and the thirty thousand French actually engaged were repulsed by ten thousand, for that number only of the allies fought.

But the battle was a half measure and ill-judged on Soult's part. Lord Wellington's experience of French warfare, his determined character, coolness and thorough acquaintance with the principles of his art, left no hope that he would suffer two-thirds of his army to be kept in check by D'Erlon's two divisions; and accordingly, the moment D'Erlon was menaced, Soult stopped his own attack to make a counter-movement and deliver a decisive battle on

favourable ground. Perhaps his secret hope was to draw his opponent to such a conclusion, but if so, the combat of San Marcial was too dear a price to pay for the chance.

A general who had made up his mind to force a way to San Sebastian, would have organized his rear so that no serious embarrassment could arise from any partial incursions towards Bayonne; he would have concentrated his whole army, and have calculated his attack so as to be felt at San Sebastian before his adversary's counter-movement could be felt towards Bayonne. In this view D'Erlon's two divisions should have come in the night of the 30th to Vera, which, without weakening the reserve opposed to the light division, would have augmented Clauzel's force by ten thousand men; and on the most important line, because San Marcial offered no front for the action of great numbers, and the secret of mountain warfare is, by surprise or the power of overwhelming numbers, to seize such commanding points as shall force an enemy either to abandon his strong position, or become the assailant to recover those he has thus lost. Now the difficulty of defending the crowned mountain was evinced by the rapid manner in which Clauzel at once gained the ridges as far as the foundry of St. Antonio; with ten thousand additional men he might have gained a commanding position on the rear and left flank of San Marcial, and forced the allies to abandon it. That lord Wellington thought himself weak on the Haya mountain is proved by his calling up the seventh division from Echallar, and by his orders to the light division.

Soult's object was to raise the siege; but his plan involved the risk of having thirty-five thousand of the allies interposed during his attack between him and Bayonne, clearly a more decisive operation than the raising of the siege, therefore the enterprise may be pronounced injudicious. He admitted, indeed, that excited to the enterprise partly by insinuations, whether from the minister of war or his own lieutenants does not appear, partly by a generous repugnance to abandon the brave garrison, he was too precipitate, acting contrary to his judgment; but he was probably tempted by the hope of obtaining at least the camp of San Marcial as a bridge-head, and thus securing a favourable point for after combinations.

Lord Wellington, having resolved not to invade France at this time, was unprepared for so great an operation as throwing his right and centre upon Soult's left; and it is obvious also that on the 30th, he expected only a partial attack at San Marcial. The order he first gave to assail D'Erlon's position, and then the counter-order for the seventh division to come to Lesaca, prove this, because the latter was issued after Clauzel's numbers and the direction of his attack were ascertained. The efforts of two Portuguese brigades against D'Erlon sufficed, therefore, to render null the duke of Dalmatia's great combinations, and his extreme sensitiveness to their operations marks the vice of his own. Here it may be observed, that the movement of the forty-third, the rifle companies and the Spaniards, to secure the right flank of Inglis, was ill arranged. Despatched by different roads, without knowing precisely the point they were to concentrate at, each fell in with the enemy at different places; the Spaniards got under fire and were forced to alter their route; the forty-third companies, stumbling on a French division, had to fall back half a mile; it was only by thus feeling the enemy at different points that the destined position was at last found, and a disaster was scarcely prevented by the fury of the tempest. Nev-

ertheless those detachments were finally well placed to have struck a blow the next morning, because their post was only half an hour's march from the high ground behind Vandermaesen's column when he forced the bridge at Vera, and the firing would have served as a guide. The remainder of Kempt's brigade could also have moved upon the same point from Lesacar. It is, however, very difficult to seize such occasions in mountain warfare, where so little can be seen of the general state of affairs.

A more obvious advantage was neglected by general Skerrett. The defence of the bridge at Vera by a single company of rifles lasted more than an hour, and four brigades of the enemy, crossing in a tumultuous manner, could not have cleared the narrow passage after it was won in a moment. Lord Wellington's despatch erroneously describes the French as passing under the fire of great part of general Skerrett's brigade, whereas that officer remained in order of battle on the lower slopes of Santa Barbara, half a mile distant, and allowed the enemy to escape. It is true that a large mass of French troops were on the counter-slopes of the Bayonnette mountain, beyond Vera, but the seventh division, being then close to Santa Barbara, would have prevented any serious disaster if the blow had failed. A great opportunity was certainly lost, but war in rough mountains is generally a series of errors.

CHAPTER IV.

The duke of Berry proposes to invade France, promising the aid of twenty thousand insurgents—Lord Wellington's views on this subject—His personal acrimony against Napoleon—That monarch's policy and character defended—Dangerous state of affairs in Catalonia—Lord Wellington designs to go there himself, but at the desire of the allied sovereigns and the English government resolves to establish a part of his army in France—His plans retarded by accidents and bad weather—Soult unable to divine his project—Passage of the Bidassoa—Second combat of Vera—Colonel Colborne's great presence of mind—Gallant action of lieutenant Havelock—The French lose the redoubt of Sarre and abandon the great Rhune—Observations.

SOULT, now on the defensive, was yet so fearful of an attack along the Nive, that his uneasy movements made the allies think he was again preparing for offensive operations. This double misunderstanding did not, however, last long, and each army resumed its former position.

The fall of San Sebastian had given lord Wellington a new port and point of support, had increased the value of Passages as a depot, and let loose a considerable body of troops for field operations; the armistice in Germany was at an end, Austria had joined the allies, and it seemed, therefore, certain that he would immediately invade France. The English cabinet had promised the continental sovereigns that it should be so when the French were expelled from Spain, meaning Navarre and Guipuscoa; and the newspaper editors were, as usual, actively deceiving the people of all countries by their dictatorial absurd projects and assumptions. Meanwhile the partisans of the Bourbons were secretly endeavouring to form a conspiracy in the south, and the duke of Berry desired to join the British army, pretending that twenty thousand Frenchmen were already armed and organized, at the head of which he would place himself. In fine all was exultation and extravagance. But lord Wellington, well understanding the inflated nature of such hopes and promises, while affecting to rebuke the absurdities of the newspapers, took the opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, by observing, "that if he had

done all that was expected, he should have been before that period in the moon."

With respect to the duke of Berry's views, it was for the sovereigns, he said, to decide whether the restoration of the Bourbons should form part of their policy, but as yet no fixed line of conduct on that or any other political points was declared. It was for their interest to get rid of Napoleon, and there could be no question of the advantage or propriety of accepting the aid of a Bourbon party, without pledging themselves to dethrone the emperor. The Bourbons might indeed decline, in default of such a pledge, to involve their partisans in rebellion, and he advised them to do so, because Napoleon's power rested internally upon the most extensive and expensive system of corruption ever established in any country, externally upon his military force, which was supported almost exclusively by foreign contributions: once confined to the limits of France, he would be unable to bear the double expense of his government and army, the reduction of either would be fatal to him, and the object of the Bourbons would thus be obtained without risk. But, if they did not concur in this reasoning, the allies in the north of Europe must declare they would dethrone Napoleon before the duke of Berry should be allowed to join the army; and the British government must make up its mind upon the question.

This reasoning put an end to the project, because neither the English cabinet nor the allied sovereigns were ready to adopt a decisive open line of policy. The ministers, exulting at the progress of aristocratic domination, had no thought save that of wasting England's substance by extravagant subsidies and supplies, taken without gratitude by the continental powers, who held themselves nowise bound thereby to uphold the common cause, which each secretly designed to make available for peculiar interests. Moreover, they all still trembled before the conqueror, and none would pledge themselves to a decided policy. Lord Wellington alone moved with a firm composure, the result of profound and well understood calculations; yet his mind, naturally so dispassionate, was strangely clouded at this time by personal hatred of Napoleon.

Where is the proof, or even probability, of that great man's system of government being internally dependent upon "the most extensive corruption ever established in any country?"

The annual expenditure of France was scarcely half that of England, and Napoleon rejected public loans which are the very life-blood of state corruption. He left no debt. Under him no man devoured the public substance in idleness merely because he was of a privileged class; the state servants were largely paid, but they were made to labour effectually for the state. They did not eat their bread and sleep. His system of public accounts, remarkable for its exactness, simplicity and comprehensiveness, was vitally opposed to public fraud, and therefore extremely unfavorable to corruption. Napoleon's power was supported in France by that deep sense of his goodness as a sovereign, and that admiration for his genius which pervaded the poorer and middle classes of the people; by the love which they bore towards him, and still bear for his memory, because he cherished the principles of a just equality. They loved him also for his incessant activity in the public service, his freedom from all private vices, and because his public works, wondrous for their number, their utility and grandeur, never stood still; under him the poor man never wanted work. To France he gave noble institutions, a comparatively just code of laws, and glory unmatched since the days of the

Romans. His *Cadastre*, more extensive and perfect than the Domesday Book, that monument of the wisdom and greatness of our Norman conqueror, was alone sufficient to endear him to the nation. Rapidly advancing under his vigorous superintendence, it registered and taught every man the true value and nature of his property, and all its liabilities public or private. It was designed and most ably adapted to fix and secure titles to property, to prevent frauds, to abate litigation, to apportion the weight of taxes equally and justly, to repress the insolence of the tax-gatherer without injury to the revenue, and to secure the sacred freedom of the poor man's home. The French *Cadastre*, although not original, would, from its comprehensiveness, have been when completed the greatest boon ever conferred upon a civilized nation by a statesman.

To say that the emperor was supported by his soldiers, is to say that he was supported by the people; because the law of conscription, that mighty staff on which France leaned when all Europe attempted to push her down; the conscription, without which she could never have sustained the dreadful war of antagonist principles entailed upon her by the revolution; that energetic law, which he did not establish, but which he freed from abuse, and rendered great, national, and enduring, by causing it to strike equally on all classes; the conscription made the soldiers the real representatives of the people. The troops idolized Napoleon, as well they might, and to assert that their attachment commenced only when they became soldiers, is to acknowledge that his excellent qualities and greatness of mind turned hatred into devotion the moment he was approached. But Napoleon never was hated by the people of France; he was their own creation, and they loved him so as never monarch was loved before. His march from Cannes to Paris, surrounded by hundreds of thousands of poor men, who were not soldiers, can never be effaced or even disfigured. For six weeks, at any moment, a single assassin might by a single shot have acquired the reputation of a tyrannicide, and obtained vast rewards besides from the trembling monarchs and aristocrats of the earth, who scrupled not to instigate men to the shameful deed. Many there were base enough to undertake, but none so hardy as to execute the crime, and Napoleon, guarded by the people of France, passed unharmed to a throne from whence it required a million of foreign bayonets to drive him again. From the throne they drove him, but not from the thoughts and hearts of men.

Lord Wellington, having shaken off the weight of the continental policy, proceeded to consider the question of invading France simply as a military operation, which might conduce to or militate against the security of the Peninsula, while Napoleon's power was weakened by the war in Germany; and such was his inflexible probity of character, that no secret ambitious promptings, no facility of gaining personal reputation, diverted him from this object, all the renown of which he already enjoyed, the embarrassments, mortifications and difficulties, enormous, although to the surface-seeing public there appeared none, alone remaining.

The rupture of the congress of Prague, Austria's accession to the coalition, and the fall of San Sebastian, were favourable circumstances; but he relied not much on the military skill of the banded sovereigns, and a great defeat might at any moment dissolve their alliance. Napoleon could then reinforce Soult and drive the allies back upon Spain, where the French still possessed the fortresses of Santona, Pampeluna, Jaca, Venasque, Monzon, Fra-

ga, Lerida, Mequinenza, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia. Meanwhile lord William Bentinck, misled by false information, had committed a serious error in sending Del Parque's army to Tudela, because the Ordal disaster and subsequent retreat showed that Suchet was strong enough, if it so pleased him, to drive the Anglo-Sicilian army back even to the Xucar and recover all his strong places. In fine, the affairs of Catalonia were in the same unsatisfactory state they had been in from the first. It was not even certain that a British army would remain there at all; for lord William, assured of Murat's defection, was intent upon invading Italy; and the ministers seemed to have leaned towards the project, since Wellington now seriously desired to know whether the Anglo-Sicilians were to go or stay in Spain.

Lord William himself had quitted that army, making the seventh change in fifteen months; this alone was sufficient to account for its misfortunes, and the Spanish generals, who had been placed under the English commander, ridiculed the latter's ill success and spoke vauntingly of themselves. Strenuously did lord Wellington urge the appointment of some commander for the Anglo-Sicilian troops who would devote his whole attention to his business, observing that at no period of the war would he have quitted his own army even for a few days without danger to its interests. But the English minister's ignorance of every thing relating to war was profound, and at this time he was himself being stript of generals. Graham, Picton, Leith, lord Dalhousie, H. Clinton, and Skerrett, had gone or were going to England on account of ill-health, wounds or private business; and marshal Beresford was at Lisbon, where dangerous intrigues, to be noticed hereafter, menaced the existence of the Portuguese army. Castaños and Giron had been removed by the Spanish regency from their commands, and O'Donel, described as an able officer but of the most impracticable temper, being denied the chief command of Elio's, Copons', and Del Parque's troops, quitted the army under pretext that his old wounds had broken out; whereupon Giron was placed at the head of the Andalusians. The operations in Catalonia were however so important, that lord Wellington thought of going there himself; and he would have done so, if the after-misfortunes of Napoleon in Germany had not rendered it impossible for that monarch to reinforce his troops on the Spanish frontier.

These general reasons for desiring to operate on the side of Catalonia were strengthened also by the consideration, that the country immediately beyond the Bidassoa, being sterile, the difficulty of feeding the army in winter would be increased; and the twenty-five thousand half-starved Spaniards in his army would certainly plunder for subsistence and incense the people of France. Moreover, Soult's actual position was strong, his troops still numerous, and his intrenched camp furnished a sure retreat. Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port were so placed that no serious invasion could be made until one or both were taken or blockaded, which, during the tempestuous season, and while the admiralty refused to furnish sufficient naval means, was scarcely possible; even to get at those fortresses would be a work of time, difficult against Soult alone, impracticable if Suchet, as he well might, came to the other's support. Towards Catalonia, therefore, lord Wellington desired to turn when the frontier of the western Pyrenees should be secured by the fall of Pampeluna. Yet he thought it not amiss mean-

while to yield something to the allied sovereigns, and give a spur to public feeling by occupying a menacing position within the French territory. A simple thing this seemed, but the English general made no slight concession when he thus bent his military judgment to political considerations.

The French position was the base of a triangle of which Bayonne was the apex, and the great roads leading from thence to Irun and St. Jean Pied de Port were the sides. A rugged mass of mountains intervened between the left and centre, but nearly all the valleys and communications, coming from Spain beyond the Nive, centred at St. Jean Pied de Port, and were embraced by an intrenched camp which Foy occupied in front of that fortress. That general could, without falling upon Paris who was at Oloron, bring fifteen thousand men including the national guards into action, and serious dispositions were necessary to dislodge him; but these could not be made secretly, and Soult calculated upon having time to aid him and deliver a general battle on chosen ground. Meanwhile Foy barred any movement along the right bank of the Nive, and he could, either by the great road leading to Bayonne or by shorter communications through Bidaray, reach the bridge of Cambo on the Nive and so gain Espelette behind the camps of Ainhoa. From thence, passing the Nivelle by the bridges at Amotz and Serres, he could reach St. Jean de Luz, and it was by this route he moved to aid in the attack of San Marcial. However, the allies, marching from the Aldudes and the Bastan, could also penetrate by St. Martin d'Arosa and the Gorospil mountain to Bidaray, that is to say, between Foy's and D'Erlon's positions. Yet the roads were very difficult, and as the French sent out frequent scouring detachments, and the bridge of Cambo was secured by works, Foy could not be easily cut off from the rest of the army.

D'Erlon's advanced camps were near Urdax and on the Mondarain and Choupera mountains, but his main position was a broad ridge behind Ainhoa, the right covering the bridge of Amotz. Beyond that bridge Clauzel's position extended along a range of strong hills, trending towards Ascain and Serres, and as the Nivelle swept with a curve quite round his rear, his right flank rested on that river also. The redoubts of St. Barbe and the camp of Sarre, barring the roads leading from the Vera and the Puerto de Echallar, were in advance of his left, and the greater Rhune, whose bare rocky head lifted two thousand eight hundred feet above the sea level overtopped all the neighbouring mountains, formed, in conjunction with its dependents the Commissari and Bayonnette, a mask for his right.

From the Bayonnette the French position ran along the summit of the Mandale or Sulcogain mountain, on a single line, but from thence to the sea the ridges suddenly abated and there were two lines of defence; the first along the Bidassoa, the second, commencing near St. Jean de Luz, stretched from the heights of Bordegain towards Ascain, having the camps of Urogne and the Sans Culottes in advance. Reille's divisions guarded these lines, and the second was connected with Clauzel's position by Villatte's reserve which was posted at Ascain. Finally, the whole system of defence was tied to that of St. Jean Pied de Port by the double bridge-head at Cambo, which secured the junction of Foy with the rest of the army.

The French worked diligently on their intrenchments, yet they were but little advanced when the castle of San Sebastian surrendered, and Wellington had even then matured a plan of attack as daring as any undertaken during the whole war. This

was to sieze the great Rhune mountain and its dependents, and at the same time to force the passage of the lower Bidassoa and establish his left wing in the French territory. He would thus bring the Rhune, Commissari and Bayonnette mountains, forming a salient menacing point of great altitude and strength towards the French centre, within his own system, and shorten his communications by gaining the command of the road running along the river from Irun to Vera. Thus also he would obtain the port of Fontarabia, which, though bad in winter, was some advantage to a general whose supplies came from the ocean, and who with scanty means of land transport had to encounter the perverse negligence and even opposition of the Spanish authorities. Moreover Passages, his nearest port, was restricted in its anchorage ground, hard to make from the sea, and dangerous when full of vessels.

He designed this operation for the middle of September, immediately after the castle of San Sebastian fell and before the French works acquired strength, but some error retarded the arrival of his pontoons, the weather became bad, and the attack, which depended as we shall find upon the state of the tides and fords, was of necessity deferred until the 7th of October. Meanwhile, to mislead Soult, to ascertain Foy's true position about St. Jean Pied de Port, and to strengthen his own right, he brought part of Del Parque's force up from Tudela to Pampeluna. The Andalusian division which had remained at the blockade after the battle of Sauroren then rejoined Giron at Echallar, and at the same time Mina's troops gathered in the neighbourhood of Roncevalles. Wellington himself repaired to that quarter on the 1st of October, and in his way, passing through the Alduides, he caused general Campbell to surprise some isolated posts on the rock of Ayrola; a French scouting detachment was also cut off near the foundry of Baigorri, and two thousand sheep were swept from the valley.

These affairs awakened Soult's jealousy. He was in daily expectation of an attack, without being able to ascertain on what quarter the blow would fall; and at first, deceived by false information that the fourth division had reinforced Hill, he thought the march of Mina's troops and the Andalusians was intended to mask an offensive movement by the Val de Baigorri. The arrival of light cavalry in the Bastan, lord Wellington's presence at Roncevalles, and the loss of the post at Ayrola, seemed to confirm this; but he knew the pontoons were at Oyarzun, and some deserters told him that the real object of the allies was to gain the great Rhune. On the other hand, a French commissary, taken at San Sebastian and exchanged after remaining twelve days at Lesaca, assured him, that nothing at Wellington's head-quarters indicated a serious attack, although the officers spoke of one, and there were many movements of troops; and this weighed much with the French general, because the slow march of the pontoons and the wet weather had caused a delay contradictory to the reports of the spies and deserters. It was also beyond calculation that Wellington should, against his military judgment, push his left wing into France merely to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns in Germany, and as the most obvious line for a permanent invasion was by his right and centre, there was no apparent cause for deferring his operations.

The true reason of the procrastination, namely, the state of the tides and fords on the lower Bidassoa, was necessarily hidden from Soult, who finally inclined to the notion that Wellington only design-

ed to secure his blockade at Pampeluna from interruption by menacing the French and impeding their labours, the results of which were now becoming visible. However, as all the deserters and spies came with the same story, he recommended increased vigilance along the whole line. And yet solittle did he anticipate the nature of his opponent's project, that on the 6th he reviewed D'Erlon's divisions at Ainhoa, and remained that night at Espelette, doubting if any attack was intended, and no way suspecting that it would be against his right. But Wellington could not diminish his troops on the side of Roncevalles and the Alduides, lest Foy and Paris and the light cavalry under Pierre Soult should unite at St. Jean Pied de Port to raise the blockade of Pampeluna; the troops at Maya were already posted offensively, menacing Soult between the Nive and the Nivelle, and it was, therefore, only with his left wing and left centre, and against the French right, that he could act.

Early in October a reinforcement of twelve hundred British soldiers arrived from England. Mina was then in the Ahescoa, on the right of general Hill, who was thus enabled to relieve Campbell's Portuguese in the Alduides; and the latter, marching to Maya, replaced the third division, which, shifting to its left, occupied the heights above Zugamurdi, to enable the seventh division to relieve Giron's Andalusians in the Puerto de Echallar.

These dispositions were made with a view to the attack of the great Rhune and its dependents, the arrangements for which shall now be described.

Giron, moving with his Andalusians from the Invantelly, was to assail a lofty ridge or saddle, uniting the Commissari and the great Rhune. A battalion, stealing up the slopes and hollows on his right flank, was to seize the rocky head of the last named mountain, and after placing detachments there in observation of the roads leading round it from Sarre and Ascaïn, was to descend upon the saddle and menace the rear of the enemy's position at the Puerto de Vera. Meanwhile the principal attack was to be made in two columns; but to protect the right and rear against a counter attack from Sarre, the Spanish general was to leave one brigade in the narrow pass leading from Vera, between the Invantelly and the Rhune to that place.

On the left of Giron the light division was to assail the Bayonnette mountain and the Puerto de Vera, connecting its right with Giron's left by skirmishers.

Longa, who had resumed his old positions above the Salinas de Lesaca, was to move in two columns across the Bidassoa. One, passing by the ford of Salinas, was to aid the left wing of the light division in its attack on the Bayonnette; the other, passing by the bridge of Vera, was to move up the ravine separating the slopes of the Bayonnette from the Puerto de Vera, and thus connect the two attacks of the light divisions. During these operations Longa was also to send some men over the river at Andarlasa, to seize a telegraph which the French used to communicate between the left and centre of their line.

Behind the light division general Cole was to take post with the fourth division on Santa Barbara, pushing forward detachments to secure the commanding points gained by the fighting troops in front. The sixth division was meanwhile to make a demonstration on the right, by Urdax and Zugamurdi, against D'Erlon's advanced posts. Thus, without weakening his line between Roncevalles and Echallar, lord Wellington put nearly twenty thousand men in motion against the Rhune moun-

tain and its dependents, and he had still twenty-four thousand disposable to force the passage of the lower Bidassoa.

It has been already shown that between Andarlasa and Biriatu, a distance of three miles, there were neither roads nor fords nor bridges. The French, trusting to this difficulty of approach, and to their intrenchments on the craggy slopes of the Mandale, had collected their troops principally where the Bildox or Green mountain and the intrenched camp of Biriatu overlooked the fords. Against these points Wellington directed general Freyre's Spaniards, who were to descend from San Marcial, cross the upper fords of Biriatu, assail the Bildox and Mandale mountains, and turn the left of that part of the enemy's line which being prolonged from Biriatu crossed the royal road and passed behind the town of Andaie.

Between Biriatu and the sea the advanced points of defence were the mountain of Louis XIV., the ridge called the *Café Republicain*, and the town of Andaie. Behind these the Calvaire d'Urogne, the Croix des Bouquets, and the camp of the Sans Culottes, served as rallying posts.

For the assault on these positions Wellington designed to employ the first and fifth divisions and the unattached brigades of Wilson and lord Aylmer, in all about fifteen thousand men. By the help of Spanish fishermen he had secretly discovered three fords, practicable at low water, between the bridge of Behobia and the sea, and his intent was to pass his column at the old fords above, and at the new fords below the bridge, and this though the tides rose sixteen feet, leaving at the ebb open heavy sands not less than half a mile broad. The left bank of the river also was completely exposed to observation from the enemy's hills, which though low in comparison of the mountains above the bridge, were nevertheless strong ridges of defence; but relying on his previous measures to deceive the enemy, the English general disdained these dangers, and his anticipations were not belied by the result.

The unlikelihood that a commander, having a better line of operations, would pass such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth, deceived the French general. Meanwhile his lieutenants were negligent. Of Reille's two divisions La Martinière's, now commanded by general Boyer, was at the camp of Urogne, and on the morning of the seventh was dispersed as usual to labour at the works; Villatte's reserve was at Ascain and Serres; the five thousand men composing Maucune's division were indeed on the first line, but unexpectant of an attack, and though the works on the Mandale were finished, and those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter to the sea they were scarcely commenced.

PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA.

The night set in heavily. A sullen thunder-storm gathering about the craggy summit of the Peña de Haya came slowly down its flanks, and towards morning rolling over the Bidassoa fell in its greatest violence upon the French positions. During this turmoil Wellington, whose pontoons and artillery were close up to Irun, disposed a number of guns and howitzers along the crest of San Marcial, and his columns attained their respective stations along the banks of the river. Freyre's Spaniards, one brigade of the guards and Wilson's Portuguese, stretching from the Biriatu fords to that near the broken bridge of Behobia, were ensconced behind the detached ridge which the French had first seized in their attack of the 31st. The second brigade of

guards and the Germans of the first division were concealed near Irun, close to a ford below the bridge of Behobia, called "the great Jonco." The British brigades of the fifth division covered themselves behind a large river embankment opposite Andaie; Sprye's Portuguese and Lord Aylmer's brigade were posted in the ditch of Fontarabia.

As all the tents were left standing in the camps of the allies, the enemy could perceive no change on the morning of the 7th, but at seven o'clock, the fifth division and lord Aylmer's brigade emerging from their concealment took the sands in two columns, that on the left pointing against the French camp of the Sans Culottes, that on the right against the ridge of Andaie. No shot was fired, but when they had passed the fords of the low-water channel a rocket was sent up from the steeple of Fontarabia as a signal. Then the guns and howitzers opened from San Marcial, the troops near Irun, covered by the fire of a battery, made for the Jonco ford, and the passage above the bridge also commenced. From the crest of San Marcial seven columns could be seen at once, attacking on a line of five miles, those above the bridge plunging at once into the fiery contest, those below it appearing in the distance like huge sullen snakes winding over the heavy sands. The Germans missing the Jonco ford got into deep water, but quickly recovered the true line, and the French, completely surprised, permitted even the brigades of the fifth division to gain the right bank and form their lines before a hostile musket flashed.

The cannonade from San Marcial was heard by Soult at Espelette, and at the same time the sixth division, advancing beyond Urdax and Zugaramurdi, made a false attack on D'Erlon's positions; the Portuguese brigade under colonel Douglas were, however, pushed too far and repulsed with the loss of one hundred and fifty men, and the French marshal instantly detecting the true nature of this attack hurried to his right, but his camps on the Bidassoa were lost before he arrived.

When the British artillery first opened Maucune's troops had assembled at their different posts of defence, and the French guns, established principally near the mountain of Louis XIV. and the *Café Republicain*, commenced firing. The alarm spread, and Boyer's marched from the second line behind Urogne to support Maucune without waiting for the junction of the working parties; but his brigades moved separately as they could collect, and before the first came into action, Sprye's Portuguese, forming the extreme left of the allies, menaced the camp of the Sans Culottes; thither therefore one of Boyer's regiments was ordered, while the others advanced by the royal road towards the Croix des Bouquets. But Andaie, guarded only by a piquet, was abandoned, and Reille, thinking the camp of the Sans Culottes would be lost before Boyer's men reached it, sent a battalion there from the centre, thus weakening his force at the chief point of attack; for the British brigades of the fifth division were now advancing left in front from Andaie, and bearing under a sharp fire of artillery and musketry towards the Croix des Bouquets.

By this time the columns of the first division had passed the river, one above the bridge preceded by Wilson's Portuguese, one below preceded by Colin Halket's German light troops, who, aided by the fire of the guns on San Marcial, drove back the enemy's advanced posts, won the *Café Republicain*, the mountain of Louis XIV., and drove the French from those heights to the Croix des Bouquets: this was the key of the position, and towards it guns

and troops were now hastening from every side. The Germans, who had lost many men in the previous attacks, were here brought to a check, for the heights were very strong, and Boyer's leading battalions were close at hand; but at this critical moment colonel Cameron arrived with the ninth regiment of the fifth division, and passing through the German skirmishers rushed with great vehemence to the summit of the first height. The French infantry instantly opened their ranks to let their guns retire, and then retreated themselves at full speed to a second ridge somewhat lower, but where they could only be approached on a narrow front. Cameron as quickly threw his men into a single column and bore against this new position, which curving inwards enabled the French to pour a concentrated fire upon his regiment; nor did his violent course seem to dismay them until he was within ten yards, when appalled by the furious shout and charge of the ninth they gave way, and the ridges of the Croix des Bouquets were won as far as the royal road. The British regiment, however, lost many men and officers, and during the fight the French artillery and scattered troops, coming from different points and rallying on Boyer's battalions, were gathered on the ridges to the French left of the road.

The intrenched camp above Biriatu and the Bildo, had been meanwhile defended with success in front, but Freyre turned them with his right wing, which being opposed only by a single battalion soon won the Mandale mountain, and the French fell back from that quarter to the Calvaire d'Urogne and Jollimont. Reille thus beaten at the Croix des Bouquets, and his flanks turned, the left by the Spaniards on the Mandale, the right by the allies along the sea-coast, retreated in great disorder along the royal causeway and the old road of Bayonne. He passed through the village of Urogne, and the British skirmishers at first entered it in pursuit, but they were beaten out again by the second brigade of Boyer's division, for Soult now arrived with part of Villatte's reserve and many guns, and by his presence and activity restored order and revived the courage of the troops at the moment when the retreat was degenerating into a flight.

Reille lost eight pieces of artillery and about four hundred men; the allies did not lose more than six hundred, of which half were Spaniards, so slight and easy had the skill of the general rendered this stupendous operation. But if the French commander, penetrating Wellington's design and avoiding the surprise, had opposed all his troops amounting with what Villatte could spare to sixteen thousand, instead of the five thousand actually engaged, the passage could scarcely have been forced; and a check would have been tantamount to a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning tide would have come with a swallowing flood upon the rear.

Equally unprepared and equally unsuccessful were the French on the side of Vera, although the struggle there proved more fierce and constant.

At daybreak Giron had descended from the Ivantelly rocks and general Alten from Santa Barbara; the first to the gorge of the pass leading from Vera to Sarre, the last to the town of Vera, where he was joined by half of Longa's force.

One brigade, consisting of the forty-third, the seventeenth Portuguese regiment of the line and the first and third battalions of riflemen, drew up in column on an open space to the right of Vera. The other brigade under colonel Colborne, consisting of the fifty-second, two battalions of caçadores and a battalion of British riflemen, was disposed on the left of Vera. Half of Longa's division was between

these brigades; the other half, after crossing the ford of Salinas, drew up on Colborne's left. The whole of the narrow vale of Vera was thus filled with troops ready to ascend the mountains, and general Cole displaying his force to advantage on the heights of Santa Barbara presented a formidable reserve.

Taupin's division guarded the enormous positions in front of the allies. His right was on the Bayonnette, from whence a single slope descended to a small plain about two parts down the mountain. From this platform three distinct tongues shot into the valley below, each was defended by an advanced post, and the platform itself secured by a star redoubt, behind which, about half way up the single slope, there was a second retrenchment with abatis. Another large redoubt and an unfinished breastwork on the superior crest completed the system of defence for the Bayonnette.

The Commissari, which is a continuation of the Bayonnette towards the great Rhune, was covered by a profound gulf thickly wooded and defended with skirmishers, and between this gulf and another of the same nature the main road leading from Vera over the Puerto pierced the centre of the French position. Rugged and ascending with short abrupt turns this road was blocked at every uncovered point with abatis and small retrenchments; each obstacle was commanded at half musket-shot by small detachments placed on all the projecting parts overlooking the ascent, and a regiment intrenched above on the Puerto itself, connected the troops on the crest of the Bayonnette and Commissari with those on the saddle-ridge, against which Giron's attack was directed.

But between Alten's right and Giron's left was an isolated ridge, called by the soldiers "the Boar's Back," the summit of which, about half a mile long and rounded at each end, was occupied by four French companies. This huge cavalier, thrown as it were into the gulf to cover the Puerto and saddle ridges, although of mean height in comparison of the towering ranges behind, was yet so great that the few warning shots fired from the summit by the enemy, reached the allies at its base with that slow singing sound which marks the dying force of a musket-ball. It was essential to take "the Boar's Back" before the general attack commenced, and five companies of British riflemen, supported by the seventeenth Portuguese regiment, were ordered to assail it at the Vera end, while a battalion of Giron's Spaniards, preceded by a detached company of the forty-third, attacked it on the other.

At four o'clock in the morning, Clauzel had received intelligence that the Bayonnette was to be assaulted that day or the next, and at seven o'clock he heard from Conroux, who commanded at Sarre, that Giron's camps were abandoned, although the tents of the seventh division were still standing; at the same time the sound of musketry was heard on the side of Urdax, a cannonade on the side of Irun, and then came Taupin's report that the vale of Vera was filled with troops. To this last quarter Clauzel hurried. The Spaniards had already driven Conroux's outposts from the gorge leading to Sarre, and a detachment was creeping up towards the unguarded head of the great Rhune. He immediately ordered four regiments of Conroux's division to occupy the summit, the front and flanks of that mountain, and he formed a reserve of two other regiments behind. With these troops he designed to secure the mountain and support Taupin, but ere they could reach their destination that general's fate was decided.

SECOND COMBAT OF VERA.

Soon after seven o'clock a few cannon-shot from some mountain-guns, of which each side had a battery, were followed by the Spanish musketry on the right, and the next moment "the Boar's Back" was simultaneously assailed at both ends. The riflemen on the Vera side ascended to a small pine wood two-thirds of the way up and there rested, but soon resuming their movement with a scornful gallantry they swept the French off the top, disdaining to use their rifles beyond a few shots down the reserve side, to show that they were masters of the ridge. This was the signal for the general attack. The seventeenth Portuguese followed the victorious sharpshooters, the forty-third, preceded by their own skirmishers and by the remainder of the riflemen of the right wing, plunged into the rugged pass, Longa's troops entered the gloomy wood of the ravine on the left, and beyond them Colborne's brigade moving by narrow paths and throwing out skirmishers assailed the Bayonnette, the fifty-second took the middle tongue, the caçadores and riflemen the two outermost, and all bore with a concentric movement against the star redoubt on the platform above. Longa's second brigade should have flanked the left of this attack with a wide skirting movement, but neither he nor his starved soldiers knew much of such warfare, and therefore quietly followed the riflemen in reserve.

Soon the open slopes of the mountains were covered with men and with fire, a heavy confused sound of mingled shouts and musketry filled the deep hollows between, and the white smoke came curling up above the dark forest trees which covered their gloomy recesses. The French compared with their assailants seemed few and scattered on the mountain side, and Kempt's brigade soon forced its way without a check through all the retrenchments on the main pass, his skirmishers spreading wider and breaking into small detachments of support as the depth of the ravine lessened and the slopes melted into the higher ridges. When about half-way up an open platform gave a clear view over the Bayonnette slope, and all eyes were turned that way. Longa's right brigade, fighting in the gulf between, seemed labouring and overmatched, but beyond, on the broad open space in front of the star fort, the caçadores and riflemen of Colborne's brigade were seen coming out, in small bodies, from a forest which covered the three tongues of land up to the edge of the platform. Their fire was sharp, their pace rapid, and in a few moments they closed upon the redoubt in a mass as if resolved to storm it. The fifty-second were not then in sight, and the French, thinking from the dark clothing that all were Portuguese, rushed in close order out of the intrenchment; they were numerous and very sudden; the rifle as a weapon is overmatched by the musket and bayonet, and this rough charge sent the scattered assailants back over the rocky edge of the descent. With shrill cries the French followed, but just then the fifty-second appeared, partly in line, partly in column, on the platform, and raising their shout rushed forward. The red uniform and full career of this regiment startled the hitherto adventurous French, they stopped short, wavered, and then turning fled to their intrenchment; the fifty-second following hard entered the works with them, the riflemen and caçadores who had meanwhile rallied passed it on both flanks, and for a few moments every thing was hidden by a dense volume of smoke. Soon however the British shout pealed again, and the whole mass emerged on the other side, the

French, now the fewer, flying, the others pursuing, until the second intrenchment, half way up the parent slope, enabled the retreating troops to make another stand.

The exulting and approving cheers of Kempt's brigade now echoed along the mountain side, and with renewed vigour the men continued to scale the craggy mountain, fighting their toilsome way to the top of the Puerto. Meanwhile Colborne, after having carried the second intrenchment above the star fort, was brought to a check by the works on the very crest of the mountain, from whence the French not only plied his troops with musketry at a great advantage, but rolled huge stones down the steep.

These works were extensive, well lined with men and strengthened by a large redoubt on the right; but the defenders soon faltered, for their left flank was turned by Kempt, and the effects of lord Wellington's skilful combinations were now felt in another quarter. Freyre's Spaniards, after carrying the Mandale mountain, between Biriato and the Bayonnette, had pushed to a road leading from the latter by Jollimont to St. Jean de Luz, and this was the line of retreat from the crest of the Bayonnette for Taupin's right wing; but Freyre's Spaniards got there first, and if Longa's brigade instead of slowly following Colborne had spread out widely on the left, a military line would have been completed from Giron to Freyre. Still Taupin's right was cut off on that side, and he was forced to file it under fire along the crest of the Bayonnette to reach the Puerto de Vera road, where he was joined by his centre. He effected this, but lost his mountain battery and three hundred men. These last, apparently the garrison of the large fort on the extreme right of the Bayonnette crest, were captured by Colborne in a remarkable manner. Accompanied by only one of his staff and half a dozen riflemen, he crossed their march unexpectedly, and with great presence of mind and intrepidity ordered them to lay down their arms, an order which they, thinking themselves entirely cut off, obeyed. Meanwhile the French skirmishers in the deep ravine, between the two lines of attack, being feebly pushed by Longa's troops, retreated too slowly, and getting among some rocks from whence there was no escape surrendered to Kempt's brigade.

The right and centre of Taupin's division being now completely beaten fled down the side of the mountain towards Olette; they were pursued by a part of the allies until they rallied upon Villatte's reserve, which was in order of battle on a ridge extending across the gorge of Olette between Urogne and Ascain. The Bayonnette and Commissari, with the Puerto de Vera, were thus won after five hours' incessant fighting and toiling up their craggy sides. Nevertheless the battle was still maintained by the French troops on the Rhune.

Giron, after driving Conroux's advanced post from the gorge leading from Vera to Sarre, had following his orders pushed a battalion from that side towards the head of the great Rhune, and placed a reserve in the gorge to cover his rear from any counter-attack which Conroux might make. And when his left wing was rendered free to move by the capture of "the Boar's Back," he fought his way up abreast with the British line until near the saddle-ridge, a little to his own right of the Puerto. There however he was arrested by a strong line of abatis, from behind which two French regiments poured a heavy fire. The Spaniards stopped, and though the adventurer Downie, now a Spanish general, encouraged them with his voice and they kept their ranks, they seemed irresolute and did not advance. There happened to be present an officer of the forty-third regiment, named

Havelock, who being attached to general Alten's staff, was sent to ascertain Giron's progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He took off his hat, he called upon the Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his horse, at one bound cleared the abatis and went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for "*El chico blanco*," "the fair boy," so they called him, for he was very young and had light hair, with one shock broke through the French, and this at the very moment when their centre was flying under the fire of Kempt's skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera.

The two regiments thus defeated by the Spaniards retired by their left along the saddle-ridge to the flanks of the Rhune, so that Clauzel had now eight regiments concentrated on this great mountain. Two occupied the crest including the highest rock called "the Hermitage;" four were on the flanks, descending towards Ascain on one hand, and towards Sarre on the other; the remaining two occupied a lower and parallel crest behind called "the small Rhune." In this situation they were attacked at four o'clock by Giron's right wing. The Spaniards first dislodged a small body from a detached pile of crags about musket-shot below the summit, and then assailed the bald staring rocks of the Hermitage itself, endeavouring at the same time to turn it by their right. In both objects they were defeated with loss. The Hermitage was impregnable, the French rolling down stones large enough to sweep away a whole column at once, and the Spaniards resorted to a distant musketry which lasted until night. This day's fighting cost Taupin's division two generals and four hundred men killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners. The loss of the allies was nearly a thousand, of which about five hundred were Spaniards, and the success was not complete, for while the French kept possession of the summit of the Rhune, the allies' new position was insecure.

The front and the right flank of that great mountain were impregnable; but lord Wellington observing that the left flank, descending towards Sarre, was less inaccessible, concentrated the Spaniards on that side on the 8th, designing a combined attack against the mountain itself, and against the camp of Sarre. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the rocks which studded the lower part of the Rhune slope were assailed by the Spaniards, and at the same time detachments of the seventh division descended from the Puerto de Echallar upon the fort of St. Barbe, and other outworks covering the advanced French camp of Sarre. The Andalusians soon won the rocks and an intrenched height that commanded the camp, for Clauzel, too easily alarmed at some slight demonstrations made by the sixth division towards the bridge of Amotz in rear of his left, thought he should be cut off from his great camp, and very suddenly abandoned not only the slope of the mountain, but all his advanced works in the basin below, including the fort of St. Barbe. His troops were thus concentrated on the height behind Sarre, still holding with their right the smaller Rhune; but the consequences of his error were soon made apparent. Wellington immediately established a strong body of the Spanish troops close up to the rocks of the Hermitage, and the two French regiments there, seeing the lower slopes and the fort of St. Barbe given up, imagined they also would be cut off, and without orders abandoned the impregnable rocks of the Hermitage and retired in the night to the smaller Rhune. The next morning some of the seventh division rashly pushed into the village of Sarre, but they were quickly repulsed, and would have lost the

camp and works taken the day before if the Spaniards had not succoured them.

The whole loss on the three days of fighting was about fourteen hundred French and sixteen hundred of the allies, one half being Spaniards, but many of the wounded were not brought in until the third day after the actions, and several perished miserably where they fell, it being impossible to discover them in those vast solitudes. Some men were also lost from want of discipline; having descended into the French villages, they got drunk, and were taken the next day by the enemy. Nor was the number small of those who plundered in defiance of lord Wellington's proclamation; for he thought it necessary to arrest and send to England several officers, and renewed his proclamation, observing that if he had five times as many men he could not venture to invade France unless marauding was prevented. It is remarkable that the French troops on the same day acted towards their own countrymen in the same manner; but Soult also checked the mischief with a vigorous hand, causing a captain of some reputation to be shot as an example, for having suffered his men to plunder a house in Sarre during the action.

With exception of the slight checks sustained at Sarre and Ainhua, the course of these operations had been eminently successful, and surely the bravery of troops who assailed and carried such stupendous positions must be admired. To them the unfinished state of the French works was not visible. Day after day, for more than a month, intrenchment had risen over intrenchment, covering the vast slopes of mountains which were scarcely accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. This they could see, yet cared neither for the growing strength of the works, the height of the mountains, nor the breadth of the river with its heavy sands, and its mighty rushing tide; all were despised, and while they marched with this confident valour, it was observed that the French fought in defence of their dizzy steepes with far less fierceness than when, striving against insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Saureren. Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the feebleness of the defence on this occasion may be traced to another cause. It was a general's, not a soldier's battle. Wellington had with overmastering combinations overwhelmed each point of attack. Taupin's and Maucune's divisions were each less than five thousand strong, and they were separately assailed, the first by eighteen, the second by fifteen thousand men, and at neither point were Reille and Clauzel able to bring their reserves into action before the positions were won.

Soult complained that he had repeatedly told his lieutenants an attack was to be expected, and recommended extreme vigilance; yet they were quite unprepared, although they heard the noise of the guns and pontoons about Irun on the night of the 5th, and again on the night of the sixth. The passage of the river, he said, had commenced at seven o'clock, long after daylight, the allies' masses were then clearly to be seen forming on the banks, and there was full time for Boyer's division to arrive before the Croix des Bouquets was lost. The battle was fought in disorder with less than five thousand men, instead of with ten thousand in good order, and supported by a part of Villatte's reserve. To this negligence the generals added also discouragement. They had so little confidence in the strength of their positions, that if the allies had pushed vigorously forward before the marshal's arrival from Epelette, they would have entered St. Jean de Luz, turned the right of

the second position, and forced the French army back upon the Nive and the Adour.

This reasoning of Soult was correct, but such a stroke did not belong to lord Wellington's system. He could not go beyond the Adour, he doubted whether he could even maintain his army during the winter in the position he had already gained, and he was averse to the experiment while Pampeluna held out, and the war in Germany bore an undecided aspect.

CHAPTER V.

Soult retakes the redoubt of Sarre—Wellington organizes the army in three great divisions under sir Rowland Hill, marshal Beresford, and sir John Hope—Disinterested conduct of the last-named officer—Soult's immense intrenchments described—His correspondence with Suchet—Proposes to retake the offensive and unite their armies in Aragon—Suchet will not accede to his views, and makes inaccurate statements—Lord Wellington, hearing of advantages gained by the allied sovereigns in Germany, resolves to invade France—Blockade and fall of Pampeluna—Lord Wellington organizes a brigade under lord Aylmer to besiege Santona, but afterwards changes his design.

SOULT was apprehensive for some days that lord Wellington would push his offensive operations further; but when he knew by Foy's reports, and by the numbers of the allies assembled on his right, that there was no design of attacking his left, he resumed his labours to advance the works covering St. Jean de Luz. He also kept a vigilant watch from his centre, holding his divisions in readiness to concentrate towards Sarre, and when he saw the heavy masses in his front disperse by degrees into different camps, he directed Clauzel to recover the fort of St. Barbe. This work was constructed on a comparatively low ridge barring issue from the gorge leading out of the vale of Vera to Sarre, and it defended the narrow ground between the Rhunes and the Nivelle river. Abandoned on the 8th without reason by the French, since it did not naturally belong to the position of the allies, it was now occupied by a Spanish piquet of forty men. Some battalions were also encamped in a small wood close behind: but many officers and men slept in the fort, and on the night of the 12th, about eleven o'clock, three battalions of Conroux's division reached the platform on which the fort stood without being perceived. The work was then escalated, the troops behind it went off in confusion at the first alarm, and two hundred soldiers with fifteen officers were made prisoners. The Spaniards, ashamed of the surprise, made a vigorous effort to recover the fort at daylight; they were repulsed, and repeated the attempt with five battalions, but Clauzel brought up two guns, and a sharp skirmish took place in the wood which lasted for several hours, the French endeavouring to regain the whole of their old intrenchments, and the Spaniards to recover the fort. Neither succeeded, and St. Barbe, too near the enemy's position to be safely held, was resigned, with a loss of two hundred men by the French and five hundred by the Spaniards. Soon after this isolated action a French sloop, freighted with stores for Santona, attempted to run from St. Jean de Luz, and being chased by three English brigs and cut off from the open sea, her crew, after exchanging a few distant shots with one of the brigs, set her on fire and escaped in their boats to the Adour.

Head-quarters were now fixed in Vera, and the allied army was organized in three grand divisions. The right, having Mina's and Morillo's battalions attached to it, was commanded by sir Rowland Hill, and extended from Roncevalles to the Bastan.

The centre, occupying Maya, the Echallar, Rhune and Bayonette mountains, was given to marshal Beresford. The left, extending from the Mandale mountain to the sea, was under sir John Hope. This officer succeeded Graham, who had returned to England. Commanding in chief at Coruña after sir John Moore's death, he was superior in rank to lord Wellington during the early part of the Peninsular war; but when the latter obtained the baton of field-marshal at Vittoria, Hope with a patriotism and modesty worthy of the pupil of Abercrombie, the friend and comrade of Moore, offered to serve as second in command, and lord Wellington joyfully accepted him, observing that he was the "ablest officer in the army."

The positions of the right and centre were offensive and menacing, but the left was still on the defensive, and the Bidassoa, impassable at high water below the bridge, was close behind. However the ridges were strong, a powerful artillery was established on the right bank, field-works were constructed, and although the fords below Behobia furnished but a dangerous retreat even at low water, those above were always available, and a pontoon bridge laid down for the passage of the guns during the action was a sure resource. The front was along the heights of the Croix des Bouquets facing Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes, and there was a reserve in an intrenched camp above Andaie. The right of the line rested on the Mandale, and from that mountain and the Bayonnette the allies could descend upon the flank of an attacking army.

Soult had however no intention of renewing the offensive. He had now lost many thousand men in battle, and the old soldiers remaining did not exceed seventy-nine thousand present under arms, including officers and artillery-men. Of this number the garrisons absorbed about thirteen thousand, leaving sixty-six thousand in the field; whereas the allies, counting Mina's and Del Parque's troops, now at Tudela, Pampeluna and the Val de Irati, exceeded one hundred thousand, seventy-three thousand, including officers, sergeants and artillery-men, being British and Portuguese. And this was below the calculation of the French general; for deceived by the exaggerated reports which the Spaniards always made of their forces, he thought Del Parque had brought up twenty thousand men, and that there were one hundred and forty thousand combatants in his front. But it was not so, and as conscripts of a good description were now joining the French army rapidly, and the national guards of the Pyrenees were many, it was in the number of soldiers, rather than of men, that the English general had the advantage.

In this state of affairs Soult's policy was to maintain a strict defensive, under cover of which the spirit of the troops might be revived, the country in the rear organized, and the conscripts disciplined and hardened to war. The loss of the lower Bidassoa was in a political view mischievous to him, it had an injurious effect upon the spirit of the frontier departments, and gave encouragement to the secret partisans of the Bourbons; but in a military view it was a relief. The great development of the mountains bordering the Bidassoa had rendered their defence difficult; while holding them he had continual fear that his line would be pierced and his army suddenly driven beyond the Adour. His position was now more concentrated.

The right under Reille formed two lines. One across the royal road on the fortified heights of Urogne and the camp of the Sans Culottes; the other in the intrenched camps of Bourdegain and Belchena,

covering St. Jean de Luz and barring the gorges of Olette and Jollimont.

The centre under Clauzel was posted on the ridges between Ascain and Amotz holding the smaller Rhune in advance; but one division was retained by Soult in the camp of Serres, on the right of the Nivelle, overhanging Ascain. To replace it, one of D'Erlon's divisions crossed to the left of the Nivelle and reinforced Clauzel's left flank above Sarre.

Villatte's reserve was about St. Jean de Luz, but having the Italian brigade in the camp of Serres.

D'Erlon's remaining divisions continued in their old position, the right connected with Clauzel's line by the bridge of Amotz; the left, holding the Choupera and Mondarain mountains, bordered on the Nive.

Behind Clauzel and D'Erlon Soult had commenced a second chain of intrenched camps, prolonged from the camp of Serres up the right bank of the Nivelle to St. Pé, thence by Suraide to the double bridge-head of Cambo on the Nive, and beyond that river to the Ursouia mountain, covering the great road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port. He had also called general Paris up from Oloron to the defence of the latter fortress and its intrenched camp, and now drew Foy down the Nive to Bidaray, half way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo. There watching the issues from the Val de Baigorri he was ready to occupy the Ursouia mountain on the right of the Nive, or, moving by Cambo, to reinforce the great position on the left of that river, according to circumstances.

To complete these immense intrenchments, which between the Nive and the sea were double and on an opening of sixteen miles, the whole army laboured incessantly and all the resources of the country whether of materials or working men were called out by requisition. Nevertheless this defensive warfare was justly regarded by the duke of Dalmatia as unsuitable to the general state of affairs. Offensive operations were most consonant to the character of the French soldiers and to the exigencies of the time. Recent experience had shown the impregnable nature of the allies' positions against a front attack, and he was too weak singly to change the theatre of operations. But when he looked at the strength of the armies appropriated by the emperor to the Spanish contest, he thought France would be ill-served if her generals could not resume the offensive successfully. Suchet had just proved his power at Ordal against lord William Bentinck, and that nobleman's successor, with inferior rank and power, with an army unpaid and feeding on salt meat from the ships, with jealous and disputing colleagues amongst the Spanish generals, none of whom were willing to act cordially with him upon a fixed and well considered plan, was in no condition to menace the French seriously. And that he was permitted at this important crisis to paralyze from fifty to sixty thousand excellent French troops, possessing all the strong places of the country, was one of the most singular errors of the war.

Exclusive of national guards and detachments of the line, disposed along the whole frontier to guard the passes of the Pyrenees against sudden marauding excursions, the French armies counted at this time about one hundred and seventy thousand men and seventeen thousand horses. Of these one hundred and thirty-eight thousand were present under arms, and thirty thousand conscripts were in march to join them. They held all the fortresses of Valencia and Catalonia, and most of those in Aragon, Navarre and Guipuscoa, and they could unite behind the Pyrenees for a combined effort in safety. Lord

Wellington could not, including the Anglo-Sicilians and all the Spaniards in arms on the eastern coast, bring into line one hundred and fifty thousand men; he had several sieges on his hands, and to unite his forces at any point required great dispositions to avoid an attack during a flank march. Suchet had above thirty thousand disposable men, he could increase them to forty thousand by relinquishing some important posts, his means in artillery were immense, and distributed in all his strong places, so that he could furnish himself from almost any point. It is no exaggeration therefore to say that two hundred pieces of artillery and ninety thousand old soldiers might have united at this period upon the flank of lord Wellington, still leaving thirty thousand conscripts and the national guards of the frontier, supported by the fortresses and intrenched camps of Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, the castle of Navarreins and Jaca on one side, and the numerous garrisons of the fortresses in Catalonia on the other, to cover France from invasion.

To make this great power bear in a right direction was the duke of Dalmatia's object, and his plans were large and worthy of his reputation. Yet he could never persuade Suchet to adopt his projects, and that marshal's resistance would appear to have sprung from personal dislike contracted during Soult's sojourn near Valencia in 1812. It has been already shown how lightly he abandoned Aragon and confined himself to Catalonia after quitting Valencia. He did not, indeed, then know that Soult had assumed the command of the army of Spain, and was preparing for his great effort to relieve Pampeluna; but he was aware that Clauzel and Paris were on the side of Jaca, and he was too good a general not to know that operating on the allies' flank was the best mode of palliating the defeat of Vittoria. He might have saved both his garrison and castle of Zaragoza; the guns and other materials of a very large field-artillery equipment were deposited there, and from thence, by Jaca, he could have opened a sure and short communication with Soult, obtained information of that general's projects, and saved Pampeluna.

It may be asked, why the duke of Dalmatia did not endeavour to communicate with Suchet? The reason was simple. The former quitted Dresden suddenly on the 4th of July, reached Bayonne the 12th, and on the 20th his troops were in full march towards St. Jean Pied de Port, and it was during this very rapid journey that the other marshal abandoned Valencia. Soult, therefore, knew neither Suchet's plans nor the force of his army, nor his movements, nor his actual position, and there was no time to wait for accurate information. However, between the 6th and the 16th of August, that is to say, immediately after his own retreat from Sauroen, he earnestly prayed that the army of Aragon should march upon Zaragoza, open a communication by Jaca, and thus drawing off some of Wellington's forces facilitate the efforts of the army of Spain to relieve San Sebastian. In this communication he stated, that his recent operations had caused troops actually in march under general Hill towards Catalonia to be recalled. This was an error. His emissaries were deceived by the movements and counter-movements in pursuit of Clauzel immediately after the battle of Vittoria, and by the change in Wellington's plans as to the siege of Pampeluna. No troops were sent towards Catalonia; but it is remarkable that Picton, Hill, Graham, and the conde de l'Abisbal were all mentioned, in this correspondence between Soult and Suchet, as being actually in Catalonia, or on the march, the three first having been

really sounded as to taking the command in that quarter, and the last having demanded it himself.

Suchet treated Soult's proposal as chimerical. His moveable troops, he said, did not exceed eleven thousand, and a march upon Zaragoza with so few men would be to renew the disaster of Baylen, unless he could fly into France by Venasque, where he had a garrison. An extraordinary view of affairs, which he supported by statements still more extraordinary!

"General Hill had joined lord William Bentinck with twenty-four thousand men." "L'Abispal had arrived with fifteen thousand." "There were more than two hundred thousand men on the Ebro." "The Spanish insurrection was general and strongly organized." "He had recovered the garrison of Tarragona and destroyed the works, and he must revictual Barcelona, and then withdraw to the vicinity of Gerona and remain on the defensive!"

This letter was written on the 23d of August, when lord William Bentinck had just retreated from the Gaya into the mountains above Hospitalet. The imperial muster-rolls prove that the two armies of Catalonia and Aragon, both under his command, exceeded sixty-five thousand men, fifty-six thousand being present under arms. Thirty thousand were united in the field when he received Soult's letter. There was nothing to prevent him marching upon Tortosa, except lord William Bentinck's army, which had just acknowledged by a retreat its inability to cope with him; there was nothing at all to prevent him marching to Lerida. The count of l'Abispal had thrown up his command from bad health, leaving his troops under Giron on the Echalar mountains. Sir Rowland Hill was at Roncevalles, and not a man had moved from Wellington's army. Elío and Roche were near Valencia in a starving condition. The Anglo-Sicilian troops, only fourteen thousand strong, including Whittingham's division, were on the barren mountains above Hospitalet, where no Spanish army could remain; Del Parque's troops and Sarsfield's division had gone over the Ebro, and Copons' Catalans had taken refuge in the mountains of Cervera. In fine, not two hundred thousand, but less than thirty-five thousand men, half organized, ill-fed, and scattered from Vich to Vinaroz, were opposed to Suchet; and their generals had different views and different lines of operations. The Anglo-Sicilians could not abandon the coast; Copons could not abandon the mountains. Del Parque's troops soon afterwards marched to Navarre, and to use lord Wellington's phrase, there was nothing to prevent Suchet "tumbling lord William Bentinck back even to the Xucar." The true nature of the great insurrection which the French general pretended to dread shall be shown when the political condition of Spain is treated of.

Suchet's errors respecting the allies were easily detected by Soult; those touching the French in Catalonia he could not suspect, and acquiesced in the objections to his first plan: but fertile of resource, he immediately proposed another, akin to that which he had urged Joseph to adopt in 1812 after the battle of Salamanca, namely, to change the theatre of war. The fortresses in Spain would, he said, inevitably fall before the allies in succession if the French armies remained on the defensive, and the only mode of rendering offensive operations successful was a general concentration of means and unity of action. The levy of conscripts under an imperial decree, issued in August, would furnish, in conjunction with the depots of the interior, a reinforcement of forty thousand men. Ten thousand would form a sufficient corps of observation about

Gerona. The armies of Aragon and Catalonia could, he hoped, by sacrificing some posts produce twenty thousand infantry in the field. The imperial muster-rolls prove that they could have produced forty thousand, but Soult, misled by Suchet's erroneous statements, assumed only twenty thousand, and he calculated that he could himself bring thirty-five or forty thousand good infantry and all his cavalry to a given point of junction for the two bodies between Tarbes and Pau. Fifteen thousand of the remaining conscripts were also to be directed on that place, and thus seventy or seventy-five thousand infantry, all the cavalry of both armies and one hundred guns, would be suddenly assembled, to thread the narrow pass of Jaca and descend upon Aragon. Once in that kingdom they could attack the allied troops in Navarre if the latter were dispersed, and if they were united retire upon Zaragoza, there to fix a solid base and deliver a general battle upon the new line of operations. Meanwhile the fifteen thousand unappropriated conscripts might reinforce the twenty or twenty-five thousand old soldiers left to cover Bayonne.

An army so great and strongly constituted appearing in Aragon, would, Soult argued, necessarily raise the blockades of Pampeluna, Jaca, Fraga and Monzon, the two last being now menaced by the bands, and it was probable that Totosa and even Saguntum would be relieved. The great difficulty was to pass the guns by Jaca, yet he was resolved to try, even though he should convoy them upon trucks to be made in Paris and sent by post to Pau. He anticipated no serious inconvenience from the union of the troops in France, since Suchet had already declared his intention of retiring towards Gerona; and on the Bayonne side the army to be left there could dispute the intrenched line between Cambo and St. Jean de Luz. If driven from thence it could take a flanking position behind the Nive, the right resting upon the intrenched camp of Bayonne, the left upon the works at Cambo, and holding communication by the fortified mountain of Ursouia with St. Jean Pied de Port. But there could be little fear for this secondary force when the great army was once in Aragon. That which he most dreaded was delay, because a fall of snow, always to be expected after the middle of October, would entirely close the pass of Jaca.

This proposition, written the 2d of September, immediately after the battle of San Marcial, reached Suchet the 11th, and was peremptorily rejected. If he withdrew from Catalonia, discouragement, he said, would spread, desertion would commence, and France be immediately invaded by lord William Bentinck at the head of fifty thousand men. The pass of Jaca was impracticable, and the power of man could not open it for carriages under a year's labour. His wish was to act on the defensive, but if an offensive movement was absolutely necessary, he offered a counter project; that is, he would first make the English in his front re-embark at Tarragona, or he would drive them over the Ebro, and then march with one hundred guns and thirty thousand men by Lerida to the Gallego river near Zaragoza. Soult's army, coming by Jaca without guns, might there meet him, and the united forces could then do what was fitting. But to effect this he required a reinforcement of conscripts, and to have Paris's division and the artillery-men and draft horses of Soult's army sent to Catalonia; he demanded also that two thousand bullocks for the subsistence of his troops should be provided to meet him on the Gallego. Then touching upon the difficulties of the road from Sanguesa to Pampeluna, he declared, that

after forcing Wellington across the Ebro, he would return to Catalonia to revictual his fortresses and prevent an invasion of France. This plan he judged far less dangerous than Soult's, yet he enlarged upon its difficulties and its dangers if the combined movements were not exactly executed. In fine, he continued, "The French armies are entangled amongst rocks, and the emperor should direct a third army upon Spain, to act between the Pyrenees and the Ebro in the centre, while the army of Spain, sixty thousand strong, and that of Aragon, thirty thousand strong, operate on the flanks. Thus the reputation of the English army, too easily acquired at Salamanca and Vittoria, will be abated."

This illiberal remark, combined with the defects of this project, proves that the duke of Albufera was far below the duke of Dalmatia's standard both in magnanimity and in capacity. The one giving his adversary just praise, thought the force already supplied by the emperor sufficient to dispute for victory; the other with an unseemly boast, desired overwhelming numbers.

Soult's letter reached Suchet the day before the combat of Ordal, and in pursuance of his own plan he should have driven lord William Bentinck over the Ebro, as he could well have done, because the Catalan troops there separated from the Anglo-Sicilians. In his former letters he had estimated the enemies in his front at two hundred thousand fighting men, and affirmed that his own disposable force was only eleven thousand, giving that as a reason why he could not march to Aragon. Now, forgetful of his previous objections and estimates, he admitted that he had thirty thousand disposable troops, and proposed the very movement which he had rejected as madness when suggested by the duke of Dalmatia. And the futility of his arguments relative to the general discouragement, the desertion of his soldiers, and the temptation to an invasion of France if he adopted Soult's plan, is apparent; for these things could only happen on the supposition that he was retreating from weakness, a notion which would have effectually covered the real design until the great movement in advance should change the public opinion. Soult's plan was surer, better imagined, and grander than his; it was less dangerous in the event of failure, and more conformable to military principles. Suchet's project involved double lines of operation without any sure communications, and consequently without any certainty of just co-operation; his point of junction was within the enemy's power, and the principal army was to be deprived of its artillery. There was no solidity in this design; a failure would have left no resource. But in Soult's project the armies were to be united at a point beyond the enemy's reach, and to operate afterwards in mass with all arms complete, which was conformable to the principles of war. Suchet, indeed, averred the impracticability of moving the guns by Jaca, yet Soult's counter-opinion claims more respect. Clauzel and Paris, who had lately passed with troops through that defile, were in his camp, he had besides made very exact inquiries of the country people, had caused the civil engineers of roads and bridges on the frontiers to examine the route, and from their reports he judged the difficulty to be not insurmountable.

Neither the inconsistency, nor the exaggeration of Suchet's statements, escaped Soult's observation; but anxious to effect something while Pampeluna still held out, and the season permitted operations in the mountains, he frankly accepted the other's modification, and adopted every stipulation, save that of sending the artillery-men and horses of his

army to Catalonia, which he considered dangerous. Moreover he doubted not to pass his own guns by Jaca. The preparations for this great movement were, therefore, immediately commenced; and Suchet on his part seemed equally earnest, although he complained of increasing difficulties, pretended that Longa's and Morillo's divisions had arrived in Catalonia, that general Graham was also in march with troops to that quarter, and deplored the loss of Fraga, from whence the Empecinado had just driven his garrison. This post commanded indeed a bridge over the Cinca, a river lying in his way and dangerous from its sudden and great floods, but he still possessed the bridge of Monzon.

During this correspondence between the French marshals, Napoleon remained silent; yet at a later period he expressed his discontent at Suchet's inactivity, and indirectly approved of Soult's plans by recommending a movement towards Zaragoza, which Suchet however did not execute. It would appear that the emperor, having given all the reinforcements he could spare, and full powers to both marshals to act as they judged fitting for his service, would not, at a distance and while engaged in such vast operations as those he was carrying on at Dresden, decide so important a question. The vigorous execution essential to success was not to be expected if either marshal acted under constraint and against his own opinion; Soult had adopted Suchet's modification, and it would have been unwise to substitute a new plan which would have probably displeased both commanders. Meanwhile Wellington passed the Bidassoa, and Suchet's project was annulled by the approach of winter and by the further operations of the allies.

If the plan of uniting the two armies in Aragon had been happily achieved, it would certainly have forced Wellington to repossess the Ebro or fight a great battle with an army much less strongly constituted than the French army. If he chose the latter, victory would have profited him little, because his enemy, strong in cavalry, could have easily retired on the fortresses of Catalonia. If he received a check he must have gone over the Ebro, perhaps back to Portugal, and the French would have recovered Aragon, Navarre and Valencia. It is not probable, however, that such a great operation could have been conducted without being discovered in time by Wellington. It has been already indicated in this history, that besides the ordinary spies and modes of gaining intelligence employed by all generals, he had secret emissaries amongst Joseph's courtiers, and even amongst French officers of rank; and it has been shown that Soult vainly endeavoured to surprise him on the 31st of August, when the combinations were only two days old. It is true that the retreat of Suchet from Catalonia, and his junction with Soult in France at the moment when Napoleon was pressed in Germany, together with the known difficulty of passing guns by Jaca, would naturally have led to the belief that it was a movement of retreat and fear; nevertheless the secret must have been known to more than one person about each marshal, and the English general certainly had agents who were little suspected. Soult would however still have had the power of returning to his old positions, and with his numbers increased by Suchet's troops, could have repeated his former attack by the Roncesvalles. It might be that his secret design was thus to involve that marshal in his operations, and being disappointed he was not very eager to adopt the modified plan of the latter, which the approach of the bad season, and the menacing position of Wellington, rendered each day

less promising. His own project was hardy, and dangerous for the allies, and well did it prove lord Wellington's profound acquaintance with his art. For he had entered France only in compliance with the wishes of the allied sovereigns, and always watched closely for Suchet, averring that the true military line of operations was towards Aragon and Catalonia. Being now however actually established in France, and the war in Germany having taken a favourable turn for the allies, he resolved to continue the operations on his actual front, awaiting only the

FALL OF PAMPELUNA.

This event was produced by a long blockade, less fertile of incident than the siege of San Sebastian, yet very honourable to the firmness of the governor, general Cassan.

The town, containing fifteen thousand inhabitants, stood on a bold table-land on which a number of valleys opened, and where the great roads, coming from St. Jean Pied de Port, Sanguesa, Tudela, Estella, Vittoria and Yrurzun, were concentrated. The northern and eastern fronts of the fortress were covered by the Arga, and the defences there consisted of simple walls edging the perpendicular rocky bank of the river, but the other fronts were regularly fortified with ditches, covert-way and half-moons. Two bad unfinished outworks were constructed on the south front, but the citadel, which stood on the southwest, was a regular pentagon, with bomb-proofs and magazines, vaulted barracks for a thousand men, and a complete system of mines.

Pampeluna had been partially blockaded by Mina for eighteen months previous to the battle of Vittoria, and when Joseph arrived after the action the place was badly provisioned. The stragglers of his army increased the garrison to something more than three thousand five hundred men of all arms, who were immediately invested by the allies. Many of the inhabitants went off during the short interval between the king's arrival and departure, and general Cassan, finding his troops too few for action, and yet too many for the food, abandoned the two outworks on the south, demolished every thing which could interfere with his defence outside, and commenced such works as he deemed necessary to improve it inside. Moreover, foreseeing that the French army might possibly make a sudden march without guns to succour the garrison, he prepared a field train of forty pieces to meet the occasion.

It has been already shown that Wellington, although at first inclined to besiege Pampeluna, finally established a blockade, and ordered works of contravallation to be constructed. Cassan's chief object was then to obtain provisions, and on the 28th and 30th of June he sustained actions outside the place to cover his foragers. On the 1st of July he burned the suburb of Madalina, beyond the river Arga, and forced many inhabitants to quit the place before the blockaders' works were completed. Skirmishes now occurred almost daily, the French always seeking to gather the grain and vegetables which were ripe and abundant beyond the walls, and the allies endeavouring to set fire to the standing corn within range of the guns of the fortress.

On the 14th of July, O'Donel's Andalusians were permanently established as the blockading force, and the next day the garrison made a successful forage on the south side of the town. This operation was repeated towards the east beyond the Arga on the 19th, when a sharp engagement of cavalry took place, during which the remainder of the garrison carried away a great deal of corn.

The 26th, the sound of Soult's artillery reached

the place, and Cassan, judging rightly that the marshal was in march to succour Pampeluna, made a sally in the night by the Roncevalles road; he was driven back, but the next morning he came out again with eleven hundred men and two guns, overthrew the Spanish outguards, and advanced towards Villalba at the moment when Picton was falling back with the third and fourth divisions. Then O'Donel, as I have before related, evacuated some of the intrenchments, destroyed a great deal of ammunition, spiked a number of guns, and but for the timely arrival of Carlos d'Espana's division, and the stand made by Picton at Huarte, would have abandoned the blockade altogether.

Soon the battle on the mountains of Oricain commenced, the smoke rose over the intervening heights of Escava and San Miguel, the French cavalry appeared on the slopes above El Cano, and the baggage of the allies was seen filing in the opposite direction by Berioplano along the road of Yrurzun. The garrison thought deliverance sure, and having reaped a good harvest withdrew into the place. The bivouac fires of the French army cheered them during the night, and the next morning a fresh sally being made with the greatest confidence, a great deal of corn was gathered with little loss of men. Several deserters from the foreign regiments in the English service also came over with intelligence exaggerated and coloured after the manner of such men, and the French re-entered the place elated with hope; but in the evening the sound of the conflict ceased, and the silence of the next day showed that the battle was not to the advantage of Soult. However the governor, losing no time, made another sally, and again obtained provisions from the south side.

The 30th, the battle recommenced, but the retreating fire of the French told how the conflict was decided, and the spirit of the soldiers fell. Nevertheless their indefatigable officers led another sally on the south side, whence they carried off grain and some ammunition which had been left in one of the abandoned outworks.

On the 31st, Carlos d'Espana's troops and two thousand of O'Donel's Andalusians, in all about seven thousand men, resumed the blockade, and maintained it until the middle of September, when the prince of Anglona's division of Del Parque's army relieved the Andalusians, who rejoined their own corps near Echallar. The allies' works of contravallation were now augmented, and when Paris retired into France from Jaca, part of Mina's troops occupied the valleys leading from the side of Sanguesa to Pampeluna, and made intrenchments to bar the escape of the garrison that way.

In September, Cassan put his fighting men upon rations of horse-flesh, four ounces to each, with some rice, and he turned more families out of the town, but this time they were fired upon by their countrymen and forced to re-enter.

On the 9th of September, baron Maucune, who had conducted most of the sallies during the blockade, attacked and carried some fortified houses on the east side of the place; he was immediately assailed by the Spanish cavalry, but he beat them and pursued the fugitives close to Villalba. Carlos d'Espana then advanced to their aid in person with a greater body, and the French were driven in with the loss of eighty men; yet the Spaniards lost a far greater number, Carlos d'Espana himself was wounded, and the garrison obtained some corn, which was their principal object.

The soldiers were now feeding on rats and other disgusting animals; seeking also for roots beyond

the walls, many in their hunger poisoned themselves with hemlock, and a number of others unable to bear their misery deserted. In this state Cassan made a general sally on the 10th of October, to ascertain the strength of the lines around him, with a view to breaking through, but after some fighting, his troops were driven in with the loss of seventy men, and all hope of escape vanished. Yet he still spoke of attempting it, and the public manner in which he increased the mines under the citadel induced Wellington to reinforce the blockade, and to bring up his cavalry into the vicinity of Pampeluna.

The scurvy now invaded the garrison. One thousand men were sick, eight hundred had been wounded, the deaths by battle and disease exceeded four hundred, one hundred and twenty had deserted, and the governor, moved by the great misery, offered on the 26th to surrender if he was allowed to retire into France with his troops and six pieces of cannon. This being refused, he proposed to yield on condition of not serving for a year and a day, which being also denied, he broke off the negotiation, giving out that he would blow up the works of the fortress and break through the blockade. To deter him a menacing letter was thrown to his outposts: and lord Wellington, being informed of his design, denounced it as contrary to the laws of war, and directed Carlos d'España to put him, all his officers and non-commissioned officers, and a tenth of the soldiers, to death, when the place should be taken, if any damage were done to the works.

Cassan's object being merely to obtain better terms, this order remained dormant, and happily so, for the execution would never have borne the test of public opinion. To destroy the works of Pampeluna and break through the blockading force, as Brenier did at Almeida, would have been a very noble exploit, and a useful one for the French army, if Soult's plan of changing the theatre of war by descending into Aragon had been followed. There could therefore be nothing contrary to the laws of war in a resolute action of that nature. On the other hand, if the governor, having no chance whatever of success, made a hopeless attempt the pretence for destroying a great fortress belonging to the Spaniards and depriving the allies of the fruits of their long blockade and glorious battles, the conquerors might have justly exercised that severe but undoubted right of war, refusing quarter to an enemy. But lord Wellington's letter to España involved another question, namely, the putting of prisoners to death. For the soldiers could not be decimated until captured, and their crime would have been only obedience to orders in a matter of which they dared not judge. This would have been quite contrary to the usages of civilized nations, and the threat must undoubtedly be considered only as a device to save the works of Pampeluna and to avoid the odium of refusing quarter.

A few days longer the governor and garrison endured their distress, and then capitulated, having defended themselves more than four months with great constancy. The officers and soldiers became prisoners of war. The first were allowed to keep their arms and baggage, the second their knapsacks, expressly on the ground that they had treated the inhabitants well during the investment. This compliment was honourable to both sides; but there was another article, enforced by España, without being accepted by the garrison, for which it is difficult to assign any motive but the vindictive ferocity of the Spanish character. No person of either sex was permitted to follow the French troops, and

women's affections were thus barbarously brought under the action of the sword.

There was no stronghold now retained by the French in the north of Spain except Santona, and as the blockade of that place had been exceedingly tedious, lord Wellington, whose sea communications were interrupted by the privateers from thence, formed a small British corps under lord Aylmer with a view to attack Laredo, which being on the opposite point of the harbour to Santona commanded the anchorage. Accidental circumstances however prevented this body from proceeding to its destination, and Santona remained in the enemy's possession. With this exception the contest in the northern parts of Spain was terminated, and the south of France was now to be invaded; but it is fitting first to show with what great political labour Wellington brought the war to this state, what contemptible actions and sentiments, what a faithless alliance, and what vile governments his dazzling glory hid from the sight of the world.

CHAPTER VI.

Political state of Portugal—Violence, ingratitude and folly of the government of that country—Political state of Spain—Various factions described, their violence, insolence and folly—Scandalous scenes at Cadiz—Several Spanish generals desire a revolution—Lord Wellington describes the miserable state of the country—Anticipates the necessity of putting down the cortex by force—Resigns his command of the Spanish armies—The English ministers propose to remove him to Germany—The new cortex reinstate him as generalissimo on his own terms—He expresses fears that the cause will finally fail, and advises the English ministers to withdraw the British army.

POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.

In this country the national jealousy, which had been compressed by the force of invasion, expanded again with violence as danger receded, and the influence of England sunk precisely in the measure that her army assured the safety of Portugal. When Wellington crossed the Ebro, the Souza faction, always opposed in the council to the British policy, became elate; and those members of the government who had hitherto cherished the British ascendancy because it sustained them against the Brazilian court intrigues, now sought popularity by taking an opposite direction. Each person of the regency had his own line of opposition marked out. Nogueira vexatiously resisted or suspended commercial and financial operations; the principal, Souza, wrangled more fiercely and insolently at the council-board; the patriarch fomented ill-will at Lisbon and in the northern provinces; Forjas, ambitious to command the national troops, became the organ of discontent upon military matters. The return of the prince regent, the treaty of commerce, the Oporto company, the privileges of the British factory merchants, the mode of paying the subsidy, the means of military transport, the convention with Spain relative to the supply of the Portuguese troops in that country, the recruiting, the organization, the command of the national army, and the honours due to it, all furnished occasions for factious proceedings, which were conducted with the ignoble subtlety that invariably characterizes the politics of the Peninsula. Moreover the expenditure of the British army had been immense, the trade and commerce dependent upon it, now removed to the Spanish ports, enormous. Portugal had lived upon England. Her internal taxes, carelessly or partially enforced, were vexatious to the people without

being profitable to the government. Nine-tenths of the revenue accrued from duties upon British trade, and the sudden cessation of markets and of employment, the absence of ready money, the loss of profit, public and private, occasioned by the departure of the army, while the contributions and other exactions remained the same, galled all classes, and the whole nation was ready to shake off the burden of gratitude.

In this state of feeling emissaries were employed to promulgate in various directions tales, some true, some false, of the disorders perpetrated by the military detachments on the lines of communication, adding that they were the result of secret orders from Wellington to satisfy his personal hatred of Portugal! At the same time discourses and writings against the British influence abounded in Lisbon and at Rio Janeiro, and were re-echoed or surpassed by the London newspapers, whose statements, overflowing of falsehood, could be traced to the Portuguese embassy in that capital. It was asserted that England, intending to retain her power in Portugal, opposed the return of the prince regent; that the war itself being removed to the frontier of France was become wholly a Spanish cause; that it was not for Portugal to levy troops, and exhaust her resources, to help a nation whose aggressions she must be called upon sooner or later to resist.

Mr. Stuart's diplomatic intercourse with the government, always difficult, was now a continual remonstrance and dispute; his complaints were met with insolence or subterfuge, and illegal violence against the persons and property of British subjects was pushed so far, that Mr. Sloane, an English gentleman upon whom no suspicion rested, was cast into prison for three months because he had come to Lisbon without a passport. The rights of the English factory were invaded, and the Oporto company, which had been established as its rival in violation of treaty, was openly cherished. Irresponsible and rapacious, this pernicious company robbed every body; and the prince regent, promising either to reform or totally abolish it, ordered a preparatory investigation, but to use the words of Mr. Stuart, the regency acted on the occasion no less unfairly by their sovereign than unjustly by their ally.

Especial privileges claimed by the factory merchants were another cause of disquiet. They pretended to exemption from certain taxes, and from billets, and that a fixed number of their clerks, domestics and cattle should be exonerated of military service. These pretensions were disputed. The one touching servants and cattle, doubtful at best, had been grossly abused, and that relating to billets unfounded; but the taxes were justly resisted, and the merchants offered a voluntary contribution to the same amount. The government rudely refused this offer, seized their property, imprisoned their persons, impressed their cattle to transport supplies that never reached the troops, and made soldiers of their clerks and servants without any intention of reinforcing the army. Mr. Stuart immediately deducted from the subsidy the amount of the property thus forcibly taken, and repaid the sufferers. The regency then commenced a dispute upon the fourth article of the treaty of commerce; and the prince, though he openly ordered it to be executed, secretly permitted count Funchal, his prime minister, to remain in London as ambassador until the disputes arising upon this treaty generally were arranged. Funchal, who disliked to quit London, took care to interpose many obstacles to a final decision, always

advising delay under pretence of rendering ultimate concession of value in other negotiations then depending.

When the battle of Vittoria became known, the regency proposed to entreat the return of the prince from the Brazils, hoping thereby to excite the opposition of Mr. Stuart; but when he, contrary to their expectations, approved of the proposal, they deferred the execution. The British cabinet, which had long neglected Wellington's suggestions on this head, then pressed the matter at Rio Janeiro; and Funchal, who had been at first averse, now urged it warmly, fearing that if the prince remained he could no longer defer going to the Brazils. However few of the Portuguese nobles desired the return of the royal family, and when the thing was proposed to the regent he discovered no inclination for the voyage.

But the most important subject of discord was the army. The absence of the sovereign and the intrigues which ruled the court of Rio Janeiro had virtually rendered the government at Lisbon an oligarchy without a leader, in other words, a government formed for mischief. The whole course of this history has shown that all Wellington's energy and ability, aided by the sagacity and firmness of Mr. Stuart and by the influence of England's power and riches, were scarcely sufficient to meet the evils flowing from this foul source. Even while the French armies were menacing the capital, the regency was split into factions, the financial resources were neglected or wasted, the public servants were insolent, incapable and corrupt, the poorer people oppressed, and the military force for want of sustenance was at the end of 1812 on the point of dissolving altogether. The strenuous interference of the English general and envoy, seconded by the extraordinary exertions of the British officers in the Portuguese service, restored indeed the efficiency of the army, and in the campaign of 1813 the spirit of the troops was surpassing. Even the militia-men, who had been deprived of their colours and drafted into the line to punish their conduct at Guarda under general Trant in 1812, nobly regained their standards on the Pyrenees.

But this state of affairs, acting upon the naturally sanguine temperament and vanity of the Portuguese, created a very exaggerated notion of their military prowess and importance, and withal a morbid sensitiveness to praise or neglect. General Picton had thrown some slur upon the conduct of a regiment at Vittoria, and marshal Beresford complained that full justice had not been done to their merits. The eulogiums passed in the English parliament and in the despatches upon the conduct of the British and Spanish troops, but not extended to the Portuguese, galled the whole nation, and the remarks and omissions of the London newspapers were as worm-wood.

Meanwhile the regency, under pretext of a dispute with Spain relative to a breach of the military convention of supply, neglected the subsistence of the army altogether; and at the same time so many obstacles to the recruiting were raised, that the depots, which ought to have furnished twelve thousand men to replace the losses sustained in the campaign, only contained four thousand, who were also without the means of taking the field. This matter became so serious that Beresford, quitting the army in October, came to Lisbon, to propose a new regulation which should disregard the exemptions claimed by the nobles, the clergy and the English merchants for their servants and followers. On his arrival Forjas urged the public discontent at the political

position of the Portuguese troops. They were, he said, generally incorporated with the British divisions, commanded by British officers, and having no distinct recognized existence their services were unnoticed and the glory of the country suffered. The world at large knew not how many men Portugal furnished for the war. It was known indeed that there were Portuguese soldiers, as it was known that there were Brunswickers and Hanoverians, but as a national army nothing was known of them; their exertions, their courage, only went to swell the general triumph of England, while the Spaniards, inferior in numbers, and far inferior in all military qualities, were flattered, praised, thanked in the public despatches, in the English newspapers, and in the discourses and votes of the British parliament. He proposed therefore to have the Portuguese formed into a distinct army acting under lord Wellington.

It was objected that the brigades incorporated with the British divisions were fed by the British commissariat, the cost being deducted from the subsidy, an advantage the loss of which the Portuguese could not sustain. Forjas rejoined that they could feed their own troops cheaper if the subsidy was paid in money; but Beresford referred him to his scanty means of transport, so scanty that the few stores they were then bound to furnish for the unattached brigades depending upon the Portuguese commissariat were not forwarded. Foiled on this point, Forjas proposed gradually to withdraw the best brigades from the English divisions, to incorporate them with the unattached brigades of native troops, and so form an auxiliary corps; but the same objection of transport still applied, and this matter dropped for the moment. The regency then agreed to reduce the legal age of men liable to the conscription for the army; but the islands, which ought to have given three hundred men yearly, were exempt from their controul, and the governors, supported by the prince regent, refused to permit any levies in their jurisdictions, and even granted asylums to all those who wished to avoid the levy in Portugal. In the islands also the persons so unjustly and cruelly imprisoned in 1810 were still kept in durance, although the regency, yielding to the persevering remonstrances of Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington, had released those at Lisbon.

Soon after this Beresford desired to go to England, and the occasion was seized by Forjas to renew his complaints and his proposition for a separate army, which he designed to command himself. General Sylveira's claim to that honour was however supported by the Souzas, to whose faction he belonged, and the only matter in which all agreed was the display of ill-will towards England. Lord Wellington became indignant. The English newspapers, he said, did much mischief by their assertions, but he never suspected they could by their omissions alienate the Portuguese nation and government. The latter complained that their troops were not praised in parliament, nothing could be more different from a debate within the house than the representation of it in the newspapers. The latter seldom stated an event or transaction as it really occurred, unless when they absolutely copied what was written for them; and even then their observations branched out so far from the text, that they appeared absolutely incapable of understanding, much less of stating the truth upon any subject. The Portuguese people should therefore be cautious of taking English newspapers as a test of the estimation in which the Portuguese army was held in England, where its character stood high and was rising daily. "Mr. Forjas is," said

lord Wellington, "the ablest man of business I have met with in the Peninsula; it is to be hoped he will not on such grounds have the folly to alter a successful military system. I understand something of the organization and feeding of troops, and I assure him that, separated from the British, the Portuguese army could not keep the field in a good state, although their government were to incur ten times the expense under the actual system; and if they are not in a fitting state for the field, they can gain no honour, they must suffer dishonour! The vexatious disputes with Spain are increasing daily, and if the omissions or assertions of newspapers are to be the causes of disagreement with the Portuguese I will quit the Peninsula for ever!"

This remonstrance being read to the regency, Forjas replied officially:

"The Portuguese government demanded nothing unreasonable. The happy campaign of 1813 was not to make it heedless of sacrifices beyond its means. It had a right to expect greater exertions from Spain, which was more interested than Portugal in the actual operations, since the safety of the latter was obtained. Portugal only wanted a solid peace; she did not expect increase of territory, nor any advantage save the consideration and influence which the services and gallantry of her troops would give her amongst European nations, and which, unhappily, she would probably require in her future intercourse with Spain. The English prince regent, his ministers and his generals, had rendered full justice to her military services in the official reports, but that did not suffice to give them weight in Europe. Official reports did not remove this inconvenience. It was only the public expressions of the English prince and his ministers that could do justice. The Portuguese army was commanded by marshal Beresford, marquis of Campo Mayor. It ought always to be so considered and thanked accordingly for its exploits, and with as much form and solemnity by the English parliament and general as was used towards the Spanish army. The more so that the Portuguese had sacrificed their national pride to the common good, whereas the Spanish pride had retarded the success of the cause and the liberty of Europe. It was necessary also to form good native generals to be of use after the war; but putting that question aside, it was only demanded to have the divisions separated by degrees and given to Portuguese officers. Nevertheless such grave objections being advanced, they were willing, he said, to drop the matter altogether."

The discontent however remained, for the argument had weight, and if any native officer's reputation had been sufficient to make the proceeding plausible, the British officers would have been driven from the Portuguese service, the armies separated, and both ruined. As it was, the regency terminated the discussion from inability to succeed; from fear, not from reason. The persons who pretended to the command were Forjas and Sylveira; but the English officers, who were as yet well liked by the troops, would not have served under the former; and Wellington objected strongly to the latter, having by experience discovered that he was an incapable officer, seeking a base and pernicious popularity by encouraging the views of the soldiers. Beresford then relinquished his intention of going to England, and the justice of the complaint relative to the reputation of the Portuguese army being obvious, the general orders became more marked in favour of the troops. But the most effectual check to the project of the regency was the significant intimation of Mr. Stuart, that England being bound by no conditions

in the payment of the subsidy, had a right, if it was not applied in the manner most agreeable to her, to withdraw it altogether.

To have this subsidy in specie and to supply their own troops continued to be the cry of the regency, until their inability to effect the latter became at last so apparent that they gave the matter up in despair. Indeed Forjas was too able a man ever to have supposed that the badly organized administration of Portugal was capable of supporting an efficient army in the field five hundred miles from its own country; the real object was to shake off the British influence if possible without losing the subsidy. For the honour of the army or the welfare of the soldiers neither the regency nor the prince himself had any care. While the former were thus disputing for the command, they suffered their subordinates to ruin an establishment at Ruña, the only asylum in Portugal for mutilated soldiers, and turned the helpless veterans adrift. And the prince, while he lavished honours upon the dependents and creatures of his court at Rio Janeiro, placed those officers whose fidelity and hard fighting had preserved his throne in Portugal at the bottom of the list, amongst the menial servants of the palace who were decorated with the same ribands! Honour, justice, humanity, were alike despised by the ruling men, and lord Wellington thus expressed his strong disgust:

"The British army which I have the honour to command has met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services; every thing that could be done has been done by the civil authorities lately to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope however that we have seen the last of Portugal!"

Such were the relations of the Portuguese government with England, and with Spain they were not more friendly. Seven envoys from that country had succeeded each other at Lisbon in three years. The Portuguese regency dreaded the democratic opinions which had obtained ground in Spain, and the leading party in the cortez were intent to spread those opinions over the whole Peninsula. The only bond of sympathy between the two governments was hatred of the English, who had saved both. On all other points they differed. The exiled bishop of Orense, from his asylum on the frontier of Portugal, excited the Gallicians against the cortez so vigorously, that his expulsion from Portugal, or at least his removal from the northern frontier, was specially demanded by the Spanish minister; but though a long and angry discussion followed, the bishop was only civilly requested by the Portuguese government to abstain from acts disagreeable to the Spanish regency. The latter then demanded that he should be delivered up as a delinquent, whereupon the Portuguese quoted a decree of the cortez which deprived the bishop of his rights as a Spanish citizen and denaturalized him. However he was removed twenty leagues from the frontier. Nor was the Portuguese government itself quite free from ecclesiastic troubles. The bishop of Braganza preached doctrines which were offensive to the patriarch and the government; he was confined, but soon released, and an ecclesiastical sentence pronounced against him, which only increased his followers and extended the influence of his doctrines.

Another cause of uneasiness, at a later period, was the return of Ballesteros from his exile at Ceuta. He had been permitted towards the end of 1813, and as lord Wellington thought with no good intent, to reside at Frejenal. The Portuguese regency, fearing that he would rally round him other discon-

tented persons, set agents to watch his proceedings, and under pretence of putting down robbers who abounded on that frontier, established a line of cavalry and called out the militia, thus making it manifest that but a little was wanting to kindle a war between the two countries.

POLITICAL STATE OF SPAIN.

Lord Wellington's victories had put an end to the intercourse between Joseph and the Spaniards who desired to make terms with the French; but those people, not losing hope, formed a strong anti-English party, and watched to profit by the disputes between the two great factions at Cadiz, which had now become most rancorous and dangerous to the common cause. The serviles, extremely bigoted both in religion and politics, had the whole body of the clergy on their side. They were the most numerous in the cortez, and their views were generally in accord with the feelings of the people beyond the Isla de Leon, although their doctrines were comprised in two sentences,—*An absolute king*,—*An intolerant church*. The liberals, supported and instigated by all ardent innovators, by the commercial body and populace of Cadiz, had also partisans beyond the Isla; and taking as guides the revolutionary writings of the French philosophers, were hastening onwards to a democracy, without regard to ancient usages or feelings, and without practical ability to carry their theories into execution. There was also a fourth faction in the cortez, formed by the American deputies, who were secretly labouring for the independence of the colonies; they sometimes joined the liberals, sometimes the serviles, as it suited their purposes, and thus often produced anomalous results, because they were numerous enough to turn the scale in favour of the side which they espoused. Jealousy of England was however common to all, and "*Inglesismo*" was used as a term of contempt. Posterity will scarcely believe, that when lord Wellington was commencing the campaign of 1813, the cortez was with difficulty, and by threats rather than reason, prevented from passing a law forbidding foreign troops to enter a Spanish fortress. Alicante, Tarifa, Cadiz itself where they held their sittings, had been preserved; Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, had been retaken for them by British valour; English money had restored their broken walls and replenished their exhausted magazines; English and Portuguese blood still smoked from their ramparts; but the men from whose veins that blood had flowed were to be denied entrance at gates which they could not approach without treading on the bones of slaughtered comrades who had sacrificed their lives to procure for this sordid ungrateful assembly the power to offer the insult.

The subjection of the bishops and other clergy, who had in Galicia openly opposed the abolition of the inquisition and excited the people to resistance, was an object of prominent interest with an active section of the liberals called the "*Jacobins*." And this section generally ruled the cortez, because the Americans leaned strongly towards their doctrines, and the interest of the anti-English or French party was to produce dissensions, which could be best effected by supporting the most violent public men. A fierce and obstinate faction they were, and they compelled the churchmen to submit for the time, but not until the dispute became so serious that lord Wellington when in the Pyrenees expected a civil war on his communications, and thought the clergy and the peasantry would take part with the French. This notion, which gives his measure for the patriotism of both parties, proved however unfounded;

his extreme discontent at the progress of liberal doctrines had somewhat warped his judgment; the people were less attached to the church than he imagined; the clergy of Galicia, meeting with no solid support, submitted to the cortez, and the archbishop of Santiago fled to Portugal.

Deep unmitigated hatred of democracy was indeed the moving spring of the English Tories' policy. Napoleon was warred against, not as they pretended because he was a tyrant and usurper, for he was neither; not because his invasion of Spain was unjust, but because he was the powerful and successful enemy of aristocratic privileges. The happiness and independence of the Peninsula were words without meaning in their state papers and speeches, and their anger and mortification were extreme when they found success against the emperor had fostered that democracy it was their object to destroy. They were indeed only prevented by the superior prudence and sagacity of their general from interfering with the internal government of Spain in so arrogant and injudicious a manner, that an open rupture, wherein the Spaniards would have had all appearance of justice, must have ensued. This folly was however stifled by Wellington, who desired to wait until the blow could be given with some effect, and he was quite willing to deal it himself; yet the conduct of the cortez, and that of the executive government which acted under its control, was so injurious to Spain and to his military operations, and so unjust to him personally, that the warmest friends of freedom cannot blame his enmity. Rather should his moderation be admired, when we find his aristocratic hatred of the Spanish constitution exacerbated by a state of affairs thus described by Vegas, a considerable member of the cortez and perfectly acquainted with the subject.

Speaking of the "*Afrancesados*," or French party, more numerous than was supposed, and active to increase their numbers, he says, "The thing which they most enforced, and which made most progress, was the diminution of the English influence. Amongst the serviles they gained proselytes by objecting to the English religion and constitution, which restricted the power of the sovereign. With the liberals they said the same constitution gave the sovereign too much power; and the Spanish constitution, having brought the king's authority under that of the cortez, was an object of jealousy to the English cabinet and aristocracy, who, fearing the example would encourage the reformers of England, were resolved that the Spanish constitution should not stand. To the Americans they observed that lord Wellington opposed them, because he did not help them, and permitted expeditions to be sent from Spain; but to the Europeans who wished to retain the colonies and exclude foreign trade, they represented the English as fomenters and sustainers of the colonial rebellion, because they did not join their forces with Spain to put it down. To the honest patriots of all parties they said that every concession to the English general was an offence against the dignity and independence of the nation. If he was active in the field, he was intent to subjugate Spain rather than defeat the enemy; if he was careful in preparation, his delay was to enable the French to conquer; if he was vigorous in urging the government to useful measures, his design was to impose his own laws; if he neglected the Spanish armies, he desired they should be beaten; if he meddled with them usefully, it was to gain the soldiers, turn the army against the country, and thus render Spain dependent on England." And these perfidious insinuations were effectual, because they flattered

the national pride, as proving that the Spaniards could do every thing for themselves without the aid of foreigners. "Finally, that nothing could stop the spread of such dangerous doctrines but new victories, which would bring the simple honesty and gratitude of the people at large into activity." Those victories came, and did indeed stifle the French party in Spain, but many of their arguments were too well founded to be stifled with their party.

The change of government, which had place in the beginning of the year, gave hope that the democratic violence of the cortez would decline under the control of the cardinal Bourbon; but that prince, who was not of the true royal blood in the estimation of the Spaniards, because his father had married without the consent of the king, was from age, and infirmity, and ignorance, a nullity. The new regency became therefore more the slaves of the cortez than their predecessors; and the Cadiz editors of newspapers, pre-eminent in falsehood and wickedness even amongst their unprincipled European brotherhood, being the champions of the Jacobins, directed the populace of that city as they pleased. And always the serviles yielded under the dread of personal violence. Their own crimes had become their punishment. They had taught the people at the commencement of the contest that murder was patriotism, and now their spirit sunk and quailed, because at every step, to use the terribly significant expression of Wellington, "*The ghost of Solano was staring them in the face.*"

The principal points of the Jacobins' policy in support of their crude constitution, which they considered as perfect as an emanation from the Deity, were,—1st. The abolition of the inquisition, the arrest and punishment of the Gallician bishops, and the consequent warfare with the clergy. 2nd. The putting aside the claim of Carlotta to the regency. 3rd. The appointment of captain-generals and other officers to suit their factious purposes. 4th. The obtaining the money for their necessities, without including therein the nourishment of the armies. 5th. The control of the elections for the new cortez so as to procure an assembly of their own way of thinking, or to prevent its assembling at the legal period in October.

The matter of the bishops, as we have seen, nearly involved them in a national war with Portugal, and a civil war with Galicia. The affair of the princess was less serious; but she had never ceased intriguing, and her pretensions, wisely opposed by the British ministers and general while the army was cooped up in Portugal, were, although she was a declared enemy to the English alliance, now rather favoured by sir Henry Wellesley as a mode of checking the spread of democracy. Lord Wellington however still held aloof, observing that if appointed according to the constitution, she would not be less a slave to the cortez than her predecessors, and England would have the discredit of giving power to "the worst woman in existence."

To remove the seat of government from the influence of the Cadiz populace was one mode of abating the power of the democratic party, and the yellow fever, coming immediately after the closing of the general cortez in September, had apparently given the executive government some freedom of action, and seemed to furnish a favourable opportunity for the English ambassador to effect its removal. The regency, dreading the epidemic, suddenly resolved to proceed to Madrid, telling sir Henry Wellesley, who joyfully hastened to offer pecuniary aid, that to avoid the sickness was their sole motive. They had secretly formed this resolution at night, and pro-

posed to commence the journey next day, but a disturbance arose in the city, and the alarmed regents convoked the extraordinary cortex; the ministers were immediately called before it, and bending in fear before their masters, declared with a scandalous disregard of truth that there was no intention to quit the Isla without consulting the cortex. Certain deputies were thereupon appointed to inquire if there was any fever, and a few cases being discovered, the deputation, apparently to shield the regents, recommended that they should remove to Port St. Mary.

This did not satisfy the assembly. The government was commanded to remain at Cadiz until the new general cortex should be installed, and a committee was appointed to probe the whole affair, or rather to pacify the populace, who were so offended with the report of the first deputation, that the speech of Arguelles on presenting it was hissed from the galleries, although he was the most popular and eloquent member of the cortex. The more moderate liberals thus discovered that they were equally with the serviles the slaves of the newspaper writers. Nevertheless the inherent excellence of freedom, though here presented in such fantastic and ignoble shapes, was involuntarily admitted by lord Wellington, when he declared, that wherever the cortex and government should fix themselves, the press would follow to control, and the people of Seville, Grenada, or Madrid, would become as bad as the people of Cadiz.

The composition of the new cortex was naturally an object of hope and fear to all factions, and the result being uncertain, the existing assembly took such measures to prolong its own power that it was expected two cortex would be established, the one at Cadiz, the other at Seville, each striving for mastery in the nation. However the new body after many delays was installed at Cadiz in November, and the Jacobins, strong in the violence of the populace, still swayed the assembly, and kept the seat of government at Cadiz until the rapid spread of the fever brought a stronger fear into action. Then the resolution to repair to Madrid was adopted, and the sessions in the Isla closed on the 29th of November. Yet not without troubles. For the general belief being that no person could take the sickness twice, and almost every resident family had already suffered from former visitations, the merchants with an infamous cupidity declaring that there was no fever, induced the authorities flagitiously to issue clean bills of health to ships leaving the port, and endeavoured by intimidation to keep the regency and cortex in the city.

An exact and copious account of these factions and disputes, and of the permanent influence which these discussions of the principles of government, this constant collision of opposite doctrines, had upon the character of the people, would, if sagaciously traced, form a lesson of the highest interest for nations. But to treat the subject largely would be to write a political history of the Spanish revolution, and it is only the effect upon the military operations which properly appertains to a history of the war. That effect was one of unmitigated evil; but it must be observed that this did not necessarily spring from the democratic system, since precisely the same mischiefs were to be traced in Portugal, where arbitrary power, called legitimate government, was prevalent. In both cases alike, the people and the soldiers suffered for the crimes of factious politicians.

It has been shown in the first part of this volume, that one Spanish regency contracted an engagement

with lord Wellington on the faith of which he took the command of their armies in 1813. It was scrupulously adhered to by him, but systematically violated by the new regency and minister of war almost as soon as it was concluded. His recommendations for promotion after Vittoria were disregarded, orders were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were made in the commands and in the destinations of the troops without his concurrence, and without passing through him as generalissimo. Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, captain-general of Galicia, Estremadura and Castile, was disgracefully removed from his government under pretence of calling him to assist in the council of state. His nephew, general Giron, was at the same time deprived of his command over the Gallician army, although both he and Castaños had been largely commended for their conduct by lord Wellington. General Freyre, appointed captain-general of Castile and Estremadura, succeeded Giron in command of the troops, and the infamous Lacy replaced Castaños in Galicia, chosen, it was believed, as a fitter tool to work out the measure of the Jacobins against the clergy in that kingdom. Nor was the sagacity of that faction at fault, for Castaños would, according to lord Wellington, have turned his arms against the cortex if an opportunity had offered. He and others were now menaced with death, and the cortex contemplated an attack upon the tithes, upon the feudal and royal tenths, and upon the estates of the grandeës. All except the last very fitting to do, if the times and circumstances had been favourable for a peaceful arrangement; but most insane, when the nation generally was averse, and there was an invader in the country to whom the discontented could turn. The clergy were at open warfare with the government, many generals were dissatisfied and menacing in their communications with the superior civil authorities, the soldiers were starving, and the people, tired of their miseries, only desired to get rid of the invaders, and to avoid the burden of supplying the troops of either side. The English cabinet, after having gorged Spain with gold and flattery, was totally without influence. A terrible convulsion was at hand, if the French could have maintained the war with any vigour in Spain itself; and the following passages from Wellington's letters to the ministers prove that even he contemplated a forcible change in the government and constitution.

"If the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them. . . . It is quite impossible such a system can last. What I regret is, that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballesteros positively intended it, and I am much mistaken if O'Donel, and even Castaños, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the king should return he also will overturn the whole fabric if he has any spirit. . . . I wish you would let me know whether, if I should find a fair opportunity of striking at the democracy, the government would approve of my doing it." And in another letter he seriously treated the question of withdrawing from the contest altogether. "The government were the best judges," he said, "of whether they could or ought to withdraw; but he did not believe that Spain could be a useful ally, or at all in alliance with England, if the republican system was not put down." Meanwhile he recommended to the English government and to his

brother, to take no part either for or against the princess of Brazil, to discountenance the democratic principles and measures of the cortex, and if their opinion was asked regarding the formation of a new regency, to recommend an alteration of that part of the constitution which lodged all power with the cortex, and to give instead some authority to the executive government, whether in the hands of king or regent. To fill the latter office one of royal blood, uniting the strongest claims of birth with the best capacity, should, he thought, be selected; but if capacity was wanting in the royal race, then to choose the Spaniard who was most deserving in the public estimation! Thus necessity teaches privilege to bend before merit.

The whole force of Spain in arms was at this period about one hundred and sixty thousand men. Of this number not more than fifty thousand were available for operations in the field, and those only because they were paid, clothed and armed by England, and kept together by the ability and vigour of the English general. He had proposed when at Cadiz an arrangement for the civil and political government of the provinces rescued from the French, with a view to the supply of the armies; but his plan was rejected, and his repeated representations of the misery the army and the people endured under the system of the Spanish government were unheeded. Certain districts were allotted for the support of each army; yet, with a jealous fear of military domination, the government refused the captain-generals of those districts the necessary powers to draw forth the resources of the country, powers which lord Wellington recommended that they should have, and wanting which the whole system was sure to become a nullity. Each branch of administration was thus conducted by chiefs independent in their attributes, yet each too restricted in authority, generally at variance with one another, and all of them neglectful of their duty. The evil effect upon the troops was thus described by the English general as early as August:

"More than half of Spain has been cleared of the enemy above a year, and the whole of Spain excepting Catalonia and a small part of Aragon since the months of May and June last. The most abundant harvest has been reaped in all parts of the country; millions of money spent by the contending armies are circulating every where, and yet your armies however weak in numbers are literally starving. The allied British and Portuguese armies under my command have been subsisted, particularly latterly, almost exclusively upon the magazines imported by sea, and I am concerned to inform your excellency, that besides money for the pay of all the armies, which has been given from the military chest of the British army, and has been received from no other quarter, the British magazines have supplied quantities of provisions to all the Spanish armies in order to enable them to remain in the field at all. And notwithstanding this assistance, I have had the mortification of seeing the Spanish troops on the outposts obliged to plunder the nut and apple trees for subsistence, and to know that the Spanish troops, employed in the blockade of Pampeluna and Santona, were starving upon half an allowance of bread, while the enemy whom they were blockading were at the same time receiving their full allowance. The system then is insufficient to procure supplies for the army, and at the same time I assure your excellency that it is the most oppressive and injurious to the country that could be devised. It cannot be pretended that the country does not produce the means of maintaining the men necessary for its de-

fence; those means are undoubtedly superabundant, and the enemy has proved that armies can be maintained in Spain, at the expense of the Spanish nation, infinitely larger than are necessary for its defence."

These evils he attributed to the incapacity of the public servants, and to their overwhelming numbers, that certain sign of an unprosperous state; to the disgraceful negligence and disregard of public duties, and to there being no power in the country for enforcing the law; the collection of the revenue cost in several branches seventy and eighty per cent. Meanwhile no Spanish officers capable of commanding a large body of troops or keeping it in an efficient state had yet appeared, no efficient staff, no system of military administration had been formed, and no shame for these deficiencies, no exertions to amend, were visible.

From this picture two conclusions are to be drawn: 1st. That the provinces, thus described as superabounding in resources, having been for several years occupied by the French armies, the warfare of the latter could not have been so devastating and barbarous as it was represented. 2nd. That Spain, being now towards the end as helpless as she had been at the beginning and all through the war, was quite unequal to her own deliverance either by arms or policy; that it was English valour, English steel, directed by the genius of an English general, which rising superior to all obstacles, whether presented by his own or the Peninsular governments, or by the perversity of national character, worked out her independence. So utterly inefficient were the Spaniards themselves, that now, at the end of six years' war, lord Wellington declared thirty thousand of their troops could not be trusted to act separately; they were only useful when mixed in the line with large numbers of other nations. And yet all men in authority to the lowest alcalde were as presumptuous, as arrogant, and as perverse as ever. Seemingly to be rendered callous to public misery by the desperate state of affairs, they were reckless of the consequences of their actions, and never suffered prudential considerations or national honour to check the execution of any project. The generals from repeated failures had become insensible to misfortunes, and without any remarkable display of personal daring, were always ready to deliver battle on slight occasions, as if that were a common matter instead of being the great event of war.

The government agents were corrupt, and the government itself was, as it had ever been, tyrannical, faithless, mean and equivocating to the lowest degree. In 1812, a Spaniard of known and active patriotism thus commenced an elaborate plan of defence for the provinces: "Catalonia abhors France as her oppressor, but she abhors still more the despotism which has been carried on in all the branches of her administration since the beginning of the war." In fine, there was no healthy action in any part of the body politic, every thing was rotten except the hearts of the poorer people. Even at Cadiz Spanish writers compared the state to a vessel in a hurricane, without captain, pilot, compass, chart, sails or rudder, and advised the crew to cry to heaven as their sole resource. But they only blasphemed.

When Wellington, indignant at the systematic breach of his engagement, remonstrated, he was answered that the actual regency did not hold itself bound by the contracts of the former government. Hence it was plain no considerations of truth, for they had themselves also accepted the contract, nor of honest policy, nor the usages of civilized states with respect to national faith, had any influence on

their conduct. Enraged at this scandalous subterfuge, he was yet conscious how essential it was he should retain his command. And seeing all Spanish generals more or less engaged in political intrigues, none capable of co-operating with him, and that no Spanish army could possibly subsist as a military body under the neglect and bad arrangement of the Spanish authorities, conscious also that public opinion in Spain would, better than the menaces of the English government, enable him to obtain a counterpoise to the democratic party, he tendered indeed his resignation if the government engagement was not fulfilled, but earnestly endeavoured by a due mixture of mildness, argument and reproof to reduce the ruling authorities to reason. Nevertheless there were, he told them, limits to his forbearance, to his submission under injury, and he had been already most unworthily treated, even as a gentleman, by the Spanish government.

From the world these quarrels were covered by an appearance of the utmost respect and honour. He was made a grandee of the first class, and the estate of Soto de Roma in Genada, of which the much-maligned and miserable prince of Peace had been despoiled, was settled upon him. He accepted the gift, but, as he had before done with his Portuguese and Spanish pay, transferred the proceeds to the public treasury during the war. The regents, however, under the pressure of the Jacobins, and apparently bearing some personal enmity, although one of them, Ciscar, had been instrumental in procuring him the command of the Spanish army, were now intent to drive him from it; and the excesses committed at San Sebastian served their factious writers as a topic for exciting the people not only to demand his resignation, but to commence a warfare of assassination against the British soldiers. Moreover, combining extreme folly with wickedness, they pretended, amongst other absurdities, that the nobility had offered, if he would change his religion, to make him king of Spain. This tale was eagerly adopted by the English newspapers, and three Spanish grandees thought it necessary to declare that they were not among the nobles who made the proposition. His resignation was accepted in the latter end of September, and he held the command

only until the assembling of the new cortex; but the attempt to render him odious failed even at Cadiz, owing chiefly to the personal ascendancy which all great minds so surely attain over the masses in troubled times. Both the people and the soldiers respected him more than they did their own government, and the Spanish officers had generally yielded as ready obedience to his wishes before he was appointed generalissimo, as they did to his orders when holding that high office. It was this ascendancy which enabled him to maintain the war with such troublesome allies; and yet so little were the English ministers capable of appreciating its importance, that after the battle of Vittoria they entertained the design of removing him from Spain to take part in the German operations. His answer was short and modest, but full of wisdom:

"Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can both here and in Germany, but nobody would enjoy the same advantages here, and I should be no better than another in Germany."

The egregious folly which dictated this proposition was thus checked, and in December the new cortex decided that he should retain the command of the armies, and the regency be bound to fulfil its predecessor's engagements. Nevertheless, so deeply had he been offended by the libels relative to San Sebastian, that a private letter to his brother terminated thus:—"It will rest with the king's government to determine what they will do upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case; but if I was to decide, I would not keep the army in Spain for one hour." And to many other persons at different times he expressed his fears and conviction that the cause was lost and that he should fail at last. It was under these and other enormous difficulties he carried on his military operations. It was with an enemy at his back more to be dreaded than the foe in his front that he invaded the south of France; and that is the answer to those French writers who have described him as being at the head of more than two hundred thousand well-furnished soldiers, supported by a well organized insurrection of the Spanish people, unembarrassed in his movements, and luxuriously rioting in all the resources of the Peninsula and of England.

BOOK XXIII.

CHAPTER I.

War in the south of France—Soul's political difficulties—Privations of the allied troops—Lord Wellington appeals to their military honour with effect—Averse to offensive operations, but when Napoleon's disasters in Germany became known, again yields to the wishes of the allied sovereigns—His dispositions of attack retarded—They are described—Battle of the Nivelle—Observations—Deaths and characters of Mr. Edward Freer and colonel Thomas Lloyd.

WAR IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.

WHILE Pampeluna held out, Soul laboured to complete his works of defence, especially the intrenched camp of St. Jean Pied de Port, that he might be free to change the theatre of war to Aragon. He pretended to entertain this project as late as November; but he must have secretly renounced all hope before that period, because the snows of an early and severe winter had rendered even the passes of the lower Pyrenees impracticable in October. Meanwhile his political difficulties were not less than lord Wellington's, all his efforts to draw forth the resources of France were met with apathy, or secret hostility, and there was no money in the military chest to answer the common daily expenses. A junta of the leading merchants in Bayonne voluntarily provided for the most pressing necessities of the troops, but their means were limited, and Soul vainly urged the merchants of Bordeaux and Toulouse to follow the patriotic example. It required therefore all his firmness of character to support the crisis; and if the English naval force had been sufficient to intercept the coasting vessels between Bordeaux and Bayonne, the French army must have retired beyond the Adour. As it was, the greatest part of the field artillery and all the cavalry were sent so far to the rear for forage, that they could not be counted a part of the fighting troops; and the infantry, in addition to their immense labours, were forced to carry their own provisions from the navigable points of the rivers to the top of the mountains.

Soul was strongly affected. "Tell the emperor," he wrote to the minister of war, "tell him when you make your next report, that on the very soil of France, this is the situation of the army destined to defend the southern provinces from invasion; tell him also that the unheard-of contradictions and obstacles I meet with shall not make me fail in my duty."

The French troops suffered much, but the privations of the allies were perhaps greater, for being on higher mountains, more extended, more dependent upon the sea, their distress was in proportion to their distance from the coast. A much shorter line had been indeed gained for the supply of the centre, and a bridge was laid down at Andarlaza which gave access to the roots of the Bayonnette mountain, yet the troops were fed with difficulty; and so scantily, that lord Wellington in amends reduced the usual stoppage of pay, and invoked the army by its military honour to sustain with firmness the unavoidable pressure. The effect was striking. The murmurs, loud in the camps before, were hushed instantly, although the soldiers knew that some

commissaries, leaguings with the speculators upon the coast, secretly loaded the provision mules with condiments and other luxuries to sell on the mountains at enormous profit. The desertion was however great, more than twelve hundred men went over to the enemy in less than four months; and they were all Germans, Englishmen or Spaniards, for the Portuguese who abandoned their colours invariably went back to their own country.

This difficulty of feeding the Anglo-Portuguese, the extreme distress of the Spaniards, and the certainty that they would plunder in France, and so raise the people in arms, together with the uneasy state of the political affairs in the Peninsula, rendered lord Wellington very averse to further offensive operations while Napoleon so tenaciously maintained his positions on the Elbe against the allied sovereigns. It was impossible to make a formidable and sustained invasion of France with the Anglo-Portuguese alone, and he had neither money nor means of transport to feed the Spaniards, even if policy warranted such a measure. The nature of the country also forbade a decisive victory, and hence an advance was attended with the risk of returning to Spain again during the winter, when a retreat would be dangerous and dishonouring. But on the 20th of October a letter from the governor of Pampeluna was intercepted, and lord Fitzroy Somerset, observing that the compliment of ceremony at the beginning was also in numerals, ingeniously followed the cue and made out the whole. It announced that the place could not hold out more than a week, and as intelligence of Napoleon's disasters in Germany became known at the same time, lord Wellington was induced to yield once more to the wishes of the allied sovereigns and the English ministers, who were earnest that he should invade France.

His intent was to attack Soul's intrenched camp on the 26th, thinking Pampeluna would fall before that period. In this he was mistaken; and bad weather stopped his movements, for in the passes above Roncesvalles the troops were knee-deep in snow. The preparations however continued, and strict precautions were taken to baffle the enemy's emissaries. Soul was nevertheless perfectly informed by the deserters of the original design and the cause of the delay; and he likewise obtained from a sergeant-major of artillery, who losing his road was taken on the 29th, certain letters and orders indicating an attack in the direction of the bridge of Amotz, between D'Erlon's right and Clauzel's left. Some French peasants also, who had been allowed to pass the allied outposts, declared they had been closely questioned about that bridge and the roads leading to it. The defences there were, therefore, augmented with new redoubts and abatis, and Soul having thus, as he judged, sufficiently provided for his safety, and being in no pain for his right, nor for Clauzel's position, covered as the latter was by the smaller Rhune, turned his attention towards Foy's corps.

That general had been posted at Bidaray, half way between St. Jean Pied de Port and Cambo, to watch certain roads, which leading to the Nive from

Val Baigorri by St. Martin d'Arosa, and from the Bastan by Yspegui and the Gorospil mountain, gave Soult anxiety for his left; but now expecting the principal attack at the bridge of Amotz, and not by these roads, nor by St. Jean Pied de Port, as he at first supposed and as lord Wellington had at one time designed, he resolved to use Foy's division offensively. In this view, on the 3d of November he instructed him if St. Jean Pied de Port should be only slightly attacked, to draw all the troops he could possibly spare from its defence to Bidaray, and when the allies assailed D'Erlon, he was to seize the Gorospil mountain and fall upon their right as they descended from the Puerto de Maya. If, on the other hand, he was himself assailed by those lines, he was to call in all his detached troops from St. Jean Pied de Port, repossess the Nive by the bridge of Bidaray, make the best defence possible behind that river, and open a communication with Pierre Soult and Treillard, whose divisions of cavalry were at St. Palais and Orthez.

On the 6th, Foy, thinking the Gorospil difficult to pass, proposed to seize the Col de Yspegui from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and so descend into the Bastan. Soult, however, preferred Bidaray as a safer point and more united with the main body of the army; but he gave Foy a discretionary power to march along the left of the Nive upon Itzatzu and Espelette, if he judged it fitting to reinforce D'Erlon's left rather than to attack the enemy.

Having thus arranged his regular defence, the French general directed the prefect of the Lower Pyrenees to post the organized national guards at the issues of all the valleys about St. Jean Pied de Port, but to keep the mass of the people quiet until the allies penetrating into the country should at once provoke and offer facilities for an irregular warfare.

On the 9th, being still uneasy about the St. Martin d'Arosa and Gorospil roads, he brought up his brother's cavalry from St. Palais to the heights above Cambo, and the next day the long expected storm burst.

Allured by some fine weather on the 6th and 7th of November, lord Wellington had moved sir Rowland Hill's troops from the Roncesvalles to the Bastan, with a view to attack Soult, leaving Mina on the position of Altobiscar and in the Alduides. The other corps had also received their orders, and the battle was to commence on the 8th; but general Freyre suddenly declared, that unable to subsist on the mountains, he must withdraw a part of his troops. This was a scheme to obtain provisions from the English magazines, and it was successful, for the projected attack could not be made without his aid. Forty thousand rations of flour, with a formal intimation that if he did not co-operate the whole army must retire again into Spain, contented Freyre for the moment; but the extravagant abuses of the Spanish commissariat were plainly exposed when the chief of the staff declared that the flour would only suffice for two days, although there were less than ten thousand soldiers in the field. Spain, therefore, furnished at the rate of two rations for every fighting man, and yet her troops were starving!

When this difficulty was surmounted, heavy rain caused the attack to be again deferred; but on the 10th, ninety thousand combatants of all arms and ranks, above seventy-four thousand being Anglo-Portuguese, descended to the battle, and with them went ninety-five pieces of artillery, which under the command of colonel Dickson were all with incon-

ceivable vigour and activity thrown into action. Nor in this host do I reckon four thousand five hundred cavalry, nor the Spaniards of the blockading division which remained in reserve. On the other hand, the French numbers were now increased by the new levy of conscripts, but many had deserted again into the interior, and the fighting men did not exceed seventy-nine thousand including the garrisons. Six thousand of these were cavalry, and as Foy's operations were extraneous to the line of defence, scarcely sixty thousand infantry and artillery were opposed to the allies.

Lord Wellington, seeing that the right of Soult's line could not be forced without great loss, resolved to hold it in check while he turned it by forcing the centre and left, pushing down the Nivelle to St. Pé. In this view the second and sixth British divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese, Morillo's Spaniards, four of Mina's battalions, and Grant's brigade of light cavalry, in all twenty-six thousand fighting men and officers with nine guns, were collected under general Hill in the Bastan to attack D'Erlon. The position of Roncesvalles was meanwhile occupied by the remainder of Mina's troops, supported by the blockading force under Carlos d'Espana.

The third, fourth and seventh divisions, and Giron's Andalusians, the whole under the command of marshal Beresford, were disposed about Zugarmurdi, the Puerto de Echallar, and the lower parts of those slopes of the greater Rhune which descended upon Sarre. On the left of this body the light division and Longa's Spaniards, both under Charles Alten, were disposed on those slopes of the greater Rhune which led down towards Ascaïn. Victor Alten's brigade of light cavalry and three British batteries were placed on the road to Sarre, and six mountain-guns followed Giron's and Charles Alten's troops. Thus thirty-six thousand fighting men and officers, with twenty-four guns, were concentrated in this quarter to attack Clauzel.

General Freyre's Spaniards, about nine thousand strong, with six guns, were disposed on Alten's left, at the fort of Calvaire and towards Jollimont, ready to fall upon any troops which might be detached from the camp of Serres by the bridge of Ascaïn to support Clauzel.

General Hope, having the first and fifth divisions, Wilson's, Bradford's and lord Aylmer's brigades of infantry, Vandeleur's brigade of light dragoons, and the heavy German cavalry, in all about nineteen thousand men and officers, with fifty-four guns, was opposed to Soult's right wing; and the naval squadron hovering on Hope's left flank was to aid the land operations.

On the French side each lieutenant-general had a special position to defend. D'Erlon's first line, its left resting on the fortified rocks of Mondarain, which could not be turned, ran from thence along the Chouperau and Atchuleguy mountains by the forge of Urdax to the Nivelle. This range was strongly intrenched and occupied by one of Abbé's and one of D'Armagnac's brigades, Espelette being behind the former and Ainhoa behind the latter. The second line or main position was several miles distant on a broad ridge, behind Ainhoa, and it was occupied by the remaining brigades of the two divisions. The left did not extend beyond the centre of the first line, but the right reaching to the bridge of Amotz stretched with a wider flank, because the Nivelle flowing in a slanting direction towards the French gave greater space as their positions receded. Three great redoubts were constructed in a line on this ridge, and a fourth had been commenced close to the bridge

On the right of D'Erlon's second line, that is to say, beyond the bridge of Amotz, Clauzel's position extended to Ascaïn, also along a strong range of heights fortified with many redoubts, trenches and abatis; and as the Nivelle after passing Amotz swept in a curve completely round the range to Ascaïn, both flanks rested alike upon that river, having communication by the bridges of Amotz and Ascaïn on the right and left, and a retreat by the bridges of St. Pé and Harastagui which were in rear of the centre. Two of Clauzel's divisions, reinforced by one of D'Erlon's under general Maransin, were here posted. In front of the left were the redoubts of St. Barbe and Grenada, covering the village and ridge of Sarre. In front of the right was the smaller Rhune, which was fortified and occupied by a brigade of Maransin's division. A new redoubt with abatis was also commenced to cover the approaches to the bridge of Amotz.

On the right of this line, beyond the bridge of Ascaïn, Daricau's division belonging to Clauzel's corps, and the Italian brigade of St. Pol drawn from Villatte's reserve, were posted to hold the intrenched camp of Serres and to connect Clauzel's position with Villatte's, which was, as I have before said, on a ridge crossing the gorges of Olette and Jolli-mont. The French right wing under Reille, strongly fortified on the lower ground and partially covered by inundations, was nearly impregnable.

Soult's weakest point of general defence was certainly the opening between the Rhune mountains and the Nivelle. Gradually narrowing as it approached the bridge of Amotz this space was the most open, the least fortified, and the Nivelle being fordable above that bridge could not hamper the allies' movements. Wherefore a powerful force acting in this direction could pass by D'Erlon's first line, and breaking in upon the main position between the right of that general's second line and Clauzel's left, turn both by the same attack.

Lord Wellington thus designed his battle. General Hill, leaving Mina's four battalions on the Gorpil mountain facing the rocks of Mondarain, moved in the night by the different passes of the Puerto de Maya, Morillo's Spaniards being to menace the French on the Choupera and Atchuleguy mountains, the second division to attack Ainhoa and Urdax. The sixth division and Hamilton's Portuguese were to assault the works covering the bridge of Amotz, either on the right or left bank of the Nivelle according to circumstances. Thus the action of twenty-six thousand men was combined against D'Erlon's position, and on their left Beresford's corps was assembled. The third division under general Colville, descending from Zugaramurdi, was to move against the unfinished redoubts and intrenchments covering the approaches to the bridge of Amotz on the left bank of the Nivelle, thus turning D'Erlon's right at the moment when it was attacked in front by Hill's corps. On the left of the third division, the seventh, descending from the mouth of the Echallar pass, was to storm the Grenada redoubt, and then passing the village of Sarre assail Clauzel's main position abreast with the attack of the third division. On the left of the seventh, the fourth division, assembling on the lower slopes of the greater Rhune, was to descend upon the redoubt of St. Barbe, and then moving through Sarre also to assail Clauzel's main position abreast with the seventh division. On the left of the fourth division, Giron's Spaniards, gathered higher up on the flank of the great Rhune, were to move abreast with the others leaving Sarre on their right. They were to drive the enemy from the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune, and then in

concert with the rest attack Clauzel's main position. In this way Hill's and Beresford's corps, forming a mass of more than forty thousand infantry, were to be thrust, on both sides of the bridge of Amotz, between Clauzel and D'Erlon, to break their line of battle.

Charles Alten, with the light division and Longa's Spaniards, furnishing together about eight thousand men, was likewise to attack Clauzel's line on the left of Giron, while Freyre's Gallicians approached the bridge of Ascaïn to prevent reinforcements coming from the camp of Serres. But ere Alten could assail Clauzel's right the smaller Rhune which covered it was to be stormed. This mountain outwork was a hog's-back ridge rising abruptly out of table-land and parallel with the greater Rhune. It was inaccessible along its front, which was precipitous and from fifty to two hundred feet high; but on the enemy's left these rocks gradually decreased, descending by a long slope to the valley of Sarre, and about two-thirds of the way down the thirty-fourth French regiment was placed, with an advanced post on some isolated crags situated in the hollow between the two Rhunes. On the enemy's right the hog's-back sunk by degrees into the plain or platform. It was however covered at that point by a marsh scarcely passable, and the attacking troops were therefore first to move up against the perpendicular rocks in front, and then to file to their left under fire, between the marsh and the lower crags, until they gained an accessible point from whence they could fight their way along the narrow ridge of the hog's-back. But the bristles of the latter were huge perpendicular crags connected with walls of loose stones so as to form several small forts or castles communicating with each other by narrow footways, and rising one above another until the culminant point was attained. The table-land beyond this ridge was extensive and terminated in a very deep ravine on every side, save a narrow space on the right of the marsh, where the enemy had drawn a traverse of loose stones, running perpendicularly from behind the hog's-back and ending in a star fort which overhung the edge of the ravine.

This rampart and fort, and the hog's-back itself, were defended by Barbot's brigade of Maransin's division, and the line of retreat was towards a low narrow neck of land, which bridging the deep ravine linked the Rhune to Clauzel's main position: a reserve was placed here, partly to sustain the thirty-fourth French regiment posted on the slope of the mountain towards Sarre, partly to protect the neck of land on the side of that village. As this neck was the only approach to the French position in that part, to storm the smaller Rhune was a necessary preliminary to the general battle; wherefore Alten, filing his troops after dark on the 9th from the Hermitage, the Commissari mountain and the Puerto de Vera, collected them at midnight on that slope of the greater Rhune which descended towards Ascaïn. The main body of the light division, turning the marsh by the left, was to assail the stone traverse and lap over the star fort by the ravine beyond; Longa, stretching still farther on the left, was to turn the smaller Rhune altogether; and the forty-third regiment, supported by the seventeenth Portuguese, was to assail the hog's back. One battalion of riflemen and the mountain-guns were however left on the summit of the greater Rhune, with orders to assail the craggy posts between the Rhunes and connect Alten's attack with that of Giron's Spaniards. All these troops gained their respective stations so secretly that the enemy had no suspicion of their presence, although for several hours the columns

were lying within half musket-shot of the works. Towards morning indeed five of six guns, fired in a hurried manner from the low ground near the sea, broke the stillness, but the French on the Rhune remained quiet, and the British troops awaited the rising of the sun, when three guns fired from the Atchubia mountain were to give the signal of attack.

BATTLE OF THE NIVELLE.

The day broke with splendour, and as the first ray of light played on the summit of the lofty Atchubia the signal guns were fired in rapid succession from its summit. The soldiers instantly leaped up, and the French beheld with astonishment several columns rushing forward from the flank of the great Rhune. Running to their defences with much tumult they opened a few pieces, which were answered from the top of the greater Rhune by the mountain artillery, and at the same moment two companies of the forty-third were detached to cross the marsh, if possible, and keep down the enemy's fire from the lower part of the hog's-back. The action being thus commenced, the remainder of the regiment, formed partly in line, partly in a column of reserve, turned the marsh by the right and advanced against the high rocks. From these crags the French shot fast and thickly, but the quick even movement of the British line deceived their aim, and the soldiers, running forward very swiftly though the ground was rough, turned suddenly between the rocks and the marsh, and were immediately joined by the two companies which had passed that obstacle notwithstanding its depth. Then all together jumped into the lower works, but the men exhausted by their exertions, for they had passed over half a mile of very difficult ground with a wonderful speed, remained for a few minutes inactive within half pistol-shot of the first stone castle, from whence came a sharp and biting musketry. When they had recovered breath they arose, and with a stern shout commenced the assault.

The defenders were as numerous as the assailants, and for six weeks they had been labouring on their well-contrived castles; but strong and valiant in arms must the soldiers have been who stood in that hour before the veterans of the forty-third. One French grenadier officer only dared to sustain the rush. Standing alone on the high wall of the first castle, and flinging large stones with both his hands, a noble figure, he fought to the last and fell, while his men shrinking on each side sought safety among the rocks on his flanks. Close and confused then was the action, man met man at every turn, but with a rattling fire of musketry, sometimes struggling in the intricate narrow paths, sometimes climbing the loose stone walls, the British soldiers won their desperate way until they had carried the second castle, called by the French "the place of arms," and "the magpie's nest," because of a lofty pillar of rock which arose above it and on which a few marksmen were perched. From these points the defenders were driven into their last castle, which being higher and larger than the others, and covered by a natural ditch or cleft in the rocks fifteen feet deep, was called "the Donjon." Here they made a stand, and the assailants, having advanced so far as to look into the rear of the rampart and star fort on the table-land below, suspended the vehement throng of their attack for a while, partly to gather a head for storming the Donjon, partly to fire on the enemy beneath them, who were now warmly engaged with the two battalions of riflemen, the Portuguese caçadores, and the seventeenth Portuguese. This last regiment was to have followed the forty-third, but seeing how rapidly and surely the latter were carrying the rocks,

had moved at once against the traverse on the other side of the marsh; and very soon the French defending the rampart, being thus pressed in front, and warned by the direction of the fire that they were turned on the ridge above, seeing also the fifty-second, forming the extreme left of the division, now emerging from the deep ravine beyond the star fort on the other flank, abandoned their works. Then the forty-third, gathering a strong head, stormed the Donjon. Some leaped with a shout down the deep cleft in the rock, others turned it by the narrow paths on each flank, and the enemy abandoned the loose walls at the moment they were being scaled. Thus in twenty minutes six hundred old soldiers were hustled out of this labyrinth; yet not so easily but that the victors lost eleven officers and sixty-seven men.

The whole mountain was now cleared of the French, for the riflemen, dropping perpendicularly down from the greater Rhune upon the post of crags in the hollow between the Rhunes, seized it with small loss; but they were ill-seconded by Giron's Spaniards, and were hardly handled by the thirty-fourth French regiment; which maintaining its post on the slope, covered the flight of the confused crowd which came rushing down the mountain behind them towards the neck of land leading to the main position. At that point they all rallied and seemed inclined to renew the action, but after some hesitation continued their retreat. This favourable moment for a decisive stroke had been looked for by the commander of the forty-third, but the officer intrusted with the reserve companies of the regiment had thrown them needlessly into the fight, thus rendering it impossible to collect a body strong enough to assail such a heavy mass.

The contest at the stone rampart and star fort, being shortened by the rapid success on the hog's-back, was not very severe, but general Kempt, always conspicuous for his valour, was severely wounded, nevertheless he did not quit the field, and soon re-formed his brigade on the platform he had thus so gallantly won. Meanwhile the fifty-second, having turned the position by the ravine, was now approaching the enemy's line of retreat, when general Alten, following his instructions, halted the division partly in the ravine itself to the left of the neck, partly on the table-land, and during this action Longa's Spaniards having got near Ascain were in connexion with Freyre's Gallicians. In this position, with the enemy now and then cannonading Longa's people and the troops in the ravine, Alten awaited the progress of the army on his right, for the columns there had a long way to march, and it was essential to regulate the movements.

The signal-guns from the Atchubia, which sent the light division against the Rhune, had also put the fourth and seventh divisions in movement against the redoubts of St. Barbe and Grenada. Eighteen guns were immediately placed in battery against the former, and while they poured their stream of shot the troops advanced with scaling ladders, and the skirmishers of the fourth division got into the rear of the work, whereupon the French leaped out and fled. Ross's battery of horse artillery, galloping to a rising ground in rear of the Grenada fort, drove the enemy from there also, and then the fourth and seventh divisions carried the village of Sarre and the position beyond it, and advanced to the attack of Clauzel's main position.

It was now eight o'clock, and from the smaller Rhune a splendid spectacle of war opened upon the view. On one hand the ships of war slowly sailing

to and fro were exchanging shots with the fort of Socoa; Hope menacing all the French lines in the low ground sent the sound of a hundred pieces of artillery bellowing up the rocks, and they were answered by nearly as many from the tops of the mountains. On the other hand, the summit of the great Atchubia was just lighted by the rising sun, and fifty thousand men rushing down its enormous slopes with ringing shouts seemed to chase the receding shadows into the deep valley. The plains of France, so long overlooked from the towering crags of the Pyrenees, were to be the prize of battle; and the half-famished soldiers in their fury broke through the iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were but a screen of reeds.

The principal action was on a space of seven or eight miles, but the skirts of battle spread wide, and in no point had the combinations failed. Far on the right, general Hill, after a long and difficult night march, had got within reach of the enemy a little before seven o'clock. Opposing Morillo's and Mina's Spaniards to Abbé's troops on the Mondarain and Atchuleguy rocks, he directed the second division against D'Armagnac's brigade and brushed it back from the forge of Urdax and the village of Ainhoa. Meanwhile the aid of the sixth division and Hamilton's Portuguese being demanded by him, they passed the Nivelle lower down and bent their march along the right bank towards the bridge of Amotz. Thus, while Mina's battalions and Morillo's division kept Abbé in check on the mountains, the three Anglo-Portuguese divisions, marching left flank in advance, approached D'Erlon's second position, but the country being very rugged it was eleven o'clock before they got within cannon-shot of the French redoubts. Each of these contained five hundred men, and they were placed along the summit of a high ridge which, being thickly clothed with bushes, and covered by a deep ravine, was very difficult to attack. However general Clinton, leading the sixth division on the extreme left, turned this ravine and drove the enemy from the works covering the approaches to the bridge, after which wheeling to his right he advanced against the nearest redoubt, and the garrison not daring to await the assault abandoned it. Then the Portuguese division, passing the ravine and marching on the right of the sixth, menaced the second redoubt, and the second division in like manner approached the third redoubt. D'Armagnac's troops now set fire to their huttet camp and retreated to Helbacen de Borda behind St. Pé, pursued by the sixth division. Abbé's second brigade, forming the French left, was separated by a ravine from D'Armagnac's ground, but he also after some hesitation retreated towards Espelette and Cambo, where his other brigade, which had meanwhile fallen back from the Mondarain before Morillo, rejoined him.

It was the progress of the battle on the left of the Nive that rendered D'Erlon's defence so feeble. After the fall of the St. Barbe and Grenada redoubts, Conroux's right and centre endeavoured to defend the village and heights of Sarre; but while the fourth and seventh divisions, aided by the ninety-fourth regiment detached from the third division, attacked and carried those points, the third division being on their right and less opposed pushed rapidly towards the bridge of Amotz, forming in conjunction with the sixth division the narrow end of the wedge into which Beresford's and Hill's corps were now thrown. The French were thus driven from all their new unfinished works covering the approaches to that bridge on both sides of the Nivelle, and Conroux's division, spreading from Sarre

to Amotz, was broken by superior numbers at every point. That general indeed vigorously defended the old works around the bridge itself; but he soon fell mortally wounded, his troops were again broken, and the third division seized the bridge and established itself on the heights between that structure and the redoubt of Louis XIV., which having been also lately commenced was unfinished. This happened about eleven o'clock; and D'Erlon fearing to be cut off from St. Pé yielded, as we have seen, at once to the attack of the sixth division, and at the same time the remainder of Conroux's troops fell back in disorder from Sarre, closely pursued by the fourth and seventh divisions, which were immediately established on the left of the third. Thus the communication between Clauzel and D'Erlon was cut off, the left flank of one and the right flank of the other broken, and a direct communication between Hill and Beresford secured by the same blow.

D'Erlon abandoned his position, but Clauzel stood firm with Taupin's and Maransin's divisions. The latter, now completed by the return of Barbot's brigade from the smaller Rhune, occupied the redoubt of Louis XIV., and supported with eight field-pieces attempted to cover the flight of Conroux's troops. The guns opened briskly, but they were silenced by Ross's battery of horse artillery, the only one which had surmounted the difficulties of the ground after passing Sarre; the infantry were then assailed, in front by the fourth and seventh divisions, in flank by the third division; the redoubt of Louis XIV. was stormed, the garrison bayoneted; Conroux's men continued to fly, Maransin's, after a stiff combat, were cast headlong into the ravines behind their position, and Maransin himself was taken, but escaped in the confusion. Giron's Spaniards now came up on the left of the fourth division, somewhat late, however, and after having abandoned the rifle-men on the lower slopes of the smaller Rhune.

On the French side, Taupin's division and a large body of conscripts forming Clauzel's right wing still remained to fight. The left rested on a large work called "the signal redoubt," which had no artillery, but overlooked the whole position; the right was covered by two redoubts overhanging a ravine which separated them from the camp of Serres, and some works in the ravine itself protected the communication by the bridge of Ascaïn. Behind the signal redoubt, on a ridge crossing the road to St. Pé, and along which Maransin's and Conroux's beaten divisions were now flying in disorder, there was another work called the redoubt of Harastagua, and Clauzel, thinking he might still dispute the victory if his reserve division, posted in the camp of Serres, could come to his aid, drew the thirty-first French regiment from Taupin and posted it in front of this redoubt of Harastagua. His object was to rally Maransin's and Conroux's troops there, and so form a new line, the left on the Harastagua, the right on the signal redoubt, into which last he threw six hundred of the eighty-eighth regiment. In this position, having a retreat by the bridge of Ascaïn, he resolved to renew the battle; but his plan failed at the moment of conception, because Taupin could not stand before the light division, which was now again in full action.

About half past nine, general Alten, seeing the whole of the columns on his right, as far as the eye could reach, well engaged with the enemy, had crossed the low neck of land in his front. It was first passed by the fifty-second regiment with a rapid pace and a very narrow front, under a destructive cannonade and fire of musketry from the intrenchments which covered the side of the opposite moun-

tain; a road coming from Ascaïn by the ravine led up the position, and as the fifty-second pushed their attack along it the enemy abandoned his intrenchments on each side, and forsook even his crowning works above. This formidable regiment was followed by the remainder of Alten's troops; and Taupin, though his division was weak from its losses on the 7th of October, and now still further diminished by the absence of the thirty-first regiment, awaited the assault above, being supported by the conscripts drawn up in his rear. But at this time Longa, having turned the smaller Rhune, approached Ascaïn, and being joined by part of Freyre's troops, their skirmishers opened a distant musketry against the works covering the bridge on Taupin's right; a panic immediately seized the French, the seventieth regiment abandoned the two redoubts above, and the conscripts were withdrawn. Clauzel ordered Taupin to retake the forts; but this only added to the disorder, the seventieth regiment instead of facing about disbanded entirely, and were not reassembled until next day. There remained only four regiments unbroken, one, the eighty-eighth, was in the signal redoubt, two under Taupin in person kept together in rear of the works on the right, and the thirty-first covered the fort of Harastagua, now the only line of retreat.

In this emergency, Clauzel, anxious to bring off the eighty-eighth regiment, ordered Taupin to charge on one side of the signal redoubt, intending to do the same himself on the other at the head of the thirty-first regiment; but the latter was now vigorously attacked by the Portuguese of the seventh division, and the fourth division was rapidly interposing between that regiment and the signal redoubt. Moreover, Alten previous to this had directed the forty-third, preceded by Barnard's riflemen, to turn at the distance of musket-shot the right flank of the signal redoubt; wherefore Taupin, instead of charging, was himself charged in front by the riflemen, and being menaced at the same time in flank by the fourth division, retreated, closely pursued by Barnard, until that intrepid officer fell dangerously wounded. During this struggle the seventh division broke the thirty-first, the rout was complete; the French fled to the different bridges over the Nivelle, and the signal redoubt was left to its fate.

This formidable work barred the way of the light division, but it was of no value to the defence when the forts on its flanks were abandoned. Colborne approached it in front with the fifty-second regiment, Giron's Spaniards menaced it on Colborne's right, the fourth division was passing to its rear, and Kempt's brigade was, as we have seen, turning it on the left. Colborne, whose military judgment was seldom at fault, halted under the brow of the conical hill on which the work was situated; but some of Giron's Spaniards, making a vaunting though feeble demonstration of attacking it on his right, were beaten back, and at that moment a staff-officer, without warrant, (for general Alten, on the spot, assured the author of this history that he sent no such order,) rode up and directed Colborne to advance. It was not a moment for remonstrance, and his troops covered by the steepness of the hill reached the flat top, which was about forty yards across to the redoubt; then they made their rush, but a wide ditch, thirty feet deep, well fraised and palisaded, stopped them short, and the fire of the enemy stretched all the foremost men dead. The intrepid Colborne, escaping miraculously, for he was always at the head and on horseback, immediately led the regiment under cover of the brow to another point, and

thinking to take the French unawares, made another rush, yet with the same result. At three different places did he rise to the surface in this manner, and each time the French fire swept away the head of his column. Resorting then to persuasion, he held out a white handkerchief and summoned the commandant, pointing out to him how his work was surrounded and how hopeless his defence; whereupon the garrison yielded, having had only one man killed, whereas on the British side there fell two hundred soldiers of a regiment never surpassed in arms since arms were first borne by men.

During this affair Clauzel's divisions had crossed the Nivelle in great disorder, Maransin's and Conroux's troops near St. Pé, the thirty-first regiment at Harastagua, Taupin between that place and the bridge of Serres. They were pursued by the third and seventh divisions, and the skirmishers of the former, crossing by Amotz and a bridge above St. Pé, entered that place while the French were in the act of passing the river below. It was now past two o'clock; Conroux's troops pushed on to Helbacen de Borda, a fortified position on the road from St. Pé to Bayonne, where they were joined by Taupin and by D'Erlon with D'Armagnac's division, but Clauzel rallied Maransin's men and took post on some heights immediately above St. Pé. Meanwhile Soult had hurried from St. Jean de Luz to the camp of Serres with all his reserve artillery and spare troops to menace the allies' left flank by Ascaïn, and Wellington thereupon halted the fourth and light divisions and Giron's Spaniards on the reverse slopes of Clauzel's original position, facing the camp of Serres, waiting until the sixth division, then following D'Armagnac's retreat on the right of the Nivelle, was well advanced. When he was assured of Clinton's progress, he crossed the Nivelle with the third and seventh divisions, and drove Maransin from his new position after a hard struggle, in which general Inglis was wounded and the fifty-first and sixty-eighth regiments handled very roughly. This ended the battle in the centre, for darkness was coming on and the troops were exhausted, especially the sixth division, which had been marching or fighting for twenty-four hours. However three divisions were firmly established in rear of Soult's right wing, of whose operations it is now time to treat.

In front of Reille's intrenchments were two advanced positions, the camp of the Sans Culottes on the right, the Bon Secours in the centre covering Urogne. The first had been attacked and carried early in the morning by the fifth division, which advanced to the inundation covering the heights of Bordegain and Sibourre. The second after a short cannonade was taken by Halket's Germans and the guards, and immediately afterwards the eighty-fifth regiment, of lord Aylmer's brigade, drove a French battalion out of Urogne. The first division, being on the right, then menaced the camp of Belchena, and the German skirmishers passed a small stream covering this part of the line, but they were driven back by the enemy, whose musketry and cannonade were brisk along the whole front. Meanwhile Freyre, advancing in two columns from Jollimont and the Calvaire on the right of the first division, placed eight guns in battery against the Nassau redoubt, a large work constructed on the ridge occupied by Villatte to cover the approaches to Ascaïn. The Spaniards were here opposed by their own countrymen under Casa Palacios, who commanded the remains of Joseph's Spanish guards, and during the fight general Freyre's skirmishers on the right united with Longa's men. Thus a kind of false battle

was maintained along the whole line to the sea until nightfall, with equal loss of men, but great advantage to the allies, because it entirely occupied Reille's two divisions and Villatte's reserve, and prevented the troops in the camp of Serres from passing by the bridge of Ascain to aid Clauzel, who was thus overpowered. When that event happened and Lord Wellington had passed the Nivelle at St. Pé, Daricau and the Italian brigade withdrew from Serres, and Villatte's reserve occupied it, whereupon Freyre and Longa entered the town of Ascain. Villatte however held the camp above until Reille had withdrawn into St. Jean de Luz and destroyed all the bridges on the lower Nivelle; when that was effected the whole retired, and at daybreak reached the heights of Bidart on the road to Bayonne.

During the night the allies halted on the position they had gained in the centre, but an accidental conflagration catching a wood completely separated the piquets towards Ascain from the main body, and spreading far and wide over the heath lighted up all the hills, a blazing sign of war to France.

On the 11th, the army advanced in order of battle. Sir John Hope on the left, forded the river above St. Jean de Luz with his infantry, and marched on Bidart. Marshal Beresford in the centre moved by the roads leading upon Arbonne. General Hill, communicating by his right with Morillo who was on the rocks of Mondarain, brought his left forward into communication with Beresford, and with his centre took possession of Suraide and Espelette facing towards Cambo. The time required to restore the bridges for the artillery at Sibourre, and the change of front on the right rendered these movements slow, and gave the duke of Dalmatia time to rally his army upon a third line of fortified camps which he had previously commenced, the right resting on the coast at Bidart, the centre at Helbacen de Borda, the left at Ustaritz on the Nive. This front was about eight miles, but the works were only slightly advanced, and Soult dreading a second battle on so wide a field drew back his centre and left to Arbonne and Arauntz, broke down the bridges on the Nive at Ustaritz, and at two o'clock a slight skirmish, commenced by the allies in the centre, closed the day's proceedings. The next morning the French retired to the ridge of Beyris, having their right in advance at Anglet and their left in the intrenched camp of Bayonne near Marac. During this movement a dense fog arrested the allies, but when the day cleared Sir John Hope took post at Bidart on the left, and Beresford occupied Ahetze, Arbonne, and the hill of St. Barbe, in the centre. General Hill endeavoured to pass the fords and restore the broken bridges of Ustaritz, and he also made a demonstration against the works at Cambo; but the rain which fell heavily in the mountains on the 11th rendered the fords impassable, and both points were defended successfully by Foy, whose operations had been distinct from the rest.

In the night of the 9th, D'Erlon, mistrusting the strength of his own position, had sent that general orders to march from Bidaray to Espelette, but the messenger did not arrive in time, and on the morning of the 10th, about eleven o'clock, Foy, following Soult's previous instructions, drove Mina's battalions from the Gorospil mountain; then pressing against the flank of Morillo he forced him also back fighting to the Puerto de Maya. However D'Erlon's battle was at this period receding fast; and Foy, fearing to be cut off, retired with the loss of a colonel and one hundred and fifty men, having however taken a quantity of baggage and a hundred prisoners. Continuing his retreat all night he

reached Cambo and Ustaritz on the 11th, just in time to relieve Abbé's divisions at those posts, and on the 12th defended them against General Hill. Such were the principal circumstances of the battle of the Nivelle, whereby Soult was driven from a mountain position which he had been fortifying for three months. He lost four thousand two hundred and sixty-five men and officers including twelve or fourteen hundred prisoners, and one general was killed. His field magazines at St. Jean de Luz and Espelette fell into the hands of the victors, and fifty-one pieces of artillery were taken, the greater part having been abandoned in the redoubts of the low country to Sir John Hope. The allies had two generals, Kempt and Byng, wounded, and they lost two thousand six hundred and ninety-four men and officers.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. Soult fared in this battle as most generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders and undisciplined soldiers lines may avail, seldom against accomplished generals, never when the assailants are the better soldiers. Cæsar at Alesia resisted the Gauls, but his lines served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey. Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus, and in modern times the duke of Marlborough broke through all the French lines in Flanders. If Wellington triumphed at Torres Vedras it was perhaps because his lines were not attacked, and, it may be, Soult was seduced by that example. His works were almost as gigantic and upon the same plan, that is to say, a river on one flank, the ocean on the other, and the front upon mountains covered with redoubts and partially protected by inundations. But the duke of Dalmatia had only three months to complete his system, his labours were under the gaze of his enemy, his troops, twice defeated during the execution, were inferior in confidence and numbers to the assailants. Lord Wellington's lines at Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year. Massena only knew of them when they stopped his progress, and his army inferior in numbers had been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco.

It is not meant by this to decry intrenched camps within compass, and around which an active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or avoiding battle according to circumstances. The objection applies only to those extensive covering lines by which soldiers are taught to consider themselves inferior in strength and courage to their enemies. A general is thus precluded from showing himself at important points and at critical periods; he is unable to encourage his troops or to correct errors; his sudden resources and the combinations of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering to the works, while the assailants may make whatever dispositions they like, menace every point, and select where to break through. The defenders, seeing large masses directed against them and unable to draw confidence from a like display of numbers, become fearful, knowing there must be some weak point which is the measure of strength for the whole. The assailants fall on with that heat and vehemence which belongs to those who act voluntarily and on the offensive; each mass strives to outdo those on its right and left, and failure is only a repulse, whereas the assailed having no resource but victory look to their flanks, and are more anxious about their neighbours' fighting than their own.

All these disadvantages were experienced at the battle of the Nivelle. D'Erlon attributed his defeat

to the loss of the bridge of Amotz by Conroux's division, and to this cause also Maransin traced his misfortunes. Taupin laid his defeat at Maransin's door, but Clauzel on the other hand ascribed it at once to want of firmness in the troops, although he also asserted that if Daricau's division had come to his aid from the camp of Serres, he would have maintained his ground. Soult, however, traced Clauzel's defeat to injudicious measures. That general, he said, attempted to defend the village of Sarre after the redoubts of St. Barbe and Grenada were carried, whereby Conroux's division was overwhelmed in detail and driven back in flight to Amotz. Clauzel should rather have assembled his three divisions at once in the main position which was his battle-ground, and there, covered by the smaller Rhune, ought to have been victorious. It was scarcely credible, he observed, that such intrenchments as Clauzel's and D'Erlon's should have been carried. For his part, he relied on their strength so confidently as to think the allies must sacrifice twenty-five thousand men to force them, and perhaps fail then. He had been on the right when the battle began, no reports came to him, he could judge of events only by the fire, and when he reached the camp of Serres with his reserve troops and artillery Clauzel's works were lost! His arrival had, however, paralyzed the march of three divisions. This was true; yet there seems some foundation for Clauzel's complaint, namely, that he had for five hours fought on his main position, and during that time no help had come, although the camp of Serres was close at hand, the distance from St. Jean de Luz to that place only four miles, and the attack in the low ground evidently a feint. This then was Soult's error. He suffered Sir John Hope to hold in play twenty-five thousand men in the low ground, while fifteen thousand under Clauzel lost the battle on the hills.

2nd. The French army was inferior in numbers, and many of the works were unfinished; and yet two strong divisions, Daricau's and Foy's, were quite thrown out of the fight, for the slight offensive movement made by the latter produced no effect whatever. Vigorous counter-attacks are no doubt essential to a good defence, and it was in allusion to this that Napoleon, speaking of Joseph's position behind the Ebro in the beginning of the war, said, "If a river were as broad and rapid as the Danube, it would be nothing without secure points for passing to the offensive." The same maxim applies to lines, and Soult grandly conceived and applied this principle when he proposed the descent upon Aragon to Suchet. But he conceived it meanly and poorly when he ordered Foy to attack by the Gorospil mountain. That general's numbers were too few, and the direction of the march false; one regiment in the field of battle at the decisive moment would have been worth three on a distant and secondary point. Foy's retreat was inevitable if D'Erlon failed, and wanting the other's aid, he did fail. What success could Foy obtain? He might have driven Mina's battalions over the Puerto de Maya and quite through the Bastan; he might have defeated Morillo and perhaps have taken general Hill's baggage: yet all this would have weighed little against the allies' success at Amotz; and the deeper he penetrated the more difficult would have been his retreat. The incursion into the Bastan by Yspeguay proposed by him on the 6th, although properly rejected by Soult, would probably have produced greater effects than the one executed by Gorospil on the 10th. A surprise on the 6th, Hill's troops being then in march by brigades through the Alduides, might have brought some advantages to the French, and perhaps

delayed the general attack beyond the 10th, when the heavy rains which set in on the 11th would have rendered it difficult to attack at all: Soult would thus have had time to complete his works.

3rd. It has been observed that a minor cause of defeat was the drawing up of the French troops in front instead of in rear of the redoubts. This may possibly have happened in some places from error and confusion, not by design, for Clauzel's report expressly states that Maransin was directed to form in the rear of the redoubts, and charge the allies when they were between the works and the abatis. It is however needless to pry closely into these matters, when the true cause lies broad on the surface. Lord Wellington directed superior numbers with superior skill. The following analysis will prove this, but it must be remembered that the conscripts are not included in the enumeration of the French force: being quite undisciplined, they were kept in masses behind and never engaged.

Abbé's division, furnishing five thousand old soldiers, was posted in two lines one behind the other, and they were both paralyzed by the position of Morillo's division and Mina's battalions. Foy's division was entirely occupied by the same troops. Six thousand of Wellington's worst soldiers therefore sufficed to employ twelve thousand of Soult's best troops during the whole day. Meanwhile Hill fell upon the decisive point where there was only D'Armagnac's division to oppose him, that is to say, five thousand against twenty thousand. And while the battle was secured on the right of the Nivelle by this disproportion, Beresford on the other bank thrust twenty-four thousand against the ten thousand composing Conroux's and Maransin's divisions. Moreover, as Hill and Beresford, advancing, the one from his left, the other from his right, formed a wedge towards the bridge of Amotz, forty-four thousand men, composing the six divisions under these generals, fell upon the fifteen thousand composing the divisions of D'Armagnac, Conroux and Maransin; and these last were also attacked in detail, because part of Conroux's troops were defeated near Sarre, and Barbot's brigade of Maransin's corps was beaten on the Rhune by the light division before the main position was attacked. Finally, Alten, with eight thousand men, having first defeated Barbot's brigade, fell upon Taupin who had only three thousand, while the rest of the French army was held in check by Freyre and Hope. Thus more than fifty thousand troops, full of confidence from repeated victories, were suddenly thrown upon the decisive point where there were only eighteen thousand, dispirited by previous reverses, to oppose them. Against such a thunderbolt there was no defence in the French works. Was it then a simple matter for Wellington so to combine his battle? The mountains on whose huge flanks he gathered his fierce soldiers, the roads he opened, the horrid crags he surmounted, the headlong steeps he descended, the wild regions through which he poured the destructive fire of more than ninety guns, these and the reputation of the French commander furnish the everlasting reply.

And yet he did not compass all that he designed. The French right escaped, because when he passed the Nivelle at St. Pé he had only two divisions in hand, the sixth had not come up, three were in observation of the camp at Serres, and before he could assemble men enough to descend upon the enemy in the low ground the day had closed. The great object of the battle was therefore unattained; and it may be a question, seeing the shortness of the days and the difficulty of the roads were not unexpected obstacles,

whether the combinations would not have been surer if the principal attack had been directed entirely against Clauzel's position. Carlos d'España's force and the remainder of Mina's battalions could have reinforced Morillo's division with five thousand men to occupy D'Erlon's attention; it was not essential to defeat him, for though he attributed his retreat to Clauzel's reverse, that general did not complain that D'Erlon's retreat endangered his position. This arrangement would have enabled the rest of Hill's troops to reinforce Beresford, and have given lord Wellington three additional divisions in hand with which to cross the Nivelle before two o'clock. Soult's right wing could not then have escaped.

4th. In the report of the battle, lord Wellington from some oversight did but scant and tardy justice to the light division. Acting alone, for Longa's Spaniards went off towards Ascaín and scarcely fired a shot, this division, furnishing only four thousand seven hundred men and officers, first carried the smaller Rhune defended by Barbot's brigade, and then beat Taupin's division from the main position, thus driving superior numbers from the strongest works. In fine, being less than one-sixth of the whole force employed against Clauzel, they defeated one-third of that general's corps. Many brave men they lost, and of two who fell in this battle I will speak.

The first, low in rank, for he was but a lieutenant, rich in honour, for he bore many scars, was young of days. He was only nineteen. But he had seen more combats and sieges than he could count years. So slight in person, and of such surpassing and delicate beauty that the Spaniards often thought him a girl disguised in men's clothing, he was yet so vigorous, so active, so brave, that the most daring and experienced veterans watched his looks on the field of battle, and implicitly following where he led, would, like children, obey his slightest sign in the most difficult situations. His education was incomplete, yet were his natural powers so happy, the keenest and best furnished intellects shrunk from an encounter of wit, and every thought and aspiration was proud and noble, indicating future greatness if destiny had so willed it. Such was Edward Freer of the forty-third, one of three brothers who covered with wounds have all died in the service. Assailed the night before the battle with that strange anticipation of coming death so often felt by military men, he was pierced with three balls at the first storming of the Rhune rocks, and the sternest soldiers in the regiment wept even in the middle of the fight when they heard of his fate.

On the same day and at the same hour was killed colonel Thomas Lloyd. He likewise had been a long time in the forty-third. Under him Freer had learned the rudiments of his profession, but in the course of the war promotion placed Lloyd at the head of the ninety-fourth, and it was leading that regiment he fell. In him also were combined mental and bodily powers of no ordinary kind. A graceful symmetry combined with Herculean strength, and a countenance at once frank and majestic, gave the true index of his nature, for his capacity was great and commanding, and his military knowledge extensive both from experience and study. On his mirth and wit, so well known in the army, I will not dwell, save to remark that he used the latter without offence, yet so as to increase his ascendancy over those with whom he held intercourse, for though gentle he was valiant, ambitious, and conscious of his fitness for great exploits. He, like Freer, was prescient of, and predicted his own fall, yet with no

abatement of courage. When he received the mortal wound, a most painful one, he would not suffer himself to be moved, but remained watching the battle and making observations upon the changes in it until death came. It was thus, at the age of thirty, that the good, the brave, the generous Lloyd died. Tributes to his merit have been published by lord Wellington, and by one of his own poor soldiers! by the highest and by the lowest! To their testimony I add mine: let those who served on equal terms with him say whether in aught I have exceeded his deserts.

CHAPTER II.

Soult occupies the intrenched camp of Bayonne, and the line of the Nive river—Lord Wellington unable to pursue his victory from the state of the roads—Bridge-head of Cambo abandoned by the French—Excesses of the Spanish troops—Lord Wellington's indignation—He sends them back to Spain—Various skirmishes in front of Bayonne—The generals John Wilson and Vandeleur are wounded—Mina plunders the Val de Baigorri—Is beaten by the national guards—Passage of the Nive and battles in front of Bayonne—Combat of the 10th—Combat of the 11th—Combat of the 12th—Battle of St. Pierre—Observations.

SOULT, having lost the Nivelle, at first designed to leave part of his forces in the intrenched camp of Bayonne, and with the remainder take a flanking position behind the Nive, half way between Bayonne and St. Jean Pied de Port, securing his left by the intrenched mountain of Ursouia, and his right on the heights above Cambo, the bridge-head of which would give him the power of making offensive movements. He could thus keep his troops together and restore their confidence, while he confined the allies to a small sterile district of France between the river and the sea, and rendered their situation very uneasy during the winter if they did not retire. However he soon modified this plan. The works of the Bayonne camp were not complete, and his presence was necessary to urge their progress. The camp on the Ursouia mountain had been neglected contrary to his orders, and the bridge-head at Cambo was only commenced on the right bank. On the left it was indeed complete, but constructed on a bad trace. Moreover he found that the Nive in dry weather was fordable at Ustaritz below Cambo, and at many places above that point. Remaining therefore at Bayonne himself with six divisions and Villatte's reserve, he sent D'Erlon with three divisions to reinforce Foy at Cambo. Yet neither D'Erlon's divisions nor Soult's whole army could have stopped lord Wellington at this time, if other circumstances had permitted the latter to follow up his victory as he designed.

The hardships and privations endured on the mountains by the Anglo-Portuguese troops had been beneficial to them as an army. The fine air and the impossibility of the soldiers committing their usual excesses in drink had rendered them unusually healthy, while the facility of enforcing a strict discipline, and their natural impatience to win the fair plains spread out before them, had raised their moral and physical qualities in a wonderful degree. Danger was their sport, and their experienced general, in the prime and vigour of life, was as impatient for action as his soldiers. Neither the works of the Bayonne camp, nor the barrier of the Nive, suddenly manned by a beaten and dispirited army, could have long withstood the progress of such a fiery host, and if Wellington could have let their strength and fury loose in the first days succeeding the battle of the Nivelle, France would have felt his conquering

footsteps to her centre. But the country at the foot of the Pyrenees is a deep clay, quite impassable after rain except by the royal road near the coast, and that of St. Jean Pied de Port, both of which were in the power of the French. On the by-roads the infantry sunk to the midleg, the cavalry above the horses' knees, and even to the saddle-girths in some places. The artillery could not move at all. The rain had commenced on the 11th, the mist in the early part of the 12th had given Soult time to regain his camp and secure the high road to St. Jean Pied de Port, by which his troops easily gained their proper posts on the Nive, while his adversary, fixed in the swamps, could only make the ineffectual demonstration at Ustaritz and Cambo already noticed.

Wellington, uneasy for his right flank while the French commanded the Cambo passage across the Nive, directed general Hill to menace it again on the 16th. Foy had received orders to preserve the bridge-head on the right bank in any circumstances, but he was permitted to abandon the work on the left bank in the event of a general attack; however at Hill's approach the officer placed there in command destroyed all the works and the bridge itself. This was a great cross to Soult, and the allies' flank being thus secured they were put into cantonments, to avoid the rain which fell heavily. The bad weather was however not the only obstacle to the English general's operations. On the very day of the battle, Freyre's and Longa's soldiers entering Ascain pillaged it and murdered several persons; the next day the whole of the Spanish troops continued these excesses in various places, and on the right Mina's battalions, some of whom were also in a state of mutiny, made a plundering and murdering incursion from the mountains towards Hellette. The Portuguese and British soldiers of the left wing had commenced the like outrages, and two French persons were killed in one town; however the adjutant-general, Pakenham, arriving at the moment, saw and instantly put the perpetrators to death, thus nipping this wickedness in the bud, but at his own risk, for legally he had not that power. This general, whose generosity, humanity and chivalric spirit excited the admiration of every honourable person who approached him, is the man who afterwards fell at New Orleans, and who has been so foully traduced by American writers. He who was pre-eminently distinguished by his detestation of inhumanity and outrage, has been with astounding falsehood represented as instigating his troops to the most infamous excesses. But from a people holding millions of their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prate and vaunt of liberty until all men turn with loathing from the sickening folly, what can be expected?

Terrified by these excesses, the French people fled even from the larger towns, but Wellington quickly relieved their terror. On the 12th, although expecting a battle, he put to death all the Spanish marauders he could take in the act, and then with many reproaches, and despite of the discontent of their generals, forced the whole to withdraw into their own country. He disarmed the insubordinate battalions under Mina, quartered Giron's Andalusians in the Bastan where O'Donel resumed the command; sent Freyre's Gallicians to the district between Irun and Ernani, and Longa over the Ebro. Morillo's division alone remained with the army. These decisive proceedings, marking the lofty character of the man, proved not less politic than resolute. The French people immediately returned, and finding the strictest discipline preserved, and

all things paid for, adopted an amicable intercourse with the invaders. However, the loss of such a mass of troops and the effects of weather on the roads reduced the army for the moment to a state of inactivity; the head-quarters were suddenly fixed at St. Jean de Luz, and the troops were established in permanent cantonments with the following line of battle.

The left wing occupied a broad ridge on both sides of the great road beyond Bidart, the principal post being at a mansion belonging to the mayor of Biarritz. The front was covered by a small stream spreading here and there into large ponds or tanks, between which the road was conducted. The centre, posted partly on the continuation of this ridge in front of Arcangues, partly on the hill of St. Barbe, extended by Arauntz to Ustaritz, the right being thrown back to face count D'Erlon's position, extended by Cambo to Itzassu. From this position, which might stretch about six miles on the front and eight miles on the flank, strong piquets were pushed forwards to several points, and the infantry occupied all the villages and towns behind as far back as Espelette, Suriade, Ainhoa, St. Pé, Sarre and Ascain. One regiment of Vandeleur's cavalry was with the advanced post on the left, the remainder were sent to Andaie and Urogne, Victor Alten's horsemen were about St. Pé, and the heavy cavalry remained in Spain.

In this state of affairs the establishment of the different posts in front led to several skirmishes. In one on the 18th, general John Wilson and general Vandeleur were wounded; but on the same day Beresford drove the French from the bridge of Urdains, near the junction of the Ustaritz and St. Pé roads, and though attacked in force the next day he maintained his acquisition. A more serious action occurred on the 23d in front of Arcangues. This village, held by the piquets of the light division, was two or three miles in front of Arbonne, where the nearest support was cantoned. It is built on the centre of a crescent-shaped ridge, and the sentries of both armies were so close that the reliefs and patrols actually passed each other in their rounds, so that a surprise was inevitable if it suited either side to attempt it. Lord Wellington visited this post, and the field-officer on duty made known to him its disadvantages, and the means of remedying them, by taking entire possession of the village, pushing piquets along the horns of the crescent, and establishing a chain of posts across the valley between them. He appeared satisfied with this project, and two days afterwards the forty-third and some of the riflemen were employed to effect it, the greatest part of the division being brought up in support. The French, after a few shots, abandoned Arcangues, Bussussary and both horns of the crescent, retiring before the piquets to a large fortified house situated at the mouth of the valley. The project suggested by the field-officer was thus executed with the loss of only five men wounded, and the action should have ceased, but the piquets of the forty-third suddenly received orders to attack the fortified house, and the columns of support were shown at several points of the semi-circle; the French, then conceiving they were going to be seriously assailed, reinforced their post; a sharp skirmish ensued, and the piquets were finally withdrawn to the ground they had originally gained, and beyond which they should never have been pushed. This ill-managed affair cost eighty-eight men and officers, of which eighty were of the forty-third.

Lord Wellington, whose powerful artillery and cavalry, the former consisting of nearly one hundred

field-pieces and the latter furnishing more than eight thousand six hundred sabres, were paralyzed in the contracted space he occupied, was now anxious to pass the Nive; but the rain, which continued to fall, baffled him, and meanwhile Mina's Spaniards, descending once more from the Aldudes to plunder Baigorri, were beaten by the national guards of that valley. However, early in December, the weather amended, forty or fifty pieces of artillery were brought up, and other preparations made to surprise or force the passage of the Nive at Cambo and Ustaritz. And as this operation led to sanguinary battles, it is fitting first to describe the exact position of the French.

Bayonne, situated at the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, commands the passage of both. A weak fortress of the third order, its importance was in its position, and its intrenched camp, exceedingly strong and commanded by the fortress, could not be safely attacked in front, wherefore Soult kept only six divisions there. His right, composed of Reille's two divisions and Villatte's reserve, touched on the lower Adour where there was a flotilla of gun-boats. It was covered by a swamp and artificial inundation, through which the royal road led to St. Jean de Luz, and the advanced posts, well intrenched, were pushed forward beyond Anglet on this causeway. His left under Clauzel, composed of three divisions, extended from Anglet to the Nive; it was covered partly by the swamp, partly by the large fortified house which the light division assailed on the 23d, partly by an inundation spreading below Urdains towards the Nive. Thus intrenched, the fortified outposts may be called the front of battle, the intrenched camp the second line, and the fortress the citadel. The country in front, a deep clay soil, enclosed and covered with small wood and farmhouses, was very difficult to move in.

Beyond the Nive the intrenched camp, stretching from that river to the Adour, was called the front of Mousserolles. It was in the keeping of D'Erlon's four divisions, which were also extended up the right bank of the Nive; that is to say, D'Armagnac's troops were in front of Ustaritz, and Foy prolonged the line to Cambo. The remainder of D'Erlon's corps was in reserve, occupying a strong range of heights about two miles in front of Mousserolles, the right at Villefranque on the Nive, the left at Old Moguerre towards the Adour. D'Erlon's communications with the rest of the army were double, one circuitous through Bayonne, the other direct by a bridge of boats thrown above that place.

After the battle of the Nivelle, Soult brought general Paris's division from St. Jean Pied de Port to Lahoussou, close under the Ursouia mountain, where it was in connexion with Foy's left, communicating by the great road to St. Jean Pied de Port which ran in a parallel direction to the river.

The Nive, the Adour, and the Gave de Pau, which falls into the latter many miles above Bayonne, were all navigable, the first as far as Ustaritz, the second to Dax, the third to Peirehorade, and the great French magazines were collected at the two latter places. But the army was fed with difficulty: and hence, to restrain Soult from the country beyond the Nive, to intercept his communications with St. Jean Pied de Port, to bring a powerful cavalry into activity, and to obtain secret intelligence from the interior of France, were Wellington's inducements to force a passage over the Nive. Yet to place the troops on both sides of a navigable river, with communications bad at all times and subject to entire interruptions from rain; to do this in face of an army possessing short communications, good roads

and intrenched camps for retreat, was a delicate and dangerous operation.

On the 7th, orders were issued for forcing the passage on the 9th. On that day sir John Hope and Charles Alten, with the first, fifth and light divisions, the unattached brigades of infantry, Vandeleur's cavalry and twelve guns, in all about twenty-four thousand combatants, were to drive back the French advanced posts along the whole front of the intrenched camp between the Nive and the sea. This movement was partly to examine the course of the lower Adour with a view to subsequent operations, but principally to make Soult discover his dispositions of defence on that side, and to keep his troops in check while Beresford and Hill crossed the Nive. To support this double operation, the fourth and seventh divisions were secretly brought up from Ascain and Espelette on the 8th, the latter to the hill of St. Barbe, from whence it detached one brigade to relieve the posts of the third division. There remained the second, the third and the sixth divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese, and Morillo's Spaniards, for the passage. Beresford, leading the third and sixth, reinforced with six guns and a squadron of cavalry, was to cross at Ustaritz with pontoons; Hill having the second division, Hamilton's Portuguese, Vivian's and Victor Alten's cavalry, and fourteen guns, was to ford the river at Cambo and Larrestore. Both generals were then to repair the bridges at these respective points with materials prepared beforehand; and to cover Hill's movement on the right and protect the valley of the Nive from Paris, who being at Lahoussou might have penetrated to the rear of the army during the operations, Morillo's Spaniards were to cross at Itzassu. At this time Foy's division was extended from Halzou in front of Larressore to the fords above Cambo, the Ursouia mountain being between his left and Paris. The rest of D'Erlon's troops remained on the heights of Moguerre in front of Mousserolles.

PASSAGE OF THE NIVE, AND BATTLES IN FRONT OF BAYONNE.

At Ustaritz the French had broken both bridges, but the island connecting them was in possession of the British. Beresford laid his pontoons down on the hither side in the night of the 8th, and in the morning of the 9th a beacon lighted on the heights above Cambo gave the signal of attack. The passage was immediately forced under the fire of the artillery, the second bridge was laid, and D'Armagnac's brigade was driven back by the sixth division; but the swampy nature of the country between the river and the high road retarded the allies' march and gave the French time to retreat with little loss. At the same time Hill's troops, also covered by the fire of artillery, forced the passage in three columns above and below Cambo with slight resistance, though the fords were so deep that several horsemen were drowned, and the French strongly posted, especially at Halzou, where there was a deep and strong mill-race to cross as well as the river.

Foy, seeing by the direction of Beresford's fire that his retreat was endangered, retired hastily with his left, leaving his right wing under general Berlier at Halzou without orders. Hence when general Pringle attacked the latter from Larressore, the sixth division was already on the high road between Foy and Berlier, who escaped by cross roads towards Hasparren, but did not rejoin his division until two o'clock in the afternoon. Meanwhile Morillo crossed at Itzassu, and Paris retired to Hellette, where he was joined by a regiment of light cavalry belonging to Pierre Soult, who was then on the Bidouze

river. Morillo followed, and in one village near Hellette his troops killed fifteen peasants, amongst them several women and children.

General Hill, having won the passage, placed a brigade of infantry at Urcuray to cover the bridge of Cambo, and to support the cavalry which he despatched to scour the roads towards Lahoussou, St. Jean Pied de Port, and Hasparren, and to observe Paris and Pierre Soult. With the rest of his troops he marched to the heights of Lormenthua in front of the hills of Moguerre and Villefranque, and was there joined by the sixth division, the third remaining to cover the bridge of Ustaritz. It was now about one o'clock, and Soult, coming hastily from Bayonne, approved of the disposition made by D'Erlon, and offered battle, his line being extended so as to bar the high road. D'Armagnac's brigade which had retired from Ustaritz was now in advance at Villefranque, and a heavy cannonade and skirmish ensued along the front, but no general attack was made because the deep roads had retarded the rear of Hill's columns. However the Portuguese of the sixth division, descending from Lormenthua about three o'clock, drove D'Armagnac's brigade with sharp fighting and after one repulse out of Villefranque. A brigade of the second division was then established in advance, connecting Hill's corps with the troops in Villefranque. Thus three divisions of infantry, wanting the brigade left at Urcuray, hemmed up four French divisions; and as the latter, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, made no advantage of the broken movements of the allies caused by the deep roads, the passage of the Nive may be judged a surprise. Wellington thus far overreached his able adversary, yet he had not trusted to this uncertain chance alone.

The French masses falling upon the heads of his columns at Lormenthua, while the rear was still labouring in the deep roads, might have caused some disorder, but could not have driven either Hill or Beresford over the river again, because the third division was close at hand to reinforce the sixth, and the brigade of the seventh, left at St. Barbe, could have followed by the bridge of Ustaritz, thus giving the allies the superiority of numbers. The greatest danger was, that Paris, reinforced by Pierre Soult's cavalry, should have returned and fallen either upon Morillo or the brigade left at Urcuray in the rear, while Soult, reinforcing D'Erlon with fresh divisions brought from the other side of the Nive, attacked Hill and Beresford in front. It was to prevent this that Hope and Alten, whose operations are now to be related, pressed the enemy on the left bank.

The first named general, having twelve miles to march from St. Jean de Luz before he could reach the French works, put his troops in motion during the night, and about eight o'clock passed between the tanks in front of Barrouilhet with his right, while his left descended from the platform of Bidart and crossed the valley towards Biarritz. The French outposts retired fighting, and Hope, sweeping with a half circle to his right, and being preceded by the fire of his guns and many skirmishers, arrived in front of the intrenched camp about one o'clock. His left then rested on the lower Adour, his centre menaced a very strong advanced work on the ridge of Beyris beyond Anglet, and his right was in communication with Alten. That general, having a shorter distance to move, halted about Bussussary and Arcangues until Hope's fiery crescent was closing on the French camp, and then he also advanced, but with the exception of a slight skirmish at the fortified house there was no resistance. Three divisions,

some cavalry, and the unattached brigades, equal to a fourth division, sufficed therefore to keep six French divisions in check on this side.

When evening closed, the allies fell back towards their original positions, but under heavy rain, and with great fatigue to Hope's wing, for even the royal road was knee-deep of mud, and his troops were twenty-four hours under arms. The whole day's fighting cost about eight hundred men for each side, the loss of the allies being rather greater on the left bank of the Nive than on the right.

Wellington's wings being now divided by the Nive, the French general resolved to fall upon one of them with the whole of his forces united; and misled by the prisoners who assured him that the third and fourth divisions were both on the heights of Lormenthua, he resolved, being able to assemble his troops with great facility on the left of the Nive where also the allies' front was most extended, to choose that side for his counter-stroke. The garrison of Bayonne was eight thousand strong, partly troops of the line, partly national guards, with which he ordered the governor to occupy the entrenched camp of Mousserolles; then stationing ten gun-boats on the upper Adour to watch that river as high as the confluence of the Gave de Pau, he made D'Erlon file his four divisions over the bridge of boats between the fortress and Mousserolles, directing him to gain the camp of Marac and take post behind Clauzel's corps on the other side of the river. He thus concentrated nine divisions of infantry and Villatte's reserve, a brigade of cavalry and forty guns, furnishing in all about sixty thousand combatants including conscripts, to assail a quarter where the allies, although stronger by one division than the French general imagined, and yet only thirty-thousand infantry with twenty-four pieces of cannon.

The French marshal's first design was to burst with his whole army on the table-land of Bussussary and Arcangues, and then act as circumstances should dictate; and he judged so well of his position that he desired the minister of war to expect good news for the next day. Indeed the situation of the allies, although better than he knew of, gave him some right to anticipate success. On no point was there any expectation of this formidable counter-attack. Lord Wellington was on the left of the Nive, preparing to assault the heights where he had last seen the French the evening before. Hope's troops, with the exception of Wilson's Portuguese now commanded by general Campbell and posted at Barrouilhet, had retired to their cantonments; the first division was at St. Jean de Luz and Sibourre, more than six miles distant from the outposts; the fifth division was between those places and Bidart, and all exceedingly fatigued. The light division had orders to retire from Bussussary to Arbonne, a distance of four miles, and part of the second brigade had already marched, when fortunately general Kempt, somewhat suspicious of the enemy's movements, delayed obedience until he could see what was going on in his front; he thus, as the event proved, saved the position.

The extraordinary difficulty of moving through the country even for single horsemen, the numerous enclosures and copses which denied any distinct view, the easy success of the operation to cross the Nive, and a certain haughty confidence, the sure attendant of a long course of victory, seems to have rendered the English general at this time somewhat negligent of his own security. Undoubtedly the troops were not disposed as if a battle was expected. The general position, composed of two distinct parts, was indeed very strong; the ridge of

Barrouilhet could only be attacked along the royal road on a narrow front between the tanks, and he had directed intrenchments to be made; but there was only one brigade there, and a road made with difficulty by the engineers supplied a bad flank communication with the light division. This Barrouilhet ridge was prolonged to the platform of Bussussary, but in its winding bulged out too near the enemy's works in the centre to be safely occupied in force, and behind it there was a deep valley or basin extending to Arbonne.

The ridge of Arcangues on the other side of this basin was the position of battle for the centre. Three tongues of land shot out from this part to the front, and the valleys between them as well as their slopes were covered with copse-woods almost impenetrable. The church of Arcangues, a gentleman's house, and parts of the village, furnished rallying points of defence for the piquets, which were necessarily numerous because of the extent of front. At this time the left-hand ridge or tongue of land was occupied by the fifty-second regiment, which had also posts in the great basin separating the Arcangues position from that of Barrouilhet; the central tongue was held by the piquets of the forty-third, with supporting companies placed in succession towards Bussussary, where was an open common across which troops in retreat would have to pass to the church of Arcangues. The third tongue was guarded, partly by the forty-third, partly by the riflemen, but the valley between was not occupied, and the piquets on the extreme right extended to an inundation, across a narrow part of which, near the house of the senator Garrat, there was a bridge: the facility for attack was there, however, small.

One brigade of the seventh division continued this line of posts to the Nive, holding the bridge of Urdains; the rest of the division was behind St. Barbe, and belonged rather to Ustaritz than to this front. The fourth division was several miles behind the right of the light division.

In this state of affairs, if Soult had, as he first designed, burst with his whole army upon Bussussary and Arcangues, it would have been impossible for the light division, scattered as it was over such an extent of difficult ground, to have stopped him for half an hour; and there was no support within several miles, no superior officer to direct the concentration of the different divisions. Lord Wellington had indeed ordered all the line to be intrenched; but the works were commenced on a great scale, and, as is common when danger does not spur, the soldiers had laboured so carelessly that, beyond a few abatis, the tracing of some lines and redoubts, and the opening of a road of communication, the ground remained in its natural state. The French general would, therefore, quickly have gained the broad open hills beyond Arcangues, separated the fourth and seventh divisions from the light division, and cut them off from Hope. Soult, however, in the course of the night, for reasons which I do not find stated, changed his project, and at day break Reille marched with Boyer's and Maucune's divisions, Sparre's cavalry and from twenty to thirty guns, against Hope by the main road. He was followed by Foy and Villatte, but Clauzel assembled his troops under cover of the ridges near the fortified house in front of Bussussary, and one of D'Erlon's divisions approached the bridge of Urdains.

COMBAT OF THE 10TH.

A heavy rain fell in the night, yet the morning broke fair, and soon after dawn the French infantry were observed by the piquets of the forty-third push-

ing each other about as if at gambols, yet lining by degrees the nearest ditches; a general officer was also seen behind a farmhouse close to the sentinels, and at the same time the heads of columns could be perceived in the rear. Thus warned, some companies of the forty-third were thrown on the right into the basin to prevent the enemy from penetrating that way to the small plain between Bussussary and Arcangues. General Kempt was with the piquets, and his foresight in delaying his march to Arbonne now saved the position, for he immediately placed the reserves of his brigade in the church and mansion house of Arcangues. Meanwhile the French, breaking forth with loud cries and a rattling musketry, fell at a running pace upon the piquets of the forty-third both on the tongue and in the basin, and a cloud of skirmishers descending on their left, penetrating between them and the fifty-second regiment, sought to turn both. The right tongue was in like manner assailed, and at the same time the piquets at the bridge near Garrat's house were driven back.

The assault was so strong and rapid, the enemy so numerous, and the ground so extensive, that it would have been impossible to have reached the small plain beyond Bussussary in time to regain the church of Arcangues if any serious resistance had been attempted; wherefore delivering their fire at pistol-shot distance the piquets fell back in succession, and never were the steadiness and intelligence of veteran soldiers more eminently displayed; for though it was necessary to run at full speed to gain the small plain before the enemy, who was constantly outflanking the line of posts by the basin, though the ways were so deep and narrow that no formation could be preserved, though the fire of the French was thick and close, and their cries vehement as they rushed on in pursuit, the instant the open ground at Bussussary was attained, the apparently disordered crowd of fugitives became a compact and well-formed body, defying and deriding the fruitless efforts of their adversaries.

The fifty-second, being about half a mile to the left, though only slightly assailed, fell back also to the main ridge; for though the closeness of the country did not permit colonel Colborne to observe the strength of the enemy, he could see the rapid retreat of the forty-third, and thence judging how serious the affair was, so well did the regiments of the light division understand each other's qualities, withdrew his outposts to secure the main position. And in good time he did so.

On the right hand tongue the troops were not so fortunate; for whether they delayed their retreat too long, or that the country was more intricate, the enemy, moving by the basin, reached Bussussary before the rear arrived, and about a hundred of the forty-third and riflemen were thus intercepted. The French were in a hollow road and careless, never doubting that the officer of the forty-third, ensign Campbell, a youth scarcely eighteen years of age, would surrender; but he with a shout broke into their column sword in hand, and though the struggle was severe, and twenty of the forty-third and thirty of the riflemen with their officer remained prisoners, reached the church with the rest.

D'Armagnac's division of D'Erlon's corps now pushed close up to the bridge of Urdains, and Clauzel assembled his three divisions by degrees at Bussussary, opening meanwhile a sharp fire of musketry. The position was however safe. The mansion house on the right, covered by abatis and not easily accessible, was defended by a rifle battalion and the Portuguese. The church and churchyard were occu-

pied by the forty third, who were supported with two mountain-guns, their front being covered by a declivity of thick copse-wood filled with riflemen, and only to be turned by narrow hollow roads leading on each side to the church. On the left the fifty-second, now supported by the remainder of the division, spread as far as the great basin which separated the right wing from the ridge of Barrouilhet, towards which some small posts were pushed, but there was still a great interval between Alten's and Hope's positions.

The skirmishing fire grew hot, Clauzel brought up twelve guns to the ridge of Bussussary, with which he threw shot and shells into the churchyard of Arcangues, and four or five hundred infantry then made a rush forwards; but a heavy fire from the forty-third sent them back over the ridge where their guns were posted. Yet the practice of the latter, well directed at first, would have been murderous if this musketry from the churchyard had not made the French gunners withdraw their pieces a little behind the ridge, which caused their shot to fly wild and high. General Kempt, thinking the distance too great, was at first inclined to stop this fire, but the moment it lulled the French gunners pushed their pieces forwards again, and their shells knocked down eight men in an instant. The small arms then recommenced and the shells again flew high. The French were in like manner kept at bay by the riflemen in the village and mansion-house, and the action, hottest where the fifty-second fought, continued all day. It was not very severe; but it has been noticed in detail, because both French and English writers, misled perhaps by an inaccurate phrase in the public despatch, have represented it as a desperate attack by which the light division was driven into its intrenchments, whereas it was the piquets only that were forced back, there were no intrenchments save those made on the spur of the moment by the soldiers in the churchyard, and the French can hardly be said to have attacked at all. The real battle was at Barrouilhet.

On that side Reille, advancing with two divisions, about nine o'clock, drove Campbell's Portuguese from Anglet, and Sparre's cavalry charging during the fight cut down a great many men. The French infantry then assailed the ridge at Barrouilhet, but moving along a narrow ridge and confined on each flank by the tanks, only two brigades could get into action by the main road, and the rain of the preceding night had rendered all the by-roads so deep that it was midday before the French line of battle was filled. This delay saved the allies, for the attack here also was so unexpected that the first division and Lord Aylmer's brigade were at rest in St. Jean de Luz and Bidart when the action commenced. The latter did not reach the position before eleven o'clock; the footguards did not march from St. Jean until after twelve, and only arrived at three o'clock in the afternoon when the fight was done; all the troops were exceedingly fatigued, only ten guns could be brought into play, and from some negligence part of the infantry were at first without ammunition.

Robinson's brigade of the fifth division first arrived to support Campbell's Portuguese, and fight the battle. The French spread their skirmishers along the whole valley in front of Biarritz, but their principal effort was directed by the great road, and against the platform of Barrouilhet about the mayor's house, where the ground was so thick of hedges and coppice-wood that a most confused fight took place. The assailants cutting ways through the hedges poured on in smaller or larger bodies as the

openings allowed, and were immediately engaged with the defenders; at some points they were successful, at others beaten back, and few knew what was going on to the right or left of where they stood. By degrees Reille engaged both his divisions, and some of Villatte's reserve also entered the fight, and then Bradford's Portuguese and Lord Aylmer's brigade arrived on the allies' side, which enabled colonel Greville's brigade of the fifth division, hitherto kept in reserve, to relieve Robinson's; that general was however dangerously wounded, and his troops suffered severely.

And now a very notable action was performed by the ninth regiment, under colonel Cameron. This officer was on the extreme left of Greville's brigade, Robinson's being then shifted in second line and towards the right, Bradford's brigade was at the mayor's house some distance to the left of the ninth regiment, and the space between was occupied by a Portuguese battalion. There was in front of Greville's brigade a thick hedge; but immediately opposite the ninth was a coppice-wood possessed by the enemy, whose skirmishers were continually gathering in masses, and rushing out as if to assail the line: they were as often driven back, yet the ground was so broken that nothing could be seen beyond the flanks, and when some time had passed in this manner, Cameron, who had received no orders, heard a sudden firing along the main road close to his left. His adjutant was sent to look out, and returned immediately with intelligence that there was little fighting on the road, but a French regiment, which must have passed unseen in small bodies through the Portuguese, between the ninth and the mayor's house, was rapidly filing into line on the rear. The fourth British regiment was then in close column at a short distance, and its commander, colonel Piper, was directed by Cameron to face about, march to the rear, and then bring up his left shoulder, when he would infallibly fall in with the French regiment. Piper marched, but whether he misunderstood the order and took a wrong direction, or mistook the enemy for Portuguese, he passed them. No firing was heard; the adjutant again hurried to the rear, and returned with intelligence that the fourth regiment was not to be seen, but the enemy's line was nearly formed. Cameron, leaving fifty men to answer the skirmishing fire which now increased from the copse, immediately faced about and marched in line against the new enemy, who was about his own strength, as fast as the rough nature of the ground would permit. The French fire, slow at first, increased vehemently as the distance lessened; but when the ninth, coming close up, sprung forwards to the charge, the adverse line broke and fled to the flanks in the utmost disorder. Those who made for their own right brushed the left of Greville's brigade, and even carried off an officer of the royals in their rush; yet the greatest number were made prisoners, and the ninth, having lost about eighty men and officers resumed their old ground.

The final result of the battle at Barrouilhet was the repulse of Reille's divisions; but Villatte still menaced the right flank, and Foy, taking possession of the narrow ridge connecting Bussussary with the platform of Barrouilhet, threw his skirmishers into the great basin leading to Arbonne, and connecting his right with Reille's left menaced Hope's flank at Barrouilhet. This was about two o'clock. Soult, whose columns were now all in hand, gave orders to renew the battle, and his masses were beginning to move when Clauzel reported that a large body of fresh troops, apparently coming from the other side of the Nive, was menacing D'Armagnac's division

from the heights above Urdains. Unable to account for this, Soult, who saw the guards and Germans moving up fast from St. Jean de Luz, and all the unattached brigades already in line, hesitated, suspended his own attack, and ordered D'Erlon, who had two divisions in reserve, to detach one to the support of D'Armagnac: before this disposition could be completed the night fell.

The fresh troops seen by Clauzel were the third, fourth, sixth and seventh divisions, whose movements during the battle it is time to notice. When lord Wellington, who remained on the right of the Nive during the night of the 9th, discovered at day-break that the French had abandoned the heights in Hill's front, he directed that officer to occupy them, and push parties close up to the intrenched camp of Mousserolles, while his cavalry spread beyond Hasparren and up the Adour. Meanwhile the cannonade on the left bank of the Nive being heard, he repaired in person to that side, first making the third and sixth divisions repossess the river, and directing Beresford to lay another bridge of communication lower down the Nive, near Villefranque, to shorten the line of movement. When he reached the left of the Nive, and saw how the battle stood, he made the seventh division close to the left from the hill of St. Barbe, placed the third division at Urdains, and brought up the fourth division to an open heathy ridge on a hill about a mile behind the church of Arcangues. From this point general Cole sent Ross's brigade down into the basin on the left of Colborne, to cover Arbonne, being prepared himself to march with his whole division if the enemy attempted to penetrate in force between Hope and Alten. These dispositions were for the most part completed about two o'clock, and thus Clauzel was held in check at Bussussary, and the renewed attack by Foy's, Villatte's and Reille's divisions on Barrouilhet prevented.

This day's battle cost the Anglo-Portuguese more than twelve hundred men killed and wounded, two generals were amongst the latter, and about three hundred men were made prisoners. The French had one general (Villatte) wounded, and lost about two thousand men. But when the action terminated, two regiments of Nassau and one of Frankfurt, the whole under the command of a colonel Kruse, came over to the allies. These men were not deserters. Their prince, having abandoned Napoleon in Germany, sent secret instructions to his troops to do so likewise, and in good time, for orders to disarm them reached Soult the next morning. The generals on each side, the one hoping to profit, the other to prevent mischief, immediately transmitted notice of the event to Catalonia where several regiments of the same nation were serving. Lord Wellington failed for reasons to be hereafter mentioned, but Suchet disarmed his Germans with reluctance, thinking they could be trusted; and the Nassau troops at Bayonne were perhaps less influenced by patriotism than by an old quarrel; for when belonging to the army of the centre they had forcibly foraged Soult's district early in the year, and carried off the spoil in defiance of his authority, which gave rise to bitter disputes at the time, and was probably not forgotten by him.

COMBAT OF THE 11TH.

In the night of the 10th, Reille withdrew behind the tanks as far as Pucho, Foy and Villatte likewise drew back along the connecting ridge towards Bussussary, thus uniting with Clauzel's left and D'Erlon's reserve, so that on the morning of the 11th the French army, with the exception of D'Armagnac's

division, which remained in front of Urdains, was concentrated, for Soult feared a counter-attack. The French deserters indeed declared that Clauzel had formed a body of two thousand choice grenadiers to assault the village and church of Arcangues, but the day passed without any event in that quarter save a slight skirmish in which a few men were wounded. Not so on the side of Barrouilhet. There was a thick fog, and lord Wellington, desirous to ascertain what the French were about, directed the ninth regiment about ten o'clock to open a skirmish beyond the tanks towards Pucho, and to push the action if the French augmented their force. Cameron did so, and the fight was becoming warm, when colonel Delancey, a staff-officer, rashly directed the ninth to enter the village. The error was soon and sharply corrected, for the fog cleared up, and Soult, who had twenty-four thousand men at that point, observing the ninth unsupported, ordered a counter-attack, which was so strong and sudden that Cameron only saved his regiment with the aid of some Portuguese troops hastily brought up by sir John Hope. The fighting then ceased, and lord Wellington went to the right, leaving Hope with orders to push back the French piquets and re-establish his former outposts on the connecting ridge towards Bussussary.

Soult had hitherto appeared undecided, but roused by this second insult, he ordered Daricau's division to attack Barrouilhet along the connecting ridge, while Boyer's division fell on by the main road between the tanks. This was about two o'clock, and the allies expecting no battle had dispersed to gather fuel, for the time was wet and cold. In an instant the French penetrated in all directions, they outflanked the right, they passed the tanks, seized the out-buildings of the mayor's house, and occupied the coppice in front of it; they were indeed quickly driven from the out-buildings by the royals, but the tumult was great, and the coppice was filled with men of all nations intermixed and fighting in a perilous manner. Robinson's brigade was very hardly handled, the officer commanding it was wounded, a squadron of French cavalry suddenly cut down some of the Portuguese near the wood, and on the right the colonel of the eighty-fourth, having unwisely engaged his regiment in a hollow road where the French possessed the high bank, was killed with a great number of men. However the ninth regiment, posted on the main road, plied Boyer's flank with fire, the eighty-fifth regiment of lord Aylmer's brigade came into action, and sir John Hope, conspicuous from his gigantic stature and heroic courage, was seen wherever danger pressed rallying and encouraging the troops; at one time he was in the midst of the enemy, his clothes were pierced with bullets, and he received a severe wound in the ankle, yet he would not quit the field, and by his great presence of mind and calm intrepidity restored the battle. The French were finally beaten back from the position of Barrouilhet; yet they had recovered their original posts, and continued to gall the allies with a fire of shot and shells until the fall of night. The total loss in this fight was about six hundred men of a side; and as the fifth division was now considerably reduced in numbers, the first division took its place on the front line. Meanwhile Soult sent his cavalry over the Nive to Mousserolles to check the incursions of Hill's horsemen.

COMBAT OF THE 12TH.

The rain fell heavily in the night, and though the morning broke fair, neither side seemed inclined to recommence hostilities. The advanced posts were however very close to each other, and about ten

o'clock a misunderstanding arose. The French general, observing the fresh regiments of the first division close to his posts, imagined the allies were going to attack him, and immediately reinforced his front: this movement causing an English battery to fall into a like error, it opened upon the advancing French troops, and in an instant the whole line of posts was engaged. Soult then brought up a number of guns, the firing continued without an object for many hours, and three or four hundred men of a side were killed and wounded; but the great body of the French army remained concentrated and quiet on the ridge between Barrouilhet and Bussusary.

Lord Wellington, as early as the 10th, had expected Soult would abandon this attack to fall upon Hill, and therefore had given Beresford orders to carry the sixth division to that general's assistance by the new bridge, and the seventh division by Ustaritz, without waiting for further instructions, if Hill was assailed; now, observing Soult's tenacity at Barrouilhet, he drew the seventh division towards Arbonne. Beresford had however made a movement towards the Nive, and this, with the march of the seventh division and some changes in the position of the fourth division, caused Soult to believe the allies were gathering with a view to attack his centre on the morning of the 13th; and it is remarkable that the deserters at this early period told him the Spaniards had re-entered France, although orders to that effect were not, as we shall find, given until the next day. Convinced then that his bolt was shot on the left of the Nive, he left two divisions and Villatte's reserve in the intrenched camp, and marched with the other seven to Mousserolles, intending to fall upon Hill.

That general had pushed his scouting parties to the Gambouri, and when general Sparre's horsemen arrived at Mousserolles on the 12th, Pierre Soult advanced from the Bidouze with all the light cavalry. He was supported by the infantry of general Paris, and drove the allies' posts from Hasparren. Colonel Vivian, who commanded there, immediately ordered major Brotherton to charge with the fourteenth dragoons across the bridge; but it was an ill-judged order, and the impossibility of succeeding so manifest, that when Brotherton, noted throughout the army for his daring, galloped forward, only two men and one subaltern, lieutenant Southwell, passed the narrow bridge with him, and they were all taken. Vivian then, seeing his error, charged with his whole brigade to rescue them, yet in vain; he was forced to fall back upon Urcuray, where Morillo's Spaniards had relieved the British infantry brigade on the 11th. This threatening movement induced general Hill to put the British brigade in march again for Urcuray on the 12th, but he recalled it at sunset, having then discovered Soult's columns passing the Nive by the boat-bridge above Bayonne.

Lord Wellington now, feeling the want of numbers, brought forward a division of Gallicians to St. Jean de Luz, and one of Andalusians from the Bastan to Itzassu, and to prevent their plundering fed them from the British magazines. The Gallicians were to support Hope, the Andalusians to watch the upper valley of the Nive and protect the rear of the army from Paris and Pierre Soult, who could easily be reinforced with a strong body of national guards. Meanwhile Hill had taken a position of battle on a front of two miles.

His left composed of the twenty-eighth, thirty-fourth and thirty-ninth regiments, under general Pringle, occupied a wooded and broken range crowned by the chateau of Villefranque; it covered the new pontoon bridge of communication, which was a

mile and a half higher up the river, but it was separated from the centre by a small stream forming a chain of ponds in a very deep and marshy valley.

The centre, placed on both sides of the high road near the hamlet of St. Pierre, occupied a crescent-shaped height, broken with rocks and close brushwood on the left hand, and on the right hand enclosed with high and thick hedges, one of which, covering, at the distance of a hundred yards, part of the line, was nearly impassable. Here Ashworth's Portuguese and Barnes' British brigade of the second division were posted. The seventy-first regiment was on the left, the fiftieth in the centre, the ninety-second on the right. Ashworth's Portuguese were posted in advance immediately in front of St. Pierre, and their skirmishers occupied a small wood covering their right. Twelve guns under the colonels Ross and Tullock were concentrated in front of the centre, looking down the great road, and half a mile in rear of this point Lecor's Portuguese division was stationed with two guns as a reserve.

The right under Byng was composed of the third, fifty-seventh, thirty-first and sixty-sixth. One of these regiments, the third, was posted on a height running nearly parallel with the Adour, called the ridge of Partouhiria, or Old Moguerre, because a village of that name was situated upon the summit. This regiment was pushed in advance to a point where it could only be approached by crossing the lower part of a narrow swampy valley which separated Moguerre from the heights of St. Pierre. The upper part of this valley was held by Byng with the remainder of his brigade, and his post was well covered by a mill-pond leading towards the enemy and nearly filling all the valley.

One mile in front of St. Pierre was a range of counter-heights belonging to the French, but the basin between was broad, open, and commanded in every part by the fire of the allies, and in all parts the country was too heavy and too much enclosed for the action of cavalry. Nor could the enemy approach in force, except on a narrow front of battle and by the high road, until within cannon-shot, when two narrow difficult lanes branched off to the right and left, and crossing the swampy valleys on each side, led, the one to the height where the third regiment was posted on the extreme right of the allies, the other to general Pringle's position on the left.

In the night of the 12th the rain swelled the Nive and carried away the allies' bridge of communication. It was soon restored, but on the morning of the 13th general Hill was completely cut off from the rest of the army; and while seven French divisions of infantry, furnishing at least thirty-five thousand combatants, approached him in front, an eighth under general Paris and the cavalry division of Pierre Soult menaced him in rear. To meet the French in his front he had less than fourteen thousand, men and officers, with fourteen guns in position; and there were only four thousand Spaniards with Vivian's cavalry at Urcuray.

BATTLE OF ST. PIERRE.

The morning broke with a heavy mist, under cover of which Soult formed his order of battle. D'Erlon, having D'Armagnac's, Abbé's and Darcu's divisions of infantry, Sparre's cavalry and twenty-two guns, marched in front; he was followed by Foy and Maransin, but the remainder of the French army was in reserve, for the roads would not allow of any other order. The mist hung heavily, and the French masses, at one moment quite shrouded in vapour, at another dimly seen or loom-

ing sudden and large and dark at different points, appeared like thunder-clouds gathering before the storm. At half past eight Soult pushed back the British piquets in the centre; the sun burst out at that moment, the sparkling fire of the light troops spread wide in the valley, and crept up the hills on either flank, while the bellowing of forty pieces of artillery shook the banks of the Nive and the Adour. Daricau, marching on the French right, was directed against general Pringle. D'Armagnac, moving on their left and taking Old Moguerre as the point of direction, was ordered to force Byng's right. Abbé assailed the centre at St. Pierre, where general Stewart commanded, for sir Rowland Hill had taken his station on a commanding mount in the rear, from whence he could see the whole battle and direct the movements.

Abbé, a man noted for vigour, pushed his attack with great violence, and gained ground so rapidly with his light troops on the left of Ashworth's Portuguese, that Stewart sent the seventy-first regiment and two guns from St. Pierre to the latter's aid; the French skirmishers likewise won the small wood on Ashworth's right, and half of the fiftieth regiment was also detached from St. Pierre to that quarter. The wood was thus retaken, and the flanks of Stewart's position secured; but this centre was very much weakened, and the fire of the French artillery was concentrated against it. Abbé then pushed on a column of attack there with such a power that in despite of the play of musketry on his flanks and a crashing cannonade in his front, he gained the top of the position, and drove back the remainder of Ashworth's Portuguese and the other half of the fiftieth regiment which had remained in reserve.

General Barnes, who had still the ninety-second regiment in hand behind St. Pierre, immediately brought it on with a strong counter-attack. The French skirmishers fell back on each side, leaving two regiments composing the column to meet the charge of the ninety-second; it was rough and pushed home, the French mass wavered and gave way. Abbé immediately replaced it; and Soult, redoubling the heavy play of his guns from the height he occupied, sent forward a battery of horse artillery, which galloping down into the valley opened its fire close to the allies with most destructive activity. The cannonade and musketry rolled like a prolonged peal of thunder, and the second French column, regardless of Ross's guns, though they tore the ranks in a horrible manner, advanced so steadily up the high road that the ninety-second yielding to the tempest slowly regained its old position behind St. Pierre. The Portuguese guns, their British commanding officer having fallen wounded, then limbered up to retire, and the French skirmishers reached the impenetrable hedge in front of Ashworth's right, General Barnes now seeing that hard fighting only could save the position, made the Portuguese guns resume their fire, and the wing of the fiftieth and the caçadores gallantly held the small wood on the right; but Barnes was soon wounded, the greatest part of his and general Stewart's staff were hurt, and the matter seemed desperate. For the light troops, overpowered by numbers, were all driven in except those in the wood, the artillery-men were falling at the guns, Ashworth's line of Portuguese crumbled away rapidly before the musketry and cannonade, the ground was strewn with the dead in front, and the wounded crawling to the rear were many.

If the French light troops could then have penetrated through the thick hedge in front of the Portuguese, defeat would have been inevitable on this

point, for the main column of attack still steadily advanced up the main road, and a second column launched on its right was already victorious, because the colonel of the seventy-first had shamefully withdrawn that gallant regiment out of action and abandoned the Portuguese. Pringle was indeed fighting strongly against Daricau's superior numbers on the hill of Villefranque, but on the extreme right the colonel of the third regiment had also abandoned his strong post to D'Armagnac, whose leading brigade was thus rapidly turning Byng's other regiments on that side. And now Foy's and Maransin's divisions, hitherto retarded by the deep roads, were coming into line ready to support Abbé, and this at the moment when the troops opposed to him were deprived of their reserve. For when general Hill beheld the retreat of the third and seventy-first regiments, he descended in haste from his mount, met, and turned the latter back to renew the fight, and then in person leading one brigade of Lecor's reserve division to the same quarter, sent the other against D'Armagnac on the hill of Old Moguerre. Thus at the decisive moment of the battle the French reserve was augmented, and that of the allies thrown as a last resource into action. However the right wing of the fiftieth and Ashworth's caçadores, both spread as skirmishers, never lost the small wood in front, upholding the fight there and towards the high road with such unflinching courage that the ninety-second regiment had time to re-form behind the hamlet of St. Pierre. Then its gallant colonel, Cameron, once more led it down the road, with colours flying and music playing, resolved to give the shock to whatever stood in the way. At this sight, the British skirmishers on the flanks, suddenly changing from retreat to attack, rushed forward and drove those of the enemy back on each side; yet the battle seemed hopeless, for Ashworth was badly wounded, his line was shattered to atoms, and Barnes, who had not quitted the field for his former hurt, was now shot through the body.

The ninety-second was but a small body compared with the heavy mass in its front, and the French soldiers seemed willing enough to close with the bayonet; but an officer riding at their head suddenly turned his horse, waved his sword, and appeared to order a retreat; then they faced about and immediately retired across the valley to their original position, in good order however, and scarcely pursued by the allies, so exhausted were the victors. This retrograde movement, for there was no panic or disorder, was produced partly by the gallant advance of the ninety-second and the returning rush of the skirmishers, partly by the state of affairs immediately on the right of the French column. For the seventy-first, indignant at their colonel's conduct, had returned to the fight with such alacrity, and were so well aided by Lecor's Portuguese, generals Hill and Stewart each in person leading an attack, that the hitherto victorious French were overthrown there also in the very moment when the ninety-second came with such a brave show down the main road: Lecor was however wounded.

This double action in the centre being seen from the hill of Villefranque, Daricau's division, already roughly handled by Pringle, fell back in confusion; and meantime on the right, Buchan's Portuguese, detached by Hill to recover the Moguerre or Partouhiria ridge, crossed the valley, and ascending under a heavy flank fire from Soult's guns rallied the third regiment; in happy time, for D'Armagnac's first brigade, having already passed the flank of Byng's regiments at the mill-pond, was actually in rear of the allies' lines. It was now twelve o'clock, and

while the fire of the light troops in the front and the cannonade in the centre continued, the contending generals restored their respective orders of battle. Soult's right wing had been quite repulsed by Pringle, his left wing was giving way before Buchan, and the difficult ground forbade his sending immediate succour to either; moreover in the exigency of the moment he had called D'Armagnac's reserve brigade to sustain Abbé's retiring columns. However that brigade and Foy's and Maransin's divisions were in hand to renew the fight in the centre, and the allies could not, unsuccessful, have sustained a fresh assault; for their ranks were wasted with fire, nearly all the staff had been killed or wounded, and three generals had quitted the field badly hurt.

In this crisis, general Hill, seeing that Buchan was now well and successfully engaged on the Partouhiria ridge, and that Byng's regiments were quite masters of their ground in the valley of the mill-pond, drew the fifty-seventh regiment from the latter place to reinforce his centre. At the same time the bridge above Villefranque having been restored, the sixth division, which had been marching since daybreak, appeared in order of battle on the mount from whence Hill had descended to rally the seventy-first. It was soon followed by the fourth division, and that again by the brigades of the third division; two other brigades of the seventh division were likewise in march. With the first of these troops came lord Wellington, who had hurried from Barrouilhet when the first sound of the cannon reached him; yet he arrived only to witness the close of the battle, the crisis was past, Hill's day of glory was complete. Soult had, according to the French method, made indeed another attack, or rather demonstration, against the centre, to cover his new dispositions, an effort easily repulsed, but at the same moment Buchan drove D'Armagnac headlong off the Partouhiria ridge. The sixth division then appeared on the commanding mount in the rear of St. Pierre, and though the French masses still maintained a menacing position on the high road, and on a hillock rising between the road and the mill-pond, they were quickly dispossessed. For the English general being now supported by the sixth division, sent Byng with two battalions against the hillock, and some troops from the centre against those on the high road. At this last point the generals and staff had been so cut down that colonel Currie, the aid-de-camp who brought the order, could find no superior officer to deliver it to, and led the troops himself to the attack; but both charges were successful, and two guns of the light battery sent down in the early part of the fight by Soult, and which had played without ceasing up to this moment, were taken.

The battle now abated to a skirmish of light troops, under cover of which the French endeavoured to carry off their wounded and rally their stragglers; but at two o'clock lord Wellington commanded a general advance of the whole line. Then the French retreated fighting, and the allies following close on the side of the Nive plied them with musketry until dark. Yet they maintained their line towards the Adour, for Sparre's cavalry passing out that way rejoined Pierre Soult on the side of Hasparren. This last-named general and Paris had during the day menaced Morillo and Vivian's cavalry at Urcuray; however not more than thirty men of a side were hurt, and when Soult's ill success became known, the French retired to Bonloc.

In this bloody action Soult had designed to employ seven divisions of infantry with one brigade of cavalry on the front, and one brigade of infantry

with a division of cavalry on the rear; but the state of the roads and the narrow front he was forced to move upon did not permit more than five divisions to act at St. Pierre, and only half of those were seriously engaged. His loss was certainly three thousand, making a total on the five days' fighting of six thousand men, with two generals, Villatte and Maucombe, wounded. The estimate made by the British at the time far exceeded this number, and one French writer makes their loss ten thousand, including probably the Nassau and Frankfort regiments. The same writer, however, estimates the loss of the allies at sixteen thousand! whereas Hill had only three generals and about fifteen hundred men killed and wounded on the 13th, and Morillo lost but twenty-six men at Urcuray. The real loss of the allies in the whole five days' fighting was only five thousand and nineteen, including, however, five generals, Hope, Robinson, Barnes, Lecor and Ashworth. Of this number five hundred were prisoners.

The duke of Dalmatia, baffled by the unexpected result of the battle of St. Pierre, left D'Erlon's three divisions in front of the camp of Mousserolles, sent two others over the Nive to Marac, and passing the Adour himself during the night with Foy's division, spread it along the right bank of that river as far as the confluence of the Gave de Pau.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. The French general's plan was conceived with genius, but the execution offers a great contrast to the conception. What a difference between the sudden concentration of his whole army on the platforms of Arcangues and Bussussary, where there were only a few piquets to withstand him, and from whence he could have fallen with the roll of an avalanche upon any point of the allies' line! what a difference between that and the petty attack of Clauzel, which a thousand men of the light division sufficed to arrest at the village and church of Arcangues. There, beyond question, was the weak part of the English general's cuirass. The spear pushed home there would have drawn blood. For the disposition and movements of the third, fourth and seventh divisions were made more with reference to the support of Hill than to sustain an attack from Soult's army; and it is evident that Wellington, trusting to the effect of his victory on the 10th of November, had treated the French general and his troops more contemptuously than he could have justified by arms without the aid of fortune. I know not what induced marshal Soult to direct his main attack by Anglet and the connecting ridge of Bussussary, against Barrouilhet, instead of assailing Arcangues, as he at first proposed; but this is certain, that for three hours after Clauzel first attacked the piquets at the latter place, there were not troops enough to stop three French divisions, much less a whole army. And this point being nearer to the bridge by which D'Erlon passed the Nive, the concentration of the French troops could have been made sooner than at Barrouilhet, where the want of unity in the attack caused by the difficulty of the roads ruined the French combinations.

The allies were so unexpected of an attack, that the battle at Barrouilhet, which might have been fought with seventeen thousand men, was actually fought by ten thousand. And those were not brought into action at once, for Robinson's brigade and Campbell's Portuguese, favoured by the narrow opening between the tanks, resisted Reille's divisions for two hours, and gave time for the rest of the fifth division and Bradford's brigade to arrive. But if Foy's division and Villatte's reserve had been able

to assail the flank at the same time, by the ridge coming from Bussussary, the battle would have been won by the French; and meanwhile three divisions under Clauzel and two under D'Erlon remained hesitating before Urdains and Arcangues, for the cannonade and skirmishing at the latter place were the very marks and signs of indecision.

2nd. On the 11th, the inactivity of the French during the morning may be easily accounted for. The defection of the German regiments, the necessity of disarming and removing those that remained, the care of the wounded, and the time required to re-examine the allies' position and ascertain what changes had taken place during the night, must have given ample employment to the French general. His attack in the afternoon also was well judged, because already he must have seen from the increase of troops in his front, from the intrenched battery and other works rapidly constructed at the church of Arcangues, that no decisive success could be expected on the left of the Nive, and that his best chance was to change his line of attack again to the right bank. To do this with effect, it was necessary, not only to draw all lord Wellington's reserves from the right of the Nive, but to be certain that they had come, and this could only be done by repeating the attacks at Barrouilhet. The same cause operated on the 12th, for it was not until the fourth and seventh divisions were seen by him on the side of Arbonne that he knew his wife had succeeded. Yet again the execution was below the conception, for first, the bivouac fires on the ridge of Bussussary were extinguished in the evening, and then others were lighted on the side of Mousserolles, thus plainly indicating the march, which was also begun too early, because the leading division was by Hill seen to pass the bridge of boats before sunset.

These were serious errors, yet the duke of Dalmatia's generalship cannot be thus fairly tested. There are many circumstances which combine to prove, that when he complained to the emperor of the contradictions and obstacles he had to encounter, he alluded to military as well as to political and financial difficulties. It is a part of human nature to dislike any disturbance of previous habits, and soldiers are never pleased at first with a general who introduces and rigorously exacts a system of discipline differing from what they have been accustomed to. Its utility must be proved and confirmed by habit ere it will find favour in their eyes. Now Soult suddenly assumed the command of troops that had been long serving under various generals and were used to much license in Spain. They were therefore, men and officers, uneasy at being suddenly subjected to the austere and resolute command of one who, from natural character as well as the exigency of the times, the war being now in his own country, demanded a ready and exact obedience, and a regularity which long habits of a different kind rendered onerous. Hence we find in all the French writers, and in Soult's own reports, manifest proofs that his designs were frequently thwarted or disregarded by his subordinates when circumstances promised impunity. His greatest and ablest military combinations were certainly rendered abortive by the errors of his lieutenants in the first operations to relieve Pampeluna, and on the 31st of August a manifest negligence of his earnest recommendations to vigilance led to serious danger and loss at the passage of the lower Bidassoa. Complaint and re-primand were rife in all quarters about the defeat on the 10th of November, and on the 19th the bridge-head of Cambo was destroyed contrary to the spirit of his instructions. These things, joined to

the acknowledged jealousy and disputes prevalent amongst the French generals employed in Spain, would indicate that the discrepancy between the conception and execution of the operations in front of Bayonne was not the error of the commander-in-chief. Perhaps king Joseph's faction, so inimical to the duke of Dalmatia, was still powerful in the army and difficult to deal with.

3rd. Lord Wellington has been blamed for putting his troops in a false position, and no doubt he undervalued—it was not the first time—the military genius and resources of his able adversary, when he exposed Hill's troops on the left of the Nive to a species of surprise. But the passage of the Nive itself, the rapidity with which he moved his divisions from bank to bank, and the confidence with which he relied upon the valour of his troops, so far from justifying the censures which have been passed upon him by the French writers, emphatically marked his mastery in the art. The stern justice of sending the Spaniards back into Spain after the battle of the Nivelle is apparent, but the magnanimity of that measure can only be understood by considering lord Wellington's military situation at the time. The battle of the Nivelle was delivered on political grounds; but of what avail would his gaining it have been if he had remained enclosed as it were in a net between the Nive and the sea, Bayonne and the Pyrenees, unable to open communications with the disaffected in France, and having the beaten army absolutely forbidding him to forage or even to look beyond the river on his right! The invasion of France was not his own operation, it was the project of the English cabinet and the allied sovereigns; both were naturally urging him to complete it, and to pass the Nive and free his flanks was indispensable if he would draw any profit from the victory of the 10th of November. But he could not pass it with his whole army unless he resigned the sea coast and his communications with Spain. He was therefore to operate with a portion only of his force, and consequently required all the men he could gather to ensure success. Yet at that crisis he divested himself of twenty-five thousand Spanish soldiers!

Was this done in ignorance of the military glory awaiting him beyond the spot where he stood?

"If I had twenty thousand Spaniards paid and fed," he wrote to lord Bathurst, "I should have Bayonne. If I had forty thousand, I do not know where I should stop. Now I have both the twenty thousand and the forty thousand, but I have not the means of paying and supplying them, and if they plunder they will ruin all."

Requisitions which the French expected as a part of war would have enabled him to run this career, but he looked further; he had promised the people protection, and his greatness of mind was disclosed in a single sentence. "I must tell your lordship that our success, and every thing, depends upon our moderation and justice." Rather than infringe on either, he sent the Spaniards to the rear, and passed the Nive with the British and Portuguese only, thus violating the military rule which forbids a general to disseminate his troops before an enemy who remains in mass, lest he should be beaten in detail. But genius begins where rules end. A great general always seeks moral power in preference to physical force. Wellington's choice here was between a shameful inactivity or a dangerous enterprise. Trusting to the influence of his reputation, to his previous victories, and to the ascendancy of his troops in the field, he chose the latter, and the result, though he committed some errors of execution,

justified his boldness. He surprised the passage of the Nive, laid his bridges of communication, and but for the rain of the night before, which ruined the roads and retarded the march of Hill's columns, he would have won the heights of St. Pierre the same day. Soult could not then have withdrawn his divisions from the left bank without being observed. Still it was an error to have the troops on the left bank so unprepared for the battle of the 10th. It was perhaps another error not to have occupied the valley or basin between Hope and Alten, and surely it was negligence not to intrench Hill's position on the 10th, 11th and 12th. Yet with all this, so brave, so hardy, so unconquerable were his soldiers, that he was successful at every point, and that is the justification of his generalship. Hannibal crossed the Alps and descended upon Italy, not in madness, but because he knew himself and his troops.

4th. It is agreed, by French and English, that the battle of St. Pierre was one of the most desperate of the whole war. Lord Wellington declared that he had never seen a field so thickly strewn with dead, nor can the vigour of the combatants be well denied where five thousand men were killed or wounded in three hours upon a space of one mile square. How then did it happen, valour being so conspicuous on both sides, that six English and Portuguese brigades, furnishing less than fourteen thousand men and officers with fourteen guns, were enabled to withstand seven French divisions, certainly furnishing thirty-five thousand men and officers with twenty-two guns? The analysis of this fact shows upon what nice calculations and accidents war depends.

If Hill had not observed the French passing their bridge on the evening of the 12th, and their bivouac fires in the night, Barnes's brigade, with which he saved the day, would have been at Urcuray, and Soult could not have been stopped. But the French general could only bring five divisions into action, and those only in succession, so that in fact three divisions, or about sixteen thousand men with twenty-two guns, actually fought the battle. Foy's and Maransin's troops did not engage until after the crisis had passed. On the other hand, the proceedings of colonel Peacocke of the seventy-first, and colonel Bunbury of the third, for which they were both obliged to quit the service, forced general Hill to carry his reserve away from the decisive point at that critical period which always occurs in a well-disputed field, and which every great general watches for with the utmost anxiety. This was no error, it was a necessity, and the superior military quality of the British troops rendered it successful.

The French officer who rode at the head of the second attacking column might be a brave man, doubtless he was; he might be an able man, but he had not the instinct of a general. On his right flank indeed Hill's vigorous counter-attack was successful, but the battle was to be won in the centre; his column was heavy, undismayed, and only one weak battalion, the ninety-second, was before it; a short exhortation, a decided gesture, a daring example, and it would have overborne the small body in its front: Foy's, Maransin's and the half of D'Armagnac's divisions would then have followed in the path thus marked out. Instead of this, he weighed chances, and retreated. How different was the conduct of the British generals, two of whom and nearly all their staff fell at this point, resolute not to yield a step at such a critical period; how desperately did the fiftieth and Portuguese fight to give time for the ninety-second to rally and re-form be-

hind St. Pierre; how gloriously did that regiment come forth again to charge with their colours flying and their national music playing as if going to a review. This was to understand war. The man who in that moment and immediately after a repulse thought of such military pomp was by nature a soldier.

I have said that sir Rowland Hill's employment of his reserve was no error, it was indeed worthy of all praise. From the commanding mount on which he stood, he saw at once, that the misconduct of the two colonels would cause the loss of his position more surely than any direct attack upon it, and with a promptness and decision truly military he descended at once to the spot, playing the soldier as well as the general, rallying the seventy-first and leading the reserve himself; trusting meanwhile with a noble and well-placed confidence to the courage of the ninety-second and the fiftieth to sustain the fight at St. Pierre. He knew indeed that the sixth division was then close at hand, and that the battle might be fought over again, but like a thorough soldier he was resolved to win his own fight with his own troops if he could. And he did so after a manner that in less eventful times would have rendered him the hero of a nation.

CHAPTER III.

Respective situations and views of lord Wellington and Soult—Partisan warfare—The Basques of the Val de Baigorri excited to arms by the excesses of Mina's troops—General Harispe takes the command of the insurgents—Clauzel advances beyond the Bidouze river—General movements—Partisan combats—Excesses committed by the Spaniards—Lord Wellington reproaches their generals—His vigorous and resolute conduct—He menaces the French insurgents of the valleys with fire and sword, and the insurrection subsides—Soult hems in the allies' right closely—Partisan combats continued—Remarkable instances of the habits established between the French and British soldiers of the light division—Shipwrecks on the coast.

To understand all the importance of the battle of St. Pierre, the nature of the country and the relative positions of the opposing generals before and after that action must be considered. Bayonne, although a mean fortress in itself, was at this period truly designated by Napoleon as one of the great bulwarks of France. Covered by its intrenched camp, which the inundations and the deep country rendered impregnable while there was an army to defend it, this place could not be assailed until that army was drawn away, and it was obviously impossible to pass it and leave the enemy to act upon the communications with Spain and the seacoast. To force the French army to abandon Bayonne was therefore lord Wellington's object, and his first step was the passage of the Nive: he thus cut Soult's direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port, obtained an intercourse with the malcontents in France, opened a large tract of fertile country for his cavalry, and menaced the navigation of the Adour, so as to render it difficult for the French general to receive supplies. This was however but a first step, because the country beyond the Nive was still the same deep clayey soil with bad roads; and it was traversed by many rivers more or less considerable, which flooding with every shower in the mountains, formed in their concentric courses towards the Adour a number of successive barriers, behind which Soult could maintain himself on lord Wellington's right and hold communication with St. Jean Pied de Port. He could thus still hem in the allies as before; upon a more extended scale

however, and with less effect, for he was thrown more on the defensive, his line was now the longest, and his adversary possessed the central position.

On the other hand, lord Wellington could not, in that deep impracticable country, carry on the wide operations necessary to pass the rivers on his right, and render the French position at Bayonne untenable, until fine weather hardened the roads, and the winter of 1813 was peculiarly wet and inclement.

From this exposition it is obvious that to nourish their own armies, and circumvent their adversaries in that respect, were the objects of both generals; Soult aimed to make Wellington retire into Spain, Wellington to make Soult abandon Bayonne entirely, or so reduce his force in the intrenched camp that the works might be stormed. The French general's recent losses forbade him to maintain his extended positions except during the wet season; three days' fine weather made him tremble; and the works of his camp were still too unfinished to leave a small force there. The difficulty of the roads and want of military transport threw his army almost entirely upon water carriage for subsistence, and his great magazines were therefore established at Dax on the Adour, and at Peirehorade on the Gave de Pau, the latter being about twenty-four miles from Bayonne. These places he fortified to resist sudden incursions, and he threw a bridge across the Adour at the port of Lanne, just above its confluence with the Gave de Pau. But the navigation of the Adour below that point, especially at Urt, the stream being confined there, could be interrupted by the allies who were now on the left bank. To remedy this, Soult ordered Foy to pass the Adour at Urt and construct a bridge with a head of works; but the movement was foreseen by Wellington, and Foy, menaced with a superior force, recrossed the river. The navigation was then carried on at night by stealth, or guarded by the French gun-boats and exposed to the fire of the allies. Thus provisions became scarce, and the supply would have been quite unequal to the demand if the French coasting trade, now revived between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been interrupted by the navy; but lord Wellington's representations on this head were still unheeded.

Soult was embarrassed by Foy's failure at Urt. He reinforced him with Boyer's and D'Armagnac's divisions, which were extended to the Port de Lanne; then leaving Reille with four divisions to guard the intrenched camp and to finish the works, he completed the garrison of Bayonne, and transferred his headquarters to Peirehorade. Clauzel, with two divisions of infantry and the light cavalry, now took post on the Bidouze, being supported with Treilhard's heavy dragoons, and having his left in communication with Paris and with St. Jean Pied de Port, where there was a garrison of eighteen hundred men besides national guards. He soon pushed his advanced posts to the Joyeuse or Gambouri, and the Aran, streams which unite to fall into the Adour near Urt, and he also occupied Hellette, Mondionde, Bonloc and the Bastide de Clérance. A bridge-head was constructed at Peirehorade, Hastingue was fortified on the Gave de Pau, Guiche, Bidache and Came on the Bidouze, and the works of Navarreins were augmented. In fine, Soult with equal activity and intelligence profited from the rain which stopped the allies' operations in that deep country.

Lord Wellington also made some changes of position. Having increased his works at Barrouilhet he was enabled to shift some of Hope's troops towards Arcangues, and he placed the sixth division on the heights of Villefranque, which permitted

general Hill to extend his right up the Adour to Urt. The third division was posted near Urcuray, the light cavalry on the Joyeuse facing Clauzel's outposts, and a chain of telegraphs was established from the right of the Nive by the hill of St. Barbe to St. Jean de Luz. Freyre's Gallicians were placed in reserve about St. Pé, and Morillo was withdrawn to Itzassu, where, supported by the Andalusian division and by Freyre, he guarded the valley of the upper Nive and watched general Paris beyond the Ursouia mountain. Such was the state of affairs in the beginning of January, but some minor actions happened before these arrangements were completed.

In December the allies seized the island of Holriague, near La Honce on the Adour, which gave them a better command of that river; but Foy kept possession of the islands of Berens and Broc above Holriague. The allies' bridges of communication on the Nive were now carried away by floods, which occasioned some embarrassment; and meanwhile, without any orders from lord Wellington, probably with a view to plunder, for his troops were exceedingly licentious, Morillo obtained from Victor Alten two squadrons of the eighteenth hussars, under pretence of exploring the enemy's position towards Mendionde and Maccaye. Their commander, major Hughes, having with difficulty ascertained that he was to form an advanced guard in a close wooded country, demanded the aid of some Spanish *caçadores*, and then moving forwards drove in the piquets, crossed the bridge of Mendionde and commenced a skirmish. But during this action Morillo withdrew his division without giving any notice, and at the same time the *caçadores* fled in a shameful manner from the left: the cavalry were thus turned and escaped with difficulty, having had one captain killed, two other captains and a lieutenant, and Hughes himself, badly wounded. The unfortunate issue of this skirmish was attributed at the time to the bad conduct of the eighteenth hussars, against whom lord Wellington was, by malicious misrepresentation, previously prejudiced; for at Vittoria they were unjustly accused of being more licentious than others in plundering the captured property on the field, whereas they had fought well and plundered less than many who were praised for their orderly demeanour.

About the same time that this disaster occurred at Mendionde, Mina, acting independently, and being pressed for provisions in the mountains, invaded the Val de Baigorri and the Val des Osses, where his men committed the greatest enormities, plundering and burning, and murdering men, women and children without distinction. The people of these valleys, distinguished amongst the Basques for their warlike qualities, immediately took arms under the command of one of their principal men, named Etchevery, and being reinforced with two hundred and fifty men from St. Jean Pied de Port, surprised one of Mina's battalions, and attacked the rest with great vigour. This event gave Soult hopes of exciting the Basques to commence such a war as they had carried on at the commencement of the French revolution. His efforts to accomplish it were unceasing, and he had for two months been expecting the arrival of general Harispe, an officer whose courage and talents have been frequently noticed in this history, and who being the head of an ancient Basque family had great local influence, which was increased by his military reputation. It was thought that if he had come when first expected, about November, lord Wellington's strict discipline being then unknown to the people, he would have raised a formidable partisan war in the mountains. But now the English general's

attention to all complaints, his proclamation, and the proof he gave of his sincerity by sending the Spaniards back when they misconducted themselves, had, in conjunction with the love of gain, that master passion with all mountaineers, tamed the Basque spirit and disinclined them to exchange ease and profit for turbulence and ravage. Nevertheless this incursion by Mina, and the licentious conduct of Morillo's troops, awakened the warlike propensities of the Val de Baigorri Basques, and Harispe was enabled to make a levy with which he immediately commenced active operations, and was supported by general Paris.

Soult, with a view to aid Harispe, to extend his own cantonments, and to restrict those of the allies, now resolved to drive the latter's detachments altogether from the side of St. Jean Pied de Port, and fix Clauzel's left at Hellette, the culminant point of the great road to that fortress. To effect this, on the 3d of January, he caused Clauzel to establish two divisions of infantry at the heights of La Costa near the Bastide de Clérance and beyond the Joyeuse river. Buchan's Portuguese brigade, placed in observation there, was thus forced to retreat upon Briscon's, and at the same time Paris advancing to Bonloc connected his right with Clauzel's left at Ayherre, while the light cavalry menaced all the allies' line of outposts. Informed of this movement by telegraph, Wellington, thinking Soult was seeking a general battle on the side of Hasparren, made the fifth division and lord Aylmer's brigade relieve the light division which marched to Arauntz; the fourth division then passed the Nive at Ustaritz; and the sixth division made ready to march from Villefranque, by the high road of St. Jean Pied de Port, towards Hasparren, as a reserve to the third, fourth and seventh divisions. The latter were concentrated beyond Urcuray on the 4th, their left in communication with Hill's right at Briscons, and their right, supported by Morillo, who advanced from Itzassu for this purpose.

The English general's intent was to fall upon the enemy at once, but the swelling of the small rivers prevented him. However, on the fifth, having ascertained the true object and dispositions of the French general, and having twenty-four thousand infantry in hand with a division of cavalry and four or five brigades of artillery, he resolved to attack Clauzel's divisions on the heights of La Costa. In this view Lecor's Portuguese marched against the French right, the fourth division marched against their centre, the third division supported by cavalry against their left; the remainder of the cavalry and the seventh division, the whole under Stapleton Cotton, were posted at Hasparren to watch Paris on the side of Bonloc. Soult was in person at the Bastide de Clérance, and a general battle seemed inevitable, but the intention of the English general was merely to drive back the enemy from the Joyeuse, and the French general, thinking the whole allied army was in movement, resolved to act on the defensive, and directed the troops at La Costa to retire fighting upon the Bidouze: the affair terminated therefore with a slight skirmish on the evening of the 6th. The allies then resumed their old positions on the right of the Nive, the Andalusians were ordered back to the Bastan, and Carlos d'Espania's Galicians were brought up to Ascaïn in their place.

When Clauzel saw that nothing serious was designed, he sent his horsemen to drive away general Hill's detachments, which had taken advantage of the great movements to forage on the lower parts of the Joyeuse and Aran rivers. Meanwhile Soult, observing how sensitive his adversary was to any

demonstration beyond the Bidouze, resolved to maintain the line of those two rivers. In this view he reduced his defence of the Adour to a line drawn from the confluence of the Aran to Bayonne, which enabled him to reinforce Clauzel with Foy's division and all the light cavalry. Meantime general Harispe, having the division of Paris and the brigade of general Dature placed under his orders to support his mountaineers, fixed his quarters at Hellette and commenced an active partisan warfare. On the 8th, he fell upon Mina in the Val des Osses and drove him with loss into Baigorri. On the 10th, returning to Hellette, he surprised Morillo's foragers with some English dragoons on the side of Maccaye, and took a few prisoners. On the 12th, he again attacked Mina and drove him up into the Alduides. During these affairs at the outposts lord Wellington might have stormed the intrenched camp in front of Bayonne, but he could not hold it except under the fire of the fortress, and not being prepared for a siege avoided that operation. Nor would the weather, which was again become terrible, permit him to make a general movement to drive Harispe from his position in the upper country; wherefore he preferred leaving that general in quiet possession to irritating the mountaineers by a counter-warfare. He endeavoured however to launch some armed boats on the Adour above Bayonne, where Soult had increased the flotilla to twenty gun-boats for the protection of his convoys, which were notwithstanding forced to run past Urt under the fire of a battery constructed by general Hill.

Lord Wellington now dreading the bad effect which the excesses committed by Mina's and Morillo's men were likely to produce, for the Basques were already beginning to speak of vengeance, put forth his authority in repression. Rebuking Morillo for his unauthorized and disastrous advance upon Mendionde, and for the excesses of his troops, he ordered him to keep the latter constantly under arms. This was resented generally by the Spanish officers, and especially by Morillo, whose savage, untractable and bloody disposition, since so horribly displayed in South America, prompted him to encourage violence. He asserted falsely that his troops were starving, declared that a settled design to ill-use the Spaniards existed, and that the British soldiers were suffered to commit every crime with impunity. The English general, in reply, explained himself both to Morillo and to Freyre, who had alluded to the libels about San Sebastian, with a clearness and resolution that showed how hopeless it would be to strive against him.

"He had not," he said, "lost thousands of men to pillage and ill-treat the French peasantry; he preferred a small army obedient to a large one disobedient and undisciplined. If his measures to enforce good order deprived him of the Spanish troops, the fault would rest with those who suffered their soldiers to commit disorders. Professions without corresponding actions would not do, he was determined to enforce obedience one way or another, and would not command insubordinate troops. The question between them was whether they should or should not pillage the French peasants. His measures were taken to prevent it, and the conduct which called them forth was more dishonouring to the Spaniards than the measures themselves. For libels he cared not, he was used to them, and did not believe the union of the two nations depended upon such things; but if it did, he desired no union founded upon such an infamous interest as pillage. He had not lost twenty thousand men in the campaign to enable Morillo to plunder, and he would not permit

it. If the Spaniards were resolved to do so, let them march their great armies into France under their own generals; he would meanwhile cover Spain itself, and they would find they could not remain in France for fifteen days. They had neither money nor magazines, nothing to maintain an army in the field, the country behind was incapable of supporting them, and, were he scoundrel enough to permit pillage, France, rich as it was, could not sustain the burden. Even with a view to living on the enemy by contributions, it would be essential to prevent plunder; and yet, in defiance of all these reasons, he was called an enemy by the Spanish generals because he opposed such conduct, and his measures to prevent it were considered dishonouring!

"Something also he could say against it in a political point of view; but it was unnecessary, because, careless whether he commanded a large or a small army, he was resolved that it should obey him and should not pillage.

"General Morillo expressed doubts of his right to interfere with the Spaniards. It was his right and his duty, and never before did he hear that to put soldiers under arms was a disgrace. It was a measure to prevent evil and misfortunes. Mina could tell by recent experience what a warfare the French peasants could carry on, and Morillo was openly menaced with a like trial. It was in vain for that general to palliate or deny the plundering of his division, after having acknowledged to general Hill that it was impossible to prevent it, because the officers and soldiers received by every post letters from their friends, congratulating them upon their good luck in entering France, and urging them to seize the opportunity of making fortunes. General Morillo asserted that the British troops were allowed to commit crimes with impunity. Neither he nor any other man could produce an instance of injury done, where, proof being adduced, the perpetrators had escaped punishment. Let him inquire how many soldiers had been hanged, how many stricken with minor chastisements and made to pay for damages done. But had the English troops no cause of complaint against the Spaniards? Officers and soldiers were frequently shot and robbed on the high roads, and a soldier had been lately murdered between Oyazun and Lesaca; the English stores and convoys were plundered by the Spanish soldiers, a British officer had been put to death at Vittoria, and others were ill-treated at St. Ander."

A sullen obedience followed this correspondence for the moment, but the plundering system was soon renewed; and this, with the mischief already done, was sufficient to rouse the inhabitants of Bidaray, as well as those of the Val de Baigorri, into action. They commenced and continued a partisan warfare, until lord Wellington, incensed by their activity, issued a proclamation calling upon them to take arms openly and join Soult, or stay peaceably at home, declaring that he would otherwise burn their villages and hang all the inhabitants. Thus it appeared that, notwithstanding all the outcries made against the French for resorting to this system of repressing the warfare of peasants in Spain, it was considered by the English general both justifiable and necessary. However the threat was sufficient for this occasion. The Basques set the pecuniary advantages to be derived from the friendship of the British and Portuguese troops and the misery of an avenging warfare against the evils of Spanish plunder, and generally disregarded Harispe's appeals to their patriotism.

Meanwhile Soult, who expected reinforcements,

seeing that little was to be gained by insurrection and being desirous to resume the offensive, ordered Harispe to leave only the troops absolutely necessary for the defence of St. Jean Pied de Port and its intrenched camp with a few Basques as scouts in the valleys, and to concentrate the remainder of his force at Mendionde, Hellette and La Houssoa, thus closely hemming in the right of the allies' line with a view to making incursions beyond the upper Nive. This was on the 14th; on the 23d, Harispe, getting information that Morillo was to forage in force on the side of Bidaray, endeavoured to cut him off; the supporting troops, consisting of Spanish infantry and some English hussars, repulsed his first attack, but they were finally pushed back with some loss in horses and mules. About the same time, one of Hill's posts near the confluence of the Aran with the Adour was surprised by some French companies, who remained in advance until fresh troops detached from Urt forced them to repass the river again. This affair was a retaliation for the surprise of a French post a few days before by the sixth division, which was attended with some circumstances repugnant to the friendly habits long established between the French and British troops at the outposts. The value of such a generous intercourse old soldiers well understand, and some illustrations of it at this period may be quoted.

On the 9th of December the forty-third was assembled in column on an open space within twenty yards of the enemy's out-sentry, yet the latter continued to walk his beat for an hour without concern, relying so confidently on the customary system that he placed his knapsack on the ground to ease his shoulders. When at last the order to advance was given, one of the British soldiers stepping out told him to go away, and helped him to replace his pack; the firing then commenced. The next morning the French in like manner warned a forty-third sentry to retire. But the most remarkable instance happened on the occasion of lord Wellington's being desirous of getting to the top of a hill occupied by the enemy near Bayonne. He ordered the riflemen who escorted him to drive the French away, and seeing the former stealing up, as he thought, too close, called out to commence firing; with a loud voice one of those old soldiers replied, "*No firing!*" and then holding up the butt of his rifle towards the French, tapped it in a peculiar way. At the well-understood signal, which meant "*We must have the hill for a short time,*" the French, who, though they could not maintain, would not have relinquished the post without a fight if they had been fired upon, quietly retired. And this signal would never have been made if the post had been one capable of a permanent defence, so well do veterans understand war and its proprieties.

The English general now only waited until the roads were practicable, to take the offensive with an army superior in every point of view to Soult's. That general's numbers were also about to be reduced. His conscripts were deserting fast, and the inclemency of the weather was filling his hospitals, while the bronzed veterans of Wellington's army, impassive to fatigue, patient to endure, fierce in execution, were free from serious maladies, ready and able to plant their colours wherever their general listed. At this time however the country was a vast quagmire; it was with difficulty that provisions or even orders could be conveyed to the different quarters, and a Portuguese brigade on the right of the Nive was several days without food from the swelling of the rivulets, which stopped the commissariat mules. At the sea-side the troops were bet-

ter off, yet with a horrible counterpoise, for on that iron-bound coast storms and shipwrecks were so frequent that scarcely a day passed but some vessel, sometimes many together, were seen embayed and drifting towards the reefs which shoot out like needles for several miles. Once in this situation there was no human help! a faint cry might be heard at intervals, but the tall ship floated slowly and solemnly onwards until the first rock arrested her, a roaring surge then dashed her to pieces, and the shore was strewn with broken timbers and dead bodies. December and January were thus passed by the allies, but February saw Wellington break into France, the successful invader of that mighty country. Yet neither his nor Soult's military operations can be understood without a previous description of political affairs, which shall be given in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

Political state of Portugal—Political state of Spain—Lord Wellington advises the English government to prepare for a war with Spain and to seize San Sebastian as a security for the withdrawal of the British and Portuguese troops—The seat of government and the new cortex are removed to Madrid—The duke of San Carlos arrives secretly with the treaty of Valençay—It is rejected by the Spanish regency and cortex—Lord Wellington's views on the subject.

PORTUGAL.

It has been shown that marshal Beresford's arrival at Lisbon put a momentary check upon the intrigues of the regency relative to the command of the troops; when he rejoined the army the vexatious conduct of the government was renewed with greater violence, and its ill-will was vented upon the English residents, whose goods were arbitrarily seized and their persons imprisoned without regard to justice or international law. The supply and reinforcing of the army were the pretences for these exactions, yet the army was neither supplied nor recruited, for though the new regulations had produced nine thousand trained soldiers, they were, in contempt of the subsidizing treaty, retained in the depots. At first this was attributed to the want of transport to enable them to march through Spain; but though lord Wellington obtained in the beginning of 1814 shipping to convey them to the army, the Portuguese government still withheld the greatest number, alleging in excuse the ill-conduct of the Spaniards relative to the military convention established between the two countries.

This convention had been concluded in 1812, to enable the Portuguese troops to establish hospitals, and to draw certain resources from Spain upon fixed conditions. One of these was that all supplies might be purchased, half with ready money, half with bills on the Portuguese treasury; nevertheless, in December, 1813, the Spanish envoy at Lisbon informed the Portuguese government that to give up the shells of certain public buildings for hospitals was the only effect they would give to the convention. Wherefore as neither troops nor horses could march through Spain, and the supply of those already with the army became nearly impossible, the regency detained the reinforcements. Lord Wellington strongly reproached the Spanish government for this foul conduct, yet observed with great force to the Portuguese regency, that the treaty by which a certain number of soldiers were to be constantly in the field was made with England, not with Spain; and as the government of the former country continued to pay the subsidy and provided ships for the trans-

port of the troops, there was no excuse for retaining them in Portugal.

His remonstrances, Beresford's orders, and Mr. Stuart's exertions, although backed by the menaces of lord Castlereagh, were however alike powerless; the regency embarked only three thousand men out of nine thousand, and those not until the month of March, when the war was on the point of terminating. Thus, instead of thirty thousand Portuguese under arms, lord Wellington had less than twenty thousand; and yet Mr. Stuart affirmed that by doing away with the militia and introducing the Prussian system of granting furloughs, one hundred thousand troops of the line might have been furnished and supported by Portugal, without pressing more severely on the finances of the country than the actual system which supplied these twenty thousand. The regency were now more than usually importunate to have the subsidy paid in specie, in which case their army would have disappeared altogether. Mr. Stuart firmly opposed this, knowing the money would be misapplied if it fell into their hands, and thinking their importunity peculiarly ill-timed when their quota of troops was withheld, and when lord Wellington, forced to pay ready money for his supplies in France, wanted all the specie that could be procured for the military chest. Such was the countenance assumed by Portugal towards England in return for the independence which the latter had secured for her; and it is obvious that if the war had not terminated immediately afterwards, the alliance could not have continued. The British army, deserted by Portugal and treated hostilely, as we shall find, by the Spaniards, must then have abandoned the Peninsula.

SPAIN.

The malice evinced towards lord Wellington by the Spanish government, the libels upon him and upon the Anglo-Portuguese army, the vices of the system by which the Spanish troops were supplied, and their own evil propensities fostered by long and cruel neglect and suffering, the activity of those intriguing politicians who were inimical to the British alliance, the insolence and duplicity of the minister of war, the growing enmity between Spain and Portugal, the virulence of all parties, and the absolute hostility of the local authorities towards the British army, the officers and soldiers of which were on all occasions treated as if they were invaders rather than friends, drove lord Wellington in the latter end of November to extremity. He judged the general disposition of the Spanish people to be still favourable to the English alliance, and with the aid of the serviles hoped to put down the liberals; but an open rupture with the government he thought inevitable, and if the liberal influence should prove most powerful with the people he might be unable to effect a retreat into Portugal. Wherefore he recommended the British minister to take measures with a view to a war against Spain! And this at the very moment when, victorious in every battle, he seemed to have placed the cause he supported beyond the power of fortune. Who, when Napoleon was defeated at Leipzig, when all Europe and even part of Asia were pouring their armed hordes into the northern and eastern parts of France, when Soult was unable to defend the western frontier; who then, looking only on the surface, could have supposed that Wellington, the long-enduring general, whose profound calculations and untiring vigour in war had brought the affairs of the Peninsula to their apparently prosperous state; that he, the victorious commander, could with truth thus describe his own uneasy situation to his government?

"Matters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards, that I think it necessary to draw your attention seriously to the subject. You will have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which I know were written and published by an officer of the war department, and I believe under the direction of the minister at war, don Juan O'Donoghue. Advantage has been taken of the impression made by these libels to circulate others in which the old stories are repeated about the outrages committed by sir John More's army in Galicia, and endeavours are made to irritate the public mind about our still keeping garrisons in Cadiz and Carthagena, and particularly in Ceuta. They exaggerate the conduct of our traders in South America, and every little concern of a master of a ship who may behave ill in a Spanish port is represented as an attack upon the sovereignty of the Spanish nation. I believe these libels all proceed from the same source, the government and their immediate servants and officers; and although I have no reason to believe that they have as yet made any impression on the nation at large, they certainly have upon the officers of the government, and even upon the principal officers of the army. These persons must see that if the libels are not written or encouraged by the government, they are at least not discouraged; they know that we are odious to the government, and they treat us accordingly. The Spanish troops plunder every thing they approach, neither their own nor our magazines are sacred. Until recently there was some semblance of inquiry, and of a desire to punish offenders; lately these acts of disorder have been left entirely unnoticed, unless when I have interfered with my authority as commander-in-chief of the Spanish army. The civil magistrates in the country have not only refused us assistance, but have particularly ordered the inhabitants not to give it for payment; and when robberies have been discovered, and the property proved to belong to the commissariat, the law has been violated and possession withheld. This was the case lately at Tolosa.

"Then, what is more extraordinary and more difficult to understand, is a transaction which occurred lately at Fontarabia. It was settled that the British and Portuguese hospitals should go to that town. There is a building there which has been a Spanish hospital, and the Spanish authority who gave it over wanted to carry off, in order to burn as fire-wood, the beds, that our soldiers might not have the use of them. And these are the people to whom we have given medicines, instruments, and other aids; whom, when wounded and sick, we have taken into our hospitals, and to whom we have rendered every service in our power after having recovered their country from the enemy! These are not the people of Spain, but the officers of government, who would not dare to conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that their conduct was agreeable to their employers. If this spirit is not checked, if we do not show that we are sensible of the injury done to our characters, and of the injustice and unfriendly nature of such proceedings, we must expect that the people at large will soon behave towards us in the same manner, and that we shall have no friend, or none who will dare to avow him as such in Spain. Consider what will be the consequence of this state of affairs if any reverse should happen, or if an aggravation of the insults and injuries, or any other cause, should cause the English army to be withdrawn. I think I should experience great difficulty, the Spanish people being hostile, in retiring through Spain into Portugal, from the peculiar nature of our equipments, and I think I might be

able to embark the army at Passages in spite of all the French and Spanish armies united. But I should be much more certain of getting clear off, as we ought, if we had possession of San Sebastian; and this view of the subject is the motive for the advice I am about to give you; as the remedy for the evils with which I have made you acquainted.

"First, then, I recommend to you to alter the nature of your political relations with Spain, and to have nothing there but a 'chargé d'affaires.' Secondly, to complain seriously of the conduct of the government and their servants; to remind them that Cadiz, Carthagena, and, I believe, Ceuta, were garrisoned by British troops at their earnest request, and that the troops were not sent to the two former till the government agreed to certain conditions. If we had not garrisoned the last, it would before now have fallen into the hands of the Moors. Thirdly, to demand, as security for the safety of the king's troops against the criminal disposition of the government and of those in authority under them, that a British garrison should be admitted into San Sebastian, giving notice that unless this demand was complied with the troops should be withdrawn. Fourthly, to withdraw the troops if this demand be not complied with, be the consequences what they may, and to be prepared accordingly. You may rely upon this, that if you take a firm decided line and show your determination to go through with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you, and will bring the government to their senses, and you will put an end at once to all the petty cabals and counter-action existing at the present moment, and you will not be under the necessity of bringing matters to extremities: if you take any other than a decided line, and one which in its consequences will involve them in ruin, you may depend upon it you will gain nothing, and will only make matters worse. I recommend these measures, whatever may be the decision respecting my command of the army. They are probably the more necessary if I should keep my command. The truth is, that a crisis is approaching in our connexion with Spain, and if you do not bring the government and nation to their senses before they go too far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might expect from services rendered to them."

Thus it appears that lord Wellington, at the end of the war, described the Spaniards precisely as sir John More described them at the beginning. But the seat of government was now transferred to Madrid, and the new cortex, as I have already noticed, decided, against the wishes of the regency, that the English general should keep the command of the Spanish armies. The liberals indeed, with great diligence, had previously sought to establish a system of control over the cortex by means of the populace of Madrid as they had done at Cadiz; and they were so active, and created so much alarm by their apparent success, that the serviles, backed by the Americans, were ready to make the princess Carlotta sole regent, as the only resource for stemming the progress of democracy. However, when they had proved their strength upon the question of lord Wellington's command, they deferred the princess's affair, and resolved to oppose their adversaries more vigorously in the assembly. They were encouraged also by a tumult which happened at Madrid, where the populace, instigated by their agents, or disliking the new constitution, for the measures of the democratic party were generally considered evil in the great towns beyond the Isla, rose and forced the authorities to imprison a number of obnoxious persons: the new cortex then arrived, the

serviles got the upper hand, and being resolved to change the regency, took as their ground of attack its conduct towards the English general. Pursuing this scheme of opposition with ardour, they caused the minister of war to be dismissed, and were ready to attack the regency itself, expecting full success, when to their amazement and extreme anger lord Wellington, far from desiring to have his personal enemies thrust out of power, expressed his earnest desire to keep them in their stations.

To men who were alike devoid of patriotism or principle, and whose only rule of action was the momentary impulse of passion, such a proceeding was incomprehensible; yet it was a wise and well-considered political change on his part, showing that private feelings were never the guides of his conduct in public matters, and that he ever seemed to bear in mind the maxim which Sophocles has put into the mouth of Ajax, "Carrying himself towards his friends as if they might one day become enemies, and treating his foes as men who might become friends." The new spirit had given him no hopes of any general alteration of the system, nor was he less convinced that sooner or later he must come to extremities with the Spaniards; but he was averse to any appearance of disunion becoming public at the moment he was invading France, lest it should check his projects of raising an anti-Napoleon party in that country. He therefore advised the British government to keep his hostile propositions in abeyance, leaving it to him and to his brother to put them in execution or not as events might dictate. Meanwhile he sent orders to evacuate Cadiz and Carthagena, and opposed the projected change in the Spanish government, observing that "the minister of war being dismissed, the most obnoxious opponent of military arrangement was gone; that the mob of Madrid, being worked upon by the same press in the hands of the same people who had made the mob of Cadiz so ungovernable, would become as bad as these last, and though the mercantile interest would not have so much power in the capital, they would not want partisans when desirous of carrying a question by violence. The grandees were too poor to retain their former natural influence, and the constitution gave them no political power. The only chance which the serviles had was to conduct themselves with prudence, and when in the right with a firm contempt for the efforts of the press and the mob; but this was what no person in Spain ever did, and the smaller party being wiser, bolder and more active, would soon govern the cortes at Madrid as they did that at Cadiz."

No permanent change for the better could be expected; and meanwhile the actual government, alarmed by the tumults in the capital, by the strength of the serviles in the cortes, by the rebukes and remonstrances of the English general and ministers, and by the evident danger of an open rupture with England, displayed, according to lord Wellington, the utmost prudence and fairness in a most important affair which occurred at this time. That is to say, their own views and interests coinciding with those of the English commander and government, there was a momentary agreement, and Wellington wisely preferred this opening for conciliation to the more dangerous mode he had before recommended.

The event which called forth his approval of their conduct was the secret arrival of the duke of San Carlos at Madrid in December. He brought with him a treaty of peace, proposed by Napoleon and accepted by Ferdinand, called the treaty of Valençay. It acknowledged Ferdinand as king of Spain and the Indies, and the integrity of the Spanish em-

pire was recognized. He was in return to make the English evacuate Spain, and the French troops were to abandon the country at the same time. The contracting powers were to maintain their respective maritime rights, as they had been stipulated by the treaty of Utrecht and observed until 1792. The sales of the national domains made by Joseph were to be confirmed; all the Spaniards who had attached themselves to the French cause were to be reinstated in their dignities and property, those who chose to quit Spain were to have ten years to dispose of their possessions. Prisoners, including all those delivered up by Spain to the English, were to be sent home on both sides. The king was to pay annually thirty millions of reals to his father Charles IV., and two millions to his widow; a treaty of commerce was to be arranged.

Ferdinand, being entirely devoid of principle, acted with that cunning which marked his infamous career through life. He gave the duke of San Carlos secret instructions to tell the serviles, if he found them all-powerful in the cortes, to ratify this treaty with a secret resolution to break it when time served; but if the Jacobins were strongest, San Carlos was merely to ask them to ratify it, Ferdinand in that case reserving to himself the task of violating it on his own authority. These instructions were made known to the English ministers and the English general; but they, putting no trust in such a negotiator, and thinking his intention was rather to deceive the allies than Napoleon, thwarted him as much as they could, and in this they were joined by the Portuguese government. The British authorities were naturally little pleased with the prospect of being forced to abandon Spain under a treaty which would necessarily give Napoleon great influence over that country in after-times, and for the present enable him to concentrate all the old troops on the eastern frontier of his empire; nor was the Jacobinical Spanish government more content to have a master. Wherefore, all parties being agreed, the regency, keeping the matter secret, dismissed San Carlos on the 8th of January with a copy of the decree passed by the cortes, which rendered null and void all acts of Ferdinand while a prisoner, and forbade negotiation for peace while a French army remained in the Peninsula. And that the king might fully understand them, they told him, "the monster despotism had been driven from the throne of Spain." Meanwhile Joseph Palafox, who had been a prisoner ever since the siege of Zaragoza, was by the French emperor first sent to Valençay, after which he was to follow San Carlos, and he arrived at Madrid four days after the latter's departure. But his negotiations were equally fruitless with the regency; and in the secret sittings of the cortes measures were discussed for watching the king's movements and forcing him to swear to the constitution and to the cortes before he passed the frontier.

Lord Wellington was alarmed at the treaty of Valençay. He had, he said, long suspected Napoleon would adopt such an expedient, and if he had shown less pride and more common sense it would have succeeded. This sarcasm was perhaps well applied to the measure as it appeared at the time; but the emperor's real proceedings he was unacquainted with, and this splenetic ebullition only indicated his own vexation at approaching mischief, for he was forced to acknowledge that the project was not unlikely even then to succeed, because the misery of Spain was so great and so clearly to be traced to the views of the government and of the new constitution, that many persons must have been desirous to put an end to the general suffering under the sanction

of this treaty. "If Napoleon," he said, "had withdrawn the garrisons from Catalonia and Valencia, and sent Ferdinand, who must be as useless a person in France as he would probably be in Spain, at once to the frontier, or into the Peninsula, peace would have been made, or the war at least rendered so difficult as to be almost impracticable and without hope of great success." Now this was precisely what Napoleon had designed, and it seems nearly certain that he contemplated the treaty of Valençay and the restoration of Ferdinand as early as the period of the battle of Vittoria, if not before.

The scheme was one which demanded the utmost secrecy, that it might be too sudden for the English influence to defeat it; the emperor had therefore arranged that Ferdinand should enter Spain early in November, that is, at the very moment when it would have been most injurious to the English interest, because then the disputes in the cortez between the serviles and Jacobins were most rancorous, and the hostility of the regencies both in Portugal and Spain towards the English general and English influence undisguised. Suchet had then also proved his superiority to the allies in Catalonia, and Soult's gigantic lines being unessayed seemed impregnable. But in Napoleon's council were persons seeking only to betray him. It was the great misfortune of his life to have been driven by circumstances to suffer such men as Talleyrand and Fouché, whose innate treachery has become proverbial, to meddle in his affairs or even to approach his court. Mischief of this kind however necessarily awaits men who, like Napoleon and Oliver Cromwell, have the courage to attempt, after great convulsions and civil wars, the rebuilding of the social edifice without spilling blood. Either to create universal abhorrence by their cruelty, or to employ the basest of men, the Talleyrands, Fouchés, and Monks, of revolutions, is their inevitable fate; and never can they escape the opposition, more dangerous still, of honest and resolute men, who unable to comprehend the necessity of the times, see nothing but tyranny in the vigour which prevents anarchy.

The treaty of Valençay was too important a measure to escape the sagacity of the traitors around Napoleon, and when their opposition in the council and their secret insinuations proved unavailing to dissuade him from it, they divulged the secret to the partisans of the Bourbons. Taking advantage of the troubled state of public affairs, which occupied the emperor's time and distracted his attention, they contrived that Ferdinand's emissaries should precede him to Madrid, and delayed his own departure until March, when the struggle was at an end. Nevertheless the chances of success for this scheme, even in its imperfect execution, were so many and so alarming that lord Wellington's sudden change from fierce enmity to a warm support of the regency, when he found it resolute and frank in its rejection of the treaty, although it created so much surprise and danger at the moment, cannot be judged otherwise than as the wise and prudent proceeding of a consummate statesman. Nor did he fail to point out to his own government the more distant as well as the immediate danger to England and Spain involved in this singularly complicated and important affair.

The evils as affecting the war and English alliance with Spain were obvious; but the two articles relating to the provision for Ferdinand's father and mother, and to the future state of the Spaniards who had joined the French, involved great interests. It was essential, he said, that the Spanish govern-

ment should explicitly declare its intentions. Negotiations for a general peace were said to be commenced; of that he knew nothing, but he supposed, such being the case, that a basis would be embodied in a preliminary treaty which all the belligerents would ratify, each power then to arrange its own peculiar treaty with France under protection of the general confederation. Napoleon would necessarily put forward his treaty with Ferdinand. It could be got rid of by the statement that the latter was a prisoner when negotiating; but new articles would then have to be framed, and therefore the Spanish government should be called upon previously to declare what their intentions were as to the two articles in the treaty of Valençay. His objections to them were that the allowance to Charles IV. was beyond the financial means of Spain, and were it not so, Napoleon should not be allowed to stipulate for any provision for him. Neither should he be suffered to embody or establish a permanent French party in Spain, under protection of a treaty, an article of which provided for the restoration of the Spaniards who had taken part with the French. It would give him the right, which he would not fail to exercise, of interfering in their favour in every question of property, or other interest, and the Spanish government would be involved in perpetual disputes with France. It was probable the allied sovereigns would be desirous of getting rid of this question, and would think it desirable that Spain should pardon her rebellious subjects. For this reason he had before advised the Spanish government to publish a general amnesty, with the view of removing the difficulty when a general peace should come to be negotiated, and this difficulty and danger be enhanced, if not before provided for, by the desire which each of the allied powers would feel, when negotiating on their separate grounds, to save their finances by disbanding their armies.

This suggestion of an amnesty, made ten days before the battle of Vittoria, illustrates Wellington's sagacity, his long and provident reach of mind, his discriminating and magnanimous mode of viewing the errors and weaknesses of human nature. Let it be remembered that in the full tide of success, after having passed the Duero, and when Joseph surprised and bewildered was flying before him, that he who had been called the iron duke, in the midst of his bivouac fires, found time to consider, and had sufficient humanity and grandeur of mind thus to address the Spanish government, on this subject.

"A large number of Spaniards who have taken the side of the French are now with the enemy's army: many of these are highly meritorious, and have rendered most essential service to the cause even during the period in which they have been in the service of the enemy. It is also a known fact that fear, the misery and distress which they suffered during the contest, and despair of the result, were the motives which induced many of these unfortunate persons to take the part which they have taken; and I would suggest for consideration whether it is expedient to involve the country in all the consequences of a rigid adherence to the existing law in order to punish such persons. I am the last man who will be found to diminish the merit of those Spaniards who have adhered to the cause of the country during the severe trial which I hope has passed, particularly of those who, having remained amongst the enemy without entering their service, have served their country at the risk of their lives. But at the same time that I can appreciate the merits of these individuals and of the

nation at large, I can forgive the weakness of those who have been induced by terror, by distress, or by despair, to pursue a different line of conduct.

"I entreat the government to advert to the circumstances of the commencement and of the different stages of this eventful contest, and to the numerous occasions in which all men must have imagined that it was impossible for the powers of the Peninsula, although aided by Great Britain, to withstand the colossal power by which they were assailed and nearly overcome. Let them reflect upon the weakness of the country at the commencement of the contest, upon the numerous and almost invariable disasters of the armies, and upon the ruin and disorganization that followed, and let them decide whether those who were witnesses of these events are guilty because they could not foresee what has since occurred. The majority are certainly not guilty in any other manner, and many now deemed guilty in the eye of the law, as having served the pretended king, have by that very act acquired the means of serving and have rendered important services to their country. It is my opinion that the policy of Spain should lead the government and the cortes to grant a general amnesty with certain exceptions. This subject deserves consideration in the two views of failing or succeeding in freeing the country from its oppressors. If the effort fail, the enemy will by an amnesty be deprived of the principal means now in his hands of oppressing the country in which his armies will be stationed: he will see clearly that he can place no reliance on any partisans in Spain, and he will not have even a pretence for supposing that the country is divided in opinion. If the effort succeed, the object of the government should be to pacify the country and to heal the divisions which the contest has unavoidably occasioned. It is impossible to accomplish this object while there exists a great body of the Spanish nation, some possessing the largest property in the country and others endowed with considerable talents, who are proscribed for their conduct during the contest, conduct which has been caused by the misfortunes to which I have above adverted. These persons, their friends and relations, will if persecuted naturally endeavour to perpetuate the divisions in the country, in the hope at some time to take advantage of them; and advertising to their number, and to that power which they must derive from their property and connexions, it must be feared that they will be too successful.

"But there are other important views of this question. First, should the effort to free the country from its oppressors succeed, at some time or other approaches to peace must be made between the two nations, and the amnesty to the persons above described will remove the greatest difficulty in the way of such an arrangement. Secondly, should even Spain be at peace with France, and the proscription against these persons be continued, they will remain in France, a perpetual instrument in the hands of that restless power to disturb the internal tranquillity of Spain; and in case of a renewal of the war, which will be their wish and object, they will be the most mischievous and most inveterate enemies of their country, of that country which with mistaken severity aggravates her misfortunes by casting off from her thousands of her useful subjects. On every ground then it is desirable that the measure should be adopted, and the present moment should be seized for adopting it."

Then pointing out with great accuracy and justice those who should be exempted from an amnesty, he thus terminated this record of his own true great-

ness, and of the littleness of the people to whom it was fruitlessly addressed.

"In bringing this subject under the consideration of the government, I am perhaps intruding my opinion on a subject in which as a stranger I have no concern; but having had an advantage enjoyed by few of being acquainted with the concerns of the country since the commencement of the contest, and having been sensible, both in the last and present campaign, of the disadvantages suffered by Spain from the want of a measure of this description, I have thought it proper, as a well-wisher to the cause, to bring it under the consideration of the government, assuring them at the same time that I have never had the slightest communication on the subject with the government of my country, nor do I believe that they have ever turned their attention to it. What I have above stated are my own opinions, to which I may attribute more weight than they merit, but they are founded upon a sincere devotion to the interests of the country."

Such was the general political state of the Peninsula as bearing upon the military operations at the close of the year 1813, and the state of England and France shall be shown in the next chapters. But however hateful and injurious to England the conduct of the Peninsular government appears, and however just and well-founded were the greatest part of lord Wellington's complaints, it is not to be assumed that the Spanish government and cortes were totally without excuse for their hostility or ingratitude. It was not solely upon military grounds that they were obnoxious to the English general. He united heartily with the English government in hatred of democratic institutions as opposed to aristocratic domination. Spain with the former seemed scarcely worth saving from France, and in a letter written about that period to the conde de l'Abispa, who it would appear proposed some immediate stroke of violence against the regency, he openly avows that he was inimical to the constitution, because it admitted a free press, and refused to property any political influence beyond what naturally belonged to it. That is, it refused to heap undue honours, privileges and power upon those who already possessed all the luxury and happiness which riches can bestow; it refused to admit the principle that those who have much should have more; that the indolence, corruption and insolence naturally attendant upon wealth should be supported and increased by irresponsible power; that those who laboured and produced all things should enjoy nothing; that the rich should be tyrants and the poor slaves. But these essential principles of aristocratic government have never yet been, and never will be, quietly received and submitted to by any thinking people: where they prevail there is no real freedom. Property inevitably confers power on its possessors, and far from adding to that natural power by political privileges, it should be the object of all men who love liberty to balance it by raising the poorer classes to political importance: the influence and insolence of riches ought to be tamed and subdued, instead of being inflated and excited by political institutions. This was the guiding principle of the most celebrated Greek legislators; the opposite principle produced the domestic dissensions of the Romans, and was the ruin of Carthage. It was the cause also of the French revolution. But after many years of darkness, the light of reason is now breaking forth again, and that ancient principle of justice which places the right of man in himself, above the right of property, is beginning to be understood. A clear perception of it has produced the American republic.

France and Spain have admitted it, and England ripens for its adoption. Yet pure, and bright, and beautiful, and healthful, as the light of freedom is in itself, it fell at this time on such foul and stagnant pools, such horrid repulsive objects, that millions turned at first from its radiance with disgust, and wished for darkness again.

CHAPTER V.

Political state of Napoleon—Guileful policy of the allied sovereigns—M. de St. Aignan—General reflections—Unsettled policy of the English ministers—They neglect lord Wellington—He remonstrates and exposes the denuded state of his army.

THE force and energy of Napoleon's system of government was evinced in a marvellous manner by the rapidity with which he returned to Germany, at the head of an enormous army, before his enemies had time even to understand the extent of his misfortunes in the Russian campaign. The victories of Lutzen and Bautzen then seemed to reinstate him as the arbiter of Europe. But those battles were fought with the heads of columns the rear of which were still filing out of France. They were fought also with young troops. Wherefore the emperor, when he had given himself a fixed and menacing position in Germany, more readily listened to the fraudulent negotiations of his trembling opponents, partly in hopes of attaining his object without further appeal to arms, partly to obtain time to organize and discipline his soldiers, confident in his own unmatched skill in directing them if war was finally to decide his fate. He counted also upon the family ties between him and Austria, and believed that power willing to mediate sincerely. Not that he was so weak as to imagine the hope of regaining some of its former power and possessions was not uppermost, nor was he unprepared to make concessions; but he seems to have been quite unsuspecting of the long course of treachery and deceit followed by the Austrian politicians.

It has been already shown that while negotiating with France an offensive and defensive treaty in 1812, the Austrian cabinet was cognizant of, and secretly aiding, the plan of a vast insurrection extending from the Tyrol to Calabria and the Illyrian provinces. The management of this scheme was entrusted by the English cabinet to general Nugent and Mr. King, who were at Vienna: their agents went from thence to Italy and the Illyrian coast; many Austrian officers were engaged in the project; and Italians of great families entered into commercial houses to enable them with more facility to carry on this plan. Moreover Austria, while actually signing the treaty with Napoleon, was with unceasing importunity urging Prussia to join the Russians in opposition to him. The feeble operations of prince Schwartzberg, the manner in which he uncovered the emperor's right flank and permitted Tchitchagoff to move to the Beresina in the Russian campaign, were but continuations of this deceitful policy. And it was openly advanced as a merit by the Austrian cabinet, that the offer of mediation after the battle of Bautzen was made solely with the view of gaining time to organize the army which was to join the Russians and Prussians. Finally, the armistice itself was violated, hostilities being commenced before its termination, to enable the Russian troops safely to join the Austrians in Bohemia.

Nevertheless Napoleon's genius triumphed at Dresden over the unskillful operations of the allies, directed by Schwartzberg, whose incapacity as a

commander was made manifest in this campaign. Nor would the after misfortunes of Vandamme and marshal Macdonald, or the defeat of Oudinot and Ney, have prevented the emperor's final success, but for the continuation of a treachery, which seemed at the time to be considered a virtue by sovereigns who were unceasingly accusing their more noble adversary of the very baseness that they were practising so unblushingly. He had conceived a project so vast, so original, so hardy, so far above the imaginations of his contemporary generals, that even Wellington's sagacity failed to pierce it, and he censured the emperor's long stay on the Elbe as an obstinacy unwarranted by the rules of art. But Napoleon had more profoundly judged his own situation. The large forces he had left at Dresden, at Torgau, and Wittenberg, for which he has been so much blamed by shallow military critics as lessening his numbers on the field of Leipzig, were essential parts of his gigantic plan. He quitted Dresden, apparently in retreat, to deceive his enemies, but with the intention of marching down the Elbe, recrossing that river, and throwing his opponents into a false position. Then he would have seized Berlin, and reopening his communications with his garrisons both on the Elbe and the Oder, have operated between those rivers; and with an army much augmented in power, because he would have recovered many thousand old soldiers cooped up in the garrisons; an army more compact and firmly established also, because he would have been in direct communication with the Danes and with Davoust's force at Hamburgh, and both his flanks would have been secured by his chains of fortresses on the two rivers. Already had Blucher and the Swedes felt his first stroke; the next would have taught the allies that the lion was still abroad in his strength, if at the very moment of execution, without any previous declaration, the Bavarians, upon whose operations he depended for keeping the Austrians in the valley of the Danube in check, had not formed common cause with his opponents, and the whole marched together towards the Rhine. The battle of Leipzig followed, the well-known treason of the Saxon troops led to the victory gained there by the allies, and Napoleon, now the prey of misfortune, reached France with only one-third of his army, having on the way, however, trampled in the dust the Bavarian Wrede, who attempted to stop his passage at Hanau.

Meanwhile the allied sovereigns, by giving hopes to their subjects that constitutional liberty would be the reward of the prodigious popular exertions against France, hopes which with the most detestable baseness they had previously resolved to defraud, assembled greater forces than they were able to wield, and prepared to pass the Rhine. But distrusting even their immense superiority of numbers, they still pursued their faithless system. When Napoleon, in consequence of the Bavarian defection, marched to Leipzig, he sent orders to Gouvion St. Cyr to abandon Dresden and unite with the garrisons on the lower Elbe: the messengers were intercepted, and St. Cyr, too little enterprising to execute such a plan of his own accord, surrendered on condition of being allowed to regain France. The capitulation was broken, and general and soldiers remained prisoners.

After the Leipzig battle, Napoleon's adherents fell away by nations. Murat, the husband of his sister, joined Austria, and thus forced prince Eugene to abandon his position on the Adige. A successful insurrection in favour of the prince of Orange broke out in Holland. The neutrality of Switzerland was

violated, and more than half a million of armed men were poured across the frontiers of France in all the violence of brute force; for their military combinations were contemptible, and their course marked by murder and devastation. But previous to this the allies gave one more notable example of their faithless cunning.

St. Aignan, the French resident minister at Gotha, had been taken at Leipzig, and treated at first as a prisoner of war. He remonstrated, and being known to entertain a desire for peace was judged a good tool with which to practice deception. Napoleon had offered on the field of battle at Leipzig to negotiate: no notice was taken of it at the time, but now the Austrian Metternich and the Russian Nesselrode had an interview with St. Aignan at Frankfort, and they assured him the Prussian minister agreed in all things with them. They had previously arranged that lord Aberdeen should come in during the conference as if by accident; nothing was put down in writing, yet St. Aignan was suffered to make minutes of their proposals in reply to the emperor's offer to negotiate. These were generally, that the alliance of the sovereigns was indissoluble—that they would have only a general peace—that France was to be confined to her natural limits, viz. the Alps, the Rhine and the Pyrenees—that the independence of Germany was a thing not to be disputed—that the Spanish Peninsula should be free, and the Bourbon dynasty be restored—that Austria must have a frontier in Italy, the line of which could be afterwards discussed, but Italy itself was to be independent of any preponderating power—that Holland was also to be independent, and her frontier to be matter for after-discussion—that England was ready to make great sacrifices for peace upon these bases, and would acknowledge that freedom of commerce and of navigation which France had a right to pretend to. St. Aignan here observed that Napoleon believed England was resolved to restrict France to the possession of thirty sail of the line: lord Aberdeen replied that it was not true.

This conference had place at the emperor of Austria's head-quarters on the 10th of November, and lord Aberdeen enclosed the account of it in a despatch dated at Smalcalde the 16th of November. He had objected verbally to the passage relating to the maritime question with England, nevertheless he permitted it to remain in St. Aignan's minutes. It was decided also that the military operations should go on notwithstanding the negotiation, and in truth the allies had not the slightest design to make peace. They thought Napoleon would refuse the basis proposed, which would give them an opportunity to declare he was opposed to all reasonable modes of putting an end to the war, and thus work upon the French people. This is proved by what followed. For when contrary to their expectations the emperor's minister signified, on the 16th of November, that he accepted the propositions, observing that the independence of all nations at sea as well as by land had been always Napoleon's object, Metternich in his reply, on the 25th of November, pretended to consider this answer as avoiding the acceptance of the basis. The emperor however put that obstacle aside, on the 2d of December, by accepting explicitly the basis, generally and summarily, such as it had been presented to him, adding that France would make great sacrifices, but the emperor was content if, by like sacrifices on the part of England, that general peace which was the declared object of the allies could be obtained. Metternich, thus driven from his subterfuge, required

Napoleon to send a like declaration to each of the allies separately, when negotiations might, he said, commence.

Meanwhile lord Aberdeen, who had permitted St. Aignan to retain the article relating to maritime rights in his minutes of conference, presented to Metternich, on the 27th of November, a note declaring that England would not admit the turn given by France to her share of the negotiation; that she was ready to yield all the rights of commerce and navigation which France had a right to pretend to, but the question would turn upon what that right was. England would never permit her navigation laws to be discussed at a congress, it was a matter essentially foreign to the object of such an assembly, and England would never depart from the great principle thereby announced as to her maritime rights. Metternich approved of lord Aberdeen's views, saying they were his own and those of his court; thus proving that the negotiation had been a deceit from the beginning. This fact was however placed beyond doubt by lord Castlereagh's simultaneous proceedings in London.

In a note, dated the 30th of November, that minister told lord Aberdeen, England admitted as a basis, that the Alps, the Rhine and the Pyrenees should be the frontier of France, subject to such modifications as might be necessary to give a secure frontier to Holland, and to Switzerland also, although the latter had not been mentioned in the proposals given by St. Aignan. He applauded the resolution to pursue military operations notwithstanding the negotiations, and he approved of demanding nothing but what they were resolved to have. Nevertheless he said that any sacrifice to be made by England was only to secure the independence of Holland and Switzerland, and the former, having already declared for the house of Nassau, was now out of the pale of discussion. Finally, he recommended that any unnecessary delay or equivocation on the part of the enemy should be considered as tantamount to a rejection of the basis, and that the allies should then put forward the offer of peace, to show that it was not they, but France, that opposed an honourable termination of the war. Having thus thrown fresh obstacles in the way of that peace which the allies pretended to have so much at heart, he, on the 21st December, sent notes to the different ambassadors of the allied powers then in London, demanding explicit answers about the intentions of their courts as to England's maritime code. To this they all responded, that their cabinets would not suffer any questions relative to that code to be entertained at a congress in which England was represented, and this on the express ground that it would mar the great object of peace.

Lord Castlereagh, thus provided, declared that France should be informed of their resolutions before negotiations commenced; but twenty days before this, Napoleon having decreed a fresh levy of three hundred thousand conscripts, the allies had published a manifesto treating this measure, so essentially a defensive one since they would not suspend their military operations, as a fresh provocation on his part, because the motives assigned for the conscription contained a just and powerful description of their past deceits and violence with a view to rouse the national spirit of France. Thus having first, by a pretended desire for peace and a willingness on the part of England to consent to an arrangement about her maritime code, inveigled the French emperor into negotiations, and thereby ascertained that the maritime question was uppermost in his mind and the only obstacle to peace, they de-

clared that vital question should not even be discussed: and when by this subtlety they had rendered peace impossible, proclaimed that Napoleon alone resisted the desire of the world for tranquillity. And at this very moment Austria was secretly endeavouring to obtain England's consent to her seizing upon Alsace, a project which was stopped by lord Wellington, who forcibly pointed out the danger of rousing France to a general insurrection by such a proceeding.

The contrast between these wiles to gain a momentary advantage, and the manly, vigorous policy of lord Wellington, must make honest men of all nations blush for the cunning which diplomatists call policy. On one side, the arts of guileful negotiation masked with fair protestations, but accompanied by a savage and revolting system of warfare; on the other, a broad open hostility declared on manly and just grounds, followed up with a strict regard to humanity and good faith; nothing put forward with an equivocal meaning, and the actions true to the word. On the eastern frontier, the Cossack let loose to ravage with all the barbarity of Asiatic warfare. On the western frontier, the Spaniards turned back into their own country in the very midst of triumph, for daring to pass the bounds of discipline prescribed by the wise and generous policy of their commander. Terror and desolation, and the insurrection of a people rendered frantic by the cruelty of the invaders, marked the progress of the ferocious multitudes who crossed the Rhine. Order and tranquillity, profound even on the very edge of the battle-field, attended the march of the civilized army which passed the Bidassoa. And what were the military actions? Napoleon, rising even above himself, hurried against the armed myriads opposed to him with such a terrible energy that though ten times his number they were rolled back on every side in confusion and dismay. But Wellington advanced without a check, victorious in every battle, although one half of the veterans opposed to him would have decided the campaign on the eastern frontier. Nor can this be gainsaid, since Napoleon's career in this campaign was only stayed by the defection of his brother-in-law Murat, and by the sickening treachery of two marshals to whom he had been prodigal of benefits. It is undeniable that Lord Wellington with sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese, acting in the south, effected more than half a million of the allies were able to effect on the opposite side of France; and yet Soult's army, on the 10th of November, was stronger than that with which Napoleon fought the battle of Brienne.

That great man was never personally deceived by the allies' pretended negotiations. He joined issue with them to satisfy the French people that he was not averse to peace, but his instructions, dated the 4th of January, and addressed to Caulincourt, prove at once his sagacity and firmness. "I think," he said, "that both the allies' good faith and the wish of England to make peace is doubtful; for my part I desire peace, but it must be solid and honourable. I have accepted the basis proposed at Frankfort, yet it is more than probable the allies have other notions. These propositions are but a mask, the negotiations are placed under the influence of the military operations, and it is easy to foresee what the consequence of such a system must be. It is necessary therefore to listen to and observe every thing. It is not certain even that you will be admitted to the head-quarters of the allies. The Russians and the English watch to prevent any opening for explanation and reconciliation with the emperor of Austria. You must therefore endeavour to ascer-

tain the real views of the allies, and let me know day by day what you learn, that I may frame instructions for which at present I have no sure grounds."

The internal state of France was more disquieting to his mind than foreign negotiations or the number of invaders. The sincere republicans were naturally averse to him as the restorer of monarchy; yet they should have felt that the sovereign whose ruin was so eagerly sought by the legitimate kings and nobles of Europe could not be really opposed to liberty. Meanwhile the advocates of legitimacy shrunk from him as a usurper, and all those tired of war, and they were a majority of the nation, judging from the stupendous power of his genius that he had only to will peace to attain it with security, blamed his tardiness in negotiation. An unexpected opposition to his wishes was also displayed in the legislative body, and the partisans of the Bourbons were endeavouring to form a great conspiracy in favour of that house. There were many traitors likewise to him and to their country, men devoid of principle, patriotism or honour, who with instinctive hatred of a failing cause plotted to thwart his projects for the defence of the nation. In fine, the men of action and the men of theories were alike combined for mischief. Nor is this outbreak of passion to be wondered at, when it is considered how recently Napoleon had stopped the anarchy of the revolution and rebuilt the social and political structure in France. But of all who by their untimely opposition to the emperor hurt their country, the most pernicious were those silly politicians, whom he so felicitously described as "discussing abstract systems of government when the battering ram was at the gates."

Such however has been in all ages the conduct of excited and disturbed nations, and it seems to be inherent in human nature, because a saving policy can only be understood and worked to good by master-spirits, and they are few and far between, their time on earth short, their task immense. They have not time to teach, they must command, although they know that pride and ignorance and even honesty will carp at the despotism which brings general safety. It was this vain short-sighted impatience that drove Hannibal into exile, caused the assassination of Cæsar, and strewed thorns beneath the gigantic footsteps of Oliver Cromwell. It raged fiercely in Spain against lord Wellington, and in France against Napoleon, and always with the most grievous injury to the several nations. Time only hallows human institutions. Under that guarantee men will yield implicit obedience and respect to the wildest caprices of the most stupid tyrant that ever disgraced a throne, and wanting it they will cavil at and reject the wisest measures of the most sublime genius. The painful notion is thus excited, that if governments are conducted with just the degree of stability and tranquillity which they deserve, and no more, the people of all nations, much as they may be oppressed, enjoy upon an average of years precisely the degree of liberty they are fitted for. National discontents mark, according to their bitterness and constancy, not so much the oppression of the rulers, as the real progress of the ruled in civilization and its attendant political knowledge. When from peculiar circumstances those discontents explode in violent revolutions, shattering the fabric of society and giving free vent and activity to all the passions and follies of mankind, fortunate is the nation which possesses a Napoleon or an Oliver Cromwell, "to step into their state of dominion, with spirit to control and capacity to subdue the

factions of the hour, and reconstruct the frame of reasonable government."

For great as these two men were in the field of battle, especially the former, they were infinitely greater when they placed themselves in the seat of power, and put forth the gigantic despotism of genius essential to the completion of their holy work. Nor do I hold the conduct of Washington to be comparable to either of those men. His situation was one of infinitely less difficulty, and there is no reason to believe that his capacity would have been equal to the emergencies of a more formidable crisis than he had to deal with. Washington could not have made himself master of all, had it been necessary and he so inclined, for he was neither the foremost general nor the foremost statesman of his nation. His forbearance was a matter of necessity, and his love of liberty did not prevent him from bequeathing his black slaves to his widow.

Such was Napoleon's situation; and as he read the signs of the times truly, he knew that in his military skill and the rage of the peasants at the ravages of the enemy he must find the means to extricate himself from his difficulties, or rather to extricate his country, for self had no place in his policy save as his personal glory was identified with France and her prosperity. Never before did the world see a man soaring so high and devoid of all selfish ambition. Let those who honestly seeking truth doubt this, study Napoleon carefully; let them read the record of his second abdication published by his brother Lucien, that stern republican who refused kingdoms as the price of his principles, and they will doubt no longer. It is not however with these matters that this history has to deal, but with the emperor's measures affecting his lieutenants on the Spanish frontier of France. There disaffection to his government was extensive, but principally from local causes. The conscription was peculiarly hateful to the wild mountaineers, who like most borderers cherish very independent notions. The war with England had ruined the foreign commerce of their great towns, and the advantage of increased traffic by land on the east was less directly felt in the south. There also the recollection of the Vendean struggle still lingered, and the partisans of the Bourbons had many connexions. But the chief danger arose from the just and politic conduct of lord Wellington, which, offering no cause of anger and very much of private advantage to the people, gave little or no hope of insurrection from sufferings.

While France was in this state, England presented a scene of universal exultation. Tory politics were triumphant, opposition in the parliament was nearly crushed by events, the press was either subdued by persecution or in the pay of the ministers, and the latter with undisguised joy hailed the coming moment when aristocratic tyranny was to be firmly established in England. The most enormous subsidies and military supplies were poured into the continent, and an act was passed to enable three-fourths of the militia to serve abroad. They were not however very forward to volunteer, and a new army which ought to have reinforced Wellington, was sent, under the command of general Graham, to support the insurrection of Holland, where it was of necessity engaged in trifling or unsuccessful operations in no manner affecting the great objects of the war. Meanwhile the importance of lord Wellington's army and views was quite overlooked or misunderstood. The ministers persevered in the foolish plan of removing him to another quarter of Europe, and at the same time, instigated by

the ambassadors of the allied sovereigns, were continually urging him to push his operations with more vigour in France. As if he was the man who had done least!

His letters were filled with strong and well-founded complaints that his army was neglected. Let his real position be borne in mind. He had, not as a military man, but with a political view, and to meet the wishes of the allied sovereigns backed by the importunities of his own government, placed himself in a confined and difficult district of France, where his operations were cramped by rivers and fortresses and by a powerful army occupying strong positions on his front and flanks. In this situation, unable to act at all in wet weather, he was necessarily dependent upon the ocean for supplies and reinforcements, and upon the Spanish authorities for his hospitals, depots, and communications. Numbers were requisite to balance the advantages derived by the enemy from the peculiar conformation of the country and the position of the fortresses. Money also was wanted to procure supplies which he could not carry with him, and must pay for exactly, if he would avoid a general insurrection and the consequent ruin of the political object for which he had adopted such critical military operations. But though he had undertaken the invasion of France at the express desire of the government, the latter seemed to be alike ignorant of its importance and of the means to accomplish it, at one moment urging progress beyond reason, at another ready to change lightly what they had proposed ignorantly. Their unsettled policy proved their incapacity even to comprehend the nature of the great tide of events on which they floated rather than sailed. Lord Wellington was forced day by day to teach them the value of their own schemes, and to show them how small their knowledge was of the true bearing of the political and military affairs they pretended to direct.

"Assure," he wrote on the 21st of December to lord Bathurst, in reply to one of their ill-founded remonstrances, "assure the Russian ambassador there is nothing I can do to forward the general interest that I will not do. What do they require? I am already further advanced on the French territory than any of the allied powers, and better prepared to take advantage of any opportunities which might offer as a consequence of my own situation or of their proceedings. . . . In military operations there are some things which cannot be done, and one is to move troops in this country during or immediately after a violent fall of rain. To attempt it will be to lose more men than can be replaced, a guilty waste of life. . . .

"The proper scene of action for the army was undoubtedly a question for the government to decide; but with thirty thousand men in the Peninsula, he had for five years held two hundred thousand of Napoleon's best soldiers in check, since it was ridiculous to suppose that the Spaniards and Portuguese could have resisted for a moment if the British troops had been withdrawn. The French armies actually employed against him could not be less than one hundred thousand men, more if he included garrisons, and the French newspapers spoke of orders to form a fresh reserve of one hundred thousand at Bordeaux. Was there any man weak enough to suppose one third of the number first mentioned would be employed against the Spaniards and Portuguese if the British were withdrawn? They would if it were an object with Bonaparte to conquer the Peninsula, and he would in that case succeed; but he was more likely to give peace to the

Peninsula, and turn against the allied sovereigns his two hundred thousand men, of which one hundred thousand were such troops as their armies had not yet dealt with. The war every day offered a crisis the result of which might affect the world for ages, and to change the scene of operations for the British army would render it incapable of fighting for four months, even if the scene were Holland, and it would even then be a deteriorated machine.

"The ministers might reasonably ask how, by remaining where he was, he could induce Napoleon to make peace. The answer was ready. He held a commanding situation on the most vulnerable frontier of France, probably the only vulnerable one, and if he could put twenty thousand Spaniards in activity—and he could do it if he had money and was properly supported by the fleet—Bayonne, the only fortress on the frontier, if it could be called a fortress, would fall to him in a short time. If he could put forty thousand Spaniards in motion his posts would soon be on the Garonne; and did any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an army in such a position more than he would feel thirty or forty thousand British troops laying siege to one of his fortresses in Holland? The resources in men and money of which the emperor would be thus deprived, and the loss of reputation, would do ten times more to procure peace than ten armies on the side of Flanders. But if he was right in believing a strong Bourbon party existed in France, and that it preponderated in the south, what mischief would not an advance to the Garonne do Napoleon! What sacrifices would he not make to get rid of the danger!

"It was for the government, not for him, to dispose of the nation's resources, he had no right to give an opinion upon the subject; but military operations in Holland and in the Peninsula could not be maintained at the same time with British troops: one or other must be given up, the British military establishment was not equal to maintain two armies in the field. He had begun the recent campaign with seventy thousand Anglo-Portuguese, and if the men got from the English militia, and the Portuguese recruits which he expected, had been added to his force, even though the Germans were removed from his army according to the ministers' plan, he might have taken the field early in 1814 with eighty thousand men. That was now impossible. The formation of a Hanoverian army was the most reasonable plan of acting on the continent, but the withdrawal of the Germans would reduce his force to fifty thousand men, unless he received real and efficient assistance to bring up the Portuguese recruits. This would increase his numbers to fifty-five or even sixty thousand, if his own wounded recovered well and he had no more battles; but he would even then be twenty thousand less than he had calculated upon, and it was certain that if the government extended their operations to other countries new means must be put in activity, or the war must be stinted on the old stage. He did not desire to complain, but every branch of the service in the Peninsula was already stinted, especially in what concerned the navy and the supplies which came directly from England!"

Whilst thus combating the false views of the English cabinet as to the general state of affairs, he had also to struggle with its negligence and even opposition to his measures in details.

The general clothing of the Spanish troops and the great-coats of the British soldiers for 1813 were not ready in January, 1814, because the inferior departments could not comprehend that the opening

of new scenes of exertion required new means, and the soldiers had to brave the winter half naked, first on the snowy mountains, then in the more chilling damps of the low country about Bayonne. The clothing of the British soldiers for 1814 should have arrived in the end of 1813, when the army, lying inactive near the coast by reason of the bad weather, could have received and fitted it without difficulty. It did not however arrive until the troops were in progress towards the interior of France; wherefore, there being no means of transporting it by land, many of the best regiments were obliged to return to the coast to receive it, and the army, as we shall find, had to fight a critical battle without them.

He had, upon commencing the invasion of France, issued a proclamation promising protection to persons and property. This was construed by the French to cover their vessels in the Nivelle when the battle of that name gave the allies St. Jean de Luz. Lord Wellington, sacrificing personal profit to the good of the service, admitted this claim, as tending to render the people amicable; but it clashed with the prize-money pretensions of lord Keith, who commanded the fleet of which Collier's squadron formed a detached portion. The serious evils endured by the army in default of sufficient naval assistance had been treated as of very slight importance; the object of a trifling personal gain for the navy excited a marvellous activity and vigorous interference on the part of the government. Upon these subjects, and others of a like vexatious nature, affecting his operations, lord Wellington repeatedly and forcibly declared his discontent during the months of December, January and February.

"As to the naval affairs," he said, "the reports of the number of ships on the stations, striking off those coming out and going home, would show whether he had just ground of complaint, and whatever their numbers there remained the right of complaint because they did not perform the service required. The French had recommenced their coast navigation from Bordeaux to Bayonne, and if the blockade of Santana had been maintained the place would have been forced to surrender at an early period. The proclamation of protection which he had issued, and the licenses which he had granted to French vessels, every act of that description, and two-thirds of the acts which he performed every day, could not, he knew, be considered of any avail as affecting the king's government, unless approved of and confirmed by the prince regent; and he knew that no power short of the regent's could save the property of French subjects on the seas from the British navy. For that reason he had requested the sanction of the government to the sea passports which he had granted. His proclamation of protection had been construed, whether rightfully or wrongfully, to protect the French ships in the rivers; his personal interest, greater than others, would lead him to deny this, but he sacrificed his profit to the general good.

"Were lord Keith and sir George Collier, because the latter happened to have a brig or two cruising off the coast, to claim as prizes all the vessels lying in every river which the army might pass in its operations? and this to the detriment of the cause which required the strictest respect for private property? For the last five years he had been acting in the confidence that his conduct would be approved of and supported, and he concluded it would be so still; but he was placed in a novel situation, and asked for legal advice to determine whether lord Keith and the channel fleet were to be considered as engaged in a conjoint expedition with the army

under his command against the subjects of France, neither having any specific instructions from government, and the fleet having nothing to do with the operations by land. He only required that fleet to give him a free communication with the coast of Spain, and prevent the enemy's sea communication between the Garonne and the Adour, and this last was a part of its duty before the army arrived. Was his proclamation of protection to hold good as regarded the ships in the rivers? He desired to have it sanctioned by the prince regent, or that he might be permitted to issue another declaring that it was of no value."

This remonstrance produced so much effect that lord Keith relinquished his claims, and Admiral Penrose was sent to command upon the station instead of sir George Collier. The immediate intercourse of lord Wellington with the navy was thus ameliorated by the superior power of this officer, who was remarkable for his suavity. Yet the licenses given to the French vessels were strongly condemned by the government, and rendered null, for we find him again complaining that "he had granted them only in hopes of drawing money and supplies from France, and of interesting the French mercantile men to aid the army; but he feared the government were not aware of, and did not feel the difficulties in which he was placed at all times for want of money, and judged his measures without adverting to the necessity which occasioned them; hence their frequent disapprobation of what he did."

Strange this may sound to those who seeing the duke of Wellington in the fulness of his glory have been accustomed to regard him as the star of England's greatness; but those who at that period frequented the society of ministers know well that he was then looked upon by those self-sufficient men as a person whose views were wild and visionary, requiring the corroboration of older and wiser heads before they could be assented to. Yea! even thus at the eleventh hour was the giant Wellington measured by the political dwarfs.

Although he gained something by making St. Jean de Luz a free port for all nations not at war with France, his financial situation was nearly intolerable, and at the moment of greatest pressure colonel Bunbury, under-secretary of state, was sent out to protest against his expenses. One hundred thousand pounds a month was the maximum in specie which the government would consent to supply, a sum quite inadequate to his wants. And this remonstrance was addressed to this victorious commander at the very crisis of his stupendous struggle, when he was overwhelmed with debts and could scarcely stir out of his quarters on account of the multitude of creditors waiting at his door for payment of just claims.

"Some of his muleteers," he said, "were twenty-six months in arrears, and recently, instigated by the British merchants, they had become so clamorous that rather than lose their services he had given them bills on the treasury for a part of their claims, though he knew they would sell these bills at a discount to the *sharks*, who had urged them to be thus importunate, and who were waiting at the ports to take advantage of the public distresses. A dangerous measure, which he desired not to repeat.

"It might be true that the supply of one hundred thousand pounds a month had been even exceeded for some time past, but it was incontestable that the English army and all its departments, and the Spanish and Portuguese armies, were at the moment paralyzed for want of money. The arrears of pay to the soldiers was entering the seventh month, the debt was immense, and the king's engagements with

the Spanish and Portuguese governments were not fulfilled. Indebted in every part of Spain, he was becoming so in France; the price of all commodities was increasing in proportion to the delay of payment, to the difficulty of getting food at all, and the want of credit into which all the departments of the army had fallen. Of two hundred thousand dollars given to marshal Beresford for the pay of his troops on account of the Portuguese subsidy, he had been forced to take back fifty thousand to keep the Spaniards together, and was even then forced to withhold ten thousand to prevent the British cavalry from perishing. Money to pay the Spaniards had sailed from Cadiz; but the vessel conveying it, and another containing the soldiers' great-coats, were by the admiralty arrangements obliged to go first to Coruña, and neither had arrived there in January, although the money had been ready in October. But the ship of war designed to carry it did not arrive at Cadiz until the end of December. Sixteen thousand Spanish troops were thus rendered useless, because without pay they could not be trusted in France. . . .

"The commissary-in-chief in England had been regularly informed of the state of the supplies of the military chest, and of the wants and prospects of the army, but those wants are not attended to. The monthly hundred thousand pounds spoken of as the maximum, even if it had been given regularly, would not cover the ordinary expenses of the troops; and there were besides the subsidies other outlays requiring ready money, such as meat for the soldiers, hospital expenses, commissariat labourers, and a variety of minor engagements. The Portuguese government had been reduced to a monthly sum of two hundred thousand dollars out of a subsidy of two millions sterling. The Spanish government got what they could out of a subsidy of one million. And when money was obtained for the government in the markets of Lisbon and Cadiz, it came not in due time, because, such were the admiralty arrangements, there were no ships to convey the treasure to the north coast of Spain. The whole sum which had passed through the military chest during the past year was scarcely more than two millions four hundred thousand pounds, out of which part of the subsidies had been paid. This was quite inadequate: the government had desired him to push his operations to the Garonne during the winter; he was prepared to do so in every point excepting money, and he knew the greatest advantages would accrue from such a movement, but he could not stir. His posts were already so distant from the coast that his means of transport were daily destroyed by the journeys; he had not a shilling to pay for any thing in the country, and his credit was gone. He had been obliged privately to borrow the expense of a single courier sent to general Clinton. It was not his duty to suggest the fitting measures for relief, but it was obvious that an immediate and large supply from England was necessary, and that ships should be provided to convey that which was obtained at Lisbon and Cadiz to the army."

Such was the denuded state of the victorious Wellington at a time when millions, and the worth of more millions, were being poured by the English ministers into the continent; when every petty German sovereign, partisan or robber, who raised a band or a cry against Napoleon, was supplied to satiety. And all this time there was not in England one public salary reduced, one contract checked, one abuse corrected, one public servant rebuked for negligence; not a writer cared to expose the mischief lest he should be crushed by persecution; no minister ceas-

ed to claim and to receive the boasting congratulations of the Tories; no Whig had sense to discover or spirit to denounce the iniquitous system; no voice of reprehension was heard from that selfish faction, unless it were in sneering contempt of the general whose mighty genius sustained England under this load of folly.

Nor were these difficulties all that Lord Wellington had to contend with. We have seen that the Portuguese regency withheld his reinforcements, even when he had provided transports for their conveyance. The Duke of York meanwhile insisted upon withdrawing his provisional battalions, which being all composed of old soldiers, the remains of regiments reduced by the casualties of war, were of more value in a winter campaign than three times their numbers of new men. With respect to the English militia regiments, he had no desire for them, because they possessed, he said, all the worst faults of the regulars and some peculiar to themselves besides. What he desired was that eight or ten thousand men should be drafted from them to fill up his ranks, he could then without much injury let his foreign battalions be taken away to re-form a Hanoverian army on the continent; and this plan he was inclined to, because the Germans, brave and strong soldiers, were yet extremely addicted to desertion, and in that particular set a bad example to the British. This suggestion was however disregarded, and other reinforcements were promised to him.

But the most serious of all the secondary vexations he endured sprang from the conduct of the Spanish authorities. His hospitals and depots were for the most part necessarily in the Spanish territories, and principally at St. Ander. To avoid inconvenience to the inhabitants he had caused portable wooden houses to be brought from England in which to shelter his sick and wounded men; and he paid extravagantly and regularly for every aid demanded from the natives. Nevertheless the natural arrogance or ill-will which produced the libels about San Sebastian, the insolence of the minister of war, and the sullen insubordination of Morillo and other generals, broke out here also. After much underhand and irritating conduct at different times, the municipality, resolute to drive the hospitals from their town, suddenly, and under the false pretext that there was a contagious fever, placed all the British hospitals with their officers and attendants under quarantine. This was in the middle of January. Thirty thousand men had been wounded since June in the service of Spain, and the return was to make those wounded men close prisoners, and drive their general to the necessity of fixing his hospitals in England. Vessels coming from St. Ander were thus rendered objects of dread, and the municipalities of the other ports, either really fearing or pretending to fear the contagion, would not suffer them to enter their waters. To such a height did this cowardice and villany attain, that the political chief of Guipuscoa, without giving any notice to Lord Wellington, shut all the ports of that province against vessels coming from St. Ander, and the alcalde of Fontarabia endeavoured to prevent a Portuguese military officer from assisting an English vessel which was about to be, and was afterwards actually cast away, because she came from St. Ander.

Now in consequence of the difficulties and dangers of navigating the bay of Biscay in the winter, and the badness of the ports near the positions of the army, all the stores and provisions coming by sea went in the first instance to St. Ander, the only good port, there to wait until favourable opportunities occurred

for reaching the more eastern harbours. Moreover all the provision magazines of the Spanish army were there; but this blow cut them off, the army was reduced to the smaller magazines at Passages which could only last for a few days, and when that supply was expended Lord Wellington would have had no resource but to withdraw across the Pyrenees! "Here," he exclaimed, "here are the consequences of the system by which these provinces are governed! Duties of the highest description, military operations, political interests, and the salvation of the state, are made to depend upon the caprices of a few ignorant individuals, who have adopted a measure unnecessary and harsh without advertent to its objects or consequences, and merely with a view to their personal interests and convenience."

They carried it into execution also with the utmost harshness, caprice and injustice, regardless of the loss of ships and lives which must follow, and finally desired Lord Wellington to relinquish the harbour and town of St. Ander altogether as a depot! However his vigorous remonstrances stopped this nefarious proceeding in time to avert the danger which it menaced.

Be it remembered now, that these dangers, and difficulties, and vexations, although related in succession, happened, not one after another, but all together; that it was when crossing the Bidasoa, breaking through the mountain fortifications of Soult, passing the Nive, fighting the battles in front of Bayonne, and when still greater and more intricate combinations were to be arranged, that all these vials of folly and enmity were poured upon his head. Who then shall refuse to admire the undaunted firmness, the unwearied temper and vigilance, the piercing judgment with which he steered his gallant vessel, and with a flowing sail, unhurt through this howling storm of passion, this tumultuous sea of folly?

CHAPTER V.

Continuation of the war in the eastern provinces—Suchet's erroneous statements—Sir William Clinton repairs Taragona—Advances to Villa Franca—Suchet endeavours to surprise him—Fails—The French cavalry cut off an English detachment at Ordal—The Duke of San Carlos passes through the French posts—Copons favourable to his mission—Clinton and Manso endeavour to cut off the French troops at Molino del Rey—They fail through the misconduct of Copons—Napoleon recalls a great body of Suchet's troops, whereupon he reinforces the garrison of Barcelona and retires to Gerona—Van Halen—He endeavours to beguile the governor of Tortosa—Fails—Succeeds at Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon—Sketch of the siege of Monzon—It is defended by the Italian soldier St. Jacques for one hundred and forty days—Clinton and Copons invest Barcelona—The beguiled garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon arrive at Martorel—Are surrounded and surrender on terms—Capitulation violated by Copons—King Ferdinand returns to Spain—His character—Clinton breaks up his army—His conduct enlogized—Lamentable sally from Barcelona—The French garrisons beyond the Ebro return to France and Habert evacuates Barcelona—Fate of the prince of Conti and the duchess of Bourbon—Siege of Santona.

CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN THE EASTERN PARTS OF SPAIN.

WHEN General Clinton succeeded Lord William Bentinck, his whole force, composed of the Anglo-Sicilians, Whittingham's and Sarsfield's Spaniards, and two battalions of Roche's division, did not furnish quite nineteen thousand men under arms. Copons, blockading Mequinenza, Lerida and Monzon, and having garrisons in Cardona and the Seu d'Urgel, the only places in his possession, could not bring more than nine thousand men into the field. Elío had nominally twenty-five thousand, but this

included Sarsfield's and Roche's troops, the greater part of which were with Clinton. It included likewise the bands of Ville Campa, Duran and the Empecinado, all scattered in Castile, Aragon and Valencia, and acting according to the caprices of their chiefs. His force, daily diminishing also from the extreme unhealthiness of the country about Tortosa, was scarcely sufficient to maintain the blockades of the French fortresses beyond the Ebro.

Copons' army having no base but the mountains about Vich and Montserrat, having no magazines or depots or place of arms, having very little artillery and scarcely any cavalry, lived as it could from day to day; in like manner lived Sarsfield's and Whittingham's troops, and Clinton's army was chiefly fed on salt provisions from the ships. The two former having no means of transport were unable to make even one day's march with ease, they were continually upon the point of starvation, and could never be reckoned as a moveable force. Nor indeed could the Anglo-Sicilians, owing to their scanty means of transport, make above two or three marches from the sea; and they were at this time more than usually hampered, being without pay and shut out from their principal depots at Gibraltar and Malta, by plague at the first and yellow fever at the second place. In fine, the courage and discipline of the British and Germans set aside, it would be difficult to find armies less efficient for an offensive campaign than those of the allies in Catalonia. Moreover lord William Bentinck had been invested with the command of all the Spanish armies; but Clinton had only Whittingham's and Sarsfield's troops under him, and notwithstanding his constant endeavours to conciliate Copons, the indolence and incapacity of that general impeded or baffled all useful operations: and to these disqualifications he added an extreme jealousy of Eroles and Manso, men designated by the public voice as the most worthy of command.

This analysis shows that Elio being entirely engaged in Valencia, and Sarsfield and Whittingham unprovided with the means of movement, the army of Copons and the Anglo-Sicilians, together furnishing, when the posts and escorts and the labourers employed on the fortifications of Tarragona were deducted, not more than eighteen thousand men in line of battle, were the only troops to be counted on to oppose Suchet, who having sixty-five thousand men, of which fifty-six thousand were present under arms, could without drawing a man from his garrisons attack them with thirty thousand. But Copons and Clinton could not act together above a few days, because their bases and lines of retreat were on different sides. The Spaniard depended upon the mountains and plains of the interior for security and subsistence, the Englishman's base was Tarragona and the fleet. Hence the only mode of combining on a single line was to make Valencia a common base, and throwing bridges over the Ebro construct works on both sides to defend them. This was strongly recommended by lord Wellington to lord William and to Clinton. But the former had several times lost his bridges, partly from the rapidity of the stream, partly from the activity of the garrison of Tortosa; and for general Clinton the difficulty was enhanced by distance, because Tarragona, where all his materials were deposited, was sixty miles from Amposta, and all his artificers were required to restore the defences of the former place. The blockade of Tortosa was therefore always liable to be raised, and the troops employed there exposed to a sudden and fatal attack, since Suchet, sure to separate the Anglo-Sicilians from Copons when he advanced,

could penetrate between them; and while the former rallied at Tarragona and the latter at Igualada, his march would be direct upon Tortosa. He could thus either carry off his strong garrison, or passing the Ebro by the bridge of the fortress, move without let or hindrance upon Peniscola, Saguntum and Valencia, and driving Elio back upon Alicante, collect his garrisons and return too powerful to be meddled with.

In these circumstances lord Wellington's opinion was, that the blockade of Tortosa should be given up, and the two armies acting on their own peculiar lines, the one from Tarragona, the other from the mountains, harass in concert the enemy's flanks and rear, alternately if he attacked either, but together if he moved upon Tortosa. To besiege or blockade that place with safety it was necessary to throw two bridges over the Ebro below, to enable the armies to avoid Suchet, by either bank, when he should succour the place, as he was sure to do. But it was essential that Copons should not abandon Catalonia, and difficult for him to do so; wherefore it would be advisable to make Tarragona the point of retreat for both armies in the first instance, after which they could separate and infest the French rear.

The difficulties of besieging Tortosa he thought insuperable, and he especially recommended that they should be well considered beforehand, and if it was invested, that the troops should be intrenched around it. In fine, all his instructions tended towards defence, and were founded upon his conviction of the weak and dangerous position of the allies; yet he believed them to have more resources than they really had, and to be superior in number to the French, a great error, as I have already shown. Nothing therefore could be more preposterous than Suchet's alarm for the frontier of France at this time, and it is unquestionable that his personal reluctance was the only bar to aiding Soult, either indirectly by marching on Tortosa and Valencia, or directly by adopting that marshal's great project of uniting the two armies in Aragon. So certain indeed is this, that general Clinton, seeing the difficulties of his own situation, only retained the command from a strong sense of duty; and lord Wellington, despairing of any advantage in Catalonia, recommended that the Anglo-Sicilian army should be broken up and employed in other places. The French general's inactivity was the more injurious to the interests of his sovereign, because any reverse, or appearance of reverse, to the allies would at this time have gone nigh to destroy the alliance between Spain and England; but personal jealousy, the preference given to local and momentary interests before general considerations, hurt the French cause at all periods in the Peninsula, and enabled the allies to conquer.

General Clinton had no thoughts of besieging Tortosa, his efforts were directed to the obtaining a secure place of arms; yet, despite of his intrinsic weakness, he resolved to show a confident front, hoping thus to keep Suchet at arm's length. In this view he endeavoured to render Tarragona once more defensible, notwithstanding the nineteen breaches which had been broken in its walls; the progress of the work was however tedious and vexatious, because he depended for his materials upon the Spanish authorities. Thus immersed in difficulties of all kinds, he could make little change in his positions, which were generally about the Campo, Sarsfield's division only being pushed to Villa Franca. Suchet meanwhile held the line of the Llobregat, and apparently to colour his refusal to join Soult, grounded on the great strength of the allies in Cata-

lonia, he suffered general Clinton to remain in tranquillity.

Towards the end of October, reports that the French were concentrating, for what purpose was not known, caused the English general, although Tarragona was still indefensible, to make a forward movement. He dared not indeed provoke a battle, but unwilling to yield the resources which Villa Franca and other districts occupied by the allies still offered, he adopted the resolution of pushing an advanced guard to the former place. He even fixed his head-quarters there, appearing ready to fight; yet his troops were so disposed in succession at Arbos, Vendrils and Torredembarra, that he could retreat without dishonour if the French advanced in force, or could concentrate at Villa Franca in time to harass their flank and rear if they attempted to carry off their garrisons on the Segre. In this state of affairs Suchet made several demonstrations, sometimes against Copons, sometimes against Clinton; but the latter maintained his offensive attitude with firmness, and even in opposition to lord Wellington's implied opinion that the line of the Ebro was the most suitable to his weakness; for he liked not to abandon Tarragona, the repairs of which were now advancing, though slowly, to completion. His perseverance was crowned with success; he preserved the few resources left for the support of the Spanish troops, and furnished Suchet with that semblance of excuse which he desired for keeping aloof from Soult.

In this manner October and November were passed; but on the first of December the French general attempted to surprise the allies' cantonments at Villa Franca, as he had before surprised them at Ordal. He moved in the same order. One column marched by San Sadurni on his right, another by Bejer and Avionet on his left, and the main body kept the great road. But he did not find colonel Adam there. Clinton had blocked the Ordal so as to render a night surprise impossible, and the natural difficulties of the other roads delayed the flanking columns. Hence when the French reached Villa Franca, Sarsfield was in full march for Igualada, and the Anglo-Sicilians, who had only three men wounded at one of the advanced posts, were on the strong ground about Arbos, where being joined by the supporting divisions they offered battle; but Suchet retired to Llobregat, apparently so mortified by his failure that he has not even mentioned it in his Memoirs.

Clinton now resumed his former ground; yet his embarrassments increased, and though he transferred two of Whittingham's regiments to Copons, and sent Roche's battalions back to Valencia, the country was so exhausted that the enduring constancy of the Spanish soldiers under privations alone enabled Sarsfield to remain in the field. More than once that general, a man of undoubted firmness and courage, was upon the point of recrossing the Ebro to save his soldiers from perishing of famine. Here, as in other parts, the Spanish government not only starved their troops, but would not even provide a piece of ordnance for the defence of Tarragona, now by the exertions of the English general, rendered defensible. Nay, when admiral Hallowell, in conjunction with Quesada, the Spanish commodore at Port Mahon, brought some ship-guns from that place to the fortress, the minister of war, O'Donoghue, expressed his disapprobation, observing with a sneer that the English might provide the guns wanting from the Spanish ordnance moved into Gibraltar by general Campbell when he destroyed the lines of San Roque!

The 9th, Suchet pushed a small corps by Bejer be-

tween the Ordal and Sitjes, and on the 10th surprised at the ostel of Ordal an officer and thirty men of the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry. This disaster was the result of negligence. The detachment after patrolling to the front had dismounted without examining the buildings of the inn, and some French troopers who were concealed within immediately seized the horses and captured the whole party.

On the 17th, French troops appeared at Martorel, the Ordal and Bejer, with a view to mask the march of a large convoy coming from Upper Catalonia to Barcelona; they then resumed their former positions; and at the same time Soult's and lord Wellington's respective letters announcing the defection of the Nassau battalions in front of Bayonne arrived. Lord Wellington's came first, and enclosed a communication from colonel Kruse to his countryman, colonel Meder, who was serving in Barcelona, and as Kruse supposed willing to abandon the French. But when Clinton, by the aid of Manso, transmitted the letter to Meder, that officer handed it to general Habert, who had succeeded Maurice Mathieu in the command of the city. All the German regiments, principally cavalry, were immediately disarmed and sent to France. Severoli's Italians were at the same time recalled to Italy, and a number of French soldiers, selected to fill the wasted ranks of the imperial guards, marched with them: two thousand officers and soldiers were likewise detached to the depots of the interior to organize the conscripts of the new levy destined to reinforce the army of Catalonia. Besides these drafts a thousand gendarmes, hitherto employed on the Spanish frontier in aid of the regular troops, were withdrawn; Suchet thus lost seven thousand veterans, yet he had still an overwhelming power compared to the allies.

It was in this state of affairs that the duke of San Carlos, bearing the treaty of Valençay, arrived secretly at the French head-quarters on his way to Madrid. Copons knew this, and it seems certain was only deterred from openly acceding to the views of the French emperor, and concluding a military convention, by the decided conduct of the cortez, and the ascendancy which lord Wellington had obtained over him in common with the other Spanish officers: an ascendancy which had not escaped Soult's sagacity, for he early warned the French minister that nothing could be expected from them while under the powerful spell of the English general. Meanwhile Clinton, getting information that the French troops were diminished in numbers, especially in front of Barcelona and on the Llobregat, proposed to pass that river and invest Barcelona, if Copons, who was in the mountains, would undertake to provision Sarsfield's division and keep the French troops between Barcelona and Gerona in check. For this purpose he offered him the aid of a Spanish regiment of cavalry, which Elio had lent for the operations in Catalonia; but Copons, whether influenced by San Carlos' mission and his secret wishes for its success, or knowing that the enemy were really stronger than Clinton imagined, declared that he was unable to hold the French troops between Gerona and Barcelona in check, and that he could not provision either Sarsfield's division or the regiment of cavalry. He suggested, instead of Clinton's plan, a combined attack upon some of Suchet's posts on the Llobregat, promising to send Manso to Villa Franca to confer upon the execution. Clinton's proposal was made early in January; yet it was the middle of that month before Copons replied, and then he only sent Manso to offer the aid of his brigade in a combined attack upon two thousand French who were at Molino del Rey. It was however at

last arranged that Manso should, at daybreak on the 16th, seize the high ground above Molino, on the left of the Llobregat, to intercept the enemy's retreat upon Barcelona, while the Anglo-Sicilians fell upon them from the right bank.

Success depended upon Clinton's remaining quiet until the moment of execution, wherefore he could only use the troops immediately in hand about Villa Franca, in all six thousand men with three pieces of artillery; but with these he made a night march of eighteen miles, and was close to the ford of San Vicente about two miles below the fortified bridge of Molino del Rey before daylight. The French were tranquil and unsuspecting, and he anxiously but vainly awaited the signal of Manso's arrival. When the day broke, the French piquets at San Vicente descriing his troops commenced a skirmish, and at the same time a column with a piece of artillery, coming from Molino, advanced to attack him, thinking there was only a patrolling detachment to deal with, for he had concealed his main body. Thus pressed he opened his guns perforce, and crippled the French piece, whereupon the reinforcements retired hastily to the intrenchments at Molino; he could then easily have forced the passage at the ford and attacked the enemy's works in the rear, but this would not have ensured the capture of their troops, wherefore he still awaited Manso's arrival, relying on that partizan's zeal and knowledge of the country. He appeared at last, not, as agreed upon, at St. Filieu between Molino and Barcelona, but at Papiol above Molino, and the French immediately retreated by San Filieu. Sarsfield and the cavalry, which Clinton now detached across the Llobregat, followed them hard, but the country was difficult, the distance short, and they soon gained a second intrenched camp above San Filieu. A small garrison remained in the masonry-works at Molino, general Clinton endeavoured to reduce them, but his guns were not of sufficient calibre to break the walls, and the enemy was strongly reinforced towards evening from Barcelona; whereupon Manso went off to the mountains, and Clinton returned to Villa Franca, having killed and wounded about one hundred and eighty French, and lost only sixty-four men, all Spaniards.

Manso's failure surprised the English general, because that officer, unlike the generality of his countrymen, was zealous, skilful, vigilant, modest and humane, and a sincere co-operator with the British officers. He however soon cleared himself of blame, assuring Clinton that Copons, contrary to his previous declarations, had joined him with four thousand men, and taking the control of his troops, not only commenced the march two hours too late, but without any reason halted for three hours on the way. Nor did that general offer any cause or explanation of his conduct, merely observing that the plan having failed, nothing more could be done, and he must return to his mountainous asylum about Vich. A man of any other nation would have been accused of treachery, but with the Spaniards there is no limit to absurdity, and from their actions no conclusion can be drawn as to their motives.

The great events of the general war were now beginning to affect the struggle in Catalonia. Suchet, finding that Copons dared not agree to the military convention dependent upon the treaty of Valençay, resigned all thoughts of carrying off his garrisons beyond the Ebro, and secretly instructed the governor of Tortosa, that when his provisions, calculated to last until April, were exhausted, he should march upon Mequinenza and Lerida, unite the garrison there to his own, and make way by Venasque

into France. Meanwhile he increased the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men and prepared to take the line of the Fluvia; for the allied sovereigns were in France, and Napoleon had recalled more of his cavalry and infantry, in all ten thousand men with eighty pieces of artillery, from Catalonia, desiring that they should march as soon as the results expected from the mission of San Carlos were felt by the allies. Suchet prepared the troops, but proposed that instead of waiting for the uncertain result of San Carlos's mission, Ferdinand should himself be sent to Spain through Catalonia, and be trusted on his faith to restore the garrisons in Valencia. Then, he said, he could march with his whole army to Lyons, which would be more efficacious than sending detachments. The restoration of Ferdinand was the emperor's great object; but this plausible proposition can only be viewed as a coloured counter-project to Soult's plan for a junction of the two armies in Bearn, since the emperor was undoubtedly the best judge of what was required for the warfare immediately under his own direction.

It was in the midst of these operations that Clinton attacked Molino del Rey, and, as we have seen, would, but for the interference of Copons, have stricken a great blow, which was however soon inflicted in another manner.

There was at this time in the French service a Spaniard, of Flemish descent, called Van Halen. This man, of fair complexion, handsome person, and a natural genius for desperate treasons, appears to have been at first attached to Joseph's court. After that monarch's retreat from Spain, he was placed by the duke de Feltre on Suchet's staff; but the French party was now a failing one, and Van Halen only sought by some notable treachery to make his peace with his country. Through the medium of a young widow, who followed him without suffering their connexion to appear, he informed Eroles of his object. He transmitted through the same channel regular returns of Suchet's force and other matters of interest, and at last, having secretly opened Suchet's portfolio, he copied the key of his cipher, and transmitted that also, with an intimation that he would now soon pass over and endeavour to perform some other service at the same time. The opportunity soon offered. Suchet went to Girona to meet the duke of San Carlos, leaving Van Halen at Barcelona, and the latter immediately taking an escort of three hussars went to Granollers, where the cuirassiers were quartered. Using the marshal's name, he ordered them to escort him to the Spanish outposts, which being in the mountains could only be approached by a long and narrow pass where cavalry would be helpless. In this pass he ordered the troops to bivouac for the night, and when their colonel expressed his uneasiness, Van Halen quieted him and made a solitary mill their common quarters. He had before this however sent the widow to give Eroles information of the situation into which he would bring the troops, and now with anxiety awaited his attack; but the Spanish general failed to come, and at daybreak Van Halen, still pretending he carried a flag of truce from Suchet, rode off with his first escort of hussars and a trumpeter to the Spanish lines. There he ascertained that the widow had been detained by the outposts, and immediately delivered over his escort to their enemies, giving notice also of the situation of the cuirassiers with a view to their destruction, but they escaped the danger.

Van Halen and Eroles now forged Suchet's signature, and the former addressed letters in cipher to

the governors of Tortosa, Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon, telling them that the emperor, in consequence of his reverses, required large drafts of men from Catalonia, and had given orders to negotiate a convention by which the garrisons south of the Llobregat were to join the army with arms and baggage and followers. The result was uncertain, but if the treaty could not be effected the governors were to join the army by force, and they were therefore immediately to mine their principal bastions and be prepared to sally forth at an appointed time. The marches and points of junction were all given in detail, yet they were told that if the convention took place the marshal would immediately send an officer of his staff to them, with such verbal instructions as might be necessary. The document finished with deploring the necessity which called for the sacrifice of conquests achieved by the valour of the troops.

Spies and emissaries who act for both sides are common in all wars, but in the Peninsula so many pretended to serve the French, and were yet true to the Spaniards, that to avoid the danger of betrayal Suchet had recourse to the ingenious artifice of placing a very small piece of light-coloured hair in the ciphered paper, the latter was then enclosed in a quill, sealed and wrapped in lead. When received, the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of white paper, and if the hair was discovered the communication was good, if not, the treachery was apparent, because the hair would escape the vigilance of uninitiated persons and be lost by any intermediate examination. Van Halen knew this secret also, and when his emissaries had returned after delivering the preparatory communication, he proceeded in person with a forged convention, first to Tortosa, for Suchet has erroneously stated in his Memoirs that the primary attempts were made at Lerida and Mequinenza. He was accompanied by several Spanish officers and by some French deserters dressed in the uniforms of the hussars he had betrayed to the Spanish outposts. The governor, Robert, though a vigilant officer, was deceived, and prepared to evacuate the place. During the night however a true emissary arrived with a letter from Suchet of later date than the forged convention. Robert then endeavoured to entice Van Halen into the fortress, but the other was too wary and proceeded at once to Mequinenza and Lerida, where he completely overreached the governors, and then went to Monzon.

This small fortress had now been besieged since the 25th of September, 1813, by detachments from the Catalan army and the bands from Aragon. Its means of defence were slight, but there was within a man of resolution and genius called St. Jacques. He was a Piedmontese by birth and only a private soldier of engineers; but the commandant, appreciating his worth, was so modest and prudent as to yield the direction of the defence entirely to him. Abounding in resources, he met, and at every point baffled the besiegers who worked principally by mines, and being as brave as he was ingenious, always led the numerous counter-attacks which he contrived to check the approaches above and below ground. The siege continued until the 18th of February, when the subtle Van Halen arrived, and by his Spanish wiles obtained in a few hours what Spanish courage and perseverance had vainly strived to gain for one hundred and forty days. The commandant was suspicious at first, but when Van Halen suffered him to send an officer to ascertain that Lerida and Mequinenza were evacuated, he was beguiled like the others and marched to join the garrisons of those places.

Sir William Clinton had been informed of this project by Eroles as early as the 22d of January, and though he did not expect any French general would be so egregiously misled, readily promised the assistance of his army to capture the garrisons on their march. But Suchet was now falling back upon the Fluvia, and Clinton, seeing the fortified line of the Llobregat weakened and being uncertain of Suchet's real strength and designs, renewed his former proposal to Copons for a combined attack which should force the French general to discover his real situation and projects. Ere he could obtain an answer, the want of forage obliged him to refuse the assistance of the Spanish cavalry lent to him by Elio, and Sarsfield's division was reduced to its last ration. The French thus made their retreat unmolested, for Clinton's project necessarily involved the investment of Barcelona after passing the Llobregat, and the Anglo-Sicilian cavalry, being mounted on small Egyptian animals, the greatest part of which were foundered or unserviceable from sand-cracks, a disease very common amongst the horses of that country, were too weak to act without the aid of Elio's horsemen. Moreover as a division of infantry was left at Tarragona awaiting the effect of Van Halen's wiles against Tortosa, the aid of Sarsfield's troops was indispensable.

Copons accepted the proposition towards the end of January; the Spanish cavalry was then gone to the rear, but Sarsfield having with great difficulty obtained some provisions, the army was put in movement on the 3d of February, and as Suchet was now near Gerona, it passed the Llobregat at the bridge of Molino del Rey without resistance. On the 5th, Sarsfield's pickets were vigorously attacked at San Filieu by the garrison of Barcelona; he however supported them with his whole division, and being reinforced with some cavalry, repulsed the French and pursued them to the walls. On the 7th, the city was invested on the land side by Copons, who was soon aided by Manso; on the seaboard by admiral Hallowel, who following the movements of the army with the fleet blockaded the harbour with the *Castor* frigate, and anchored the *Fame* a seventy-four off Mataro. On the 8th, intelligence arrived of Van Halen's failure at Tortosa: but the blockade of Barcelona continued uninterrupted until the 16th, when Clinton was informed by Copons of the success at Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon. The garrisons, he said, would march upon Igualada, and Eroles who, under pretence of causing the convention to be observed by the somatenes, was to follow in their rear, proposed to undeceive and disarm them at that place. On the 17th, however, he sent notice that Martorel had been fixed upon in preference to Igualada for undeceiving and disarming the French, and as they would be at the former place that evening, general Clinton was desired to send some of his troops there to ensure the success of the project.

This change of plan, and the short warning, for Martorel was a long march from Barcelona, together with the doubts and embarrassments which Copons' conduct always caused, inclined the English general to avoid meddling with the matter at all; yet fearing that it would fail in the Spaniards' hands, he finally drafted a strong division of troops and marched in person to Martorel. There he met Copons, who now told him that the French would not pass Esparaguera that night, that Eroles was close in their rear, and another division of the Catalan army at Bispal blocking the bridge of Martorel. Clinton immediately undertook to pass the Llobregat, meet the French column, and block the road of San Sa-

durni; and he arranged with Copons the necessary precautions and signals.

About nine o'clock general Isidore Lamarque arrived with the garrisons at Martorel, followed at a short distance by Eroles. No other troops were to be seen, and after a short halt the French continued their march on the right bank of the Llobregat, where the Barcelona road enters a narrow pass between the river and a precipitous hill. When they were completely entangled, Clinton sent an officer to forbid their further progress, and referred them to Copons who was at Martorel for an explanation; then giving the signal all the heights around were instantly covered with armed men. It was in vain to offer resistance, and two generals, having two thousand six hundred men, four guns and a rich military chest, capitulated, but upon conditions, which were granted and immediately violated with circumstances of great harshness and insult to the prisoners. The odium of this baseness, which was quite gratuitous, since the French helpless in the defile must have submitted to any terms, attaches entirely to the Spaniards. Clinton refused to meddle in any manner with the convention, he had not been a party to Van Halen's deceit, he appeared only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in the field which the Spaniards could not have subdued without his aid, he refused even to be present at any consultation previous to the capitulation, and notwithstanding an assertion to the contrary in Suchet's Memoirs, no appeal on the subject from that marshal ever reached him.

During the whole of these transactions the infatuation of the French leaders was extreme. The chief of one of the battalions, more sagacious than his general, told Lamarque, in the night of the 16th, at Igualada, that he was betrayed, at the same time urging him vainly to abandon his artillery and baggage and march in the direction of Vich, to which place they could force their way in despite of the Spaniards. It is remarkable also that Robert, when he had detected the imposture and failed to entice Van Halen into Tortosa, did not make a sudden sally upon him and the Spanish officers who were with him, all close to the works. And still more notable is it that the other governors, the more especially as Van Halen was a foreigner, did not insist upon the bearer of such a convention remaining to accompany their march. It has been well observed by Suchet that Van Halen's refusal to enter the gates was alone sufficient to prove his treachery.

The detachment recalled by Napoleon now moved into France, and in March was followed by a second column of equal force which was at first directed upon Lyons; but the arrival of lord Wellington's troops on the Garonne caused, as we shall hereafter find, a change in its destination. Meanwhile, by order of the minister at war, Suchet entered into a fresh negotiation with Copons, to deliver up all the fortresses held by his troops except Figueras and Rosas, provided the garrisons were allowed to rejoin the army. The Spanish commander assented, and the authorities generally were anxious to adopt the proposal; but the regency referred the matter to lord Wellington, who rejected it without hesitation, as tending to increase the force immediately opposed to him. Thus baffled and overreached at all points, Suchet destroyed the works of Olot, Besalu, Bascara and Palamos, dismantled Gerona and Rosas, and concentrated his forces at Figueras. He was followed by Copons; but though he still had twelve thousand veterans besides the national guards and depots of the French departments, he continued most obstinately to refuse any aid to Soult, and yet

remained inactive himself. The blockade of Barcelona was therefore maintained by the allies without difficulty or danger save what arose from their commissariat embarrassments and the efforts of the garrison.

On the 23d of February, Habert made a sally with six battalions, thinking to surprise Sarsfield; he was however beaten, and colonel Meder, the Nassau officer who had before shown his attachment to the French cause; was killed. The blockade was thus continued until the 12th of March, when Clinton received orders from lord Wellington to break up his army, send the foreign troops to lord William Bentinck in Sicily, and march with the British battalions by Tudela to join the great army in France. Clinton at first prepared to obey; but Suchet was still in strength, Copons appeared to be provoking a collision though he was quite unable to oppose the French in the field, and to maintain the blockade of Barcelona in addition, after the Anglo-Sicilians should depart, was quite impossible. The latter therefore remained, and on the 19th of March king Ferdinand reached the French frontier.

This event, which happening five or even three months before would probably have changed the fate of the war, was now of little consequence. Suchet first proposed to Copons to escort Ferdinand with the French army to Barcelona, and put him in possession of that place; but this the Spanish general dared not assent to, for he feared lord Wellington and his own regency, and was closely watched by colonel Coffin, who had been placed near him by sir William Clinton. The French general then proposed to the king a convention for the recovery of his garrisons, to which Ferdinand agreed with the facility of a false heart. His great anxiety was to reach Valencia, because the determination of the cortez to bind him to conditions before he recovered his throne was evident, the Spanish generals were apparently faithful to the cortez, and the British influence was sure to be opposed to him while he was burdened with French engagements.

Suchet had been ordered to demand securities for the restoration of his garrisons previous to Ferdinand's entry into Spain; but time was precious, and he determined to escort him at once with the whole French army to the Fluvia, having first received a promise to restore the garrisons. He also retained his brother don Carlos as a hostage for their return, but even this security he relinquished when the king, in a second letter written from Gerona, solemnly confirmed his first promise. On the 24th, therefore, in presence of the Catalan and French armies, ranged in order of battle on either bank of the Fluvia, Ferdinand passed that river and became once more king of Spain. He had been a rebellious son in the palace, a plotting traitor at Aranjuez, a dastard at Bayonne, an effeminate superstitious fawning slave at Valençay, and now after six years' captivity he returned to his own country an ungrateful and cruel tyrant. He would have been the most odious and contemptible of princes, if his favourite brother don Carlos had not existed. Reaching the camp at Barcelona on the 30th, he dined with sir William Clinton, reviewed the allied troops, and then proceeded first to Zaragoza and finally to Valencia. Marshal Suchet says the honours of war were paid to him by all the French garrisons, but this was not the case at Barcelona: no man appeared even on the walls. After this event the French marshal repassed the Pyrenees, leaving only one division at Figueras; and Clinton proceeded to break up his army, but was

again stopped by the vexatious conduct of Copons, who would not relieve the Anglo-Sicilians at the blockade, nor indeed take any notice of the English general's communications on the subject before the 11th of April. On the 14th, however, the troops marched, part to embark at Tarragona, part to join lord Wellington. Copons then became terrified lest general Robert, abandoning Tortosa, should join Habert at Barcelona, and enclose him between them and the division at Figueras; wherefore Clinton once more halted to protect the Spaniards.

Copons had indeed some reason to fear, for Habert about this time received, and transmitted to Robert, the emperor's orders to break out of Tortosa and gain Barcelona, instead of passing by the valley of Venasque as Suchet had before prescribed: the twelve thousand men thus united were then to push into France. This letter was intercepted, copied, and sent on to Robert; whose answer, being likewise intercepted, showed that he was not prepared and had no inclination for the enterprise. This seen, Clinton continued his embarkation, and thus completed his honourable but difficult task. With a force weak in numbers, and nearly destitute of every thing that constitutes strength in the field, he had maintained a forward and dangerous position for eight months; and though Copons' incapacity and ill-will, and other circumstances beyond control, did not permit him to perform any brilliant actions, he occupied the attention of a very superior army, suffered no disaster, and gained some advantages.

While his troops were embarking, Habert, in furtherance of the emperor's project, made a vigorous sally on the 18th, and though repulsed with loss he killed or wounded eight hundred Spaniards. This was a lamentable combat. The war had terminated long before, yet intelligence of the cessation of hostilities only arrived four days later. Habert was now repeatedly ordered by Suchet and the duke of Feltre to give up Barcelona, but warned by the breach of former conventions, he held it until he was assured that all the French garrisons in Valencia had returned safely to France, which did not happen until the 28th of May, when he yielded up the town and marched to his own country. This event, the last operation of the whole war, released the duchess of Bourbon. She and the old prince of Conti had been retained prisoners in the city during the Spanish struggle: the prince died early in 1814, the duchess survived and now returned to France.

How strong Napoleon's hold of the Peninsula had been, how little the Spaniards were able of their own strength to shake him off, was now apparent to all the world. For notwithstanding lord Wellington's great victories, notwithstanding the invasion of France, seven fortresses, Figueras, Barcelona, Tortosa, Morella, Peniscola, Saguntum and Denia, were recovered, not by arms, but by the general peace. And but for the deceits of Van Halen there would have been three others similarly situated in the eastern parts alone, while in the north Santona was recovered in the same manner; for neither the long blockade, nor the active operations against that place, of which some account shall now be given, caused it to surrender.

The site of Santona is one of those promontories, frequent on the coast of Spain, which, connected by low sandy necks with the main land, offer good harbours. Its waters, deep and capacious, furnished two bays. The outer one, or roadstead, was commanded by the works of Santona itself, and by those of Laredo, a considerable town lying at the foot of a mountain on the opposite point of the harbour. A narrow entrance to the inner port was between a

spit of land, called the Puntal, and the low isthmus on which the town of Santona is built. The natural strength of the ground was very great, but the importance of Santona arose from its peculiar situation as a harbour and fort of support in the Montaña de St. Ander. By holding it the French shut out the British shipping from the only place which being defensible on the land side furnished a good harbour between San Sebastian and Coruña; they thus protected the sea-flank of their long line of invasion, obtained a port of refuge for their own coasting vessels, and a post of support for the moveable columns sent to chase the partidas, which abounded in that rough district. And when the battle of Vittoria placed the allies on the Bidassoa, from Santona issued forth a number of privateers who, as we have seen, intercepted lord Wellington's supplies, and interrupted his communication with Coruña, Oporto, Lisbon, and even with England.

The advantages of possessing Santona were felt early by both parties; the French seized it at once, and although the Spaniards recovered possession of it in 1810, they were driven out again immediately. The English ministers then commenced deliberating and concocting extensive, and for that reason injudicious and impracticable plans of offensive operations, to be based upon the possession of Santona; meanwhile Napoleon fortified it, and kept it to the end of the war. In August, 1812, its importance was better understood by the Spaniards, and it was continually menaced by the numerous bands of Biscay, the Austurias and the Montaña. Fourteen hundred men, including the crew of a corvette, then formed its garrison, the works were not very strong, and only forty pieces of artillery were mounted. Napoleon however foreseeing the disasters which Marmont was provoking, sent general Lameth, a chosen officer, to take charge of the defence. He immediately augmented the works, and constructed advanced redoubts on two hills, called the Gromo and the Brusco, which, like San Bartolomeo at San Sebastian, closed the isthmus inland. He also erected a strong redoubt and blockhouse on the Puntal, to command the straits, and to sweep the roadstead in conjunction with the fort of Laredo, which he repaired. This done, he formed several minor batteries, and cast a chain to secure the narrow entrance to the inner harbour, and then covered the rocky promontory of Santona itself with defensive works.

Some dismantled guns remained in the arsenal, others which had been thrown into the sea by the Spaniards when they took the place in 1810 were fished up, and the garrison, felling trees in the vicinity, made carriages for them: by these means a hundred and twenty guns were finally placed in battery, and there was abundance of ammunition. The corvette was not seaworthy, but the governor established a flotilla of gun-boats, and other small craft, which sallied forth whenever the signal-posts on the headland gave notice of the approach of vessels liable to attack, or of French coasters bringing provisions and stores. The garrison had previously lost many men, killed in a barbarous manner by the partidas, and in revenge they never gave quarter to their enemies. Lameth, shocked at their inhumanity, resolutely forbade under pain of death any farther reprisals, rewarded those men who brought in prisoners, and treated the latter with gentleness: the Spaniards, discovering this, also changed their system, and civilization resumed its rights. From this time military operations were incessant; the garrison sometimes made sallies, sometimes sustained partial attacks, sometimes aided the moveable col-

umns employed by the different generals of the army of the north to put down the partisan warfare, which was seldom even lulled in the Montaña.

After the battle of Vittoria, Santona being left to its own resources was invested on the land side by a part of the troops composing the Gallician or fourth Spanish army. It was blockaded on the seaboard by the English ships of war, but only nominally, for the garrison received supplies, and the flotilla vexed lord Wellington's communications, took many of his store-ships and other vessels, delayed his convoys, and added greatly to the difficulties of his situation. The land blockade thus also became a nullity, and the Spanish officers complained with reason that they suffered privations and endured hardships without an object. These complaints and his own embarrassments, caused by lord Melville's neglect, induced lord Wellington, in October, 1813, when he could ill spare troops, to employ a British brigade under lord Aylmer in the attack of Santona; the project, for reasons already mentioned, was not executed, but an English engineer, captain Wells, was sent with some sappers and miners to quicken the operations of the Spanish officers, and his small detachment has been by a French writer magnified into a whole battalion.

Captain Wells remained six months, for the Spanish generals though brave and willing were tainted with the national defect of procrastination. The siege made no progress until the 13th of February, 1814, when general Barco, the Spanish commander, carried the fort of Puntal in the night by escalade, killing thirty men and taking twenty-three prisoners; yet the fort being under the heavy fire of the Santona works was necessarily dismantled and abandoned the next morning. A piquet was however left there, and the French opened their batteries, but as this did not dislodge the Spaniards, Lameth embarked a detachment and recovered his fort. However, in the night of the 21st, general Barco ordered an attack to be made with a part of his force upon the outposts of El Grumo and Brusco, on the Santona side of the harbour, and led the remainder of his troops in person to storm the fort and town of Laredo. He carried the latter and also some outer defences of the fort, which being on a rock was only to be approached by an isthmus so narrow as to be closed by a single fortified house. In the assault of

the body of this fort Barco was killed, and the attack ceased, but the troops retained what they had won, and established themselves at the foot of the rock, where they were covered from fire. The attack on the other side, conducted by colonel Llorente, was successful; he carried the smallest of the two outworks on the Brusco, and closely invested the largest after an ineffectual attempt by mine and assault to take it. A large breach was however made, and the commandant, seeing he could no longer defend his post, valiantly broke through the investment and gained the work of the Grumo. He was however aided by the appearance on the isthmus of a strong column, which sallied at the same time from the works on the Santona promontory, and the next day the Grumo itself was abandoned by the French.

Captain Wells, who had been wounded at the Puntal escalade, now strenuously urged the Spaniards to crown the counterscarp of the fort at Laredo and attack vigorously, but they preferred establishing four field-pieces to batter it in form at the distance of six hundred yards. These guns, as might be expected, were dismounted the moment they began to fire, and thus corrected, the Spanish generals committed the direction of the attack to Wells. He immediately opened a heavy musketry fire on the fort to stifle the noise of his workmen, then pushing trenches up the hill close to the counterscarp in the night, he was proceeding to burst open the gate with a few field-pieces and to cut down the palisades, when the Italian garrison, whose muskets from constant use had become so foul that few would go off, mutinied against their commander, and making him prisoner surrendered the place. This event gave the allies the command of the entrance to the harbour, and Lameth offered to capitulate in April upon condition of returning to France with his garrison. Lord Wellington refused the condition, Santona therefore remained a few days longer in possession of the enemy, and was finally evacuated at the general cessation of hostilities.

Having now terminated the narrative of all military and political events which happened in the Peninsula, the reader will henceforth be enabled to follow without interruption the events of the war in the south of France, which shall be continued in the next book.

BOOK XXIV.

CHAPTER I.

Napoleon recalls several divisions of infantry and cavalry from Soult's army—Embarrassments of that marshal—M. Batbedat, a banker of Bayonne, offers to aid the allies secretly with money and provisions—La Roche-Jacquelin and other Bourbon partisans arrive at the allies' head-quarters—The duke of Angoulême arrives there—Lord Wellington's political views—General reflections—Soult embarrassed by the hostility of the French people—Lord Wellington embarrassed by the hostility of the Spaniards—Soult's remarkable project for the defence of France—Napoleon's reasons for neglecting it put hypothetically—Lord Wellington's situation suddenly ameliorated—His wise policy, foresight and diligence—Resolves to throw a bridge over the Adour below Bayonne, and to drive Soult from that river—Soult's system of defence—Numbers of the contending armies—Passage of the Gaves—Combat of Garris—Lord Wellington forces the line of the Bidouze and Gave de Mauléon—Soult takes the line of the Gave d'Oleron and resolves to change his system of operation.

LORD WELLINGTON'S difficulties have been described. Those of his adversary were even more embarrassing because the evil was at the root; it was not misapplication of power, but the want of power itself, which paralyzed Soult's operations. Napoleon trusted much to the effect of his treaty with Ferdinand, who, following his intentions, should have entered Spain in November; but the intrigues to retard his journey continued, and though Napoleon, when the refusal of the treaty by the Spanish government became known, permitted him to return without any conditions, as thinking his presence would alone embarrass and perhaps break the English alliance with Spain, he did not, as we have seen, arrive until March. How the emperor's views were frustrated by his secret enemies is one of the obscure parts of French history, at this period, which time may possibly clear, but probably only with a feeble and uncertain light. For truth can never be expected in the memoirs, if any should appear, of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché, and other politicians of their stamp, whose plots rendered his supernatural efforts to rescue France from her invaders abortive. Meanwhile there is nothing to check and expose the political and literary empirics who never fail on such occasions to poison the sources of history.

Relying upon the effect which the expected journey of Ferdinand would produce, and pressed by the necessity of augmenting his own weak army, Napoleon gave notice to Soult that he must ultimately take from him two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. The undecided nature of his first battle at Brienne caused him to enforce this notice in the beginning of February, but he had previously sent imperial commissaries to the different departments of France, with instructions to hasten the new conscription, to form national and urban guards, to draw forth all the resources of the country, and to aid the operations of the armies by the action of the people. These measures however failed generally in the south. The urban cohorts were indeed readily formed as a means of police, and the conscription was successful, but the people remained sullen and apathetic; and the civil commissaries are said to have been, with some exceptions, pompous, declamatory, and affecting great state and dignity, without en-

ergy and activity. Ill-will was also produced by the vexatious and corrupt conduct of the subordinate government agents, who seeing in the general distress and confusion a good opportunity to forward their personal interests, oppressed the people for their own profit. This it was easy to do, because the extreme want of money rendered requisitions unavoidable, and under the confused direction of civilians, partly ignorant and unused to difficult times, partly corrupt, and partly disaffected to the emperor, the abuses inevitably attendant upon such a system were numerous; and to the people so offensive, that numbers to avoid them passed with their carts and utensils into the lines of the allies. An official letter written from Bayonne at this period ran thus: "The English general's policy and the good discipline he maintains do us more harm than ten battles. Every peasant wishes to be under his protection."

Another source of anger was Soult's works near Bayonne, where the richer inhabitants could not bear to have their country villas and gardens destroyed by the engineer, he who spares not for beauty or for pleasure where his military traces are crossed. The merchants, a class nearly alike in all nations, with whom profit stands for country, had been with a few exceptions long averse to Napoleon's policy, which from necessity interfered with their commerce. And this feeling must have been very strong in Bayonne and Bordeaux; for one Batbedat, a banker of the former place, having obtained leave to go to St. Jean de Luz under pretence of settling the accounts of English officers, prisoners of war, to whom he had advanced money, offered lord Wellington to supply his army with various commodities, and even to provide money for bills on the English treasury. In return he demanded licenses for twenty vessels to go from Bordeaux, Rochelle and Nantes, to St. Jean de Luz, and they were given on condition that he should not carry back colonial produce. The English navy however showed so little inclination to respect them that the banker and his coadjutors hesitated to risk their vessels, and thus saved them, for the English ministers refused to sanction the licenses, and rebuked their general.

During these events the partisans of the Bourbons, coming from Brittany and La Vendée, spread themselves all over the south of France and entered into direct communication with lord Wellington. One of the celebrated family of La Roche-Jacquelin arrived at his head-quarters, Bernadotte sent an agent to those parts, and the count of Grammont, then serving as a captain in the British cavalry, was at the desire of the marquis de Mailhos, another of the malcontents, sent to England to call the princes of the house of Bourbon forward. Finally, the duke of Angoulême arrived suddenly at the head-quarters, and he was received with respect in private, though not suffered to attend the movements of the army. The English general indeed, being persuaded that the great body of the French people, especially in the south, were inimical to Napoleon's government, was sanguine as to the utility of encouraging a Bourbon party. Yet he held his

judgment in abeyance, sagaciously observing that he could not come to a safe conclusion merely from the feelings of some people in one corner of France; and as the allied sovereigns seemed backward to take the matter in hand unless some positive general movement in favour of the Bourbons was made, and there were negotiations for peace actually going on, it would be, he observed, unwise and ungenerous to precipitate the partisans of the fallen house into a premature outbreak, and then leave them to the vengeance of the enemy.

That lord Wellington should have been convinced the prevailing opinion was against Napoleon is not surprising, because every appearance at the time would seem to prove it so; and certain it is that a very strong Bourbon party, and one still stronger averse to the continuation of war, existed. But in civil commotions nothing is more dangerous, nothing more deceitful, than the outward show and declarations on such occasions. The great mass of men in all nations are only endowed with moderate capacity and spirit, and as their thoughts are intent upon the preservation of their families and property they must bend to circumstances; thus fear and suspicion, ignorance, baseness and good feeling, all combine to urge men in troubled times to put on the mask of enthusiasm for the most powerful, while selfish knaves ever shout with the loudest. Let the scene change and the multitude will turn with the facility of a weathercock. Lord Wellington soon discovered that the count of Viel Castel, Bernadotte's agent, while pretending to aid the Bourbons, was playing a double part; and only one year after this period Napoleon returned from Elba, and neither the presence of the duke of Angoulême, nor the energy of the dutchess, nor all the activity of their partisans, could raise in this very country more than the semblance of an opposition to him. The tricolour was every where hoisted and the Bourbon party vanished. And this was the true test of national feeling, because in 1814 the white colours were supported by foreign armies, and misfortune had bowed the great democratic chief to the earth; but when rising again in his wondrous might he came back alone from Elba, the poorer people, with whom only patriotism is ever really to be found, and that because they are poor and therefore unsophisticated, crowded to meet him and hail him as a father. Not because they held him entirely blameless. Who born of woman is? They demanded redress of grievances even while they clung instinctively to him as their stay and protection against the locust tyranny of aristocracy.

There was however at this period in France enough of discontent, passion and intrigue, enough of treason, and enough of grovelling spirit in adversity, added to the natural desire of escaping the ravages of war, a desire so carefully fostered by the admirable policy of the English general, as to render the French general's position extremely difficult and dangerous. Nor is it the least remarkable circumstance of this remarkable period, that while Soult expected relief by the Spaniards falling away from the English alliance, lord Wellington received from the French secret and earnest warnings to beware of some great act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards. It was at this period also that Morillo and other generals encouraged their soldiers' licentiousness, and displayed their own ill-will by sullen discontent and captious complaints, while the civil authorities disturbed the communications and made war in their fashion against the hospitals and magazines.

His apprehensions and vigilance are plainly to be

traced in his correspondence. Writing about general Copons, he says, "His conduct is quite unjustifiable both in concealing what he knew of the duke de San Carlos' arrival and the nature of his mission." In another letter he observes, that the Spanish military people about himself desired peace with Napoleon according to the treaty of Valençay; that they all had some notion of what had occurred, and yet had been quite silent about it; that he had repeated intelligence from the French of some act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards; that several persons of that nation had come from Bayonne to circulate reports of peace, and charges against the British which he knew would be received on that frontier; that he had arrested a man calling himself an agent of, and actually bearing a letter of credence from, Ferdinand.

But the most striking proof of the alarm he felt was his great satisfaction at the conduct of the Spanish government in rejecting the treaty brought by San Carlos and Palafox. Sacrificing all his former great and just resentment, he changed at once from an enemy to a friend of the regency, supported the members of it against the serviles, spoke of the matter as being the most important concern of all that had engaged his attention, and when the count of l'Abispaal, the deadly enemy of the regency, proposed some violent and decided action of hostility which a few weeks before would have been received with pleasure, he checked and softened him, observing that the conduct of the government about the treaty should content every Spaniard, that it was not possible to act with more frankness and loyalty, and that they had procured honour for themselves and for their nation not only in England but all over Europe. Such is the light mode in which words are applied by public men, even by the noblest and greatest, when their wishes are fulfilled. This glorious and honourable conduct of the regency was simply a resolution to uphold their personal power and that of their faction, both of which would have been destroyed by the arrival of the king.

Napoleon, hoping much from the effect of these machinations, not only intimated to Soult, as I have already shown, that he would require ten thousand of his infantry immediately, but that twice that number with a division of cavalry would be called away if the Spaniards fell off from the English alliance. The duke of Dalmatia then, foreseeing the ultimate result of his own operations against Wellington, conceived a vast general plan of action, which showed how capable a man he was to treat the greatest questions of military policy.

"Neither his numbers nor means of supply after Wellington had gained the banks of the Adour above Bayonne would, he said, suffice to maintain his positions covering that fortress and menacing the allies' right flank; the time therefore approached when he must, even without a reduction of force, abandon Bayonne to its own resources, and fight his battles on the numerous rivers which run with concentric courses from the Pyrenees to the Adour. Leval's and Boyer's divisions of infantry were to join the grand army on the eastern frontier, Abbé's division was to reinforce the garrison of Bayonne and its camp to fourteen thousand men, but he considered this force too great for a simple general of division and wished to give it to general Reille, whose corps would be broken up by the departure of the detachments. That officer was however altogether averse, and as an unwilling commander would be half beaten before the battle commenced, he decided that count d'Erlon should be appointed in Reille's place.

"The active army remaining could not then be expected to fight the allies in pitched battles, and he therefore recommended the throwing it as a great partisan corps on the left, touching always on the Pyrenees and ready to fall upon lord Wellington's flank and rear if he should penetrate into France. Clauzel, a native of those parts and speaking the country language, was by his military qualities and knowledge the most suitable person to command. General Reille could then march with the troops called to the great army, and as there would be nothing left for him, Soult, to do in these parts, he desired to be employed where he could aid the emperor with more effect. This he pressed urgently because, notwithstanding the refusal of the cortes to receive the treaty of Valençay, it was probable the war on the eastern frontier would oblige the emperor to recall all the troops designated. It would then become imperative to change from a regular to an irregular warfare, in which a numerous corps of partisans would be more valuable than the shadow of a regular army without value or confidence, and likely to be destroyed in the first great battle. For these partisans it was necessary to have a central power and director. Clauzel was the man most fitted for the task. He ought to have under his orders all the generals who were in command in the military departments between the Garonne and the Pyrenees, with power to force all the inhabitants to take arms and act under his directions.

"I am sensible," he continued, "that this system, one of the least unhappy consequences of which would be to leave the enemy apparently master of all the country between the mountains and the Garonne, can only be justified by the necessity of forming an army in the centre of France sufficiently powerful to fend off the multitude of our enemies from the capital; but if Paris falls all will be lost, whereas if it be saved the loss of a few large towns in the south can be repaired. I propose then to form a great army in front of Paris by a union of all the disposable troops of the armies on the different frontiers, and at the same time to spread what remains of the latter as partisans wherever the enemy penetrates or threatens to penetrate. All the marshals of France, the generals and other officers, either in activity or in retirement, who shall not be attached to the great central army, should then repair to their departments to organize the partisan corps and bring those not actively useful as such up to the great point of union, and they should have military power to make all men able to bear arms find them at their own expense. This measure is revolutionary, but will infallibly produce important results, while none or at least a very feeble effect will be caused by the majority of the imperial commissioners already sent to the military divisions. They are grand persons, they temporize, make proclamations, and treat every thing as civilians, instead of acting with vigour to obtain promptly a result which would astonish the world; for notwithstanding the cry to the contrary, the resources of France are not exhausted, what is wanted is to make those who possess resources use them for the defence of the throne and the emperor."

Having thus explained his views, he again requested to be recalled to Paris to serve near the emperor, but declared that he was ready to obey any order and serve in any manner; all he demanded was clear instructions with reference to the events that might occur:—1st. What he should do if the treaty arrangements with Ferdinand had no effect and the Spanish troops remained with lord Wellington;—2nd. If those troops retired, and the British, seeing the French weakened by detachments, should alone

penetrate into France:—3rd. If the changes in Spain should cause the allies to retire altogether.

Such was Soult's plan of action; but his great project was not adopted, and the emperor's reasons for neglecting it have not been made known. Nor can the workings of that capricious mind be judged of without a knowledge of all the objects and conditions of his combinations. Yet it is not improbable that at this period he did not despair of rejecting the allies beyond the Rhine either by force of arms, by negotiation, or by working upon the family pride of the emperor of Austria. With this hope he would be naturally averse to incur the risk of a civil war by placing France under martial law, or of reviving the devouring fire of revolution which it had been his project for so many years to quell; and this is the more probable, because it seems nearly certain that one of his reasons for replacing Ferdinand on the Spanish throne was his fear lest the republican doctrines which had gained ground in Spain should spread to France. Was he wrong? The fierce democrat will answer, Yes! But the man who thinks that real liberty was never attained under a single unmixed form of government giving no natural vent to the swelling pride of honour, birth or riches; those who measure the weakness of pure republicanism by the miserable state of France at home and abroad when Napoleon by assuming power saved her; those who saw America with all her militia and her licentious liberty unable to prevent three thousand British soldiers from passing three thousand miles of ocean and burning her capital, will hesitate to condemn him. And this without detriment to the democratic principle, which in substance may and should always govern under judicious forms. Napoleon early judged, and the event has proved he judged truly, that the democratic spirit of France, however violent, was unable to overbear the aristocratic and monarchic tendencies of Europe. Wisely therefore, while he preserved the essence of the first by fostering equality, he endeavoured to blend it with the other two; thus satisfying as far as the nature of human institutions would permit the conditions of the great problem he had undertaken to solve. His object was the reconstruction of the social fabric which had been shattered by the French revolution, mixing with the new materials all that remained of the old sufficiently unbroken to build with again. If he failed to render his structure stable it was because his design was misunderstood, and the terrible passions let loose by the previous stupendous explosion were too mighty even for him to compress.

To have accepted Soult's project would have been to endanger his work, to save himself at the expense of his system, and probably to plunge France again into the anarchy from which he had with so much care and labour drawn her. But as I have before said, and it is true, Napoleon's ambition was for the greatness and prosperity of France, for the regeneration of Europe, for the stability of the system which he had formed with that end, never for himself personally; and hence it is that the multitudes of many nations instinctively revere his memory. And neither the monarch nor the aristocrat, dominant though they be by his fall, feel themselves so easy in their high places as to rejoice much in their victory.

Whatever Napoleon's motive was, he did not adopt Soult's project, and in February two divisions of infantry and Treilhard's cavalry with many batteries were withdrawn. Two thousand of the best soldiers were also selected to join the imperial

guards, and all the gendarmes were sent to the interior. The total number of old soldiers left did not, including the division of general Paris, exceed forty thousand exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne and other posts, and the conscripts, beardless youths, were for the most part unfit to enter the line, nor were there enough of muskets in the arsenals to arm them. It is remarkable also, as showing how easily military operations may be affected by distant operations, that Soult expected and dreaded at this time the descent of a great English army upon the coast of La Vendée, led thereto by intelligence of an expedition preparing in England, under sir Thomas Graham, really to aid the Dutch revolt.

While the French general's power was thus diminished, lord Wellington's situation was as suddenly ameliorated. First by the arrival of reinforcements, next by the security he felt from the rejection of the treaty of Valençay, lastly by the approach of better weather, and the acquisition of a very large sum in gold, which enabled him not only to put his Anglo-Portuguese in activity, but also to bring the Spaniards again into line with less danger of their plundering the country. During the forced cessation of operations he had been actively engaged preparing the means to enter France with power and security, sending before him the fame of a just discipline and a wise consideration for the people who were likely to fall under his power; for there was nothing he so much dreaded as the partisan and insurgent warfare proposed by Soult. The peasants of Baigorri and Bidaray had done him more mischief than the French army, and his terrible menace of destroying their villages, and hanging all the population he could lay his hands upon if they ceased not their hostility, marks his apprehensions in the strongest manner. Yet he left all the local authorities free to carry on their internal government, to draw their salaries, and raise the necessary taxes in the same mode and with as much tranquillity as if perfect peace prevailed; he opened the ports, and drew a large commerce which served to support his own army and engage the mercantile interests in his favour; he established many sure channels for intelligence political and military, and would have extended his policy further and to more advantage if the English ministers had not so abruptly and ignorantly interfered with his proceedings. Finally, foreseeing that the money he had received would, being in foreign coin, create embarrassment, he adopted an expedient which he had before practised in India to obviate this. Knowing that in a British army a wonderful variety of knowledge and vocations, good and bad, may be found, he secretly caused the coiners and die-sinkers amongst the soldiers to be sought out, and once assured that no mischief was intended them, it was not difficult to persuade them to acknowledge their peculiar talents. With these men he established a secret mint at which he coined gold Napoleons, marking them with a private stamp and carefully preserving their just fineness and weight with a view of enabling the French government, when peace should be established, to call them in again. He thus avoided all the difficulties of exchange, and removed a very fruitful source of quarrels and ill-will between the troops and the country-people and shopkeepers; for the latter are always fastidious in taking and desirous of abating the current worth of strange coin, and the former attribute to fraud any declination from the value at which they receive their money. This sudden increase of the current coin tended also to diminish the pressure necessarily attendant upon troubled times.

Nor was his provident sagacity less eminently

displayed in purely military matters than in his administrative and political operations. During the bad weather he had formed large magazines at the ports, examined the course of the Adour, and carefully meditated upon his future plans. To penetrate into France and rally a great Bourbon party under the protection of his army was the system he desired to follow; and though the last point depended upon the political proceedings and successes of the allied sovereigns, the military operations most suitable at the moment did not clash with it. To drive the French army from Bayonne and either blockade or besiege that place were the first steps in either case. But this required extensive and daring combinations. For the fortress and its citadel, comprising in their circuit the confluence of the Nive and the Adour, could not be safely invested with less than three times the number necessary to resist the garrison at any one point, because the communications of the invested being short, internal and secure, those of the investors external, difficult and unsafe, it behooved that each division should be able to resist a sally of the whole garrison. Hence, though reduced to the lowest point, the whole must be so numerous as seriously to weaken the forces operating towards the interior.

How and where to cross the Adour with a view to the investment was also a subject of solicitude. It was a great river with a strong current and well guarded by troops and gun-boats above Bayonne; still greater was it below the town; there the ebb tide ran seven miles an hour, there also there were gun-boats, a sloop of war, and several merchant-vessels which could be armed and employed to interrupt the passage. The number of pontoons or other boats required to bridge the stream across either above or below, and the carriage of them, an immense operation in itself, would inevitably give notice of the design and render it abortive, unless the French army were first driven away, and even then the garrison of Bayonne, nearly fifteen thousand strong, might be sufficient to baffle the attempt. Nevertheless in the face of these difficulties he resolved to pass, the means adopted being proportionate to the greatness of the design.

He considered that, besides the difficulty of bringing the materials across the Nive and through the deep country on each side of that river, he could not throw his bridge above Bayonne without first driving Soult entirely from the confluents of the Adour and from the Adour itself; that when he had effected this his own communications between the bridge and his magazines at the sea-ports would still be difficult and unsafe, because his convoys would have a flank march, passing the Nive as well as the Adour, and liable to interruption from the overflowing of those rivers; finally that his means of transport would be unequal to the wear and tear of the deep roads and be interrupted by rain. But throwing his bridge below the town he would have the Adour itself as a harbour, while his land convoys used the royal causeway leading close to the river and not liable to be interrupted by weather. His line of retreat also would then be more secure if any unforeseen misfortune should render it necessary to break up the investment. He had no fear that Soult, while retiring before the active force he intended to employ against him on the upper parts of the rivers, would take his line of retreat by the great Bordeaux road and fall upon the investing force: that road led behind Bayonne through the sandy wilderness called the Landes, into which the French general would not care to throw himself, lest his opponent's operations along the edge of the desert should prevent

him from ever getting out. To draw the attention of the French army by an attack on their left near the roots of the Pyrenees would be sure to keep the lower Adour free from any formidable defensive force, because the rapidity and breadth of the stream there denied the use of common pontoons, and the mouth, about six miles below Bayonne, was so barred with sand, so beaten by surges, and so difficult of navigation even with the help of the land-marks, some of which had been removed, that the French would never expect small vessels fit for constructing a bridge could enter that way. Yet it was thus lord Wellington designed to achieve his object. He had collected forty large sailing boats of from fifteen to thirty tons burthen, called "*chasse-marée*," as if for the commissariat service, but he secretly loaded them with planks and other materials for his bridge. These and some gun-boats he designed, with the aid of the navy, to run up the Adour to a certain point upon which he meant also to direct the troops and artillery, and then with hawsers and pontoons formed into rafts, to throw over a covering body and destroy a small battery near the mouth of the river. He trusted to the greatness and danger of the attempt for success, and in this he was favoured by fortune.

The French trading vessels in the Adour had offered secretly to come out upon licenses and enter the service of his commissariat, but he was obliged to forego the advantage because of the former interference and dissent of the English ministers about the passports he had previously granted. This added greatly to the difficulty of the enterprise. He was thus forced to maltreat men willing to be friends, to prepare grates for heating shot, and a battery of congreve rockets with which to burn their vessels and the sloop of war, or at least to drive them up the river, after which he proposed to protect his bridge with the gun-boats and a boom.

While he was thus preparing for offensive operations the French general was active in defensive measures. He had fortified all the main passes of the rivers by the great roads leading against his left; but the diminution of his force in January obliged him to withdraw his outposts from Anglet, which enabled lord Wellington to examine the whole course of the Adour below Bayonne and arrange for the passage with more facility. Soult then, in pursuance of Napoleon's system of warfare, which always prescribed a recourse to moral force to cover physical weakness, immediately concentrated his left wing against the allies' right beyond the Nive, and redoubled that harassing partisan warfare which I have already noticed, endeavouring to throw his adversary entirely upon the defensive. Thus, on the 26th of January, Morillo having taken possession of an advanced post near Mendionde not properly belonging to him, Soult, who desired to ascertain the feelings of the Spaniards about the English alliance, caused Harispe under pretence of remonstrating to sound him; he did not respond, and Harispe then drove him, not without a vigorous resistance, from the post.

The French marshal had however no hope of checking the allies long by these means. He judged justly that Wellington was resolved to obtain Bordeaux and the line of the Garonne, and foreseeing that his own line of retreat must ultimately be in a parallel direction with the Pyrenees, he desired to organize in time a strong defensive system in the country behind him, and to cover Bordeaux if possible. In this view he sent general Daricaux, a native of the Landes, to prepare an insurgent levy in that wilderness; and directed Maransin to the high Pyr-

enees, to extend the insurrection of the mountaineers already commenced in the lower Pyrenees by Harispe. The castle of Jaca was still held by eight hundred men, but they were starving, and a convoy collected at Navarreins being stopped by the snow in the mountain-passes made a surrender inevitable. Better would it have been to have withdrawn the troops at an early period; for though the Spaniards would thus have gained access to the rear of the French army, and perhaps ravaged a part of the frontier, they could have done no essential mischief to the army; and their excesses would have disposed the people of those parts, who had not yet felt the benefit of lord Wellington's politic discipline, to insurrection.

At Bordeaux there was a small reserve commanded by general La Huillier: Soult urged the minister of war to increase it with conscripts from the interior. Meanwhile he sent artillery-men from Bayonne, ordered fifteen hundred national guards to be selected as a garrison for the citadel of Blaye, and desired that the Médoc and Paté forts and the batteries along the banks of the Garonne should be put in a state of defence. The vessels in that river, fit for the purpose, he desired might be armed, and a flotilla of fifty gun-boats established below Bordeaux, with a like number to navigate that river above the city as far as Toulouse. But these orders were feebly carried into execution or entirely neglected, for there was no public spirit, and treason and disaffection were rife in the city.

On the side of the lower Pyrenees Soult enlarged and improved the works of Navarreins, and designed to commence an intrenched camp in front of it. The castle of Lourdes in the high Pyrenees was already defensible, and he gave orders to fortify the castle of Pau, thus providing a number of supporting points for the retreat which he foresaw. At Mauléon he put on foot some partisan corps, and the imperial commissary Caffarelli gave him hopes of being able to form a reserve of seven or eight thousand national guards, gendarmes and artillery-men at Tarbes. Dax, containing his principal depots, was already being fortified, and the communication with it was maintained across the rivers by the bridges and bridge-heads at Port de Lanne, Hastingue, Peirehorade and Sauveterre; but the floods in the beginning of February carried away his bridge at the Port de Lanne, and the communication between Bayonne and the left of the army was thus interrupted until he established a flying bridge in place of the one carried away.

Such was the situation of the French general when lord Wellington advanced, and as the former supposed with one hundred and twenty thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, for he knew nothing of the various political and financial difficulties which had reduced the English general's power and prevented all the reinforcements he expected from joining him. His emissaries told him that Clinton's force was actually broken up, and the British part in march to join Wellington; that the garrisons of Carthage, Cadiz and Ceuta were on the point of arriving, and that reinforcements were coming from England and Portugal. This information made him conclude that there was no intention of pressing the war in Catalonia, and that all the allied troops would be united and march against him; wherefore, with more earnestness than before, he urged that Suchet should be ordered to join him, that their united forces might form a "dike against the torrent" which threatened to overwhelm the south of France. The real power opposed to him was however very much below his calculations. The

twenty thousand British and Portuguese reinforcements promised had not arrived, Clinton's army was still in Catalonia; and though it is impossible to fix the exact numbers of the Spaniards, their regular forces available, and that only partially and with great caution on account of their licentious conduct, did not exceed the following approximation:

Twelve thousand Gallicians, under Freyre, including Carlos d'España's division; four thousand under Morillo; six thousand Andalusians, under O'Donel; eight thousand of Del Parque's troops, under the prince of Anglona. In all thirty thousand.

The Anglo-Portuguese present under arms were by the morning states on the 13th of February, the day on which the advance commenced, about seventy thousand men and officers of all arms, nearly ten thousand being cavalry.

The whole force, exclusive of Mina's bands which were spread as we have seen from Navarre to the borders of Catalonia, was, therefore, one hundred thousand men and officers, with one hundred pieces of field artillery of which ninety-five were Anglo-Portuguese.

It is difficult to fix with precision the number of the French army at this period, because the imperial muster-rolls, owing to the troubled state of the emperor's affairs, were either not continued beyond December, 1813, or have been lost. But from Soult's correspondence and other documents it would appear, that exclusive of his garrisons, his reserves and detachments at Bordeaux and in the department of the high Pyrenees, exclusive also of the conscripts of the second levy which were now beginning to arrive, he could place in line of battle about thirty-five thousand soldiers of all arms, three thousand being cavalry, with forty pieces of artillery. But Bayonne alone, without reckoning the fortresses of St. Jean Pied de Port and Navarreins, occupied twenty-eight thousand of the allies; and by this and other drains lord Wellington's superiority in the field was so reduced, that his penetrating into France, that France which had made all Europe tremble at her arms, must be viewed as a surprising example of courage and fine conduct, military and political.

PASSAGE OF THE GAVES.

In the second week of February the weather set in with a strong frost, the roads became practicable, and the English general, eagerly seizing the long expected opportunity, advanced at the moment when general Paris had again marched with the convoy from Navarreins to make a last effort for the relief of Jaca. But the troops were at this time receiving the clothing which had been so long delayed in England, and the regiments wanting the means of carriage marched to the stores; the English general's first design was therefore merely to threaten the French left and turn it by the sources of the rivers with Hill's corps, which was to march by the roots of the Pyrenees, while Beresford kept the centre in check upon the lower parts of the same rivers. Soult's attention would thus he hoped be drawn to that side, while the passage of the Adour was being made below Bayonne. And it would seem that, uncertain if he should be able to force the passage of the tributary rivers with his right, he intended, if his bridge was happily thrown, to push his main operations on that side and thus turn the Gaves by the right bank of the Adour: a fine conception, by which his superiority of numbers would have best availed him to seize Dax and the Port de Lanne and cut Soult off from Bordeaux.

On the 12th and 13th, Hill's corps, which inclu-

ding Picton's division and five regiments of cavalry furnished twenty thousand combatants with sixteen guns, being relieved by the sixth and seventh divisions in front of Mousserolles and on the Adour, was concentrated about Urcuray and Hasparren. The 14th, it marched in two columns: one by Bonloc, to drive the French posts beyond the Joyeuse; another by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port, against Harispe who was at Hellette. This second column had the Ursaia mountain on the right; and a third, composed of Morillo's Spaniards, having that mountain on its left, marched from La Houssoa against the same point. Harispe, who had only three brigades, principally conscripts, retired skirmishing in the direction of St. Palais and took a position for the night at Meharin. Not more than thirty men on each side were hurt, but the line of the Joyeuse was turned by the allies, the direct communication with St. Jean Pied de Port cut, and that place was immediately invested by Mina's battalions.

On the 15th, Hill, leaving the fifty-seventh regiment at Hellette to observe the road to St. Jean Pied de Port, marched through Meharin upon Garri, eleven miles distant, but that road being impracticable for artillery the guns moved by Armendaritz, more to the right. Harispe's rear-guard was overtaken and pushed back fighting, and meanwhile lord Wellington directed Beresford to send a brigade of the seventh division from the heights of La Costa across the Gambouri to the Bastide de Clérance. The front being thus extended from Urt by Briscans, the Bastide and Isturitz, towards Garri, a distance of more than twenty miles, was too attenuated; wherefore he caused the fourth division to occupy La Costa in support of the troops at the Bastide. At the same time learning that the French had weakened their force at Mousserolles, and thinking that might be to concentrate on the heights of Anglet, which would have frustrated his plan for throwing a bridge over the Adour, he directed Hope secretly to occupy the back of those heights in force, and prevent any intercourse between Bayonne and the country.

Soult knew of the intended operations against his left on the 12th; but hearing the allies had collected boats and constructed a fresh battery near Urt on the upper Adour, and that the pontoons had reached Urcuray, he thought lord Wellington designed to turn his left with Hill's corps, to press him on the Bidouze with Beresford's, and to keep the garrison of Bayonne in check with the Spaniards while Hope crossed the Adour above that fortress. Wherefore, on the 14th, when Hill's movement commenced, he repaired to Passorou near the Bastide de Clérance and made his dispositions to dispute the passage, first of the Bidouze and the Soissons or Gave de Mauléon, and then of the Gave d'Oloron. He had four divisions in hand, with which he occupied a position, on the 15th, along the Bidouze; and he recalled general Paris, posting him on the road between St. Palais and St. Jean Pied de Port, with a view to watch Mina's battalions which he supposed to be more numerous than they really were. Jaca thus abandoned capitulated on the 17th, the garrison returning to France on condition of not serving until exchanged. This part of the capitulation it appears was broken by the French; but the recent violation by the Spaniards of the convention made with the deluded garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon furnished a reply.

Harispe, having Paris under his command and being supported by Pierre Soult with a brigade of light cavalry, now covered the road from St. Jean

Pied de Port with his left, and the upper line of the Bidouze with his right. Lower down that river, Villatte occupied Iharre, Taupin was on the heights of Bergoney below Villatte, and Foy guarded the banks of the river from Came to its confluence with the Adour. The rest of the army remained under D'Erlon on the right of the latter river.

COMBAT OF GARRIS.

Harispe had just taken a position in advance of the Bidouze, on a height called the Garris mountain which stretched to St. Palais, when his rear-guard came plunging into a deep ravine in his front, closely followed by the light troops of the second division. Upon the parallel counter-ridge thus gained by the allies general Hill's corps was immediately established, and though the evening was beginning to close the skirmishers descended into the ravine, and two guns played over it upon Harispe's troops. These last to the number of four thousand were drawn up on the opposite mountain, and in this state of affairs Wellington arrived. He was anxious to turn the line of the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen himself there, and seeing that the communication with general Paris by St. Palais was not well maintained, sent Morillo by a flank march along the ridge now occupied by the allies towards that place; then menacing the enemy's centre with Lecor's Portuguese division, he at the same time directed the thirty-ninth and twenty-eighth regiments forming Pringle's brigade to attack, observing with a concise energy, "You must take the hill before dark."

The expression caught the attention of the troops, and it was repeated by colonel O'Callaghan as he and general Pringle placed themselves at the head of the thirty-ninth, which, followed by the twenty-eighth, rushed with loud and prolonged shouts into the ravine. The French fire was violent, Pringle fell wounded, and most of the mounted officers had their horses killed; but the troops, covered by the thick wood, gained with little loss the summit of the Garris mountain, on the right of the enemy, who thought from the shouting that a larger force was coming against them and retreated. The thirty-ninth then wheeled to their own right, intending to sweep the summit; but soon the French discovering their error came back at a charging pace, and receiving a volley without flinching tried the bayonet. Colonel O'Callaghan, distinguished by his strength and courage, received two strokes of that weapon, but repaid them with fatal power in each instance; and the French, nearly all conscripts, were beaten off. Twice however they came back, and fought until the fire of the twenty-eighth was beginning to be felt, when Harispe, seeing the remainder of the second division ready to support the attack, Lecor's Portuguese advancing against the centre, and the Spaniards in march towards St. Palais, retreated to that town, and calling in Paris from the side of Mauléon immediately broke down the bridges over the Bidouze. He lost on this day nearly five hundred men, of whom two hundred were prisoners, and he would hardly have escaped if Morillo had not been slow. The allies lost only one hundred and sixty, of whom not more than fifty fell at Garris, and these chiefly in the bayonet contest, for the trees and the darkness screened them at first.

During these operations at Garris, Picton moved from Bonloc to Orèque on Hill's left, menacing Villatte; but though Beresford's scouting parties, acting on the left of Picton, approached the Bidouze facing Taupin and Foy, his principal force remain-

ed on the Gambouri, the pivot upon which Wellington's line hinged, while the right sweeping forward turned the French positions. Foy, however, though in retreat, observed the movement of the fourth and seventh divisions on the heights between the Nive and the Adour, pointing their march as he thought towards the French left, and his reports to that effect reached Soult at the moment that general Blondu gave notice of the investment of St. Jean Pied de Port. The French general being thus convinced that lord Wellington's design was not to pass the Adour above Bayonne, but to gain the line of that river by constantly turning the French left, made new dispositions.

The line of the Bidouze was strong, if he could have supported Harispe at St. Palais, and guarded at the same time the passage of the Soissons at Mauléon; but this would have extended his front, already too wide, wherefore he resolved to abandon both the Bidouze and the Soissons, and take the line of the Gave d'Oloron, placing his right at Pierehorade and his left at Navarriens. In this view D'Erlon was ordered to pass the Adour by the flying bridge at the Port de Lanne, and take post on the left bank of that river, while Harispe, having Paris' infantry still attached to his division, defended the Gave de Mauléon and pushed parties on his left towards the town of that name. Villatte occupied Sauveterre, where the bridge was fortified with a head on the left bank, and from thence Taupin lined the right bank to Sordes, near the confluence of the Gave de Pau. Foy occupied the works of the bridge-head at Peirehorade and Hastingue, guarding that river to its confluence with the Adour; this line was prolonged by D'Erlon towards Dax, but Soult still kept advanced parties on the lower Bidouze at the different intrenched passages of that river. One brigade of cavalry was in reserve at Sauveterre, another distributed along the line. Head-quarters were transported to Orthez, and the park of artillery to Aire. The principal magazines of ammunition were however at Bayonne, Navarreins and Dax; and the French general, seeing that his communications with all these places were likely to be intercepted before he could remove his stores, anticipated distress, and wrote to the minister of war to form new depots.

On the 16th, lord Wellington repaired the broken bridges of St. Palais, after a skirmish in which a few men were wounded. Hill then crossed the Bidouze, the cavalry and artillery by the repaired bridge, the infantry by the fords; but the day being spent in the operation the head of the column only marched beyond St. Palais. Meanwhile the fourth and part of the seventh divisions occupied the Bastide de Clérance on the right of the Joyeuse, and the light division came up in support to the heights of La Costa, on the left bank of that river.

The 17th, Hill, marching at eight o'clock, passed through Domezain towards the Soissons, while the third division advancing from Orèque on his left passed by Masparraute to the heights of Somberaute, both corps converging upon general Paris, who was in position at Arriveriette to defend the Soissons above its confluence with the Gave d'Oloron. The French outposts were immediately driven across the Gave. General Paris attempted to destroy the bridge of Arriveriette, but lord Wellington was too quick; the ninety-second regiment, covered by the fire of some guns, crossed at a ford above the bridge, and beating two French battalions from the village secured the passage. The allies then halted for the day near Arriveriette, having marched only five miles, and lost one man killed with

twenty-three wounded. Paris relinquished the Soissons, but remained between the two rivers during the night, and retired on the morning of the 18th. The allies then seized the great road, which here runs from Sauveterre to Navarreins up the left bank of the Oloron Gave.

Harispe, Villatte and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, were now at Sauveterre occupying the bridge-head on the left bank, Taupin's division was opposite the Bastide de Béarn lower down on the right, Foy on the right of Taupin, and D'Erlon on the left of the Adour above its confluence with the Gave de Pau. Meanwhile the fourth division advanced to Bidache on the Bidouze, and the light division followed in support to the Bastide de Clérance, the seventh division remaining as before, partly in that vicinity, partly extended on the left to the Adour. The cavalry of the centre, under sir Stapleton Cotton, arrived also on the banks of the Bidouze, connecting the fourth with the third division at Somberraute. In this state of affairs Hill sent Morillo up the Soissons to guard the fords as high as Nabas, then spreading Fane's cavalry and the British and Portuguese infantry between that river and the Gave d'Oloron, he occupied all the villages along the road to Navarreins, and at the same time cannonaded the bridge-head of Sauveterre.

Soult, thrown from the commencement of the operations entirely upon the defensive, was now at a loss to discover his adversary's object. The situation of the seventh division, and the march of the fourth and light divisions, led him to think his works at Hastingue and Peirehorade would be assailed. The weakness of his line, he having only Taupin's division to guard the river between Sauveterre and Sordes a distance of ten miles, made him fear the passage of the Gave would be forced near the Bastide de Béarn, to which post there was a good road from Came and Bidache. On the other hand, the prolongation of Hill's line up the Gave towards Navarreins indicated a design to march on Pau, or it might be to keep him in check on the Gaves while the camp at Bayonne was assaulted. In this uncertainty he sent Pierre Soult, with a cavalry brigade and two battalions of infantry, to act between Oloron and Pau, and keep open a communication with the partisan corps forming at Mauléon. That done he decided to hold the Gaves as long as he could, and when they were forced, to abandon the defensive; concentrate his whole force at Orthez, and fall suddenly upon the first of the allies' converging columns that approached him.

CHAPTER II.

Lord Wellington arrests his movements and returns in person to St. Jean de Luz to throw his bridge over the Adour.—Is prevented by bad weather and returns to the Gave de Mauléon.—Passage of the Adour by sir John Hope.—Difficulty of the operations.—The flotilla passes the bar and enters the river.—The French sally from Bayonne, but are repulsed, and the stupendous bridge is cast.—Citadel invested after a severe action.—Lord Wellington passes the Gave d'Oloron and invests Navarreins.—Soult concentrates his army at Orthez.—Beresford passes the Gave de Pau near Peirehorade.—Battle of Orthez.—Soult changes his line of operations.—Combat of Aire.—Observations.

THE French general's various conjectures embraced every project but the true one of the English general. The latter did indeed design to keep him in check upon the rivers, not to obtain an opportunity of assaulting the camp of Bayonne, but to throw his stupendous bridge over the Adour; yet

were his combinations so made that failing in that he could still pursue his operations on the Gaves. When therefore he had established his offensive line strongly beyond the Soissons and the Bidouze, and knew that his pontoon train was well advanced towards Garris, he on the 19th returned rapidly to St. Jean de Luz. Every thing there depending on man was ready; but the weather was boisterous with snow for two days, and Wellington, fearful of letting Soult strengthen himself on the Gave d'Oloron, returned on the 21st to Garris, having decided to press his operations on that side in person, and leave sir John Hope and admiral Penrose the charge of effecting

THE PASSAGE OF THE ADOUR.

The heights of Anglet had been occupied since the 15th by the guards and Germans, small parties were cautiously pushed towards the river through the pine forest called the wood of Bayonne, and the fifth division, now commanded by general Colville, occupied Bussussary and the bridge of Urdains. On the 21st, Colville relieved the sixth division in the blockade of Mousserolles on the right of the Nive. To replace these troops at Bussussary, Freyre's Spaniards passed the Bidassoa, but the Andalusians, and Del Parque's troops and the heavy British and Portuguese cavalry were still retained within the frontiers of Spain. Sir John Hope had therefore only two British and two Spanish divisions, three independent brigades of Anglo-Portuguese infantry and Vandeleur's brigade of cavalry, furnishing altogether about twenty-eight thousand men and officers with twenty pieces of artillery. There were however two regiments which had been sent to the rear sick, and several others expected from England destined to join him.

In the night of the 22d, the first division, six eighteen-pounders and the rocket battery were cautiously filed from the causeway near Anglet towards the Adour; but the road was deep and heavy, and one of the guns falling into a ditch delayed the march. Nevertheless at daybreak the whole reached some sand-downs which extended behind the pine forest to the river. The French piquets were then driven into the intrenched camp at Beyris, the pontoon train and the field artillery were brought down to the Adour opposite to the village of Boucaut, and the eighteen-pounders were placed in battery on the bank. The light troops meanwhile closed to the edge of the marsh which covered the right of the French camp, and Carlos d'Espana's division taking post on the heights of Anglet, in concert with the independent brigades, which were at Arcangues and the bridge of Urdains, attracted the enemy's attention by false attacks which were prolonged beyond the Nive by the fifth division.

It was intended that the arrival of the gun-boats and chasse-marées at the mouth of the Adour should have been simultaneous with that of the troops; but the wind having continued contrary none were to be seen, and sir John Hope, whose firmness no untoward event could ever shake, resolved to attempt the passage with the army alone. The French flotilla opened its fire on his columns about nine o'clock; his artillery and rockets retorted upon the French gun-boats and the sloop of war so fiercely that three of the former were destroyed, and the sloop so hardly handled, that about one o'clock the whole took refuge higher up the river. Meanwhile sixty men of the guards were rowed in a pontoon across the mouth of the river in the face of a French piquet, which, seemingly bewildered, retired without firing. A raft was then formed with the remainder of the

pontoons, and a hawser being stretched across, six hundred of the guards and the sixtieth regiment, with a part of the rocket battery, the whole under colonel Stopford, passed, yet slowly, and at slack-water only, for the tide ran strongly and the waters were wide.

During this operation general Thouvenot, deceived by spies and prisoners, thought that the light division was with Hope as well as the first division, and that fifteen thousand men were embarked at St. Jean de Luz to land between Cape Breton and the Adour. Wherefore fearing to endanger his garrison by sending a strong force to any distance down the river, when he heard Stopford's detachment was on the right bank, he detached only two battalions under general Macomble to ascertain the state of affairs, for the pine forest and a great bending of the river prevented him from obtaining any view from Bayonne. Macomble made a show of attacking Stopford: but the latter, flanked by the field-artillery from the left bank, received him with a discharge of rockets, projectiles which like the elephants in ancient warfare often turn upon their own side. This time, however, amenable to their directors, they smote the French column and it fled, amazed, and with a loss of thirty wounded. It is nevertheless obvious that if Thouvenot had kept strong guards, with a field-battery, on the right bank of the Adour, sir John Hope could not have passed over the troops in pontoons, nor could any vessels have crossed the bar; no resource save that of disembarking troops between the river and Cape Breton would then have remained. This error was fatal to the French. The British continued to pass all night, and until twelve o'clock on the 24th, when the flotilla was seen under a press of sail making with a strong breeze for the mouth of the river.

To enter the Adour is from the flatness of the coast never an easy task: it was now most difficult, because the high winds of the preceding days had raised a great sea, and the enemy had removed one of the guiding flag-staves by which the navigation was ordinarily directed. In front of the flotilla came the boats of the men-of-war, and ahead of all the naval captain, O'Reilly, ran his craft, a chosen Spanish vessel, into the midst of the breakers, which rolling in a frightful manner over the bar dashed her on to the beach. That brave officer, stretched senseless on the shore, would have perished with his crew but for the ready succour of the soldiers; however a few only were drowned, and the remainder with an intrepid spirit launched their boat again to aid the passage of the troops which was still going on. O'Reilly was followed, and successfully, by lieutenant Denbenham in a six-oared cutter; but the tide was falling, wherefore the remainder of the boats, the impossibility of passing until high water being evident, drew off, and a pilot was landed to direct the line of navigation by concerted signals.

When the water rose again the crews were promised rewards in proportion to their successful daring, and the whole flotilla approached in close order; but with it came black clouds and a driving gale which covered the line of coast with a rough tumbling sea, dashing and foaming without an interval of dark water to mark the entrance of the river. The men-of-war's boats first drew near this terrible line of surge, and Mr. Bloye of the *Lyra*, having the chief pilot with him, heroically led into it; but in an instant his barge was engulfed, and he and all with him were drowned. The *Lyra's* boat thus swallowed up, the following vessels swerved from their course, and shooting up to the right and left

kept hovering undecided on the edge of the torment-ed waters. Suddenly lieutenant Cheyne of the *Woodlark* pulled ahead, and striking the right line, with courage and fortune combined, safely passed the bar. The wind then lulled, the waves as if conquered abated somewhat of their rage, and the chasse-marées, manned with Spanish seamen but having an engineer officer with a party of sappers in each, who compelled them to follow the men-of-war's boats, came plunging one after another through the huge breakers, and reached the point designed for the bridge. Thus was achieved this perilous and glorious exploit; but captain Elliot of the *Martial*, with his launch and crew and three transports' boats, perished close to the shore, in despite of the most violent efforts made by the troops to save them; three other vessels, cast on the beach, lost part of their crews; and one large chasse-marée, full of men, after passing the line of surf safely, was overtaken by a swift bellying wave which breaking on her deck dashed her to pieces.

The whole of the first division and Bradford's Portuguese, in all eight thousand men, being now on the right bank, took post on the sand-hills for the night. The next morning, sweeping in a half circle round the citadel and its intrenchments, they placed their left on the Adour above the fortress, and their right on the same river below the place; for the water here made such a bend in their favour that their front was little more than two miles wide, and for the most part covered by a marshy ravine. This nice operation was effected without opposition, because the intrenched camps, menaced by the troops on the other side of the Adour, were so enormous that Thouvenot's force was scarcely sufficient to maintain them. Meanwhile the bridge was constructed, about three miles below Bayonne, at a place where the river was contracted to eight hundred feet by strong retaining walls, built with the view of sweeping away the bar by increasing the force of the current. The plan of the bridge and boom were the conception of colonel Sturgeon and major Todd, but the execution was confided entirely to the latter, who, with a mind less brilliant than Sturgeon's but more indefatigable, very ably and usefully served his country throughout this war.

Twenty-six of the chasse-marées, moored head and stern at distances of forty feet, reckoning from centre to centre, were bound together with ropes, two thick cables were then carried loosely across their decks, and the ends being cast over the walls on each bank were strained and fastened in various modes to the sands. They were sufficiently slack to meet the spring-tides which rose fourteen feet, and planks were laid upon them without any supporting beams. The boom, moored with anchors above and below, was a double line of masts connected with chains and cables, so as to form a succession of squares, in the design that if a vessel broke through the outside, it should by the shock turn round in the square and become entangled with the floating wrecks of the line through which it had broken. Gun-boats, with aiding batteries on the banks, were then stationed to protect the boom, and to keep off fire-vessels: many row-boats were furnished with grappling irons. The whole was, by the united labour of seamen and soldiers, finished on the 26th. And contrary to the general opinion on such matters, major Todd assured the author of this history, that he found the soldiers, with minds quickened by the wider range and variety of knowledge attendant on their service, more ready of resource, and their efforts, combined by a more regular discip-

line, of more avail, with less loss of time, than the irregular activity of the seamen.

The agitation of the water in the river from the force of the tides was generally so great that to maintain a pontoon bridge on it was impossible. A knowledge of this had rendered the French officers too careless of watch and defence, and this year the shifting sands had given the course of the Adour such a slanting direction towards the west that it ran for some distance almost parallel to the shore; the outer bank thus acting as a breakwater lessened the agitation within, and enabled the large two-masted boats employed to ride safely and support the heaviest artillery and carriages. Nevertheless this fortune, the errors of the enemy, the matchless skill and daring of the British seamen, and the discipline and intrepidity of the British soldiers, all combined by the genius of Wellington, were necessary to the success of this stupendous undertaking, which must always rank amongst the prodigies of war.

When the bridge was finished, sir John Hope resolved to contract his line of investment round the citadel. This was a serious affair. The position of the French outside that fort was exceedingly strong, for the flanks were protected by ravines the sides of which were covered with fortified villas; and in the centre a ridge, along which the great roads from Bordeaux and Peirehorade led into Bayonne, was occupied by the village and church of St. Etienne, both situated on rising points of ground strongly intrenched and under the fire of the citadel guns. The allies advanced in three converging columns covered by skirmishers. Their wings easily attained the edges of the ravines at either side, resting their flanks on the Adour above and below the town, at about nine hundred yards from the enemy's works. But a severe action took place in the centre. The assailing body, composed of Germans and a brigade of guards, was divided into three parts which should have attacked simultaneously, the guards on the left, the light battalions of Germans on the right, and their heavy infantry in the centre. The flanks were retarded by some accident, and the centre first attacked the heights of St. Etienne. The French guns immediately opened from the citadel, and the skirmishing fire became heavy; but the Germans stormed church and village, forced the intrenched line of houses, and took a gun, which however they could not carry off under the close fire from the citadel. The wings then gained their positions, and the action ceased for a time; but the people of Bayonne were in such consternation that Thouvenot to reassure them sallied at the head of the troops. He charged the Germans twice, and fought well, but was wounded and finally lost his gun and the position of St. Etienne. There is no return of the allies' loss; it could not have been less than five hundred men and officers, of which four hundred were Germans; and the latter were dissatisfied that their conduct was unnoticed in the despatch: an omission somewhat remarkable, because their conduct was by sir John Hope always spoken of with great commendation.

The new position thus gained was defended by ravines on each flank, and the centre being close to the enemy's works on the ridge of St. Etienne was intrenched. Preparations for besieging the citadel were then commenced under the direction of the German colonel Hartmann, a code of signals was established, and infinite pains taken to protect the bridge and to secure a unity of action between the three investing bodies. The communications however required complicated arrangements, for the ground on the right bank of the river being low was

overflowed every tide, and would have occasioned great difficulty but for the retaining wall, which being four feet thick was made use of as a carriage road.

While these events were in progress at Bayonne, lord Wellington pushed his operations on the Gaves with great vigour. On the 21st, he returned as we have seen to Garris; the pontoons had already reached that place, and on the 23d they were carried beyond the Gave de Mauléon. During his absence the sixth and light divisions had come up, and thus six divisions of infantry and two brigades of cavalry were concentrated beyond that river on the Gave d'Oloron, between Sauveterre and Navarreins. Beresford meanwhile held the line of the Bidouze down to its confluence with the Adour, and apparently to distract the enemy threw a battalion over the latter river near Urt, and collected boats as if to form a bridge there. In the evening he recalled this detachment, yet continued the appearance of preparations for a bridge until late on the 23d, when he moved forward and drove Foy's posts from the works at Oeyergave and Hastingue, on the lower parts of the Oloron Gave, into the intrenchments of the bridge-head at Peirehorade. The allies lost fifty men, principally Portuguese; but Soult's right and centre were thus held in check; for Beresford, having the fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian's cavalry, was strong enough for Foy at Peirehorade and Taupin at the Bastide of Béarn. The rest of the French army was distributed at Orthez and Sauveterre, feeling towards Navarreins, and on the 24th Wellington put his troops in motion to pass the Gave d'Oloron.

During the previous days his movements and the arrival of his reinforcements had again deceived the French general, who seems to have known nothing of the presence of the light division, and imagined the first division was at Came on the 22d, as well as the fourth and seventh divisions. However his dispositions remained the same; he did not expect to hold the Gave, and looked to a final concentration at Orthez.

On the 24th, Morillo, reinforced with a strong detachment of cavalry, moved to the Loussette, a small river running in front of Navarreins, where rough ground concealed his real force, while his scouts beat back the French outposts, and a battalion marching higher up menaced the fords of the Gave at Doguen, with a view to draw the attention of the garrison of Navarreins from the ford of Villenave. This ford, about three miles below Doguen, was the point where lord Wellington designed really to pass, and a great concentric movement was now in progress towards it. Lecor's Portuguese division marched from Gestas; the light division from Aroue, crossing the Soissons at Nabas; the second division, three batteries of artillery, the pontoons, and four regiments of cavalry moved from other points. Favoured by the hilly nature of the country, the columns were well concealed from the enemy, and at the same time the sixth division advanced towards the fords of Montfort about three miles below that of Villenave. A battalion of the second division was sent to menace the ford of Baraute below Montfort, while the third division, reinforced with a brigade of hussars and the batteries of the second division, marched by Osserain and Arrieriette against the bridge-head of Sauveterre, with orders to make a feint of forcing a passage there. The bulk of the light cavalry remained in reserve under Cotton, but Vivian's hussars coming up from Beresford's right, threatened all the fords between Picton's left and the Bastide of Béarn; and

below this Bastide some detachments were directed upon the fords of Sindos, Castagnette and Hauterive. During this movement Beresford, keeping Foy in check at Peirehorade with the seventh division, sent the fourth towards Sordes and Leren, above the confluence of the Gaves, to seek a fit place to throw a bridge. Thus the whole of the French front was menaced on a line of twenty-five miles, but the great force was above Sauveterre.

The first operations were not happily executed. The columns directed on the side of Sindos missed the fords. Picton opened a cannonade against the bridge-head of Sauveterre and made four companies of Keane's brigade and some cavalry pass the Gave in the vicinity of the bridge; they were immediately assailed by a French regiment and driven across the river again, with a loss of ninety men and officers, of whom some were drowned and thirty were made prisoners: whereupon the cavalry returned to the left bank and the cannonade ceased. Nevertheless the diversion was complete and the general operations were successful. Soult on the first alarm drew Harispe from the Sauveterre and placed him on the road to Orthez at Monstrueig, where a range of hills running parallel to the Gave of Oloron separates it from that of Pau; thus only a division of infantry and Berton's cavalry remained under Villatte at Sauveterre, and that general, notwithstanding his success against the four companies, alarmed by the vigour of Picton's demonstrations, abandoned his works on the left bank and destroyed the bridge. Meanwhile the sixth division passed without opposition at Montfort above Sauveterre; and at the same time the great body of the other troops, coming down upon the ford of Villenave, met only with a small cavalry piquet, and crossed with no more loss than two men drowned: a happy circumstance, for the waters were deep and rapid, the cold intense, and the ford so narrow that the passage was not completed before dark. To have forced it in face of an enemy would have been exceedingly difficult and dangerous, and it is remarkable that Soult who was with Harispe, only five miles from Montfort and about seven from Villenave, should not have sent that general down to oppose the passage. The heads of the allies' columns immediately pushed forward to the range of hills before spoken of, the right being established near Loubeing, the left towards Sauveterre, from whence Villatte and Berton had been withdrawn by Clauzel, who commanding at this part seems to have kept a bad watch when Clinton passed at Montfort.

The French divisions now took a position to give time for Taupin to retire from the lower parts of the Gave of Oloron, towards the bridge of Berenx on the Gave of Pau; for both he and Foy had received orders to march upon Orthez and break down all the bridges as they passed. When the night fell, Soult sent Harispe's division also over the bridge of Orthez, and D'Erlon was already established in that town, but general Clauzel remained until the morning at Orion to cover the movement. Meanwhile Pierre Soult, posted beyond Navarreins with his cavalry and two battalions of infantry to watch the road to Pau, was pressed by Morillo, and being cut off from the army by the passage of the allies at Villenave was forced to retreat by Moneins.

On the 25th, at daylight, lord Wellington with some cavalry and guns pushed Clauzel's rear-guard from Magret into the suburb of Orthez, which covered the bridge of that place on the left bank. He also cannonaded the French troops beyond the river; and the Portuguese of the light division, skirmishing with the French in the houses to prevent

the destruction of the bridge, lost twenty-five men. The second, sixth and light divisions, Hamilton's Portuguese, five regiments of cavalry, and three batteries were now massed in front of Orthez; the third division and a brigade of cavalry was in front of the broken bridge of Berenx, about five miles lower down the Gave; the fourth and seventh divisions with Vivian's cavalry were in front of Peirehorade, from whence Foy retired by the great Bayonne road to Orthez. Affairs being in this state, Morillo was directed to Navarreins. And as Mina's battalions were no sure guarantee against the combined efforts of the garrison of St. Jean Pied de Port and the warlike inhabitants of Baigorri, five British regiments, which had gone to the rear for clothing and were now coming up separately, were ordered to halt at St. Palais in observation, relieving each other in succession as they arrived at that place.

On the morning of the 26th, Beresford, finding that Foy had abandoned the French works at Peirehorade, passed the Gave, partly by a pontoon bridge, partly by a ford, where the current ran so strong that a column of the seventh division was like to have been carried away bodily. He had previously detached the eighteenth hussars to find another ford higher up, and this being effected under the guidance of a miller, the hussars gained the high road about half way between Peirehorade and Orthez, and drove some French cavalry through Puyoo and Ramous. The French, rallying upon their reserves, turned and beat back the foremost of the pursuers; but they would not await the shock of the main body, now reinforced by Vivian's brigade and commanded by Beresford in person. In this affair major Sewell, an officer of the staff, who had frequently distinguished himself by his personal prowess, happening to be without a sword, pulled a large stake from a hedge, and with that weapon overthrew two hussars in succession, and only relinquished the combat when a third had cut his club in twain.

Beresford now threw out a detachment to Habas on his left to intercept the enemy's communication with Dax, and lord Wellington immediately ordered lord Edward Somerset's cavalry and the third division to cross the Gave by fords below the broken bridge of Berenx. Then directing Beresford to take a position for the night on some heights near the village of Baights, he proceeded to throw a pontoon bridge at Berenx, and thus after a circuitous march of more than fifty miles with his right wing he again united it with his centre and secured a direct communication with Hope.

During the 25th and 26th, he had carefully examined Soult's position. The bridge of Orthez could not be easily forced. That ancient and beautiful structure consisted of several irregular arches, with a high tower in the centre, the gateway of which was built up by the French, the principal arch in front of the tower was mined, and the houses on both sides contributed to the defence. The river above and below was deep and full of tall pointed rocks, but above the town the water spreading wide with flat banks presented the means of crossing. Lord Wellington's first design was to pass there with Hill's troops and the light division, but when he heard that Beresford had crossed the Gave he suddenly changed his design, and, as we have seen, passed the third division over and threw his bridge at Berenx. This operation was covered by Beresford, while Soult's attention was diverted by the continual skirmish at the suburbs of Orthez, by the appearance of Hill's columns above, and by Wellington's taking cognizance of the position near the bridge so openly as to draw a cannonade.

The English general did not expect Soult would, when he found Beresford and Picton were over the Gave, await a battle, and his emissaries reported that the French army was already in retreat: a circumstance to be borne in mind, because the next day's operation required success to justify it. Hope's happy passage of the Adour being now known, that officer was instructed to establish a line of communication to the Port of Lanne, where a permanent bridge was to be formed with boats brought up from Urt. A direct line of intercourse was thus secured with the army at Bayonne. But lord Wellington felt that he was pushing his operations beyond his strength if Suchet should send reinforcements to Soult; wherefore he called up Freyre's Spaniards, ordering that general to cross the Adour below Bayonne, with two of his divisions and a brigade of Portuguese nine-pounders, and join him by the Port of Lanne. O'Donel's Andalusians and the prince of Anglona's troops were also directed to be in readiness to enter France.

These orders were given with the greatest reluctance.

The feeble resistance made by the French in the difficult country already passed left him without much uneasiness as to the power of Soult's army in the field, but his disquietude was extreme about the danger of an insurgent warfare. "Maintain the strictest discipline, *without that we are lost*," was his expression to general Freyre, and he issued a proclamation authorizing the people of the districts he had overrun to arm themselves for the preservation of order under the direction of their mayors. He invited them to arrest all straggling soldiers and followers of the army, and all plunderers and evildoers, and convey them to head-quarters with the proof of their crimes, promising to punish the culpable and to pay for all damages. At the same time he confirmed all the local authorities who chose to retain their offices, on the sole condition of having no political or military intercourse with the countries still possessed by the French army. Nor was his proclamation a dead letter; for in the night of the 25th, the inhabitants of a village, situated near the road leading from Sauveterre to Orthez, shot one English soldier dead and wounded a second who had come with others to plunder. Lord Wellington caused the wounded man to be hung as an example, and he also forced an English colonel to quit the army for suffering his soldiers to destroy the municipal archives of a small town.

Soult had no thought of retreating. His previous retrograde movements had been effected with order, his army was concentrated with its front to the Gave, and every bridge, except the noble structure at Orthez, the ancient masonry of which resisted his mines, had been destroyed. One regiment of cavalry was detached on the right to watch the fords as far as Peirehorade, three others with two battalions of infantry under Pierre Soult watched those between Orthez and Pau, and a body of horsemen and gendarmes covered the latter town from Morillo's incursions. Two regiments of cavalry remained with the army, and the French general's intention was to fall upon the head of the first column which should cross the Gave. But the negligence of the officer stationed at Puyoo, who had suffered Vivian's hussars, as we have seen, to pass on the 26th without opposition and without making any report of the event, enabled Beresford to make his movement in safety, when otherwise he would have been assailed by at least two-thirds of the French army. It was not until three o'clock in the evening that Soult received intelligence of his march, and his columns

were then close to Baights on the right flank of the French army, his scouts were on the Dax road in its rear, and at the same time the sixth and light divisions were seen descending by different roads from the heights beyond the river pointing towards Berenx.

In this crisis the French marshal hesitated whether to fall upon Beresford and Picton while the latter was still passing the river, or take a defensive position; but finally judging that he had not time to form his columns of attack he decided upon the latter. Wherefore under cover of a skirmish, sustained near Baights by a battalion of infantry which coming from the bridge of Berenx was joined by the light cavalry from Puyoo, he hastily threw D'Erlon's and Reille's divisions on a new line across the road from Peirehorade. The right extended to the heights of St. Boës, along which ran the road from Orthez to Dax, and this line was prolonged by Clauzel's troops to Caste Tarbe, a village close to the Gave. Having thus opposed a temporary front to Beresford, he made his dispositions to receive battle the next morning, bringing Villatte's infantry and Pierre Soult's cavalry from the other side of Orthez through that town, and it was this movement that led lord Wellington's emissaries to report that the army was retiring.

Soult's new line was on a ridge of hills, partly wooded, partly naked.

In the centre was an open rounded hill, from whence long narrow tongues were pushed out, on the French left towards the high road of Peirehorade, on their right by St. Boës towards the high church of Baights, the whole presenting a concave to the allies.

The front was generally covered by a deep and marshy ravine, broken by two short tongues of land which jutted out from the principal hill.

The road from Orthez to Dax passed behind the front to the village of St. Boës, and thence along the ridge forming the right flank.

Behind the centre a succession of undulating bare heathy hills trended for several miles to the rear, but behind the right the country was low and deep.

The town of Orthez, receding from the river up the slope of a steep hill, and terminating with an ancient tower, was behind the left wing.

General Reille, having Taupin's, Roguet's and Paris' divisions under him, commanded on the right, and occupied all the ground from the village of St. Boës to the centre of the position.

Count D'Erlon, commanding Foy's and D'Armagnac's divisions, was on the left of Reille. He placed the first along a ridge extending towards the road of Peirehorade, the second in reserve. In rear of this last Villatte's division and the cavalry were posted above the village of Ronton, that is to say, on the open hills behind the main position. In this situation, with the right overlooking the low country beyond St. Boës, and the left extended towards Orthez, this division furnished a reserve to both D'Erlon and Reille.

Harispe, whose troops as well as Villatte's were under Clauzel, occupied Orthez and the bridge, having a regiment near the ford of Souars above the town.

Thus the French army extended from St. Boës to Orthez, but the great mass was disposed towards the centre. Twelve guns were attached to general Harispe's troops, twelve were upon the round hill in the centre, sweeping in their range the ground beyond St. Boës, and sixteen were in reserve on the Dax road.

The 27th, at daybreak, the sixth and light divisions, having passed the Gave near Berenx by the

pontoon bridge thrown in the night, wound up a narrow way between high rocks to the great road of Peirehorade. The third division and lord Edward Somerset's cavalry were already established there in columns of march, with skirmishers pushed forwards to the edge of the wooded height occupied by D'Erlon's left; and Beresford, with the fourth and seventh divisions and Vivian's cavalry, had meanwhile gained the ridge of St. Boës and approached the Dax road beyond. Hill remained with the second British, and Lecor's Portuguese divisions, menacing the bridge of Orthez and the ford of Souars. Between Beresford and Picton, a distance of a mile and a half, there were no troops; but about half way, exactly in front of the French centre, was a Roman camp crowning an isolated peering hill of singular appearance and nearly as lofty as the centre of Soult's position.

On this camp, now covered with vineyards, but then open and grassy with a few trees, lord Wellington, after viewing the country on Beresford's left, stopped for an hour or more to examine the enemy's disposition for battle. During this time the two divisions were coming up from the river, but so hemmed in by rocks that only a few men could march abreast, and their point of union with the third division was little more than cannot-shot from the enemy's position. The moment was critical; Picton did not conceal his disquietude; but Wellington, undisturbed as the deep sea, continued his observations without seeming to notice the dangerous position of his troops. When they had reached the main road, he reinforced Picton with the sixth, and drew the light division by cross roads behind the Roman camp, thus connecting his wings and forming a central reserve. From this point by-ways led on the left to the high church of Baigts and the Dax road, on the right to the Peirehorade road, and two others led straight across the marsh to the French position.

This marsh, the open hill about which Soult's guns and reserves were principally gathered, the form and nature of the ridges on the flanks, all combined to forbid an attack in front, and the flanks were scarcely more promising. The extremity of the French left sunk indeed to a gentle undulation in crossing the Peirehorade road, yet it would have been useless to push troops on that line towards Orthez, between D'Erlon and Caste Tarbe, for the town was strongly occupied by Harispe, and was there covered by an ancient wall and the bed of a torrent. It was equally difficult to turn the St. Boës flank, because of the low marshy country into which the troops must have descended beyond the Dax road; and the brows of the hills trending backwards from the centre of the French position would have enabled Soult to oppose a new and formidable front at right angles to his actual position. The whole of the allied army must therefore have made a circuitous flank movement within gun-shot and through a most difficult country, or Beresford's left must have been dangerously extended and the whole line weakened. Nor could the movement be hidden, because the hills, although only moderately high, were abrupt on that side, affording a full view of the low country, and Soult's cavalry detachments were in observation on every brow.

It only remained to assail the French flanks along the ridges, making the principal efforts on the side of St. Boës, with intent if successful to overlap the French right beyond, and seize the road of St. Sever, while Hill passed the Gave at Souars and cut off the road to Pau, thus enclosing the beaten army in Orthez. This was however no slight affair.

On Picton's side it was easy to obtain a footing on the flank ridge near the high road, but beyond that the ground rose rapidly and the French were gathered thickly with a narrow front and plenty of guns. On Beresford's side they could only be assailed along the summit of the St. Boës ridge, advancing from the high church of Baigts and the Dax road. But the village of St. Boës was strongly occupied, the ground immediately behind it was strangled to a narrow pass by the ravine, and the French reserve of sixteen guns, placed on the Dax road, behind the hill in the centre of Soult's line, and well covered from counter-fire, was in readiness to crush the head of any column which should emerge from the gorge of St. Boës.

BATTLE OF ORTHEZ.

During the whole morning a slight skirmish with now and then a cannot-shot had been going on with the third division on the right, and the French cavalry at times pushed parties forward on each flank, but at nine o'clock Wellington commenced the real attack. The third and sixth divisions won without difficulty the lower part of the ridges opposed to them, and endeavoured to extend their left along the French front with a sharp fire of musketry; but the main battle was on the other flank. There general Cole, keeping Anson's brigade of the fourth division in reserve, assailed St. Boës with Ross's British brigade and Vasconcellos' Portuguese; his object was to get on to the open ground beyond it, but fierce and slaughtering was the struggle. Five times breaking through the scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the wider space beyond; yet ever as the troops issued forth the French guns from the open hill smote them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax road swept through them with grape from flank to flank. And then Taupin's supporting masses rushed forwards with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on either hand, forced the shattered columns back into the village. It was in vain that with desperate valour the allies time after time broke through the narrow way and struggled to spread a front beyond: Ross fell dangerously wounded, and Taupin, whose troops were clustered thickly and well supported, defied their utmost efforts. Nor was Soult less happy on the other side. The nature of the ground, would not permit the third and sixth divisions to engage many men at once, so that no progress was made: and one small detachment which Picton extended to his left, having made an attempt to gain the smaller tongue jutting out from the central hill, was suddenly charged, as it neared the summit, by Foy, and driven down again in confusion, losing several prisoners.

When the combat had thus continued with unabated fury on the side of St. Boës for about three hours, lord Wellington sent a *caçadore* regiment of the light division from the Roman camp to protect the right flank of Ross's brigade against the French skirmishers; but this was of no avail, for Vasconcellos' Portuguese, unable to sustain the violence of the enemy any longer, gave way in disorder, and the French pouring on, the British troops retreated through St. Boës with difficulty. As this happened at the moment when the detachment on Picton's left was repulsed, victory seemed to declare for the French, and Soult, conspicuous on his commanding open hill, the knot of all his combinations, seeing his enemies thus broken and thrown backwards on each side, put all his reserves in movement to complete the success. It is said that in the exultation of the moment he smote his thigh exclaiming, "At

last I have him." Whether this be so or not, it was no vain-glorious speech, for the moment was most dangerous. There was however a small black cloud rising just beneath him, unheeded at first amidst the thundering din and tumult that now shook the field of battle, but which soon burst with irresistible violence. Wellington, seeing that St. Boës was inexpugnable, had suddenly changed his plan of battle. Supporting Ross with Anson's brigade, which had not hitherto been engaged, he backed both with the seventh division and Vivian's cavalry, now forming one heavy body towards the Dax road. Then he ordered the third and sixth divisions to be thrown in mass upon Foy's left flank, and at the same time sent the fifty-second regiment down from the Roman camp with instructions to cross the marsh in front, to mount the French ridge beyond, and to assail the flank and rear of the troops engaged with the fourth division at St. Boës.

Colonel Colborne, so often distinguished in this war, immediately led the fifty-second down and crossed the marsh under fire, the men sinking at every step above the knees, in some places to the middle, but still pressing forwards with that stern resolution and order to be expected from the veterans of the light division, soldiers who had never yet met their match in the field. They soon obtained footing on firm land, and ascended the heights in line at the moment that Taupin was pushing vigorously through St. Boës, Foy and D'Armagnac, hitherto more than masters of their positions, being at the same time seriously assailed on the other flank by the third and sixth divisions. With a mighty shout and a rolling fire the fifty-second soldiers dashed forwards between Foy and Taupin, beating down a French battalion in their course and throwing every thing before them into disorder. General Bechaud was killed in Taupin's division, Foy was dangerously wounded, and his troops, discouraged by his fall and by this sudden burst from a quarter where no enemy was expected, for the march of the fifty-second had been hardly perceived save by the skirmishers, got into confusion, and the disorder spreading to Reille's wing he was also forced to fall back and take a new position to restore his line of battle. The narrow pass behind St. Boës was thus opened; and Wellington, seizing the critical moment, thrust the fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian's cavalry and two batteries of artillery through, and spread a front beyond.

The victory was thus secured. For the third and sixth divisions had now won D'Armagnac's position and established a battery of guns on a knoll, from whence their shot ploughed through the French masses from one flank to another. Suddenly a squadron of French chasseurs came at a hard gallop down the main road of Orthez to charge these guns, and sweeping to their right they rode over some of the sixth division which had advanced too far; but pushing this charge too madly, got into a hollow lane and were nearly all destroyed. The third and seventh divisions then continued to advance and the wings of the army were united. The French general rallied all his forces on the open hills beyond the Dax road, and with Taupin's, Roguet's, Paris' and D'Armagnac's divisions made strong battle to cover the re-formation of Foy's disordered troops; but his foes were not all in front. This part of the battle was fought with only two-thirds of the allied army. Hill, who had remained with twelve thousand combatants, cavalry and infantry, before the bridge of Orthez, received orders, when Wellington changed his plan of attack, to force the passage of the Gave, partly in the view of preventing Harispe

from falling upon the flank of the sixth division, partly in the hope of a successful issue to the attempt: and so it happened. Hill, though unable to force the bridge, forded the river above at Souars, and driving back the troops posted there seized the heights above, cut off the French from the road to Pau, and turned the town of Orthez. He thus menaced Soult's only line of retreat by Salespice, on the road to St. Sever, at the very moment when the fifty-second having opened the defile of St. Boës the junction of the allies' wings was effected on the French position.

Clauzel immediately ordered Harispe to abandon Orthez and close towards Villatte on the heights above Rontun, leaving however some conscript battalions on a rising point beyond the road of St. Sever called the "*Motte de Turenne*." Meanwhile in person he endeavoured to keep general Hill in check by the menacing action of two cavalry regiments and a brigade of infantry; but Soult arrived at the moment, and seeing that the loss of Souars had rendered his whole position untenable, gave orders for a general retreat.

This was a perilous matter. The heathy hills upon which he was now fighting, although for a short distance they furnished a succession of parallel positions favourable enough for defence, soon resolved themselves into a low ridge running to the rear on a line parallel with the road to St. Sever; and on the opposite side of that road, about cannon-shot distance, was a corresponding ridge along which general Hill, judging by the firing how matters went, was now rapidly advancing. Five miles distant was the Luy de Béarn, and four miles beyond that the Luy de France, two rivers deep and with difficult banks. Behind these the Lutz, the Gabas and the Adour, crossed the line; and though once beyond the wooden bridge of Sault de Navailles on the Luy de Béarn, these streams would necessarily cover the retreat, to carry off by one road and one bridge a defeated army still closely engaged in front seemed impossible. Nevertheless Soult did so. For Paris sustained the fight on his right until Foy and Taupin's troops rallied, and when the impetuous assault of the fifty-second and the rush of the fourth and seventh divisions drove Paris back, D'Armagnac interposed to cover him until the union of the allies' wings was completed; then both retired, being covered in turn by Villatte. In this manner the French yielded, step by step and without confusion, the allies advancing with an incessant deafening musketry and cannonade, yet losing many men, especially on the right, where the third division were very strongly opposed. However, as the danger of being cut off at Salespice by Hill became more imminent, the retrograde movements were more hurried and confused; Hill seeing this, quickened his pace, until at last both sides began to run violently, and so many men broke from the French ranks making across the fields towards the fords, and such a rush was necessarily made by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, that the whole country was covered with scattered bands. Sir Stapleton Cotton, then breaking with lord Edward Somerset's hussars through a small covering body opposed to him by Harispe, sabred two or three hundred men, and the seventh hussars cut off about two thousand who threw down their arms in an enclosed field; yet some confusion or mismanagement occurring, the greatest part recovering their weapons escaped, and the pursuit ceased at the Luy of Béarn.

The French army appeared to be entirely dispersed; but it was more disordered in appearance than

reality, for Soult passed the Luy of Béarn and destroyed the bridge with the loss of only six guns and less than four thousand men killed, wounded and prisoners. Many thousands of conscripts however threw away their arms, and we shall find one month afterwards the stragglers still amounting to three thousand. Nor would the passage of the river have been effected so happily if lord Wellington had not been struck by a musket-ball just above the thigh, which caused him to ride with difficulty, whereby the vigour and unity of the pursuit was necessarily abated. The loss of the allies was two thousand three hundred, of which fifty with three officers were taken, but among the wounded were lord Wellington, general Walker, general Ross, and the duke of Richmond, then lord March. He had served on lord Wellington's personal staff during the whole war without a hurt, but being made a captain in the fifty-second, like a good soldier joined his regiment the night before the battle. He was shot through the chest a few hours afterwards, thus learning by experience, the difference between the labours and dangers of staff and regimental officers, which are generally in the inverse ratio to their promotions.

General Berton, stationed between Pau and Orthez during the battle, had been cut off by Hill's movement, yet skirting that general's march he retreated by Mant and Samadet with his cavalry, picking up two battalions of conscripts on the road. Meanwhile Soult, having no position to rally upon, continued his retreat in the night to St. Sever, breaking down all the bridges behind him. Lord Wellington pursued at daylight in three columns, the right by Lacadée and St. Medar to Samadet, the centre by the main road, the left by St. Cricq. At St. Sever he hoped to find the enemy still in confusion, but he was too late; the French were across the river, the bridge was broken, and the army halted. The result of the battle was however soon made known far and wide, and Daricau who with a few hundred soldiers was endeavouring to form an insurgent levy at Dax, the works of which were incomplete and still unarmed, immediately destroyed part of the stores, the rest had been removed to Mont de Marsan, and retreated through the Landes to Langon on the Garonne.

From St. Sever, which offered no position, Soult turned short to the right and moved upon Barcelonne, higher up the Adour; but he left D'Erlon with two divisions of infantry, some cavalry and four guns at Cazères on the right bank, and sent Clauzel to occupy Aire on the other side of the river. He thus abandoned his magazines at Mont de Marsan and left open the direct road to Bordeaux; but holding Cazères with his right he commanded another road by Rochefort to that city, while his left being at Aire protected the magazines and artillery park at that place, and covered the road to Pau. Meanwhile the main body at Barcelonne equally supported Clauzel and D'Erlon, and covered the great roads leading to Agen and Toulouse on the Garonne, and to the mountains by Tarbes.

In this situation it was difficult to judge what line of operations he meant to adopt. Wellington however passed the Adour about one o'clock, partly by the repaired bridge of St. Sever, partly by a deep ford below, and immediately detached Beresford with the light division and Vivian's cavalry to seize the magazines at Mont de Marsan; at the same time he pushed the head of a column towards Cazères, where a cannonade and charge of cavalry took place, and a few men and officers were hurt on both sides. The next day Hill's corps, marching from Samadet, reached the Adour between St. Sever and

Aire, and D'Erlon was again assailed on the right bank and driven back skirmishing to Barcelonne. This event proved that Soult had abandoned Bordeaux; but the English general could not push the pursuit more vigorously, because every bridge was broken, and a violent storm on the evening of the 1st of March had filled the smaller rivers and torrents, carried away the pontoon bridges, and cut off all communication between the troops and the supplies.

The bulk of the army was now necessarily halted on the right bank of the Adour until the bridges could be repaired; but Hill who was on the left bank marched to seize the magazines at Aire. Moving in two columns from St. Savin and St. Gillies, on the 2d of March, he reached his destination about three o'clock, with two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry and a battery of horse-artillery; he expected no serious opposition, but general Clauzel had arrived a few hours before, and was in order of battle covering the town with Villatte's and Harispe's divisions and some guns. The French occupied a steep ridge in front of Aire, high and wooded on the right where it overlooked the river, but merging on the left into a wide table-land over which the great road led to Pau. The position was strong for battle, yet it could be readily outflanked on the left by the table-land, and was an uneasy one for retreat on the right where the ridge was narrow, the ravine behind steep and rugged, with a mill-stream at the bottom between it and the town. A branch of the Adour also flowing behind Aire cut it off from Barcelonne, while behind the left wing was the greater Lys, a river with steep banks and only one bridge.

COMBAT OF AIRE.

General Hill, arriving about two o'clock, attacked without hesitation. General Stewart with two British brigades fell on the French right, a Portuguese brigade assailed their centre, and the other brigades followed in columns of march. The action was however very sudden; the Portuguese were pushed forward in a slovenly manner by general Da Costa, a man of no ability, and the French under Harispe met them on the flat summit of the height with so rough a charge that they gave way in flight. The rear of the allies' column being still in march the battle was like to be lost; but general Stewart, having by this time won the heights on the French right, where Villatte, fearing to be enclosed, made but a feeble resistance, immediately detached general Barnes with the fiftieth and ninety-second regiments to the aid of the Portuguese. The vehement charge of these troops turned the stream of battle, the French were broken in turn and thrown back on their reserves, yet they rallied and renewed the action with great courage, fighting obstinately until general Byng's British brigade came up, when Harispe was driven towards the river Lys, and Villatte quite through the town of Aire into the space between the two branches of the Adour behind.

General Reille, who was at Barcelonne when the action began, brought up Rouget's division to support Villatte, the combat was thus continued until night at that point; meanwhile Harispe crossed the Lys and broke the bridge, but the French lost many men. Two generals, Dautour and Gasquet, were wounded, a colonel of engineers was killed, a hundred prisoners were taken, many of Harispe's conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their homes, and the magazines fell into the conqueror's hands. The loss of the British troops was one hundred and fifty, general Barnes was wounded and colonel Hood killed. The loss of the Portuguese was

never officially stated, yet it could not have been less than that of the British, and the vigour of the action proved that the French courage was very little abated by the battle of Orthez. Soult immediately retreated up the Adour, by both banks, towards Maubourguet and Marciac; and he was not followed, for new combinations were now opened to the generals on both sides.

OBSERVATIONS.

1st. On the 14th of February, the passage of the Gaves was commenced by Hill's attack on Harispe at Hellette. On the 2d of March, the first series of operations was terminated by the combat at Aire. In these sixteen days lord Wellington traversed with his right wing eighty miles, passed five large and several small rivers, forced the enemy to abandon two fortified bridge-heads and many minor works, gained one great battle and two combats, captured six guns and about a thousand prisoners, seized the magazines at Dax, Mont de Marsan and Aire, forced Soult to abandon Bayonne, and cut him off from Bordeaux. And in this time he also threw his stupendous bridge below Bayonne, and closely invested that fortress after a sharp and bloody action. Success in war, like charity in religion, covers a multitude of sins; but success often belongs to fortune as much as skill, and the combinations of Wellington, profound and sagacious, might in this manner be confounded with the lucky operations of the allies on the other side of France, where the presumption and the vacillation of ignorance alternately predominated.

2nd. Soult attributed the loss of his positions to the superior forces of the allies. Is this well-founded? The French general's numbers cannot be determined exactly; but after all his losses in December, after the detachments made by the emperor's order in January, and after completing the garrison of Bayonne to fourteen thousand men, he informed the minister of war that thirty thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry and forty pieces of artillery were in line. This did not include the conscripts of the new levy, all youths indeed and hastily sent to the army by battalions as they could be armed, but brave, and about eight thousand of them might have joined before the battle of Orthez. Wherefore, deducting the detachments of cavalry and infantry under Berton on the side of Pau, and under Daricau on the side of Dax, it may be said that forty thousand combatants of all arms were engaged in that action. Thirty-five thousand were very excellent soldiers, for the conscripts of the old levy who joined before the battle of the Nivelle were stout men; their vigorous fighting at Garris and Aire proved it, for of them was Harispe's division composed.

Now, lord Wellington commenced his operations with the second, third, fourth and seventh British divisions, the independent Portuguese division under Lecor, Morillo's Spaniards, forty-eight pieces of artillery, and only four brigades of light cavalry, for Vandeleur's brigade remained with Hope, and all the heavy cavalry and the Portuguese were left in Spain. Following the morning states of the army, this would furnish, exclusive of Morillo's Spaniards, something more than forty thousand fighting men and officers of all arms, of which four thousand were horsemen. But five regiments of infantry, and amongst them two of the strongest British regiments of the light division, were absent to receive their clothing; deduct these, and we have about thirty-seven thousand Anglo-Portuguese combatants. It is true that Mina's battalions and Moril-

lo's aided in the commencement of the operations, but the first immediately invested St. Jean Pied de Port, and the latter invested Navarreins. Lord Wellington was therefore in the battle superior by a thousand horsemen and eight guns, but Soult outnumbered him in infantry by four or five thousand, conscripts it is true, yet useful. Why then was the passage of the Gaves so feebly disputed? Because the French general remained entirely on the defensive in positions too extended for his numbers.

3rd. *Offensive operations must be the basis of a good defensive system.* Let Soult's operations be tried by this rule. On the 12th, he knew that the allies were in motion for some great operation, and he judged rightly that it was to drive him from the Gaves. From the 14th to the 18th, his left was continually assailed by very superior numbers; but during part of that time Beresford could only oppose to his right and centre the fourth and a portion of the seventh divisions with some cavalry; and those not in a body and at once, but parcelled and extended; for it was not until the 16th that the fourth, seventh and light divisions were so closed towards the Bidouze as to act in one mass. On the 15th, lord Wellington admitted that his troops were too extended; Villatte's, Taupin's and Foy's divisions were never menaced until the 18th, and there was nothing to prevent D'Erlon's divisions, which only crossed the Adour on the 17th, from being on the Bidouze the 15th. Soult might therefore, by rapid and well-digested combinations, have united four divisions of infantry and a brigade of cavalry to attack Beresford on the 15th or 16th, between the Nive and the Adour. If successful, the defeated troops, pushed back upon the sixth division, must have fought for life with the rivers on their flanks, Soult in front, and the garrison of Bayonne issuing from the works of Mousserolles on their rear. If unsuccessful, the French retreat behind the Gave d'Oloron could not have been prevented.

It is however to be pleaded that Soult was not exactly informed of the numbers and situation of his opponents. He thought Beresford had the first division also on the lower Bidouze; he knew that Wellington had large reserves to employ, and, that general's design of passing the Adour below Bayonne being unknown to him, he naturally supposed they would be used to support the operations on the Gaves: he therefore remained on the defensive. It might possibly also have been difficult to bring D'Erlon's divisions across the Adour by the Port de Lanne before the 17th, because the regular bridge had been carried away and the communications interrupted a few days before by the floods. In fine, there are many matters of detail in war, known only to a general-in-chief, which forbid the best combinations; and this it is that makes the art so difficult and uncertain. Great captains worship Fortune.

On the 24th, the passage of the Gave d'Oloron was effected. Soult then recognized his error, and concentrated his troops at Orthez to retake the offensive. It was a fine movement and effected with ability, but he suffered another favourable opportunity of giving a counter-blow to escape him. The infantry under Villatte, Harispe and Paris, supported by a brigade of cavalry, were about Sauveterre, that is to say, four miles from Montfort and only seven from Villenave, where the principal passage was effected, where the ford was deep, the stream rapid, and the left bank, although favourable for the passage, not entirely commanding the right bank. How then did it happen that the operation was effected without opposition? Amongst the allies it was

rumoured at the time that Soult complained of the negligence of a general who had orders to march against the passing troops. The position of Harispe's division at Monstrueig, forming a reserve at equal distances from Sauveterre and Villenave, would seem to have been adopted with that view; but I find no confirmation of the report in Soult's correspondence, and it is certain he thought Picton's demonstration at Sauveterre was a real attack.

4th. The position adopted by the French general at Orthez was excellent for offence. It was not so for defence, when Beresford and Picton had crossed the Gave below in force. Lord Wellington could then throw his whole army on that side, and secure his communication with Hope, after which outflanking the right of the French he could seize the defile of Sault de Navailles, cut them off from their magazines at Dax, Mont de Marsan and Aire, and force them to retreat by the Pau road leaving the way open to Bordeaux. To await this attack was therefore an error; but Soult's original design was to assail the head of the first column which should come near him, and Beresford's approach to Baigts on the 26th furnished the opportunity. It is true that the French light cavalry gave intelligence of that general's march too late, and marred the combination, but there was still time to fall on the head of the column while the third division was in the act of passing the river and entangled in the narrow way leading from the ford to the Peirehorade road: it is said the French marshal appeared disposed to do this at first, but finally took a defensive position in which to receive battle.

However, when the morning came, he neglected another opportunity. For two hours the third division and the hussars remained close to him, covering the march of the sixth and light divisions through the narrow ways leading from the bridge of Berenx up to the main road; the infantry had no defined position, the cavalry had no room to extend, and there were no troops between them and Beresford, who was then in march by the heights of Baigts to the Dax road. If the French general had pushed a column across the marsh to seize the Roman camp he would have separated the wings of the allies; then pouring down the Peirehorade road with Foy's, D'Armagnac's and Villatte's divisions, he would probably have overwhelmed the third division before the other two could have extricated themselves from the defiles. Picton therefore had grounds for uneasiness.

With a subtle skill did Soult take his ground of battle at Orthez, fiercely and strongly did he fight, and wonderfully did he effect his retreat across the Luy of Béarn; but twice in twenty-four hours he had neglected those happy occasions which in war take birth and flight at the same instant; and as the value of his position, essentially an offensive one, was thereby lost, a slowness to strike may be objected to his generalship. Yet there is no commander, unless a Hannibal or a Napoleon surpassing the human proportions, but will abate something of his confidence and hesitate after repeated defeats. Soult in this campaign, as in many others, proved himself a hardy captain full of resources.

5th. Lord Wellington, with a vastness of conception and a capacity for arrangement and combination equal to his opponent, possessed in a high degree that daring promptness of action, that faculty of inspiration for suddenly deciding the fate of whole campaigns, with which Napoleon was endowed beyond all mankind. It is this which especially constitutes military genius. For so vast, so complicated are the combinations of war, so easily and by

such slight causes are they affected, that the best generals do but grope in the dark, and they acknowledge the humiliating truth. By the number and extent of their fine dispositions then, and not by their errors, the merit of commanders is to be measured.

In this campaign, lord Wellington designed to penetrate France, not with a hasty incursion but solidly, to force Soult over the Garonne, and if possible in the direction of Bordeaux, because it was the direct line, because the citizens were inimical to the emperor, and the town, lying on the left bank of the river, could not be defended; because a junction with Suchet would thus be prevented. Finally, if by operating against Soult's left he could throw the French army into the Landes, where his own superior cavalry could act, it would probably be destroyed.

To operate against Soult's left in the direction of Pau was the most obvious method of preventing a junction with Suchet, and rendering the positions which the French general had fortified on the Gaves useless. But the investment of Bayonne required a large force, which was yet weak against an outer attack because separated in three parts by the rivers; hence if lord Wellington had made a wide movement on Pau, Soult might have placed the Adour between him and the main army, and then fallen upon Hope's troops on the right side of that river. The English general was thus reduced to act upon a more contracted line, and to cross all the Gaves. To effect this he collected his principal mass on his right by the help of the great road leading to St. Jean Pied de Port, then by rapid marches and reiterated attacks he forced the passage of the rivers above the points which Soult had fortified for defence, and so turned that general's left with a view of finally cutting him off from Suchet and driving him into the wilderness of the Landes. During these marches he left Beresford on the lower parts of the rivers to occupy the enemy's attention and cover the troops blockading Mousserolles. Meanwhile, by the collection of boats at Urt and other demonstrations indicating a design of throwing a bridge over the Adour above Bayonne, he diverted attention from the point chosen below the fortress for that operation, and at the same time provided the means of throwing another bridge at the Port de Lanne to secure the communication with Hope by the right bank whenever Soult should be forced to abandon the Gaves. These were fine combinations.

I have shown that Beresford's corps was so weak at first that Soult might have struck a counterblow. Lord Wellington admitted the error. Writing, on the 15th, he says, "If the enemy stand upon the Bidouze I am not so strong as I ought to be," and he ordered up the fourth and light divisions; but this excepted his movements were conformable to the principles of war. He chose the best strategic line of operations, his main attack was made with heavy masses against the enemy's weakest points, and in execution he was prompt and daring. His conduct was conformable also to his peculiar situation. He had two distinct operations in hand, namely to throw his bridge below Bayonne, and to force the Gaves. He had the numbers required to obtain these objects, but dared not use them lest he should put the Spanish troops into contact with the French people; yet he could not entirely dispense with them; wherefore bringing Freyre to Bayonne, Morillo to Navarreins, and Mina to St. Jean Pied de Port, he seemed to put his whole army in motion, thus gaining the appearance of military strength with as little politi-

cal danger as possible. Nevertheless so terrible had the Spaniards already made themselves by their cruel lawless habits that their mere return across the frontier threw the whole country into consternation.

6th. When in front of Orthez, it would at first sight appear as if lord Wellington had changed his plan of driving the enemy upon the Landes, but it was not so. He did not expect a battle on the 27th. This is proved by his letter to sir John Hope, in which he tells that general, that he anticipated no difficulty in passing the Gave of Pau, that on the evening of the 26th the enemy were retiring, and that he designed to visit the position at Bayonne. To pass the Gave in the quickest and surest manner, to re-establish the direct communications with Hope, and to unite with Beresford, were his immediate objects; if he finally worked by his left, it was a sudden act and extraneous to the general design, which was certainly to operate with Hill's corps and the light division by the right.

It was after passing the Gave at Berenx on the morning of the 27th, lord Wellington first discovered Soult's intention to fight, and that consequently he was himself in a false position. Had he shown any hesitation, any uneasiness, had he endeavoured to take a defensive position with either Beresford's or Picton's troops, he would inevitably have drawn the attention of the enemy to his dangerous situation. Instead of this, judging that Soult would not on the instant change from the defensive to the offensive, he confidently pushed Picton's skirmishers forward as if to assail the left of the French position, and put Beresford in movement against their right, and this with all the coolness imaginable. The success was complete. Soult, who supposed the allies stronger than they really were, naturally imagined the wings would not be so bold unless well supported in the centre where the Roman camp could hide a multitude. He therefore held fast to his position until the movement was more developed, and in two hours the sixth and light divisions were up and the battle commenced. It was well fought on both sides, but the crisis was decided by the fifty-second, and when that regiment was put in movement only a single Portuguese battalion was in reserve behind the Roman camp; upon such nice combinations of time and place does the fate of battles turn.

7th. Soult certainly committed an error in receiving battle at Orthez, and it has been said that lord Wellington's wound at the most critical period of the retreat alone saved the hostile army. Nevertheless the clear manner in which the French general carried his troops away, his prompt judgment, shown in the sudden change of his line of retreat at St. Sever, the resolute manner in which he halted and showed front again at Cazères, Barcelonne and Aire, were all proofs of no common ability. It was Wellington's aim to drive the French on to the Landes, Soult's to avoid this; he therefore shifted from the Bordeaux line to that of Toulouse, not in confusion, but with the resolution of a man ready to dispute every foot of ground. The loss of the magazines at Mont de Marsan was no fault of his; he had given orders for transporting them towards the Toulouse side fifteen days before, but the matter depending upon the civil authorities was neglected. He was blamed by some of his officers for fighting at Aire, yet it was necessary to cover the magazines there, and essential to his design of keeping up the courage of the soldiers under the adverse circumstances which he anticipated. And here the palm of generalship remained with him, for certainly the battle of Orthez was less decisive than it should have been.

I speak not of the pursuit to Sault de Navailles, nor of the next day's march upon St. Sever, but of Hill's march on the right. That general halted near Samadet the 28th of February, reached St. Savin on the Adour on the 1st, and fought the battle of Aire on the evening of the second of March. But from Samadet to Aire is not longer than from Samadet to St. Savin, where he was on the 1st. He could therefore, if his orders had prescribed it so, have seized Aire on the 1st before Clauzel arrived, and thus spared the obstinate combat at that place. It may also be observed that his attack did not receive a right direction. It should have been towards the French left, because they were more weakly posted there, and the ridge held by their right was so difficult to retire from that no troops would stay on it if any progress was made on the left. This was however an accident of war; general Hill had no time to examine the ground, his orders were to attack, and to fall without hesitation upon a retiring enemy after such a defeat as Orthez was undoubtedly the right thing to do. But it cannot be said that lord Wellington pushed the pursuit with vigour. Notwithstanding the storm on the evening of the 1st, he could have reinforced Hill, and should not have given the French army time to recover from their recent defeat. "The secret of war," says Napoleon, "is to march twelve leagues, fight a battle, and march twelve more in pursuit."

CHAPTER III.

Soult's perilous situation—He falls back to Tarbes—Napoleon sends him a plan of operations—His reply and views stated—Lord Wellington's embarrassments—Soult's proclamation—Observations upon it—Lord Wellington calls up Freyre's Gallicians and detaches Beresford against Bordeaux—The mayor of that city revolts from Napoleon—Beresford enters Bordeaux and is followed by the duke of Angoulême—Fears of a reaction—The mayor issues a false proclamation—Lord Wellington expresses his indignation—Rebukes the duke of Angoulême—Recalls Beresford, but leaves lord Dalhousie with the seventh division and some cavalry—Decaen commences the organization of the army of the Gironde—Admiral Penrose enters the Garonne—Remarkable exploit of the commissary Ogilvie—Lord Dalhousie passes the Garonne and the Dordogne, and defeats L'Huillier at Etauliers—Admiral Penrose destroys the French flotilla—The French set fire to their ships of war—The British seamen and marines land and destroy all the French batteries from Blaye to the mouth of the Garonne.

EXTREMELY perilous and disheartening was the situation of the French general. His army was greatly reduced by his losses in battle and by the desertion of the conscripts, and three thousand stragglers, old soldiers who ought to have rejoined their eagles, were collected by different generals, into whose districts they had wandered, and employed to strengthen detached corps instead of being restored to the army. All his magazines were taken; discontent, the natural offspring of misfortune, prevailed amongst his officers; a powerful enemy was in front, no certain resources of men or money behind, and his efforts were ill seconded by the civil authorities. The troops, indignant at the people's apathy, behaved with so much violence and insolence, especially during the retreat from St. Sever, that Soult, who wanted officers very badly, proposed to fill the vacancies from the national guards, that he might have "men who would respect property." On the other hand, the people comparing the conduct of their own army with the discipline of the Anglo-Portuguese, and contrasting the requisitions necessarily imposed by their countrymen with the ready and copious disbursements in gold made by their

enemies, for now one commissary preceded each division to order rations for the troops and another followed to arrange and pay on the spot, were become so absolutely averse to the French army, that Soult writing to the minister of war thus expressed himself: "If the population of the departments of the Landes, the Gers, and the Lower Pyrenees, were animated with a good spirit, this is the moment to make the enemy suffer by carrying off his convoys and prisoners; but they appear more disposed to favour the invaders than to second the army. It is scarcely possible to obtain a carriage for transport, and I shall not be surprised to find in a short time these inhabitants taking arms against us." Soult was however a man formed by nature and by experience to struggle against difficulties, always appearing greater when in a desperate condition than when more happily circumstanced. At Genoa under Massena, at Oporto, and in Andalusia, he had been injured to military distress, and probably for that reason the emperor selected him to sustain this dangerous contest in preference to others accounted more ready tacticians on a field of battle.

On the 3d and 4th of March, he retreated by Plaisance and Madiran to Rabasteins, Marcillac and Maubourguet, where he halted, covering Tarbes, for his design was to keep in mass and await the development of the allies' plans. In this view he called in the detachments of cavalry and infantry which had been left on the side of Pau before the battle of Orthez, and hearing that Daricau was at Langon with a thousand men, he ordered him to march by Agen and join the army immediately. He likewise put the national guards and gendarmes in activity on the side of the Pyrenees, and directed the commanders of the military districts in his rear to keep their old soldiers, of which there were many scattered through the country, in readiness to aid the army.

While thus acting he received from the minister of war a note dictated by the emperor.

"Fortresses," said Napoleon, "are nothing in themselves when the enemy, having the command of the sea, can collect as many shells and bullets and guns as he pleases to crush them. Leave therefore only a few troops in Bayonne; the way to prevent the siege is to keep the army close to the place. Resume the offensive, fall upon one or other of the enemy's wings, and though you should have but twenty thousand men, if you seize the proper moment and attack hardily, you ought to gain some advantage. You have enough talent to understand my meaning."

This note came fourteen days too late. But what if it had come before? Lord Wellington, after winning the battle of St. Pierre the 13th of December, was firmly established on the Adour above Bayonne, and able to interrupt the French convoys as they descended from the Port de Lanne. It was evident then that when dry weather enabled the allies to move Soult must abandon Bayonne to defend the passage of the Gaves, or risk being turned and driven upon the Landes from whence it would be difficult for him to escape. Napoleon however desired him to leave only a few men in Bayonne, another division would thus have been added to his field army, and this diminution of the garrison would not have increased lord Wellington's active forces, because the investment of Bayonne would still have required three separate corps: moreover, until the bridge-head at Peirehorade was abandoned to concentrate at Orthez, Bayonne was not, rigorously speaking, left to its own defence.

To the emperor's observations Soult therefore re-

plied, that several months before he had told the minister of war Bayonne was incapable of sustaining fifteen days open trenches unless the intrenched camp was well occupied, and he had been by the minister authorized so to occupy it. Taking that as his base, he had left a garrison of thirteen thousand five hundred men; and now that he knew the emperor's wishes, it was no longer in his power to withdraw them. With respect to keeping close to the place, he had done so as long as he could without endangering the safety of the army; but lord Wellington's operations had forced him to abandon it, and he had only changed his line of operations at St. Sever when he was being pushed back upon Bordeaux with little prospect of being able to pass the Garonne in time. He had for several months thought of establishing a pivot of support for his movements at Dax, in the design of still holding by Bayonne, and with that view had ordered the old works of the former place to be repaired and a camp to be fortified; but from poverty of means even the body of the place was not completed or armed at the moment when the battle of Orthez forced him to relinquish it. Moreover the insurgent levy of the Landes upon which he depended to man the works had failed, not more than two hundred men had come forward. Neither was he very confident of the advantage of such a position, because Wellington with superior numbers would probably have turned his left, and forced him to retire precipitately towards Bordeaux by the desert of the greater Landes.

The emperor ordered him to take the offensive, were it only with twenty thousand men. He would obey with this observation, that from the 14th of February to that moment he had had no power to take the initiatory movement, having been constantly attacked by infinitely superior numbers. He had defended himself as he could, but had not expected to succeed against the enormous disproportion of force. It being thus impossible, even though he sacrificed his last man in the attempt, to stop the enemy, he now sought to prolong the war as much as possible on the frontier, and by defending every position to keep the invaders in check and prevent them from attacking Bordeaux or Toulouse, save by detachments. He had taken his line of operations by the road of Tarbes, St. Gaudens and Toulouse, that is to say, by the roots of the Pyrenees, calculating that if lord Wellington sent small detachments against Bordeaux or Toulouse, the generals commanding at those places would be able, if the national guards would fight for their country, to defend them.

If the enemy made large detachments, an attack in front while he was thus weakened would bring them back again. If he marched with his whole army upon Bordeaux, he could be followed and forced to face about. If he attempted to march by Auch against Toulouse, he might be stopped by an attack in flank. If he remained stationary, he should be provoked by an advance to develop his objects. But if, as was to be expected, the French army was itself attacked, it would defend its position vigorously, and then retreating by St. Gaudens draw the allies into a difficult mountain country, where the ground might be disputed step by step, the war be kept still on the frontier, and the passage of the Garonne be delayed. He had meditated deeply upon his task, and could find no better mode. But his army was weakened by combats, still more by desertion; the conscripts went off so fast that of five battalions lately called up from Toulouse two-thirds were already gone without having seen an enemy.

Soult was mistaken as to the real force of the al-

lies in the recent operations. In other respects he displayed clear views and great activity. He re-organized his army in six divisions, called in his detachments, urged the imperial commissioners and local authorities to hasten the levies and restore deserters, and he prepared a plan of action for the partisans which had been organized towards the mountains. Nevertheless his difficulties increased. The conscripts who did arrive were for the most part without arms, and he had none to spare. The imperial commissary Cornudet and the prefect of the Gironde quitted Bordeaux, and when general L'Huilier attempted to move the military stores belonging to the army from Langon, Podensac and Bordeaux, the inferior authorities opposed him. There was no money they said to pay the expense; but in truth Bordeaux was the focus of Bourbon conspiracy, and the mayor, Lynch, was eager to betray his sovereign.

Nor was Wellington without embarrassments. The storms prevented him following up his victory while the French army was in confusion. Now it was reorganized on a new line, and could retreat for many days in a direction parallel to the Pyrenees with strong defensive positions. Should he press it closely? his army weakened at every step would have to move between the mountains and the Garonne, exposing its flanks and rear to the operations of any force which the French might be able to collect on those boundaries, that is to say, all the power of France beyond the Garonne. It was essential to find some counterpoise and to increase his field army. To establish a Bourbon party at Bordeaux was an obvious mode of attaining the first object. Should he then seize that city by a detachment? he must employ twelve thousand men, and remain with twenty-six thousand to oppose Soult, who he erroneously believed was being joined by the ten thousand men which Suchet had sent to Lyons. The five regiments detached for their clothing had rejoined the army and all the reserves of cavalry and artillery were now called up, but the reinforcements from England and Portugal, amounting to twenty thousand men, upon which he had calculated, were detained by the respective governments. Wherefore, driven by necessity, he directed Freyre to join him by the Port de Lanne with two divisions of the Gallician army, a measure which was instantly followed by innumerable complaints of outrages and excesses, although the Spaniards were entirely provided from the English military chest. Now also Clinton was ordered to send the British and Germans of the Anglo-Sicilian army to St. Jean de Luz. This done he determined to seize Bordeaux. Meanwhile he repaired the destroyed bridges, brought up one of Morillo's brigades from Navarreins to the vicinity of Aire, sent Campbell's Portuguese dragoons to Roquefort, general Fane with two regiments of cavalry and a brigade of infantry to Pau, and pushed posts towards Tarbes and Vic en Bigorre.

Soult, now fearing the general apathy and ill-will of the people would become fatal to him, endeavoured to arouse the energies of the people and the army by the following proclamation, which has been unreasonably railed at by several English writers, for it was a judicious, well-timed and powerful address.

"Soldiers! at the battle of Orthez you did your duty, the enemy's losses surpassed yours, his blood moistened all the ground he gained. You may consider that feat of arms as an advantage. Other combats are at hand, no repose for us until his army, formed of such extraordinary elements, shall evacuate the French territory or be annihilated. Its numbers and progress may be great, but at hand are unexpected perils. Time will teach the enemy's gen-

eral that French honour is not to be outraged with impunity.

"Soldiers! he has had the indecency to provoke you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition; he speaks of peace, but fire-brands of discord follow him! He speaks of peace, and excites the French to a civil war! Thanks be to him for making known his projects, our forces are thereby centupled; and he himself rallies round the imperial eagles all those who, deceived by appearances, believed our enemies would make a loyal war. No peace with the disloyal and perfidious nation! no peace with the English and their auxiliaries until they quit the French territory! they have dared to insult the national honour, the infamy to incite Frenchmen to become perjured towards the emperor. Revenge the offence in blood. To arms! Let this cry resound through the south of France, the Frenchman that hesitates abjures his country and belongs to her enemies.

"Yet a few days, and those who believe in English delicacy and sincerity will learn to their cost that cunning promises are made to abate their courage and subjugate them. They will learn also that if the English pay to-day and are generous, they will to-morrow retake, and with interest, in contribution what they disburse. Let the pusillanimous beings who calculate the cost of saving their country remember that the English have in view to reduce Frenchmen to the same servitude as the Spaniards, Portuguese and Sicilians, who groan under their domination. Past history will recall to those unworthy Frenchmen who prefer momentary enjoyment to the safety of the great family, the English making Frenchmen kill Frenchmen at Quiberon; it will show them at the head of all conspiracies, all odious political intrigues, plots and assassinations, aiming to overthrow all principles, to destroy all grand establishments of trade, to satisfy their immeasurable ambition, their insatiable cupidity. Does there exist upon the face of the globe a point known to the English where they have not destroyed by seditions and violence all manufactures which could rival their own? Thus they will do to the French establishments if they prevail.

"Devote then to opprobrium and execration all Frenchmen who favour their insidious projects, aye! even those who are under his power if they seek not to hurt him. Devote to opprobrium and reject as Frenchmen those who think under specious pretexts to avoid serving their country; and those also who, from corruption or indolence, hide deserters instead of driving them back to their colours. With such men we have nothing in common, and history will pass their names with execrations to posterity. As to us soldiers, our duty is clear. Honour and fidelity. This is our motto, and we will fight to the last the enemies of our emperor and France. Respect persons and property. Grieve for those who have momentarily fallen under the enemy's yoke, and hasten the moment of their deliverance. Be obedient and disciplined, and bear implacable hatred towards traitors and enemies of the French name! War to death against those who would divide us to destroy us; and to those cowards who desert the imperial eagles to range themselves under another banner. Remember always that fifteen ages of glory, triumphs innumerable, have illustrated our country. Contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great sovereign, his signal victories which immortalize the French name. Let us be worthy of him, and we can then bequeath without a taint to our posterity the inheritance we hold from our fathers. Be, in fine, Frenchmen, and die arms in hand sooner than survive dishonour."

Let the time and the occasion of this proclamation be considered. Let it be remembered that no English writer, orator or politician, had for many years used milder terms than robbers, murderers, atheists, and tyrant, when speaking of Frenchmen and their sovereign; that lord Wellington even at this time refused that sovereign his title of emperor, calling him Bonaparte; that on entering France he had published an order of the day accusing the French commanders of authorizing and encouraging the cruelties of their soldiers in Spain; finally, that for six years the Spanish, Portuguese and English state papers were filled with most offensive ribald abuse of Napoleon, his ministers and commanders. Let all this be remembered, and the acrimony of Soult's proclamation cannot be justly blamed, while the noble energy, the loyalty of the sentiments, the exciting passionate feeling of patriotism which pervades it, must be admired. Was he, sprung from the ranks, a soldier of the republic, a general of the empire, after fighting thirty years under the tricolour, to be tame and measured to squeamishness in his phrases when he saw his country invaded by foreigners, and a pretender to the throne stalking behind their bayonets, beckoning his soldiers to desert their eagles, inviting his countrymen to betray their sovereign and dishonour their nation? Why the man was surrounded by traitors, and proud and scornful of danger was his spirit to strive so mightily against defeat and treason combined!

It has been said in condemnation of him that the English general did not encourage the Bourbon party. Is that true? Did it so appear to the French general? Had not the duke of Angoulême come to the English head-quarters with mystery, and following the invading army and protected by its arms assemble round him all the ancient partisans of his house, sending forth agents, scattering proclamations even in Soult's camp, endeavouring to debauch his soldiers and to aid strangers to subjugate France? Soult not only knew this, but was suffering under the effects. On every side he met opposition and discontent from the civil authorities, his movements were made known to the enemy and his measures thwarted in all directions. At Bordeaux a party were calling aloud with open arms to the invaders. At Tarbes the fear of provoking an action near the town had caused the dispersion of the insurrectional levy organized by the imperial commissioner Caffarelli. At Pau the aristocracy had secretly assembled to offer homage to the duke of Angoulême, and there was a rumour that he was to be crowned at the castle of Henry IV. Was the French general to disregard these facts and symptoms because his opponent had avoided any public declaration in favour of the Bourbon family? Lord Wellington would have been the first to laugh at his simplicity if he had.

And what is the reason that the English general did not openly call upon the Bourbon partisans to raise the standard of revolt? Simply that Napoleon's astounding genius had so baffled the banded sovereigns and their innumerable hordes that a peace seemed inevitable to avoid fatal disasters; and therefore lord Wellington, who had instructions from his government not to embarrass any negotiation for peace by pledges to a Bourbon party, acting as an honest statesman and commander, would not excite men to their own ruin for a momentary advantage. But so far from discouraging treason to Napoleon on any other ground, he avowed his anxious desire for it, and his readiness to encourage every enemy of that monarch. He had seen and consulted with La Roche-Jacquelin, with De Mail-

hos and other vehement partisans for an immediate insurrection; and also with Viel Castel, an agent of Bernadotte's, until he found him intriguing against the Bourbons. He advised the duke of Angoulême to form regular battalions, promised him arms, and actually collected eighty thousand stand, to arm the insurgents. Finally, he rebuked the timid policy of the English ministers, who having such an opportunity of assailing Napoleon refrained from doing it. Before Soult's proclamation appeared he thus wrote to lord Bathurst:

"I find the sentiment as we advance in the country still more strong against the Bonaparte dynasty and in favour of the Bourbons, but I am quite certain there will be no declaration on the part of the people if the allies do not in some manner declare themselves. I cannot discover the policy of not hitting one's enemy as hard as one can and in the most vulnerable place. I am certain that he would so act by us, he would certainly overturn the British authority in Ireland if it were in his power."

Soult and Wellington acted and wrote each in the manner most suitable to their situation; but it was not a little remarkable that Ireland should so readily occur to the latter as a parallel case.

It was in this state of affairs that the English general detached Beresford with twelve thousand men against Bordeaux, giving him instructions to occupy that city and acquire the Garonne as a port for the allies, but to make the French authorities declare whether they would or would not continue to exercise their functions under the conditions announced by proclamation. For hitherto lord Wellington had governed the country he advanced in this public manner, thus nullifying the misrepresentations of political intriguers, obviating the dangers of false reports and rumours of his projects, making his justice and moderation known to the poorest peasant, and securing the French local authorities who continued to act under him from any false and unjust representation of their conduct to the imperial government if peace should be made with Napoleon. This expedition against Bordeaux however involved political as well as military interests. Beresford was instructed that there were many partisans of the Bourbons in that city, who might propose to hoist the white standard and proclaim Louis the Eighteenth under protection of the troops. They were to be told that the British nation and its allies wished well to their cause, and while public tranquillity was maintained in the districts occupied by the troops there would be no hinderance to their political proceedings: they or any party opposed to Napoleon would receive assistance. Nevertheless as the allied sovereigns were negotiating with the French emperor, however well inclined the English general might be to support a party against the latter during war, he could give no help if peace were concluded, and this they must weigh well before they revolted. Beresford was therefore not to meddle with any declaration in favour of Louis the Eighteenth; but he was not to oppose it, and if revolt took place he was to supply the revolted with the arms and ammunition collected at Dax.

On the 8th, Beresford marched towards Langon with the fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian's horsemen and some guns; he was joined on the road by some of Vandeleur's cavalry from Bayonne, and he had orders to observe the enemy's movements towards Agen, for it was still in Soult's power by a forced march on that side to cross the Garonne and enter Bordeaux before him. La Roche-Jacquelin preceded the troops, and the duke of Angoulême followed closely; but his partisans in the city, fright-

ened at the danger of their enterprise, now besought Beresford to delay his march. La Roche-Jacquelin vehemently condemned their hesitation, and his influence, supported by the consternation which the battle of Orthez had created among the Napoleonists, decided the question in favour of revolt.

Long before this epoch, Soult, foreseeing that the probable course of the war would endanger Bordeaux, had given orders to place the forts in a state of defence, to arm the flotilla and to organize the national guards and the urban legions; he had urged these measures again when the imperial commissioner Cornudet first arrived, but according to the usual habits of civilians who have to meddle with military affairs every thing was promised and nothing done. Cornudet and the prefect quitted the city as early as the 4th, first burning with a silly affectation of vigour some ships of war upon the stocks; general L'Huilier, unable to oppose the allies, then destroyed the fort of Médoc on the left bank of the Garonne, disarmed some of the river batteries, and passing in the night of the 11th to the right bank occupied the fortress of Blaye, the Paté and other points. Meanwhile Beresford, who reached Langon on the 10th, left lord Dalhousie there with the bulk of the forces, and advanced with eight hundred cavalry.

Entering Bordeaux the 12th, he met the municipality and a great body of Bourbonists, at the head of whom was the mayor, count Lynch, decorated with the scarf of his office and the legion of honour, both conferred upon him, and probably at his own solicitation, by the sovereign he was then going to betray. After some formal discourse, in which Beresford explicitly made known his instructions, Lynch very justly tore the tri-colour, the emblem of his country's glory, from his own shoulders, the white flag was then displayed, and the allies took peaceable possession of the city. The duke of Angoulême arrived on the same day, and Louis the Eighteenth was formally proclaimed. This event, the act of a party, was not generally approved; and the mayor, conscious of weakness, immediately issued, with the connivance of the duke of Angoulême, a proclamation, in which he asserted, that "the British, Portuguese and Spanish armies were united in the south, as the other nations were united in the north, solely to destroy Napoleon and replace him by a Bourbon king, who was conducted hither by these generous allies, and only by accepting that king could the French appease the resentment of the Spaniards." At the same time the duke of Angoulême, as if quite master of the country, appointed prefects and other authorities in districts beyond the limits of Bordeaux.

Both the duke and the mayor soon repented of their precipitancy. The English fleet, which should have acted simultaneously with the troops, had not arrived; the *Regulus*, a French seventy-four, with several inferior vessels of war, were anchored below Blaye, and Beresford was recalled with the fourth division and Vivian's cavalry. Lord Dalhousie remained with only the seventh division and three squadrons to oppose L'Huilier's troops and other French corps which were now on the Garonne. He could not guard the river below Bordeaux, and some French troops recrossing again took possession of the fort of Grave near the mouth; a new army was forming under general Decaen beyond the Garonne, the Napoleonists recovering from their first stupor began to stir themselves, and a partisan officer, coming down to St. Macaire on the 18th, surprised fifty men which lord Dalhousie had sent across the Garonne from Langon to take possession of a French

magazine. In the Landes the peasants forming bands burned the houses of the gentlemen who had joined the white standard, and in Bordeaux itself a counter-insurrection was preparing whenever Decaen should be ready to advance.

The prince, frightened at these symptoms of reaction, desired lord Dalhousie to bring his troops into Bordeaux to awe the Napoleonists, and meanwhile each party strove to outvie the other in idle rumours and falsehoods relating to the emperor. Victories and defeats were invented or exaggerated, Napoleon was dead from illness, had committed suicide, was poisoned, stabbed; and all these things were related as certain with most circumstantial details. Meanwhile Wellington, writing to the duke of Angoulême, denied the veracity of the mayor's proclamation, and expressed his trust that the prince was not a party to such a mendacious document. The latter however, with some excuses about hurry and confusion, avowed his participation in its publication, and defended the mayor's conduct. He also forwarded a statement of the danger his party was exposed to, and demanded aid of men and money, supporting his application by a note of council in which, with more ingenuity than justice, it was argued, that as civil government could not be conducted without executive power, and as lord Wellington had suffered the duke of Angoulême to assume the civil government at Bordeaux without an adequate executive force, he was bound to supply the deficiency from his army, and even to furnish money until taxes could be levied under the protection of the soldiers.

The English general was not a man to bear with such sophistry in excuse for a breach of faith. Sorry he was, he said, to find that the principle by which he regulated his conduct towards the Bourbon party, though often stated, had made so little impression that the duke could not perceive how inconsistent it was with the mayor's proclamation. Most cautious therefore must be his future conduct, seeing that as the chief of an army, and the confidential agent of three independent nations, he could not permit his views to be misrepresented upon such an important question. He had occupied Bordeaux as a military point; but certain persons, contrary to his advice and opinion, thought proper to proclaim Louis the Eighteenth. Those persons made no exertions, subscribed not a shilling, raised not a soldier; yet because he would not extend the posts of his army beyond what was proper and convenient, merely to protect their families and property, exposed to danger, not on account of their exertions, for they had made none, but on account of their premature declaration contrary to his advice, they took him to task in a document delivered to lord Dalhousie by the prince himself. The writer of that paper and all such persons however might be assured that nothing should make him swerve from what he thought his duty to the sovereigns who employed him, he would not risk even a company of infantry to save properties and families placed in a state of danger contrary to his advice. The duke had better then conduct his policy and compose his manifestoes in such a manner as not to force a public contradiction of them. His royal highness was free to act as he pleased for himself, but he was not free to adduce the name and authority of the allied governments in support of his own measures, when they had not been consulted, nor of their general, when he had been consulted, but had given his opinion against those measures.

He had told him that if any great town or extensive district declared in favour of the Bourbons he

would not interfere with the government of that town or district, and if there was a general declaration in favour of his house, he would deliver the civil government of all the country overrun by the army into his hands; but the fact was, that even at Bordeaux the movement in favour of the Bourbons was not unanimous. The spirit had not spread elsewhere, not even to La Vendée, nor in any part occupied by the army. The events contemplated had not therefore occurred, and it would be a great breach of duty towards the allied sovereigns, and cruel to the inhabitants, if he were to deliver them over to his royal highness prematurely or against their inclinations. He advised him therefore to withdraw his prefects and confine his government to Bordeaux. He could give him no money, and after what had passed, he was doubtful if he should afford him any countenance or protection. The argument of the note of council, affirming that he was bound to support the civil government of his royal highness, only rendered it more incumbent upon him to beware how he gave further encouragement, or to speak plainly, *permission* to the Bourbonists, to declare themselves. It was disagreeable to take any step which should publicly mark a want of good understanding between himself and the duke, but count Lynch had not treated him with common fairness nor with truth; wherefore as he could not allow the character of the allied sovereigns or his own to be doubted, if his royal highness did not within ten days contradict the objectionable parts of the mayor's proclamation he would do so himself.

Thus it appeared that with the French, as with the Spaniards and Portuguese, neither enthusiastic declarations nor actual insurrection offered any guarantee for sense, truth or exertion; and most surely all generals and politicians of every country who trust to sudden popular commotions will find that noisy declamations, vehement demonstrations of feeling, idle rumours and boasting, the life-blood of such affairs, are essentially opposed to useful public exertions.

When Beresford marched to rejoin the army the line of occupation was too extensive for lord Dalhousie, and lord Wellington ordered him to keep clear of the city and hold his troops together, observing that his own projected operations on the upper Garonne would keep matters quiet on the lower part of that river. Nevertheless, if the war had continued for a month, that officer's situation would have been critical. For when Napoleon knew that Bordeaux had fallen, he sent Decaen by post to Libourne to form the "*army of the Gironde*." For this object general Despeaux, acting under Soult's orders, collected a body of gendarmes, custom-house officers and national guards on the upper Garonne, between Agen and La Réole, and it was one of his detachments that surprised lord Dalhousie's men at St. Macaire on the 18th. A battery of eight guns was sent down from Narbonne, other batteries were despatched from Paris to arrive at Périgueux on the 11th of April, and three or four hundred cavalry, coming from the side of La Rochelle, joined L'Huillier who with a thousand infantry was in position at St. André de Cubzac beyond the Dordogne. Behind these troops all the national guards, custom-house officers and gendarmes of five departments were ordered to assemble, and march to the Dordogne; but the formidable part of the intended army was a body of Suchet's veterans, six thousand in number, under general Beurman, who had been turned from the road of Lyons and directed upon Libourne.

Decaen entered Mucidan on the 1st of April, but

Beurman's troops had not then reached Périgueux, and lord Dalhousie's cavalry were in Libourne between him and L'Huillier. The power of concentration was thus denied to the French, and meanwhile admiral Penrose had secured the command of the Garonne. It appears lord Wellington thought this officer dilatory; but on the 27th of March, he arrived with a seventy-four and two frigates, whereupon the *Regulus*, and other French vessels then at Royan, made sail up the river, and were chased to the shoal of Talmont, but they escaped through the narrow channel on the north side and cast anchor under some batteries. Previous to this event, Mr. Ogilvie, a commissary, being on the river in a boat manned with Frenchmen, discovered the *Requin* sloop, half French half American, pierced for twenty-two guns, lying at anchor not far below Bordeaux; at the same time he saw a sailor leap hastily into a boat above him and row for the vessel. This man being taken proved to be the armourer of the *Requin*; he said there were not many men on board; and Mr. Ogilvie observing his alarm, and judging that the crew would also be fearful, with ready resolution bore down upon the *Requin*, boarded and took her without any opposition either from her crew or that of his own boat, although she had fourteen guns mounted and eleven men with two officers on board.

The naval co-operation being thus assured, lord Dalhousie crossed the Garonne above the city, drove the French posts beyond the Dordogne, pushed scouring parties to La Réole and Marmande, and sending his cavalry over the Dordogne intercepted Decaen's and L'Huillier's communications: the former was thus forced to remain at Mucidan with two hundred and fifty gendarmes awaiting the arrival of Beurman, and he found neither arms nor ammunition nor a willing spirit to enable him to organize the national guards.

The English horsemen repassed the Dordogne on the 2d of April; but on the 4th, lord Dalhousie crossed it again lower down, near St. André de Cubzac, with about three thousand men, intending to march upon Blaye, but hearing that L'Huillier had halted at Etauliers he turned suddenly upon him. The French general formed his line on an open common, occupying some woods in front with his detachments. Overmatched in infantry, he had three hundred cavalry opposed to one weak squadron, and yet his troops would not stand the shock of the battle. The allied infantry cleared the woods in a moment, the artillery then opened upon the main body, which retired in disorder, horsemen and infantry together, through Etauliers, leaving behind several scattered bodies upon whom the British cavalry galloped and made two or three hundred men and thirty officers prisoners.

If the six thousand old troops under Beurman had, according to Napoleon's orders, arrived at this time in lord Dalhousie's rear, his position would have been embarrassing, but they were delayed on the road until the 10th. Meanwhile admiral Penrose, having on the 2d observed the French flotilla, consisting of fifteen armed vessels and gun-boats, coming down from Blaye to join the *Regulus* at Talmont, sent the boats of his fleet to attack them; whereupon the French vessels ran on shore, and the crews aided by two hundred soldiers from Blaye lined the beach to protect them. Lieutenant Dunlop, who commanded the English boats, landing all his seamen and marines, beat these troops and carried off or destroyed the whole flotilla, with a loss to himself of only six men wounded and missing. This operation completed and the action at Etauliers

known, the admiral, now reinforced with a second ship of the line, resolved to attack the French squadron and the shore batteries, but in the night of the 6th the enemy set fire to their vessels. Captain Harris of the *Belle Poule* frigate then landed with six hundred seamen and marines, and destroyed the batteries and forts on the right bank from Talmont to the Courbe point. Blaye still held out; but at Paris treason had done its work, and Napoleon, the man of mightiest capacity known for good, was overthrown to make room for despots, who with minds enlarged only to cruelty, avarice and dissoluteness, were at the very moment of triumph intent to defraud the people, by whose strength and suffering they had conquered, of the only reward they demanded, *just government*. The war was virtually over, but on the side of Toulouse, Bayonne and Barcelona, the armies ignorant of this great event were still battling with unabated fury.

CHAPTER IV.

Wellington's and Soult's situations and forces described—Folly of the English ministers—Freyre's Galicians and Ponsonby's heavy cavalry join Lord Wellington—He orders Giron's Andalusians and Del Parque's army to enter France—Soult suddenly takes the offensive—Combats of cavalry—Partisan expedition of captain Dania—Wellington menaces the peasantry with fire and sword if they take up arms—Soult retires—Lord Wellington advances—Combat of Vic en Bigorre—Death and character of colonel Henry Sturgeon—Daring exploit of captain William Light—Combat of Tarbes—Soult retreats by forced marches to Toulouse—Wellington follows more slowly—Cavalry combat at St. Gaudens—The allies arrive in front of Toulouse—Reflections.

WHILE Beresford was moving upon Bordeaux, Soult and Wellington remained in observation, each thinking the other stronger than himself. For the English general, having intelligence of Beurman's march, believed that his troops were intended to reinforce and had actually joined Soult. On the other hand, that marshal, who knew not of Beresford's march until the 13th of March, concluded Wellington still had the twelve thousand men detached to Bordeaux. The numbers on each side were however nearly equal. The French army was thirty-one thousand, infantry and cavalry; yet three thousand being stragglers detained by the generals of the military districts, Soult could only put into line, exclusive of conscripts without arms, twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty-eight pieces of artillery. On the allies' side twenty-seven thousand sabres and bayonets were under arms, with forty-two guns; but from this number, detachments had been sent to Pau on one side, Roquefort on the other, and the cavalry scouts were pushed into the Landes and to the upper Garonne.

Lord Wellington, expecting Soult would retreat upon Auch and designing to follow him, had caused Beresford to keep the bulk of his troops towards the upper Garonne that he might the sooner rejoin the army; but the French general, having early fixed his line of retreat by St. Gaudens, was only prevented from retaking the offensive on the 9th or 10th by the loss of his magazines, which forced him first to organize a system of requisition for the subsistence of his army. Meanwhile his equality of force passed away, for on the 13th Freyre came up with eight thousand Spanish infantry, and the next day Ponsonby's heavy cavalry arrived. Lord Wellington was then the strongest, yet he still awaited Beresford's troops, and was uneasy about his own situation. He dreaded the junction of Suchet's army, for it was at this time the Spanish regency re-

ferred the convention, proposed by that marshal for the evacuation of the fortresses, to his decision. He gave a peremptory negative, observing that it would furnish twenty thousand veterans for Soult, while the retention of Rosas and Figueras would bar the action of the Spanish armies of Catalonia in his favour. But his anxiety was great, because he foresaw that Ferdinand's return and his engagement with Suchet, already related, together with the evident desire of Copons that the garrisons should be admitted to a convention, would finally render that measure inevitable. Meanwhile the number of his own army was likely to decrease. The English cabinet, less considerate even than the Spanish government, had sent the militia, permitted by the recent act of parliament to volunteer for foreign service, to Holland, and with them the other reinforcements originally promised for the army in France: two or three regiments of militia only came to the Garonne when the war was over. To make amends, the ministers proposed that lord William Bentinck should send four thousand men from Sicily to land at Rosas, or some point in France, and so join Lord Wellington, who was thus expected to extend his weakened force from the bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean in order to cover the junction of this uncertain reinforcement. In fine, experience had taught the English statesmen so little, that we find their general thus addressing them only one week previous to the termination of the war.

Having before declared that he should be, contrary to his wishes, forced to bring more Spaniards into France, he says:—

“There are limits to the numbers with which this army can contend, and I am convinced your lordship would not wish to see the safety and honour of this handful of brave men depend upon the doubtful exertions and discipline of an undue proportion of Spanish troops. . . . The service in Holland may doubtless be more important to the national interest than that in this country, but I hope it will be considered that that which is most important of all is not to *lose* the brave army which has struggled through its difficulties for nearly six years.”

The French infantry was now reorganized in six divisions, commanded by Daricau, D'Armagnac, Taupin, Maransin, Villatte and Harispe; general Paris's troops, hitherto acting as an unattached body, were thus absorbed; the cavalry, composed of Berton's and Vial's brigades, was commanded by Pierre Soult; and there was a reserve division of seven thousand conscripts, infantry, under general Travot. The division into wings and a centre, each commanded by a lieutenant-general, continued, yet this distinction was not attended to in the movements. Reille, though commanding the right wing, was at Maubourguet on the left of the line of battle; D'Erlon, commanding the centre, was at Marcillac on the right, covering the road to Auch; Clauzel was at Rabastens, forming a reserve to both. The advanced guards were towards Plaisance on the right, Madiran in the centre, and Lembeie on the left. Soult thus covered Tarbes, and could move on a direct line by good roads either to Auch or Pau.

Lord Wellington, driven by necessity, now sent orders to Giron's Andalusians and Del Parque's troops to enter France from the Bastan, although Freyre's soldiers had by their outrages already created a wide-spread consternation. His headquarters were fixed at Aire, his army was in position on each side of the Adour, he had repaired all the bridges behind him, restored that over the Lys in his front, and dispersed some small bands which had appeared upon his left flank and rear: Soult had

however organized a more powerful system of partisans towards the mountains, and only wanted money to put them in activity. The main bodies of the two armies were a long day's march asunder, but their advanced posts were not very distant, the regular cavalry had frequent encounters, and both generals claimed the superiority, though neither made any particular report.

On the night of the 7th, Soult, thinking to find only some weak parties at Pau, sent a strong detachment there to arrest the nobles who had assembled to welcome the duke of Angoulême; but general Fane getting there before him with a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, the stroke failed; however the French, returning by another road, made prisoners an officer and four or five English dragoons. Meanwhile a second detachment, penetrating between Pau and Aire, carried off a post of correspondence; and two days after, when Fane had quitted Pau, a French officer accompanied by only four hussars captured there thirty-four Portuguese with their commander and ten loaded mules. The French general, having by these excursions obtained exact intelligence of Beresford's march to Bordeaux, resolved to attack the allies, and the more readily that Napoleon had recently sent him instructions to draw the war to the side of Pau, keeping his left resting on the Pyrenees, which accorded with his own designs.

Lord Wellington's main body was now concentrated round Aire and Barcelonne, yet divided by the Adour, and the advanced guards were pushed to Garlin, Conchez, Vielle, Riscle and Pouydraguen, that is to say, a semicircle to the front and about half a march in advance. Soult therefore thought to strike a good blow, and gathering his divisions on the side of Maubourguet the 12th, marched on the 13th, designing to throw himself upon the higher tabular land between Pau and Aire, and then act according to circumstances.

The country was suited to the action of all arms, offering a number of long and nearly parallel ridges of moderate height, the sides of which were sometimes covered with vineyards, but the summits commonly so open that troops could move along them without much difficulty, and between these ranges a number of small rivers and muddy fords descended from the Pyrenees to the Adour. This conformation determined the order of the French general's march, which followed the courses of these rivers. Leaving one regiment of cavalry to watch the valley of the Adour, he moved with the rest of his army by Lembeie upon Conchez down the smaller Lys. Clauzel thus seized the high land of Daise and pushed troops to Portet; Reille supported him at Conchez; D'Erlon remained behind that place in reserve. In this position the head of the columns, pointing direct upon Aire, separated Vielle from Garlin, which was the right of general Hill's position, and menaced that general's posts on the great Lys. Meanwhile Pierre Soult, marching with three regiments of cavalry along the high land between the two Lys, reached Mascaras and the castle of Sault; he thus covered the left flank of the French army, and pushed Fane's cavalry posts back with the loss of two officers taken and a few men wounded. During this movement, Berton, advancing from Madiran with two regiments of cavalry towards Vielle, on the right flank of the French army, endeavoured to cross the Saye river at a difficult muddy ford near the broken bridge. Sir John Campbell, leading a squadron of the fourth Portuguese cavalry, overthrew the head of his column; but the Portuguese horsemen were too few to dispute the passage, and Ber-

ton finally getting a regiment over higher up, gained the table-land above, and charging the rear of the retiring troops in a narrow way leading to the Aire road, killed several and took some prisoners, amongst them Bernardo de Sà, the since well known count of Bandeira.

This terminated the French operations for the day; and lord Wellington, imagining the arrival of Suchet's troops had made Soult thus bold, resolved to keep on the defensive until his reinforcements and detachments could come up. Hill however passed the greater Lys, partly to support his posts, partly to make out the force and true direction of the French movement; but he recrossed that river during the night, and finally occupied the strong platform between Aire and Garlin which Soult had designed to seize. Lord Wellington immediately brought the third and sixth divisions and the heavy cavalry over the Adour to his support, leaving the light division with the hussar brigade still on the right bank. The bulk of the army thus occupied a strong position parallel with the Pau road. The right was at Garlin, the left at Aire, the front covered by the greater Lys, a river difficult to pass; Fane's cavalry was extended along the Pau road as far as Boelho, and on the left of the Adour the hussars pushed the French cavalry regiment left there back upon Plaisance.

On the morning of the 14th, Soult, intending to fall on Hill whose columns he had seen the evening before on the right of the Lys, drove in the advanced posts which had been left to cover the retrograde movement, and then examined the allies' new position; but these operations wasted the day, and towards evening he disposed his army on the heights between the two Lys, placing Clauzel and D'Erlon at Castle Pugon opposite Garlin, and Reille in reserve at Portet. Meanwhile Pierre Soult carried three regiments of cavalry to Clarac, on the Pau road, to intercept the communications with that town and to menace the right flank of the allies, against which the whole French army was now pointing. Fane's outposts being thus assailed retired with some loss at first, but they were soon supported and drove the French horsemen in disorder clear off the Pau road to Carere.

Soult now seeing the strength of the position above Aire, and hearing from the peasants that forty or fifty thousand men were concentrated there, feared to attack, but changing his plan, resolved to hover about the right flank of the allies in the hopes of enticing them from their vantage-ground. Lord Wellington, on the other hand, drew his cavalry posts down the valley of the Adour, and keeping close on that side massed his forces on the right in expectation of an attack. In fine, each general, acting upon false intelligence of the other's strength, was afraid to strike. The English commander's error as to the junction of Suchet's troops was encouraged by Soult, who had formed his battalions upon two ranks instead of three to give himself an appearance of strength, and in the same view had caused his reserve of conscripts to move in rear of his line of battle. And he also judged the allies' strength by what it might have been rather than by what it was; for though Freyre's Spaniards and Ponsonby's dragoons were now up, the whole force did not exceed thirty-six thousand men, including the light division and the hussars who were on the right bank of the Adour. This number was however increasing every hour by the arrival of detachments and reserves; and it behoved Soult, who was entangled in a country extremely difficult if rain should fall, to watch that Wellington, while holding

the French in check with his right wing, did not strike with his left by Maubourguet and Tarbes, and thus cast them upon the mountains about Lourdes.

This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of the fall of Bordeaux, induced the French general to retire before day on the 16th to Lembeie and Simacourbe, where he occupied both sides of the two branches of the Lys and the heights between them; however his outposts remained at Conchez, and Pierre Soult, again getting upon the Pau road, detached a hundred chosen troopers against the allies' communication with Orthez. Captain Dania, commanding these men, making a forced march, reached Hagetmau at nightfall, surprised six officers and eight medical men with their baggage, made a number of other prisoners, and returned on the evening of the 18th. This enterprise, extended to such a distance from the army, was supposed to be executed by the bands, and seemed to indicate a disposition for insurrection; wherefore lord Wellington to check it seized the civil authorities at Hagetmau, and declared that he would hang all the peasants caught in arms and burn their villages.

The offensive movement of the French general had now terminated, he sent his conscripts at once to Toulouse, and prepared for a rapid retreat on that place. His recent operations had been commenced too late; he should have been on the Lys the 10th or 11th, when there were not more than twenty thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred cavalry to oppose him between Aire and Garlin. On the other hand, the passive state of Wellington, which had been too much prolonged, was now also at an end; all his reinforcements and detachments were either up or close at hand, and he could put in motion six Anglo-Portuguese and three Spanish divisions of infantry furnishing forty thousand bayonets, with five brigades of cavalry furnishing nearly six thousand sabres, and from fifty to sixty pieces of artillery.

On the evening of the 17th, the English general pushed the hussars up the valley of the Adour, towards Plaisance, supporting them with the light division, which was followed at the distance of half a march by the fourth division coming from the side of Roquefort, on its return from Langon.

The 18th, at daylight, the whole army was in movement, the hussars with the light and the fourth division, forming the left, marched upon Plaisance; Hill's troops, forming the right, marched from Garlin upon Conchez, keeping a detachment on the road to Pau in observation of Pierre Soult's cavalry. The main body moved in the centre, under Wellington in person, to Vielle, by the high road leading from Aire to Maubourguet. The French right was thus turned by the valley of the Adour, while general Hill with a sharp skirmish, in which about eighty British and Germans were killed and wounded, drove back their outposts upon Lembeie.

Soult retired during the night to a strong ridge, having a small river with rugged banks, called the Laiza, in his front, and his right under D'Erlon was extended towards Vic en Bigorre on the great road of Tarbes. Meanwhile Berton's cavalry, one regiment of which retreating from Vielle on the 16th disengaged itself with some difficulty and loss, reached Maubourguet and took post in column behind that place, the road being confined on each side by deep and wide ditches. In this situation, pressed by Bock's cavalry, which preceded the centre column of the allies, the French horsemen suddenly charged the Germans, at first with success, taking an officer and some men, but finally they were beaten and retreated through Vic en Bigorre. Soult, thinking a

flanking column only was on this side in the valley of the Adour, resolved to fall upon it with his whole army; but he recognized the skill of his opponent when he found that the whole of the allies' centre, moving by Madiran, had been thrown on to the Tarbes road while he was retiring from Lembeie. This heavy mass was now approaching Vic en Bigorre, the light division, coming from Plaisance up the right bank of the Adour were already near Auriebat, pointing to Rabasteins, upon which place the hussars had already driven the French cavalry left in observation when the army first advanced: Vic en Bigorre was thus turned, Berton's horsemen had passed it in retreat, and the danger was imminent. The French general immediately ordered Berton to support the cavalry regiment at Rabasteins, and cover that road to Tarbes. Then directing D'Erlon to take post at Vic en Bigorre and check the allies on the main road, he marched, in person and in all haste, with Clauzel's and Reille's divisions, to Tarbes by a circuitous road leading through Ger-sur-Landes.

D'Erlon, not seeming to comprehend the crisis, moved slowly, with his baggage in front, and having the river Lechez to cross, rode on before his troops, expecting to find Berton at Vic en Bigorre; but he met the German cavalry there. Then indeed he hurried his march, yet he had only time to place Daricau's division, now under general Paris, amongst some vineyards, two miles in front of Vic en Bigorre, when hither came Picton to the support of the cavalry and fell upon him.

COMBAT OF VIC EN BIGORRE.

The French left flank was secured by the Lechez river, but their right, extending towards the Adour, being loose was menaced by the German cavalry, while the front was attacked by Picton. The action commenced about two o'clock, and Paris was soon driven back in disorder, but then D'Armagnac's division entered the line and extending to the Adour renewed the fight, which lasted until D'Erlon, after losing many men, saw his right turned, beyond the Adour, by the light division and by the hussars, who were now close to Rabasteins; whereupon he likewise fell back behind Vic en Bigorre, and took post for the night. The action was vigorous. About two hundred and fifty Anglo-Portuguese, men and officers, fell, and amongst them died colonel Henry Sturgeon, so often mentioned in this history. Skilled to excellence in almost every branch of war, and possessing a variety of accomplishments, he used his gifts so gently for himself and so usefully for the service that envy offered no bar to admiration, and the whole army felt painfully mortified that his merits were passed unnoticed in the public despatches.

Soult's march through the deep sandy plain of Ger was harassing, and would have been dangerous if Wellington had sent Hill's cavalry, now reinforced by two regiments of heavy dragoons, in pursuit; but the country was unfavourable for quick observation, and the French covered their movements with rear-guards whose real numbers it was difficult to ascertain. One of these bodies was posted on a hill the end of which abutted on the high road, the slope being clothed with trees and defended by skirmishers. Lord Wellington was desirous to know whether a small or a large force thus barred his way, but all who endeavoured to ascertain the fact were stopped by the fire of the enemy. At last captain William Light, distinguished by the variety of his attainments, an artist, musician, mechanist, seaman and soldier, made the trial. He rode forward as if

he would force his way through the French skirmishers, but when in the wood dropped his reins and leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of the enemy's light troops, and they thinking him mortally hurt ceased their fire and took no further notice. He thus passed unobserved through the wood to the other side of the hill, where there were no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit above, put spurs to his horse and galloped along the French main line counting their regiments as he passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence and his speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged, while he, dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the very skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed in front. Reaching the spot where lord Wellington stood, he told him there were but five battalions on the hill.

Soult now felt that a rapid retreat upon Toulouse by St. Gaudens was inevitable, yet determined to dispute every position which offered the least advantage, his army was on the morning of the 20th again in line of battle on the heights of Oleac, two or three miles behind Tarbes, and covering Tournai on the road to St. Gaudens; however he still held Tarbes with Clauzel's corps, which was extended on the right towards Trie, as if to retain a power of retreat by that road to Toulouse. The plain of Tarbes, although apparently open, was full of deep ditches which forbade the action of horsemen; wherefore he sent his brother with five regiments of cavalry to the Trie road, with orders to cover the right flank and observe the route to Auch, for he feared lest Wellington should intercept his retreat by that line.

At daybreak the allies again advanced in two columns. The right under Hill moved along the high road. The left under Wellington in person was composed of the light division and hussars, Ponsonby's heavy cavalry, the sixth division and Freyre's Spaniards. It marched by the road from Rabasteins, and general Cole, still making forced marches with the fourth division and Vivian's cavalry, followed from Beaumarchez and La Devèse, sending detachments through Marciac to watch Pierre Soult on the side of Trie.

COMBAT OF TARDES.

The Adour separated Wellington's columns, but when the left approached Tarbes, the light division and the hussars bringing up their right shoulders attacked the centre of Harispe's division, which occupied the heights of Orleix and commanded the road from Rabasteins with two guns. Under cover of this attack, general Clinton made a flank movement to his left through the village of Dours, and opening a cannonade against Harispe's right endeavoured to get between that general and Soult's main position at Oleac. Meanwhile general Hill, moving by the other bank of the Adour, assailed the town and bridge of Tarbes, which was defended by Villatte's division. These operations were designed to envelope and crush Clauzel's two divisions, which seemed the more easy because there appeared to be only a fine plain, fit for the action of all the cavalry between him and Soult. The latter however, having sent his baggage and encumbrances off during the night, saw the movement without alarm; he was better acquainted with the nature of the plain behind Harispe, and had made roads to enable him to retreat upon the second position without passing through Tarbes. Nevertheless Clauzel was in some danger, for while Hill menaced his left at

Tarbes, the light division supported with cavalry and some guns fell upon his centre at Orleix, and general Clinton opening a brisk cannonade passed through the villages of Oleac and Boulon, penetrated between Harispe and Pierre Soult, and cut the latter off from the army.

The action was begun about twelve o'clock. Hill's artillery thundered on the right, Clinton's answered it on the left, and Alten threw the light division in mass upon the centre, where Harispe's left brigade posted on a strong hill was suddenly assailed by three rifle battalions. Here the fight was short, yet wonderfully fierce and violent; for the French, probably thinking their opponents to be Portuguese on account of their green dress, charged with great hardness, and being encountered by men not accustomed to yield, they fought muzzle to muzzle, and it was difficult to judge at first who would win. At last the French gave way, and Harispe's centre being thus suddenly overthrown he retired rapidly through the fields, by the ways previously opened, before Clinton could get into his rear. Meanwhile Hill forced the passage of the Adour at Tarbes, and Villatte also retreated along the high road to Tournai, but under a continued cannonade. The flat country was now covered with confused masses of pursuers and pursued, all moving precipitately with an eager musketry, the French guns also replying as they could to the allies' artillery. The situation of the retreating troops seemed desperate, but as Soult had foreseen, the deep ditches and enclosures and the small copses, villages and farm-houses, prevented the British cavalry from acting; Clauzel therefore, extricating his troops with great ability from their dangerous situation, finally gained the main position, where four fresh divisions were drawn up in order of battle, and immediately opened all their batteries on the allies. The pursuit was thus checked, and before lord Wellington could make arrangements for a new attack darkness came on, and the army halted on the banks of the Larret and Larros rivers. The loss of the French is unknown; that of the allies did not exceed one hundred and twenty, but of that number twelve officers and eighty men were of the rifle battalions.

During the night Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on different hills as points of direction. The next day he reached St. Gaudens with D'Erlon's and Reille's corps, while Clauzel, who had retreated across the fields, halted at Monrejeau, and was there rejoined by Pierre Soult's cavalry. This march of more than thirty miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner. For the French general, having now seen nearly all Wellington's infantry and his five thousand horsemen, and hearing from his brother that the fourth division and Vivian's cavalry were pointing towards Mielan on his right, feared that the allies would by Trie and Castelnau suddenly gain the plains of Muret and intercept his retreat upon Toulouse, which was his great depot, the knot of all his future combinations, and the only position where he could hope to make a successful stand with his small army.

The allies pursued in three columns by St. Gaudens, Galan and Trie, but their marches were short.

On the 21st, Beresford who had assumed the command of the left column was at Castelnau, Hill in the vicinity of Lannemezan, Wellington at Tournai.

The 22d, Beresford was at Castelnau, Wellington at Galan, Hill at Monrejeau, and Fane's horsemen pushed forwards to St. Gaudens. Here four squad-

rons of French cavalry were drawn up in front of the town. Overthrown by two squadrons of the thirteenth dragoons at the first shock, they galloped in disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the other side and were again broken and pursued for two miles, many being sabred and above a hundred taken prisoners. In this action the veteran major Dogherty of the thirteenth was seen charging between his two sons at the head of the leading squadron.

On the 23d, Hill was at St. Gaudens, Beresford at Puymauren, Wellington at Bouloigne.

The 24th, Hill was in St. Martori, Beresford in Lombez, Wellington at Isle en Dodon.

The 25th, Hill entered Cazères, Beresford reached St. Foy, and Wellington was at Samatan.

The 26th, Beresford entered St. Lys, and marching in order of battle by his left, while his cavalry skirmished on the right, took post on the Auch road behind the Aussonnelle stream, facing the French army, which was on the Touch covering Toulouse. The allies thus took seven days to march what Soult had done in four.

This tardiness, idly characterized by French military writers as the sign of timidity and indecision of character, has been by English writers excused on the score of wet weather, and the encumbrance of a large train of artillery and pontoons; yet the rain equally affected the French, and the pontoons might have been as usefully waited for on the Garonne, after the French army had been pressed in its retreat of ninety miles. It is more probable that the English general, not exactly informed of Soult's real numbers nor of his true line of retreat, nor perfectly acquainted with the country, was cautious; because, being then acrimoniously disputing with the duke of Angoulême, he was also uneasy as to the state of the country behind him and on his flanks. The partisans were beginning to stir, his reinforcements from England and Portugal were stopped, and admiral Penrose had not yet entered the Garonne. On the other hand, Ferdinand had entered Spain and formed that engagement with Suchet about the garrisons already mentioned. In fine, lord Wellington found himself with about forty-five thousand men composed of different nations, the Spaniards being almost as dangerous as useful to him, opposed to an able and obstinate enemy, and engaged on a line of operations running more than a hundred and fifty miles along the French frontier. His right flank was likely to be vexed by the partisans forming in the Pyrenees, his left flank by those behind the Garonne, on the right bank of which a considerable regular force was also collecting, while the generals commanding the military districts beyond Toulouse were forming corps of volunteers, national guards and soldiers of the regular depots: and ever he expected Suchet to arrive on his front and overmatch him in numbers. He was careful therefore to keep his troops well in hand, and to spare them fatigue that the hospitals might not increase. In battle their bravery would, he knew, bring him through any crisis, but if wearing down their numbers by forced marches he should cover the country with small posts and hospital stations, the French people would be tempted to rise against him. So little therefore was his caution allied to timidity that it was no slight indication of daring to have advanced at all.

It does seem, however, that with an overwhelming cavalry, and great superiority of artillery, he should not have suffered the French general so to escape his hands. It must be admitted also that Soult proved himself a very able commander. His

halting on the Adour, his success in reviving the courage of his army, and the front he showed in hopes to prevent his adversary from detaching troops against Bordeaux, were proofs not only of a firm unyielding temper, but of a clear and ready judgment. For though, contrary to his hopes, lord Wellington did send Beresford against Bordeaux, it was not on military grounds, but because treason was there to aid him. Meanwhile he was forced to keep his army for fifteen days passive within a few miles of an army he had just defeated, permitting his adversary to reorganize and restore the discipline and courage of the old troops, to rally the dispersed conscripts, to prepare the means of a partisan warfare, to send off all his encumbrances and sick to Toulouse, and to begin fortifying that city as a final and secure retreat; for the works there were commenced on the 3d or 4th of March, and at this time the intrenchments covering the bridge and suburb of St. Cyprien were nearly completed. The French general was even the first to retake the offensive after Orthez, too late indeed, and he struck no important blow, and twice placed his army in dangerous situations; but his delay was a matter of necessity arising from the loss of his magazines, and if he got into difficulties they were inseparable from his operations, and he extricated himself again.

That he gained no advantages in fight is rather an argument for lord Wellington than against Soult. The latter sought but did not find a favourable opportunity to strike, and it would have been unwise, because his adversary gave him no opening, to have fallen desperately upon superior numbers in a strong position with an army so recently defeated, and whose restored confidence it was so essential not to shake again by a repulse. He increased that confidence by appearing to insult the allied army with an inferior force, and in combination with his energetic proclamation encouraged the Napoleonists and alarmed the Bourbonists; lastly, by his rapid retreat from Tarbes he gained two days to establish and strengthen himself on his grand position at Toulouse. And certainly he deceived his adversary, no common general, and at the head of no common army; for so little did Wellington expect him to make a determined stand there, that in a letter written on the 26th to sir John Hope, he says, "I fear the Garonne is too full and large for our bridge: if not we shall be in that town (Toulouse) I hope immediately."

The French general's firmness and the extent of his views cannot however be fairly judged by merely considering his movements in the field. Having early proved the power of his adversary, he had never deceived himself about the ultimate course of the campaign, and therefore struggled without hope, a hard and distressing task; yet he showed no faintness, fighting continually, and always for delay, as thinking Suchet would finally cast personal feelings aside and strike for his country. Nor did he forbear importuning that marshal to do so. Notwithstanding his previous disappointments, he wrote to him again on the 9th February, urging the danger of the crisis, the certainty that the allies would make the greatest effort on the western frontier, and praying him to abandon Catalonia and come with the bulk of his troops to Béarn: in the same strain he wrote to the minister of war, and his letters reached their destinations on the 13th. Suchet, having no orders to the contrary, could therefore have joined him with thirteen thousand men before the battle of Orthez; but that marshal, giving a deceptive statement of his forces in reply, coldly observed that if he marched any where it would be to join the emperor and not

the duke of Dalmatia. The latter continued, notwithstanding, to inform him of all his battles and his movements, and his accumulating distresses, yet in vain; and Suchet's apathy would be incredible but for the unequivocal proofs of it furnished in the work of the French engineer Choumara.

CHAPTER V.

Views of the commanders on each side—Wellington designs to throw a bridge over the Garonne at Portet above Toulouse, but below the confluence of the Arriège and Garonne—The river is found too wide for the pontoons—He changes his design—Cavalry action at St. Martin de Touch—General Hill passes the Garonne at Pensaguel above the confluence of the Arriège—Marches upon Cintegabelle—Crosses the Arriège—Finds the country too deep for his artillery and returns to Pensaguel—Recrosses the Garonne—Soult fortifies Toulouse and the Mont Rave—Lord Wellington sends his pontoons down the Garonne—Passes that river at Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse, with twenty thousand men—The river floods and his bridge is taken up—The waters subside—The bridge is again laid—The Spaniards pass—Lord Wellington advances up the right bank to Fenouillet—Combat of cavalry—The eighteenth hussars win the bridge of Croix d'Orade—Lord Wellington resolves to attack Soult on the 9th of April—Orders the pontoons to be taken up and relaid higher up the Garonne at Seilh, in the night of the 8th—Time is lost in the execution and the attack is deferred—The light division cross at Seilh on the morning of the 10th—Battle of Toulouse.

THE two armies being now once more in presence of each other, and with an equal resolution to fight, it is fitting to show the peculiar calculations upon which the generals founded their respective combinations. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew the country, and chose Toulouse as a strategic post, because that ancient capital of the south contained fifty thousand inhabitants, commanded the principal passage of the Garonne, was the centre of a great number of roads on both sides of that river, and the chief military arsenal of the south of France. Here he could most easily feed his troops, assemble, arm and discipline the conscripts, control and urge the civil authorities, and counteract the machinations of the discontented. Posted at Toulouse he was master of various lines of operations. He could retire upon Suchet by Carcassonne, or towards Lyons by Albi. He could take a new position behind the Tarn, and prolong the contest by defending successively that river and the Lot, retreating if necessary upon Decaen's army of the Gironde, and thus drawing the allies down the right bank of the Garonne as he had before drawn them up the left bank, being well assured that lord Wellington must follow him, and with weakened forces, as it would be necessary to leave troops in observation of Suchet.

His first care was to place a considerable body of troops, collected from the depots and other parts of the interior at Montauban, under the command of general Loverdo, with orders to construct a bridgehead on the left of the Tarn. The passage of that river, and a strong point of retreat and assembly for all the detachments sent to observe the Garonne below Toulouse, was thus secured, and withal the command of a number of great roads leading to the interior of France, consequently the power of making fresh combinations. To maintain himself as long as possible in Toulouse was however a great political object. It was the last point which connected him at once with Suchet and with Decaen; and while he held it both the latter general and the partisans in the mountains about Lourdes could act, each on their own side, against the long lines of communications maintained by Wellington with Bordeaux and Bayonne. Suchet also could do the

same, either by marching with his whole force or sending a detachment through the Arriège department to the upper Garonne, where general Laffitte having seven or eight hundred men, national guards and other troops, was already in activity. These operations Soult now strongly urged Suchet to adopt; but the latter treated the proposition, as he had done all those before made from the same quarter, with contempt.

Toulouse was not less valuable as a position of battle.

The Garonne, flowing on the west, presented to the allies a deep loop, at the bottom of which was the bridge, completely covered by the suburb of St. Cyprien, itself protected by an ancient brick wall three feet thick and flanked by two massive towers; these defences Soult had improved, and he added a line of exterior intrenchments.

Beyond the Garonne was the city, surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and so thick as to admit sixteen and twenty-four-pound guns.

The great canal of Languedoc, which joined the Garonne a few miles below the town, wound for the most part within point blank shot of the walls, covering them on the north and east as the Garonne and St. Cyprien did on the west.

The suburbs of St. Etienne and Guillemerie, built on both sides of this canal, furnished outworks on the west, for they were intrenched and connected with and covered by the hills of Sacarin and Cambon, also intrenched and flanking the approaches to the canal both above and below these suburbs.

Eight hundred yards beyond these hills a strong ridge, called the Mont Rave, ran nearly parallel with the canal: its outer slope was exceedingly rugged and overlooked a marshy plain through which the Ers river flowed.

The south side of the town opened on a plain; but the suburb of St. Michel lying there, between the Garonne and the canal, furnished another advanced defence, and at some distance beyond, a range of heights called the Pech David commenced, trending up the Garonne in a direction nearly parallel to that river.

Such being the French general's position, he calculated that as lord Wellington could not force the passage by the suburb of St. Cyprien without an enormous sacrifice of men, he must seek to turn the flanks above or below Toulouse, and leave a sufficient force to blockade St. Cyprien under pain of having the French army issue on that side against his communications. If he passed the Garonne above its confluence with the Arriège, he would have to cross that river also, which could not be effected nearer than Cintegabelle, one march higher up. Then he must come down by the right of the Arriège, an operation not to be feared in a country which the recent rains had rendered impracticable for guns. If the allies passed the Garonne below the confluence of the Arriège, Soult judged that he could from the Pech David, and its continuation, overlook their movements, and that he should be in position to fall upon the head of their column while in the disorder of passing the river: if he failed in this he had still Toulouse and the heights of Mont Rave to retire upon, where he could fight again, his retreat being secure upon Montauban.

For these reasons the passage of the Garonne above Toulouse would lead to no decisive result, and he did not fear it; but a passage below the city was a different matter. Lord Wellington could thus cut him off from Montauban and attack Toulouse from the northern and eastern quarters; and if the French then lost the battle they could only retreat by Car-

cassonne to form a junction with Suchet in Roussillon, where, having their backs to the mountains and the allies between them and France, they could not exist. Hence, feeling certain the attack would finally be on that side, Soult lined the left bank of the Garonne with his cavalry as far as the confluence of the Tarn, and called up general Despeaux's troops from Agen in the view of confining the allies to the space between the Tarn and the Garonne: for his first design was to attack them there rather than lose his communication with Montauban.

On the other hand, lord Wellington, whether from error, from necessity, or for the reasons I have before touched upon, having suffered the French army to gain three day's march in the retreat from Tarbes, had now little choice of operations. He could not halt until the Andalusians and Del Parque's troops should join him from the Bastan, without giving Soult all the time necessary to strengthen himself and organize his plan of defence, nor without appearing fearful and weak in the eyes of the French people, which would have been most dangerous. Still less could he wait for the fall of Bayonne. He had taken the offensive, and could not resume the defensive with safety: the invasion of France once begun it was imperative to push it to a conclusion. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers, his business was to bring his adversary to battle as soon as possible, and as he could not force his way through St. Cyprien in face of the whole French army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse.

It has been already shown that in a strategic view this passage should have been made below that town, but seeing that the south side of the city was the most open to attack, the English general resolved to cast his bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse, designing to throw his right wing suddenly into the open country between the Garonne and the canal of Languedoc, while with his centre and left he assailed the suburbs of Cyprien. With this object, at eight o'clock in the evening of the 27th, one of Hill's brigades marched up from Muret, some men were ferried over and the bridge was commenced, the remainder of that general's troops being to pass at midnight. But when the river was measured the width was found too great for the pontoons, and there were no means of substituting trestles, wherefore this plan was abandoned. Had it been executed, some considerable advantage would probably have been gained, since it does not appear that Soult knew of the attempt until two days later, and then only by his emissaries, not by his scouts.

Wellington, thus baffled, tried another scheme; he drove the enemy from the Touch river on the 28th, and collected the infantry of his left and centre about Portet, masking the movement with his cavalry. In the course of the operation a single squadron of the eighteenth hussars, under major Hughes, being inconsiderately pushed by colonel Vivian across the bridge of St. Martin de la Touch, suddenly came upon a whole regiment of French cavalry; the rashness of the act, as often happens in war, proved the safety of the British, for the enemy thinking that a strong support must be at hand discharged their carbines and retreated at a canter. Hughes followed, the speed of both sides increased, and as the nature of the road did not admit of any egress to the sides, this great body of French horsemen was pushed headlong by a few men under the batteries of St. Cyprien.

During these movements Hill's troops were withdrawn to St. Roque; but in the night of the 30th, a new bridge being laid near Pensaguel, two miles

above the confluence of the Arriège, that general passed the Garonne with two divisions of infantry, Morillo's Spaniards, Gardiner's and Maxwell's artillery, and Fane's cavalry, in all thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets, eighteen guns, and a rocket brigade. The advanced guard moved with all expedition by the great road, having orders to seize the stone bridge of Cintegabelle, fifteen miles up the Arriège, and, on the march, to secure a ferry-boat known to be at Vinergue. The remainder of the troops followed, the intent being to pass the Arriège river hastily at Cintegabelle, and so come down the right bank to attack Toulouse on the south while lord Wellington assailed St. Cyprien. This march was to have been made privily in the night; but the bridge, though ordered for the evening of the 30th, was not finished until five o'clock in the morning of the 31st. Soult thus got notice of the enterprise in time to observe from the heights of Old Toulouse the strength of the column, and to ascertain that the great body of the army still remained in front of St. Cyprien. The marshy nature of the country on the right of the Arriège was known to him, and the suburbs of St. Michel and St. Etienne being now in a state to resist a partial attack, the matter appeared a feint to draw off a part of his army from Toulouse while St. Cyprien was assaulted, or the Garonne passed below the city. In this persuasion he kept his infantry in hand, and sent only his cavalry up the right bank of the Arriège to observe the march of the allies; but he directed general Laffitte, who had collected some regular horsemen and the national guards of the department, to hang upon their skirts and pretend to be the van of Suchet's army. He was however somewhat disquieted, because the baggage, which to avoid encumbering the march had been sent up the Garonne to cross at Carbonne, being seen by his scouts was reported to be a second column, increasing Hill's force to eighteen thousand men.

While in this uncertainty he heard of the measurement of the river made at Portet on the night of the 27th, and that many guns were still collected there; wherefore, being ignorant of the cause why the bridge was not thrown, he concluded there was a design to cross there also when Hill should descend the Arriège. To meet this danger, he put four divisions under Clauzel, with orders to fall upon the head of the allies if they should attempt the passage before Hill came down, resolving in the contrary case to fight in the suburbs of Toulouse and on the Mont Rave, because the positions on the right of the Arriège were all favourable to the assailants. He was however soon relieved from anxiety. General Hill effected indeed the passage of the Arriège at Cintegabelle, and sent his cavalry towards Villefranche and Nailloux, but his artillery were quite unable to move in the deep country there; and as success and safety alike depended on rapidity, he returned during the night to Pensaguel, recrossed the Garonne, and taking up his pontoons left only a flying bridge with a small guard of infantry and cavalry on the right bank. His retreat was followed by Laffitte's horsemen, who picked up a few stragglers and mules, but no other event occurred, and Soult remained well pleased that his adversary had thus lost three or four important days.

The French general was now sure the next attempt would be below Toulouse, yet he changed his design of marching down the Garonne to fight between that river and the Tarn rather than lose his communications with Montauban. Having completed his works of defence for the city and the suburbs, and fortified all the branches over the canal,

he concluded not to abandon Toulouse under any circumstances, and therefore set his whole army and all the working population to intrench the Mont Rave, between the canal and the Ers river, thinking he might thus securely meet the shock of battle let it come on which side it would. Meanwhile the Garonne continued so full and rapid that lord Wellington was forced to remain inactive before St. Cyprien until the evening of the 3d of April; then the waters falling, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse, where the bridge was at last thrown and thirty guns placed in battery on the left bank to protect it. The third, fourth and sixth divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry, the whole under Beresford, immediately passed, and the cavalry being pushed out two leagues on the front and flanks captured a large herd of bullocks destined for the French army. But now the river again swelled so fast, that the light division and the Spaniards were unable to follow, the bridge got damaged, and the pontoons were taken up.

This passage was made known to Soult immediately by his cavalry scouts, yet he knew not the exact force which had crossed; and as Morillo's Spaniards, whom he mistook for Freyre's, had taken the outposts in front of St. Cyprien, he imagined Hill also had moved to Grenade, and that the greatest part of the allied army was over the Garonne. Wherefore merely observing Beresford with his cavalry, he continued to strengthen his field of battle about Toulouse, his resolution to keep that city being confirmed by hearing, on the 7th, that the allied sovereigns had entered Paris.

On the 8th the waters subsided, the allies' bridge was again laid down, Freyre's Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery crossed, and lord Wellington taking the command in person advanced to the heights of Fenouillet within five miles of Toulouse. Marching up both banks of the Ers, his columns were separated by that river, which was impassable without pontoons, and it was essential to secure as soon as possible one of the stone bridges. Hence when his left approached the heights of Kyrie Eleison, on the great road of Albi, Vivian's horsemen drove Berton's cavalry up the right of the Ers towards the bridge of Bordes, and the eighteenth hussars descended towards that of Croix d'Orade. The latter was defended by Vial's dragoons, and after some skirmishing the eighteenth was suddenly menaced by a regiment in front of the bridge, the opposite bank of the river being lined with dismounted carbineers. The two parties stood facing each other; hesitating to begin, until the approach of some British infantry, when both sides sounded the charge at the same moment; but the English horses were so quick, the French were in an instant jammed up on the bridge, their front ranks were sabred, and the mass breaking away to the rear went off in disorder, leaving many killed and wounded and above a hundred prisoners in the hands of the victors. They were pursued through the village of Croix d'Orade, but beyond it they rallied on the rest of their brigade and advanced again; the hussars then recrossed the bridge, which was now defended by the British infantry whose fire stopped the French cavalry. The communication between the allied columns was thus secured.

The credit of this brilliant action was given to colonel Vivian in the despatch, incorrectly, for that officer was wounded by a carbine shot previous to the charge at the bridge: the attack was conceived and conducted entirely by major Hughes of the eighteenth.

Lord Wellington, from the heights of Kyrie Eleison, carefully examined the French general's position, and resolved to attack on the 9th. Meanwhile to shorten his communications with general Hill he directed the pontoons to be removed from Grenade and relaid higher up at Seilh. The light division was to cross at the latter place at daybreak, but the bridge was not relaid until late in the day, and the English general, extremely incensed at the failure, was forced to defer his battle until the 10th.

Soult's combinations were now crowned with success. He had by means of his fortresses, his battles, the sudden change of his line of operations after Orthez, his rapid retreat from Tarbes, and his clear judgment in fixing upon Toulouse as his next point of resistance, reduced the strength of his adversary to an equality with his own. He had gained seventeen days for preparation, had brought the allies to deliver battle on ground naturally adapted for defence, and well fortified; where one-third of their force was separated by a great river from the rest, where they could derive no advantage from their numerous cavalry, and were overmatched in artillery notwithstanding their previous superiority in that arm.

His position covered three sides of Toulouse. Defending St. Cyprien on the west with his left, he guarded the canal on the north with his centre, and with his right held the Mont Rave on the east. His reserve under Travot manned the ramparts of Toulouse, and the urban guards while maintaining tranquillity aided to transport the artillery and ammunition to different posts. Hill was opposed to his left, but while the latter, well fortified at St. Cyprien, had short and direct communication with the centre by the great bridge of Toulouse, the former could only communicate with the main body under Wellington by the pontoon bridge at Seilh, a circuit of ten or twelve miles.

The English general was advancing from the north, but his intent was still to assail the city on the south side, where it was weakest in defence. With this design he had caused the country on the left of the Ers to be carefully examined, in the view of making under cover of that river a flank march round the eastern front, and thus gaining the open ground which he had formerly endeavoured to reach by passing at Portet and Pensaguel. But again he was baffled by the deep country, which he could not master so as to pass the Ers by force, because all the bridges, with the exception of that of Croix d'Orade, were mined or destroyed by Soult, and the whole of the pontoons were on the Garonne. There was then no choice save to attack from the northern and eastern sides. The first, open and flat, and easily approached by the great roads of Montauban and Albi, was yet impregnable in defence, because the canal, the bridges over which were strongly defended by works, was under the fire of the ramparts of Toulouse, and for the most part within musket-shot. Here then, as at St. Cyprien, it was a fortress and not a position which was opposed to him, and his field of battle was necessarily confined to the Mont Rave or eastern front.

This range of heights, naturally strong and rugged, and covered by the Ers river, which as we have seen was not to be forded, presented two distinct platforms, that of Calvignet, and that of St. Sympère on which the extreme right of the French was posted. Between them, where the ground dipped a little, two roads leading from Lavaur and Caraman were conducted to Toulouse, passing the canal behind the ridge at the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Etienne.

The Calvinet platform was fortified on its extreme left with a species of hornwork, consisting of several open retrenchments and small works, supported by two large redoubts, one of which flanked the approaches to the canal on the north: a range of abatis was also formed there by felling the trees on the Albi road. Continuing this line to the right, two other large forts, called the Calvinet and the Colombette redoubts, terminated the works on this platform.

On that of St. Sypière there were also two redoubts, one on the extreme right called St. Sypière, the other without a name nearer to the road of Carman.

The whole range of heights occupied was about two miles long, and an army attacking in front would have to cross the Ers under fire, advance through ground naturally steep and marshy, and now rendered almost impassable by means of artificial inundations, to the assault of the ridge and the works on the summit; and if the assailants should even force between the two platforms, they would, while their flanks were battered by the redoubts above, come upon the works of Cambon and Sacarin. If these fell, the suburbs of Guillemerie and St. Etienne, the canal, and finally the ramparts of the town, would still have to be carried in succession. But it was not practicable to pass the Ers except by the bridge of Croix d'Orade, which had been seized so happily on the 8th. Lord Wellington was therefore reduced to make a flank march under fire, between the Ers and the Mont Rave, and then to carry the latter with a view of crossing the canal above the suburb of Guillemerie, and establishing his army on the south side of Toulouse, where only the city could be assailed with any hope of success.

To impose this march upon him all Soult's dispositions had been directed. For this he had mined all the bridges on the Ers, save only that of Croix d'Orade, thus facilitating a movement between the Ers and the Mont Rave, while he impeded one beyond that river by sending half his cavalry over to dispute the passage of the numerous streams in the deep country on the right bank. His army was now disposed in the following order. General Reille defended the suburb of St. Cyprien with Taupin's and Maransin's divisions. Daricau's division lined the canal on the north from its junction with the Garonne to the road of Albi, defending with his left the bridge-head of Jumeaux, the convent of the Minimes with his centre, and the Matabiau bridge with his right. Harispe's division was established in the works on the Mont Rave. His right at St. Sypière looked towards the bridge of Bordes, his centre was at the Colombette redoubt, about which Vial's horsemen were also collected; his left looked down the road of Albi towards the bridge of Croix d'Orade. On this side a detached eminance within cannon-shot, called "the hill of Pugade," was occupied by St. Pol's brigade, drawn from Villatte's division. The two remaining divisions of infantry were formed in columns at certain points behind the Mont Rave, and Travot's reserve continued to man the walls of Toulouse behind the canal. This line of battle presented an angle towards the Croix d'Orade, each side about two miles in length and the apex covered by the brigade on the Pugade.

Wellington having well observed the ground on the 8th and 9th, made the following disposition of attack for the 10th. General Hill was to menace St. Cyprien, augmenting or abating his efforts to draw the enemy's attention according to the progress of the battle on the right of the Garonne, which he could easily discern. The third and light divi-

sions and Freyre's Spaniards, being already on the left of the Ers, were to advance against the northern front of Toulouse. The two first, supported by Bock's German cavalry, were to make demonstrations against the line of canal defended by Daricau. That is to say, Picton was to menace the bridge of Jumeaux and the convent of the Minimes, while Alten maintained the communication between him and Freyre, who, reinforced with the Portuguese artillery, was to carry the hill of Pugade and then halt to cover Beresford's column of march. This last, composed of the fourth and sixth divisions with three batteries, was, after passing the bridge of Croix d'Orade, to move round the left of the Pugade and along the low ground between the French heights and the Ers, until the rear should pass the road of Lavaur, when the two divisions were to wheel into line and attack the platform of St. Sypière. Freyre was then to assail that of Calvinet, and Ponsonby's dragoons following close were to connect that general's left with Beresford's column.

Meanwhile lord Edward Somerset's hussars were to move up the left of the Ers, while Vivian's cavalry moved up the right of that river, each destined to observe Berton's cavalry, which having possession of the bridges of Bordes and Montaudran higher up, could pass from the right bank to the left, and destroying the bridge fall upon the head of Beresford's troops while in march.

BATTLE OF TOULOUSE.

The 10th of April, at two o'clock in the morning, the light division passed the Garonne by the bridge at Seilh, and about six o'clock the whole army moved forwards in the order assigned for the different columns. Picton and Alten, on the right, drove the French advanced posts behind the works at the bridge over the canal. Freyre's columns, marching along the Albi road, were cannonaded by St. Pol with two guns until they had passed a small stream by the help of some temporary bridges, when the French general following his instructions retired to the hornwork on the Calvinet platform. The Spaniards were thus established on the Pugade, from whence the Portuguese guns under major Arentschild opened a heavy cannonade against Calvinet. Meanwhile Beresford, preceded by the hussars, marched from Croix d'Orade in three columns abreast. Passing behind the Pugade, through the village of Montblanc, he entered the marshy ground between the Ers river and the Mont Rave, but he left his artillery at Montblanc, fearing to engage it in that deep and difficult country under the fire of an enemy. Beyond the Ers on his left, Vivian's cavalry, now under colonel Arentschild, drove Berton's horsemen back with loss, and nearly seized the bridge of Bordes, which the French general passed and destroyed with difficulty at the last moment. However the German hussars succeeded in gaining the bridge of Montaudran higher up, though it was barricaded, and defended by a detachment of cavalry sent there by Berton, who remained himself in position near the bridge of Bordes, looking down the left of the Ers.

While these operations were in progress, general Freyre, who had asked as a favour to lead the battle at Calvinet, whether from error or impatience assailed the hornwork on that platform about eleven o'clock, and while Beresford was still in march. The Spaniards, nine thousand strong, moved in two lines and a reserve, and advanced with great resolution at first, throwing forwards their flanks so as to embrace the end of the Calvinet hill. The French musketry and great guns thinned the ranks at every

step, yet closing upon their centre they still ascended the hill, the formidable fire they were exposed to increasing in violence until their right wing, which was also raked from the bridge of Matabiau, unable to endure the torment wavered. The leading ranks rushing madly onwards jumped for shelter into a hollow road, twenty-five feet deep in parts, and covering this part of the French intrenchments; but the left wing and the second line ran back in great disorder, the Cantabrian fusiliers under colonel Leon de Sicilia alone maintaining their ground under cover of a bank which protected them. Then the French came leaping out of their works with loud cries, and lining the edge of the hollow road poured an incessant stream of shot upon the helpless crowds entangled in the gulf below, while the battery from the bridge of Matabiau, constructed to rake this opening, sent its bullets from flank to flank hissing through the quivering mass of flesh and bones.

The Spanish generals rallying the troops who had fled, led them back again to the brink of the fatal hollow, but the frightful carnage below and the unmitigated fire in front filled them with horror. Again they fled, and again the French bounding from their trenches pursued, while several battalions sallying from the bridge of Matabiau and from behind the Calvint followed hard along the road of Albi. The country was now covered with fugitives whose headlong flight could not be restrained, and with pursuers whose numbers and vehemence increased, until lord Wellington, who was at that point, covered the panic-stricken troops with Ponsonby's cavalry, and the reserve artillery, which opened with great vigour. Meanwhile the Portuguese guns on the Pugade never ceased firing, and a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, menaced the flank of the victorious French, who immediately retired to their intrenchments on Calvint: but more than fifteen hundred Spaniards had been killed or wounded, and their defeat was not the only misfortune.

General Picton, regardless of his orders, which, his temper on such occasions being known, were especially given, had turned his false attack into a real one against the bridge of Jumeaux, and the enemy fighting from a work too high to be forced without ladders and approachable only along an open flat, repulsed him with a loss of nearly four hundred men and officers: amongst the latter colonel Forbes of the forty-fifth was killed, and general Brisbane who commanded the brigade was wounded. Thus from the hill of Pugade to the Garonne the French had completely vindicated their position, the allies had suffered enormously, and beyond the Garonne, although general Hill had now forced the first line of intrenchments covering St. Cyprien and was menacing the second line, the latter being much more contracted and very strongly fortified could not be stormed. The musketry battle therefore subsided for a time; but a prodigious cannonade was kept up along the whole of the French line, and on the allies' side from St. Cyprien to Montblanc, where the artillery left by Beresford, acting in conjunction with the Portuguese guns on the Pugade, poured its shot incessantly against the works on the Calvint platform: injudiciously, it has been said, because the ammunition thus used for a secondary object was afterwards wanted when a vital advantage might have been gained.

It was now evident that the victory must be won or lost by Beresford, and yet from Picton's error lord Wellington had no reserves to enforce the decision: for the light division and the heavy cavalry

only remained in hand, and these troops were necessarily retained to cover the rallying of the Spaniards, and to protect the artillery employed to keep the enemy in check. The crisis therefore approached with all happy promise to the French general. The repulse of Picton, the utter dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second line of intrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first Taupin's whole division, and then one of Maransin's brigades from that quarter, to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus three divisions and his cavalry, that is to say nearly fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement without in any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on the canal. With this mass he might have fallen upon Beresford, whose force, originally less than thirteen thousand bayonets, was cruelly reduced as it made slow and difficult way for two miles through a deep marshy country crossed and tangled with water-courses. For sometimes moving in mass, sometimes filing under the French musketry, and always under the fire of their artillery from the Mont Rave, without a gun to reply, the length of the column had augmented so much at every step from the difficulty of the way that frequent halts were necessary to close up the ranks.

The flat miry ground between the river and the heights became narrower and deeper as the troops advanced, Berton's cavalry was ahead, an impassable river was on the left, and three French divisions supported by artillery and horsemen overshadowed the right flank. Fortune came to their aid. Soult, always eyeing their march, had, when the Spaniards were defeated, carried Taupin's division to the platform of St. Sypière, and supporting it with a brigade of D'Armagnac's division disposed the whole about the redoubts. From thence, after a short hortative to act vigorously, he ordered Taupin to fall on with the utmost fury, at the same time directing a regiment of Vial's cavalry to descend the heights by the Lavour road and intercept the line of retreat, while Berton's horsemen assailed the other flank from the side of the bridge of Bordes. But this was not half of the force which the French general might have employed. Taupin's artillery, retarded in its march, was still in the streets of Toulouse, and that general instead of attacking at once took ground to his right, waiting until Beresford having completed his flank march had wheeled into lines at the foot of the heights.

Taupin's infantry, unskillfully arranged for action it is said, at last poured down the hill; but some rockets discharged in good time ravaged the ranks, and with their noise and terrible appearance, unknown before, dismayed the French soldiers. Then the British skirmishers running forwards plied them with a biting fire; and Lambert's brigade of the sixth division, aided by Anson's brigade and some provisional battalions of the fourth division—for it is an error to say the sixth division alone repulsed this attack—Lambert's brigade, I say, rushed forwards with a terrible shout, and the French turning fled back to the upper ground. Vial's horsemen trotting down the Lavour road now charged on the right flank; but the second and third lines of the sixth division being thrown into squares repulsed them; and on the other flank general Cole had been so sudden in his advance up the heights, that Berton's cavalry had no opportunity to charge. Lambert following hard upon the beaten infantry in his front, killed Taupin, wounded a general of brigade, and without a check won the summit of the platform, his skirmishers even descended in pursuit on the re-

verse slope; and meanwhile, on his left general Cole meeting with less resistance had still more rapidly gained the height at that side: so complete was the rout that the two redoubts were abandoned from panic, and the French with the utmost disorder sought shelter in the works of Sacarin and Cambon.

Soult, astonished at this weakness in troops from whom he had expected so much, and who had just before given him assurances of their resolution and confidence, was in fear that Beresford pushing his success would seize the bridge of the Demoiselles on the canal. Wherefore, covering the flight as he could with the remainder of Vial's cavalry, he hastily led D'Armagnac's reserve brigade to the works of Sacarin, checked the foremost British skirmishers and rallied the fugitives; Taupin's guns arrived from the town at the same moment, and the mischief being stayed a part of Travot's reserve immediately moved to defend the bridge of the Demoiselles. A fresh order of battle was thus organized; but the indomitable courage of the British soldiers overcoming all obstacles and all opposition, had decided the first great crisis of the fight.

Lambert's brigade immediately wheeled to its right across the platform on the line of the Lavour road, menacing the flank of the French on the Calvinet platform, while Pack's Scotch brigade and Douglas's Portuguese, composing the second and third lines of the sixth division, were disposed on the right with a view to march against the Colombette redoubts on the original front of the enemy. And now also the eighteenth and German hussars, having forced the bridge of Montaudran on the Ers river, came round the south end of the Mont Rave, where, in conjunction with the skirmishers of the fourth division, they menaced the bridge of the Demoiselles, from whence and from the works of Cambon and Sacarin the enemy's guns played incessantly.

The aspect and form of the battle were thus entirely changed. The French thrown entirely on the defensive occupied three sides of a square. Their right extending from the works of Sacarin to the redoubts of Calvinet and Colombette, was closely menaced by Lambert, who was solidly posted on the platform of St. Sypière, while the redoubts themselves were menaced by Pack and Douglas. The French left thrown back to the bridge-head at Matabiau awaited the renewed attack of the Spaniards, and the whole position was very strong, not exceeding a thousand yards on each side, with the angles all defended by formidable works. The canal and city of Toulouse, its walls and intrenched suburbs, offered a sure refuge in case of disaster, while the Matabiau on one side, Sacarin and Cambon on the other, ensured the power of retreat.

In this contracted space were concentrated Vial's cavalry, the whole of Villatte's division, one brigade of Maransin's, another of D'Armagnac's, and, with the exception of the regiment driven from the St. Sypière redoubt, the whole of Harispe's division. On the allies' side therefore defeat had been staved off, but victory was still to be contended for, and with apparently inadequate means; for Picton being successfully opposed by Daricau was so far paralyzed, the Spaniards rallying slowly were not to be depended upon for another attack, and there remained only the heavy cavalry and the light division, which lord Wellington could not venture to thrust into the action under pain of being left without any reserve in the event of a repulse. The final stroke, therefore, was still to be made on the left, and with a very small force, seeing that Lambert's brigade and the fourth division were necessarily employed to

keep in check the French troops at the bridge of the Demoiselles, Cambon, and Sacarin. This heavy mass, comprising one brigade of Travot's reserve, the half of D'Armagnac's division, and all of Taupin's, together with the regiment belonging to Harispe which had abandoned the forts of St. Sypière, was commanded by general Clauzel, who disposed the greater part in advance of the intrenchments, as if to retake the offensive.

Such was the state of affairs about half past two o'clock, when Beresford renewed the action with Pack's Scotch brigade, and the Portuguese of the sixth division under colonel Douglas. These troops, ensconced in the hollow Lavour road on Lambert's right, had been hitherto well protected from the fire of the French works; but now scrambling up the steep banks of that road, they wheeled to their left by wings of regiments as they could get out, and ascending the heights by the slope facing the Ers, under a wasting fire of cannon and musketry, carried all the French breast-works and the Colombette and Calvinet redoubts. It was a surprising action when the loose disorderly nature of the attack, imposed by the difficulty of the ground, is considered; but the French, although they yielded at first to the thronging rush of the British troops, soon rallied and came back with a reflux. Their cannonade was incessant, their reserves strong, and the struggle became terrible. For Harispe, who commanded in person at this part, and under whom the French seemed always to fight with redoubled vigour, brought up fresh men, and surrounding the two redoubts with a surging multitude absolutely broke into the Colombette, killed or wounded four-fifths of the forty-second, and drove the rest out. The British troops were however supported by the seventy-first and ninety-first, and the whole clinging to the brow of the hill fought with a wonderful courage and firmness, until so many men had fallen that their order of battle was reduced to a thin line of skirmishers. Some of the British cavalry then rode up from the low ground and attempted a charge, but they were stopped by a deep hollow road, of which there were many, and some of the foremost troopers tumbling headlong in perished. Meanwhile the combat about the redoubts continued fiercely; the French, from their numbers, had certainly the advantage; but they never retook the Calvinet fort, nor could they force their opponents down from the brow of the hill. At last when the whole of the sixth division had rallied and again assailed them, flank and front, when their generals Harispe and Baurot had fallen dangerously wounded, and the Colombette was retaken by the seventy-ninth, the battle turned, and the French finally abandoned the platform, falling back partly by their right to Sacarin, partly by their left towards the bridge of Matabiau.

It was now about four o'clock. The Spaniards during this contest had once more partially attacked, but they were again put to flight, and the French thus remained master of their intrenchments in that quarter; for the sixth division had been very hardly handled, and Beresford halted to re-form his order of battle and receive his artillery: it came to him indeed about this time, yet with great difficulty and with little ammunition in consequence of the heavy cannonade it had previously furnished from Montblanc. However Soult, seeing that the Spaniards, supported by the light division, had rallied a fourth time, that Picton again menaced the bridge of Jumeaux and the Minime convent, while Beresford, master of three-fourths of Mont Rave, was now advancing along the summit, deemed farther resist-

ance useless, and relinquished the northern end of the Calvint platform also. About five o'clock he withdrew his whole army behind the canal, still however holding the advanced works of Sacarin and Cambon. Lord Wellington then established the Spaniards in the abandoned works, and so became master of the Mont Rave in all its extent.

Thus terminated the battle of Toulouse. The French had five generals and perhaps three thousand men killed or wounded, and they lost one piece of artillery. The allies lost four generals and four thousand six hundred and fifty-nine men and officers, of which two thousand were Spaniards. A lamentable spilling of blood, and a useless, for before this period Napoleon had abdicated the throne of France and a provisional government was constituted at Paris.

During the night the French general, defeated but undismayed, replaced the ammunition expended in the action, reorganized and augmented his field-artillery from the arsenal of Toulouse, and made dispositions for fighting the next morning behind the canal. Yet looking to the final necessity of a retreat, he wrote to Suchet to inform him of the result of the contest, and proposed a combined plan of operation illustrative of the firmness and pertinacity of his temper. "March," said he, "with the whole of your forces by Quillan upon Carcassonne, I will meet you there with my army, we can then retake the initiatory movement, transfer the seat of war to the upper Garonne, and holding on by the mountains oblige the enemy to recall his troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to recover that city and make a diversion in our favour."

On the morning of the 11th he was again ready to fight, but the English general was not. The French position, within musket-shot of the walls of Toulouse, was still inexpugnable on the northern and eastern fronts. The possession of Mont Rave was only a preliminary step to the passage of the canal at the bridge of the Demoiselles and other points above the works of Sacarin and Cambon, with the view of throwing the army as originally designed on the south side of the town. But this was a great affair requiring fresh dispositions, and a fresh provision of ammunition only to be obtained from the park on the other side of the Garonne. Hence to accelerate the preparations, to ascertain the state of general Hill's position, and to give that general farther instructions, lord Wellington repaired on the 11th to St. Cyprien; but though he had shortened his communications by removing the pontoon bridge from Grenade to Seilh, the day was spent before the ammunition arrived and the final arrangements for the passage of the canal could be completed. The attack was therefore deferred until daylight on the 12th.

Meanwhile all the light cavalry were sent up the canal, to interrupt the communications with Suchet and menace Soult's retreat by the road leading to Carcassonne. The appearance of these horsemen on the heights of St. Martin, above Baziéges, together with the preparations in his front, taught Soult that he could no longer delay if he would not be shut up in Toulouse. Wherefore, having terminated all his arrangements, he left eight pieces of heavy artillery, two generals, the gallant Harispe being one, and sixteen hundred men, whose wounds were severe, to the humanity of the conquerors; then filing out of the city with surprising order and ability, he made a forced march of twenty-two miles, cut the bridges over the canal and the upper Ers, and the 12th established his army at Villefranche. On the same day general Hill's troops were pushed close to Bazi-

éges in pursuit, and the light cavalry, acting on the side of Montlaur, beat the French with the loss of twenty-five men and cut off a like number of gendarmes on the side of Revel.

Lord Wellington now entered Toulouse in triumph, the white flag was displayed, and, as at Bordeaux, a great crowd of persons adopted the Bourbon colours; but the mayor, faithful to his sovereign, had retired with the French army. The British general, true to his honest line of policy, did not fail to warn the Bourbonists that their revolutionary movement must be at their own risk. But in the afternoon two officers, the English colonel Cooke, and the French colonel St. Simon, arrived from Paris, charged with the abdication of Napoleon; they had been detained near Blois by the officiousness of the police attending the court of the empress Louisa, and the blood of eight thousand brave men had overflowed the Mont Rave in consequence. Nor did their arrival immediately put a stop to the war. When St. Simon, in pursuance of his mission, reached Soult's quarters on the 13th, that marshal, not without just cause, demurred to his authority, and proposed to suspend hostilities until authentic information could be obtained from the ministers of the emperor: then sending all his encumbrances by the canal to Carcassonne, he took a position of observation at Castelnau-dari and awaited the progress of events. Lord Wellington refused to accede to his proposal, and as general Loverdo, commanding at Montauban, acknowledged the authority of the provisional government and readily concluded an armistice, he judged that Soult designed to make a civil war and therefore marched against him. The 17th, the outposts were on the point of engaging when the duke of Dalmatia, who had now received official information from the chief of the emperor's staff, notified his adhesion to the new state of affairs in France; and with this honourable distinction, that he had faithfully sustained the cause of his great monarch until the very last moment.

A convention which included Suchet's army was immediately agreed upon; but that marshal had previously adopted the white colours of his own motion, and lord Wellington instantly transmitted the intelligence to general Clinton in Catalonia and to the troops at Bayonne. Too late it came for both, and useless battles were fought. That at Barcelona has been already described, but at Bayonne misfortune and suffering had fallen upon one of the brightest soldiers of the British army.

SALLY FROM BAYONNE.

During the progress of the main army in the interior, sir John Hope conducted the investment of Bayonne, with all the zeal, the intelligence and unremitting vigilance and activity which the difficult nature of the operation required. He had gathered great stores of gabions and fascines and platforms, and was ready to attack the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him, yet indirectly and without any official character to warrant a formal communication to the garrison without lord Wellington's authority. These rumours were however made known at the outposts, and perhaps lulled the vigilance of the besiegers; but to such irregular communications, which might be intended to deceive, the governor naturally paid little attention.

The piquets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were at this time furnished by a brigade of the fifth division, but from thence to the extreme right the guards had charge of the line, and they had also one company in St. Etienne itself. General Hinuber's German brigade was encamped as a support to the

left, the remainder of the first division was encamped in the rear, towards Baucaut. In this state, about one o'clock in the morning of the 14th, a deserter, coming over to general Hay who commanded the outposts that night, gave an exact account of the projected sally. The general, not able to speak French, sent him to general Hinuber, who immediately interpreting the man's story to general Hay, assembled his own troops under arms, and transmitted the intelligence to sir John Hope. It would appear that Hay, perhaps disbelieving the man's story, took no additional precautions, and it is probable that neither the German brigade nor the reserves of the guards would have been put under arms but for the activity of general Hinuber. However at three o'clock the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, poured suddenly out of the citadel to the number of three thousand combatants. They surprised the piquets, and with loud shouts breaking through the chain of posts at various points, carried with one rush the church, and the whole of the village of St. Etienne, with the exception of a fortified house which was defended by captain Forster of the thirty-eighth regiment. Masters of every other part, and overthrowing all who stood before them, they drove the piquets and supports in heaps along the Peirehorade road, killed general Hay, took colonel Townsend of the guards prisoner, divided the wings of the investing troops, and passing in rear of the right threw the whole line into confusion. Then it was that Hinuber, having his Germans well in hand, moved up on the side of St. Etienne, rallied some of the fifth division, and being joined by a battalion of general Bradford's Portuguese from the side of St. Esprit, bravely gave the counter-stroke to the enemy and regained the village and church.

The combat on the right was at first even more disastrous than in the centre, neither the piquets nor the reserves were able to sustain the fury of the assault, and the battle was most confused and terrible; for on both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the enclosures and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes friends encountered, sometimes foes: all was tumult and horror. The guns of the citadel vaguely guided by the flashes of the musketry sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of fight, and the gun-boats dropping down the river opened their fire upon the flanks of the supporting columns, which being put in motion by sir John Hope on the first alarm were now coming up from the side of Baucaut. Thus nearly one hundred pieces of artillery were in full play at once, and the shells having set fire to the fascine depots and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the striving masses.

Amidst this confusion sir John Hope suddenly disappeared, none knew how or wherefore at the time, but it afterwards appeared that, having brought up the reserves on the right, to stem the torrent in that quarter, he pushed for St. Etienne by a hollow road which led close behind the line of piquets; the French had however lined both banks, and when he endeavoured to return a shot struck him in the arm, while his horse, a large one as was necessary to sustain the gigantic warrior, received eight bullets and fell upon his leg. His followers had by this time escaped from the defile, but two of them, captain Herries and Mr. More, a nephew of sir John More, seeing his helpless state turned back, and alighting endeavoured amidst the heavy fire of the enemy to draw him from beneath the horse. While thus engaged they were both struck down with dan-

gerous wounds, the French carried them all off, and sir John Hope was again severely hurt in the foot by an English bullet before they gained the citadel.

The day was now beginning to break, and the allies were enabled to act with more unity and effect. The Germans were in possession of St. Etienne, and the reserve brigades of the guards, being properly disposed by general Howard, who had succeeded to the command, suddenly raised a loud shout, and running in upon the French drove them back into the works with such slaughter that their own writers admit a loss of one general and more than nine hundred men. But on the British side general Stopford was wounded, and the whole loss was eight hundred and thirty men and officers. Of these more than two hundred were taken, besides the commander-in-chief; and it is generally acknowledged that captain Forster's firm defence of the fortified house first, and next the readiness and gallantry with which general Hinuber and his Germans retook St. Etienne, saved the allies from a very terrible disaster.

A few days after this piteous event the convention made with Soult became known and hostilities ceased.

All the French troops in the south were now reorganized in one body under the command of Suchet; but they were so little inclined to acquiesce in the revolution, that prince Polignac, acting for the duke of Angoulême, applied to the British commissary-general Kennedy for a sum of money to quiet them.

The Portuguese army returned to Portugal. The Spanish army to Spain, the generals being, it is said, inclined at first to declare for the cortez against the king; but they were diverted from their purpose by the influence and authority of lord Wellington.

The British infantry embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England, and the cavalry marching through France took shipping at Boulogne.

Thus the war terminated, and with it all remembrance of the veteran's services.

CHAPTER VI.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS.

MARSHAL SOULT and general Thouvenot have been accused of fighting with a full knowledge of Napoleon's abdication. This charge, circulated originally by the Bourbon party, is utterly unfounded. The extent of the information conveyed to Thouvenot through the advanced posts has been already noticed; it was not sufficiently authentic to induce sir John Hope to make a formal communication, and the governor could only treat it as an idle story to insult or to deceive him, and baffle his defence by retarding his counter-operations while the works for the siege were advancing. For how unlikely, nay impossible, must it have appeared, that the emperor Napoleon, whose victories at Montmirail and Champaubert were known before the close investment of Bayonne, should have been deprived of his crown in the space of a few weeks, and the stupendous event be only hinted at the outposts without any relaxation in the preparations for the siege.

As false and unsubstantial is the charge against Soult.

The acute remark of an English military writer, that if the duke of Dalmatia had known of the peace before he fought, he would certainly have announced it after the battle, were it only to maintain himself in that city and claim a victory, is unanswerable:

but there are direct proofs of the falsehood of the accusation. How was the intelligence to reach him? It was not until the 7th that the provisional government wrote to him from Paris, and the bearer could not have reached Toulouse under three days even by the most direct way, which was through Montauban. Now the allies were in possession of that road on the 4th, and on the 9th the French army was actually invested. The intelligence from Paris must therefore have reached the allies first, as in fact it did, and it was not Soult, it was lord Wellington who commenced the battle. The charge would therefore bear more against the English general, who would yet have been the most insane as well as the wickedest of men to have risked his army and his fame in a battle where so many obstacles seemed to deny success. He also was the person of all others called upon by honour, gratitude, justice and patriotism, to avenge the useless slaughter of his soldiers, to proclaim the infamy and seek the punishment of his inhuman adversary.

Did he ever by word or deed countenance the calumny?

Lord Aberdeen after the passing of the English reform bill, repeated the accusation in the house of lords, and reviled the minister for being on amicable political terms with a man capable of such a crime. Lord Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically declared that marshal Soult did not know, and that it was impossible he could know of the emperor's abdication when he fought the battle. The detestable distinction of sporting with men's lives by wholesale, attaches to no general on the records of history, save the Orange William, the murderer of Glencoe. And though marshal Soult had known of the emperor's abdication he could not for that have been justly placed beside that cold-blooded prince who fought at St. Denis with the peace of Nimeguen in his pocket, because "he would not deny himself a safe lesson in his trade."

The French marshal was at the head of a brave army, and it was impossible to know whether Napoleon had abdicated voluntarily or been constrained. The authority of such men as Talleyrand, Fouché and other intriguers, forming a provisional government self-instituted and under the protection of foreign bayonets, demanded no respect from Soult. He had even the right of denying the emperor's legal power to abdicate. He had the right, if he thought himself strong enough, to declare, that he would not suffer the throne to become the plaything of foreign invaders, and that he would rescue France even though Napoleon yielded the crown. In fine, it was a question of patriotism and of calculation, a national question which the general of an army had a right to decide for himself, having reference always to the real will and desire of the people at large.

It was in this light that Soult viewed the matter, even after the battle and when he had seen colonel St. Simon.

Writing to Talleyrand, on the 22d of April, he says: "The circumstances which preceded my act of adhesion are so extraordinary as to create astonishment. The 7th, the provisional government informed me of the events which had happened since the 1st of April. The 6th and 7th, count Dupont wrote to me on the same subject. On the 8th, the duke of Feltre, in his quality of war minister, gave me notice, that having left the military cipher at Paris he would immediately forward to me another. The 9th, the prince Berthier, vice-constable and major-general, wrote to me from Fontainebleau, transmitting the copy of a convention and armistice which had been arranged at Paris with the allied

powers; he demanded at the same time a state of the force and condition of my army: but neither the prince nor the duke of Feltre mentioned events; we had then only knowledge of a proclamation of the empress, dated the 3d, which forbade us to recognize any thing coming from Paris.

"The 10th, I was attacked near Toulouse by the whole allied army under the orders of lord Wellington. This vigorous action, where the French army, the weakest by half, showed all its worth, cost the allies from eight to ten thousand men: lord Wellington might perhaps have dispensed with it.

"The 12th, I received through the English the first hint of the events at Paris. I proposed an armistice, it was refused; I renewed the demand, it was again refused. At last I sent count Gazan to Toulouse, and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms was accepted and signed the 18th, the armies being then in the presence of each other. The 19th, I ratified this convention, and gave my adhesion to the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject I ought to declare that I sought to obtain a suspension of arms before I manifested my sentiments in order that my will and that of the army should be free: that neither France nor posterity should have the power to say it was torn from us by force of arms. To follow only the will of the nation was a homage I owed to my country."

The reader will observe in the above letter certain assertions, relative to the numbers of the contending armies and the loss of the allies, which are at variance with the statements in this history; and this loose but common mode of assuming the state of an adverse force has been the groundwork for great exaggeration by some French writers, who strangely enough claim a victory for the French army, although the French general himself made no such claim at the time, and so far as appears has not done so since.

Victories are determined by deeds and their consequences. By this test we shall know who won the battle of Toulouse.

Now all persons, French and English, who have treated the subject, including the generals on both sides, are agreed, that Soult fortified Toulouse, the canal and the Mont Rave as positions of battle; that he was attacked, that Taupin's division was beaten, that the Mont Rave with all its redoubts and intrenchments fell into the allies' power. Finally, that the French army abandoned Toulouse, leaving there three wounded generals, sixteen hundred men, several guns and a quantity of stores at the discretion of their adversaries: and this without any fresh forces having joined the allies, or any remarkable event affecting the operations happening elsewhere.

Was Toulouse worth preserving? Was the abandonment of it forced or voluntary? Let the French general speak? "I have intrenched the suburb of St. Cyprien which forms a good bridge-head. The enemy will not, I think, attack me there unless he desires to lose a part of his army. Two nights ago he made a demonstration of passing the Garonne two leagues above the city, but he will probably try to pass it below, in which case I will attack him whatever his force may be, because it is of the utmost importance to me not to be cut off from Montauban, where I have made a bridge-head. . . . I think the enemy will not move on your side unless I move that way first, and I am determined to avoid that as long as I can. . . . If I could remain a month on the Garonne, I should be able to put six or eight thousand conscripts into the ranks who now embarrass me, and who want arms, which I expect

with great impatience from Perpignan. . . . I am resolved to deliver the battle near Toulouse whatever may be the superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified a position, which, supported by the town and the canal, furnishes me with a retrenched camp susceptible of defence. . . . I have received the unhappy news of the enemy's entrance into Paris. This misfortune strengthens my determination to defend Toulouse whatever may happen. The preservation of a place which contains establishments of all kinds is of the utmost importance to us, but if unhappily I am forced to quit it, my movements will naturally bring me nearer to you. In that case you cannot sustain yourself at Perpignan because the enemy will inevitably follow me. . . . The enemy appears astonished at the determination I have taken to defend Toulouse. Four days ago he passed the Garonne and has done nothing since; perhaps the bad weather is the cause."

From these extracts it is clear that Soult resolved if possible not to fall back upon Suchet, and was determined even to fight for the preservation of his communications with Montauban: yet he finally resigned this important object for the more important one of defending Toulouse. And so intent upon its preservation was he, that having on the 25th of March ordered all the stores and artillery not of immediate utility to be sent away, he on the 2d of April forbade further progress in that work and even had those things already removed brought back. Moreover he very clearly remarks that to abandon the city and retreat towards Suchet will be the signs and consequences of a defeat.

These points being fixed, we find him, on the evening of the 10th, writing to the same general thus:

"The battle which I announced to you took place to-day, the enemy has been horribly maltreated, but he succeeded in establishing himself upon a position which I occupied to the right of Toulouse. The general of division, Taupin, has been killed, general Harispe has lost his foot by a cannon-ball, and three generals of brigade are wounded. I am prepared to recommence to-morrow, if the enemy attacks; but I do not believe I can stay in Toulouse; it might even happen that I shall be forced to open a passage to get out."

On the 11th of April he writes again:

"As I told you in my letter of yesterday, I am in the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear being obliged to fight my way at Baziéges where the enemy is directing a column to cut my communications. To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche, because I have good hope that this obstacle will not prevent my passing."

To the minister of war he also writes on the 11th:

"To-day I rest in position. If the enemy attacks me I will defend myself. I have great need to replenish my means before I put the army in march, yet I believe that in the coming night I shall be forced to abandon Toulouse, and it is probable I shall direct my movements so as to rally upon the troops of the duke of Albufera."

Soult lays no claim here to victory. He admits that all the events previously indicated by him as the consequences of defeat were fulfilled to the letter; that is to say, the loss of the position of battle, the consequent evacuation of the city, and the march to join Suchet. On the other hand, lord Wellington clearly obtained all that he sought. He desired to pass the Garonne, and he did pass it; he desired to win the position and works of Mont Rave, and he did win them; he desired to enter Toulouse,

and he did enter it as a conqueror at the head of his troops.

Amongst the French writers who (without denying these facts) lay claim to a victory, Choumara is most deserving of notice. This gentleman, known as an able engineer, with a praiseworthy desire to render justice to the great capacity of marshal Soult, shows very clearly that his genius would have shone in this campaign with far greater lustre if marshal Suchet had adopted his plans and supported him in a cordial manner. But Choumara, heated by his subject, completes the picture by a crowning victory at Toulouse, which the marshal himself appears not to recognize. The work is a very valuable historical document with respect to the disputes between Soult and Suchet, but with respect to the battle of Toulouse it contains grave errors as to facts, and the inferences are untenable, though the premises were admitted.

The substance of Choumara's argument is, that the position of Toulouse was of the nature of a fortress. That the canal was the real position of battle, the Mont Rave an outwork, the loss of which weighed little in the balance, because the French army was victorious at Calvinet against the Spaniards, at the convent of the Minimes against the light division, at the bridge of Jumeaux against Picton, at St. Cyprien against general Hill. Finally, that the French general certainly won the victory because he offered battle the next day and did not retreat from Toulouse until the following night.

Now admitting that all these facts were established, the fortress was still taken.

But the facts are surprisingly incorrect. For first, marshal Soult himself tells Suchet that the Mont Rave was his *position of battle*, and that the town and the canal *supported it*. Nothing could be more accurate than this description. For when he lost the Mont Rave, the town and the canal enabled him to rally his army and take measures for a retreat. But the loss of the Mont Rave rendered the canal untenable: why else was Toulouse abandoned? That the line of the canal was a more formidable one to attack in front than the Mont Rave is true, yet that did not constitute it a position; it was not necessary to attack it, except partially at Sacarin and Cambon and the bridge of the Demoiselles: those points once forced and the canal would, with the aid of the Mont Rave, have helped to keep the French in Toulouse as it had before helped to keep the allies out. Lord Wellington, once established on the south side of the city and holding the Pech David, could have removed the bridge from Seilh to Portet, above Toulouse, thus shortening and securing his communication with Hill: the French army must then have surrendered, or broken out, no easy matter in such a difficult and strangled country. The Mont Rave was therefore not only the position of battle, it was also the key of the position behind the canal; and Choumara is placed in this dilemma. He must admit the allies won the fight, or confess the main position was so badly chosen that a slight reverse at an outwork was sufficient to make the French army abandon it at every other point.

But were the French victorious at every other point? Against the Spaniards they were, and Picton also was repulsed. The order of movements for the battle proves indeed that this general's attack was intended to be a false one; he disobeyed his orders however and one of his brigades was repulsed; but to check one brigade with a loss of three or four hundred men, is a small matter in a battle where more than eighty thousand combatants were engaged.

The light division made a demonstration against the convent of the Minimes and nothing more. Its loss on the whole day was only fifty-six men and officers, and no French veteran of the Peninsula but would laugh at the notion that a real attack by that matchless division could be so stopped.

It is said the exterior line of intrenchments at St. Cyprien was occupied with a view to offensive movements, and to prevent the allies from establishing batteries to rake the line of the canal from that side of the Garonne; but whatever may have been the object, general Hill got possession of it, and was so far victorious. He was ordered not to assail the second line seriously; and he did not, for his whole loss scarcely exceeded eighty men and officers.

From these undeniable facts, it is clear that the French gained an advantage against Picton, and a marked success against the Spaniards; but Beresford's attack was so decisive as to counterbalance these failures, and even to put the defeated Spaniards in possession of the height they had originally contended for in vain.

Choumara attributes Beresford's success to Taupin's errors and to a vast superiority of numbers on the side of the allies. "Fifty-three thousand infantry, more than eight thousand cavalry, and a reserve of eighteen thousand men of all arms, opposed to twenty-five thousand French infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and a reserve of seven thousand conscripts, three thousand of which were unarmed." Such is the enormous disproportion, assumed on the authority of general Vaudoncourt.

Now the errors of Taupin may have been great, and his countrymen are the best judges of his merit; but the numbers here assumed are most inaccurate. The imperial muster-rolls are not of a later date than December, 1813, yet an official table of the organization of Soult's army, published by the French military historian Kock, gives thirty-six thousand six hundred and thirty-five combatants on the 10th of March. Of these, in round numbers, twenty-eight thousand six hundred were infantry, two thousand seven hundred cavalry, and five thousand seven hundred were artillery-men, engineers, miners, sappers, gendarmes and military workmen. Nothing is said of the reserve division of conscripts commanded by general Travot; but general Vaudoncourt's table of the same army, on the 1st of April, adopted by Choumara, supplies the deficiency. The conscripts are there set down seven thousand two hundred and sixty-seven, and this cipher being added to Kock's, gives a total of forty-three thousand nine hundred fighting men. The loss in combats and marches from the 10th of March to the 1st of April must be deducted; but on the other hand we find Soult informing the minister of war, on the 7th of March, that three thousand soldiers dispersed by the battle of Orthez were still wandering behind the army: the greatest part must have joined before the battle of Toulouse. There was also the regular garrison of that city, composed of the depots of several regiments and the urban guards, all under Travot. Thus little less than fifty thousand men were at Soult's disposal.

Let twelve thousand be deducted for, 1st. the urban guard which was only employed to maintain the police of the town; 2nd. the unarmed conscripts; 3rd. the military workmen not brought into action; 4th. the detachments employed on the flanks to communicate with Lafitte in the Arriège, and to reinforce general Loverdo at Montauban. There will remain thirty-eight thousand fighting men of all arms. And with a very powerful artillery; for we find Soult after the action directing seven field-bat-

teries of eight pieces each to attend the army; and the French writers mention, beside this field-train, 1st. fifteen pieces which were transferred during the battle from the exterior line of St. Cyprien to the northern and eastern fronts; 2nd. four twenty-four-pounders and several sixteen-pounders mounted on the walls of the city; 3rd. the armaments of the bridge-heads, the works on Calvint and those at Sacarin and Cambon. Wherefore not less than eighty, or perhaps ninety, pieces of French artillery were engaged.

An approximation to the strength of the French army being thus made, it remains to show the number of the allies, and with respect to the Anglo-Portuguese troops that can be done very exactly, not by approximative estimates, but positively from the original returns.

The morning state delivered to lord Wellington on the 10th of April bears forty-three thousand seven hundred and forty-four British and Germans, and twenty thousand seven hundred and ninety-three Portuguese, in all sixty-four thousand five hundred and thirty-seven soldiers and officers present under arms, exclusive of artillery-men. Of this number nearly ten thousand were cavalry, eleven hundred and eighty-eight being Portuguese.

The Spanish auxiliaries, exclusive of Mina's bands investing St. Jean Pied de Port, were, 1st. Giron's Andalusians and the third army under general O'Donel, fifteen thousand; 2nd. the Gallicians under general Freyre, fourteen thousand; 3rd. three thousand Gallicians under Morillo, and as many more under Longa; making with the Anglo-Portuguese a total of ninety thousand combatants, with somewhat more than a hundred pieces of field-artillery.

Of this force, O'Donel's troops were in the valley of the Bastan, Longa's on the upper Ebro; one division of Freyre's Gallicians was under Carlos d'España in front of Bayonne; one-half of Morillo's division was blockading Navarreins, the other half and the nine thousand Gallicians remaining under Freyre, were in front of Toulouse. Of the Anglo-Portuguese, the first and fifth divisions, and three unattached brigades of infantry with one brigade of cavalry, were with sir John Hope at Bayonne; the seventh division was at Bordeaux; the household brigade of heavy cavalry was on the march from the Ebro, where it had passed the winter; the Portuguese horsemen were partly employed on the communications in the rear, partly near Agen, where sir John Campbell commanding the fourth regiment had an engagement on the 11th with the celebrated partisan Florian. The second, third, fourth, sixth and light divisions of infantry, and Lecor's Portuguese, called the unattached division, were with lord Wellington, who had also Bock's, Ponsonby's, Fane's, Vivian's and lord Edward Somerset's brigades of cavalry.

These troops on the morning of the 10th mustered under arms, in round numbers, thirty-one thousand infantry, of which four thousand three hundred were officers, sergeants and drummers, leaving twenty-six thousand and six hundred bayonets. Add twelve thousand Spaniards under Freyre and Morillo, and we have a total of forty-three thousand five hundred infantry. The cavalry amounted to seven thousand, and there were sixty-four pieces of artillery. Hence about fifty-two thousand of all ranks and arms were in line to fight thirty-eight thousand French with more than eighty pieces of artillery, some being of the largest calibre.

But of the allies only twenty-four thousand men with fifty-two guns can be said to have been seri-

ously engaged. Thirteen thousand sabres and bayonets with eighteen guns were on the left of the Garonne under general Hill. Neither the light division, nor Ponsonby's heavy cavalry, nor Bock's Germans were really engaged. Wherefore twelve thousand six hundred sabres and bayonets under Beresford, nine thousand bayonets under Freyre, and two thousand five hundred of Picton's division really fought the battle. Thus the enormous disproportion assumed by the French writers disappears entirely; for if the allies had the advantage of numbers it was chiefly in cavalry, and horsemen were of little avail against the intrenched position and preponderating artillery of the French general.

The duke of Dalmatia's claim to the admiration of his countrymen is well-founded and requires no assumption to prop it up. Vast combinations, inexhaustible personal resources, a clear judgment, unshaken firmness and patience under difficulties, unwavering fidelity to his sovereign and his country, are what no man can justly deny him. In this celebrated campaign of only nine months, although counteracted by the treacherous hostility of many of his countrymen, he repaired and enlarged the works of five strong places, and intrenched five great camps with such works as Marius himself would not have disdained; once he changed his line of operations, and either attacking or defending delivered twenty-four battles and combats. Defeated in all he yet fought the last as fiercely as the first, remaining unconquered in mind, and still intent upon renewing the struggle when peace came to put a stop to his prodigious efforts. Those efforts were fruitless, because Suchet renounced him, because the people of the south were apathetic and fortune was adverse; because he was opposed to one of the greatest generals of the world at the head of unconquerable troops. For what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's Africans at Cannæ, Cesar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's guards at Austerlitz, such were Wellington's British soldiers at this period. The same men who had fought at Vimiera and Talavera contended at Orthez and Toulouse. Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their natural strength and fierceness a confidence which rendered them invincible. It is by this measure Soult's firmness and the constancy of his army is to be valued, and the equality to which he reduced his great adversary at Toulouse is a proof of ability which a judicious friend would put forward rather than suppress.

Was he not a great general, who being originally opposed on the Adour by nearly double his own numbers, for such was the proportion after the great detachments were withdrawn from the French army by the emperor in January, did yet by the aid of his fortresses, by his able marches and combinations, oblige his adversary to employ so many troops for blockades, sieges and detached posts, that at Toulouse his army was scarcely more numerous than the French? Was it nothing to have drawn Wellington from such a distance along the frontier, and force him at last, either to fight a battle under the most astonishing disadvantages or to retreat with dishonour? And this not because the English general had committed any fault, but by the force of combinations which, embracing all the advantages offered by the country, left him no option.

That Soult made some mistakes is true, and perhaps the most important was that which the emperor warned him against, though too late, the leaving so many men in Bayonne. He did so, he says, because the place could not hold out fifteen days without the intrenched camp, and the latter required

men; but the result proved Napoleon's sagacity, for the allies made no attempt to try the strength of the camp, and on the 18th of March lord Wellington knew not the real force of the garrison. Up to that period sir John Hope was inclined to blockade the place only, and from the difficulty of gathering the necessary stores and ammunition on the right bank of the Adour, the siege, though resolved upon, was not even commenced on the 14th of April, when that bloody and most lamentable sally was made. Hence the citadel could not, even with a weaker garrison, have been taken before the end of April, and Soult might have had Abbé's division of six thousand good troops in the battles of Orthez and Toulouse. Had Suchet joined him, his army would have been numerous enough to bar lord Wellington's progress altogether, especially in the latter position. Here it is impossible not to admire the sagacity of the English general, who from the first was averse to entering France, and only did so for a political object, under the promise of great reinforcements and in the expectation that he should be allowed to organize a Bourbon army. What could he have done if Soult had retained the twenty thousand men drafted in January, or if Suchet had joined, or the people had taken arms?

How well Soult chose his ground at Toulouse, how confidently he trusted that his adversary would eventually pass the Garonne below and not above the city, with what foresight he constructed the bridge-head at Montauban, and prepared the difficulties lord Wellington had to encounter, have been already touched upon. But Choumara has assumed that the English general's reason for relinquishing the passage of the Garonne at Portet on the night of the 27th, was not the want of pontoons, but the fear of being attacked during the operation, adducing in proof Soult's orders to assail the heads of his columns. Those orders are however dated the 31st, three days after the attempt, of which Soult appears to have known nothing at the time; they were given in the supposition that lord Wellington wished to effect a second passage at that point to aid general Hill while descending the Arriège. And what reason has any man to suppose that the same general and troops who passed the Nive and defeated a like counter-attack near Bayonne, would be deterred by the fear of a battle from attempting it on the Garonne? The passage of the Nive was clearly more dangerous, because the communication with the rest of the army was more difficult, Soult's disposable force larger, his counter-movements more easily hidden until the moment of execution. At Portet the passage, designed for the night season, would have been a surprise, and the whole army, drawn close to that side, could have been thrown over in three or four hours with the exception of the divisions destined to keep the French in check at St. Cyprien. Soult's orders did not embrace such an operation. They directed Clauzel to fall upon the head of the troops and crush them while in the disorder of a later passage which was expected and watched for.

General Clauzel having four divisions in hand was no doubt a formidable enemy, and Soult's notion of defending the river by a counter-attack was excellent in principle; but to conceive is one thing, to execute is another. His orders were, as I have said, only issued on the 31st, when Hill was across both the Garonne and the Arriège. Lord Wellington's design was then not to force a passage at Portet, but to menace that point, and really attack St. Cyprien when Hill should have descended the Arriège. Nor did Soult himself much expect Clauzel

would have any opportunity to attack, for in his letter to the minister of war he said, the positions between the Arriège and the canal were all disadvantageous to the French, and his intention was to fight in Toulouse if the allies approached from the south; yet he still believed Hill's movement to be only a blind, and that lord Wellington would finally attempt the passage below Toulouse.

The French general's views and measures were profoundly reasoned, but extremely simple. His first care on arriving at Toulouse was to secure the only bridge over the Garonne by completing the works of St. Cyprien, which he had begun while the army was still at Tarbes. He thus gained time, and as he felt sure that the allies could not act in the Arriège district, he next directed his attention to the bridge-head of Montauban to secure a retreat behind the Tarn and the power of establishing a fresh line of operations. Meanwhile, contrary to his expectations, lord Wellington did attempt to act on the Arriège, and the French general, turning of necessity in observation to that side, entrenched a position on the south; soon however he had proof that his first notion was well-founded, that his adversary after losing much time must at last pass below Toulouse; wherefore he proceeded with prodigious activity to fortify the Mont Rave and prepare a field of battle on the northern and eastern fronts of the city. These works advanced so rapidly, while the wet weather by keeping the rivers flooded reduced lord Wellington to inactivity, that Soult became confident in their strength, and being influenced also by the news from Paris, relinquished his first design of opposing the passage of the Garonne and preserving the line of operations by Montauban. To hold Toulouse then became his great object, nor was he diverted from this by the accident which befell lord Wellington's bridge at Grenade. Most writers, French and English, have blamed him for letting slip that opportunity of attacking Beresford. It is said that general Reille first informed him of the rupture of the bridge, and strongly advised him to attack the troops on the right bank. But Choumara has well defended him on that point: the distance was fifteen miles, the event uncertain, the works on the Mont Rave would have stood still meanwhile, and the allies might perhaps have stormed St. Cyprien.

Lord Wellington was however under no alarm for Beresford, or rather for himself, because each day he passed the river in a boat and remained on that side. His force was no less than twenty thousand including sergeants and officers, principally British; his position was on a gentle range, the flanks covered by the Ers and the Garonne; he had eighteen guns in battery on his front, which was likewise flanked by thirty other pieces placed on the left of the Garonne. Nor was he without retreat. He could cross the Ers, and Soult dared not have followed to any distance lest the river should subside and the rest of the army pass on his rear, unless, reverting to his original design of operating by Montauban, he lightly abandoned his now matured plan of defending Toulouse. Wisely therefore he continued to strengthen his position round that city, his combinations being all directed to force the allies to attack him between the Ers and the Mont Rave where it seemed scarcely possible to succeed.

He has been also charged with this fault, that he did not intrench the hill of Pugade. Choumara holds that troops placed there would have been endangered without adequate advantage. This does not seem conclusive. The hill was under the shot of the main height, it might have been intrenched

with works open to the rear, and St. Pol's brigade would thus have incurred no more danger than when placed there without any intrenchments. Beresford could not have moved up the left bank of the Ers until these works were carried, and this would have cost men. It is therefore probable that want of time caused Soult to neglect this advantage. He committed a graver error during the battle by falling upon Beresford with Taupin's division only, when he could have employed D'Armagnac's and Villatte's likewise in that attack. He should have fallen on him also while in the deep country below, and before he had formed his lines at the foot of the heights. What hindered him? Picton was repulsed, Freyre was defeated, the light division was protecting the fugitives, and one of Maransin's brigades withdrawn from St. Cyprien had reinforced the victorious troops on the extreme left of the Calvignet platform. Beresford's column, entangled in the marshy ground, without artillery and menaced both front and rear by cavalry, could not have resisted such an overwhelming mass, and lord Wellington can scarcely escape criticism for placing him in that predicament.

A commander is not indeed to refrain from high attempts because of their perilous nature, the greatest have ever been the most daring, and the English general, who could not remain inactive before Toulouse, was not deterred by danger or difficulty: twice he passed the broad and rapid Garonne, and reckless of his enemy's strength and skill worked his way to a crowning victory. This was hardihood, greatness. But in Beresford's peculiar attack he did not overstep the rules of art, he hurtled against them; and that he was not damaged by the shock is owing to his good fortune, the fierceness of his soldiers, and the errors of his adversary. What if Beresford had been overthrown on the Ers? Wellington must have repassed the Garonne, happy if by rapidity he could reunite in time with Hill on the left bank. Beresford's failure would have been absolute ruin, and that alone refutes the French claim to a victory. Was there no other mode of attack? That can hardly be said. Beresford passed the Lavaur road to assail the platform of St. Sypière, and he was probably so ordered to avoid an attack in flank by the Lavaur road, and because the platform of Calvignet on the side of the Ers river was more strongly intrenched than that of St. Sypière. But for this gain it was too much to throw his column into the deep ground without guns, and quite separated from the rest of the army, seeing that the cavalry intended to maintain the connexion were unable to act in that miry labyrinth of water-courses. If the Spaniards were judged capable of carrying the strongest part of the Calvignet platform, Beresford's fine Anglo-Portuguese divisions were surely equal to attacking this same platform on the immediate left of the Spaniards, and an advanced guard would have sufficed to protect the left flank. The assault would then have been made with unity, by a great mass and on the most important point: for the conquest of St. Sypière was but a step towards that of Calvignet, but the conquest of Calvignet would have rendered St. Sypière untenable. It is however to be observed that the Spaniards attacked too soon, and their dispersion exceeded all reasonable calculation: so panic-stricken they were as to draw from lord Wellington at the time the bitter observation, that he had seen many curious spectacles, but never before saw ten thousand men running a race.

Soult's retreat from Toulouse, a model of order and regularity, was made in the night. This proves the difficulty of his situation. Nevertheless it was

not desperate; nor was it owing to his adversary's generous forbearance that he passed unmolested under the allies' guns as an English writer has erroneously assumed. For first those guns had no ammunition, and this was one reason why lord Wellington, though eager to fall upon him on the 11th, could not do so. On the 12th Soult was gone, and his march covered by the great canal could scarcely have been molested, because the nearest point occupied by the allies was more than a mile and a half distant. Nor do I believe that Soult, as some other writers have imagined, ever designed to hold Toulouse to the last. It would have been an avowal of military insolvency to which his proposal, that Suchet should join him at Carcassonne and retake the offensive, written on the night of the 11th, is quite opposed. Neither was it in the spirit of French warfare. The impetuous valour and susceptibility of that people are ill-suited for stern Numantian despair. Place an attainable object of war before the French soldier and he will make supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing he becomes proportionally discouraged. Let some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with unbounded energy: the fear of death never checks him, he will attempt any thing. But the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance wears his fury out; it was so proved in the Peninsula, where the sudden deafening shout, rolling over a field of battle more full and terrible than that of any other nation, and followed by the strong unwavering charge, often startled and appalled a French column before whose fierce and vehement assault any other troops would have given way.

Napoleon's system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and augment the military excellence and to strengthen the weakness of the national character. His discipline, severe but appealing to the feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the French soldiers to patience under hardships, and strong endurance under fire. He taught the generals to rely on their own talents, to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to dare every thing even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of France might have full play: hence the violence of their attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and to keep strong reserves that sudden disorders might be repaired, and the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine spirit, certain that they would then renew the battle with the same confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier, but so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of their exploits surpassed those of all other nations; the Romans not excepted if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the Macedonians if the quality of their opponents be considered.

Let their amazing toils in the Peninsular war alone, which though so great and important was but an episode in their military history, be considered. "*In Spain large armies will starve and small armies will be beaten,*" was the saying of Henry IV. of France, and this was no light phrase of an indolent monarch, but the profound conclusion of a sagacious general. Yet Napoleon's enormous armies were so wonderfully organized that they existed and fought in Spain for six years, and without cessation, for to them winters and summers were alike. Their large armies endured incredible toils and privations, but were not starved out, nor were their small armies

beaten by the Spaniards. And for their daring and resource a single fact recorded by lord Wellington will suffice. They captured more than one strong place in Spain without any provision of bullets save those fired at them by their enemies, having trusted to that chance when they formed the siege! Before the British troops they fell, but how terrible was the struggle! how many defeats they recovered from, how many brave men they slew, what changes and interpositions of fortune occurred before they could be rolled back upon their own frontiers! And this is the glory of England, that her soldiers, and hers only, were capable of overthrowing them in equal battle. I seek not to defraud the Portuguese of his well-earned fame, nor to deny the Spaniard the merit of his constancy. England could not alone have triumphed in the struggle, but for her share in the deliverance of the Peninsula let this brief summary speak.

She expended more than one hundred millions sterling on her own operations, she subsidized Spain and Portugal besides, and with her supplies of clothing, arms and ammunition, maintained the armies of both, even to the guerillas. From thirty up to seventy thousand British troops were employed by her constantly, and while her naval squadrons continually harassed the French with descents upon the coasts, her land forces fought and won nineteen pitched battles and innumerable combats; they made or sustained ten sieges, took four great fortresses, twice expelled the French from Portugal, preserved Alicante, Carthage, Cadiz, Lisbon; they killed, wounded and took about two hundred thousand enemies, and the bones of forty thousand British soldiers lie scattered on the plains and mountains of the Peninsula.

Finally, for Portugal she reorganized a native army and supplied officers who led it to victory, and to the whole Peninsula she gave a general whose like has seldom gone forth to conquer. And all this and more was necessary to redeem the Peninsula from France!

The duke of Wellington's campaigns furnish lessons for generals of all nations, but they must always be peculiarly models for British commanders in future continental wars, because he modified and reconciled the great principles of art with the peculiar difficulties which attend generals controlled by politicians who, depending upon private intrigue, prefer parliamentary to national interests. An English commander must not trust his fortune. He dare not risk much, however conscious he may be of personal resources, when one disaster will be his ruin at home. His measures must therefore be subordinate to this primary consideration. Lord Wellington's caution, springing from that source, has led friends and foes alike into wrong conclusions as to his system of war. The French call it want of enterprise, timidity; the English have denominated it the Fabian system. These are mere phrases. His system was the same as that of all great generals. He held his army in hand, keeping it with unmitigated labour always in a fit state to march or to fight; and thus prepared, he acted indifferently as occasion offered on the offensive or defensive, displaying in both a complete mastery of his art. Sometimes he was indebted to fortune, sometimes to his natural genius, but always to his untiring industry, for he was emphatically a pains-taking man.

That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon, must be admitted, and being later in the field of glory it is to be presumed that he learned something of the art from that greatest

of all masters; yet something besides the difference of genius must be allowed for the difference of situation: Napoleon was never, even in his first campaign of Italy, so harassed by the French as Wellington was by the English, Spanish and Portuguese governments. Their systems of war were however alike in principle, their operations being necessarily modified by their different political positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to protect their flanks and communications without scattering their forces, these were common to both. In defence firm, cool, enduring; in attack fierce and obstinate; daring when daring was politic, but always operating by the flanks in preference to the front: in these things they were alike, but in following up a victory the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a battering-ram, down went the wall in ruins. The battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded and the roaring flood poured onwards covering all.

Yet was there nothing of timidity or natural want of enterprise to be discerned in the English general's campaigns. Neither was he of the Fabian school. He recommended that commander's system to the Spaniards, but he did not follow it himself. His military policy more resembled that of Scipio Africanus. Fabius, dreading Hannibal's veterans, hovered on the mountains, refused battle, and to the unmatched skill and valour of the great Carthaginian opposed the almost inexhaustible resources of Rome. Lord Wellington was never loth to fight when there was any equality of numbers. He landed in Portugal with only nine thousand men, with intent to attack Junot who had twenty-four thousand. At Roliça he was the assailant, at Vimiera he was assailed, but he would have changed to the offensive during the battle if others had not interfered. At Oporto he was again the daring and successful assailant. In the Talavera campaign he took the initiatory movements, although in the battle itself he sustained the shock. His campaign of 1810 in Portugal was entirely defensive, because the Portuguese army was young and untried; but his pursuit of Massena in 1811 was as entirely aggressive, although cautiously so, as well knowing that in mountain warfare those who attack labour at a disadvantage. The operations of the following campaign, including the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera, the first siege of Badajoz and the combat of Guinaldo, were of a mixed character; so was the campaign of Salamanca: but the campaign of Vittoria and that in the south of France were entirely and eminently offensive.

Slight therefore is the resemblance to the Fabian warfare. And for the Englishman's hardness and enterprise bear witness the passage of the Duero at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, the storming of Badajoz, the surprise of the forts at Mirabete, the march to Vittoria, the passage of the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle, the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthez, the crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he committed faults is only to say that he made war; but to deny him the qualities of a great commander is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want of light. How few of his combinations failed. How many battles he fought, victorious in all! Iron hardihood of body, a quick and sure vision, a grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the habit of laborious minute investigation and arrangement; all these qualities he possessed, and with them that most rare faculty

of coming to prompt and sure conclusions on sudden emergencies. This is the certain mark of a master spirit in war; without it a commander may be distinguished, he may be a great man, but he cannot be a great captain. Where troops nearly alike in arms and knowledge are opposed, the battle generally turns upon the decision of the moment.

At the Somosierra, Napoleon's sudden and what to those about him appeared an insensate order, sent the Polish cavalry successfully charging up the mountain, when more studied arrangements with ten times that force might have failed. At Talavera, if Joseph had not yielded to the imprudent heat of Victor, the fate of the allies would have been sealed. At the Coa, Montbrun's refusal to charge with his cavalry saved general Crawford's division, the loss of which would have gone far towards the evacuation of Portugal. At Busaco, Massena would not suffer Ney to attack the first day, and thus lost the only favourable opportunity for assailing that formidable position. At Fuentes Onoro, the same Massena suddenly suspended his attack when a powerful effort would probably have been decisive. At Albuera, Soult's column of attack, instead of pushing forward, halted to fire from the first height they had gained on Beresford's right, which saved that general from an early and total defeat; again at a later period of that battle the unpremeditated attack of the fusiliers decided the contest. At Barosa, general Graham with a wonderful promptitude snatched the victory at the very moment when a terrible defeat seemed inevitable. At Sabugal, not even the astonishing fighting of the light division could have saved it if general Regnier had possessed this essential quality of a general. At El Bodon, Marmont failed to seize the most favourable opportunity which occurred during the whole war for crushing the allies. At Orthez, Soult let slip two opportunities of falling upon the allies with advantage, and at Toulouse he failed to crush Beresford.

At Vimiera, lord Wellington was debarred by Burrard from giving a signal illustration of this intuitive generalship; but at Busaco and the heights of San Cristoval, near Salamanca, he suffered Massena and Marmont to commit glaring faults unpunished. On the other hand he has furnished many examples of that successful improvisation in which Napoleon seems to have surpassed all mankind. His sudden retreat from Oropesa across the Tagus by the bridge of Arzobispo; his passage of the Duero in 1809; his halt at Guinaldo in the face of Marmont's overwhelming numbers; the battle of Salamanca; his sudden rush with the third division to seize the hill of Arinez at Vittoria; his counter-stroke with the sixth division at Sauroren; his battle on the 30th, two days afterwards; his sudden passage of the Gave below Orthez. Add to these his wonderful battle of Assye, and the proofs are complete that he possesses in an eminent degree that intuitive perception which distinguishes the greatest generals.

Fortune however always asserts her supremacy in war, and often from a slight mistake such disastrous consequences flow that in every age and every nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial. Napoleon's march upon Madrid in 1808, before he knew the exact situation of the British army is an example. By that march he lent his flank to his enemy. Sir John Moore seized the advantage, and though the French emperor repaired the error for the moment by his astonishing march from Madrid to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula was then decided. If he had not been forced to turn against Moore, Lisbon would have fallen, Portugal could not have been organized for resistance, and the jealousy

of the Spaniards would never have suffered Wellington to have established a solid base at Cadiz: that general's after-successes would then have been with the things that are unborn. It was not so ordained. Wellington was victorious, the great conqueror was overthrown. England stood the most triumphant nation of the world. But with an enormous debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace without tranquillity, greatness without intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms! And it is a stirring sound! War is the condition of this world. From man to the smallest insect all are at strife; and the glory of arms, which cannot be ob-

tained without the exercise of honour, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty and temperance, excites the brave man's patriotism and is a chastening corrective for the rich man's pride. It is yet no security for power. Napoleon, the greatest man of whom history makes mention, Napoleon, the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms Poland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and France. Fortune, that name for the unknown combinations of infinite power, was wanting to him, and without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled ocean.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

ESCALADE OF ST. VINCENT.

EXTRACT FROM A MEMOIR BY CAPTAIN EDWARD P. HOPKINS, FOURTH REGIMENT.

"THE column halted a few yards from a breastwork surmounted with a stockade and a *chevaux de frise*, concealing a guard-house on the covert-way, and at this moment a most awful explosion took place, followed by the most tremendous peals of musketry. 'That is at the breaches,' was the whisper amongst our soldiers, and their anxiety to be led forward was intense, but their firmness and obedience were equally conspicuous. The moon now appeared. We could hear the French soldiers talking in the guard-house, and their officers were visiting the sentries. The engineer officer who preceded the column, said, '*Now is the time;*' the column instantly moved to the face of the gateway. It was only at this moment that the sentry observed us, and fired his alarm-shot, which was followed by musketry. The two companies of Portuguese carrying the scaling-ladders threw them down, and deaf to the voices of their officers, made off. This occurrence did not in the least shake the zeal and steadiness of our men, who occupied immediately the space left, and shouldering the ladders moved on. We could not force the gate open, but the breastwork was instantly crowded, and the impediments cut away sufficiently to allow of two men entering abreast. . . . The engineer officer was by this time killed. We had no other assistance from that corps, and the loss was most severely felt at this early period of the attack.

. . . . "The troops were now fast filling the ditch; they had several ladders, and I shall never forget the momentary disappointment amongst the men when they found that the ladders were too short. . . . The enemy took advantage of this to annoy us in every way, rolling down beams of wood, fire-balls, etc. together with an *enfilading* fire.

"We observed near us an embrasure unfurnished of artillery, its place being occupied by a gabion filled with earth. A ladder was instantly placed under its mouth, and also one at each side. This allowed three persons to ascend at once, but only one at a time could enter in at the embrasure. The first several attempts were met with instant death. The ladders were even now too short, and it was necessary for one person to assist the other by hoisting him up the embrasure. . . . Some shots were fired from a building in the town, and colonel Piper was sent with a party to dislodge the enemy, while general Walker, at the head of his brigade, attempted to clear the rampart to the right. . . .

"The enemy retired from the building on our approach, and colonel Piper did not return to the ramparts, but moved into the body of the town. Could we have divested our minds of the real situation of the town, it might have been imagined that the inhabitants were preparing for some grand fête, as all the houses in the streets and squares were bril-

liantly illuminated, from the top to the first floor, with numerous lamps. This illumination scene was truly remarkable: not a living creature to be seen, but a continual low buzz and whisper around us, and we now and then perceived a small lattice gently open and reshut, as if more closely to observe the singular scene of a small English party perambulating the town in good order, the bugleman at the head blowing his instrument. Some of our men and officers now fell wounded; at first we did not know where the shots came from, but soon observed they were from the sills of the doors. We soon arrived at a large church facing some grand houses, in a sort of square. The party here drew up, and it was at first proposed to take possession of this church, but that idea was abandoned. We made several prisoners leading some mules laden with loose ball-cartridges in large wicker baskets, which they stated they were conveying from the magazines to the breaches. After securing the prisoners, ammunition, etc. we moved from the square with the intention of forcing our way upon the ramparts. We went up a small street towards them, but met with such opposition as obliged us to retire with loss. We again found ourselves in the square. There an English soldier came up to us who had been confined in the jail, probably a deserter. He said our troops had attacked the castle, and had failed, but that the French troops had afterwards evacuated it. At this period rapid changes took place. Several French officers came into the square; the town belonged to the English; the great Wellington was victorious. A scene of sad confusion now took place; several French officers of rank, their wives and children, ran into the square in a state of phrensy, holding little caskets containing their jewels and valuables, and their children in their arms. The situation of these females was dreadful; they implored our protection, and I believe this party escaped the plunder and pillage which was now unfortunately in progress. The scene that now commenced surpassed all that can be imagined; drunkenness, cruelty, and debauchery, the loss of many lives, and great destruction of property, was one boon for our victory. The officers had lost all command of their men in the town; those who had got drunk and satisfied themselves with plunder congregated in small parties and fired down the streets. I saw an English soldier pass through the middle of the street with a French knapsack on his back; he received a shot through his hand from some of the drunkards at the top of the street; he merely turned round and said, 'Damn them, I suppose they took me for a Frenchman.' An officer of the Brunswickers, who was contending with a soldier for the possession of a canary bird, was shot dead by one of those insane drunkards. Groups of soldiers were seen in all places, and could we have forgotten the distressing part of the scene, never was there a more complete masquerade. Some dressed as monks, some as friars, some in court dresses, many carrying furniture, cloth, provisions, money, plate from the churches; the military chest was even got at by the soldiers."

No. II.

THE following extracts of letters are published to avoid any future cavils upon the points they refer to, and also to show how difficult it is for the historian to obtain certain and accurate details, when eyewitnesses, having no wish to mislead, differ so much.

BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

EXTRACT OF A MEMOIR BY SIR CHARLES DALBIAC, WHO WAS ONE OF LE MARCHANT'S BRIGADE OF HEAVY CAVALRY.

"Throughout these charges upon the enemy, the heavy brigade was unsupported by any other portion of the cavalry whatever; but was followed, as rapidly as it was possible for infantry to follow, by the third division, which had so gloriously led the attack in the first instance and had so effectually turned the enemy's extreme left."

EXTRACT FROM A MEMOIR BY COLONEL MONEY, WHO WAS ONE OF GENERAL ANSON'S BRIGADE OF LIGHT CAVALRY.

"The third division moved to the right, and the cavalry, Le Marchant's and Anson's, were ordered to charge as soon as the tirailleurs of the third division began to ascend the right flank of the hill. . . . The rapid movement of the cavalry which now began to gallop, and the third division pressing them (the French,) they ran into the wood, which separated them from the army; we (Anson's light cavalry) charged them under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery from another height; near two thousand threw down their arms in different parts of the wood, and we continued our charge through the wood until our brigade came into an open plain of ploughed fields, where the dust was so great we could see nothing, and halted; when it cleared away, we found ourselves within three hundred yards of a large body of French infantry and artillery, formed on the declivity of a hill. A tremendous battle was heard on the other side, which prevented the enemy from perceiving us. At last they opened a fire of musketry and grape-shot, and we retired in good order and without any loss."

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HENRY WATSON, COMMANDING THE FIRST REGIMENT OF PORTUGUESE CAVALRY UNDER GENERAL D'URBAN.

"When Marmont, at the battle of Salamanca, advanced his left, lord Wellington ordered down the reserve, of which the first and tenth Portuguese cavalry and two squadrons of the British cavalry under captain Townsend, now lieutenant-colonel Townsend, formed a part under sir Benjamin D'Urban. The cavalry was pushed forward in contiguous columns, and were protected from the enemy by a small rising ground, which, as soon as I had passed, I was ordered to wheel up, and charge the front in line. The enemy had formed a square, and gave us a volley as we advanced, the eleventh and fourteenth remained *en potence*. In this charge we completely succeeded, and the enemy appeared panic-struck, and made no attempt to prevent our cutting and thrusting at them in all directions until the moment I was about to withdraw; then a soldier, at not more than six or eight paces, levelled his musket at me, and shot me through the shoulder, which knocked me off my horse, where I continued to lie till the whole of our infantry had passed over."

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF COLONEL TOWNSEND, FOURTEENTH DRAGOONS.

"At the battle of Salamanca, I perfectly recollect seeing D'Urban's cavalry advance up the hill and charge the French infantry. They were repulsed, and left Watson (now sir Henry,) who led his regiment, the first Portuguese, badly wounded on the field. . . . I am almost positive the French were not in square, but in line, waiting to receive the attack of the leading brigade of the third division, which gallantly carried every thing before it."

No. III.

MARMONT'S OPERATIONS.

COLONEL LE MESURIER, COMMANDANT OF ALMEIDA, TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL TRANT.

"Almeida, March 28, 1812.

"WHEN I took possession of the fortress ten days since, I found not a single gun in a state for working; either owing to the want of side-arms or the ill assortment of shot and ammunition, not a single platform was laid down, and scarcely a single embrasure opened in any part of the newly repaired fronts. My powder was partly in an outwork, partly in two buildings scarcely weather-proof, only one front of my covert-way palisaded, and the face of one of my ravelins without any revêtement whatever; the revêtement throughout the whole of the newly repaired fronts not being more than one-third or one-fourth of its former height. Many of these defects have been remedied; we have platforms and embrasures throughout the new fronts, the guns posted with their proper side-arms and shot-piles, and with a proper assortment of ammunition in the caissons; the bulk of our powder and ordnance-cartridges being distributed in bomb-proofs; we have formed a respectable intrenchment on the top of the breach of the mined ravelin, which it is proposed to arm with palisades, but the almost total want of transport has prevented our being able to complete more than two fronts and a half of our covert-way with those essential defences. From this sketch you will collect that, though the fortress is not to be walked into, it is yet far from being secure from the consequences of a resolute assault, particularly if the garrison be composed of raw and unsteady troops."

EXTRACT FROM A MEMOIR OF GENERAL TRANT.

"Now it so happened that on this same night Marmont had marched from Sabugal in order to attack me in Guarda; he had at the least five thousand infantry, some reports made his force seven thousand, and he had five or six hundred cavalry. My distrust of the militia with regard to the execution of precautions such as I had now adopted, had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bed-room door, in readiness to beat to arms; and this was most fortunately the case on the night of the 13th of April, 1812, for the very first intimation I received of the enemy being near at hand was given me by my own servant, on bringing me my coffee at day-break on the 14th. He said such was the report in the street, and that the soldiers were assembling at the alarm rendezvous in the town. I instantly beat to arms, and the beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer who heard it, Marmont, who at that very moment was with his cavalry at the very entrance of the town (quite open on the Sabugal side more than elsewhere,) retired. He had cut off the out-

posts without their firing a shot, and, had he only dashed headlong into the town, must have captured Wilson's and my militia divisions without losing probably a single man. I was myself the first out of the town, and he was not then four hundred yards from it, retiring at a slow pace. I lost no time in forming my troops in position, and sent my few dragoons in observation. When a couple of miles distant, Marmont drew up fronting Guarda, and it turned out, as I inferred, that he expected infantry."

No. IV.

COMBAT OF MAYA.

EXTRACT FROM A MANUSCRIPT MEMOIR BY CAPTAIN NORTON, THIRTY-FOURTH REGIMENT.

"THE thirty-ninth regiment, commanded by the honourable colonel O'Callaghan, then immediately engaged with the French, and after a severe contest also retired; the fiftieth was next in succession, and they also after a gallant stand retired, making way for the ninety-second, which met the advancing French column first with its right wing drawn up in line, and after a most destructive fire and heavy loss on both sides the remnant of the right wing retired, leaving a line of killed and wounded that appeared to have no interval. The French column advanced up to this line and then halted, the killed and wounded of the ninety-second forming a sort of rampart; the left wing then opened its fire on the column, and as I was but a little to the right of the ninety-second, I could not help reflecting painfully how many of the wounded of their right wing must have unavoidably suffered from the fire of their comrades. The left wing, after doing good service and sustaining a loss equal to the first line, retired."

No. V.

COMBAT OF RONCEVALLES.

GENERAL COLE TO LORD WELLINGTON.

"Heights in front of Pampeluna, July 27, 1813.


"THE enemy having in the course of the night turned those posts, were now perceived moving in very considerable force along the ridge leading to the Puerto de Mendichuri. I therefore proceeded in that direction and found that their advance had nearly reached the road leading from the Roncevalles pass to Los Alduides, from which it was separated by a small wooded valley. Owing to the difficulty of the communications, the head of major-general Ross's brigade could not arrive there sooner; the major-general, however, with great decision, attacked them with the Brunswick company and three companies of the twentieth, all he had time to form; these actually closed with the enemy, and bayonneted several in the ranks. They were however forced to yield to superior numbers, and to retire across the valley; the enemy attempted to follow them, but were repulsed with loss, the remainder of the brigade having come up."

MARSHAL SOULT TO THE MINISTER OF WAR.

"Linzoin, 26 July, 1813.

"Their losses have been equally considerable, both at the attack of Linduz by general Reille, where the twentieth regiment (English) was almost entirely destroyed in consequence of a charge with the bayonet, performed by a battalion of the sixth light infantry (Foy's division,) and at the attack of Allobiscar by general Clauzel."









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